TODAY

On a modest bed inside his war-battered home in the Khartoum North neighbourhood of the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, Murtada Mohieddin, a diabetic patient in his early 50s, carefully counts his remaining doses of insulin. His search for medicine has transformed into a harrowing battle – not just to find the treatment he needs to survive his diabetes, but to ensure the medicine is not expired or ruined.

“Sometimes the insulin is spoiled,” Mohieddin tells Al Jazeera, inspecting his limited supply. “You wouldn’t know if it is ruined or expired. You can check the expiration date, but it could still be damaged from poor storage.”

More than three years of civil war have crippled Sudan’s healthcare infrastructure: hospitals, health centres and pharmaceutical factories have been shut and vital medical supply chains and storage across the country have been disrupted.

The war, which erupted as a power struggle between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has killed more than 50,000 people and displaced 14 million – nearly a quarter of the country’s population.

The devastating conflict has paralysed domestic pharmaceutical production and collapsed vital supply chains across the country.

According to a World Health Organization (WHO) news release dated April 14, 2026, Sudan represents the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with 21 million people lacking basic healthcare services out of 34 million needing aid.

In the void left by the closure of pharmaceutical companies, smuggling networks have flourished, flooding the market with unregulated drugs locally known as “Boko” medicines.

These include critical intravenous malaria medications smuggled across borders. Because they completely bypass strict temperature controls and quality checks during transit, these drugs are frequently spoiled, rendering them either totally ineffective or lethally toxic to patients.

A double threat

Inside local pharmacies in Omdurman, located on the outskirts of Khartoum, the crisis is not just limited to scarcity. Patients now face the double threat of exorbitant costs and life-threatening quality issues, as these illicit medicines are often severely spoiled due to a lack of proper storage and refrigeration.

Mutawakil Hamza, a pharmacist based in Omdurman, said the reliance on unregulated channels is putting lives at immediate risk.

“Most malaria medicines are now brought in through smuggling,” Hamza said. “These are ultimately injections for intravenous use, and this is highly dangerous to a patient’s health.”

Because intravenous treatments bypass the body’s natural defences and require absolute sterility, administering improperly stored or degraded smuggled injections can rapidly cause severe bloodstream infections, systemic shock, or death.

The war has effectively dismantled local manufacturing, reversing years of medical self-reliance. Yasser Ahmed Youssef, a pharmaceutical industry expert whose factory is located in Khartoum, noted the stark contrast to the pre-war era, when local factories managed to produce “very large quantities of life-saving medicines, including drugs for blood pressure, diabetes, colds, and paediatric care”.

Now, the majority of those production lines are silent, leaving the population dependent on a shattered healthcare system. According to the October 2025 Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS) report cited in a WHO Public Health Situation Analysis from January 6, 2026, 40 percent of health facilities nationwide are entirely nonoperational.

The situation is even more drastic regionally, with 87 percent of facilities shut down in Khartoum and 85 percent closed in North Kordofan, whose control is contested between the rival sides.

In active conflict zones such as Gezira, Khartoum, Darfur and the Kordofan regions, the shortages are particularly dire.

A United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) emergency report from August 2025 highlighted that the only functioning maternity hospital in the besieged city of el-Fasher faces critical medicine shortages and risks imminent closure.

El-Fasher, the last SAF stronghold in the western region of Darfur, was taken over by the RSF in late October 2025, trapping approximately 700,000 civilians – mostly women and children. People have been cut off entirely from food and medicine and subjected to attacks.

Collapsed warehouses and supply lines

In the government-funded public sector, the National Medical Supplies Fund maintains that it is working to secure essential medicines despite the fighting, claiming to have achieved 75 percent availability for cancer medications and fully secured supplies for kidney patients.

However, officials admit the overarching infrastructure is in ruins, with the local health ecosystem almost destroyed.

“We have been massively affected by the ongoing war inside Sudan,” said Abubakar Salouha, a department director at the fund. “The medical supplies have been severely impacted; there has been a collapse at the level of the main warehouses at the headquarters.”

International aid deliveries from neighbouring countries also face enormous logistical hurdles.

The WHO’s January 6 situation analysis detailed that cross-border transit times for medical commodities can take up to 90 days to reach remote regions like Darfur from the Cameroonian city of Douala via Chad. Compounding these suffocating delays, armed groups have repeatedly targeted medical infrastructure, looting pharmacies and stripping remaining hospitals of their vital medical supplies.

Recent attacks highlight this systematic destruction by rival sides. On March 20, 2026, a drone attack on Al-Daein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur state killed at least 64 people, including medical personnel, and injured 89 others. Sudanese rights group the Emergency Lawyers reported that the army was behind the attack.

On April 2, another drone attack struck Al-Jabalain Hospital in White Nile state, killing 10 staff members, including the hospital’s director while he was performing surgery. That same day, the Family Hospital in el-Daein was looted, and patients and health workers were assaulted and expelled. Similarly, a hospital in Kurmuk, Blue Nile state, was looted on March 25, its equipment destroyed, and patients forced out. The RSF was blamed for these attacks.

“Sudan is confronting one of the gravest humanitarian and public health emergencies in the world today. The ongoing conflict has pushed the health system to the edge of complete collapse,” warned WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus on April 4.

“These incidents are stark reminders of the urgent need for renewed international solidarity and decisive political and humanitarian action. Sudan cannot endure this crisis alone.”

Malaysia has introduced new regulations preventing children under the age of 16 from registering accounts on social media platforms as part of a broader effort to improve online safety and protect minors from harmful digital content.

Under the new rules, major social media companies including Meta Platforms, TikTok, and Alphabet will be required to verify users’ ages using government issued records before allowing new account registrations.

The policy took effect on Monday and is being enforced by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission. Companies that fail to comply could face fines of up to 10 million ringgit, equivalent to approximately 2.5 million dollars.

Authorities emphasized that the measure is not intended to block children from using the internet entirely, but rather to ensure greater responsibility among technology companies, parents, and guardians in protecting young users online.

How the New Rules Will Work

The new framework requires social media platforms to implement age verification systems that cross check user information against official government records.

While the restrictions immediately apply to new account registrations, existing users will also be subject to age verification measures during a six month implementation period.

The move places greater responsibility on technology companies to ensure that underage users are not able to bypass age requirements through inaccurate information during the registration process.

Growing Concerns Over Children’s Online Safety

Malaysia’s decision reflects increasing global concern about the impact of social media on children and teenagers.

Governments around the world have raised alarms over issues including exposure to harmful content, cyberbullying, online exploitation, misinformation, and the effects of excessive social media use on mental health.

Policymakers argue that stronger safeguards are needed as digital platforms become a central part of daily life for younger generations.

Malaysia’s Wider Crackdown on Online Content

The age restrictions are part of a broader effort by Malaysian authorities to regulate online platforms more aggressively.

Officials have reported a significant increase in harmful online content in recent years and have intensified monitoring of material that could inflame racial or religious tensions. Authorities have also targeted content viewed as insulting or critical of the country’s monarchy.

The government says social media companies must play a more active role in preventing harmful content from reaching vulnerable audiences.

Why It Matters

Malaysia’s decision places it among a growing group of countries seeking stricter regulation of social media platforms and greater protections for children online.

The policy could become a model for other governments considering similar measures, particularly as concerns over digital safety continue to grow worldwide. It also increases pressure on technology companies to develop more reliable age verification systems while balancing privacy concerns and user accessibility.

The move highlights the growing debate over who should bear responsibility for protecting children online, governments, technology firms, or parents.

Key Stakeholders

Children and Teenagers

Young users will face stricter age verification requirements before being allowed to create social media accounts.

Parents and Guardians

Families are expected to play a larger role in monitoring children’s online activities and ensuring compliance with age restrictions.

Social Media Companies

Major technology platforms must implement and maintain age verification systems while ensuring compliance with Malaysian regulations.

Malaysian Government

Authorities aim to reduce children’s exposure to harmful content and strengthen oversight of online platforms.

Digital Rights and Privacy Advocates

Advocacy groups will closely monitor how age verification systems are implemented and whether they affect privacy and data protection standards.

What Happens Next

Social media companies now have six months to complete age verification checks for existing users and fully integrate compliance systems for new registrations.

Regulators are expected to monitor implementation closely and may impose penalties on platforms that fail to meet requirements. The effectiveness of the policy will likely be assessed based on whether it reduces underage access and limits exposure to harmful content.

Other countries in the region may also watch Malaysia’s experience as they consider similar online safety measures.

Analysis

Malaysia’s new restrictions reflect a broader global shift toward stronger regulation of digital platforms, particularly where children are concerned. Governments are increasingly moving away from voluntary industry guidelines and toward legally enforceable requirements that place direct responsibility on technology companies.

The success of the policy will depend largely on the effectiveness of age verification systems. If implementation is weak, underage users may still find ways to access platforms. If verification measures are too strict, however, concerns about privacy, data security, and accessibility could emerge.

The regulation also signals a growing willingness among governments to intervene in how social media platforms operate. As concerns about online safety continue to rise, Malaysia’s approach may become an important test case for balancing child protection, digital rights, and platform accountability in the years ahead.

With information from Reuters.

South Korea has confirmed plans to develop a new class of nuclear-powered submarines under the Jang Bogo N Project. These will put South Korea in an exclusive class of nations operating nuclear-powered subs, with currently only China, France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States having them in active service. The move has larger implications than providing the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) with just more capable submarines.

South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) today published a document, the Basic Plan for the Development of Nuclear-Powered Submarines in the Republic of Korea, that sets out its ambition for a major advance in the country’s naval capabilities. The name of the program alludes to South Korea’s first submarine, the Jang Bogo class.

The MND has presented the thinking behind its nuclear-powered sub plans, noting that the vessels will offer “dramatically enhanced operational capabilities” compared to the ROKN’s existing diesel submarines. As well as their functionally unlimited range, the MND says the new nuclear-powered submarines will offer “higher mobility” than their predecessors, which pairs with nuclear submarines’ abilities to travel farther, and do so faster, as well as their underwater agility, at least in certain performance envelope areas.

The ministry also outlines that the new submarines “will play a core role in responding to threats such as North Korea’s submarine-launched nuclear and missile threats.”

“The Republic of Korea will transparently and firmly fulfill its nuclear non-proliferation obligations based on the trust of the international community,” the MND adds.

Clearly, this is a long-term program, with it being Seoul’s first venture into nuclear propulsion for a military application, although it does develop reactors for civilian purposes, which could be leveraged for such work.

The defense ministry expects that the construction process will take up to 10 years, after which the boats will be operated for more than 30 years.

A precise timeline has not been released, and it is also unclear how many hulls are expected to be built.

Back in October last year, TWZ reported on a key milestone toward the program launch, when U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he’d signed off on the plan.

“Our Military Alliance is stronger than ever before and, based on that, I have given them approval to build a Nuclear Powered Submarine, rather than the old fashioned, and far less nimble diesel powered submarines that they have now,” Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social.

The U.S. leader also claimed that at least some of the boats would be built in the United States. The MND hasn’t mentioned this possibility, and the wording of its announcement stresses the sovereign nature of the program and local industrial participation. However, with South Korean firms already building ships in Philadelphia and the United States needing more nuclear shipbuilding capacity, this dynamic could also come into play as a result of the Jang Bogo N Project.

Collapse of U.S. shipbuilding poses national and economic security risks | 60 Minutes

Before Trump’s remarks, South Korea had been open about its nuclear-powered submarine ambitions for years. In fact, related discussions date back to at least around 2003.

However, the plans long faced pushback, including from the United States, especially over nuclear proliferation concerns.

The ROKN already operates a sizable diesel-electric submarine force made up of 12 Jang Bogo class boats, nine Sohn Won-yil class submarines, and three Dosan Ahn Changho class vessels — these are also referred to under the Korean Submarine (KSS) nomenclature, being the KSS-I, KSS-II, and KSS-III, respectively.

The Jang Bogo and Sohn Won-yil classes are based on the German Type 209 and Type 214 designs, respectively, while the Dosan Ahn Changho class is a fully South Korean design.

Last year, South Korea also launched the first of three planned Jang Yeongsil class (KSS-III Batch II) submarines, the nation’s largest and most technologically advanced submarine class so far. You can read more about them here.

Whatever Seoul’s plan is for the production of the new boats, it is still possible, indeed likely, that the United States will provide assistance at least in relation to their propulsion systems.

Last year, South Korea’s defense minister said that South Korea would build its own submarines and modular reactors, but would receive a supply of enriched uranium fuel from the United States. Seoul’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), meanwhile, said that the country was already working on developing small nuclear reactors.

This fuel issue is interesting, bearing in mind that one of the hurdles for the program is a bilateral agreement that prevents it from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel without Washington’s approval. Today’s announcement would suggest that the U.S. government has given the program the green light.

When it comes to the nuclear issue, it’s worth noting that, as it now stands, all nations operating nuclear-powered submarines also field nuclear weapons. Already, however, Australia is moving to acquire nuclear-powered submarines through the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense cooperation agreement. Canberra has no plans for fielding nuclear weapons.

For South Korea, however, there remains a possibility that it may seek to develop a nuclear deterrent, something South Korean officials have talked about in the past, and that we have discussed on many occasions. The primary driver for this is the fact that neighboring North Korea possesses a ballooning nuclear arsenal and a growing number of delivery systems to convey it. Furthermore, it may now be pursuing its own nuclear-powered submarines with assistance from Russia. The degree to which Moscow is providing assistance is unclear, but it may well be propelling the program forward significantly. There is also the factor that, at least in some cases, the United States is not seen globally as the strategic partner it once was. In a South Korean context, Trump has reportedly talked about pulling some U.S. troops out of South Korea.

As a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this would also stand in the way of South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, separate from weapons, the process of building enrichment or other nuclear facilities, or otherwise acquiring the highly enriched fissile material to power the submarines, would be an issue for the NPT.

The Jang Bogo N Project is certainly ambitious, and not just in terms of constructing the boats and securing the fuel required for them.

There will also be enormous investments required to develop suitable infrastructure to sustain a fleet of nuclear-powered subs, as well as training personnel in the operational and maintenance of naval reactors.

Beyond that, there is the question about the degree to which Seoul even needs nuclear-powered submarines. South Korea is already developing conventionally-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) that can be fired from some of its more modern diesel submarines. These would already offer a conventional second-strike capability to help deter North Korea. The ranges involved in striking North Korean targets hardly need a launch platform with nuclear propulsion.

At the same time, South Korean diesel-electric submarine technology already outstrips North Korea’s limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

South Korea Test Launches Ballistic Missile From Submarine

On the other hand, while South Korea’s new diesel-electric subs offer a conventional quasi-second strike capability, it is not anywhere comparable to a true strategic nuclear second-strike deterrent of the kind that highly survivable nuclear-powered boats could provide, if South Korea one day chooses to go nuclear. Even with just conventional ballistic missiles aboard, the ability of a nuclear submarine to disappear out to sea for long periods is unmatched, which would enhance the survivability of the boats and their missiles, and help the credibility of a far more limited conventional second strike deterrent.

Beyond the North Korean threat, the nuclear-powered submarine program promises boats with extreme endurance and a higher level of underwater performance that can range much farther afield, reflecting Seoul’s growing focus on a broader regional security picture. With this in mind, it’s clear that the Jang Bogo N Project is also directed against the threat posed by China. Beijing’s military capabilities are a growing concern for South Korea, a fact reflected in Seoul looking increasingly toward security challenges beyond the peninsula. 

In an underwater warfare context, China maintains a very large submarine force that includes diesel-electric and nuclear-powered types, and which it continues to expand in both size and capability.

The Chinese government has also previously spoken out against South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine plans, calling for Seoul and the U.S. “to fulfill their nuclear non-proliferation obligations and do things to promote regional peace and stability, and not the other way around,” according to Reuters.

South Korea’s burgeoning submarine plans underscore how quickly its naval ambitions in general are evolving from coastal defense to a far more capable regional deterrent force, and one that will increasingly be able to undertake long-duration bluewater operations.

With the Jang Bogo N Project now underway, the ROKN can look forward to fielding its most advanced vessels yet. Depending on final plans for the production of these boats, it may well also cement its position as one of the few countries capable of designing and building nuclear-powered vessels. At the very least, it should put yet another piece in place should South Korea decide it needs a true second-strike strategic nuclear deterrent.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Previous World Cup appearances: 16
Best performance: Winners (1966)
First appearance: 1950 (Brazil)
Top goal scorer: Gary Lineker (10)
Most appearances: Peter Shilton (18)
Player to watch: Harry Kane
FIFA world ranking: 4
Fixtures: Croatia (June 17, Dallas), Ghana (June 23, Boston), Panama (June 27, New York)

It has now been 60 years of hurt for England, who lifted their only World Cup title in 1966. But while the Three Lions are certainly genuine contenders this time around, they come into the 2026 edition in a rather unsettled mood.

The Three Lions strolled through their group, becoming the first European team to qualify for the 2026 World Cup as they booked their place with two games to spare.

However, it’s fair to say that it was not the toughest group, and their performances in recent friendlies have drawn boos from fairly unenthused Wembley crowds, not least the defeats to Senegal and Japan.

Can England get a tune out of the likes of Jude Bellingham and Harry Kane? Can the Three Lions find a way back to playing entertaining football? And does coach Thomas Tuchel actually know his best team?

Tuchel gambles on ‘chemistry’

The German manager’s squad selection raised a few eyebrows as several key names were left out amid a few surprise inclusions.

Chelsea’s Cole Palmer and Man City’s Phil Foden, two of England’s most creative players, did not make the cut after disappointing seasons, while Real Madrid’s Trent Alexander-Arnold and Man United’s Harry Maguire also missed out.

Meanwhile, striker Ivan Toney – who plays for Saudi Arabia for Al-Ahli and has barely featured for England under Tuchel – has made the squad, along with some other debatable choices in Tottenham’s Djed Spence, Brentford’s 35-year-old midfielder Jordan Henderson, and Bayer Leverkusen defender Jarell Quansah.

Nine members of the 26-man squad have no previous tournament experience.

Tuchel defended his selections by stressing the importance of unity.

“From day one, we were clear that we are trying to select and build the best possible team, which is not necessarily to select and collect the 26 most talented players,” Tuchel told reporters.

“Teams win championships. It’s as simple as that. Everything I know and hear about international football is that it is about the team and the chemistry.”

Unimpressed fans

England’s previous boss Gareth Southgate had his detractors, namely over in-game decisions and for presiding over some pretty stodgy, risk-averse football at times. But he did take England to the finals of two European Championships, as well as a World Cup semifinal in 2018.

In addition to contending with this record, the former Chelsea and PSG boss Tuchel has also faced criticism over the failure to improve England’s style of play, which is still often marred by slow, sideways passes.

And while it’s logical to experiment, it’s also not clear he really knows his best team, and attempts to play a false nine or two number 10s have not come off.

Nevertheless, there’s no doubt that Tuchel is an elite manager and his solid, well-organised England side won their group with a 100 percent record (eight wins from eight), including tough wins away at Serbia and Albania, and conceded zero goals in the process.

Amid some consternation among the tabloid press over appointing a German to the role, Tuchel would delight in confounding the naysayers by leading the England men’s side to a first major trophy since 1966.

The Kane conundrum

Despite winning the golden boot at the 2018 World Cup, England have often failed to get the best out of their captain and record goalscorer at major tournaments.

By the end of a long season, Kane is frequently struggling for fitness and contending with knocks, and often comes into major tournaments looking off the pace.

However, if England can field a relatively fresh Kane in North America, the 33-year-old should be high on confidence following his best-ever season in front of goal.

Kane has averaged more than a goal a game on his way to scoring 61 times in 51 appearances across all competitions for Bayern Munich, who were crowned Bundesliga champions in April but were defeated by PSG in the Champions League semifinal.

England’s captain also has his country’s World Cup scoring record in sight as he needs just two more strikes to equal Gary Lineker’s record of 10 goals in the tournament.

The battle for number 10

Bellingham is perhaps the most effective out of several talented England number 10s, but the 22-year-old has had a frustrating club season as he has contended with injuries and his side’s frequently poor form, and accordingly, his England appearances have also been sporadic recently.

Aston Villa’s Morgan Rogers may have staked a strong claim to start ahead of him based on appearances under Tuchel and his sparkling club form.

Bellingham can also play further back in midfield, but assuming that Declan Rice and Eliot Anderson are fairly nailed on as holding midfielders, there may not be a space for him there either. So the Real Madrid player may have to initially look to make an impact from the bench.

Have England finally solved their perennial left-back weakness?

England have probably not had a truly world-class left-back since Ashley Cole. However, that may be about to change with the rapid rise of Nico O’Reilly.

The 21-year-old Manchester City player also offers an attacking threat as he has grabbed seven goals and three assists in the Premier League this season, and scored a brace as City won the League Cup final.

While some of these goals have come from midfield, O’Reilly looks to have the defensive skills and positional nous to become a world-class full back – although he’s still a work in progress.

How does their group look?

Group L contains some tricky opponents, and England face a particularly tough opener against 11th-ranked Croatia, who beat England in the 2018 semifinal.

Panama are ranked a perhaps surprisingly high 33rd and beat the United States en route to becoming CONCACAF Nations League runners-up last year.

And while 74th-ranked Ghana are the four-seeded underdogs, they could also pose a stiff test as they boast the likes of Antoine Semenyo and Mohammed Kudus.

England’s group stage match dates and kickoff times:

⚽ June 17: England vs. Croatia (Arlington, Texas, US), 4pm (20:00 GMT)
⚽ June 23: England vs. Ghana (Foxborough, Massachusetts, US), 4pm (20:00 GMT)
⚽ June 27: Panama vs. England (East Rutherford, New Jersey, US), 5pm (21:00 GMT)

Al Jazeera’s prediction

Quarterfinals.

Is it coming home? Probably not, but England still expects.

Full squad

Goalkeepers: Jordan Pickford (Everton), Dean Henderson (Crystal Palace), James Trafford (Man City)

Defenders: Reece ‌James (Chelsea), ‌Ezri Konsa (Aston Villa), Jarell Quansah (Bayer Leverkusen), John Stones (Man City), Marc Guehi (Man City), Dan Burn (Newcastle), Nico O’Reilly (Man City), Djed Spence (Tottenham), Tino Livramento (Newcastle)

Midfielders: Declan Rice (Arsenal), Elliot Anderson (Nottingham Forest), Kobbie Mainoo (Man Utd), Jordan Henderson (Brentford), Morgan Rogers (Aston Villa), Jude Bellingham (Real Madrid), Eberechi Eze (Arsenal)

Forwards: Harry Kane (Bayern Munich), Ivan Toney (Al-Ahli), Ollie Watkins (Aston Villa), Bukayo Saka (Arsenal), Marcus Rashford (Barcelona), Anthony Gordon (Newcastle), Noni Madueke (Arsenal)

The most recent flare-up of hostilities between the U.S. and Iran yet again highlights that while the future of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions remains at the heart of peace negotiations, the status of the Strait of Hormuz is the key flashpoint. On Tuesday, Tehran vowed retaliation a day after U.S. forces struck several targets in southern Iran on and near the Strait. Exacerbating the problems, another vessel was reportedly attacked near the mouth of the vital waterway on Tuesday.

These incidents are complicating work toward a peace deal amid an increasingly fragile ceasefire. After the start of the war on Feb. 28, the strategic chokepoint was closed to most traffic by Iran, which is now letting some vessels through under a new fee system that the U.S. vehemently rejects. The closure is having global economic impacts.

“Undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic of Iran will not leave any act of mischief unanswered and will not hesitate in defending the country’s integrity,” the Iranian Foreign Ministry said in a statement on X in which it labeled the U.S. strikes on Monday “a gross violation of the ceasefire enacted on April 8. 

The ministry offered no specifics about what actions it could take.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei issued a threat against U.S. allies in the region. Countries like Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Oman and Iraq all house U.S. facilities, many of which have already come under attack during Epic Fury and even after the April 8 ceasefire.

“The hand of time does not turn back, and the nations and lands of the region will no longer serve as shields for American bases,” he stated on X. “America will no longer have a safe haven for mischief and the establishment of military bases in the region.”

The statements were among many from Iran decrying the latest kinetic exchange with America. On Monday, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) told us it hit targets being used to endanger its personnel.

U.S. forces “conducted self-defense strikes in southern Iran… to protect our troops from threats posed by Iranian forces,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, CENTCOM’s chief spokesman told TWZ Monday evening. “Targets included missile launch sites and Iranian boats attempting to emplace mines. U.S. Central Command continues to defend our forces while using restraint during the ongoing ceasefire.”

CENTCOM carried out the strikes after Iran deployed mine-laying boats in the Strait of Hormuz and flew attack drones near American ships, The New York Times reported on Tuesday.

The U.S. “observed Iranian forces taking several actions, including launching the drones and activity at missile launch sites,” the newspaper noted.

CENTCOM’s statement followed reports of explosions in the key southern Iranian city of Bandar Abbas, the epicenter of Iranian naval operations around the Strait of Hormuz. It was attacked repeatedly during Operation Epic Fury and again earlier this month after the ceasefire was in place.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) organization reported that the Olympic Life, a Marshal Islands-registered oil tanker, was attacked 60 nautical miles east of Muscat, Oman on Tuesday.

The maritime security firm Ambrey told us the ship was struck by an unknown projectile, which resulted in an explosion on the vessel’s port side along the waterline, creating a discharge of bunker fuel. There were no injuries reported and neither UKMTO nor Ambrey said who launched the projectile.

Ultra-Orthodox Jewish demonstrators stormed a police station in Beit Shemesh, Israel, to protest the arrest of a man who abandoned military service. Israeli police used sound bombs and tear gas to disperse the crowd.

Muhammed Kaumi had just stepped out of the mosque when his phone rang on the evening of Friday, May 29. He had recently returned from Dikwa, a town in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, and assumed the call was from a relative checking on his journey home. Instead, the voice on the other end delivered news that left him numb.

“Bulama has been killed,” the caller said. “They have killed Bulama.” Muhammed felt his chest tighten. “I instantly felt a sharp pain in my heart,” he recalled.

Bulama Ali was his cousin, a farmer, a father of five, and one of thousands, like him, who have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency that has scarred the region for more than a decade.

Within minutes, Muhammed was on his way to the Custom House Internally Displaced Persons’ Camp in Muna, on the outskirts of Maiduguri, where Bulama had lived with his family for nearly a decade.

As he rushed there, questions flooded his mind: “What had happened? Who had killed him? Why?”

When he arrived, residents told him that Bulama had allegedly been beaten by men they identified as “repentant Boko Haram fighters”, locally known as “Hybrids”.

For many residents of Maiduguri, the allegation struck a painful nerve.

For years, former insurgents who surrendered to authorities have passed through government rehabilitation and reintegration programmes such as Operation Safe Corridor and the Borno Model, before returning to civilian communities. However, some have bypassed both interventions completely. 

The Nigerian authorities have involved some of these deserters in security operations, where they help troops with intelligence gathering, their knowledge of terrorist-held terrain, and even operational activities. The arrangement has remained controversial among many survivors of the conflict and among security analysts. 

Now, residents in these communities say their fears have been justified. 

They brought him back dead

Bulama’s final hours began shortly before the Friday Muslim congregational prayers.

Muhammed was told by relatives and eyewitnesses that “[Bulama] was on his way to the mosque on his bicycle when he received a phone call. He stopped by the roadside [close to Muna, on the Maiduguri-Gamboru highway] to answer it.” Behind him was a vehicle carrying armed men dressed in black uniforms. “They honked at him to move,” Muhammed said. “But he was speaking on the phone and did not hear them.”

Abbas Shettima, who witnessed the incident, said the confrontation, which occurred between 1:15 p.m. and 1:30 p.m., quickly escalated. 

“We were all heading to the mosque when we saw them beating him,” Abbas recounted. According to him, the group consisted of about ten men carrying guns and sticks. “They said he was blocking their way,” he said.

Bulama tried to explain. He apologised repeatedly, but his pleas fell on deaf ears. 

“He kept begging them to spare him,” Abbas said. “He crouched down and covered his head with his hands while they beat him.” When bystanders attempted to intervene, the armed men threatened them. Residents watched helplessly. Eventually, the men forced Bulama into their vehicle and drove away.

No one knew where he had been taken.

At the time, witnesses said they believed the group were members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) because of their uniforms.

Hours later, shortly after 3 p.m., the vehicle returned. “They brought him back severely wounded,” Abbas recounted. “He could barely move.”

Residents rushed toward him to help, but within ten minutes, he died.

The incident was immediately reported to the soldiers stationed at the camp’s entrance. According to Muhammed, the soldiers said they had seen the vehicle dropping Bulama but did not know what had transpired. “They were the ones who told us the men were Hybrids and that they had come from the Maiwa axis,” he said.

Residents later learned that Bulama had allegedly been taken to Maiwa Kura, a remote village in Mafa Local Government Area, Borno State, where the group was reportedly stationed. 

Although “Hybrids” are often perceived as operating independently, they are typically attached to military formations and work alongside security forces, according to a member of a local volunteer security outfit involved in counterterrorism operations who spoke to HumAngle.

“The commanding officer of the military base gives instructions to the ‘Hybrid’ commander attached to that formation, who then relays orders to his men,” the source explained. “During broader operations involving multiple locations, they also have a state commander from whom they receive directives.”

However, this does not necessarily imply military involvement in the attack that claimed Bulama’s life, as Hybrid patrols sometimes operate independently.

Bulama’s family subsequently reported the matter to the police. 

Muhammed said that soldiers, police officers, and members of the CJTF later travelled to Maiwa, where they arrested three suspects, including a commander. “They told us the others had travelled to Mafa for an operation,” he said.

The suspects were taken into custody and transferred to the Borno State Criminal Investigation Department for further investigation.

According to family members, the suspects claimed Bulama died after jumping from the back of a moving Hilux vehicle. But the relatives remain unconvinced. “The doctors told us he had been severely beaten,” Muhammed said. “His hands were tied, and he had internal bleeding.”

The family retrieved the body on Saturday morning and buried him later that afternoon. When the body was prepared for burial, he said, blood continued to seep from his eyes, ears, and nose. “It stained the white shroud.”

When HumAngle contacted the Borno State Police Public Relations Officer, Nahum Kenneth Daso, he said he was not aware of the case and would make inquiries. As of publication, no official update had been provided.

The men known as ‘Hybrids’

In many communities across Borno State, the word “Hybrid” carries different meanings depending on who defines it. 

To security officials, they are a practical asset in a war that has stretched for more than 15 years. For many residents, they are former terrorists trying to rebuild their lives. To others, especially those who lost relatives, homes, farms, and livelihoods during the conflict, they are a constant reminder of wounds that have never fully healed.

The term is commonly used to describe some former Boko Haram members who surrendered and passed through official rehabilitation and deradicalisation programmes, and later became attached to security operations in various capacities.

Since they possess intimate knowledge of terrorist operations and hierarchy, security agencies have increasingly relied on some of them to help in identifying former colleagues, navigating difficult terrain, and providing information that security forces may otherwise struggle to obtain.

For authorities, the arrangement is often viewed as a necessary component of the counterterrorism campaign. However, many civilians find it deeply unsettling.

That is why, for some residents, the sight of former terrorists carrying weapons or working alongside security forces can be difficult to accept.

Bulama’s death has reopened those anxieties. Yet, the resentment many residents express today did not begin with his killing. It has been building for years.

In August 2021, as thousands of terrorist deserters began surrendering from the Sambisa Forest and the Lake Chad region, the Borno State Government convened a high-level stakeholders’ meeting at the Government House in Maiduguri. Government officials, security agencies, traditional rulers, religious leaders, civil society organisations, journalists, and community representatives gathered to discuss the reintegration of former insurgents into society.

At the end of the meeting, participants agreed in principle to forgive and accept these deserters back into their communities. Their acceptance, however, was not unconditional. The stakeholders insisted that surrendered terrorists must be thoroughly screened before reintegration. They also warned against the release of hardened extremists into the communities. They further called for meaningful reconciliation between victims and former terrorists.

The gathering was widely presented as a collective endorsement of reconciliation.

But beyond the conference hall, acceptance has proved far more complicated.

Many residents who had survived the violence felt they had not been part of that conversation. Some had lost parents, spouses, siblings, and/or children. Others had spent years moving between displacement camps, uncertain whether they would ever return home. For them, forgiveness was not a policy decision that could be reached through consensus among stakeholders. It was an intensely personal choice shaped by trauma, memory, and loss.

“The people making these decisions are not always the people who suffered directly,” Abba Gana told HumAngle.

Over the years, some residents have complained of harassment and intimidation by former terrorists and their families. Others say they simply feel the reintegration process has moved faster than community healing.

The debate became even more sensitive as some former terrorists began assisting security operations. To many survivors, the transformation can be difficult to reconcile: people who once arrived as attackers returning as neighbours and protectors, and in some cases, as men carrying authority.

Some government officials have repeatedly defended the reintegration policy. Recently, General Olufemi Oluyede, the Chief of Defence Staff and chairperson of the Operation Safe Corridor National Steering Committee, likened terrorist deserters to the biblical Prodigal Son, arguing that they deserve rehabilitation because they remain Nigerian citizens. 

Those concerns were further amplified by reports that not all former terrorists were passing through official rehabilitation channels. In 2025, a HumAngle investigation documented allegations that some defectors were quietly leaving the forest and reintegrating into communities without participating in formal deradicalisation programmes, raising questions about screening, accountability, and oversight.

Over the years, several incidents involving terrorist deserters have also contributed to public unease. In April, a former Boko Haram member allegedly shot and killed a CJTF member during an argument in the Mafa LGA. According to reports, the victim was rushed to the hospital but was confirmed dead on arrival, while the suspect was later arrested and handed over to the police.

Two years earlier, some deserters reportedly stormed a police station in Maiduguri in an attempt to secure the release of their colleagues arrested over alleged drug-related offences. In another case that generated public outrage in 2023, a deserter was accused of killing his wife at the outskirts of Maiduguri.

Concerns about the reintegration programme are not new. As far back as 2020, Ali Ndume, the senator representing Borno South Senatorial District, publicly criticised aspects of the government’s amnesty efforts, recounting the case of a deserter whom he alleged killed his father and later absconded with his property. The senator argued that the victims and survivors’ concerns were not receiving the same level of attention as the rehabilitation of the deserters.

Taken individually, the circumstances surrounding these incidents differ significantly from Bulama’s case. Collectively, however, they have helped shape public perceptions of the reintegration programmes and deepened anxieties among some residents about the monitoring, supervision, and accountability of deserters, particularly those involved in security-related activities.

For many survivors of the conflict, such incidents reinforce a lingering fear that rehabilitation alone may not be enough. Bulama’s death has now brought those long-simmering concerns into sharper focus. 

“The community is deciding on an action,” Abbas said.

Residents gathered after Bulama’s burial to discuss possible legal steps. Some suggested pooling money to hire a lawyer. Others proposed approaching human rights organisations.

“We are thinking of contributing money and hiring a lawyer,” Abbas said.

Justice and unfinished wounds

For Muhammed, grief and anger now coexist. His cousin survived displacement and years of uncertainty. He, however, did not survive a short journey to the mosque.

When asked what justice would look like for his family and the displaced community, Muhammed replied, “The law does not play by sentiments; it follows laid-down rules. I hope they will do what is right. If it is by my sentiments, I would not want them to be free. I would want them imprisoned for life.”

He paused.

“I don’t care about compensation. I don’t care about apologies. Justice for me is their imprisonment.”

A family left devastated 

Bulama was only 30 years old. He left behind two wives and five children.

He earned a living as a farmer. And before displacement forced the family from Boboshe in 2016, his father was killed. His elderly mother remains alive and still lives with them at the displacement camp.

The survival of his family, which was Bulama’s responsibility as the breadwinner, hangs uncertainly over relatives, who are also struggling to survive. “We are not rich people,” Muhammed said. “Caring for five children in addition to our own children will be difficult.”

Around the camp where he lived for over a decade, residents gather beneath makeshift shelters to rest, but the conversations about Bulama’s death remain on their lips. 

What remains immediate is his nuclear family, and the space left by a man who left home for Friday prayers and never returned.

The cost to connect each of the U.S. military’s Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) one-way attack drones to space-based networks has risen from $5,000 to $25,000 a month, according to a new report. This is said to be the result of a switch from using the commercial Starlink network to its more secure government-focused cousin Starshield, which SpaceX demanded after extensive use of LUCAS drones in the latest conflict with Iran. The Pentagon has pushed back on the story, but it still highlights how critical SpaceX’s networks and other space services have become across the U.S. government, which TWZ has previously explored in detail.

Reuters first reported on the price increase to connect the datalinks on LUCAS drones to SpaceX’s space-based networks earlier today. The story cites anonymous sources, as well as Pentagon documents the outlet says it reviewed. This follows the recent announcement that the Pentagon is working to make LUCAS more autonomous with new artificial intelligence (AI) driven swarming capabilities, which could impact future connectivity demands.

Produced by SpektreWorks, LUCAS was developed in close cooperation with the U.S. military. It is a reverse-engineered clone of the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 and has a unit cost of around $35,000. The American drone already comes in multiple variations, and there is a related target drone design for use in training and test and evaluation activities. Versions fitted with miniature beyond-line-of-sight satellite datalinks, allowing for dynamic control and for their progress to be otherwise monitored after launch, have been a fixture in official pictures of LUCAS drones in the Middle East.

In the video in the social media post below, the satellite communications terminal can be seen hanging from a cord on a LUCAS drone said to have been recovered largely intact in Iraq.

The U.S. military announced it had begun fielding LUCAS drones operationally last December with a special operations-led task force in the Middle East. LUCAS’s official combat debut came in the opening wave of strikes on Iran on February 28. U.S. Navy Adm. Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command, subsequently described the one-way attackers as an “indispensable” component of that operation, dubbed Epic Fury.

What we know about SpaceX’s reported upcharge for LUCAS

“Within weeks of the United States launching its bombing campaign, SpaceX executives met Pentagon officials and argued ​the military had been paying about $5,000 for connection per terminal while effectively using a higher tier of service worth closer to $25,000,” according to Reuters. “SpaceX argued the ⁠LUCAS drones were operating under conditions that aligned more closely with its aviation tier subscription rather than a lower priced land or mobility service. Pentagon officials argued that the $25,000 price tag – a monthly fee – was designed for aircraft, not kamikaze drones that used Starlink connection for a matter of minutes ​or hours.”

“The Pentagon, which was ramping up strikes on Iran, ultimately agreed to pay SpaceX’s proposed price increase,” Reuters‘ report added.

The story also said this reflected broader “tensions” between the Pentagon and SpaceX that have been growing recently over Starlink fees.

“The Fake News media has the story wrong, again,” top Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell subsequently wrote in a post on X. “The claims in this article are simply not based in reality and do not reflect the close, effective collaboration between our teams.”

When reached for comment by TWZ earlier today before Parnell’s post, the Pentagon did not directly address Reuters‘ report.

“The Department of War is committed to fostering a competitive environment for commercial satellite communications and is conducting comprehensive market research to continuously monitor commercial offerings that align with government requirements,” a Pentagon official told us. “We are actively engaging with industry to identify innovative solutions and new entrants, ensuring acquisitions are inclusive of a diverse range of capable vendors.”

“The Commercial Satellite Communications Office is working on additional options with other proliferated low earth orbit partners as part of its strategy to leverage the unprecedented capabilities provided by the commercial SATCOM industry,” that same official added. “The U.S. Space Force is operating in accordance with the terms and conditions of its contracts.”

TWZ has also reached out to SpaceX for more information.

“It is a violation of commercial Starlink terms of service to use the terminal for weapon systems. This applies to all users and is shut down when discovered,” Elon Musk, who is the founder and CEO of SpaceX among his other endeavors, had written on X on March 1 in response to a post about LUCAS making use of Starlink. “There is a separate network called Starshield, which is operated by the US government. This is not under SpaceX control.”

SpaceX’s networks and the LUCAS cost equation

Though described as a “monthly fee,” Reuters‘ report indicates that the U.S. military pays the $25,000 only once to employ a LUCAS drone. As the piece points out, the Pentagon reportedly argued that it should get to pay the lower $5,000 rate because it was only using the network to support LUCAS in timeframes measured in “minutes ​or hours.” This is also in line with Reuters describing the added cost as effectively approaching doubling the LUCAS drone’s $35,000 unit price.

The entire point of these one-way-attack drones is to offer a lower-cost complement to traditional exquisite long-range strike munitions. The Tomahawk cruise missile, the unit cost of a current-generation version of which is generally said to be in the $2 to $2.5 million range, is often used as a point of comparison, although they are far from equal in many ways. The underlying argument for LUCAS also relies on the drone being relatively cheap and easy to produce, as well as employ in large volumes. TWZ laid all of this out in a detailed case for the Pentagon acquiring exactly these kinds of drones in mass, which we published just three months before LUCAS was confirmed to be in operational service.

A combined price tag of some $60,000 (the unit cost plus one month’s fee to connect to Starshield, as reported by Reuters) would still be far less expensive than the cost of a single Tomahawk. Using Starlink/Starshield terminals to begin with, beyond their connectivity advantages, offers the benefit of miniaturized high-bandwidth hardware that is being produced at a commercial scale.

Plans to make LUCAS more autonomous through the addition of new swarming capabilities could affect future network connectivity requirements for the drones. This will be enabled by the integration of Shield AI’s Hivemind autonomy software, as you can read more about here.

Shield AI flies Hivemind AI Pilot on 6th Aircraft

As TWZ recently wrote:

“For the time being, the U.S. military demands a human operator is ‘in or on the loop’ for kinetic or otherwise potentially deadly actions, as opposed to letting autonomous weapons choose what targets to attack on their own without any extra authorization. While less controversial morally, this can also be a tactical hindrance, slowing the swarm’s potential and adding complexity and vulnerabilities to its operations. The debate around this choice will only get more heated as adversaries bypass this elected restriction in order to get an upper hand in future combat scenarios.”

“As we pointed out in our initial reporting on LUCAS’s emergence, the fact that some of the LUCAS drones already include miniature SATCOM terminals is very noteworthy. After all, ‘human in the loop’ swarming would not be possible without this form of communications at the beyond line-of-sight ranges these drones fly. At the same time, an entire swarm can be controlled in this manner, even if just a handful are equipped with SATCOM terminals. While a swarm can be mesh networked within line-of-sight, it has to relay all the important information back to an operator. By using some of the drones as SATCOM relay nodes, the entire swarm can be controlled remotely from most places on the planet.”

“Regardless, the Hivemind AI pilot will allow appropriately equipped LUCAS drones to perceive their environment, make decisions, and act autonomously without continuous human input. Unlike conventional autopilots tied to fixed flight paths, Hivemind is designed to dynamically adjust mission plans, react to unforeseen conditions, avoid obstacles, and carry out complex tasks with minimal operator oversight.”

An increase in fees to connect individual SATCOM terminals to SpaceX’s networks, as well as cost savings on hardware, might further push the Pentagon toward a hub-and-spoke mesh-like networking arrangement like the one described above. LUCAS drones could also be employed in other contexts where satellite connectivity throughout the course of a mission might not be required, including if used essentially as fire-and-forget missiles aimed at fixed target coordinates. A SATCOM terminal would not be necessary at all for this kind of mission set, although it would be beneficial.

There is also a question about the total bandwidth that might be required to support swarms of LUCAS drones. From Reuters‘ reporting today, the increased load on its networks was a central factor in SpaceX’s demands for higher fees after strikes on Iran began. That being said, as already mentioned, Starlink/Starshield terminals are already designed with relatively high bandwidth use in mind.

These same considerations will apply to current and future programs that rely heavily on SpaceX’s satellite communications networks.

Dependence on SpaceX and U.S. national security

Specific cost figures aside, the LUCAS drone’s reliance on Starlink/Starshield underscores SpaceX’s dominance in the satellite communications market globally. It also highlights how essential the company’s space-based networks have already become for the U.S. military. TWZ explored this reality in detail amid open feuding between President Donald Trump and Elon Musk last year. The relationship between Trump and Musk has since rebounded, with the latter accompanying the President on his recent state visit to China.

Reuters reported today that there are some 10,000 satellites in SpaceX’s constellation supporting Starlink and Starshield, and that this represents more than 60 percent of all satellites currently in orbit. The company’s space-based networks, far and away, dominate the commercial satellite communications space globally. Offerings from competitors like OneWeb and Amazon Leo are more limited in scale and scope.

Watch SpaceX deploy Starlink satellites into space

This is reflected in the U.S. government’s ever-growing use of Starlink/Starshield on aircraft, ships, and in settings on land. This includes integration on some very high-value assets, including the U.S. Marine Corps’ VH-92 Patriot presidential helicopters and U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. There has also been a steadily growing push to use these networks to support tactical operations, as now highlighted by the link to LUCAS. The U.S. military had first demonstrated the ability to use Starlink to transmit targeting data years ago.

The U.S. government’s increasing use of Starlink/Starshield has already prompted operational security questions, even just in the context of supporting day-to-day peacetime operations, as you can read more about here. Starshield is designed to be more secure to help address these concerns for government customers.

At the same time, heavy use of Starlink on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine, including as a means of guiding one-way attackers in the air and at sea, has further underscored potential risks associated with the use of the networks in tactical scenarios. SpaceX and CEO Musk have faced particularly significant criticism in the past over limiting some Ukrainian use of the network. Actions SpaceX took earlier this year to block unregistered Starlink terminals also had major consequences for Russian forces, which were sent scrambling to find alternatives to fill the massive resulting communications gaps.

What SpaceX might have been prepared to do if the Pentagon did not agree to pay increased fees to support LUCAS is unknown. We also do not know what kind of protections are currently baked into U.S. contracts with SpaceX to prevent government users from being suddenly disconnected without warning. Regardless, as noted earlier, the Pentagon could deploy LUCAS swarms with just a handful of drones equipped with terminals to relay the critical info needed to control the rest of the formation, and LUCAS can still be used as a fire-and-forget weapon without any beyond line-of-sight connectivity, although this would greatly curtail its flexibility and, in some cases, its efficacy.

As the Pentagon official noted to TWZ today, there is a push to explore commercial alternatives to Starlink/Starshield and promote further competition in this space. At the same time, part of the attractiveness of Starlink/Starshield for the U.S. government has been the relatively low costs and other benefits associated with leveraging such well-established networks, as well as the knowledge base that comes along with that pedigree. Just today, the U.S. Space Force announced it had finalized a new Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreement with SpaceX, valued at $2.29 billion, for work on the Space Data Network (SDN) Backbone program. The SDN is tied to work on new space-based sensing and targeting capabilities, particularly for missile defense, which could now feed into the Golden Dome initiative.

Beyond satellite communications, SpaceX is reportedly also now a critical player in U.S. military efforts to increasingly move air and ground moving target indicator (AMTI/GMTI) tasks into orbit.

On top of all this, SpaceX is also by far the top provider of space launch services globally, as well as other space-related services, including for the U.S. government. The core elements of Golden Dome, including the sustainment of planned batteries of space-based interceptors, require reliable, routine access to space at a frequency that only SpaceX can provide within budget constraints.

SpaceX looks set to remain a dominant force in this market space worldwide for the foreseeable future, and it continues to expand its presence, driven heavily by commercial demand. The company’s government contracts, though substantial, only account for around a fifth of its annual revenue, according to Reuters.

Despite the Pentagon’s response to the particulars of Reuters’ story today, being so heavily reliant on one provider for critical technologies still raises important questions not just for LUCAS, but for other efforts across the U.S. military that rely on robust and secure satellite communications connectivity.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Jerome Powell says the US central bank is undergoing a ‘stress test’ like other institutions in the current era.

Former US Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has warned against the politicisation of monetary policy amid President Donald Trump’s repeated attacks on the independence of the central bank.

In a speech at an awards ceremony in Boston on Sunday, Powell said that the Fed had been undergoing a “stress test” like many other institutions in the Trump era.

Powell said the US Congress had “wisely” chosen to insulate the central bank from political pressure and that all other advanced economies had similar norms upholding the independence of monetary policy.

“These protections have served the public well, and administrations from both parties have respected them,” Powell said after accepting the 2026 John F Kennedy Profile in Courage Award.

“If any administration finds a way to remove Fed officials over policy differences, then future administrations will do so as well,” Powell said.

“The public would lose faith that the central bank will make decisions based only on what’s best for all Americans.”

Powell, who stepped down as the head of the central bank last month, said that the Fed’s credibility would be “lost” in such a scenario.

“That credibility enables the Fed to support a strong and stable economy for the benefit of American families and businesses,” he said.

“Our credibility has been built and sustained over many decades, and we have a duty to safeguard that priceless asset for our fellow citizens and for generations to come.”

Powell, who made the usual decision to stay on as one of the seven members of the Fed’s Board of Governors after stepping down as chair, also offered a broader defence of democratic institutions generally.

“Partisan political differences are normal – indeed essential – in a thriving democracy. But we ought to be united in our commitment to the higher principles that define our nation,” Powell said.

“Chief among them is respect for the rule of law. As John Adams wrote, ours is ‘a government of laws and not of men’. Our public institutions carry us forward through change. These institutions embody our commitment to freedom, democracy, and service of the public good.”

While Powell did not mention Trump by name, the US president has waged a sustained pressure campaign against the central bank for not heeding his demands to cut interest rates more sharply.

Trump repeatedly threatened Powell with dismissal during his tenure, while Trump appointee and ally Jeanine Pirro opened a short-lived criminal investigation into Powell’s congressional testimony about ongoing renovation works at the Fed’s headquarters.

Trump also ordered the removal of Fed governor Lisa Cook over unproven claims of mortgage fraud, though the Supreme Court has ruled that she can remain in her position while it considers a legal challenge against her firing.

Under the Federal Reserve Act, the US president must demonstrate “cause”, widely interpreted to mean malfeasance, to remove any of the Federal Reserve’s governors.

The John F Kennedy Profile in Courage Award was created in 1989 to honour those who demonstrate courage in public service without regard to professional or personal consequences.

Past winners of the award, which is named after Kennedy’s Pulitzer-winning book Profiles in Courage, include former US President Barack Obama, then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, and then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The U.S. Navy appears to be preparing to replace its remaining F-5E/F Tiger II adversary jets with F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, continuing the modernization and rationalization of these critical training assets. The Navy’s apparent acknowledgment that even upgraded F-5s are no longer sufficient for top-tier adversary training reflects a broader Pentagon shift toward higher-end platforms in this role.

The House Armed Services Committee released its first draft of the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill yesterday. Among the many provisions in the defense policy bill is a call for a report “on the status of efforts to transfer F/A-18E/F aircraft to the Navy Reserve to replace the F-5 aircraft.”

The report is to be delivered to the congressional defense committees by March 2027 at the latest.

This seems to be the first confirmation that further Navy adversary units will adopt the F/A-18E/F, the production of which is now ending, with the final deliveries expected next year.

As expected, the report will highlight any potential risk to mission execution, fleet readiness, and pilot and maintainer qualification during the period in which the older F-5s are being transferred and replaced by Super Hornets.

The Secretary of the Navy is also required to inform Congress of how long the transition process will take. This includes acquiring the required support equipment and spares, training for pilots and maintainers, and contracts related to the changeover.

Currently, the Navy has four Fighter Squadron Composite (VFC) squadrons responsible for adversary work.

One of these, VFC-12 “Fighting Omars,” has already transitioned to the F/A-18E/F at Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana, Virginia.

VFC-13 “Saints,” based at NAS Fallon, Nevada, is equipped with surplus, but significantly upgraded F-16C/Ds, having previously flown F-5s.

This leaves two F-5F/N units.

VFC-111 “Sundowners” flies out of NAS Key West, Florida.

Finally, VFC-204 “River Rattlers” is at NAS/Joint Reserve Base New Orleans in Louisiana. VFC-204 converted from the Legacy Hornet to the F-5 relatively recently.

The Navy has made efforts in recent years to enhance its F-5 fleet, under an effort formally known as the Avionics Reconfiguration and Tactical/Modernization for Inventory Standardization program, or ARTEMIS.

This includes new Mk 16 ejection seats, Digital Air Data Computers (DADC), and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders, as well as upgrades to its cockpit, including flat panel displays.

The lead contractor for ARTEMIS is the private U.S. ‘red air’ adversary support company, Tactical Air Support, Inc., or TacAir. The ARTEMIS upgrade package is based on the F-5 Advanced Tiger, or F-5AT, configuration developed by TacAir. This includes Nemesis radar, mission computer, threat weapons engagement zone (WEZ) replication software suite, Argus radar warning receiver (RWR), Mason hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) controls, Garmin wide area display, Scorpion helmet mounted display, open architecture mission system, and datalink, among other enhancements.

Transport of Swiss AF F-5 in a Navy C-130T

The Navy’s 28 single-seat F-5Ns and its pair of two-seat F-5Fs are being brought up to the ARTEMIS standard, as are a batch of 22 ex-Swiss Air Force F-5E/Fs that are being converted into adversary jets. The former Swiss airframes are being divided between the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps and are known as F-5N+/F-5F+s once the work on them is completed.

But even with these enhancements, the F-5s are dated aircraft and are increasingly unsuitable for meeting the Navy’s demand for more advanced red air capabilities.

As we have described in the past:

“At its core, the F-5 is a dated, non-stealthy Cold War-era design, but it still can replicate a wide variety of threats, including some capability aspects of fourth-generation fighters and cruise missiles. F-5s do lack the performance to truly mimic a fourth-generation fighter. At the same time, they offer a valuable dissimilar threat for Navy and Marine aviators to train against, thanks to their relatively small size and agility.”

Where the F-5 does come into its own is in economically helping to generate a greater volume of aerial threats to better represent higher-end large-scale conflict scenarios during exercises, something that is especially important as the U.S. military prepares for a potential major fight in the Pacific against China. The degree to which the F/A-18E/F will be able to meet this requirement will depend on how many airframes are made available for adversary work. This is something that will also have to be weighed up against frontline fleet demands, at a time when there is already a shortage of tactical aircraft. It’s also worth noting that the Blue Angels fly some of the oldest Super Hornets in a special display configuration.

You can read what it’s like to fly Navy F-5 adversary jets in this past feature.

As of April last year, the Navy had 325 single-seat F/A-18Es, 250 two-seat F/A-18Fs in inventory, according to official budget documents. These are the primary workhorses of the service’s carrier air wings, as well as for supporting operations from bases on land. Super Hornets and Growlers have been heavily involved in combat operations in the Middle East in recent years and remain heavily engaged today.

Meanwhile, to help meet the surging demand for adversary support, the Navy and other services have turned more heavily to contractors to help fill in for red air requirements. These include TacAir, with its own F-5ATs.

However, there is no escaping the fact that the Navy, and the U.S. military at large, increasingly requires more advanced adversary capacity, especially as it gears up to fight advanced fourth-generation combat jets, let alone stealthy fifth-generation threats. The U.S. Air Force has responded to this requirement by operating its F-35A stealth fighters as a dedicated red air adversary during high-end training, as you can read about here. That service has since stood up an F-35 adversary squadron, while reducing its reliance on contractor red air services flying dated, third generation types, like the F-5.

The Super Hornet, with its AN/APG-79 — arguably the most mature active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar available — as well as its ATFLIR targeting pods and a radar warning receiver, makes a very capable adversary in training scenarios and a good match for replicating advanced Chinese fourth-generation threats, like the J-16 Flanker. Navy Super Hornets can also carry an advanced infrared search and track (IRST) system, like the Flanker.

When flown in a relatively clean configuration, the F/A-18E/F becomes a more effective adversary, eliminating the drag issues caused by the canted underwing pylons. Even when fitted with wingtip stores and a centerline fuel tank, it offers good aerodynamic and energy-maneuverability performance, allowing it to more closely emulate agile adversary aircraft during dissimilar air combat training. In particular, its well-known slow-speed handling performance makes it a good surrogate for the Flanker family of threats. Clean Super Hornets also have the ability to ‘run down’ fleeing targets much better than an F-5 — one negative about the small third generation fighter going up against fourth- and fifth-generation jets.

Looking further ahead, as the program matures, it is likely that a Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) or an adversary variant will be used for more basic Navy red air tasks and for generating combat mass alongside the F/A-18E/Fs and F-16s. With that in mind, it is worth noting that Anduril’s CCA offering for the Air Force has its roots in an adversary drone, as you can read about here. Still, the Navy is moving a bit slower than the other services when it comes to CCA, but they could use the adversary role to reduce risk, increase trust, and as a gateway for fielding loyal wingman drones with its carrier air wings.

As of 2022, the Navy’s stated plan was to continue flying F-5s in the adversary role at least until 2035. It is unclear if this schedule might now change, but we have approached the service for more details.

There is also the question of what will happen with the Marine F-5s, flown by a pair of Marine Fighter Training Squadrons (VMFT). These are VMFT-401 “Snipers” at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Arizona, and VMFT-402 “Grim Reapers” at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina. These jets are being upgraded with the Red Net system, providing them with a tactical and situational awareness datalink, achieved via a commercially available tablet-kneeboard display.

Ultimately, the Marine F-5s are to be replaced under a program named Adversary Next.

After the latest Marine Aviation Plan (AVPLAN) was released in February, the service told TWZ:

“Planning for Adversary Next is underway and will be detailed in future AVPLANs. Adversary Next is anticipated to be a family of systems that will provide world-class adversary replication to USMC and joint units to prepare for the next fight.”

The latest AVPLAN puts F-5 retirement at 2040-plus.

Until then, the Marines will continue to use their upgraded F-5s, valued above all for their low-cost and highly reliable adversary support. Potentially, they could also bolster their fleet with former Navy examples if the service jettisons them far before the USMC does. Otherwise, Navy F-5s could also find their way to contractor red air providers, once the service retires them.

As for the Navy F-5, it appears that officials are now drawing up plans to finally call time on the iconic jet’s career in the service, one that goes far back in the Navy’s adversary program and the successful operation of Top Gun.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.

US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.

On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.

Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.

Strait of Hormuz

Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.

During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.

In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.

The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.

“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.

A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.

Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.

Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.

For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.

READ: Iran ready to reassure world it is not pursuing nuclear weapons, president says

Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets

Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.

As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.

Nuclear file

The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.

A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.

Extent of ceasefire

Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.

This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.

Context

Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.

Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.

READ: Trump says Iran talks ‘constructive’ but blockade will remain until final deal is reached

The death of Abakar Minuki, one of the most influential leaders of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), in a joint United States and Nigerian military operation, marks one of the most consequential blows to the insurgent group in recent years. Yet, analysts and insiders familiar with the terror group warn that history offers little reason to assume the killing will significantly diminish the long-term threat posed by the group.

Multiple sources familiar with ISWAP’s internal structure told HumAngle that Minuki’s most likely successor was Baba Shuwa, commonly known as Ba Shuwa. However, indications emerging from the aftermath of the operation suggest he may also have been killed. If confirmed, the simultaneous removal of both men would trigger the most significant leadership transition in the organisation since its emergence from Boko Haram’s internal schism nearly a decade ago.

For the first time, leadership could pass not to the insurgency’s founding generation, but to a second generation of fighters raised entirely within the movement’s war ecosystem. Two names have emerged as the strongest contenders: Abu Salem and Bana Chingori.

“This would represent a generational shift unlike anything the movement has experienced before,” a source familiar with ISWAP’s internal dynamics told HumAngle.

From village barber to insurgent leader

Known variously as Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al Mainoki, Abor Mainoki, Abubakar Mainoki, and Abakar Minuki, the slain commander was himself a product of the insurgency’s evolution.

Born in 1982 in the village of Mainok, a settlement along the Maiduguri-Benisheikh corridor in Borno State, he adopted his nom de guerre from his hometown. Long before becoming one of the most feared figures in the Lake Chad Basin insurgency, Minuki was known as a young barber operating a modest salon in the village.

Those who encountered him during the rise of Mohammed Yusuf’s movement recall a quiet young man who blended into daily life. That anonymity would eventually disappear. By the time Boko Haram transformed from a fringe religious movement into a powerful insurgent force, Minuki had become part of its military structure.

Abu Mus’ab, Abu Fatima, and other Boko Haram leaders had to secure Minuki’s approval before finalising their escape from Abubakar Shekau in the Sambisa forest to the islands of the Lake Chad Basin, shortly before ISWAP split from Boko Haram. Minuki not only provided refuge for members of the newly formed ISWAP fleeing Shekau’s crackdown, but also protected them and facilitated their settlement in his territory, where he ruled as one of Shekau’s most formidable Amirul Fiya.

He belonged to the first generation of fighters who entered the organisation before the 2009 uprising that transformed the movement forever.

The last men of Yusuf’s generation

To understand what Minuki represented, one must return to Boko Haram’s earliest years. According to sources familiar with the group’s formative history, Mohammed Yusuf’s original armed contingent consisted of fewer than 100 members. These men were responsible not only for security but also for recruitment.

As the organisation expanded, Yusuf reorganised fighters into military formations named after prominent figures from Islamic history. Among them were the Zubair Ibn Awwam Battalion, Umar Farouk Battalion, Salmanu Farisu Battalion, Khalid Ibn Walid Battalion, and Salaudeen Ayubi Battalion.

Several battalions survived years of expansion, state crackdowns, factional disputes, and battlefield losses. Over time, however, only two retained their original lineage and remain operational: the Timbuktu formation, associated with Faruk, and the Buhairiya structure, which absorbed the remnants of several earlier battalions.

Minuki was already a Naqeeb, a junior commander, during the pre-2009 period. Ba Shuwa, by contrast, was merely a foot soldier. While Abu Salem, who is now touted as the likely successor of ISWAP, was still a child. That generational distinction highlights that few survivors remain from the movement’s founding era.

The rise of the second generation

If Minuki and Ba Shuwa are both dead, the succession process could elevate men who never knew the insurgency before it became a regional war. Among them, Abu Salem stands out. Sources describe him as both a military commander and a religious authority within the insurgency. He currently serves as Amirul Fiya, based in Krinua, a battlefield commander with influence extending beyond purely military affairs.

His biography mirrors the insurgency’s own evolution. The son of a respected first-generation Boko Haram member, Abu Salem benefited from mentorship by senior leaders from an early age. His pedigree gave him access to influential networks that many younger fighters lacked.

He also carries the scars of combat. During one battle with members of Nigeria’s armed forces, he sustained serious gunshot wounds to the lower abdomen. The injuries required long-term medical management involving a Foley catheter. According to sources familiar with his condition, he continued participating in military operations despite the injury for years.

Within ISWAP, Abu Salem has cultivated a reputation for bravery, clerical authority, and charisma. Several sources compared his influence to that once exercised by Abu Musab al-Barnawi and Minuki himself.

Another contender is Bana Chingori, regarded as Ba Shuwa’s closest deputy. Unlike Abu Salem, however, Bana faces a structural challenge: He does not originate from the Faruk battalion network, which sources estimate supplies approximately 70 per cent of ISWAP’s current fighters and leadership, including Minuki.

In an organisation where battlefield alliances and battalion loyalties remain deeply influential, that may prove decisive.

The ethnic question behind ISWAP leadership

Leadership succession inside ISWAP is not determined solely by military competence. HumAngle understands that ethnicity, lineage, dialect, and social hierarchy continue to shape power within the organisation.

Public portrayals often reduce Boko Haram and ISWAP to ideological movements driven exclusively by extremist interpretations of Islam. The reality is considerably more complex. The overwhelming majority of ISWAP’s estimated fighting force originates from the Kanuri ethnic nationality, which has historically been dominant across the Lake Chad Basin. Yet, the Kanuris are far from homogeneous.

They are divided into numerous dialect communities, clan networks, and social categories that carry significant political weight, all of which the insurgents take very seriously. These divisions influence recruitment, promotions, alliances, and leadership legitimacy.

Mohammed Yusuf, for example, belonged to the Manga dialect group, one of the most prestigious Kanuri communities. His lineage strengthened his standing within the movement’s formative years. Abubakar Shekau came from the Kaama-speaking Ngala’a community, often viewed as socially marginal within traditional Kanuri hierarchies.

Several researchers and former members argue that Shekau’s relationship with the broader movement was shaped partly by this outsider status. Minuki himself emerged from Borno Central, where multiple Kanuri dialect groups intersect. Ba Shuwa’s ancestry has also been the subject of internal scrutiny.

Sources say rivals occasionally questioned the purity of his Kanuri lineage, reflecting how deeply social stratification continues to influence perceptions of authority within insurgency networks in the Lake Chad basin.

For this reason, sources told HumAngle, the emergence of a non-Kanuri leader remains highly unlikely. Even if such a figure were elevated, sustaining authority would be extraordinarily difficult. “The movement talks about Islam and the caliphate,” one source familiar with internal deliberations said, “But when leadership questions arise, ethnicity still matters.”

The foreign fighters effect

The leadership transition unfolding inside ISWAP is taking place within an organisation that has undergone profound internal transformation in recent years. Sources familiar with the group’s operations told HumAngle that the growing presence of foreign fighters from across the Sahel and beyond has reshaped not only the movement’s military tactics but also its internal security culture.

As foreign fighters increasingly settled in the Lake Chad region, ISWAP imposed some of its strictest operational security measures to date. Members were ordered to delete existing photographs and cease documenting activities through images. The use of smartphones was largely prohibited, reflecting mounting concerns about surveillance, geolocation tracking, and intelligence penetration. 

The restrictions marked a sharp departure from earlier years when both Boko Haram and ISWAP routinely photographed preaching sessions, training exercises, weapon displays, and daily life in territories under their control. Such imagery formed a central component of the group’s propaganda and recruitment machinery.

According to sources, the new rules were enforced ruthlessly. Several fighters accused of taking photographs or retaining images on their devices were reportedly executed. The killings served as both punishment and deterrence, reinforcing a culture of secrecy that now permeates much of the organisation. 

“The message was simple,” one source familiar with the group’s internal directives said. “Any digital trace that could expose fighters, commanders, or locations became a security threat.” The arrival of experienced foreign fighters appears to have accelerated this shift. Many brought with them lessons learned from conflicts across the Sahel, where drone surveillance, signals intelligence, and electronic tracking have increasingly shaped the battlefield.

The influence of foreign fighters introduced a greater emphasis on counter-intelligence, operational discipline, compartmentalisation, and the elimination of digital footprints that could expose personnel, camps, supply routes, or command structures. The result is an insurgent organisation that has become considerably more cautious than its predecessors. While leadership losses continue to disrupt, ISWAP’s evolving security architecture suggests a movement increasingly focused on institutional survival rather than on dependence on individual commanders.

Fractured, not defeated

The killing of Minuki undoubtedly represents a serious disruption, and the elimination of Ba Shuwa, if confirmed, would considerably deepen that disruption. Yet, military and intelligence officials caution against interpreting the development as a strategic defeat for ISWAP.

“The organisation has experienced similar moments before with the deaths of Mohammed Yusuf, Mamman Nur, Abu Musab al Barnawi, Ba Idrissa, and several other senior commanders, each of which generated predictions of organisational collapse,” said Kyari Mustafa, a conflict researcher in Maiduguri.

Those predictions never materialised. Instead, the group adapted. The pattern has become familiar across the Lake Chad Basin.

HumAngle has documented a pattern where successful military campaigns weaken the insurgency. Communities experience a period of relative calm. The group regroups, reassesses, and eventually resumes attacks. This cycle has repeated itself for more than 15 years. What makes the current moment significant is the possibility that an entire generation of commanders may be disappearing simultaneously. If Minuki and Ba Shuwa are indeed gone, the future of ISWAP may soon be shaped by men who were toddlers when Mohammed Yusuf built the movement.

Whether that transition produces fragmentation, renewal, or further violence remains uncertain. What is clear is that the Lake Chad Basin has witnessed enough leadership decapitations to know that the death of a commander, however important, does not automatically mean the end of the war.

Bembou Silaty, Guinea – Mamadou Aliou walks through the small village of Bembou Silaty in northwestern Guinea carrying an irresolvable contradiction.

The 38-year-old works in the environmental health and safety department for a bauxite mining company, yet he is also an activist striving to improve life in his community, which often means criticising the actions of another mining company in the area.

“Before these companies arrived, we cultivated our land, and it sustained us,” Aliou told Al Jazeera.

“We could cover our daily needs, especially food. But now, when a piece of land is registered and belongs to a mining company, you have nothing there any more.”

The foreign-linked mining companies are part of the global scramble for Guinea’s bauxite. The West African nation holds the world’s biggest reserves of the ore, which is the source material for alumina and ultimately aluminium, a metal essential for car and aircraft frames, windows, wind turbines, and solar panels.

Over the past three decades, Guinea has multiplied its bauxite production tenfold. More than a dozen projects of bauxite production are currently ongoing in the country, according to the online cadastre.

As the global energy transition demands ever more aluminium, it has placed Guinea in a strategically crucial position. Approximately 75 percent of the bauxite exported by the country over the past decade has ended up in China, which produces 60 percent of the world’s aluminium.

Companies from Russia, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates have also established themselves in the country to secure the ore. In Bembou Silaty, an Indian company that began operations in 2019 now holds an exploitation concession until 2034.

Located in the prefecture of Telimele (Kindia region), Bembou Silaty has undergone a transformation since bauxite was discovered on its land about five years ago.

Yet, on the ground, many lament the cost: Contaminated water, loss of farmland, and a steep decline in agricultural productivity.

‘No land, no money’

In the traditional bauxite heartlands of Kindia and Boke, the main roads are in notably good condition, a cut above the rest of the country. Steady jobs in technical roles or transport logistics have created economic opportunities for some Guineans.

Yet Bembou Silaty remains a quiet, peaceful village without electricity, and farming methods that are untouched by mechanisation.

Less than 2km (1.2 miles) away, however, the lush green landscape and mild climate of the rainy season give way to the electric-powered site of the Indian mining company.

There, excavators and trucks laden with bauxite constantly traverse the wide, unpaved roads, built to accommodate the heavy traffic, in a noisy, busy zone where the mining economy bulldozes its way forward.

People working in technical roles at the mine can earn up to about $300 a month.

For other locals who make a living from farming, most don’t have a regular wage and rely on the yield from their crops.

Across Guinea, an estimated half of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihood.

Locals in Bembou Silaty say every hectare claimed by mining is a hectare lost to farming, in a country that spent more than $500m importing rice in 2024.

“They give you compensation for your land, but it’s not enough, and in the end, it’s mismanaged,” Aliou said.

“Within a month or two, someone who received 50 or 100 million Guinean francs ($5,700-11,400) has nothing left. No land, no money. They have to start over, from below zero.”

Locals who still own land continue to grow rice, cassava, peanuts and cashews in the village, but they have ever less space and agricultural productivity is falling.

The village women have set up an association, “Allawalli” (which means “God help us” in Fula), to work cooperatively.

‘Not enough’

Walking through the alleys of Bembou Silaty, a few houses stand out.

They are made of cement, which withstands the rains better than the more common mud-brick homes, though many remain unfinished.

Locals say they were built with compensation money.

Fatoumata Binta Bah, a neighbour of Aliou’s, comes from a family of farmers. They once cultivated cashews, their livelihood.

Then the Indian mining company started up operations and offered them less than 50 million Guinean francs (about $5,700) for their land. That compensation, paid as a lump sum, seemed like a decent amount of money, she says.

But now, the money is gone, and their new house is still incomplete.

“The land they took from us was productive. That’s what we lived on,” said Bah, 20, as she prepared tea over a fire in the family courtyard.

“In the end, it wasn’t enough,” she lamented.

The Indian company did not respond to Al Jazeera’s questions on the purchase of land.

Meanwhile, on the outskirts of the village, surgical holes drilled into the ground mark where mining companies have tested for bauxite – a reminder to the farmers that the impact on the land is felt even before extraction begins.

In a recent report, Djami Diallo, the Guinean minister of the environment and sustainable development, stated that each year, certain companies had their impact studies and evaluation reports rejected for failing to comply with environmental standards.

Three or four companies in Boke, Kindia’s neighbouring region that is considered the bauxite capital in the country, were said to be affected. But the minister acknowledged that “just because companies do not meet the conditions to obtain the compliance certificate does not mean that everything stops.”

Clean water, the greatest challenge

Not all homes in Bembou Silaty, a community of about 5,000, have indoor toilets and plumbing. In the centre of the village, there are communal latrines for those who do not have facilities available in their homes. Showers can be taken in the same place, using a bucket and water collected from the spring.

One small gain for the community since the mining company’s arrival is a new water point in the village. The tap serves nearly all the residents. Even Aliou uses it to fill buckets for his household – for cooking and drinking – though he says he knows the water contains iron, as contamination occurs.

Still, he considers himself luckier than his friends in the neighbouring village of Koussadji Dow, who rely on now-brown, contaminated river water.

Tala Oury Sow, a trader and farmer, washes her cooking utensils in the murky river water – a daily struggle.

She starts speaking softly, surrounded by neighbours, but her voice rises to a shout.

“Do you think we can live like this?

“We had hoped the mining company’s arrival would improve things, but it has gotten worse,” she protested.

“Since the mining companies came, we’ve had this problem with the water. The children get sick, and the parents too,” added Mariama Kindi Diallo, a farmer, in her courtyard.

“The doctors tell us not to drink the rain or river water. There are no roads, no school, no phone signal. What are we supposed to do? We are asking for help to have a dignified life,” she pleaded, as her family and neighbours nodded in agreement.

The Indian company did not respond to requests for comment on these issues.

‘We need refineries here’

To escape the increasingly difficult conditions in villages like Bembou Silaty, some people leave the rural areas and head to the capital, Conakry.

Bauxite mining so dominates Guinea that one can chance upon a driver of one of the trains hauling ore from the mines to the port of Kamsar.

Alpha, who did not want his real name published, works for a United States-backed company and provides a window into the immense volume of resources being exported.

“We operate six trains of 150 wagons each day,” he said, explaining that the annual target for 2025 was to export 17.5 million tonnes of bauxite.

“The government wants to change things, because the profits we make in Guinea right now are small. We need refineries here to increase the state’s revenue,” he added.

Alpha lives near the coast, where his job has allowed him to build a house for his family and achieve a standard of living unattainable for most of his compatriots.

The government of Mamady Doumbouya, which came to power in a 2021 coup, is attempting to reorganise the mining sector. It is pressing investors to process bauxite within Guinea, ensuring a portion of the value stays in the country.

Processing bauxite into aluminium can multiply its price by 37 times.

Instability in Iran amid the US and Israel’s war has contributed to rising aluminium prices, which surpassed $3,600 per tonne in April.

Doumbouya is set to lead the country for the next seven years, after winning the December 2025 elections with nearly 87 percent of the vote. While opponents view him as illegitimate, many Guineans agree on the need to reform the mining sector.

Achieving this, however, requires a huge increase in electricity generation – power that is non-existent in villages like Bembou Silaty and unreliable even in Conakry, where blackouts are frequent when fans and TVs are switched on at night.

Guinea is working with neighbouring Senegal on a solution: Using Senegalese gas to generate enough electricity to process its bauxite on African soil. Currently, both countries export raw materials, while jobs and wealth are created elsewhere.

Following the bauxite route

More than 3,000km (1,900 miles) away, across the ocean, Spain is also a part of the Guinean bauxite story.

Parets del Valles, a municipality of 18,000 people less than 30km (19 miles) from Barcelona, represents the journey’s end.

From the town centre to its industrial outskirts, businesses specialising in aluminium are plentiful: Aluminium distribution, carpentry, and window fitting, much of them serving household needs.

For Spain, Europe’s largest consumer of Guinean bauxite, more than 90 percent of its imports come from Guinea-Conakry.

The aluminium produced there, mainly in the country’s north, feeds the automotive industry and serves both industrial and domestic purposes.

Parets is another world compared with the bauxite’s point of origin in Guinea.

In Spain, there is light, hot water, paved roads – all the base elements of a decent life. It’s why many say growing numbers of West Africans are arriving in Parets and across the Valles Oriental region. This is part of a broader trend in Catalonia and Spain, according to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE): The Guinean population has quadrupled in Spain since 2000 – from 2,700 to 11,000 people – and in Catalonia from 1,000 to 4,000.

These figures don’t include those who go unregistered.

Increasingly, more boats are leaving directly from Guinea, towards the Canary Islands and on to mainland Europe. According to Frontex, the European Union border security agency, more Guineans arrived in the Canary Islands, Spain, in 2023 (2,324) than in the previous 13 years combined. In 2024 and 2025 combined, another 6,000 Guineans arrived.

Migrants, predominantly men from Senegal and increasingly from Guinea, come alone, settling where they have contacts and job prospects. The newest arrivals, often very young, spend long hours with their mobile phones as their sole companion – the only tether to the country they left behind.

Many left, following the bauxite trail, hoping to find something more in the places where their resources are both enjoyed and exploited.

As Aliou, back in Bembou Silaty, says: “If you compare the bauxite we export with what we get in return, the difference is enormous. We gain almost nothing. Just enough to survive.”

This article was produced in collaboration with the Catalan association SETEM Catalunya, promoted by the Connect for Global Change consortium and Lafede.cat, and with financial support from the European Union and the Government of Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya)

Far-right outsider Abelardo de la Espriella will face left-wing Senator Ivan Cepeda in the run-off for Colombia’s presidential election next month.

After polls closed on Sunday, the two candidates quickly surged ahead in the vote tally, extinguishing the hopes of right-wing Senator Paloma Valencia, a former frontrunner.

As of Sunday afternoon, with 99 percent of the votes tallied, de la Espriella took the lead, with 43 percent of the ballots cast in his favour.

Cepeda trailed him by more than 600,000 votes, earning 40 percent support.

Neither candidate breached the 50-percent threshold needed to avoid a head-to-head match-up on June 21. But the results are likely to buoy de la Espriella’s campaign going into the final round.

Cepeda had consistently topped public opinion polls in the final weeks before the vote. A May 24 poll from the National Consulting Centre (CNC) showed him with more than 33 percent support, ahead of de la Espriella’s 30.9 percent.

De la Espriella’s ‘outsider’ campaign

Questions about security were at the forefront of voters’ concerns going into Sunday’s election.

De la Espriella, a businessman and lawyer who has never held elected office, leaned heavily into fears of crime as he launched an outsider campaign, similar to the dark-horse bid of Argentinian President Javier Milei.

By contrast, Cepeda is a well-known quantity in Colombian politics. His father was a senator, too, before he was assassinated in 1994, in what was widely considered to be an act of political violence.

Cepeda himself has served as a senator since 2014. Before that, he served in the Chamber of Deputies, representing the capital, Bogota.

During his political career, he became embroiled in a long-running legal dispute with former right-wing President Alvaro Uribe, whom he accused of complicity with right-wing paramilitaries.

Uribe initially sued Cepeda for defamation, but in a dramatic twist, Colombia’s Supreme Court dismissed the charge and instead investigated Uribe for witness tampering.

While Uribe was initially found guilty and sentenced to 12 years of house arrest, an appeals court ultimately struck down the verdict, citing procedural errors, including insufficient evidence.

Security a top concern

Central to the rift in Colombia’s politics is the country’s six-decade-long internal conflict.

Since 1964, criminal networks, government forces, left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries have all jockeyed against one another for power and territory.

Cepeda has been critical of right-wing efforts to solve the conflict through military might alone.

Instead, he has allied himself with Colombia’s outgoing president, Gustavo Petro, the first left-wing figure ever elected to the country’s highest office.

A former rebel fighter, Petro has championed a policy he calls “Total Peace”, which actively seeks negotiated solutions to the fighting.

While critics have questioned the efficacy of “Total Peace”, pointing to a recent uptick in violence, Cepeda has nevertheless pledged to carry it forward. He represents Petro’s left-wing Historic Pact party in this year’s election.

In an interview this month with CNN, Cepeda acknowledged the policy’s “immense challenges”, saying: “We cannot continue to develop conversations that do not yield clear results.”

But he rejected overly militaristic solutions, as well as the prospect of intervention by the United States. The US-led “war on drugs”, Cepeda said, has “failed spectacularly”.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has embraced the kind of hardline security platform commonly associated with El Salvador’s leader, Nayib Bukele.

His platform includes a pledge to crack down on crime and build 10 megaprisons in Colombia.

Nicknamed “The Tiger”, he founded the Defenders of the Homeland political party and is known to rally with the slogan, “Stand firm for the nation”.

“The only peace process I believe in is one imposed by the force of arms and the laws of the republic,” de la Espriella told The Associated Press news agency this month.

Like US President Donald Trump, de la Espriella has also threatened to launch a bombing campaign to disrupt drug-trafficking, killing suspects by downing planes and shooting boats.

But such campaigns have been widely denounced as a form of extrajudicial killing, effectively denying suspects the chance of defending themselves in a court of law.

Narrowing odds for Colombia’s left

More than 23.6 million Colombians voted in Sunday’s election, though there was a high number of blank or nullified ballots.

Early estimates, with 99 percent of ballots tallied, indicate that 245,342 voting sheets were null, and another 406,830 were left blank.

The second round is likely to be an uphill battle for Cepeda. Colombia’s right-wing is expected to consolidate behind de la Espriella in the second round.

In Sunday’s vote count, more than 10.3 million ballots were cast for de la Espriella, compared with roughly 9.7 million for Cepeda.

A victory for the right would continue a regional trend in Latin America. Last year alone, left-wing governments in Chile, Honduras and Bolivia were all replaced by right-wing presidential contenders.

De la Espriella signalled his optimism about the second round in a social media post as the results rolled in.

“We are going to defeat tyranny and absolutism,” de la Espriella wrote. “We have advanced to the run-off thanks to the more than 10 million Colombians who answered the roar. In 21 days, we will make history!”

Members of Congress are looking to block the U.S. Navy from starting construction of the first nuclear-powered Trump class battleship until the service provides assurances that key weapon systems are “sufficiently mature.” The battleships are to be armed with railguns, high-power laser directed energy weapons, and other advanced weapons that have yet to be fully proven out. Legislators are also looking to compel the Navy to devise a strategy for future subvariants of the FF(X) frigate, including the potential for a version with a built-in Vertical Launch System (VLS). TWZ was first to confirm that the initial FF(X) design would lack a VLS, a decision that has prompted questions and criticism.

The battleship and frigate provisions are included in an early draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2027 Fiscal Year, which the House Armed Services Committee released late yesterday. The Trump class battleship and FF(X) are set to be some of the Navy’s top shipbuilding priorities in the coming years.

Tying the battleship construction timeline to weapon system progress

The section in the proposed legislation regarding the Trump class battleship is brief, reading as follows:

“The Secretary of the Navy may not enter into a contract or other agreement that includes a scope of work for the construction of the lead ship of the Battleship program until the date on which the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that the weapon systems planned for inclusion in such lead ship are at a sufficiently mature technology readiness level.”

The provision does not name any particular weapon systems or define what level of “technology readiness” would be accepted as “sufficiently mature.”

The Navy currently plans to arm the 35,000-ton-displacement Trump class battleships with a mixture of nuclear and conventional missiles, an electromagnetic railgun, a pair of traditional 5-inch naval guns, various laser directed energy weapons, and additional weapon systems for close-in defense. The missiles, which will include hypersonic types, are to be loaded inside very large VLS arrays.

In terms of technological maturity, the railgun presents particular questions. Between 2005 and 2021, the Navy had an active railgun program. Despite promising developments, plans for an at-sea test were repeatedly pushed back before the entire effort was shelved. Major technical hurdles were cited as a key factor in that decision. The railgun itself was effectively placed in storage at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico.

However, it emerged earlier this year that the Navy had conducted a new round of testing of the railgun at WSMR in February 2025. Whether the Navy has any plans to pick up where it left off with this prototype design, which was developed by BAE Systems, or pursue a new one remains unclear. General Atomics, which previously supported U.S. Army railgun efforts, has publicly expressed interest in being involved in arming the Trump class.

While the Navy has been very active in developing and fielding laser directed energy weapons, this is another area where the service has faced continued challenges in expanding their operational use. The plans for the Trump class specifically call for a 300-kilowatt-class laser, which is far more powerful than any of the designs the Navy has integrated on its warships to date. The service currently has eight Arleigh Burke class destroyers with the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN), as well as another one of those warships with the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS). HELIOS is a 60-kilowatt-class design, though there has been talk about scaling up its power rating to 150 kilowatts. ODIN’s power rating does not appear to be officially confirmed, but it is understood to be significantly lower than that of HELIOS. You can read more about all of this here.

The Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) hypersonic missile, another key component of the future Trump class arsenal, is also still in development. The first test launch from a warship, the stealth destroyer USS Zumwalt, is expected to come next year. IRCPS is the Navy half of a joint program with the U.S. Army, which is working to field a land-based version of the same missile. The Army refers to its complete weapon system as the Dark Eagle. The Army had suffered significant setbacks in the past with the Dark Eagle, but the service had blamed those issues on the launcher rather than the missile.

More context about what planned weapons systems for the Trump class may have prompted the House Armed Services Committee to include this section in the draft NDAA are likely to emerge as the proposed bill is refined. Nuclear propulsion and other planned aspects of the ship could present their own challenges during development and production. The U.S. Navy has not procured a nuclear-powered surface combatant of any kind since the Cold War.

For its part, the Navy has said it will leverage significant prior work on weapons and other systems to help reduce risk and ensure the battleship program remains on schedule.

“We intend to, with all we can do, use pull-through technologies, [including] things from that we’ve worked on with DDG(X),” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle said at a hearing earlier this month. “It will have the SPY-6 radar. It will have the Baseline 10 Aegis combat system. It will pull through, of course, the A1B Ford class reactor plant and all the design that goes with that. The only thing inherently new to it will be the actual hull itself, and so most of the fixtures in it. And I would say the directed energy [weapons] and up gunning, that will also be new.”

One of the “mistakes that we’ve done before, quite frankly,” is “we’ve started to build before the design is mature enough,” the CNO also said at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Navy League’s Sea Air Space 2026 in April. “And we want to make sure that we’re at [sic] least a very, very high level – I won’t try to give a percentage, but you can think like 80% or more design – before the first weld is done.”

The Navy is understood to still be in the very early phases of laying out the Trump class design.

The provision in the draft NDAA could easily delay the start of work on the first of these battleships, which could set back the entire schedule for the program. As it stands now, the Navy is looking to order the lead ship, set to be named the USS Defiant, in Fiscal Year 2028. With an estimated price tag of $17 billion, this ship would cost more than each of the next three Ford class aircraft carriers, and is not expected to enter service in 2036. The Navy also currently plans to buy 14 more battleships between Fiscal Years 2029 and 2055. As TWZ has previously explored in detail, many significant questions remain about the future of the Trump class, including whether the program will ultimately come to fruition at all.

Plans for future FF(X) frigate subvariants

In its current form, the draft NDAA would also require the Secretary of the Navy to “submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy for the iterative development of the FF(X) class frigate” within 180 days of the bill becoming law. The Secretary would also be compelled to provide a briefing to update legislators on their progress in devising this strategy within 90 days.

The strategy would have to include the following:

• “Information on the estimated timeline for each planned variant (commonly known as a ‘‘Flight’’) of the FF(X) class frigate”
• “Details on the integration of additional capabilities for future Flights of the frigate, such as vertical launch systems or improved sensors, and implications for the space, weight, power, and cost of the hull form.”
• Any additional mission sets or combat functions that may be added to the concept of operation for FF(X) class frigates.”

The Navy has already confirmed that the FF(X) design will based on that of the Legend class cutter currently in service with the U.S. Coast Guard. As mentioned, the fact that the first of these frigates, at least, will lack a VLS array has raised significant questions about this program.

The FF(X) configuration that has been shown so far will have essentially the same integrated armament as the Navy’s much-maligned Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The limitations of both subclasses of LCS explicitly led the Navy to pursue the Constellation class frigate. Despite the Constellation class being based on the established Franco-Italian Fregate Europea Multi-Missione (FREMM; European Multi-Mission Frigate in English), repeated design changes turned the program into a boondoggle. It was finally cancelled last November.

The Constellation class would have featured a 32-cell Mk 41 VLS array. There had already been a debate about whether this was sufficient VLS capacity to meet operational requirements, something TWZ previously explored in detail.

The Navy’s current stated vision for the Flight I FF(X) configuration is to utilize containerized weapons and other systems to make up for gaps in integrated capabilities. The frigates are also expected to act as motherships for future fleets of uncrewed surface vessels, which could provide additional distributed weapons and sensor capabilities and capacity.

“While Flight I of the FF(X) Class (currently planned as at least the first 2 ships) does not incorporate a traditional fixed VLS battery, it retains the capability to deploy VLS-equivalent payloads through modular, mission-tailored configurations,” according to the Navy’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request. “This approach provides an inherent growth path for VLS and other capabilities through containerized solutions in early flights, reinforcing the platform’s adaptability while mitigating cost, schedule, and integration risks associated with fixed VLS installation.”

A containerized VLS, in particular, would be far more limited in capacity than a traditional built-in Mk 41 and Mk 57 array.

At the same time, the Navy’s budget documents make clear that there are already plans for “studies for future flights [that] will consider expanded capabilities including Vertical Launch Systems, and Anti-Submarine Warfare systems.”

Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the shipbuilder behind the Legend class design on which the FF(X) will be based, has shown multiple concepts for derivatives with integrated VLS arrays and other additional capabilities in the past, as seen in the video below.

Patrol Frigate Variants – Information Video

When it comes to the battleship and FF(X) provisions in the draft NDAA, it is also important to remember that this legislation is not yet finalized and could easily change in the weeks and months ahead. The House’s version of the bill will also need to be reconciled with what the Senate puts forward, a process often marked by lengthy negotiations. The House and Senate will both need to pass the finalized version, and then the President has to sign it into law.

As the name makes clear, the battleship program is of particular significance to President Donald Trump, which will be an important factor in these processes. Even before his first term, Trump had expressed interest in returning battleships to the Navy’s combat fleets, but there had been no indications of any formal moves to pursue this ship before last year. With the schedule the Navy has laid out now, major decisions about how to proceed in the production of these ships, if at all, will fall to the next administration. There are already massive competing priorities, and some members of Congress have already questioned whether the battleship effort is the best use of available resources.

It’s also worth noting here that Trump has long been very outspoken when it comes to Navy shipbuilding design decisions, especially from an aesthetic perspective.

The House Armed Services Committee has at least taken steps now toward putting a hold on production of the first Trump class battleship until it is confident that key weapon systems are mature, as well as pushing the Navy to lay a formal plan for future versions of the FF(X) frigate.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Gaza will not forget

The suffocating smoke still hangs over her ruins, thick with the acrid stench of explosives powder and dust carrying the scent of betrayal and the mark of courage. Her streets, once filled with children’s laughter, became Israeli fields of slaughter. Now they echo with the names and memories of martyrs.

The mass graves, the broken concrete, and the twisted steel are not just evidence of Zionist hatred. They are witnesses to those who stood with her, and to those who failed her. Today, Gaza’s rubble holds more memories than all the nation’s libraries.

Palestine will remember

She will remember the selfless sacrifices of doctors and healthcare workers who refused to abandon their sick patients as bombs rained on their hospitals; the journalists who became the news, targeted for daring to expose the truth; the mothers who wrapped their children in the red, black, green, and white flag of a nation Israel is desperate to erase.

These are not tales of despair, but of defiance, insisting on its right to breathe life amid death.

Gaza will not forget

She will not forget the silence of Western democracies. In a tragic inversion, most European nations, shackled by the ghosts of their past, traded morality for absolution. The self-proclaimed champions of human rights offered Palestinians on the altar of yesterday’s victims to atone for Europe’s sins.

Gaza will not forget the Biden administration, which vetoed every U.N. Security Council resolution calling to end the genocide. Nor Donald Trump, who poured fuel on the fire, then demanded recognition for dousing his own flames.

This week, Arab, Muslim, and world leaders gather like moths around the American arsonist-turned-firefighter, “celebrating” the ashes of Gaza.

Palestine will remember

She will remember the people who rose for Gaza, from Yemen to Dublin, from Cape Town to London and Madrid, while Arab capitals from Cairo to Riyadh slept. Ireland and Spain led the boycott, while Arab countries from the Gulf to Jordan opened their ports and highways to provide alternative routes for Israeli goods, even as Yemen imposed a sea blockade in the Red Sea.

Gaza will not forget — nor forgive — the Arab governments that opened their ports when shipyard workers in Italy refused, delivering American weapons used to annihilate her children and destroy her hospitals.

Palestine will remember

She will remember South Africa — not an Arab or Muslim nation — that led her case before the International Court of Justice, charging Israel with genocide. A country once scarred by apartheid became the moral conscience of a world too timid to speak. In that act of solidarity, South Africa rekindled the universal truth that justice knows no borders.

Palestine will remember the Lebanese resistance that gave its leaders for Gaza’s defense; Yemen, poor in wealth but rich in dignity, whose solidarity never wavered; and Iran, steadfast against Israeli hubris. She will remember Ireland and Spain, who did not turn away when Arabs did, proving that true solidarity transcends borders, faith, and kinship, resting only on shared humanity.

She will remember the heroes of the flotillas who braved waves of hatred and siege to carry messages of compassion; the nameless volunteers who left the safety of their countries to heal the wounded and feed the hungry; the American students who turned campuses into encampments of resistance; the artists, actors, and musicians who risked careers for justice; the employees who lost their jobs protesting the complicity of Google, Microsoft, and other tech giants in Israel’s crimes.

Gaza will not forget those who betrayed her

Palestine will forever be grateful to those who dared to speak the truth when it was dangerous, who marched when it was forbidden, who grieved when it was unfashionable.

Palestine will remember. History will remember. Justice will remember.

For nearly two years, Gaza has endured a genocide so relentless it defies descriptive language. Israel’s war machine has turned hospitals into morgues, UN schools into mass graves, and refugee camps into craters. Yet Gaza refuses to die.

Each time she is bombed “back to the Stone Age,” she rises — like the phoenix — to rebuild, not only her structures but her indomitable will. In that defiance lies the occupier’s greatest fear: memory.

Israel can destroy buildings but not erase remembrance. The siege may starve Gaza’s body, but it nourishes Palestine’s collective soul.

Gaza’s children will grow up with memories no child should bear. But they will also inherit something indestructible: dignity. In every demolished home and every shattered family lives a story that refuses burial.

Gaza’s memory will not fade. For the mind, unlike stone, cannot be occupied. It is the eternal archive of a people’s resilience, passed from one generation to the next, weaving the indelible tapestry of Palestine today.

The ruins of Gaza stand not only as testimony to Israel’s genocide but to the moral collapse of those who enabled it.

Gaza will rise again, brick by brick.

But what will never be resurrected is the Israeli lie, which, for eight decades, cloaked the Zionist project in the guise of victimhood, occupying Western narratives and manufacturing consent.

Gaza will rise — and the Israeli myth will remain buried beneath her rubble, forever.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

With the pan-European Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which is supposed to include a crewed New Generation Fighter (NGF) aircraft, mired in difficulty, Airbus has raised the possibility of teaming with Saab on the manned tactical component of it — the fighter. As well as France and Germany, Spain is a part of the pan-European FCAS as a junior partner, while Belgium has also joined it. The recent statements mark one of the clearest indications yet that Airbus is actively exploring post-FCAS alternatives, or, at the least, a major overhaul of the program’s structure.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Airbus Defense Summit at Airbus Defense & Space’s Manching site near Munich last week, that company’s CEO, Michael Schoellhorn, said that he was keen to cooperate with Sweden and Saab on a new fighter.

Schoellhorn’s words were provided in an exclusive interview by Johan Wendel, a reporter and analyst for the Swedish Dagens Industri financial newspaper.

At this point, it’s worth recalling that the FCAS nomenclature is also used by the British and Swedish future combat air initiatives. The British effort is now mainly known as the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP).

FCAS System of Systems

Noting that FCAS was in trouble in its current guise, he confirmed that Airbus has been in contact with both the Swedish and German governments on the issue, with “productive but confidential” discussions.

“We are open to a number of things. For Airbus, the crewed fighter aircraft is still an open question,” Schoellhorn told Dagens Industri, when asked if the company is considering developing a crewed fighter together with Saab.

The Airbus boss then reiterated that the company “will be involved in the development of a sixth-generation fighter aircraft.”

Schoellhorn recently visited Sweden and reflected that “Sweden and Saab are candidates with extensive expertise” in the field of fighter design and production. “We have difficulties that everyone knows about. That is why it is time to actively explore other options, which is what we are now doing,” he added, in reference to the FCAS program.

As TWZ only recently reported, questions around FCAS continue to grow.

For a long time, tensions have been evident within the FCAS program, with its two main partners, France and Germany, increasingly at odds. German defense officials are reportedly frustrated by what they see as disproportionate French demands for control and workshare in the project. For a while now, there have been reports that Germany is exploring alternative paths, including the possibility of separating itself from France within the program entirely.

Within France, Dassault CEO Éric Trappier recently declared the FCAS project dead if Airbus refuses to cooperate, while President Emmanuel Macron has made efforts to resuscitate the program.

Now, Sweden, with its position as a builder of tactical aircraft in the West, has emerged as a possible lifeline for FCAS, something that Schoellhorn acknowledged to Dagens Industri.

“We will be involved in the development of such an aircraft. The structure within FCAS could be improved. That could lead to two fighter aircraft within FCAS, or to another form of cooperation, and Sweden and Saab are candidates with extensive expertise in this field.”

When asked whether this was an Airbus tactic to put pressure on Dassault, Schöllhorn pointed to “many” previous cooperations between his company and Saab.

“We are not flirting,” he added. “We want to build sixth-generation fighter aircraft as soon as possible. I do not want to see sixth-generation fighter aircraft bought from the United States, as Europe did with the fifth generation.”

Here, he pointed to the growing customer base for the U.S.-made F-35 in Europe and the prospect that, in the future, the sixth-generation F-47 might also be offered for export in the region, although this might only be in a watered-down form.

Of course, GCAP, the British-led rival to FCAS, with the Tempest crewed fighter as its centerpiece, could be another option, but there are big questions surrounding the future of that program, too. As well as the United Kingdom, GCAP involves Italy and Japan.

“We must act now,” Schöllhorn said, to prevent Europe from looking beyond the pan-European FCAS for its next crewed fighter.

“If we are to have something that can be called sixth generation and that is airborne before the 2040s, we have to act now. We are waiting impatiently to see what the politicians will decide. If we are still in limbo at the end of the year, that would be very challenging,” Schöllhorn added.

As for GCAP, in which Sweden previously had a limited involvement, before stepping away from it, Schöllhorn also refused to rule out rolling the different projects together.

“GCAP is an existing alternative that could be considered,” he explained. “The defense industry submits proposals; the politicians decide what is to be done.”

Then there is the drone issue, or, more accurately, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft, or CCA, issue.

While cooperative projects to develop fighters and their surrounding ecosystems have floundered, CCAs, as a concept, have forged ahead.

“Everyone has seen the need for CCA. There is a European race underway to find the model for CCA in various European countries,” said Schöllhorn.

The Airbus CEO underlined the fact that the company is also developing combat drones and that future uncrewed fighters are part of the plan. “There will not be a one-size-fits-all solution,” Schöllhorn added. “Perhaps we should not all go into the same niche, such as air-to-ground. The goal is to deliver the versatility, but also the scale that Europe will need.”

Airbus and Kratos are already pitching the stealthy XQ-58A Valkyrie drone to Germany, and Airbus has also been working on a stealthy CCA-like concept of its own, known as Wingman. Meanwhile, Boeing Australia has teamed up with Rheinmetall, the largest arms manufacturer in Germany, to offer the MQ-28 Ghost Bat drone to the German military.

Once again, Sweden could provide a key partner to Airbus on CCA-type developments, whether part of a broader FCAS effort or separate.

As we have reported in the past, Sweden is also moving ahead with plans for a new-generation combat aircraft, with Saab undertaking continued conceptual studies for future fighter systems. However, it remains unclear if there will definitely be a crewed successor to the Swedish Air Force’s current Gripen fighter, or if the ongoing studies will lead to a combat air ‘ecosystem’ comprised of different types of drones. A combination of crewed and uncrewed platforms remains possible, too.

Interestingly, Schöllhorn also put forward the possibility of Airbus working alongside Sweden for the airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) segment, specifically Saab’s GlobalEye aircraft.

“If we were to join forces, we could be a very capable team that could contribute many future capabilities,” said Schöllhorn of this idea.

The CEO noted that a NATO procurement decision on its future AEW&C platform is currently under review. Meanwhile, France has chosen the GlobalEye to replace its E-3F Sentry Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) fleet.

Millions of Ethiopians are heading to the polls for general elections on June 1.

The governing party of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who has consolidated power since he took office in 2018, says it is confident of victory.

Abiy’s government has faced years of turmoil and conflict. Despite that, it is portraying the vote as the next step on the path towards what it calls genuine democracy.

Critics and the opposition, however, argue that is unlikely because of Ethiopia’s ethnic and regional divisions. Some opposition parties have been excluded and violence is preventing voting in dozens of constituencies.

So, will the vote hold any significance?

Presenter: Mohammed Jamjoom

Guests:

Samuel Getachew – Journalist and commentator specialising in Ethiopian politics and security

Martin Plaut – Senior research fellow at King’s College London

Bizuneh Yimenu – Lecturer in comparative politics at Queen’s University Belfast who specialises in federalism.

Nine people have reportedly been rescued from the rubble of a collapsed five-storey building in New Delhi, India.

Some victims’ families are still awaiting news of their relatives as rescuers continue searching.