TODAY

Iran showed no sign of accepting Donald Trump’s ultimatum to open the Strait of Hormuz by the end of Tuesday. Trump stated that “a whole civilization will die tonight” unless Tehran reached a last-minute agreement. As the deadline approached, strikes on Iran escalated, targeting railway bridges, a petrochemical plant, an airport, and power lines, according to Iranian media. Explosions were also reported on Kharg Island, which houses Iran’s oil export terminal. Iran stated it would no longer hold back from attacking the infrastructure of neighboring Gulf countries and claimed to have launched strikes on a ship in the Gulf and on Saudi industrial facilities tied to U. S. firms.

In a post on his Truth Social site, Trump expressed his concerns, saying, “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again. ” He added that with “Complete and Total Regime Change,” there could be a positive outcome, stating that it could be one of history’s most important moments. Iran, however, rejected a proposal for a temporary ceasefire that had been communicated by intermediaries. A senior Iranian source explained that talks for lasting peace could only commence once the U. S. and Israel stopped their strikes, assured they wouldn’t resume, and compensated for damages. The Iranian source insisted that any settlement must give Iran control of the Strait, enabling them to impose fees on passing ships.

Trump’s deadline was set for 8 p.m. in Washington (midnight GMT and 3:30 a.m. in Tehran) for Iran to end its blockade of Gulf oil, with threats to destroy every bridge and power plant in Iran if they did not comply. Iran indicated it would retaliate against the infrastructure of U. S. allies in the Gulf. Despite intense military actions and heated rhetoric, global markets remained cautious about betting on whether Trump would follow through with his threats or retract them, as he had done in previous situations.

Reports indicated ongoing strikes inside Iran, including hits on railway and highway bridges and facilities. Power outages were reported in parts of Karaj, near Tehran, due to a strike on transmission lines. Israel warned Iranians via social media to keep away from trains, citing safety concerns. A synagogue in Tehran was reportedly destroyed in what Iran called Israeli air strikes, with Hebrew texts found among the debris. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards declared that their response to attacks on their infrastructure would result in a significant reduction of oil and gas supply to the U. S. and its allies.

Amid the rising tensions, Pakistan is trying to mediate an end to the conflict. An Iranian citizen expressed hope that Trump’s threats were a bluff, observing that Trump had previously backed off from similar ultimatums. The two nations had exchanged proposals through Pakistan, but a compromise seemed elusive, with each claiming victory in the conflict. Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan indicated that mediation efforts were at a critical stage but did not provide specific details. A proposal from Pakistan suggested a temporary ceasefire and lifting of Iran’s blockade while postponing a more comprehensive peace discussion. However, Iran’s 10-point response called for an end to the war, lifting of sanctions, and reconstruction pledges from damaged sites, alongside a new mechanism for governing passage through the Strait, which had been effectively blocked to most ships since U. S. and Israeli strikes began in February. Trump’s latest deadline statement used aggressive language, underscoring his seriousness about potential military action against Iran.

With information from Reuters

Lapping up the pomp as Masters champion is what every golfers wants, but it also comes with more interviews, more presentations and – potentially – more distractions.

Spain’s Jon Rahm finished tied 45th on his return after winning in 2023, later admitting he struggled to “adjust” with the demands of “a lot going on”.

“If you’ve won the Masters, especially for Rory, it really is a dream come true. So you’re happy to go back there and I don’t think the additional commitments are ever a distraction,” said Brown.

“Rory has done everything he set out to do in his career, but there are always more goals. Now he wants to defend it.

“As a professional sportsman, you’re always striving for the next win. What can I improve to take me to the next level?

“Golf’s particularly difficult because one week you’re a champion, the next minute you’re a chicken. You can’t take your foot off the gas.”

McIlroy’s form going into the season-opening major provides little indication about his chances.

Three top-10 finishes in his opening four events of 2026 bode well, before a back injury forced his withdrawal from the Arnold Palmer Invitational and left him “still not 100%” at the PGA Tour’s flagship Players Championship three weeks ago.

He says not playing competitively since has provided a “good opportunity to address the issue” before Augusta – which is notoriously physically taxing.

Therefore, it seems the more pertinent factor in McIlroy’s hopes this week is the trust he has gained in his tactical ability.

“Augusta over the years has made me quite tentative at times, especially with approach play,” McIlroy said.

“By becoming a better putter, by working on my short game and becoming better around the greens, that probably allowed me to become more aggressive with my approach play.

“I think that’s been a big part of the reason why I’ve now eventually won there, but why my play has got better there over the years.”

McIlroy feels the Masters is the major where he could potentially end his career with the most success.

Becoming a multiple champion this week, and a rare back-to-back winner, would be another golfing mountain which he has managed to scale.

A total 11 out of 15 members supported the resolution, which was already watered down to evade vetoes.

Russia and China have vetoed a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution aimed at protecting commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The draft text, on which a vote was held on Tuesday, was proposed by Bahrain. Eleven of the 15 members of the UNSC voted in favour, and two abstained. However, Russia and China said that the measure was biased against Iran.

Under the resolution, affected states would have been asked to “coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute ‌‌to ‌‌ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz”.

Shipping through the narrow waterway, through which a fifth of global oil and gas shipments previously passed, has effectively come to a standstill after Tehran threatened to attack vessels in response to the war launched against Iran by the United States and Israel on February 28.

The blockade has sent fuel prices soaring across much of the world and led some countries, particularly in Asia, to introduce restrictions on consumption and ration supplies.

A deadline set by US President Donald Trump for Iran to reopen the water passage or else face even worse bombardment is set to expire later on Tuesday, after he repeatedly issued – and delayed – similar threats.

The US ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, condemned the Russian and Chinese vetoes, saying they marked “a new low”, as Iran’s shutting of the strait was preventing medical aid and supplies from reaching humanitarian crises in the Congo, Sudan and Gaza.

“No one should tolerate that. They are holding the global economy at gunpoint. But today, Russia and China did tolerate it.”

France deplored the vetoes. “The aim was to encourage strictly, purely defensive measures to provide the security and safety for the strait without spiralling towards escalation,” its UN ambassador, Jerome Bonnafont, said.

Russia and ⁠⁠China said the resolution was biased against Iran.

China’s UN envoy Fu Cong said adopting such a draft when the US was threatening the survival of a civilisation would have sent the wrong message.

Russia’s ⁠⁠UN ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, said Russia and China were proposing an alternative resolution on the ⁠⁠situation in the Middle East, including maritime security.

Iran’s UN ambassador, Amir Saeid Iravani, praised the Chinese and Russian moves, saying “Their action today prevented the Security Council from being misused to legitimise aggression.”

The wording of the resolution had been the subject of behind-the-scenes negotiations for days.

An earlier version of the document had explicitly referred to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which grants the UNSC the authority to take measures ranging from sanctions to the use of military force.

But after China’s opposition, Bahrain had significantly weakened its draft, dropping any authorisation of the use of force.

An explicit reference to binding enforcement, included in an earlier draft, was also left out.

After Iran rejected the idea of a 45-day ceasefire and said it wanted a permanent end to the conflict, the countdown continues to see whether Tehran bows to U.S. pressure and reopens the Strait of Hormuz. “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again,” U.S. President Donald Trump declared today. “I don’t want that to happen, but it probably will.”

We also continue to update our coverage on the recovery of a U.S. Air Force F-15E Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) in this separate story.

Last night, President Trump had threatened that if Tehran did not meet his deadline of 8:00 pm ET tonight, “every bridge in Iran will be decimated” by midnight ET on Wednesday and “every power plant in Iran will be out of business, burning, exploding and never to be used again.”

In the face of repeated questions about whether such a wave of attacks would constitute a war crime, Trump said he was “not at all” concerned about that possibility. “You know what’s a war crime? Having a nuclear weapon,” he said.

Kabul’s foreign minister expresses hope that minor interpretations will not hinder progress.

Afghanistan has said that peace talks with Pakistan being held in China have been “useful”.

The comment was issued by the foreign ministry in Kabul amid talks aimed at halting cross-border fighting between the two neighbours, which were launched last week following an invitation by China.

The peace process in the western Chinese city of Urumqi is an effort to stop the conflict that began in February, which has seen hundreds killed and perturbed Beijing, which is sensitive to the violence close to its western regions.

Pakistan, which declared it was in “open war” with its neighbour, has carried out air strikes inside Afghanistan, including in the capital, Kabul.

The United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan posted on X on Tuesday that the conflict had displaced 94,000 people overall, while 100,000 people in two Afghan districts near the border have been completely cut off by the fighting since February.

The conflict has alarmed the international community, particularly as the area is one where other armed groups, including al-Qaeda and the ISIL (ISIS) group, still have a presence.

Foreign Ministry Deputy Spokesman Zia Ahmad Takal said Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi met China’s ambassador to Afghanistan on Tuesday, and thanked Beijing for arranging and hosting the talks, while also crediting Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates for their mediation efforts.

“Noting that constructive discussions have taken place so far, FM Muttaqi expressed hope that minor interpretations would not hinder the progress of the negotiations,” Takal wrote.

Separately, Muttaqi said that “useful discussions have taken place”.

There have been few official statements regarding the discussions since they began on April 1 between mid-level delegations from the two sides.

Accusations

Even as the talks have been taking place, Afghanistan has accused Pakistan of carrying out shelling across its border on several occasions, killing and wounding civilians.

Pakistan has not commented. Islamabad often accuses Afghanistan of providing a safe haven to armed groups that carry out attacks, especially the Pakistan Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP.

The group is separate from but allied with the Afghan Taliban, which took over Afghanistan in 2021 following the chaotic withdrawal of US-led troops. Kabul denies the charge.

The recent fighting, the most severe between the two neighbours, began after Pakistan carried out air strikes aimed at such groups. Afghanistan then launched cross-border attacks in response.

The clashes disrupted a ceasefire brokered by Qatar in October, after earlier fighting had killed dozens of soldiers, civilians, and suspected fighters.

On March 17, a Pakistani air strike hit a drug-treatment centre in Kabul, which Afghan officials claimed killed more than 400 people.

Pakistan denied it had targeted civilians, saying its strikes were against military facilities.

Reinaldo Iturriza is a Venezuelan intellectual and writer who served as Minister of Communes (2013-14) and Culture (2014-16). He currently heads the Socialist Democracy Studies Center (CEDES) in Caracas. In this interview with Diario Red, Iturriza offers his views on the present Venezuelan context, the US’ January 3 invasion and subsequent impositions, the phenomenon of political disaffiliation and the importance of organizing a counter-offensive.

Although US aggression against Venezuela has been going on for decades, what happened on January 3, 2026, was an unprecedented and, to some extent, disconcerting event. This is because of the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, but also because it wasn’t a coup d’État, at least not according to the White House’s usual playbook, which involves a change in the government’s political alignment. What is your analysis of what happened that day?

What happened that day was an invasion, in every sense of the word. A flagrant and criminal violation of our sovereignty, preceded by constant threats and provocations, as well as the murder of dozens of fishermen in the Caribbean Sea – to which must be added the hundred Venezuelan military personnel and Cuban internationalists responsible for the president’s security who fell in combat during those early morning hours.

Regarding the shift in the government’s political alignment, the first thing this outcome reveals, in my view, is that it is absolutely false that the US aggression was motivated by anything even remotely related to its concern for democracy, just as the siege immediately preceding it had nothing to do with the Venezuelan government’s alleged ties to drug trafficking.

It is clear that the US government acted out of an interest in regaining control of our strategic resources, starting with our oil. Additionally, while weighing options and considering possible scenarios, the US concluded that the least traumatic way to achieve that objective was to leave the government structure virtually unchanged.

How did we reach this critical juncture?

Only someone completely unversed in politics would dare to claim that we should thank the United States for taking the first decisive steps to free us from a “tyranny” that had been in power for 25 years and that, otherwise, might have persisted indefinitely.

I mention this because Venezuelan society is not exactly known for its apolitical nature. What I’m getting at is that this is a narrative that is not only self-serving but also very dangerous, seeking to defend the indefensible. It is a version of events that is stumbling its way forward and aspires to become common sense. That is why it is essential to block its path once and for all.

And this requires emphasizing that throughout the first decade of this century, and even during the first half of the past decade, Venezuela was characterized as a high-intensity democracy, with very notable advances in all aspects of the material and spiritual lives of the popular majorities. What needs to be understood is what has happened here over the last 10 years.

When did the turning point occur? What circumstances led to the erosion of our high-intensity democracy? 

It seems to me that Antonio Gramsci provides invaluable analytical insights to begin understanding this historical development. What we witnessed and endured was nothing other than what the Italian intellectual calls the “reciprocal destruction” of the forces in conflict, with the consequent deterioration of democratic life and the progressive weakening of the political class and its respective social bases of support.

It is in this context that the intervention of the “foreign guard” took place on January 3, to continue using Gramscian terminology. A “foreign guard” that, incidentally, played a leading role in the conflict, decisively supporting one of the forces [the Venezuelan opposition] and doing everything possible to undermine the foundations of the national economy.

As the weeks went by, it became clear that the government of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has largely accepted the conditions imposed by the United States. Is this a “betrayal,” or is it a tactical retreat aimed at sustaining the Bolivarian Process in the long term?

Speaking in terms of betrayal or loyalty to the cause contributes little or nothing to understanding the situation. Opinions one way or the other are part of what Gramsci himself described as “petty political criticism.” Nor, it must be said, does the abuse of historical analogies aid in this regard.

I clearly recall that regarding the government’s rapprochement with certain factions of the bourgeoisie throughout 2016, and later in connection with the implementation of the orthodox monetarist program in 2018 – aimed primarily at controlling hyperinflation, which meant, among other things, reducing public spending to unprecedented levels and freezing wages – some comrades asked me in good faith whether this was something akin to Lenin’s New Economic Policy or whether, on the contrary, we were witnessing the abandonment of the strategic programmatic banners of the Bolivarian Revolution.

I would almost invariably tell them that what was needed was an analysis of the balance of power and that, regardless of how one chose to characterize it, the indisputable fact is that a recomposition of the ruling bloc was taking place: the working class, slowly but surely, ceased to be the backbone of that power bloc, as it undoubtedly had been throughout the Hugo Chávez era and even during Maduro’s early years.

Since January 3, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk has been invoked to try to explain the reasons behind the rapprochement with the US government, much in the same way that anything was previously justified by invoking Stalin’s defeat of fascism because we were facing the far right.

It is paradoxical that over the past 10 years we were able to find ourselves in the situation of the Soviet Union in March 1921, then in May 1945, and finally in March 1918, yet today, following one tactical retreat after another, the Bolivarian Process is hardly in a better position to face the future.

In retrospect, the facts seem to point to a structural retreat or, more precisely, a full-fledged strategic retreat.

A few days after January 3, you wrote an article in which you noted that the public reaction following the kidnapping [of Maduro and Flores] was one of “silence.” At that initial moment, there were no celebrations by the opposition, nor were there pro-government demonstrations; instead, a mood of “mourning for the humiliated nation” prevailed. And you made a very interesting point by arguing that “far from signifying consent with what had happened,” it was a manifestation of dissent that could find no “means of expression.” This is striking given the narrative of polarization that has surrounded Venezuela for years, which seems to encompass the entire society, dividing it between Chavistas and anti-Chavistas. Is there a vacuum of political representation?

Indeed, quite contrary to the prevailing narratives, Venezuelan society over the last 10 years has become increasingly depolarized, or perhaps we should work with the hypothesis that polarization has taken on new contours: the majority of the population versus its political class.

On several occasions, I have argued that during this period, no political phenomenon has been more significant and with more far-reaching implications than political disaffiliation. And this is by no means a recent “discovery”; I first raised this point in December 2015, in the context of the opposition’s parliamentary election victory.

When we analyzed the situation in depth, it became clear that the defeat of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) stemmed from the fact that, in Chavismo’s electoral strongholds, there had been a protest vote against the government.

It is no small matter that, despite the historical and contextual differences, that 2015 defeat, as was the case on January 3, was not celebrated by the people. That protest vote reflected a demand for correction.

In the eyes of a very significant portion of the social base supporting the Bolivarian Revolution, that correction did not occur. Quite the contrary: it was precisely from that point on that this process of recomposition of the power bloc I have already referred to began or intensified.

Why do you think this political disaffiliation occurred?

I am working on the hypothesis that the massive disaffiliation from Chavismo – understood here as a political identity – is directly proportional to the gradual distancing of the official political class from its working-class origins. In other words, to the extent that political identity ceased to embody the interests of the popular majorities, they ceased to feel represented by that political identity.

What occurred was what René Zavaleta Mercado termed a political and ideological hollowing out of the popular classes. This hollowing out, incidentally, should not be confused with depoliticization. The concept refers rather to the fact that the main guiding ideas that organize and give meaning to the way we conceive of the political are no longer associated with a specific identity.

This is particularly evident among younger people: my generation (and even more so the generations that preceded us) often laments the depoliticization of youth. And yes, there is depoliticization. But it is not uncommon to strike up a conversation with a young person from the working class in their twenties and realize that several of the key ideas that historically defined Chavismo are still there, yet those ideas have no political expression today.

In any case, I must emphasize that this phenomenon is far from being exclusively limited to young people. In reality, it describes the situation of the vast majority of Venezuelan society. A majority that does not condone something like a foreign invasion, but that cannot find ways to express its deep discontent with the state of affairs.

In your role as Minister of Communes between 2013 and 2014, but also as an activist and intellectual, you have been involved in the process of organizing and building the communes. This is a novel form of popular organization proposed by the Bolivarian Revolution and particularly by Hugo Chávez. For those unfamiliar with the topic, what are the communes? What is their objective?

The communes, and before them the communal councils, can be understood as the political formula devised by the Bolivarian leadership, and in particular by Hugo Chávez, to organize fundamentally that segment of the working class that came to constitute the backbone of the movement: the subproletariat, understood as the working poor whose labor does not guarantee them sufficient means to ensure their reproduction as a labor force.

Elsewhere I have elaborated in greater detail on what I am now only touching upon very briefly: the subproletariat was the driving force behind the popular uprising of February 27, 1989, [known as the Caracazo]. During the 1990s, under neoliberalism, the subproletariat came to represent the largest segment of the Venezuelan working class.

Excluded from the market, politics, and citizenship, it became politicized under Chávez’s leadership. It did everything possible to bring him to power. It defended democracy when it was threatened by the elites and led the massive street demonstrations that succeeded in reversing the 2002 coup d’état. Months later, it was on the front lines of resistance against the strike-sabotage of the oil industry and the corporate lockout: the Bolivarian Revolution would not be defeated by hunger and unemployment.

In a country on the brink of economic ruin [in 2002-03], we witnessed the recovery of the oil industry and experienced the effects of the first attempts at the democratic redistribution of oil rents – an experience that was entirely foreign to the more recent subproletariat.

Citizenship and the market were no longer off-limits: they gained gradual access to healthcare, education, and food. Their neighborhoods began to appear on official maps. Millions were able to obtain an identity card for the first time. They achieved their most resounding political victory in the 2004 referendum, which decided whether Chávez would remain in power.

In 2005, the Bolivarian leadership faced the challenge of how to organize a sub-proletariat that, by definition, is not in the factory, that due to its political culture distrusts the more traditional forms of political representation, and that also demonstrates a strong inclination toward political experimentation.

The answer, broadly speaking, was that it was necessary to promote the creation of popular self-government in the territories; this self-government had to, among other things, identify the productive potential of those territories and organize itself to develop that potential.

It was in this context that the first community councils were established. Later, in 2008, in areas where the self-governance initiatives were deemed to have the greatest political potential, efforts were intensified with the pilot launch of the first communes.

The communes were conceived as spaces with relative autonomy. This means that they were not to be subordinate to any formal power, nor were they to function as small, self-sufficient communities – like tiny islands in the sea of capitalism.

In Chávez’s words, they were to be capable of organizing themselves in a networked manner, “like a gigantic spiderweb covering the territory of the future, but in no case outside the strategic horizon of the Bolivarian Revolution.” In this sense, they represented a kind of popular vanguard in the process of implementing the program of transformation in the territory.

What is the current state of communal organization in Venezuela compared to previous years? How has the process been affected in recent years?

That’s a good question, especially since it has become customary in recent years to point to the existence of the communes as a kind of political – and even ethical – bulwark that could eventually serve as a counterweight to more authoritarian or conservative tendencies within Chavismo.

As a sort of consolation: we admit that things aren’t going very well, to say the least, and it’s equally true that the outlook isn’t encouraging at all, but at least the communes exist.

However, we must emphasize a few points I’ve already mentioned: the last 10 years have been a time of recomposition of the ruling bloc, of massive political disaffiliation, and of an economic policy that does not prioritize the interests of the working class. These are times of managing the status quo, which means that the scope for political experimentation has been reduced to historic lows.

To this, of course, we must add that after January 3, it is the US government that ultimately administers and decides how our revenues are spent. In other words, the problem is no longer even the scope of action of the communes, but rather the scope of the republic’s sovereignty.

This issue of the communes’ relative autonomy presents itself to us today in a radically different context: it remains to be seen whether, beyond the ability to manage very limited resources for the implementation of very limited local projects, communal leadership has the will and capacity to reaffirm its autonomy – no longer in the face of state or party institutions, but primarily in the face of a “foreign guard” that seeks to decide the nation’s fate.

Regarding the latter point you mentioned, Donald Trump’s offensive against Latin America, within a global context of military escalation and the rise of the far right, presents a very complex scenario for leftist governments, movements, and organizations. Added to the aggression against Venezuela is the intensification of the blockade against Cuba and the pressure on progressive governments in the region. How do you see the future of Chavismo and the Bolivarian Revolution in this context?

Let me refer once again to Gramsci: the analysis I have attempted here is not an end in itself. Its purpose is not to demonstrate clarity, eloquence, or anything of the sort. Such an analysis only makes sense if it aims to create the conditions for “optimism of the will.” 

The global onslaught of the far right cannot be met with voluntarism or naive pragmatism. There is no more effective incentive than developing the capacity to conduct analyses of the balance of power that are as rigorous and unflinching as possible. In times of retreat, the priority must be on organizing the counteroffensive. And such a thing is impossible based on complacent analyses or those aimed at reaffirming our status as victims.

In the battle of ideas, it is imperative to construct an effective narrative regarding the Bolivarian Revolution. One that does not shy away from pointing out our mistakes or limitations, but at the same time – and drawing on abundant historical evidence – properly highlights our numerous successes, starting with the fact that we managed to outline a programmatic vision that the popular majority embraced, feeling for the first time in a long while that they were masters of their own destiny.

The current state of affairs is not the inevitable consequence of an anachronistic program –one alien to our ideas and customs –that carried within it the seeds of authoritarianism from the very beginning. On the contrary, our program was well-suited to its time, consistent with our political culture, and realized itself as a high-intensity democracy. We must account for the multiple causes of various kinds that led to the interruption of the process of implementing that program.

This must take place within the context of a profound crisis of political representation, so we will most likely have to be prepared to witness – and even foster – the emergence of a new political identity that does not renounce its national, popular, and anti-capitalist character.

In the short term, what is essential is the convergence of all forces of different stripes that oppose the imposition of conditions of tutelage on our nation. We are on the threshold of new battles to recover our full sovereignty. This is only just beginning.

Source: Diario Red

Follow the build-up, analysis and live text commentary of the game as Madrid host Bayern for their first-leg clash.

In July 1943, Allied troops landed in Sicily. Mussolini was overthrown and imprisoned by his former colleagues in the Fascist government. In September, Italy signed an armistice with the Allies. The German army began the occupation of Italy and Mussolini was rescued by German commandos. He was installed as the leader of a new government, but had little power. As the Allies advanced northwards through Italy, Mussolini fled towards Switzerland. He was captured by Italian partisans and shot on 28 April 1945.

Iran has proposed a 10-point peace plan to end the war as the United States and Israel intensify their attacks on Tehran and a deadline looms that was set by US President Donald Trump for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, whose near-closure has triggered a global energy crisis.

At the White House on Monday, Trump called the 10-point plan a “significant step” but “not good enough”.

Iran’s top university and a major petrochemical plant were hit on Monday after Trump threatened to target power plants and bridges until Tehran agreed to end the war and open the strait, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas supplies pass.

Here is more about Iran’s 10-point plan and Trump’s response to it:

What is Iran’s 10-point plan?

On Monday, Pakistan, which has mediated talks in Islamabad aimed at ending the war, put forth a 45-day ceasefire proposal after separate meetings with US and Iranian officials. The Iranian and US negotiators have not met face to face about the 45‑day truce plan. In late March, Trump told reporters that his envoys were talking to a senior Iranian official, but this was not confirmed by Iran. Tehran has denied holding talks with US negotiators.

Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency said Tehran had conveyed its response via Islamabad. Iran reportedly rejected the proposed ceasefire, putting forward instead a call for a permanent end to the hostilities.

The Iranian proposal consisted of 10 clauses, including an end to conflicts in the region, a protocol for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of sanctions and reconstruction, IRNA reported. The conflict has spread to the Gulf region and Lebanon, where 1.2 million Lebanese people have been displaced due to Israeli attacks.

Details about the 10 clauses have not been published.

How did the White House respond?

Speaking to reporters about Iran’s plan, Trump said: “They made a … significant proposal. Not good enough, but they have made a very significant step. We will see what happens.”

“If they don’t make a deal, they will have no bridges and no power plants,” he added.

In a profane Truth Social post on Sunday, Trump threatened to attack Iran’s civilian infrastructure, including bridges and power plants, if the Strait of Hormuz is not fully reopened. “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the F****** Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell – JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah,” he wrote.

The deadline is set for 8pm Washington time on Tuesday (00:00 GMT). Tehran has rejected this ultimatum and threatened to retaliate.

Human rights organisations and members of the US Congress have criticised Trump for threatening to attack civilian targets, which is considered a war crime.

The Axios news website reported that an unnamed US official who saw the Iranian response called it “maximalist”.

What other proposals have been on the table?

The last time the word “maximalist” was used to describe a peace plan in this war was late last month when Iran called a US plan “maximalist”.

An unnamed, high-ranking diplomatic source told Al Jazeera on March 25 that Iran had received a 15-point plan drafted by the US. The plan was delivered to Iran through Pakistan.

The source said Tehran described the US proposal as “extremely maximalist and unreasonable”.

“It is not beautiful, even on paper,” the source said, calling the plan deceptive and misleading in its presentation.

The 15-point plan included a 30-day ceasefire, the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear facilities, limits on Iran’s missiles and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

In return, the US would remove all sanctions imposed on Iran and provide support for electricity generation at Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.

Iran has rejected a temporary ceasefire, arguing it would give the US and Israel time to regroup and launch further attacks. Tehran has pointed to Israel’s 12-day war on Iran in June. The US joined that conflict for one day, hitting Iran’s three main nuclear sites with air strikes. Trump claimed at the time that the US had destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities but months later justified the current war by saying Iran posed an imminent threat.

The UN nuclear watchdog, however, said Iran was not in a position to make a nuclear bomb.

The US and Israel launched the war on February 28 as Washington was holding negotiations with Iran. On the eve of the war, Oman, the mediator of the talks, had said a deal was “within reach”.

Tehran has said for years that its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes and it does not intend to create nuclear weapons. It even signed a deal with the US in 2015 to limit its nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. But Trump withdrew from the landmark deal in 2018 and slapped sanctions back on Iran.

In response, Iran decided to enrich uranium from 3.6 percent, which was allowed under the 2015 deal, to almost 60 percent after its Natanz nuclear facility was bombed in 2021. Iran blamed Israel. A 90 percent level of purity is required to make an atomic bomb.

Why does this matter?

With Tuesday’s deadline fast approaching, chances for a ceasefire appear remote as the two sides remain far from agreement and the conflict is now in its second month.

On Tuesday, Reza Amiri Moghadam, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan, posted on X: “Pakistan positive and productive endeavours in Good Will and Good Office to stop the war is approaching a critical, sensitive stage …”

“Stay Tuned for more”.

The war in Iran has created an energy shock in Africa.

The continent relies heavily on oil and gas imports from the Middle East.

Much of this supply is currently stuck on tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, which is closed.

Countries including Kenya, Ethiopia and Zambia are reporting shortages.

Africa’s largest oil refinery in Nigeria is pumping out crude at maximum capacity, but that’s nowhere near enough to meet the continent’s needs.

In addition, Africa’s energy infrastructure has suffered from years of underinvestment.

So, what choices do governments have to contain the crisis?

Abas Aslani of the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies argues that the US and Israel are playing “Russian roulette” with the Gulf’s environmental security following strikes near Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant.

A workers’ union at the World Cup venue has asked FIFA to keep ICE agents away from the venue to alleviate their fears.

A union representing about 2,000 food service workers at the Los Angeles Stadium has asked FIFA to keep United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) away from World Cup operations in the city and warned ⁠workers could strike if their concerns are not addressed.

Unite Here Local 11, which represents cooks, servers and bartenders at the Inglewood venue, said on Monday that the workers ⁠remain without a labour contract as the World Cup approaches.

The union laid out three main demands to FIFA and stadium owner Kroenke Sports & Entertainment: A public commitment that ICE and Border Patrol will play no role in the tournament, protections ‌for union jobs and working conditions, and support for affordable housing for hospitality workers.

Acting director of ICE, Todd Lyons, has said ICE would play a “key part” in the World Cup, a prospect the union said threatened worker and guest safety in Los Angeles.

Local 11 said it also wanted assurances that artificial ⁠intelligence and automation would not be used during the tournament to eliminate union jobs.

The union linked its labour demands to broader concerns over housing costs in the Los Angeles area, particularly ⁠in Inglewood, and called for support for a workforce housing fund, restrictions on short-term rentals and tax measures aimed ⁠at funding affordable housing and immigrant family protections.

“FIFA ⁠and its corporate sponsors will pocket billions from Los Angeles while refusing to even acknowledge the cooks, servers, and stand attendants who make this event possible,” Kurt Petersen, co-president of Local 11, ‌said in a statement.

The union said it had repeatedly sought meetings with FIFA since Los Angeles was chosen as a host city, but had been ignored. ‌

The venue is known as the SoFi Stadium, but has been rebranded to the Los Angeles Stadium for the World Cup due to sponsor clashes.

Los ‌Angeles is set to host eight World Cup matches at the stadium, the first being the US against Paraguay on June 12.

The first tranche of these – 1,000 of them – were meant to be created this summer. But the government has now withdrawn those after the BMA announced it was taking strike action. It comes after 30,000 applicants applied for 10,000 jobs last summer, although some of these were foreign doctors.

A US-Israeli strike has caused extensive damage to a synagogue in Tehran, according to a video published by Iran’s semi-official Mehr News Agency. Footage shows civil defence workers amid the rubble, with Hebrew-language books scattered on the ground.

An advanced imaging infrared seeker from a U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile interceptor looks to have been recovered largely intact in Syria. This could be a major intelligence loss that may allow adversaries to gain valuable insights into the capabilities of THAAD, which is being very heavily employed in the current conflict with Iran. THAAD has also been an important player in blunting previous Iranian missile barrages against Israel, and is a key component of the U.S. military’s global missile defense architecture.

A video, seen below, began circulating on social media earlier today showing the THAAD seeker, as well as other portions of the interceptor, on the ground. The clip is said to have been shot in the vicinity of the Syrian city of Suwayda in the southwestern corner of the country, though TWZ cannot immediately verify this independently. However, Suwayda is some 25 miles north of the border with Jordan and around 55 miles to the east of Israel’s internationally recognized boundaries. The U.S. military is currently reported to have THAAD batteries in Israel and Jordan.

As its name indicates, THAAD is designed to intercept short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight. Depending on a variety of factors, including the physical position of the launcher relative to the threat, the system can attempt intercepts against targets just as they begin their descent into Earth’s atmosphere.

THAAD cues its interceptors before their launch, either using its own powerful AN/TPY-2 radar or via data from offboard sensors through the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communication (C2BMC) network.

After launch, the so-called “kill vehicle” at the front end detaches from the rocket booster at the rear. A shroud at the front, which covers the seeker and the rest of the kill vehicle, also breaks away. That shroud is also seen on the ground in the newly emerged video.

Freed from the shroud, the kill vehicle uses its conformal infrared seeker to find and home in on the target missile. In general, imaging infrared has the benefit of being a passive guidance method that is immune to radiofrequency countermeasures, such as jamming or decoys designed to mimic the radar signature of a real threat.

THAAD’s interceptors are hit-to-kill types that are designed to destroy their targets through sheer force of impact. As such, the kill vehicles do not contain any kind of explosive warhead. Each one does have several small rocket motors that help it precisely maneuver into position to slam into the incoming missile. These are collectively known as the Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS).

“The unique DACS provides two kinds of propulsion: one for attitude control and another for kill-vehicle maneuvering. The DACS uses six thrusters to provide roll, pitch, and yaw control for the interceptor,” according to L3Harris, which supplies this component of the interceptor. “These thrusters work together to precisely stabilize the interceptor-seeker field of view for proper target visibility. The seeker’s target data are then converted into maneuvering or divert commands that actuate the other four DACS thrusters as required. The four divert thrusters provide short, forceful pulses to quickly and accurately position the THAAD kill vehicle for target intercept.”

In the video, the entire kill vehicle is intact enough that the ports for some of these rockets are plainly visible.

The fact that the kill vehicle and shroud were recovered on the ground so close together and in relatively good condition points to a failure of some kind, but the exact circumstances remain unknown. What has since happened to the debris is also not known.

Gaining access to a THAAD interceptor seeker, as well as the rest of the kill vehicle, would give an adversary new insights into its performance envelope and other capabilities. That information could then be used in the development of new countermeasures, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures to reduce the interceptor’s effectiveness. This would be on top of what Iran, as well as countries like Russia and China, have already been gleaning just from observing THAAD’s performance in the current conflict, as well as prior engagements.

Deep intelligence exploitation of the physical design of the seeker and the kill vehicle, as well as the materials used to make them, could be beneficial for supporting other developments, as well. The kill vehicle and the systems within have to survive the stresses of traveling at hypersonic speeds, typically defined as anything above Mach 5, as it screams toward its target. Adversaries like China could leverage this information to improve their own anti-ballistic missile capabilities or attempt to clone THAAD more directly.

Employing highly advanced weaponry of any kind always carries at least a degree of risk of intelligence loss. Even just in the course of normal operations, the most reliable systems can still fail and fall into the wrong hands. This is not the first time TWZ has called attention to this reality, including in regard to the recovery of sensitive components of surface-to-air interceptors. The U.S. government, as well as China, Russia, and many other countries, have extensive foreign materiel exploitation programs poised to seize on any opportunity to acquire weapon systems and other equipment for extensive analysis, testing, and even reverse engineering.

Though we do not know what happened to the THAAD seeker and the rest of the kill vehicle seen in the video, this may not be the last time we see such debris in Syria or elsewhere in the region, given how extensively these interceptors are being used as Iranian ballistic missile attacks continue.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

US President Donald Trump said ‘Tuesday will be power plant day’ in a vulgar post on social media. He says the US plans to start bombing electricity infrastructure unless Iran opens the Strait of Hormuz. Al Jazeera’s Hala Al Shami looks at Iran’s power plants and the dangers of potential attacks.

Political analyst Trita Parsi says no one should be surprised that Iran has rejected the idea of a ceasefire deal with the US and Israel, given their history of violating previous agreements.

‘It’s a historic day… but don’t forget to enjoy the view.’
Four astronauts from NASA’s Artemis II mission have broken the record for the farthest human travel from Earth. The record of 400,171km was set by Apollo 13 in April 1970.

Bleeding from injuries incurred ejecting from his F-15E Strike Eagle fighter and climbing a craggy mountain to escape, the U.S. Air Force Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) hid out in a crevice as both rescuers and Iranians frantically searched for him. Monday afternoon, President Donald Trump and Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered new details about the complex and dangerous missions to rescue the WSO and pilot – call signs DUDE44 Bravo and DUDE44 Alpha – whose Strike Eagle had been shot down April 3, the first loss of crewed aircraft to enemy fire during Epic Fury. While they offered the government’s take on events, other details emerged that we will address later in this story.

These rescue missions involved hundreds of troops, scores of aircraft and diversion operations over more than a half dozen different parts of Iran. It required risking the lives of many of those personnel to recover the two airmen.

President Trump News Conference After U.S. Airmen Rescue in Iran

The WSO’s recovery occurred on Easter Sunday some 50 hours after being shot down. It all began in the early morning hours of April 3 in Iran. After the F-15E was shot down, officials at U.S. Central Command received a message that would kick start the operation.

“A U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle, call sign DUDE44… was down in hostile Iranian territory, the pilot and weapon systems officer had both safely ejected and were isolated behind enemy lines,” Caine told reporters during a White House briefing. “Following confirmation of active rescue beacons, and on the direction of the Secretary [of War Pete Hegseth] and by order of the President, a rescue operation was launched with the stated purpose of bringing both Americans home safely.”

A US Air Force combat search and rescue (CSAR) task force was quickly spun up, Caine explained. It included 10 A-10C Thunderbolt II close support jets, HC-130J Combat King CSAR planes, HH-60W Jolly Green II CSAR helicopters and Air Force special operations airmen.

“A package comprised of combat rescue officers and pararescuemen operators audaciously penetrated enemy territory in broad daylight to find, fix and recover DUDE44 Alpha from behind enemy lines,” Caine proffered.

As the CSAR package, protected by a fighter strike package, crossed into Iran, “A-10s and …drones and other tactical aircraft were violently suppressing and engaging the enemy in a close in gunfight to keep them away from the front seater and allow the pickup force to get into the objective area,” Caine noted. During this engagement, one of the A-10s – “the one primarily responsible for communicating with the downed pilot, was hit by enemy fire,” said Caine. “This pilot continued to fight, continued the mission, and then upon exit, flew his aircraft into another country and determined that the airplane was not landable… The pilot then made the decision to eject over friendly territory, and was quickly and safely recovered and is doing fine.”

After picking up the F-15E pilot, the HH 60W Jolly Green “was engaged by every single person in Iran who had a small arms weapon, and one of the aircraft, the trailing aircraft, took several hits,” Caine told reporters. “The crew sustained minor injury, and they are going to be fine.”

“The A-10 force and the rescue force did a fantastic job rescuing DUDE44 Alpha,” Caine continued. “He was recovered Friday afternoon, as I said, and the nation needs to know this. This was an incredibly brave and courageous mission, and a testament to the courage, skill and tenacity of the joint force and our leaders, and especially a daylight option.”

Rescuing the pilot was only the first step. The WSO was still out there, alone and being hunted by the military and civilians. Officials in Tehran put out a large bounty for his recovery. If was captured or killed, it would have been a tremendous propaganda coup for Iran and a huge problem for America.

“Meanwhile, the second crew member, the weapon system officer, a highly respected colonel, had landed a significant distance away from the pilot,” Trump explained. “When you’re going at those speeds, even if you go out two or three seconds later, it’s miles and miles away, because you’re going fast.”

The Death-Defying Mechanics of Fighter Jet Ejections | Cars Insider

The WSO “was injured quite badly and stranded in an area teeming with terrorists from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a rough group, as well as the Basij militia and local authorities,” recounted Trump, who was watching it all unfold in real time. “Despite the peril, the officer followed his training and climbed into the treacherous mountain terrain and started climbing toward a higher altitude, something they were trained to do in order to evade capture.”

“He scaled cliff faces bleeding rather profusely, treated his own wounds and contacted American forces to transmit his location,” the president continued. “They have a very sophisticated beeper type apparatus that is on them at all times.”

The WSO was located thanks in large measure to help from the CIA.

“As an agency, the CIA possesses unique capabilities that only the president can deploy,” said its director, John Ratcliffe, who also spoke at the presser. “Some of these capabilities fall under covert action authorities, and because covert means exactly that I’m not going to be able to tell you everything that you want to know. At the President’s direction, we deployed both human assets and exquisite technologies that no other intelligence service in the world possesses to a daunting challenge, comparable to hunting for a single grain of sand in the middle of a desert.”

Trump praised Ratcliffe and the agency.

“And John Ratcliffe was incredible,” the president proffered. “It was actually their genius that called us from – he was 40 miles away – and he said, ‘you know, we’re seeing something moving up in a mountain.’ It’s at night And they kept the camera on for 45 minutes. He wasn’t moving. And they said, ‘you know, probably wrong, but we’re seeing something moving.’ This a man, vast mountain, vast thick with bushes, trees. He said, ‘We see something moving 40 miles away…I’m telling you, it’s moving.’ And then all of a sudden, 45 minutes later, he moved a lot, stood up, and they said, ‘we have him.’”

“And that was really the beginning of something incredible,” Trump added. “We had an idea where he was, but not specifically. That’s big mountain. So I want to thank the CIA too. I don’t think they get enough credit for the great job they’ve done.”

Once the WSO was located, “[w]e immediately mobilized a massive operation to retrieve him from the mountain,” Trump continued. “He kept going higher and higher. The mountain kept getting rougher and rougher, and was really, very, very hard to find. The second rescue mission involved 155 aircraft, including four bombers, 64 fighters, 48 refueling tankers, 13 rescue aircraft and more.”

All these assets, however, weren’t just for the spot where the WSO was located. Many of these aircraft were taking part in diversion efforts to throw Iranians off the trail. 

“We were bringing them all over, and a lot of it was subterfuge,” Trump stated. “We wanted to have them think he was in a different location, because they had a vast military force out there, thousands and thousands of people were looking. So we wanted them to look in different areas. So we were scattered all over, like we were right on top of them. We had seven different locations where they thought, and they were very confused. They said, ‘Well, wait a minute, they’ve got groups here. They’ve got groups there.’”

As the WSO hid, the military had created a forward arming and refueling point on a farm, Trump noted. You can read more about how the Air Force would set up and defend such a location in our interview with a former Air Force Special Tactics Squadron airman here.

That location, the president proffered, was less than ideal for such operations, which involved landing two heavily loaded MC-130J Commando II special operations cargo planes that included several H-6 Little Bird special operations helicopters among other equipment in their holds.

“This was not much of a runway,” the president stated, adding that the ground was wet and sandy, making landing, and especially takeoff, a challenge. “This was a farm, not a runway. It’s a farm. But it did the trick.”

After the wounded WSO was found, he was whisked back to the FARP, but getting him and the aircraft brought in to help find him was a tremendous challenge.

Trump said that with the MC-130s stuck in the wet, sandy soil, “we blew them up to smithereens.” The Little Birds were also blown up in place as well, because the aircraft that replaced the Commando IIs weren’t capable of exfilling them.

To replace the C-130s, “lighter, faster aircraft came in, and they took them out,” Trump said about the personnel and equipment. He was almost certainly referring to the CASA C-295W, a short take off and landing (STOL) twin turboprop that are modified for the special operations role.

A video has previously emerged said to show a C-295W flying at extremely low altitude in the general vicinity of the crash site. The U.S. Air Force operates a handful of these aircraft, likely assigned to the secretive 427th Special Operations Squadron. This unit is known to specialize in covert and clandestine infiltration and exfiltration missions, among other duties.

You can see that video below.

During the press conference, Trump pointed out not everyone in the military was in agreement that the U.S. should commit so many resources, human and equipment, to such a dangerous effort to rescue two men.

“There was military people, very professional, that preferred not doing it,” explained the president. “There were military people that said, ‘you just don’t do this. You don’t go into the heart of a very powerful military.’”

Trump of course listened instead to Caine and Hegseth, each of whom implored him to green light the missions.

Now with the official account of the mission behind us, here are some additional details about the rescue that were reported elsewhere.

The communication device the airmen used was the CSEL, or Combat Survivor Evader Locator, according to Ynet. The manufacturer, Boeing, describes it as being “like a global 911 emergency call system for downed personnel, providing U.S. forces with a tactical advantage.”

The CSEL system uses a flexible, modular communications architecture over multiple satellite links for secure communications and sends simple messages in bursts, with a low probability of intercept (LPI). These messages can include basic information about the status of the downed airman. It can then switch to less stealthy line-of-sight radio when extraction forces are nearby.

Last month, images hit the internet showing a very stealthy, extremely long-endurance, very high-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drone commonly (and unofficially) referred to as the RQ-180, or an evolution thereof, landing at a base in Greece. Many questions remain about the uncrewed aircraft and why it might be operating from Larissa Air Base.

However, as we noted in our initial reporting, the current conflict with Iran would be a very relevant fit for what the RQ-180 was likely designed to do. Furthermore, a secretive late Cold War-era drone program known as Quartz, intended to persistently monitor mobile nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles deep within the Soviet Union, offers a window into exactly why the RQ-180 could be in high demand in the Middle East now. There is no higher-priority standing mission for Operation Epic Fury at this time than finding and destroying Iranian launchers.

In many ways, the shadowy Quartz program from decades ago was a progenitor for what became a very large flying wing uncrewed aircraft that shares the planform of the B-21 (and the original B-2 design) and is likely at least part of the RQ-180’s origin story.

Strange arrival over Greece

To recap quickly, on March 18, local Greek news website onlarissa.gr first published pictures of what it misidentified as a B-2 bomber landing at Larissa Air Base, also known as Larissa National Airport. The base, which belongs to the Hellenic Air Force, but is also known to host U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drones, is situated in the city of the same name.

Onlarissa.gr outlet followed up its initial reporting by posting a video of the drone, seen below. Additional and increasingly more detailed imagery has subsequently emerged.

Το αμερικανικό βομβαρδιστικό Β-2 πάνω από τον ουρανό της Λάρισας

Per onlarissa.gr, the highly exotic aircraft had landed at Larissa after experiencing some kind of technical issue, citing unnamed sources. This remains unconfirmed, but it would explain why the drone touched down in broad daylight, rather than coming in under the cover of darkness. It could also have diverted there with an emergency, while operating out of another location, even one in the continental United States. It is worth noting that Larissa Air Base appears to have unique facilities built in recent years that seem to be very well suited for housing an aircraft like this.

TWZ previously reached out to U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the Pentagon for comment, but has not received any responses as of the time of writing. In a story published on March 24, Air & Space Forces Magazine said U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also declined to comment.

Attention was also subsequently called to U.S. Air Force cargo planes having been tracked making unusual flights from Edwards Air Force Base in California to Larissa recently. One of those flights came on February 25, while another one occurred on March 9. A C-5M also flew to Larissa from Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma on February 25, according to Aviation Week. Whether there is any connection between these flights and the drone spotted at the base has not been confirmed at this time. Edwards is the Air Force’s main hub for aviation test and evaluation efforts, and flight testing of the RQ-180 was reportedly at least managed from there in the 2010s. The Air Force could also have moved other assets to Larissa via Edwards.

The shadowy state of the ‘RQ-180’

The current state of the RQ-180, or any designs that have evolved from it, on a programmatic level, is very murky. In addition to testing at Edwards, past reports have said that a unit at Beale Air Force Base in California began flying the drones operationally, at least on a limited level, by 2019. There has been talk of a large flying wing aircraft similar in configuration to the B-21 Raider bomber flying out of Plant 42 in Palmdale, also in California, under the cover of darkness for years.

There are very strong indications that a photograph that appeared on Instagram in October 2020 of an unmanned aircraft flying in the skies over California’s Mojave Desert near Edwards Air Force Base was the first sighting of an RQ-180. That picture also notably showed a drone with an overall white paint scheme. That aligned with a report from Aviation Week that the design had gained the nicknames “Great White Bat” and “Shikaka.” The latter of these is the name of a fictional sacred white bat that is at the center of the plot of the 1995 Jim Carrey comedy Ace Ventura 2. The drone seen recently flying over Larissa has an overall black or otherwise dark-colored paint job. TWZ has noted previously that an overall white/cream/light pastel color scheme could help the drone to hide better at high altitudes during the day, but that a dark scheme would be more relevant at night. It is very possible, if not probable, that multiple schemes have been tested for a drone expected to fly sorties lasting multiple days.

It has long been thought that the RQ-180 could be a much-discussed, more survivable replacement for the non-stealthy RQ-4 Global Hawk drone, the vast majority of which are now retired. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force, now together with the U.S. Space Force, has been engaged in a major effort to push more surveillance capabilities, including exactly some of what the RQ-180 is likely intended to do, into space. This has led to public force structure changes and deferrals of traditional airborne sensing capabilities, and could have resulted in the stealthy high altitude, long-endurance (HALE) drone program being scaled back.

There certainly has been no clear evidence, at Beale or anywhere else, of the establishment of the kind of infrastructure that one would associate with the RQ-180 reaching a more advanced operational state and serial production. It is possible that the drone could share facilities with the B-21 under the larger umbrella of the Long Range Strike (LRS) family of systems. The RQ-180 is very likely intended, in part, to work in concert with the Raider, and there may even be some commonality between the two aircraft. The RQ-180 and/or related designs very likely played a direct role in risk reduction efforts that helped sell the Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) concept, and possibly the win by Northrop Grumman of that contract.

B-21 Takeoff and Landing

So, where the RQ-180 stands in terms of its overall capacity and its future remains unclear, but they are clearly being used on operational sorties, at least in a limited manner.

Iranian missile threats persist

After more than five weeks of fighting, the conflict with Iran is still grinding on. Despite the United States and Israel having substantially degraded the ability of Iranian forces to launch retaliatory missile and drone strikes, they have not stopped entirely. Iran has been digging out underground missile bases struck by American and Israeli forces and getting them back into operation, sometimes within hours, The New York Times reported just last Friday, citing U.S. intelligence reports. That followed other reports stating that Iran still retains a vast arsenal of missiles and drones, as well as a significant number of launchers to fire them.

In recent weeks, publicly available data from multiple sources has, at times, shown relatively small, but noticeable upticks in Iran’s launches. There are also signs that more of those threats are evading interception, though whether this has translated to more damage and/or casualties from impacts is unclear.

When it comes to launchers, Iran has invested heavily over the years in road mobile designs for firing ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones. This includes types that can be hard to distinguish from normal civilian trucks, especially those used for launching short-range ballistic missiles.

✈️🎯60+ strike flights: The IAF completed additional waves of strikes in western Iran targeting the Iranian regime’s missile launchers, defense systems, and live-fire arrays. pic.twitter.com/I1rRLBJlUR

— Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) March 3, 2026

Iran also has extensive underground ‘missile cities’ and other hardened sites that launchers can sprint to and from, and even fire from within in some cases. Beyond the main missile storage and launch sites, Iranian authorities have clearly had plans to disperse these weapons across the country. Reports have said that more authority to employ them has been delegated to lower echelons of command to minimize the impacts of separate U.S. and Israeli strikes on command and control nodes, as well.

On top of all this, Iran still has longer-ranged ballistic missiles that it can fire from areas further to the east, where the volume of U.S. and Israeli strikes has only more recently begun to grow. What’s left of Iran’s air defenses, which presents a real threat, is therefore likely to be more intact in those regions. In general, many of Iran’s air defense systems are also road mobile and can pop-up suddenly. All of this creates challenges for finding and fixing Iran’s remaining launch capacity, let alone neutralizing it.

Three weeks of Operation Epic Fury.

The Joint Force owns the skies, but Tehran holds the Strait. Additional U.S. fighter aircraft and naval assets arrived in both theaters, and Marine expeditionary forces are en route.

8,000+ Iranian targets and 130+ ships struck, per CENTCOM. pic.twitter.com/Xk8XYs1sP2

— Ian Ellis (@ianellisjones) March 23, 2026

The Israeli Air Force has dropped over 16,000 bombs in Iran since the start of the war, in over 800 waves of strikes, the military says.

According to the IDF, over 10,000 separate strikes have been carried out on 4,000 targets. pic.twitter.com/gkU4rW4s8T

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) April 1, 2026

In this context, there is a clear need to be able to readily detect launchers, which can pop out suddenly and unexpectedly from cover, across vast areas. Known missile storage sites and launch areas around them also need to be persistently surveilled. The ability to find launchers faster opens up new options for striking them. Just tracking and recording their typical movements would also help further refine interdiction and intelligence-gathering strategies going forward.

As TWZ has previously explored in great depth, the RQ-180 is best understood as a very high-flying, very long-endurance, and very stealthy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance platform that is capable of penetrating and persisting deep into enemy airspace. Its primary means of achieving that mission would be a radar with ground moving target indicator (GMTI) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capabilities, but radar would be just the primary component of a larger sensor package, which would likely include powerful electro-optical sensors and passive radiofrequency ones.

At its most basic, GMTI allows battle managers to see the enemy’s ground movements in real-time and then quickly adapt their game plan to counter those enemy forces before they can ever attack, or even pose a threat to friendly forces. GMTI is also a critical capability for detecting changes in force posture, establishing patterns of enemy movements over time, and identifying new targets of interest. Modern GMTI products can also be looped into a ‘kill web’ for rapid targeting purposes.

Some of this is also achieved through the aforementioned SAR mode, which basically provides a satellite-like image of a target area using radar. It also has the ability to see some things optical systems cannot, and, like GMTI, it can work under nearly all atmospheric conditions, day or night. When paired with GMTI, SAR can be used to help positively identify targets, as well as gain better situational awareness about the targets being tracked.

Passive electronic intelligence collection that allows for radiofrequency-emitters to be quickly detected and geolocated via onboard antennas and interferometry-based computing is another part of the equation. Long-range optical sensors can also provide higher-fidelity intelligence and spot movements of infrared signatures over large areas. You can imagine how fuzing all these capabilities together, combined with advanced networking, on a single platform could be incredibly potent. Basically, detecting a target or target group of interest, and then training advanced sensors on it to rapidly build up a high-quality understanding of what is going on and even to provide real-time targeting data to ‘shooters’ would be this aircraft’s bread and butter.

All of these are capabilities that would be ideally suited to the very high-priority task at hand of searching for Iranian launchers across the country’s vast terrain.

This all brings us back to Quartz and the very specific mission set that drove that program. Quartz is the best-known codename for a drone conceived as part of what was officially dubbed the Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance System, or AARS program.

The lead-up to Quartz

AARS/Quartz was itself born out of a succession of earlier developments. Proving that using a stealth platform to penetrate enemy air defenses and to stay over contested territory for hours on end while transmitting data collected without being detected is one of the biggest revolutions in warfare of the 20th Century. This capability was demonstrated on the tactical side at the dawn of stealth technology by Northrop’s Tacit Blue. That aircraft was developed as part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) highly classified Battlefield Surveillance Aircraft-Experimental (BSAX) program, which began in the late 1970s. 

Tacit Blue notably served as a periphery risk reduction effort for the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) program that would result in the B-2. However, its reason for being was to show that a stealthy aircraft carrying a huge radar can penetrate enemy air defenses and loiter for prolonged periods of time, collecting GMTI radar data and other intelligence information.

The radar for BSAX was a low probability of intercept design that had come from Pave Mover, another DARPA effort. Pave Mover ultimately led to the non-stealthy and now-retired E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, but offshoots of that radar technology did end up elsewhere, including on the B-2. Low probability of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) radars and communications suites are now key tenets of stealth aircraft design, in general. Keeping signal emissions, which an enemy can use to spot and track threats, to a minimum is critical for low-observable (stealthy) aircraft designs. Pave Mover was also tied into DARPA’s Assault Breaker program, which focused on proving out various technologies to enable standoff targeting of enemy forces, especially large Soviet armored formations on the move, deep behind the front lines.

The famously ugly Tacit Blue, also nicknamed the “Whale,” produced results that were revolutionary, as you can read more about here. Even the most capable existing penetrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft available at the time, like the SR-71 Blackbird, could only take a snapshot in time of the enemy and its posture. Satellites were far more predictable and could only provide the same ‘moment in time’ intelligence, and in a much less flexible manner. Tacit Blue could watch for hours with the enemy not even knowing it was there.

This meant the quality of intelligence Tacit Blue was capable of collecting was of far greater value. Metaphorically speaking, the SR-71 was like documenting a wedding by loudly running through a crowd and snapping a few photos. Tacit Blue was like rolling hours of videotape at the same wedding by an invisible cameraman. It was an absolute game-changer. The information was also transmitted securely using a LPI data link in near-real-time so that it could be rapidly exploited, not once the aircraft returned to base.

A drone to hunt Soviet mobile ballistic missiles

AARS/Quartz can be seen as something of a strategic parallel to the more tactically-minded BSAX effort and the Tacit Blue demonstrator. It was conceived as a cooperative effort between the U.S. Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). NRO, the very existence of which was only declassified in 1992, is and has historically been responsible primarily for intelligence-gathering via satellite. However, it was also involved in ISR drone operations in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration grew concerned about a gap in reconnaissance assets, in the air and in space, to persistently track and monitor Soviet mobile nuclear-armed intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

“As spy satellite systems came on line in the 1960s, they shared the same fundamental operational scheme as the SR-71. Both conducted reconnaissance with relative impunity but were so fast that they only provided episodic coverage. The Soviet system of fixed air bases, missile silos, and command centers of the Cold War’s first 30 years favored ‘fast pass’ reconnaissance, however, so its weaknesses were not evident until the strategic equation shifted in the late 1970s,” Thomas Ehrhard wrote in a monograph, titled Air Force UAVs: The Secret History, which the Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies published in 2010. “Soviet mobile missiles (both nuclear and air-to-air) and the advance of aviation technology opened the door for a true loitering surveillance UAV called AARS.”

Ehrhard pointed to three missiles as particular drivers behind the AARS program. The first of these was the road-mobile RSD-10 Pioneer, known in the West as the SS-20 Saber, a nuclear-armed intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with three warheads in a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) configuration. The SS-20 had an immensely destabilizing impact on the security environment in Europe. Its appearance was a central factor in the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987.

Contemporary reports said that the Soviets were also looking into an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) based on the SS-20, which itself may have been the result of an abortive ICBM program. After the Soviet Union fell, Russia subsequently developed the RS-26 Rubezh, which it described as an ICBM, but many believed it to actually be an IRBM akin to the SS-20. The INF treaty ultimately collapsed in 2019, rendering the issue moot. Five years later, a new Russian intermediate-range missile, called Oreshnik, emerged after one was fired at Ukraine. The U.S. government has assessed Oreshnik to be based on the RS-26.

The other Soviet missiles that helped make the case for AARS/Quartz were two ICBMs, the rail-mobile RT-23 Molodets (SS-24 Scalpel) and the road-mobile RT-2PM/RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle).

RT-23/SS-24 SCALPEL MOD 1 ICBM

RT-2PM/SS-25 SICKLE ICBM

In his 2010 monograph, Ehrhard describes the Reagan-era view of the resulting problem set as follows:

“The technological problem of holding these mobile missiles at risk, one that NATO had never solved with the SS-20, now became vastly more complex [with the inclusion of the SS-24 and SS-25]. U.S. forces had to constantly monitor their movement and electronic emissions, something neither fast-pass satellites, U-2s, nor the SR-71 could accomplish. The mission also entailed breaking the over two decade-long declaratory policy of not overflying the Soviet Union, a prospect the Reagan Administration apparently felt was worth the gain. To complicate matters further, they needed a platform that could track those missiles in a nuclear detonation environment while flying from remote bases in the continental US. Operating and receiving imagery from such a craft beyond line-of-sight using space relays would prove daunting. The political and design challenges loomed large, but in the end the Air Force/NRO/CIA consortium opted for a leap-ahead system.”

With all this in mind, AARS/Quartz was seen as a national imperative. The very long-endurance drone, penetrating deep into Soviet airspace, would be able to locate many of these threats, allowing them to be targeted during the opening throes of a potential apocalypse – something we will come back to later on.

By the mid-1980s, contracts were doled out to Lockheed and Boeing to develop what at the time could be seen as the most ambitious ‘silver bullet’ aerospace program of its time, albeit one that had very few eyes on it as it was deeply buried in the classified realm. Ehrhard writes:

“To accomplish the loitering surveillance mission, this UAV needed autonomous (i.e., not remote controlled), highly reliable flight controls, and a design capable of intercontinental ranges from bases in the US zone of the interior with extreme high altitude capability (long wingspan with sailplane-type lift and multi-engine propulsion to reach altitudes more than 70,000 feet). Moreover, it had to carry an array of high-resolution sensors, high-capacity satellite communications capabilities, and various antennas—all in a package that was stealthy to the point of being covert. The cost of developing each technology piece alone would be staggering, but integrating them presented an even greater challenge – thus the project became a magnet for the best and most starry-eyed technologists in the black world. As one CIA engineer said in an anonymous interview, this project was ‘the cat’s pajamas,’ and ‘the single most fun project I ever worked on’ because it stretched every conceivable technology area.”

Ehrhard does not elaborate on the expected sensor package, but an LPI/LPD radar with GMTI and SAR modes, as well as other sensors, would have been needed for a stealthy platform tasked with this mission set. As noted earlier, electronic emissions, which can be detected passively, were also seen at this time as a key way to spot and track mobile missile launchers.

A highly ambitious undertaking

By all indications, AARS/Quartz was seen as a very ambitious effort from the start, but one that could yield impressive capabilities needed to address a mission requirement critical to national security. It should be noted that the U.S. military was pursuing a host of advanced stealth aviation technology programs at around the same time. Many of the efforts would go on to produce real results, if they hadn’t already by the mid-1980s, and this is just based on what is known publicly. Northrop’s stealthy Tacit Blue demonstrator flew for the first time in 1982. Lockheed’s F-117 Nighthawk reached an initial operational capability the following year. The Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) program that would lead to the B-2 was well underway by this time, too.

In the end, AARS/Quartz did not fare as well as many of its contemporaries, at least from what we know. The program ran through the end of the Reagan years and into the 1990s under the administration of President George H.W. Bush. It morphed and changed hands considerably from a smaller ‘bleeding-edge’ NRO-led program into one that was integrated into a new national unmanned aircraft strategy. This, in turn, caused its mission set to balloon as a maelstrom of stakeholders demanded many capabilities out of a single platform that was already beyond the available technology of the era.

Ehrhard’s 2010 monograph sums up just how bloated AARS became by the 1990s:

“[David A.] Kier[, NRO’s Deputy Director from 1997 to 2001] said the large version of AARS, which according to some reports had a wingspan of 250 feet, cost less than a B-2, but more than $1 billion a copy. Reportedly, the production plan called for only eight vehicles at a cost of $10 billion, each of the vehicles capable of an amazing 40 hours on station after flying to the area of interest.”

“Air Force officials were so leery of the UAV’s autonomous flight concept (no pilot had moment-to-moment control) that they reportedly insisted the flying prototype carry a pilot to handle in-flight anomalies and that the final design include a modular, two-place cockpit insert to make it optionally piloted. ‘By the time everyone got their wishes included,’ Kier said, ‘it [AARS] had to do everything but milk the cow and communicate with the world while doing it.’”

“With all of AARS’s leading-edge sensors and communications links, each of which posed substantial technical challenges in its own right, flight reliability quickly became the biggest design hurdle, according to Kier. The technologies were so secret, and the value of the payload and the air vehicle was so great that its loss over unfriendly territory was unthinkable. One defense official remarked, ‘If one had crashed, it would have been so classified we would have had to bomb it to ensure it was destroyed.’”

“Sailing along on the glut of black money in the late 1980s, AARS kept moving forward despite its continually expanding, problematic requirements list. As happened with [the] D-21 and Compass Arrow [drone programs] in the early 1970s, however, AARS was about to have its most vital mission curtailed.”

“The end of the Cold War brought the expensive program to a halt. An Air Force general familiar with the project said: ‘When AARS was invented, there was more money than they [the NRO] could spend. After the Cold War, the money went away and projects like that could not possibly survive.’ Like predators stalking a wounded animal, manned alternatives to AARS emerged. One proposal would put a sophisticated target acquisition system on the B-2 stealth bomber – the so-called RB-2 configuration. The proposal had value as a terminal tracking system, but the RB-2 lacked a method of off-board cueing to direct it to a search area.”

…

“As it turned out, none of the alternative programs made the cut, for not only was the Cold War officially over with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the venerable Strategic Air Command was disbanded in June 1992. With that move, AARS lost its primary military constituent and the AARS alliance began to crumble.”

“…The Air Force pulled funding on AARS, and it was terminated in December 1992 by the intelligence community hierarchy just as it was to enter full scale development. AARS was, in the final analysis, a misfit. It was a major aircraft program backed by a satellite organization (the NRO), and a risky unmanned surveillance platform slated for a combat pilot-led Air Force—hardly an edifice solid enough to survive the removal of its strategic underpinnings. No one organization provided focus or advocacy for the program. As a result, the “perfect” surveillance UAV faded away even as the ultimate Cold War satellite system, Milstar, and the equally exotic B-2 stealth bomber managed to survive, backed as they were by one service, and powerful sub-groups within that service, who were culturally and operationally attuned to those configurations.”

By 1990, Lockheed and Boeing are also said to have been directed to combine their previously separate work on AARS/Quartz.

Kier, who Ehrhard also identifies as the last AARS program manager, says the drone’s design ultimately evolved into something that “resembled a substantially scaled-up version of DARPA’s DarkStar.” Lockheed’s DarkStar, which eventually received the designation RQ-3, was a stealthy tailless design with an ovoid central fuselage and with very long, slender, and straight main wings. Boeing was also a major subcontractor for the RQ-3.

DarkStar was also referred to as “Tier III-minus,” a moniker that reflected the requirements for the drone, which were truncated compared to a planned Tier III type. Tier III was a more direct follow-on to AARS, but was already envisioned as a smaller and less capable, and one would imagine less expensive, uncrewed aircraft. There were also additional lower capability tiers, one of which ultimately led to the RQ-4 Global Hawk. Ehrhard says some members of Congress and of industry did attempt to drum up support for a true successor to AARS/Quartz, unofficially referred to as Tier IV, but without success.

With regard to the RQ-3, at least two flying examples were built, the first of which crashed in 1996 after suffering a control system malfunction. DarkStar had vanished completely from the public eye by 1999, but it has since emerged that a direct line can be traced between it and the stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel via another secretive drone called the X-44A, which TWZ was first to report on back in 2019.

When it comes to AARS/Quartz, the full scale and scope of what exactly came out of the hundreds of millions, and possibly billions, spent on the program over at least a decade, remains unclear. Clearly, major leaps were made in the critical communications, command and control, structural, and sensor technologies needed to make the system a reality. There are rumors that sub-scale risk-reduction test articles were flown, but details surrounding the program remain highly secretive. 

A mission requirement that rhymes

As we noted earlier, many questions remain about the RQ-180, as well as the overall status of that program. At the same time, fast forward some three decades or so from the end of AARS (and its immediate successors), and there are now echoes of the Cold War mission requirements that prompted that program, including in the current conflict with Iran.

The Iranian arsenal of conventionally-armed missiles is not anywhere near the same kind of threat as Soviet nuclear-tipped IRBMs and ICBMs. Still, they do present very real threats, especially for strikes on large critical infrastructure targets and as terror weapons when loaded with cluster munition payloads. The current conflict has demonstrated that strategy also puts immense strain on Israeli missile defenses, which could have broader ramifications, as you can read more about here. Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles offer additional flexibility against targets on land or at sea. In addition, it has been clear for years now that Iran is very willing to launch conventional ballistic missile attacks.

As already noted, the launchers for these missiles are mobile, and some are configured to look like typical civilian-style trucks at a casual glance. Some operate from hardened and underground bases. A number of those facilities were even built with ports that allow missiles to be fired from within, though it is unclear how extensively Iran has made use of that capability in the current conflict. These apertures have likely been repeatedly struck by the U.S. and Israel.

The underlying challenge of finding Iran’s ballistic missiles, and doing so with enough time to attempt to strike them before they launch, has clear similarities to the mission that drove AARS/Quartz. The Iranian case is perhaps more complex in certain respects, given the larger number of smaller missiles, many of which could be dispersed over a broad area. Still, the long-range weapons that threaten Israel are clearly the top priority and would be the easiest to spot for an asset like the RQ-180.

CENTCOM:

The Iranian regime is using mobile launchers to indiscriminately fire missiles in an attempt to inflict maximum harm across the region.

U.S. forces are hunting these threats down and without apology or hesitation, we are taking them out.pic.twitter.com/l4lxbTlAf4

— Clash Report (@clashreport) March 3, 2026

🚨 WATCH: CENTCOM releases footage of strikes on fortified missile bases in southern Iran. The first footage includes hits on tunnel entrances and on mobile and stationary launchers at the missile base in Hajjiabad, Iran. pic.twitter.com/wuoi5GEhqp

— Major Sammer Pal Toorr (Infantry Combat Veteran) (@samartoor3086) March 22, 2026

Iran is responding to external threats by releasing a new video showcasing one of its underground missile tunnel systems, packed with missile engines, mobile launchers, and a range of advanced weaponry. The footage prominently features the Paveh cruise missile, the Ghadr-380… pic.twitter.com/ILsdlrPtQy

— Basha باشا (@BashaReport) March 25, 2025

Furthermore, Iran’s air defenses have been significantly degraded after some five weeks of U.S. and Israeli strikes, on top of the losses during the 12 Day War last year, but threats remain. As noted, the northeastern end of the country has seen fewer strikes compared to other areas, overall. Total air supremacy over Iran has yet to be achieved.

This is not a hypothetical assessment either, as underscored by the recent loss of a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle. In the ensuing efforts to recover the F-15E’s crew, an A-10 Warthog crashed after being hit by hostile fire and two rescue helicopters were also damaged. American forces deliberately destroyed additional aircraft – reportedly two MC-130J special operations tanker transports and four Little Bird helicopters – inside Iran to prevent the capture of sensitive material. This came after the MC-130Js had become disabled after touching down at an austere operating location during the final mission to retrieve the downed Strike Eagle’s Weapon System Officer.

Last month, a U.S. Air Force F-35A fighter also had to make an emergency landing after reportedly being hit by an Iranian surface-to-air missile. In addition to damage to the aircraft, there are reports that the pilot suffered shrapnel wounds, as well. There have been reports of other close calls since the conflict began.

Iran’s IRGC released a footage reportedly showing U.S. F-35 jet being hit over Iran.

Note that we can’t independently confirm the authenticity of the footage. pic.twitter.com/9N0ePd2LLf

— Clash Report (@clashreport) March 19, 2026

This is exactly the environment where a very high-flying, extremely long-endurance, and very stealthy drone, like the RQ-180, would be valuable, if not critical, to perform the aforementioned mission. The drone would simply fly outside the range of Iranian defenses if need be and likely fly nearly directly over most of them without fear of being shot down. From that perch, which could be far above where normal jet aircraft fly (60,000-70,000+ feet is possible) it would be able to monitor massive swathes of Iranian territory for movement of launchers and indications of launches, especially around known launch areas and storage sites.

It is also important to note here that much has changed in the past 20 years, let alone the past 40, which makes a successor to the AARS/Quartz concept more viable now, in general. Massive leaps have been made in every single relevant technological area. Examples include the fielding of operational semi-autonomous high-altitude, long-endurance drones, huge breakthroughs in composite structures and satellite data links, and the miniaturization of highly-powerful sensor systems. Just the available satellite bandwidth alone and the increases in onboard computing power were so far advanced by the mid-2000s already compared to the 1980s. Added to that now is the ability to crunch through all the data collected onboard using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies, which further helps make use of the bandwidth available..

AARS/Quartz was never intended to exist in a vacuum. It was explicitly seen as a part of an ecosystem that also included the B-2 bomber (to strike the targets the drone found) and the Milstar communications satellite constellation (to help transmit relevant data). The B-2 and Milstar did enter service, although the former did so on a very truncated level due to post-Cold War drawdowns. The U.S. military has made further investments since then in advanced networking capabilities as part of integrated kill web architectures. The B-2 and other relevant capabilities that could directly tie in with the RQ-180 are being employed publicly in the current conflict with Iran. It is possible, if not highly plausible, that this integration has already existed for years, in part as a result of the development of the LRS family of systems.

There is a degree of precedent here already, with regard to Iran specifically, with the RQ-170 Sentinel. RQ-170s are understood to have conducted extensive flights over Iran in the 2000s and into the very early 2010s, particularly to provide persistent monitoring of nuclear sites. Those missions were thrust into the public eye in 2011, when an RQ-170 went down in Iran and was captured largely intact.

The fact that the Sentinel has been flying operationally for nearly two decades, at least, also just underscores the degree to which stealthy, persistent drone surveillance capabilities had already advanced decades ago. That being said, the RQ-170 is a medium-altitude platform that was developed as a more tactical-level asset for surveillance of smaller areas. It does not fulfill the continued requirements for something like the RQ-180, able to fly at much higher altitudes over far greater distances for much longer periods of time, while carrying huge sensors, and was never intended to do so.

It’s also worth noting here that any decision to employ a highly secretive and sensitive asset like the RQ-180 over Iran would still carry major risks. Stealth aircraft aren’t invisible or completely immune to threats, and accidents do happen. As noted earlier, a technical issue of some kind may well be the only reason why we got a clear look at the drone during the day at Larissa in Greece, to begin with. At the same time, there is something of a precedent for taking these kinds of risks with regard to Iran, specifically, even outside of the demands of open conflict. After the RQ-170 went down in Iran, it is very likely that Russia and China had opportunities to analyze the drone in detail. But the technologies in the RQ-170, and its very design, are understood to be far less exquisite than what would be found in the RQ-180.

But even as an RQ-180 would have an even more pressing use case against a peer competitor like China, which is drastically expanding its nuclear arsenal and has thousands of road-mobile ballistic missiles, risking such a sensitive asset over Iran is paired with the high stakes involved with this operation, especially in regard to Israel. Iran’s massive and rapidly growing number of long-range missiles were a stated reason Trump decided he had to act now. The administration has said that soon Iran would be able to oversaturate any defenses if action wasn’t taken. It is this same threat that would be a major factor in using such a prized asset for Epic Fury, to do whatever possible to limit the damage to Israel, and to America’s Arab allies as well.

When the secretive drone first emerged at Larissa, comparisons were also drawn to an Israeli design referred to as the RA-01. That uncrewed stealth aircraft has a roughly similar planform, but is a smaller overall design that likely falls between the RQ-170 and the RQ-180. It has been very active during the conflict, being seen in videos. It would be of no surprise if it were tasked with hunting Iranian missile launchers, as well.

It should be stressed that we still do not know for sure why the secretive drone is at Larissa and what operations it might have been conducting, or still is, from the Greek base. As mentioned at the start of this piece, U.S. authorities have, so far, declined to comment on the uncrewed aircraft’s presence there at all.

At the same time, its emergence does come at a time when the capabilities of the RQ-180, or an evolution thereof, would be in extremely high demand to support current operations over Iran, and specifically to address the urgent need to counter Iran’s long-range weapons, just as the progenitor of the concept was meant to do nearly four decades ago.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com