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Bleeding from injuries incurred ejecting from his F-15E Strike Eagle fighter and climbing a craggy mountain to escape, the U.S. Air Force Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) hid out in a crevice as both rescuers and Iranians frantically searched for him. Monday afternoon, President Donald Trump and Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered new details about the complex and dangerous missions to rescue the WSO and pilot – call signs DUDE44 Bravo and DUDE44 Alpha – whose Strike Eagle had been shot down April 3, the first loss of crewed aircraft to enemy fire during Epic Fury. While they offered the government’s take on events, other details emerged that we will address later in this story.

These rescue missions involved hundreds of troops, scores of aircraft and diversion operations over more than a half dozen different parts of Iran. It required risking the lives of many of those personnel to recover the two airmen.

President Trump News Conference After U.S. Airmen Rescue in Iran

The WSO’s recovery occurred on Easter Sunday some 50 hours after being shot down. It all began in the early morning hours of April 3 in Iran. After the F-15E was shot down, officials at U.S. Central Command received a message that would kick start the operation.

“A U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle, call sign DUDE44… was down in hostile Iranian territory, the pilot and weapon systems officer had both safely ejected and were isolated behind enemy lines,” Caine told reporters during a White House briefing. “Following confirmation of active rescue beacons, and on the direction of the Secretary [of War Pete Hegseth] and by order of the President, a rescue operation was launched with the stated purpose of bringing both Americans home safely.”

A US Air Force combat search and rescue (CSAR) task force was quickly spun up, Caine explained. It included 10 A-10C Thunderbolt II close support jets, HC-130J Combat King CSAR planes, HH-60W Jolly Green II CSAR helicopters and Air Force special operations airmen.

“A package comprised of combat rescue officers and pararescuemen operators audaciously penetrated enemy territory in broad daylight to find, fix and recover DUDE44 Alpha from behind enemy lines,” Caine proffered.

As the CSAR package, protected by a fighter strike package, crossed into Iran, “A-10s and …drones and other tactical aircraft were violently suppressing and engaging the enemy in a close in gunfight to keep them away from the front seater and allow the pickup force to get into the objective area,” Caine noted. During this engagement, one of the A-10s – “the one primarily responsible for communicating with the downed pilot, was hit by enemy fire,” said Caine. “This pilot continued to fight, continued the mission, and then upon exit, flew his aircraft into another country and determined that the airplane was not landable… The pilot then made the decision to eject over friendly territory, and was quickly and safely recovered and is doing fine.”

After picking up the F-15E pilot, the HH 60W Jolly Green “was engaged by every single person in Iran who had a small arms weapon, and one of the aircraft, the trailing aircraft, took several hits,” Caine told reporters. “The crew sustained minor injury, and they are going to be fine.”

“The A-10 force and the rescue force did a fantastic job rescuing DUDE44 Alpha,” Caine continued. “He was recovered Friday afternoon, as I said, and the nation needs to know this. This was an incredibly brave and courageous mission, and a testament to the courage, skill and tenacity of the joint force and our leaders, and especially a daylight option.”

Rescuing the pilot was only the first step. The WSO was still out there, alone and being hunted by the military and civilians. Officials in Tehran put out a large bounty for his recovery. If was captured or killed, it would have been a tremendous propaganda coup for Iran and a huge problem for America.

“Meanwhile, the second crew member, the weapon system officer, a highly respected colonel, had landed a significant distance away from the pilot,” Trump explained. “When you’re going at those speeds, even if you go out two or three seconds later, it’s miles and miles away, because you’re going fast.”

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The WSO “was injured quite badly and stranded in an area teeming with terrorists from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a rough group, as well as the Basij militia and local authorities,” recounted Trump, who was watching it all unfold in real time. “Despite the peril, the officer followed his training and climbed into the treacherous mountain terrain and started climbing toward a higher altitude, something they were trained to do in order to evade capture.”

“He scaled cliff faces bleeding rather profusely, treated his own wounds and contacted American forces to transmit his location,” the president continued. “They have a very sophisticated beeper type apparatus that is on them at all times.”

The WSO was located thanks in large measure to help from the CIA.

“As an agency, the CIA possesses unique capabilities that only the president can deploy,” said its director, John Ratcliffe, who also spoke at the presser. “Some of these capabilities fall under covert action authorities, and because covert means exactly that I’m not going to be able to tell you everything that you want to know. At the President’s direction, we deployed both human assets and exquisite technologies that no other intelligence service in the world possesses to a daunting challenge, comparable to hunting for a single grain of sand in the middle of a desert.”

Trump praised Ratcliffe and the agency.

“And John Ratcliffe was incredible,” the president proffered. “It was actually their genius that called us from – he was 40 miles away – and he said, ‘you know, we’re seeing something moving up in a mountain.’ It’s at night And they kept the camera on for 45 minutes. He wasn’t moving. And they said, ‘you know, probably wrong, but we’re seeing something moving.’ This a man, vast mountain, vast thick with bushes, trees. He said, ‘We see something moving 40 miles away…I’m telling you, it’s moving.’ And then all of a sudden, 45 minutes later, he moved a lot, stood up, and they said, ‘we have him.’”

“And that was really the beginning of something incredible,” Trump added. “We had an idea where he was, but not specifically. That’s big mountain. So I want to thank the CIA too. I don’t think they get enough credit for the great job they’ve done.”

Once the WSO was located, “[w]e immediately mobilized a massive operation to retrieve him from the mountain,” Trump continued. “He kept going higher and higher. The mountain kept getting rougher and rougher, and was really, very, very hard to find. The second rescue mission involved 155 aircraft, including four bombers, 64 fighters, 48 refueling tankers, 13 rescue aircraft and more.”

All these assets, however, weren’t just for the spot where the WSO was located. Many of these aircraft were taking part in diversion efforts to throw Iranians off the trail. 

“We were bringing them all over, and a lot of it was subterfuge,” Trump stated. “We wanted to have them think he was in a different location, because they had a vast military force out there, thousands and thousands of people were looking. So we wanted them to look in different areas. So we were scattered all over, like we were right on top of them. We had seven different locations where they thought, and they were very confused. They said, ‘Well, wait a minute, they’ve got groups here. They’ve got groups there.’”

As the WSO hid, the military had created a forward arming and refueling point on a farm, Trump noted. You can read more about how the Air Force would set up and defend such a location in our interview with a former Air Force Special Tactics Squadron airman here.

That location, the president proffered, was less than ideal for such operations, which involved landing two heavily loaded MC-130J Commando II special operations cargo planes that included several H-6 Little Bird special operations helicopters among other equipment in their holds.

“This was not much of a runway,” the president stated, adding that the ground was wet and sandy, making landing, and especially takeoff, a challenge. “This was a farm, not a runway. It’s a farm. But it did the trick.”

After the wounded WSO was found, he was whisked back to the FARP, but getting him and the aircraft brought in to help find him was a tremendous challenge.

Trump said that with the MC-130s stuck in the wet, sandy soil, “we blew them up to smithereens.” The Little Birds were also blown up in place as well, because the aircraft that replaced the Commando IIs weren’t capable of exfilling them.

To replace the C-130s, “lighter, faster aircraft came in, and they took them out,” Trump said about the personnel and equipment. He was almost certainly referring to the CASA C-295W, a short take off and landing (STOL) twin turboprop that are modified for the special operations role.

A video has previously emerged said to show a C-295W flying at extremely low altitude in the general vicinity of the crash site. The U.S. Air Force operates a handful of these aircraft, likely assigned to the secretive 427th Special Operations Squadron. This unit is known to specialize in covert and clandestine infiltration and exfiltration missions, among other duties.

You can see that video below.

During the press conference, Trump pointed out not everyone in the military was in agreement that the U.S. should commit so many resources, human and equipment, to such a dangerous effort to rescue two men.

“There was military people, very professional, that preferred not doing it,” explained the president. “There were military people that said, ‘you just don’t do this. You don’t go into the heart of a very powerful military.’”

Trump of course listened instead to Caine and Hegseth, each of whom implored him to green light the missions.

Now with the official account of the mission behind us, here are some additional details about the rescue that were reported elsewhere.

The communication device the airmen used was the CSEL, or Combat Survivor Evader Locator, according to Ynet. The manufacturer, Boeing, describes it as being “like a global 911 emergency call system for downed personnel, providing U.S. forces with a tactical advantage.”

The CSEL system uses a flexible, modular communications architecture over multiple satellite links for secure communications and sends simple messages in bursts, with a low probability of intercept (LPI). These messages can include basic information about the status of the downed airman. It can then switch to less stealthy line-of-sight radio when extraction forces are nearby.

Last month, images hit the internet showing a very stealthy, extremely long-endurance, very high-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drone commonly (and unofficially) referred to as the RQ-180, or an evolution thereof, landing at a base in Greece. Many questions remain about the uncrewed aircraft and why it might be operating from Larissa Air Base.

However, as we noted in our initial reporting, the current conflict with Iran would be a very relevant fit for what the RQ-180 was likely designed to do. Furthermore, a secretive late Cold War-era drone program known as Quartz, intended to persistently monitor mobile nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles deep within the Soviet Union, offers a window into exactly why the RQ-180 could be in high demand in the Middle East now. There is no higher-priority standing mission for Operation Epic Fury at this time than finding and destroying Iranian launchers.

In many ways, the shadowy Quartz program from decades ago was a progenitor for what became a very large flying wing uncrewed aircraft that shares the planform of the B-21 (and the original B-2 design) and is likely at least part of the RQ-180’s origin story.

Strange arrival over Greece

To recap quickly, on March 18, local Greek news website onlarissa.gr first published pictures of what it misidentified as a B-2 bomber landing at Larissa Air Base, also known as Larissa National Airport. The base, which belongs to the Hellenic Air Force, but is also known to host U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drones, is situated in the city of the same name.

Onlarissa.gr outlet followed up its initial reporting by posting a video of the drone, seen below. Additional and increasingly more detailed imagery has subsequently emerged.

Το αμερικανικό βομβαρδιστικό Β-2 πάνω από τον ουρανό της Λάρισας

Per onlarissa.gr, the highly exotic aircraft had landed at Larissa after experiencing some kind of technical issue, citing unnamed sources. This remains unconfirmed, but it would explain why the drone touched down in broad daylight, rather than coming in under the cover of darkness. It could also have diverted there with an emergency, while operating out of another location, even one in the continental United States. It is worth noting that Larissa Air Base appears to have unique facilities built in recent years that seem to be very well suited for housing an aircraft like this.

TWZ previously reached out to U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the Pentagon for comment, but has not received any responses as of the time of writing. In a story published on March 24, Air & Space Forces Magazine said U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also declined to comment.

Attention was also subsequently called to U.S. Air Force cargo planes having been tracked making unusual flights from Edwards Air Force Base in California to Larissa recently. One of those flights came on February 25, while another one occurred on March 9. A C-5M also flew to Larissa from Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma on February 25, according to Aviation Week. Whether there is any connection between these flights and the drone spotted at the base has not been confirmed at this time. Edwards is the Air Force’s main hub for aviation test and evaluation efforts, and flight testing of the RQ-180 was reportedly at least managed from there in the 2010s. The Air Force could also have moved other assets to Larissa via Edwards.

The shadowy state of the ‘RQ-180’

The current state of the RQ-180, or any designs that have evolved from it, on a programmatic level, is very murky. In addition to testing at Edwards, past reports have said that a unit at Beale Air Force Base in California began flying the drones operationally, at least on a limited level, by 2019. There has been talk of a large flying wing aircraft similar in configuration to the B-21 Raider bomber flying out of Plant 42 in Palmdale, also in California, under the cover of darkness for years.

There are very strong indications that a photograph that appeared on Instagram in October 2020 of an unmanned aircraft flying in the skies over California’s Mojave Desert near Edwards Air Force Base was the first sighting of an RQ-180. That picture also notably showed a drone with an overall white paint scheme. That aligned with a report from Aviation Week that the design had gained the nicknames “Great White Bat” and “Shikaka.” The latter of these is the name of a fictional sacred white bat that is at the center of the plot of the 1995 Jim Carrey comedy Ace Ventura 2. The drone seen recently flying over Larissa has an overall black or otherwise dark-colored paint job. TWZ has noted previously that an overall white/cream/light pastel color scheme could help the drone to hide better at high altitudes during the day, but that a dark scheme would be more relevant at night. It is very possible, if not probable, that multiple schemes have been tested for a drone expected to fly sorties lasting multiple days.

It has long been thought that the RQ-180 could be a much-discussed, more survivable replacement for the non-stealthy RQ-4 Global Hawk drone, the vast majority of which are now retired. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force, now together with the U.S. Space Force, has been engaged in a major effort to push more surveillance capabilities, including exactly some of what the RQ-180 is likely intended to do, into space. This has led to public force structure changes and deferrals of traditional airborne sensing capabilities, and could have resulted in the stealthy high altitude, long-endurance (HALE) drone program being scaled back.

There certainly has been no clear evidence, at Beale or anywhere else, of the establishment of the kind of infrastructure that one would associate with the RQ-180 reaching a more advanced operational state and serial production. It is possible that the drone could share facilities with the B-21 under the larger umbrella of the Long Range Strike (LRS) family of systems. The RQ-180 is very likely intended, in part, to work in concert with the Raider, and there may even be some commonality between the two aircraft. The RQ-180 and/or related designs very likely played a direct role in risk reduction efforts that helped sell the Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) concept, and possibly the win by Northrop Grumman of that contract.

B-21 Takeoff and Landing

So, where the RQ-180 stands in terms of its overall capacity and its future remains unclear, but they are clearly being used on operational sorties, at least in a limited manner.

Iranian missile threats persist

After more than five weeks of fighting, the conflict with Iran is still grinding on. Despite the United States and Israel having substantially degraded the ability of Iranian forces to launch retaliatory missile and drone strikes, they have not stopped entirely. Iran has been digging out underground missile bases struck by American and Israeli forces and getting them back into operation, sometimes within hours, The New York Times reported just last Friday, citing U.S. intelligence reports. That followed other reports stating that Iran still retains a vast arsenal of missiles and drones, as well as a significant number of launchers to fire them.

In recent weeks, publicly available data from multiple sources has, at times, shown relatively small, but noticeable upticks in Iran’s launches. There are also signs that more of those threats are evading interception, though whether this has translated to more damage and/or casualties from impacts is unclear.

When it comes to launchers, Iran has invested heavily over the years in road mobile designs for firing ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones. This includes types that can be hard to distinguish from normal civilian trucks, especially those used for launching short-range ballistic missiles.

✈️🎯60+ strike flights: The IAF completed additional waves of strikes in western Iran targeting the Iranian regime’s missile launchers, defense systems, and live-fire arrays. pic.twitter.com/I1rRLBJlUR

— Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) March 3, 2026

Iran also has extensive underground ‘missile cities’ and other hardened sites that launchers can sprint to and from, and even fire from within in some cases. Beyond the main missile storage and launch sites, Iranian authorities have clearly had plans to disperse these weapons across the country. Reports have said that more authority to employ them has been delegated to lower echelons of command to minimize the impacts of separate U.S. and Israeli strikes on command and control nodes, as well.

On top of all this, Iran still has longer-ranged ballistic missiles that it can fire from areas further to the east, where the volume of U.S. and Israeli strikes has only more recently begun to grow. What’s left of Iran’s air defenses, which presents a real threat, is therefore likely to be more intact in those regions. In general, many of Iran’s air defense systems are also road mobile and can pop-up suddenly. All of this creates challenges for finding and fixing Iran’s remaining launch capacity, let alone neutralizing it.

Three weeks of Operation Epic Fury.

The Joint Force owns the skies, but Tehran holds the Strait. Additional U.S. fighter aircraft and naval assets arrived in both theaters, and Marine expeditionary forces are en route.

8,000+ Iranian targets and 130+ ships struck, per CENTCOM. pic.twitter.com/Xk8XYs1sP2

— Ian Ellis (@ianellisjones) March 23, 2026

The Israeli Air Force has dropped over 16,000 bombs in Iran since the start of the war, in over 800 waves of strikes, the military says.

According to the IDF, over 10,000 separate strikes have been carried out on 4,000 targets. pic.twitter.com/gkU4rW4s8T

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) April 1, 2026

In this context, there is a clear need to be able to readily detect launchers, which can pop out suddenly and unexpectedly from cover, across vast areas. Known missile storage sites and launch areas around them also need to be persistently surveilled. The ability to find launchers faster opens up new options for striking them. Just tracking and recording their typical movements would also help further refine interdiction and intelligence-gathering strategies going forward.

As TWZ has previously explored in great depth, the RQ-180 is best understood as a very high-flying, very long-endurance, and very stealthy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance platform that is capable of penetrating and persisting deep into enemy airspace. Its primary means of achieving that mission would be a radar with ground moving target indicator (GMTI) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capabilities, but radar would be just the primary component of a larger sensor package, which would likely include powerful electro-optical sensors and passive radiofrequency ones.

At its most basic, GMTI allows battle managers to see the enemy’s ground movements in real-time and then quickly adapt their game plan to counter those enemy forces before they can ever attack, or even pose a threat to friendly forces. GMTI is also a critical capability for detecting changes in force posture, establishing patterns of enemy movements over time, and identifying new targets of interest. Modern GMTI products can also be looped into a ‘kill web’ for rapid targeting purposes.

Some of this is also achieved through the aforementioned SAR mode, which basically provides a satellite-like image of a target area using radar. It also has the ability to see some things optical systems cannot, and, like GMTI, it can work under nearly all atmospheric conditions, day or night. When paired with GMTI, SAR can be used to help positively identify targets, as well as gain better situational awareness about the targets being tracked.

Passive electronic intelligence collection that allows for radiofrequency-emitters to be quickly detected and geolocated via onboard antennas and interferometry-based computing is another part of the equation. Long-range optical sensors can also provide higher-fidelity intelligence and spot movements of infrared signatures over large areas. You can imagine how fuzing all these capabilities together, combined with advanced networking, on a single platform could be incredibly potent. Basically, detecting a target or target group of interest, and then training advanced sensors on it to rapidly build up a high-quality understanding of what is going on and even to provide real-time targeting data to ‘shooters’ would be this aircraft’s bread and butter.

All of these are capabilities that would be ideally suited to the very high-priority task at hand of searching for Iranian launchers across the country’s vast terrain.

This all brings us back to Quartz and the very specific mission set that drove that program. Quartz is the best-known codename for a drone conceived as part of what was officially dubbed the Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance System, or AARS program.

The lead-up to Quartz

AARS/Quartz was itself born out of a succession of earlier developments. Proving that using a stealth platform to penetrate enemy air defenses and to stay over contested territory for hours on end while transmitting data collected without being detected is one of the biggest revolutions in warfare of the 20th Century. This capability was demonstrated on the tactical side at the dawn of stealth technology by Northrop’s Tacit Blue. That aircraft was developed as part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) highly classified Battlefield Surveillance Aircraft-Experimental (BSAX) program, which began in the late 1970s. 

Tacit Blue notably served as a periphery risk reduction effort for the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) program that would result in the B-2. However, its reason for being was to show that a stealthy aircraft carrying a huge radar can penetrate enemy air defenses and loiter for prolonged periods of time, collecting GMTI radar data and other intelligence information.

The radar for BSAX was a low probability of intercept design that had come from Pave Mover, another DARPA effort. Pave Mover ultimately led to the non-stealthy and now-retired E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, but offshoots of that radar technology did end up elsewhere, including on the B-2. Low probability of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) radars and communications suites are now key tenets of stealth aircraft design, in general. Keeping signal emissions, which an enemy can use to spot and track threats, to a minimum is critical for low-observable (stealthy) aircraft designs. Pave Mover was also tied into DARPA’s Assault Breaker program, which focused on proving out various technologies to enable standoff targeting of enemy forces, especially large Soviet armored formations on the move, deep behind the front lines.

The famously ugly Tacit Blue, also nicknamed the “Whale,” produced results that were revolutionary, as you can read more about here. Even the most capable existing penetrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft available at the time, like the SR-71 Blackbird, could only take a snapshot in time of the enemy and its posture. Satellites were far more predictable and could only provide the same ‘moment in time’ intelligence, and in a much less flexible manner. Tacit Blue could watch for hours with the enemy not even knowing it was there.

This meant the quality of intelligence Tacit Blue was capable of collecting was of far greater value. Metaphorically speaking, the SR-71 was like documenting a wedding by loudly running through a crowd and snapping a few photos. Tacit Blue was like rolling hours of videotape at the same wedding by an invisible cameraman. It was an absolute game-changer. The information was also transmitted securely using a LPI data link in near-real-time so that it could be rapidly exploited, not once the aircraft returned to base.

A drone to hunt Soviet mobile ballistic missiles

AARS/Quartz can be seen as something of a strategic parallel to the more tactically-minded BSAX effort and the Tacit Blue demonstrator. It was conceived as a cooperative effort between the U.S. Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). NRO, the very existence of which was only declassified in 1992, is and has historically been responsible primarily for intelligence-gathering via satellite. However, it was also involved in ISR drone operations in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration grew concerned about a gap in reconnaissance assets, in the air and in space, to persistently track and monitor Soviet mobile nuclear-armed intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

“As spy satellite systems came on line in the 1960s, they shared the same fundamental operational scheme as the SR-71. Both conducted reconnaissance with relative impunity but were so fast that they only provided episodic coverage. The Soviet system of fixed air bases, missile silos, and command centers of the Cold War’s first 30 years favored ‘fast pass’ reconnaissance, however, so its weaknesses were not evident until the strategic equation shifted in the late 1970s,” Thomas Ehrhard wrote in a monograph, titled Air Force UAVs: The Secret History, which the Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies published in 2010. “Soviet mobile missiles (both nuclear and air-to-air) and the advance of aviation technology opened the door for a true loitering surveillance UAV called AARS.”

Ehrhard pointed to three missiles as particular drivers behind the AARS program. The first of these was the road-mobile RSD-10 Pioneer, known in the West as the SS-20 Saber, a nuclear-armed intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with three warheads in a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) configuration. The SS-20 had an immensely destabilizing impact on the security environment in Europe. Its appearance was a central factor in the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987.

Contemporary reports said that the Soviets were also looking into an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) based on the SS-20, which itself may have been the result of an abortive ICBM program. After the Soviet Union fell, Russia subsequently developed the RS-26 Rubezh, which it described as an ICBM, but many believed it to actually be an IRBM akin to the SS-20. The INF treaty ultimately collapsed in 2019, rendering the issue moot. Five years later, a new Russian intermediate-range missile, called Oreshnik, emerged after one was fired at Ukraine. The U.S. government has assessed Oreshnik to be based on the RS-26.

The other Soviet missiles that helped make the case for AARS/Quartz were two ICBMs, the rail-mobile RT-23 Molodets (SS-24 Scalpel) and the road-mobile RT-2PM/RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle).

RT-23/SS-24 SCALPEL MOD 1 ICBM

RT-2PM/SS-25 SICKLE ICBM

In his 2010 monograph, Ehrhard describes the Reagan-era view of the resulting problem set as follows:

“The technological problem of holding these mobile missiles at risk, one that NATO had never solved with the SS-20, now became vastly more complex [with the inclusion of the SS-24 and SS-25]. U.S. forces had to constantly monitor their movement and electronic emissions, something neither fast-pass satellites, U-2s, nor the SR-71 could accomplish. The mission also entailed breaking the over two decade-long declaratory policy of not overflying the Soviet Union, a prospect the Reagan Administration apparently felt was worth the gain. To complicate matters further, they needed a platform that could track those missiles in a nuclear detonation environment while flying from remote bases in the continental US. Operating and receiving imagery from such a craft beyond line-of-sight using space relays would prove daunting. The political and design challenges loomed large, but in the end the Air Force/NRO/CIA consortium opted for a leap-ahead system.”

With all this in mind, AARS/Quartz was seen as a national imperative. The very long-endurance drone, penetrating deep into Soviet airspace, would be able to locate many of these threats, allowing them to be targeted during the opening throes of a potential apocalypse – something we will come back to later on.

By the mid-1980s, contracts were doled out to Lockheed and Boeing to develop what at the time could be seen as the most ambitious ‘silver bullet’ aerospace program of its time, albeit one that had very few eyes on it as it was deeply buried in the classified realm. Ehrhard writes:

“To accomplish the loitering surveillance mission, this UAV needed autonomous (i.e., not remote controlled), highly reliable flight controls, and a design capable of intercontinental ranges from bases in the US zone of the interior with extreme high altitude capability (long wingspan with sailplane-type lift and multi-engine propulsion to reach altitudes more than 70,000 feet). Moreover, it had to carry an array of high-resolution sensors, high-capacity satellite communications capabilities, and various antennas—all in a package that was stealthy to the point of being covert. The cost of developing each technology piece alone would be staggering, but integrating them presented an even greater challenge – thus the project became a magnet for the best and most starry-eyed technologists in the black world. As one CIA engineer said in an anonymous interview, this project was ‘the cat’s pajamas,’ and ‘the single most fun project I ever worked on’ because it stretched every conceivable technology area.”

Ehrhard does not elaborate on the expected sensor package, but an LPI/LPD radar with GMTI and SAR modes, as well as other sensors, would have been needed for a stealthy platform tasked with this mission set. As noted earlier, electronic emissions, which can be detected passively, were also seen at this time as a key way to spot and track mobile missile launchers.

A highly ambitious undertaking

By all indications, AARS/Quartz was seen as a very ambitious effort from the start, but one that could yield impressive capabilities needed to address a mission requirement critical to national security. It should be noted that the U.S. military was pursuing a host of advanced stealth aviation technology programs at around the same time. Many of the efforts would go on to produce real results, if they hadn’t already by the mid-1980s, and this is just based on what is known publicly. Northrop’s stealthy Tacit Blue demonstrator flew for the first time in 1982. Lockheed’s F-117 Nighthawk reached an initial operational capability the following year. The Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) program that would lead to the B-2 was well underway by this time, too.

In the end, AARS/Quartz did not fare as well as many of its contemporaries, at least from what we know. The program ran through the end of the Reagan years and into the 1990s under the administration of President George H.W. Bush. It morphed and changed hands considerably from a smaller ‘bleeding-edge’ NRO-led program into one that was integrated into a new national unmanned aircraft strategy. This, in turn, caused its mission set to balloon as a maelstrom of stakeholders demanded many capabilities out of a single platform that was already beyond the available technology of the era.

Ehrhard’s 2010 monograph sums up just how bloated AARS became by the 1990s:

“[David A.] Kier[, NRO’s Deputy Director from 1997 to 2001] said the large version of AARS, which according to some reports had a wingspan of 250 feet, cost less than a B-2, but more than $1 billion a copy. Reportedly, the production plan called for only eight vehicles at a cost of $10 billion, each of the vehicles capable of an amazing 40 hours on station after flying to the area of interest.”

“Air Force officials were so leery of the UAV’s autonomous flight concept (no pilot had moment-to-moment control) that they reportedly insisted the flying prototype carry a pilot to handle in-flight anomalies and that the final design include a modular, two-place cockpit insert to make it optionally piloted. ‘By the time everyone got their wishes included,’ Kier said, ‘it [AARS] had to do everything but milk the cow and communicate with the world while doing it.’”

“With all of AARS’s leading-edge sensors and communications links, each of which posed substantial technical challenges in its own right, flight reliability quickly became the biggest design hurdle, according to Kier. The technologies were so secret, and the value of the payload and the air vehicle was so great that its loss over unfriendly territory was unthinkable. One defense official remarked, ‘If one had crashed, it would have been so classified we would have had to bomb it to ensure it was destroyed.’”

“Sailing along on the glut of black money in the late 1980s, AARS kept moving forward despite its continually expanding, problematic requirements list. As happened with [the] D-21 and Compass Arrow [drone programs] in the early 1970s, however, AARS was about to have its most vital mission curtailed.”

“The end of the Cold War brought the expensive program to a halt. An Air Force general familiar with the project said: ‘When AARS was invented, there was more money than they [the NRO] could spend. After the Cold War, the money went away and projects like that could not possibly survive.’ Like predators stalking a wounded animal, manned alternatives to AARS emerged. One proposal would put a sophisticated target acquisition system on the B-2 stealth bomber – the so-called RB-2 configuration. The proposal had value as a terminal tracking system, but the RB-2 lacked a method of off-board cueing to direct it to a search area.”

…

“As it turned out, none of the alternative programs made the cut, for not only was the Cold War officially over with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the venerable Strategic Air Command was disbanded in June 1992. With that move, AARS lost its primary military constituent and the AARS alliance began to crumble.”

“…The Air Force pulled funding on AARS, and it was terminated in December 1992 by the intelligence community hierarchy just as it was to enter full scale development. AARS was, in the final analysis, a misfit. It was a major aircraft program backed by a satellite organization (the NRO), and a risky unmanned surveillance platform slated for a combat pilot-led Air Force—hardly an edifice solid enough to survive the removal of its strategic underpinnings. No one organization provided focus or advocacy for the program. As a result, the “perfect” surveillance UAV faded away even as the ultimate Cold War satellite system, Milstar, and the equally exotic B-2 stealth bomber managed to survive, backed as they were by one service, and powerful sub-groups within that service, who were culturally and operationally attuned to those configurations.”

By 1990, Lockheed and Boeing are also said to have been directed to combine their previously separate work on AARS/Quartz.

Kier, who Ehrhard also identifies as the last AARS program manager, says the drone’s design ultimately evolved into something that “resembled a substantially scaled-up version of DARPA’s DarkStar.” Lockheed’s DarkStar, which eventually received the designation RQ-3, was a stealthy tailless design with an ovoid central fuselage and with very long, slender, and straight main wings. Boeing was also a major subcontractor for the RQ-3.

DarkStar was also referred to as “Tier III-minus,” a moniker that reflected the requirements for the drone, which were truncated compared to a planned Tier III type. Tier III was a more direct follow-on to AARS, but was already envisioned as a smaller and less capable, and one would imagine less expensive, uncrewed aircraft. There were also additional lower capability tiers, one of which ultimately led to the RQ-4 Global Hawk. Ehrhard says some members of Congress and of industry did attempt to drum up support for a true successor to AARS/Quartz, unofficially referred to as Tier IV, but without success.

With regard to the RQ-3, at least two flying examples were built, the first of which crashed in 1996 after suffering a control system malfunction. DarkStar had vanished completely from the public eye by 1999, but it has since emerged that a direct line can be traced between it and the stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel via another secretive drone called the X-44A, which TWZ was first to report on back in 2019.

When it comes to AARS/Quartz, the full scale and scope of what exactly came out of the hundreds of millions, and possibly billions, spent on the program over at least a decade, remains unclear. Clearly, major leaps were made in the critical communications, command and control, structural, and sensor technologies needed to make the system a reality. There are rumors that sub-scale risk-reduction test articles were flown, but details surrounding the program remain highly secretive. 

A mission requirement that rhymes

As we noted earlier, many questions remain about the RQ-180, as well as the overall status of that program. At the same time, fast forward some three decades or so from the end of AARS (and its immediate successors), and there are now echoes of the Cold War mission requirements that prompted that program, including in the current conflict with Iran.

The Iranian arsenal of conventionally-armed missiles is not anywhere near the same kind of threat as Soviet nuclear-tipped IRBMs and ICBMs. Still, they do present very real threats, especially for strikes on large critical infrastructure targets and as terror weapons when loaded with cluster munition payloads. The current conflict has demonstrated that strategy also puts immense strain on Israeli missile defenses, which could have broader ramifications, as you can read more about here. Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles offer additional flexibility against targets on land or at sea. In addition, it has been clear for years now that Iran is very willing to launch conventional ballistic missile attacks.

As already noted, the launchers for these missiles are mobile, and some are configured to look like typical civilian-style trucks at a casual glance. Some operate from hardened and underground bases. A number of those facilities were even built with ports that allow missiles to be fired from within, though it is unclear how extensively Iran has made use of that capability in the current conflict. These apertures have likely been repeatedly struck by the U.S. and Israel.

The underlying challenge of finding Iran’s ballistic missiles, and doing so with enough time to attempt to strike them before they launch, has clear similarities to the mission that drove AARS/Quartz. The Iranian case is perhaps more complex in certain respects, given the larger number of smaller missiles, many of which could be dispersed over a broad area. Still, the long-range weapons that threaten Israel are clearly the top priority and would be the easiest to spot for an asset like the RQ-180.

CENTCOM:

The Iranian regime is using mobile launchers to indiscriminately fire missiles in an attempt to inflict maximum harm across the region.

U.S. forces are hunting these threats down and without apology or hesitation, we are taking them out.pic.twitter.com/l4lxbTlAf4

— Clash Report (@clashreport) March 3, 2026

🚨 WATCH: CENTCOM releases footage of strikes on fortified missile bases in southern Iran. The first footage includes hits on tunnel entrances and on mobile and stationary launchers at the missile base in Hajjiabad, Iran. pic.twitter.com/wuoi5GEhqp

— Major Sammer Pal Toorr (Infantry Combat Veteran) (@samartoor3086) March 22, 2026

Iran is responding to external threats by releasing a new video showcasing one of its underground missile tunnel systems, packed with missile engines, mobile launchers, and a range of advanced weaponry. The footage prominently features the Paveh cruise missile, the Ghadr-380… pic.twitter.com/ILsdlrPtQy

— Basha باشا (@BashaReport) March 25, 2025

Furthermore, Iran’s air defenses have been significantly degraded after some five weeks of U.S. and Israeli strikes, on top of the losses during the 12 Day War last year, but threats remain. As noted, the northeastern end of the country has seen fewer strikes compared to other areas, overall. Total air supremacy over Iran has yet to be achieved.

This is not a hypothetical assessment either, as underscored by the recent loss of a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle. In the ensuing efforts to recover the F-15E’s crew, an A-10 Warthog crashed after being hit by hostile fire and two rescue helicopters were also damaged. American forces deliberately destroyed additional aircraft – reportedly two MC-130J special operations tanker transports and four Little Bird helicopters – inside Iran to prevent the capture of sensitive material. This came after the MC-130Js had become disabled after touching down at an austere operating location during the final mission to retrieve the downed Strike Eagle’s Weapon System Officer.

Last month, a U.S. Air Force F-35A fighter also had to make an emergency landing after reportedly being hit by an Iranian surface-to-air missile. In addition to damage to the aircraft, there are reports that the pilot suffered shrapnel wounds, as well. There have been reports of other close calls since the conflict began.

Iran’s IRGC released a footage reportedly showing U.S. F-35 jet being hit over Iran.

Note that we can’t independently confirm the authenticity of the footage. pic.twitter.com/9N0ePd2LLf

— Clash Report (@clashreport) March 19, 2026

This is exactly the environment where a very high-flying, extremely long-endurance, and very stealthy drone, like the RQ-180, would be valuable, if not critical, to perform the aforementioned mission. The drone would simply fly outside the range of Iranian defenses if need be and likely fly nearly directly over most of them without fear of being shot down. From that perch, which could be far above where normal jet aircraft fly (60,000-70,000+ feet is possible) it would be able to monitor massive swathes of Iranian territory for movement of launchers and indications of launches, especially around known launch areas and storage sites.

It is also important to note here that much has changed in the past 20 years, let alone the past 40, which makes a successor to the AARS/Quartz concept more viable now, in general. Massive leaps have been made in every single relevant technological area. Examples include the fielding of operational semi-autonomous high-altitude, long-endurance drones, huge breakthroughs in composite structures and satellite data links, and the miniaturization of highly-powerful sensor systems. Just the available satellite bandwidth alone and the increases in onboard computing power were so far advanced by the mid-2000s already compared to the 1980s. Added to that now is the ability to crunch through all the data collected onboard using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies, which further helps make use of the bandwidth available..

AARS/Quartz was never intended to exist in a vacuum. It was explicitly seen as a part of an ecosystem that also included the B-2 bomber (to strike the targets the drone found) and the Milstar communications satellite constellation (to help transmit relevant data). The B-2 and Milstar did enter service, although the former did so on a very truncated level due to post-Cold War drawdowns. The U.S. military has made further investments since then in advanced networking capabilities as part of integrated kill web architectures. The B-2 and other relevant capabilities that could directly tie in with the RQ-180 are being employed publicly in the current conflict with Iran. It is possible, if not highly plausible, that this integration has already existed for years, in part as a result of the development of the LRS family of systems.

There is a degree of precedent here already, with regard to Iran specifically, with the RQ-170 Sentinel. RQ-170s are understood to have conducted extensive flights over Iran in the 2000s and into the very early 2010s, particularly to provide persistent monitoring of nuclear sites. Those missions were thrust into the public eye in 2011, when an RQ-170 went down in Iran and was captured largely intact.

The fact that the Sentinel has been flying operationally for nearly two decades, at least, also just underscores the degree to which stealthy, persistent drone surveillance capabilities had already advanced decades ago. That being said, the RQ-170 is a medium-altitude platform that was developed as a more tactical-level asset for surveillance of smaller areas. It does not fulfill the continued requirements for something like the RQ-180, able to fly at much higher altitudes over far greater distances for much longer periods of time, while carrying huge sensors, and was never intended to do so.

It’s also worth noting here that any decision to employ a highly secretive and sensitive asset like the RQ-180 over Iran would still carry major risks. Stealth aircraft aren’t invisible or completely immune to threats, and accidents do happen. As noted earlier, a technical issue of some kind may well be the only reason why we got a clear look at the drone during the day at Larissa in Greece, to begin with. At the same time, there is something of a precedent for taking these kinds of risks with regard to Iran, specifically, even outside of the demands of open conflict. After the RQ-170 went down in Iran, it is very likely that Russia and China had opportunities to analyze the drone in detail. But the technologies in the RQ-170, and its very design, are understood to be far less exquisite than what would be found in the RQ-180.

But even as an RQ-180 would have an even more pressing use case against a peer competitor like China, which is drastically expanding its nuclear arsenal and has thousands of road-mobile ballistic missiles, risking such a sensitive asset over Iran is paired with the high stakes involved with this operation, especially in regard to Israel. Iran’s massive and rapidly growing number of long-range missiles were a stated reason Trump decided he had to act now. The administration has said that soon Iran would be able to oversaturate any defenses if action wasn’t taken. It is this same threat that would be a major factor in using such a prized asset for Epic Fury, to do whatever possible to limit the damage to Israel, and to America’s Arab allies as well.

When the secretive drone first emerged at Larissa, comparisons were also drawn to an Israeli design referred to as the RA-01. That uncrewed stealth aircraft has a roughly similar planform, but is a smaller overall design that likely falls between the RQ-170 and the RQ-180. It has been very active during the conflict, being seen in videos. It would be of no surprise if it were tasked with hunting Iranian missile launchers, as well.

It should be stressed that we still do not know for sure why the secretive drone is at Larissa and what operations it might have been conducting, or still is, from the Greek base. As mentioned at the start of this piece, U.S. authorities have, so far, declined to comment on the uncrewed aircraft’s presence there at all.

At the same time, its emergence does come at a time when the capabilities of the RQ-180, or an evolution thereof, would be in extremely high demand to support current operations over Iran, and specifically to address the urgent need to counter Iran’s long-range weapons, just as the progenitor of the concept was meant to do nearly four decades ago.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth says US forces are carrying out more strikes on Iran than any day since the start of war.

In the midst of the escalation of the Gaza conflict that has been going on since 2023, the world is once again witnessing the heartbreaking reality of women crying among the ruins of their homes and the burning of property, mothers who have lost children, and families separated by military attacks. Global media were quick to point to this event as a symbol of the suffering of civil society. But behind the empathy shown, there is also a question that is rarely asked: how exactly can Palestinian women be represented, and who can shape that narrative?

For decades, women in conflict zones, such as the Middle East, have often been portrayed in the same framework, as passive victims who need to be rescued and protected. In the context of Gaza, this pattern has resurfaced. Global media coverage often only highlights women’s plight without giving enough space for their voices, perspectives, and agency in conflict. This narrative does look humanistic, but it also contains an element of simplification that makes the world unaware of the more complex reality behind it.

This is where postcolonial feminism offers a sharper critique and helps us to look further at this issue as a form of epistemic violence. This perspective emphasizes that in understanding women’s experiences, it cannot be separated from considerations about the history of colonialism and global power relations. In the context of the Gaza conflict, this means that violence is experienced by women. Not only a patriarchal problem but also supported by aspects of colonialism, militarization, and inequality politics (Enloe, 2014).

This phenomenon cannot be separated from the thoughts of Lila Abu-Lughod, who mentioned “politics of saving” in her work entitled Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Abu-Lughod (2013) criticized how the Western world portrays Muslim women as an oppressed group in need of rescue. This narrative is not only a form of simplifying women’s representation but can also be used as a legitimacy for political, cultural, and even military intervention from external actors. Such as the concept of militarization of daily life raised by Enloe (2014), who explains that militarization does not only occur on the battlefield but also enters into the reality of daily life, including in how the media frames conflicts. Where in this context the representation of Palestinian women as passive victims is used to affirm certain narratives about war, security, and the legitimacy of power.

The term “security politics” in the Gaza conflict appears in a more subtle form. Palestinian women are positioned as a universal form of suffering but are rarely seen as political subjects with diverse experiences and aspirations. The suffering they experience in conflict becomes a global consumption, while structural contexts, such as colonialism and power inequality, are often ignored.

An important question then arises: who really has the right to speak on behalf of Palestinian women? This is where Spivak’s (2009) thoughts on the concept of the subaltern become relevant. Spivak himself argues that the subaltern group is a group that is in a marginalized position so that its voice is not heard in the dominant discourse. Even when they are “represented,” their voices are often mediated or even filtered by stronger actors.

In many news narratives about Gaza, Palestinian women rarely appear as the main narrator of their own experiences. Brand awareness is often told by foreign journalists and international organizations. Or humanitarian institutions as “representatives.” As a result, the narrative that is born is not a complete reflection of the reality they face, but rather a form of representation that has been framed according to the logic and direction of global media reporting.

This issue becomes more complex when we look at how the media tends to ignore the agency dimension. Palestinian women not only live in the shadow of conflict but also have active agency in various forms of resistance, both as activists, journalists, medical personnel, and community leaders. They have the capacity to build solidarity and even contribute to political struggles as well as peace. However, aspect II rarely gets the same spotlight as the narrative of suffering.

This disregard of agency can create an imbalance of representation. Palestinian women are only seen as passive victims, which makes them look like they also have no capacity as active actors. This inequality is not only a question of representation but also a question of power regarding who has the right to define reality for a particular purpose.

In the digital era, this is certainly starting to change. Social media provides a space for Palestinian women to be able to speak directly to a global audience. Through various social media platforms, they can share experiences and aspirations that are often not featured in the mainstream media. This ultimately opens up the possibility of a more authentic and diverse counternarrative.

However, the digital space is still full of limitations. Certain narratives can easily go viral, while others sink and disappear without a trace. In other words, while social media can offer opportunities, the space is not completely free from the influence of broader power structures.

Rereading the narrative of Palestinian women in the era of the Gaza conflict is a form of recognition that representation is not neutral. It is always related to interests, ideologies, and power relations. The narrative of “rescue” may seem like a form of concern from the surface, but if you look further, it can also be a form of control over the other party’s representation. Looking at the Gaza conflict through the lens of feminism is to question basic assumptions in global reporting. Do we really see them as individuals? Do we really hear their voices, or just voices about them?

Therefore, it is important to change our perspective. Instead of seeing Palestinian women as victims who need to be saved, we need to recognize them as subjects who have the capacity to speak, form agencies, and share their experiences in the form of real reality. This is not to ignore the real suffering but to place Palestinian women’s experiences in armed conflict in a broader, fairer, and closer context to reality. As Abu-Lughod (2013) reminds us, the more important question that arises is not how to save Muslim women, but how to understand the conditions and realities that shape their life experiences.

Ultimately, the lens of feminism, particularly postcolonial feminism, invites us to not only have empathy but also to be more critical. By looking further at how the narrative is formed, who can benefit, and which voices are ignored.

Perhaps the more relevant question is not whether Palestinian women need protection and rescue, but whether the world is ready to hear and see them as subjects who have the capacity to speak and move. Because what needs to change is not them, but the way we understand them.

Iran has rejected a ceasefire proposal from the United States, but says it sees a need for a permanent end to the war, its official news agency has reported. As of Monday, the United States and Iran were considering a framework aimed at ending their five-week conflict, as Tehran stressed its desire for a durable resolution and resisted pressure to quickly reopen the Strait of Hormuz under a temporary ceasefire.

According to the official IRNA news agency, Iran delivered its response to the U.S. proposal via Pakistan, rejecting the idea of a ceasefire and underscoring the need for a permanent conclusion to the war.

The response outlined 10 provisions, including ending regional hostilities, lifting sanctions, and supporting reconstruction efforts, IRNA reported.

According to a report from Axios that cites “four U.S., Israeli, and regional sources with knowledge of the talks,” the two-tier plan was to start with a 45-day ceasefire, planned to lead into a longer-term peace deal.

A senior Iranian official confirmed to the Reuters news agency that Tehran had received the ceasefire plan from Pakistan.

April 6 (Reuters) – Iran and the U.S. have received a plan to end hostilities that could come into effect on Monday and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a source aware of the proposals said on Monday.

A framework to end hostilities has been put together by Pakistan and exchanged…

— Tala Ramadan (@TalaRamadan) April 6, 2026

Pakistan has been playing a leading role in negotiations, with its Army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, reportedly in contact throughout the night with U.S. Vice President JD Vance, special envoy Steve Witkoff, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi.

Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, was in contact “all night long” with U.S. Vice President JD Vance, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, a source told Reuters.

— Idrees Ali (@idreesali114) April 6, 2026

One major sticking point appears to be Iran’s refusal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for a “temporary ceasefire.” Around a fifth of the world’s oil supply usually passes through the strait, which Iran has effectively blocked.

The same Iranian official told Reuters that the United States is not ready for a permanent ceasefire. Tehran will not be pressured into accepting deadlines and making a decision, the official added.

Iran and the United States have received a plan to end hostilities that could come into effect on April 6 and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a source aware of the proposals said https://t.co/i98nhEFDcr

— Reuters (@Reuters) April 6, 2026

Over the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to obliterate Iranian power plants and bridges if it doesn’t agree to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz by 8:00 p.m. Tuesday (U.S. Eastern Time). “If they don’t come through, if they want to keep it closed, they’re going to lose every power plant and every other plant they have in the whole country,” Trump said in an eight-minute interview with The Wall Street Journal on Sunday. 

Today, Trump reiterated that the Tuesday deadline is final.

(Reuters) – U.S. President Donald Trump said on Monday the Tuesday deadline he has set for Iran to make a deal is final, adding that Iran’s proposal was significant but not good enough.

— Phil Stewart (@phildstewart) April 6, 2026

Trump also issued an expletive-laden warning on his Truth Social website: “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the Fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell – JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah. President DONALD J. TRUMP.”

Trump reiterates his demands to Iran: “Open the Fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell” pic.twitter.com/aZb8sSjGBU

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) April 5, 2026

Iran’s parliament speaker responded with a warning that the US president’s “reckless moves” would mean “our whole region is going to burn”.

Iran’s deputy foreign minister said that those threats could amount to war crimes. “The American president, as the highest official of his country, has publicly threatened to commit war crimes,” Kazem Gharibabadi said on X, citing provisions of international law.

“The threat to attack power plants and bridges (civilian infrastructure) is a war crime under Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” he said, cited by AFP. Gharibabadi also warned that Iran would “deliver a decisive, immediate and regret-inducing response to any aggression or imminent threat.”

Iran has itself attacked civilian infrastructure on the Arabian Peninsula, including desalination plants critical to providing water to people living there.

Iran’s parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, condemned Trump’s threats and argued that he was being misled by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Your reckless moves are dragging the United States into a living HELL for every single family, and our whole region is going to burn because you insist on following Netanyahu’s commands,” Qalibaf posted on X.

Iran’s central military command also responded to the latest threats, promising “much more devastating” retaliation if the U.S. military starts to hit civilian targets.

According to Barak Ravid, global affairs correspondent for Axios, the 45-day ceasefire is “one of many more ideas” being discussed.

🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷A White House official told me the plan for a 45-day ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran is “one of many ideas” being discussed at the moment. “The President has not signed off on it. Operation Epic Fury continues. President Trump will speak more at 1pm”, the White House… https://t.co/gKzZ30ZMaL

— Barak Ravid (@BarakRavid) April 6, 2026

UPDATES:

Author’s note: We will be updating our readers on what we know about the F-15E WSO recovery in a separate piece.

UPDATE: 4:15 PM EDT –

A recent post on X by the U.S. Central Command shows U.S. Marines preparing an example of the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) during Operation Epic Fury.

UPDATE: 4:10 PM EDT –

Reuters reports that four Iranian army ground force officers were killed on Sunday during an operation to counter U.S. aircraft in Isfahan, citing the semi-official Fars news agency. It is unclear if this is connected to the F-15E WSO recovery operation, which was taking place in the same region at that time.

Four officers of the Iranian army’s ground forces were killed during clashes with US aircraft in the central Isfahan province on Sunday, the state-affiliated Fars news agency reports, saying they died while engaging attacking warplanes, helicopters and drones. pic.twitter.com/l46hpCwyKr

— Al Arabiya English (@AlArabiya_Eng) April 6, 2026

UPDATE: 4:00 PM EDT –

Temporary markings in the form of Easter eggs appeared on the nose of this U.S. Air Force U-2S spy plane, seen departing RAF Fairford, in England, for a mission this morning.

U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth says the United States will step up its strikes on Iran under Trump’s orders.

“Per the president’s direction, today will be the largest volume of strikes since day one of this operation. Tomorrow, even more than today. And then Iran has a choice.”

UPDATE: 3:40 PM EDT –

Trump today repeated his familiar assertions about the success of the war and the performance of the U.S. military (it has performed “unbelievably well,” he said), while also praising the “very historic” rescue of the second crew member from the Air Force F-15E shot down over Iran last week.

Shifting to his latest deadline for Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz (8:00 p.m. ET on Tuesday), he added:

“The entire country can be taken out in one night, and that night might be tomorrow night.”

Trump warned that if Iran failed to meet his deadline, it would be left with “no bridges” and “no power plants,” saying the country would be reduced to “the Stone Ages,” reiterating his previous threat to send Iran “back to the Stone Ages.”

He later reinforced that warning, saying strikes on Iran’s bridges and power plants could begin from 8:00 p.m. ET tomorrow and suggesting the operation could be completed in as little as four hours.

“Every power plant in Iran will be out of business, burning, exploding, and never to be used again … I mean complete demolition by 12 o’clock. And it will happen over a period of four hours if we wanted to. We don’t want that to happen.”

.@POTUS: “We have a plan, because of the power of our military, where every bridge in Iran will be decimated by 12 o’clock tomorrow night, where every power plant in Iran will be out of business…it’ll happen over a period of 4hrs if we want it to. We don’t want that to happen.” pic.twitter.com/965HCIV9HB

— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) April 6, 2026

UPDATE: 3:45 PM EDT –

In a surprising disclosure, Trump today suggested that Washington armed (Kurdish) Iranian opposition groups during the January demonstrations.

Trump:

We sent some guns; they were supposed to go to the people of Iran. You know what happened? The people we sent them through kept them.

I am very upset with a certain group of people, and they will pay a big price for that. pic.twitter.com/dACg5aZyMS

— Clash Report (@clashreport) April 6, 2026

“President Trump told me the United States sent guns to the Iranian protesters,” Trump told Trey Yingst on the Fox News channel.

“He told me, ‘We sent them a lot of guns. We sent them to the Kurds.’ And the president says he thinks the Kurds kept them. He went on to say. ‘We sent guns to the protesters, a lot of them.’”

As well as lending credence to Iran’s claims that the protests were foreign-inspired, the disclosure would appear to put Kurds in an even more dangerous position. For their part, Kurdish groups have denied the claims.

This puts Kurds in such a dangerous position, particularly with the threat at the end. (Kurdish groups have denied Trump’s claims.) Yesterday, a lot of people blamed the journalist who reported Trump’s comments, hard to do that in this case. https://t.co/Wz6ogQbnCf

— Winthrop Rodgers (@wrodgers2) April 6, 2026

UPDATE: 3:50 PM EDT –

Trump today implied that the widening rift between the United States and NATO began when he floated the idea of taking over Greenland.

“It all began with, if you want to know the truth, Greenland. We want Greenland. They don’t want to give it to us. And I said, ‘bye, bye.’”

He made the comments ahead of a scheduled visit to the White House later this week by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte — whom Trump, for what it’s worth, describes as a “wonderful guy” and a “great person.”

“NATO is a paper tiger. We didn’t need them, obviously, because they haven’t helped at all.”

Trump on NATO:

It all began with Greenland. We want Greenland, and they don’t want to give it to us, and I said, “Bye-bye!” pic.twitter.com/Jhp0izwfht

— Clash Report (@clashreport) April 6, 2026

Earlier today, U.S.-Israeli strikes killed the intelligence chief of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, according to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

“Major General Majid Khademi, the powerful and educated head of the Intelligence Organisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was martyred in the criminal terrorist attack by the American-Zionist enemy… at dawn today,” said the Guards in a post on their Telegram channel.

BREAKING: Majid Khademi, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Intelligence Organisation, has been killed, according to state media. pic.twitter.com/NaMHbNx6Hm

— Al Jazeera Breaking News (@AJENews) April 6, 2026

The IDF has continued airstrikes against Iranian targets, including further attacks on Mehrabad International Airport in Tehran, a major hub for commercial flights, which is also used by the government of Iran, and is one of the bases of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). A video released by the IDF shows multiple Mi-8/17 Hip-series helicopters being targeted on the ground at Mehrabad. The IDF claims that “dozens” of aircraft were hit.

The IDF says it destroyed dozens of Iranian aircraft during strikes on three airports in the Tehran area overnight.

According to the military, the strikes were aimed at causing a blow to the Iranian air force and IRGC air force.

Dozens of Israeli Air Force fighter jets hit… https://t.co/wuBaitmzw8 pic.twitter.com/9pCvmrGvkf

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) April 6, 2026

U.S. forces located on Bubiyan ​Island, Kuwait, were targeted by ‌Iran, Ebrahim Zolfaghari, the spokesperson of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, said ​in a video ​statement shared by state media ⁠on Monday. Bubiyan is the largest of Kuwait’s coastal island chain, located in the northwest of the Gulf. Zolfaghari said that Iran targeted satellite equipment and munitions on the island with drones, adding that U.S. forces had relocated there from Arifjan camp in Kuwait after that base was repeatedly struck by Iran.

BREAKING: Iran targeted US forces relocated on Kuwait’s Bubiyan island, the spokesperson for Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters Ebrahim Zolfaghari said in a video statement shared by state media. pic.twitter.com/GLwEkjLJFX

— Al Jazeera Breaking News (@AJENews) April 6, 2026

Israeli rescue teams were searching through debris on Monday for two people still missing after a missile strike in the northern city of Haifa, authorities said. The projectile, reportedly launched from Iran, hit a residential building, killing two people.

Officials said the direct impact on the seven-storey structure caused severe damage, leaving parts of it partially collapsed. Videos showed rescuers combing through the rubble with flashlights, navigating broken concrete and debris as the search continued.

“We have a major destruction site,” said Elad Edri, chief of staff of Israel’s home front command. Israel’s fire and rescue services said later that two of four people trapped under the rubble had been found dead.

A senior Home Front Command search and rescue officer describes the 18-hour effort to recover the four bodies at the site of an Iranian ballistic missile impact in Haifa as one of the “most complex” rescue operations of the war.

According to the officer, the four victims were in… pic.twitter.com/ltxhfAA2AK

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) April 6, 2026

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has warned that strikes near Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant pose a serious risk to nuclear safety and must cease.

Located in the country’s south, the facility, which is home to a 1,000-megawatt reactor, has reportedly been targeted four times since the start of the latest conflict.

Rafael Grossi, director of the IAEA, said that any strikes around the area “could cause a severe radiological accident with harmful consequences for people and the environment in Iran and beyond.” He added that one strike hit just 250 feet from the plant perimeter. “A nuclear facility and surrounding areas should never be struck,” he said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said it can confirm ‌recent impacts of military strikes close to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, but said that the plant itself was not damaged https://t.co/REx5AQ76kr

— Reuters (@Reuters) April 6, 2026

Israel has struck a major petrochemical facility at Iran’s massive South Pars natural gas field, according to multiple news agencies.

Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, confirmed what he described as “a powerful strike on the largest petrochemical facility in Iran,” which accounts for roughly half of the country’s petrochemical output. Meanwhile, Israeli military spokesperson Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani said there would be “no immunity” for Iran as negotiations continue.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz:

The IDF forcefully struck Iran’s largest petrochemical plant. This key facility accounts for about 50% of Iran’s petrochemical output. This follows an attack on Iran’s second-largest facility last week.

As a result, both facilities, which… pic.twitter.com/DOYQ4iHVFK

— Clash Report (@clashreport) April 6, 2026

Katz’s remarks followed an earlier report from the Fars News Agency stating that “several explosions” were heard at the South Pars petrochemical complex in Asaluyeh.

The development raises doubts about ongoing efforts to secure a ceasefire between the United States and Iran. The field, which Iran shares with Qatar, is the largest natural gas reserve in the world and lies beneath the Persian Gulf. The latest strikes come just weeks after widespread international criticism of Israel’s March 18 attack on the same South Pars gas field.

Airstrikes hit petrochemical facilities at Iran’s South Pars gas field a short while ago, Iranian state media reports.

The Fars news agency says there was an “enemy attack” on “South Pars Petrochemical in Asaluyeh.”

Israel bombed gas infrastructure in the area last month.

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) April 6, 2026

Iran widened its attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure over the weekend, carrying out drone and missile strikes on petrochemical sites in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. The Revolutionary Guards also said they had targeted an Israeli-linked vessel at Dubai’s Jebel Ali port.

BREAKING: Iran’s IRGC has claimed it fired a missile at an Israel-linked ship in a channel leading to Dubai’s Port of Jebel Ali, causing it to catch fire.

There was no immediate confirmation from Emirati authorities.

🔴 LIVE updates: https://t.co/ddyrxmyzUg pic.twitter.com/UcN7Oc6bPX

— Al Jazeera English (@AJEnglish) April 5, 2026

Authorities in the emirate of Sharjah said on Sunday that they were responding to an incident involving Khor Fakkan Port, one of the United Arab Emirates’ largest container hubs. No injuries were reported, and officials provided no additional details in a statement released by the Sharjah media office.

Earlier, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that the captain of a container ship at the port had observed several splashes from unidentified projectiles landing close to the vessel.

A container ship at the UAE’s Khor Fakkan Port reported several projectiles were fell in the water near the ship while conducting loading operations, UKMTO reports. pic.twitter.com/HvvWGUCA7Q

— Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران (@ariel_oseran) April 5, 2026

An Indian-flagged, Japan-owned tanker has crossed the Strait of Hormuz. A spokeswoman for Mitsui O.S.K. Lines told AFP that the Green Asha, owned by its subsidiary, had passed through the strait and was en route to India. The vessel, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker, is the third Japan-linked ship to transit the strait. “Both the crew and the cargo are safe,” the spokeswoman said.

Two more Indian-flagged liquefied petroleum gas tankers, Green Asha and Green Sanvi, have exited the Gulf carrying the fuel for the South Asian nation, according to ship tracking data on LSEG and Kpler.https://t.co/DDCq4ZWgwh

— Al Arabiya English (@AlArabiya_Eng) April 6, 2026

North Korea appears to be stepping back from its longstanding ties with Iran and is carefully shaping its public messaging to keep open the possibility of improved relations with the United States after the Iran conflict, South Korean lawmakers told Reuters on Monday, citing intelligence officials.

North Korea appears to be distancing itself from longtime partner Iran and carefully managing its public messaging to preserve the possibility of a new relationship with the US after the Iran war, South Korean lawmakers said, citing the spy agency https://t.co/0Ju5su12yR

— Reuters (@Reuters) April 6, 2026

There are unconfirmed reports, based on publicly available flight-tracking data, that a U.S. Air Force F-35 fighter flying in an area in southern Iraq, close to the Kuwaiti border, has squawked 7700. This is the universal, international transponder code used by aircraft to immediately alert Air Traffic Control (ATC) of a general emergency.

A U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II declared an emergency while flying over Iraq about two hours ago, squawking 7700.

That code is the universal signal for a general in-flight emergency, indicating the crew is dealing with a serious situation. pic.twitter.com/qa4Dh54JTo

— Egypt’s Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) April 6, 2026

While we had previously seen Iranian satellite imagery that purported to show the extent of the Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia that occurred on March 27, the destruction of an aircraft maintenance shelter now appears to have been verified by commercially available Sentinel-2L imagery. The attack also destroyed a prized E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) as well as damaging other aircraft and injuring several American service members, as you can read more about here.

Iranian satellite imagery has once again been confirmed as authentic.

Sentinel-2L imagery confirms the destruction of the Large Area Maintenance Shelter (LAMS) used by U.S. forces at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, likely as a result of an Iranian attack that occurred… https://t.co/VFQXcho2UN pic.twitter.com/B1RLeyvZom

— Egypt’s Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) April 6, 2026

An IDF spokesperson disclosed recently that an Iranian underground complex used for storing ballistic missiles had been targeted.

Based on open-source intelligence, this appears to have been a relatively new and sizable missile base, constructed within the past two years along the Tehran–Qazvin road. It features at least five large access points designed for missile transporters and launch systems.

It also seems that the site was put into operation before construction was fully completed.

לפני מספר ימים, דובר צה”ל חושף כי הותקף מתחם אחסון תת-קרקעי לטילים בליסטיים.

מדובר בבסיס טילים חדש וגדול שנבנה ממש בשנתיים האחרונות על כביש טהראן-קזוין. המתחם כולל לא פחות מחמישה פתחים רחבים עבור מובילי טילים ומשגרים.
אין הרבה תשתיות עיליות בשטח, מה שאומר שהאיראנים פעלו בשנים… pic.twitter.com/rzZtWj6fFF

— Ben Tzion Macales (@BenTzionMacales) April 6, 2026

In recent days, imagery has emerged showing the reported aftermath of an Iranian drone strike on Camp Buehring in Kuwait, which appears to have destroyed at least one U.S. Army CH-47F Chinook helicopter.

Further signs of an attack on Camp Buehring are provided by infrared imagery from the NASA FIRMS portal.

More evidence has emerged of the use of cluster bombs in U.S. airstrikes on Iran. Last week, photos appeared showing Israeli Air Force F-16I Sufa fighters apparently carrying cluster munitions. Now, U.S. Air Force F-16s have also been photographed with cluster bomb units underwing. The kinds of submunitions that might be inside remain unknown. However, Iranian officials previously accused the United States of employing air-dropped BLU-91/B anti-tank mines, which are delivered via cluster bomb. This seems most likely to be part of a limited-use area denial strategy to contain long-range missile launches, as you can read about in our previous reporting here.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The rescue of the F-15E weapon systems officer (WSO) missing in Iran after his fighter was shot down was one of the most complex and dangerous missions the U.S. military can undertake. These kinds of operations can come in many forms. In this case, before the WSO was finally recovered from the mountain crevice where he was hiding, a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) deep inside enemy territory had to be rapidly set up and secured so that it could act as a staging area for the aircraft, equipment and troops taking part in the mission. This is an exact mission set U.S. special operations forces train for extensively.

To get more insights about how such a FARP would be set up and operated, we reached out to Kyle Rempfer, a former Special Tactics Squadron (STS) airman who served in Afghanistan and Iraq. STS units are an elite cadre of operators who work to control aircraft in the air, including from airfields they establish deep inside contested territory, and direct airpower onto the enemy, among other duties, including rescuing personnel trapped behind enemy lines. They are often paired with special operations units, such as SEALs, Delta Force and Rangers, to bring their unique skills to their missions.

Air Force Special Tactics – the Air Force’s ONLY Special Operations Ground Force

Rempfer, a journalist and former colleague of the author at Military Times, offered unique insights into the process as someone who trained for these missions.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity.

Q: What happens in the Special Tactics Squadron level when the word comes out that there’s an aircraft down deep into enemy territory? 

A: By this point in the campaign, Air Force Special Tactics teams – which are made up of combat controllers (CCTs) and pararescue jumpers (PJs) – would have surveyed or identified scores of Iranian runways and austere airfields that can be used for landing zones or drop zones down the line. Even if CCTs hadn’t set foot on these sites, they’d have pulled imagery of the locations and started using tools like AutoCAD, a surveying and mapping software, to sketch out the dimensions of an airfield and identify what type of aircraft could land there. Is this a site that could only work for a light short take off and landing (STOL) aircraft, or could we land something bigger like a C-17? Those types of questions are on their minds. And since this event appears to have happened near the Isfahan nuclear facility, it can be assumed that Special Tactics has been scoping out landing zones in that area since at least this war started, maybe far earlier. 

For this mission, the Special Tactics team just needed someplace to land a couple of MC-130J Commando IIs. Those are designed to infiltrate and exfiltrate special operations troops into and out of the hinterlands, so an agricultural runway intended for crop-spraying planes would fit the bill in terms of dimensions. But on the ground, the soil strength might not hold up for repeat landings, or perhaps the recent weather has eroded the area or left it muddy. That can have an impact, and there are tools like dynamic cone penetrometers that Special Tactics teams use to assess soil strength. They’ve used those and a host of other tools to scout airfields all around potential conflict zones in Africa, northern Iraq, Syria, etc., but given the tight security in Iran, that probably was not feasible to do in advance here. So the soil strength might have been a known-unknown going in. 

Q: What would happen once the FARP is set up?

A: They can do these fast. Everything is prestaged, even inside the MC-130. AH-6 Little Bird helicopters were probably offloaded and taking off within minutes, not hours, and beaming toward the WSO’s beacon. At that point, the team at the FARP site is pulling security and talking to all the aircraft overhead. Those pilots and aircrews are using sensors to monitor all the roadways that plausibly lead to the site, and potentially even putting warheads on those roadways to make them unusable. We know there were some diversionary bomb drops as part of the rescue, so they could also take that time to put big potholes in the roads.

Q: Can you talk about what systems, personnel and equipment would have secured the site?

A: The people who are surveying and setting up the landing zone and FARP are probably CCTs [Combat Control Teams] from the 24th Special Tactics Squadron. They would have had imagery to look at ahead of the mission, but you might not know what level of stress the ground can take until you physically get there. CCTs are trained to inspect that, blow up obstacles on the runway if needed, scan enemy activity around the landing site, etc., and then set up the austere airfield to start accepting planes and helos. They might not have had time to do a full-on reconnaissance mission, of course. 

CCTs have dirt bikes, something like a Kawasaki KLR 250, that they can drive up and down the airstrip for quickly setting up lights and visually inspecting the terrain. The lights they’d use to create the airstrip would be set up to infrared mode so only people with night vision devices can see them. This isn’t the early days of Afghanistan, though, and night vision devices have proliferated to such a degree that infrared lights are no longer the game changer they once were. However, it still prevents civilians from seeing the operation at night, and that is important given reports that Iranian state media was mobilizing the population to look for the downed airman. 

Q: Who would be brought in for force protection?

A: The CCTs of course are not alone at the landing zone. They had DEVGRU (SEAL Team 6) for security and dozens of aircraft backing them up with an absolutely jarring amount of aerial firepower. CCTs are usually also certified JTACs so they can manage the aircraft stacks not just for landing the MC-130s and AH-6s returning from the WSO rescue, but also the dozens of aircraft overhead that can fire at targets as necessary.

Q: Reports indicate that the WSO climbed up a 7,000 foot crevice and hid out there with intermittent communications while the Iranians were looking for him. How does that complicate things? And what would the team on the ground be doing?

A: I imagine that all the communications would have been encrypted – not anything that the Iranians could listen in on. For the guys on the ground, the biggest situation is monitoring to make sure that other forces aren’t approaching the area and protecting that forward arming and refueling site, because while it’s not a base, for all intensive purposes it is the center of mass of the most U.S. forces, the safest zone you have. So basically probably just protected that site. 

Q: What would be happening in the air?

A: You would have ISR assets that would be scanning the area, and not just the immediate area, but probably any roads and highways leading up to where that FARP site was set up. They would be watching anyone who could possibly be approaching. 

That whole area would just be soaked with ISR assets, and I know the Iranians knocked out two Reaper drones during the operation. So presumably, there was plenty of ISR. 

There would be a mix of attack and surveillance aircraft. There would be dozens of aircraft available for this mission. That is great for the team on the ground, but just like an air traffic control tower at Ronald Reagan Airport in DC can be overburdened, so will the JTAC who’s on the ground controlling all these different pilots and aircrews calling in to report threats they’ve spotted, relay their fuel or munitions status, report radio chatter they’re picking up from the ground, etc. This could require multiple JTACs on the ground, and probably also pilots in A-10s or F-35s who can act as an extra layer of forward air control in the sky, handling aircraft check-ins and keeping track of specific assets so the JTACs on the ground aren’t losing their minds mind handling a massive air stack behind enemy lines. 

Most CCTs also have a JTAC certification, so they can help call in airstrikes as needed to protect the FARP site. And attack aircraft, like A-10s, or multi-role fighters, like F-35s, also have pilots who are certified as Forward Air Controller (Airborne) — or FAC(A). The E-3 can also provide a command and control function to help manage this complex battlespace. 

Q: How difficult is a mission like this? What are the dangers?

A: This would have been a hot refueling site, with engines running refueling, and you’re doing all that blacked out, and you have to probably keep the amount of radio chatter on the ground to a minimum because you don’t know if maybe Iran does have something where they can break through the encryption. 

So I would imagine that the danger is even more than just the IRGC coming in and shooting at you. The danger is  the technicalities that you’re dealing with, with the forward  arming and refueling sites and all these aircraft moving around under night vision in blacked out conditions in a tight area. It’s a small airfield, you have to keep your signature low.

Thankfully, they were able to get more aircraft in to usher everyone out. But that just shows how even what they were dealing with, the runway probably wasn’t built to handle these kinds of aircraft, or not maintained. 

Clearly this kind of operation – where you’re coming in, setting up an airfield, whether it’s for a follow-on parachute jump or even just air landing more troops and supplies – would be repeated in most of the other scenarios people are talking about. For instance, going in and digging out Iran’s enriched uranium. I think it would have to be pretty similar. You would send in a special tactics team with some Ranger recce guys, and the Ranger reconnaissance company would maybe parachute in, and check out the airfield, and they would start bringing in the MC-130s. It’s going to be a remote, austere airfield. It’s not going to be easy to land aircraft there, it’s not going to be well maintained, and you’re going to run into a lot of problems on the ground with aircraft. 

In addition to the fixed-wing planes, the U.S. also destroyed a reported four Little Birds on the way out. Imagine if you’re trying to do sustained operations bringing aircraft in, that all those aircraft are wearing down that obscure runway as you’re coming in, and you’re having more and more troops flow in. Your signature is going to be bigger and it’s going to be there for a longer time. 

So this is how you create a window into a country to conduct follow-on operations. In this case, it was just to look for one guy and pick him up. But, they’re obviously looking at runways and airfields all across the country, whether they’re actual runways that are in use by the Iranian government or municipal governments, or if they’re just like roads that they can use or dirt fields that they think they can land on. So this rescue mission was probably a snapshot into larger operational planning.

Q: After the rescue of the pilot, the search for the WSO seemed to turn fairly quickly from a traditional PJ mission to a Tier One rescue operation. Can you talk about that transition and how those two fit together?

A: That’s right. From my understanding, there were two missions. The first was a traditional CSAR mission that was launched in daylight immediately after the F-15E went down. This likely involved the PJs from a rescue squadron that was on standby. They were aboard HH-60W Jolly Greens and had refueling support from an HC-130J. That mission is obviously very risky and time sensitive. They’re flying low and slow, in daylight, and vulnerable to ground fire. We saw people shooting at them with small arms, which probably won’t do much barring really lucky shots, but the crews are still exposed to man portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

You can see Iranians firing small arms at the CSAR aircraft in the following video.

This initial CSAR package successfully recovered the F-15E pilot, who would have had a beacon and survival radio. But obviously the WSO was still at large. Perhaps they knew his location but couldn’t get to him before the region came alive like a bees’ nest – with everyone from locals to actual security forces scouring the scene. At that point, it appears the mission shifted from a more traditional CSAR operation conducted by a rescue squadron to something we’re actually more familiar with from Afghanistan and Iraq – Tier One raids into denied territory. This makes sense to me because this was the single most important mission going on, and it makes sense to flood this with assets to successfully pull off a second pick up. In a bigger war, I doubt downed aircrew can expect JSOC rescue parties every time one of them goes down. 

A lot of people were surprised that MC-130s and AH-6s were used for this, but it actually reminds me a lot of the early Afghanistan missions Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) conducted in fall 2001, before the Taliban fell. At least one of these involved Air Force Special Tactics CCTs parachuting into a remote part of Afghanistan, setting up a dirt airstrip, landing two MC-130s, off-loading a couple of Little Birds and then flying those around all night striking Taliban targets.

This rescue raid isn’t too different. It sounds like Air Force Special Tactics CCTs surveyed the airfield in advance – maybe in person, maybe just using satellite imagery – and then brought in the MC-130s that held the AH-6s to actually conduct the rescue that grabbed the WSO. This sort of scheme makes sense given the distance inside Iran. The MC-130s can bring extra fuel and ammunition to set up a mini-special ops refueling and re-arming site.

One thing to note here is why the commandos reportedly blew up the MC-130s on the way out. If the government’s version of events is accurate, this might have been because the runway was not suitable for the MC-130s and those planes got stuck or damaged landing there. The CCTs may have known this was a possibility but determined it was the least bad option. There’s also the possibility the aircraft were more damaged by enemy fire than we’ve been told. We may never know. 

Q: What would be the biggest danger from the Iranians? Indirect fire like artillery? Drones?

A: Hard for me to say. If the team had the element of surprise, which it seemed to, then the Iranians would have been caught off guard enough that they didn’t have time to stage artillery or have drones already scanning the area. In that case, I could see the biggest threat being local police or civilians stumbling upon the site early in the mission. As the operation gets underway, the noise signature would probably attract more and more attention. And then you have IRGC teams speeding to the scene. If they’re moving fast, they might only have small arms, maybe some belt-fed machine guns, small caliber mortars, and potentially MANPADs. The longer the U.S. team was on the ground, the more time Iran had to rush forces to the scene and that’s when things appeared to get dicey, the Army’s Delta Force reportedly had to blow in place the MC-130s and call in a quick reaction force (QRF) for pickup. 

Because people keep asking, the WSO was extracted on little birds flying STS and DEVGRU. Smoke checked 9 EKIA on tgt. The QRF that got called in for the FARP was from Delta. https://t.co/mmCbzrRjys

— Jack Murphy (@JackMurphyRGR) April 5, 2026

This is also why having so many aircraft overhead would be useful. Not only are those planes there to strike targets, they can listen to enemy communications and local civilian radio chatter, they can use their sensors to scan all the routes leading up to the airfield, and they can use jamming and spoofing to befuddle the Iranian response. All that helps buy time. 

Q: What kinds of geospatial tools would have been used to find and prep the site and carry out the mission?

A: I imagine in advance of this mission the airfields and runways in this area were pre-scouted using satellite imagery. I’m probably too out of date to go into specifics even if I wanted to, but we have very high resolution satellite imagery that’s available in the commercial space and is very impressive. Additionally, aircraft can fly over sites and scan the terrain using LIDAR to build 3D maps of the environment. Suffice to say, the CCTs would have a great picture of the environment before going in, but being physically on the ground shows new problems — can the soil hold up to landing an MC-130? How fine is the sand? When the AH-6s take off, are they creating a brown-out environment? 

In an ideal scenario, the CCTs could parachute in before the main mission, conducting a high-altitude, high-opening (HAHO) jump and then confirming on the ground that the site will work to land an MC-130. We don’t know if that’s what happened, but if the reporting is accurate that an MC-130 got stuck and had to be blown up in place, then perhaps they made a mistake or – my bet – they knew the runway was rough and accepted the risk.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Seoul says Pyongyang has not been supplying Iran with weapons in the hopes of being able to reopen diplomatic dialogue with the US.

North Korea appears to be distancing itself from longtime partner Iran in the hopes of forming a new relationship with the United States, South Korean intelligence believes.

Seoul’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) sees no signs that North Korea has sent weapons or supplies to Tehran since the US-Israel war on Iran began at the end of February, lawmaker Park Sun-won, who attended a closed-door briefing held by the NIS, said on Sunday.

While Iran’s other allies China and Russia have frequently issued statements on the US-Israel war on Iran, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry has only issued two toned-down statements so far, said the NIS.

While Pyongyang did condemn the US and Israeli attacks on Iran as illegal, it did not issue public condolences after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death or send a congratulatory message when Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, succeeded him.

The spy agency said Pyongyang is likely adopting this cautious approach to position it for a new diplomatic chapter with the US once the Middle East conflict subsides, said Park.

The NIS also told lawmakers that it now believes Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un is grooming his teenage daughter as his successor, citing a recent public display of her driving a tank.

The NIS said the imagery was intended to highlight the supposed military aptitude of the youngster, who is believed to be around 13 and named Ju Ae.

Such scenes are intended to pay “homage” to Kim’s own public military appearances during the early 2010s, when he was being prepared to succeed his father, Park said.

Kim’s powerful sister, Kim Yo Jong, was earlier thought to be a leading candidate to succeed her brother.

On Monday, she was in North Korean headlines as she welcomed an apology issued by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on Sunday over a January drone incursion.

“The ROK [Republic of Korea] president personally expressed regret and talked about a measure for preventing recurrence. Our government appreciated it as very fortunate and wise behaviour for its own sake,” Kim Yo Jong said in a statement carried by the official Korean Central News Agency.

Seoul initially denied any official role in the January drone incursion, with authorities suggesting it was the work of civilians, but Lee said a probe had revealed government officials had been involved.

“We express regret to the North over the unnecessary military tensions caused by the irresponsible and reckless actions of some individuals,” Lee said.

Lee has sought to repair ties with North Korea since taking office last year, criticising his predecessor for allegedly sending drones to scatter propaganda over Pyongyang.

His repeated overtures, however, have gone unanswered by the North until now.

Lee’s expression of regret follows Kim’s labelling of Seoul as the “most hostile state” in a policy address in March in which he vowed to “thoroughly reject and disregard it”.

Why are many Latin American countries shutting down nonprofit organizations? Amnesty International claims it has the answer: in every case, it’s part of a drive to restrict human rights and “tear up the social fabric.”

Amnesty’s new 95-page report (in Spanish, with an English summary), criticizes governments across the political spectrum for attacking what it calls “civil society organizations.” But Amnesty ignores the history of many such organizations and therefore why governments might be justified in closing them.

Here we focus on the report’s deficiencies in relation to Nicaragua, Venezuela (two NGOs interviewed in each) and Cuba (none).

Data-light analysis supports preconceived conclusions

Amnesty’s report is strikingly thin. Unlike many other Amnesty investigations, this one provides scarce case studies or incidents, almost no statistics, few named victims or affected organizations, and little discussion of specific crackdowns. In most cases, substantive content about a particular country is assumed to apply to all countries.

Amnesty conducted interviews with only 15 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across six countries: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador and Ecuador. Its analysis extended to two more, Guatemala and Cuba, where no interviews took place. Yet the six countries alone have around 40,000 NGOs between them, making Amnesty’s sample minuscule. In none of the countries did Amnesty do any direct fieldwork.

Amnesty did not consult with any government sources or individuals close to governments, resulting in a one-sided narrative. According to Amnesty, the issues “should not be interpreted as… differentiation between the countries analyzed.” Thus, countries as politically different as Ecuador and Nicaragua are painted with the same brush.

While claiming to expose the real purpose of these laws, Amnesty fails to explain their political context, despite the widespread and documented use made of NGOs by the US to destabilize countries.

The authors emailed Amnesty with our key criticisms. In a lengthy response, Mariana Marques, Amnesty’s South America Researcher & Advisor, claimed that “the report intentionally prioritizes depth and comparability [between the chosen countries].” However, this is difficult to accept given that the report’s sweeping generalizations are mechanically applied to all six.

The authors also asked Amnesty if they had considered evidence that NGOs in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba have indeed engaged in political activities – that would very likely be illegal in Western countries such as the US? Did they consider whether allegations that NGOs provoked political violence or other criminal activities might be true? In response, Ms. Marques wrote: “The report does not adjudicate case‑by‑case allegations about individual organizations.”

Nevertheless, the report apparently identified “selective enforcement” and “sanctions” that were “disproportionate.” But how could they reach an impartial judgment on the fairness of a government’s actions without considering whether the alleged infractions might have actually occurred?

Destabilization claims go unexamined

If governments justify their laws as efforts to halt foreign-funded destabilization, surely Amnesty should ask whether such claims have merit. Here are some examples that Amnesty might have considered:

• In Cuba, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) spent $15.5 million from 2009 through 2012 running “civil society” programs aimed at secretly stirring up anti-government activism. Then in just one year (2020), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – a reported CIA cutout itself masquerading as an NGO even though it is largely funded by the US government – financed 40 civil-society projects in Cuba with sums up to $650,000. According to the Cuban government, these groups were directly involved in violent demonstrations that affected Cuba in July 2021.

• In Nicaragua, which suffered a major coup attempt in 2018, Global Americans reported that the NED was “laying the groundwork for insurrection” even as the violence was taking place. NED and other bodies bragged to Congress about their regime-change efforts, and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs described in detail how NGOs indoctrinated young Nicaraguans.

• In Venezuela, USAID corroborated the use of NGOs to further US regime-change activities; since 2017 it provided “more than $158 million in humanitarian aid in Venezuela” through questionably “impartial” organizations.

Well-substantiated examples of Washington’s huge investment, extending over many years, to create or infiltrate NGOs in the three countries and use them to provoke anti-government violence, were of no interest to Amnesty researchers.

Rather, the report focuses on restrictions on access to foreign funding, which allegedly have “chilling effects on legitimate human‑rights work.” Amnesty’s refusal to “map individual donors” prevents scrutiny about the purpose of Washington’s funding for NGOs, which are often framed in vague terms such as “promoting democracy” or “strengthening civic society.”

Had the researchers talked to actual NGOs doing humanitarian work, they might have heard testimony such as this one from Rita Di Matiatt with Master Mama, a Venezuelan NGO dedicated to offering support to breastfeeding mothers: “NGOs that conspire against the stability and rights of a nation or its citizens, as well as everything that does not comply with the norms and laws of a country must be held accountable.” Venezuelan National Assembly deputy Julio Chávez expressed concern about such NGO’s working “to generate destabilization.”

And, indeed, the current NED president, Damon Wilson, recently confirmed that Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela are his highest priorities in the region.

Comparison with other countries

Amnesty claims a “global” trend toward laws resembling Russia’s “foreign agents” legislation. However, a more relevant comparison is the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) which is really the model.

The US has some of the world’s strongest and most detailed regulatory powers governing NGOs. Indeed, the US typically closes around 44,000 nonprofits annually that fail to comply. This is not unusual. The Charity Commission in Britain closes around 4,000 nonprofits each year. New regulations have led to large-scale closures in India, Turkey, South Africa and elsewhere.

Washington’s foreign agents act is not unique: The Library of Congress has examples of 13 countries with similar legislation. In Britain, the government has consulted on the introduction of a “Foreign Influence Registration Scheme,” which is similar to FARA, as are regulations which apply in the European Union.

However, it does not suit Amnesty’s narrative to make comparisons with Western countries that might caste the laws in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela in a different light.

Amnesty’s longstanding bias

Amnesty has a long history of bias against countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Ecuadorian-Canadian journalist Joe Emersberger documents how Amnesty minimizes the impact of US sanctions – illegal under international law – which target all three countries.

While Amnesty refused to recognize Nelson Mandella as a prisoner of conscious, because he failed to renounce violence in self-defense against the South African apartheid regime, Amnesty readily bestowed the honor on Leopoldo López, who fomented a number of violent coup attempts in Venezuela.

María Corina Machado is arguably Amnesty’s most lauded Venezuelan. Her legitimacy is based largely on her victory in an opposition primary. However, the contest was conducted by her personal NGO, Súmate, rather than the official Venezuelan electoral authority as is customary. This is relevant to NGO law, because Súmate received NED funds. Machado won that privately run primary by an incredible 92% landslide in a crowded field of eight candidates. When the runner-up, Carlos Prosperi, cried fraud, the ballots were destroyed to prevent an audit of the vote.

Camilo Mejia, a US military resistor and an Amnesty “prisoner of conscience,” published an open letter expressing his “unequivocal condemnation of Amnesty International with regards to the destabilizing role it has played in Nicaragua, my country of birth.”

Amnesty has long been accused of bias on an international scale. Journalist Alexander Rubinstein documented Amnesty’s collaboration with US and UK intelligence agencies dating back to the 1960s. Francis A. Boyle, human rights law professor and founding Amnesty board member, observed: “You will find a self-perpetuating clique of co-opted Elites who deliberately shape and direct the work of AI and AIUSA so as to either affirmatively support, or else not seriously undercut, the imperial, colonial, and genocidal policies of the United States, Britain, and Israel.”

NGOs and the “human rights industry”

Alfred de Zayas, former UN independent human rights expert, argues in The Human Rights Industry that there are few fields that are “as penetrated and corrupted by intelligence services” as NGOs. “The level of NGO interference in the internal affairs of states and their destabilizing impact on the constitutional order has become so prevalent that more and more countries have adopted… legislation to control this ‘invasion’ of foreign interests, or simply to ban them.”

While de Zayas recognizes Amnesty International when it does good work, he points out that in Latin America it ignores the struggle of sovereign nations “to shake off the yoke of US domination.” In a general comment that might apply specifically to Amnesty’s Tearing Up the Social Fabric, de Zayas condemns “entire reports… compiled from accounts of US-backed opposition groups.”

Nicaragua-based writer John Perry publishes in the London Review of Books, FAIR, CovertAction and elsewhere. Roger D. Harrisis with the Task Force on the Americas and the Venezuela Solidarity Network. Both authors are active with the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Brisk south-easterly winds developing on Tuesday and Wednesday will drag in much warmer air from the European continent.

Temperatures will be around 6 to 10C above average for early April.

On Tuesday temperatures will rise to the high teens and low twenties in most parts.

Across the south Midlands and the west coast of Wales it is likely to reach 22C, making it the warmest day of the year so far.

The previous highest temperature this year was 20.9C, recorded on 31 March at Pershore, Worcestershire.

Tuesday will be a mostly sunny day, especially across England and Wales but cloud will build in Northern Ireland and western Scotland with a few showers.

By Wednesday temperatures will rise even further to 23C, perhaps even 24C in south-east England.

With sunshine continuing, temperatures across England and Wales will still be into the low twenties, so it will feel more like a typical summer’s day for most of us.

However, conditions will turn a little cooler in western Scotland, Northern Ireland and Irish Sea coasts with more cloud and rain moving in later in the afternoon.

The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the opening phase of the US-Israeli war against Iran has generated a striking argument in strategic and theological circles alike: that the killing may have removed not merely a political leader but a normative brake on Iran’s possible march toward nuclear weapons. Reports indicate that Iranian decision-making has since hardened under intense military pressure and an increasingly securitised internal environment.

What gives Khamenei’s death a particular doctrinal significance is that he had, over more than two decades, publicly framed weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear and chemical weapons—as contrary to Islam. If that position represented a genuine religious constraint rather than mere diplomatic rhetoric, then his death may have removed more than a leader: it may have weakened the doctrinal restraint that helped keep Iran a threshold nuclear state.

What gives Khamenei’s death a particular doctrinal significance is that he had, over more than two decades, publicly framed weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear and chemical weapons—as contrary to Islam.

Islamic just war theory places moral constraints on indiscriminate violence, constraints that Khamenei appeared to project onto state policy. With that authority now gone, the central question is whether a moral tradition can discipline a state that increasingly experiences its insecurity as existential. Whether the next supreme leader can impose doctrinal restraint on a system drifting toward hard security logic.

The Islamic just war theory

The Islamic conception of war begins from a premise different from the caricatures often projected onto it. Classical Islamic thought does not treat war as an unbounded field of religious violence. Rather, it regulates warfare through a moral-legal framework derived from the Qur’an, the practice of the Prophet, and the juristic traditions that developed in subsequent centuries. The foundational Qur’anic injunction is taken from verse 2:190: “Fight in the way of God those who fight you, but do not transgress. Indeed, God does not love transgressors.” The verse both permits fighting and limits it: war is accepted as a political reality, but not treated as morally autonomous.

The Islamic conception of war begins from a premise different from the caricatures often projected onto it. Classical Islamic thought does not treat war as an unbounded field of religious violence.

The duality of permission and restraint thus runs through the Islamic just war tradition. War may be legitimate in cases of defence, resistance to aggression, or protection of the community. But even a just cause does not license unlimited means. Islamic jurists emphasised proportionality, legitimate authority, fidelity to agreements, and the protection of non-combatants—including women, children, the elderly, monks, and peasants— developing a norm of discrimination that restricted violence to active combatants.

It is from this perspective that nuclear weapons become especially difficult to reconcile with Islamic ethics. A weapon whose essence is mass, uncontrolled devastation, sits uneasily with any tradition that treats non-combatant immunity as morally central. In Islamic terms, the problem is not simply the scale of destruction, but the very structure of the act: the means themselves are transgressive.

 The fatwa: Genuine constraint or strategic cover?

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s reputed opposition to chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War established an early precedent for this kind of doctrinal restraint. Iraq used chemical agents extensively, and Iran suffered enormously—some 20,000 Iranians were killed and over 100,000 severely injured. Yet the Islamic Republic did not respond in kind on a comparable scale. Whether that restraint was entirely theological or also strategic remains debated. Recent evidence suggests limited Iranian chemical weapons development during the war. Still, the episode reinforced the notion that certain weapons lay beyond the moral threshold that Iran’s clerical leadership was prepared to cross openly.

Khamenei extended this logic to the nuclear realm. He first issued an oral fatwa in October 2003 declaring nuclear weapons as forbidden (haram) in Islam, and repeated this position in an official statement at the emergency meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in August 2005. Over subsequent years, Iranian officials repeatedly invoked his religious decree as evidence of the Islamic Republic’s peaceful nuclear intentions.

Khamenei extended this logic to the nuclear realm. He first issued an oral fatwa in October 2003 declaring nuclear weapons as forbidden (haram) in Islam, and repeated this position in an official statement at the emergency meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in August 2005.

But the fatwa’s authenticity and legal weight have always been contested. Some have argued that no formal written fatwa was ever issued and that what Iran marketed as a religious ruling was, in origin, merely the closing paragraph of a message to a 2010 nuclear disarmament conference, later retroactively framed by Iranian diplomats as a fatwa. Others have documented that Khamenei’s pronouncements on nuclear weapons were inconsistent: at times he categorically forbade development, stockpiling, and use; at other times he appeared to permit development and stockpiling while forbidding use.

None of this entirely strips the fatwa of significance. In political systems where legitimacy is partly theological, a public prohibition articulated by the supreme jurist, even if ambiguous in its legal form, raises the political and doctrinal cost of reversal. As one scholar observes, such declarations make it costly for the Islamic Republic to overturn the publicly stated position even if they do not constitute binding juridical rulings in the formal sense.

Succession and the question of doctrinal inheritance

The critical question of whether Khamenei’s successor would inherit his political and moral authority looms large. On March 9, 2026, the Assembly of Experts named Mojtaba Khamenei, the 56-year-old son of Ali Khamenei as Iran’s third supreme leader. Whether he would inherit his father’s doctrinal commitments, especially on nuclear weapons, is far from clear. Not known as a jurist of comparable standing to his father, Mojtaba’s authority derives primarily from his revolutionary and security credentials rather than from the depth of his theological learning, a fact noted critically within Iran’s clerical establishment, which has historically resisted father-to-son succession as uncomfortably monarchical.

Khamenei’s nuclear prohibition carried weight because it came from the state’s highest religious authority. Mojtaba’s standing is far more contested, which means that any comparable prohibition would likely carry less doctrinal force—while any tacit relaxation would accelerate the erosion of the barrier his father maintained. The IRGC commanders who manoeuvred his appointment to power have long been among those pressing for a reassessment of Iran’s nuclear posture.

Islamic restraint vs strategic realism

This leads to the final and perhaps hardest question: would Iran, if acting as a pure realist state, pursue nuclear weapons regardless of the Islamic just war tradition? The realist answer is straightforward. States seek survival in an anarchic international system. When a state faces stronger adversaries, recurring coercion, and the credible prospect of regime-change violence, it has every incentive to pursue the ultimate deterrent. From this perspective, the logic of nuclear acquisition is not theological but strategic: a bomb would promise not battlefield utility but regime survival, deterrence, and insulation from future attack.

And yet Iran is not a pure realist state in the abstract. It is a political order where ideology, clerical authority, national security, and regime survival have long coexisted in uneasy combination. The more interesting possibility, therefore, is not that realism simply replaces theology, but that realism gradually colonises it. In that scenario, doctrine is not openly discarded; it is reinterpreted and subordinated to necessity, allowing the state to retain Islamic language while moving toward a posture that the older Khamenei publicly resisted.

The greater danger is that the Islamic Republic’s language of restraint may cease to anchor policy and instead begin to trail behind it. If so, Iran’s nuclear future will be decided not only in centrifuge halls or command bunkers, but in the struggle between theological limits and strategic fear.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

US President Donald Trump has issued a direct ultimatum to Iran: reopen the Strait of Hormuz by 8pm Eastern Time in the United States on Tuesday, April 7 (midnight GMT on April 8), or face the destruction of national power plants and bridges.

This echoes an earlier March 21 ultimatum in which he threatened to attack Iran’s power plants – “the biggest one first” – if the strait was not fully reopened within 48 hours.

President Trump has since extended that deadline several times, citing progress in negotiations he claims the US is having with Iran to end the ongoing war. Iran denies it is holding direct talks with the US.

While Trump has made grand statements such as “they’re going to lose every power plant and every other plant they have in the whole country”, he has not mentioned specific targets.

The US president has also threatened to destroy the country’s bridges. Over the weekend, a US-Israeli strike hit the B1 bridge in the city of Karaj, west of Tehran. The major highway link, described as the tallest bridge in the Middle East, had been scheduled to be inaugurated soon. It sustained significant damage in the strike.

Legal experts say that targeting civilian sites amounts to “collective punishment”, which is prohibited under the laws of war.

Where are Iran’s power plants?

Iran operates hundreds of power plants which, together, form one of the largest electricity systems in the Middle East, supplying energy to 92 million people.

Most of the country’s power plants are close to major population centres and industrial hubs. The majority of Iran’s population lives in the western half of the country, with Tehran, Mashhad and Isfahan the three largest cities.

Iran has a mixture of gas, coal, hydro, nuclear and oil-fired power plants, but most are gas-fired. In the north and centre of the country, clusters of gas-fired plants supply electricity to the country’s largest population centres, including Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan and Mashhad.

Another major concentration of power plants lies along the Gulf coast. These plants sit close to major gasfields and ports, allowing large thermal stations to run on abundant natural gas.

The coast is also home to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Iran’s only nuclear power facility, which has a capacity of 1,000MW. The US and Israel have repeatedly hit this nuclear power plant, raising risks of radioactive contamination far beyond Iran’s borders, the state-run Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) has warned.

Iran also operates a handful of hydropower dams concentrated along the Karun River, the country’s most important source of hydroelectric generation.

Electricity generated from all these plants is fed into a national transmission network operated by Iran Grid Management Company, which distributes power to cities, industries and homes across the country.

The map below shows all of Iran’s power stations with a capacity of 100MW or more.

A 100MW power plant can typically supply electricity to roughly 75,000 to 100,000 homes, depending on consumption patterns.

Iran’s largest power plant by capacity is the Damavand Power Plant located in the Pakdasht area, roughly 50km (31 miles) southeast of Tehran, with a capacity of some 2,900MW, enough to power more than two million homes.

Which are Iran’s most important power plants?

Iran’s largest power plants include:

• Damavand (Pakdasht) Power Plant – Near Tehran.
  Fuel: Natural gas (combined-cycle).
  Capacity: 2,868MW.
• Shahid Salimi Power Plant – Neka, along the Caspian Sea coast.
  Fuel: Natural gas.
  Capacity: 2,215MW.
• Shahid Rajaee Power Plant – Near Qazvin.
  Fuel: Natural gas.
  Capacity: 2,043MW.
• Karun-3 Dam – Khuzestan Province.
  Fuel: Hydropower.
  Capacity: 2,000MW.
• Kerman Power Plant – Kerman.
  Fuel: Natural gas.
  Capacity: 1,912MW.

Other smaller but strategically important power plants include:

• Ramin Power Plant – Ahvaz, Khuzestan.
  Fuel: Gas.
  Capacity: 1,903MW.
• Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant – On the Gulf.
  Fuel: Nuclear.
  Capacity: 1,000MW.
• Bandar Abbas Power Plant – Near the Strait of Hormuz.
  Fuel: Oil.
  Capacity: 1,330MW.

How does Iran generate its electricity?

Iran’s electricity system relies heavily on large thermal power plants fuelled by natural gas. The country has one of the world’s largest natural gas reserves, and this fuel forms the backbone of its power system.

In 2025, 86 percent of Iran’s electricity came from natural gas.

Oil-fired plants provide a smaller share, generating roughly seven percent of electricity. Some power stations switch to diesel or fuel oil when natural gas supplies are tight, especially during winter demand peaks.

Hydropower accounts for about five percent of electricity. Large dams on rivers such as the Karun River generate power by using flowing water to spin turbines.

Nuclear energy contributes around two percent of the country’s electricity, mainly from the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Iran’s only operational nuclear reactor.

Renewables such as solar and wind play a very small role, together accounting for less than one percent of electricity generation.

Overall, more than 90 percent of Iran’s electricity comes from fossil fuels, making it one of the most gas-dependent power systems in the world.

As the US threatens to launch a ground invasion of Iran, many questions remain about its goals and geographical span. Some scenarios suggest a focus on some of the islands in the Gulf, others – joining forces with local insurgent groups.

Early on in the war, Washington seemed to toy with the idea of supporting opposition groups from Iran’s large Kurdish minority to launch a war by proxy.

According to reports in the Israeli media, initial efforts by Mossad to encourage attacks by Kurdish groups in Iran’s northwest failed due to “leaks, distrust”. Iran bolstered its defences in the area and put pressure on the authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Iranian Kurdish groups are based.

Last week, in an interview with Fox News, US President Donald Trump acknowledged that the US provided weapons to the Kurds.

Further action involving either Kurdish or other ethnic opposition groups may still be on the table as his administration seeks to put together an exit strategy from the war. Encouraging local insurgencies to weaken Tehran may seem like a good plan, but would it work?

Iran’s weak spots

Fomenting ethnic or religious tensions in the enemy camp is an old military tactic, which the US itself has used many times in the Middle East. Trump is likely looking for ways to gain leverage over the regime in Tehran and stretch its military capabilities. Iran’s internal fractures may seem to offer some opportunities for that.

In the past three decades, Tehran has failed to address the growing grievances of various minority populations in the country’s periphery. Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Balochis feel marginalised in the Shi’a majority state, while Arab and Kurdish Shia Muslims feel discriminated against by ethnic Persians.

This has led to various anti-government mobilisations, including armed ones over the past three decades.

Kurdish armed groups based in Iraq have operated for decades in northwestern Iran. Kurdish areas have also seen waves of mass protests, the most recent of which was in the autumn of 2022 following the death of a Kurdish woman at the hands of morality police in Tehran.

Other armed groups have also been active. In 2018, an attack on a military parade in the city of Ahvaz killed 29 people; an Arab separatist group claimed responsibility. In 2019, Baluchi rebels of the Jaish Al Adl group attacked a bus carrying members of the IRGC, killing at least 27. A raid by the same group on a police station in 2023 killed 11 security personnel. Then in 2024, the bombing of a mourner’s procession for the late General Qasem Sulaimani killed at least 90 people in the southeastern city of Kerman; ISIL claimed responsibility.

All of these incidents expose weaknesses in Iran’s periphery, which its enemies have long tried to exploit. If Trump decides to go down that path, he should take heed of the experiences of those who have tried to undermine the authorities in Tehran by fomenting ethno-religious insurgencies.

Past failures

Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein was one of them. When he decided to invade Iran in 1980, he saw an opportunity in the ethnic unrest among Kurds and Arabs the Islamic Republic had inherited from the monarchical regime. Saddam Hussein encouraged insurgencies among both minorities.

By the time Iraqi troops stormed onto Iranian territory, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) had already launched a rebellion against the newly formed Islamic Republic in 1979. Iraq eventually provided arms and finances, enabling the KDP-I to take over some territory and hold it for months, but internal fighting and the brutal campaign Tehran launched through its Revolutionary Guards managed to suppress the rebellion by 1982-83.

Saddam also tried to get the Arabs in the south to revolt, some Iranian Arab separatist groups fought alongside Iraqi forces in the battle for the Iranian city of Khorramshahr in 1980. But the Sunni Arab community did not join in large numbers. Shi’a Arabs had no desire to participate in what they saw as a foreign invasion, launched by an Sunni-dominated Iraqi regime. As a result, Saddam never got the mass Arab uprising he wished for.

Twenty years later, US President George W Bush tried to use a similar playbook against Iran. He authorised the CIA and other intelligence outfits to carry out covert operations in Iran and funnel money and equipment to some opposition armed groups.

Like Saddam, Bush also failed to foment rebellions in Iran. This is not just because the Islamic Republic was able to handle security situations swifty and decisively, but also because efforts to incite uprisings never really got enough momentum. The reason for that is that parts of Iran’s minorities are well-integrated into the nation’s core and elite. Ethno-religious identities and socio-economic realities in Iran are too complex to feed into a simple black-and-white narrative about ethnic oppression by the Persian majority.

The likelihood of success today

More than a month into the war on Iran, it is by now clear that US and Israeli efforts to trigger a mass uprising in Iran by decapitating the regime have failed.

At this time, there is nothing to suggest that any efforts to foment ethnic insurgencies would be more successful. US-Israel support for separatist groups is unlikely to get anywhere further than localised acts of sabotage or small skirmishes.

This would not divert important military resources and attention away from the fight with the US and Israel, as Iran is fighting a techno-guerilla war, where its most valuable weapons are missiles and drones – not ground troops.

Furthermore, there is significant regional opposition to US support for separatist groups from major allies, including Pakistan and Turkiye. Islamabad has been dealing its own violent attacks carried out by Baluch separatists in the southwest of the country. Meanwhile, for Ankara, the issue of any support for Kurdish groups is highly sensitive given its own long history of unrest in the Kurdish regions of the country.

Iraq would also be reluctant to support such activities. The government in Baghdad, as well as the Kurdistan Regional Government, would not risk retaliation from Iran by allowing US-Israeli support for the Iranian Kurds to take place on Iraqi territory.

Inciting ethnic insurgencies may seem like a good strategy on paper, but in reality it would be another recipe for disaster for the Trump administration, which is already struggling with enough failures in its war on Iran.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

United States President Donald Trump has announced that the US military has rescued a missing American fighter jet crew member in Iran.

The Air Force officer went missing in a remote part of Iran after the downing of his F-15 jet on Friday. Its two crew members ejected from the plane. The pilot was quickly rescued by US forces, but a search had to be launched for the F-15’s weapons systems officer.

In a Truth Social post on Sunday, Trump wrote that the US had rescued the second “seriously wounded, and really brave” airman from “deep inside the mountains of Iran”. It was reported that a firefight between US and Iranian forces took place in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad province before the rescue. Iran has not confirmed this, however.

Here is how the complicated rescue mission unfolded:

What has Trump said about the rescue?

While the identity of the rescued airman has not been made public, Trump referred to him as “a highly respected Colonel”.

He added that the type of rescue mission that recovered him “is seldom attempted because of the danger to ‘man and equipment’”.

Trump said two raids had taken place, and the pilot was rescued in “broad daylight” during the second raid. It is unclear when precisely the pilot was rescued. The US president wrote that the rescue was “unusual, spending seven hours over Iran”.

In his post, Trump said he would talk more about the rescue mission during a news conference with the US military in the Oval Office of the White House on Monday at 1pm (17:00 GMT).

Trump wrote on Truth Social: “This brave Warrior was behind enemy lines in the treacherous mountains of Iran, being hunted down by our enemies, who were getting closer and closer by the hour, but was never truly alone because his Commander in Chief, Secretary of War, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and fellow Warfighters were monitoring his location 24 hours a day, and diligently planning for his rescue.”

Trump added that he had ordered dozens of aircraft carrying “lethal weapons” to be sent to retrieve the airman, who had managed to evade Iranian forces for two days.

How did the search unfold?

On Friday morning, the US confirmed that an F-15E Strike Eagle had been shot down over southern Iran. The F-15 is a tactical fighter jet used by the US Air Force that first flew in 1972. Modern variants of the jet cost more than $90m each.

State media outlets in Iran showed photos of what they said was wreckage from the F-15 and what appeared to be an ejection seat with an attached parachute.

Trump suggested that the US knew the location of the plane’s second airman and was tracking him as the rescue mission unfolded.

Iran was also racing to locate the airman. Tehran called on the public to hand over the soldier to the authorities in what appeared to be an effort to secure an American prisoner of war.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed on Sunday that Iranian forces had also destroyed two C-130 aircraft and two Black Hawk helicopters during the operation to rescue the US airman in southern Isfahan province.

What do we know about the two C-130 planes that Iran says it destroyed?

The C-130 Hercules and the newer C-130J Super Hercules variant were developed by the US weapons manufacturer Lockheed Martin. They are military transport aircraft primarily used for tactical airlifts, troop transport and medical evacuations.

The Wall Street Journal reported that each C-130 costs more than $100m.

The newspaper said in a report on Sunday that the US blew up the C-130 jets on the ground during the rescue operation, quoting an unnamed person familiar with the matter. This unnamed official did not explain how the jets were downed during the rescue operation but told the outlet that it was necessary to destroy them to ensure they did not fall into enemy hands.

Has the US lost other military assets or personnel?

Yes. This conflict has killed 13 US service members and wounded more than 300, the US military’s Central Command said, but no US soldiers have been taken prisoner by Iran.

Since the start of the war on February 28, the US has lost three F-15 fighter jets in what it said was a friendly fire incident over Kuwait. A US military refuelling aircraft also went down over Iraq last month, killing all six crew members.

According to the US military, the last US fighter jet to be shot down by enemy fire before the F-15 on Friday was an A-10 Thunderbolt II during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

At least one Black Hawk helicopter was hit during the initial rescue operation, US officials said, but it managed to stay airborne.

An A-10 Warthog aircraft was also hit near the Strait of Hormuz a short time after the F-15E on Friday, but its pilot was able to eject before the plane crashed and was subsequently rescued. Iranian media reported this aircraft was hit by Iran’s defence systems.

Iran has not yet confirmed that a firefight took place before the F-15 airman’s rescue. Al Jazeera’s Tohid Asadi, reporting from Tehran, said a firefight appeared to have occurred in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad province and nine people were reported to have been killed in “strikes” there although it was unclear if this was related to the US rescue mission.

Pakistan has proposed a two-stage plan to end the US-Israel war on Iran and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, with both sides now mulling the framework, a source has told the Reuters news agency.

Esmaeil Baghaei, spokesman for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Monday acknowledged diplomatic efforts by Pakistan, which has shared a plan with Iran and the United States to end hostilities, according to Reuters.

Baghaei added that Iran is focused on its security amid the latest attacks from the US and Israel.

A top university in Tehran and the South Pars Petrochemical Plant in Asaluyeh were bombed on Monday, killing at least 34 people in Iran.

Axios first reported on Sunday that the US, Iran and regional mediators were discussing a potential 45-day ceasefire as part of a “two-phased deal” that could lead to a permanent end to the war, citing US, Israeli and regional sources.

The source told Reuters that Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, has been in contact “all night long” with US Vice President JD Vance, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

“All elements need to be agreed today,” the source said, adding the initial understanding would be structured as a memorandum of understanding finalised electronically through Pakistan, the sole communication channel in the talks.

Under the proposal, a ceasefire would take effect immediately, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, with 15 to 20 days given to finalise a broader settlement.

The deal, tentatively dubbed the “Islamabad Accord”, would include a regional framework for the strait, with final in-person talks in the capital of Pakistan.

The final agreement is expected to include Iranian commitments not to pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets, the source said.

‘No reopening of Hormuz’

Tehran has responded by stating that it will not reopen the strait as part of a temporary ceasefire, a senior Iranian official told Reuters on Monday, adding that it will not accept deadlines as it reviews the proposal. Washington also lacks the readiness for a permanent ceasefire, the official said.

The US has not yet responded to Pakistan’s plan.

“Pakistan officials tell me that Islamabad is involved in ‘frantic diplomacy’, as they put it,” said Al Jazeera’s Osama Bin Javaid.

“The problem they’re facing, as one official put it, is essentially that it’s a schoolboy brawl that they are dealing with. It is egos that they have to manage, and it is also a sea of distrust over which they have to build bridges.”

One source told Javaid that Pakistan is speaking to Iran’s clergy, diplomats, and military commanders, but the level of distrust is still high.

“You heard the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman mention that they have come under attack multiple times by the US and Israel. And then, if there is some sort of rapprochement, if there is some sort of agreement, what are the guarantees that their leaders are not going to be targeted?” said Javaid.

US’s 15-point plan ‘illogical’, says Tehran

Baghaei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, said on Monday that Tehran would never accept a 15-point plan put forward by the US last month. He stated that Tehran had finalised its demands amid recent proposals to end the war, but would reveal them only when appropriate.

He stressed that Iran would not bow to pressure, the IRNA news agency reported.

“A few days ago, they put forward proposals through intermediaries, and the 15-point US plan was reflected through Pakistan and some other friendly countries,” Baghaei said. “Such proposals are both extremely ambitious, unusual, and illogical.”

Baghaei underlined that Iran has its own framework.

“Based on our own interests, based on our own considerations, we codified the set of demands that we had and have,” he said.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman also rejected the idea that engaging with mediators signals weakness.

The latest diplomatic push by Pakistan comes amid escalating hostilities that have raised concerns over disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global fuel supplies. More than 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas passes through the waterway, which remains under a de facto Iranian blockade.

Trump, in an expletive-laden post on Sunday, threatened to rain “hell” on Tehran if it did not make a deal by the end of Tuesday that would reopen the strait.

More than 2,000 people have been killed in Iran since the war began on February 28, according to Iranian authorities.

Israel has also invaded southern Lebanon and struck Beirut, where Lebanese authorities say 1,461 people, including at least 124 children, have been killed. More than 1.2 million Lebanese have been displaced.

Aichatou often heard of insecurity for most of her life, but never experienced it herself. She had relatives who had either been killed or displaced in places like Bosso, a village close to Lake Chad that was ravaged by Boko Haram insurgency in 2015. But the violence that festered along the Sokoto and Kebbi flanks was not common where she lived in Dosso, a region in southwestern Niger. 

Then came the coup. And with it, a promise that what had happened elsewhere would never reach her. 

It did. 

In 2024, terrorists stormed her town. They killed her brother and neighbours. And like many other survivors, she fled carrying nothing except the experience of something she had only once heard about – violence. It had finally reached her. 

After Niger’s military rulers seized power in July 2023, they promised to do what the elected government could not: make the country safe. Nearly three years later, an analysis of conflict data, geospatial information, and interviews with people in the country shows that the military administration has failed to deliver on its promise.

While the junta has partly succeeded in shielding the capital city, Niamey, from attacks, more people are being killed across the country, and more people are being displaced from regions that were previously stable. The evidence shows that the generals have not ended the violence; they have simply relocated it.

For this investigation, HumAngle analysed 62 months of conflict data, evenly divided between the period before and after the coup. We complemented this with interviews with Nigeriens in Maradi and Diffa, many of whom had fled from areas that had historically never been frontlines. They declined to speak on record, citing fear and arrest, and so their names have been changed to protect them.

Aichatou now lives in Maradi as a displaced person. She has not heard from her missing relatives and some of her neighbours. They were scattered when the attackers came. Everyone ran for safety, and it’s unclear who died and who survived. It’s a crisis of missing persons during a war. 

“We don’t know where they are and don’t even have phone numbers to reach out,” she says.

The promise

When soldiers deposed President Mohamed Bazoum on the evening of July 26, 2023, the justification was that the civilian government had failed the people. Specifically, it had failed them on economy and security.

The coup leader, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, accused Bazoum of covering up the deteriorating security situation and cited what he described as both his predecessor’s “outstretched hand” policy toward armed groups and a fundamental failure to build a regionally coherent security architecture. 

Two days after seizing power, Tchiani proclaimed himself head of state, saying he had deposed Bazoum to prevent what he described as “the gradual and inevitable demise of the country.” The new ruling body named itself the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) – a title that placed national security at the very centre of its identity and mandate.

The announcement landed on fertile ground. Niger had suffered genuine insecurity under the elected government. The Tillabéri region, squeezed between the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso in the volatile Liptako-Gourma tri-border zone, had been burning for years. Attacks by Islamic State affiliates and al-Qaeda-linked groups had claimed the lives of hundreds of soldiers and thousands of civilians. The insurgency had spread eastward into Tahoua, and southward into Dosso — regions that had once felt insulated. 

Ordinary Nigeriens, particularly in rural and border areas, had every reason to want something different. The coup, for some, looked like that. What followed were celebrations. 

Pro-junta crowds gathered in Niamey. Thousands marched. Russian and Nigerien flags flew alongside each other in the same streets where anti-French sentiment had been building for years. The generals had read the room correctly, at least in the capital.

Since assuming power, the junta in Niger has claimed some successes, especially in repelling some attacks, asserting sovereignty, and staging defences against the internal and perceived external threats. The military has, in 2025, also pursued general mobilisation decrees and created new partnerships, especially with Russian mercenaries. The mobilisation includes bolstering the military to 50,000 troops, increasing the retirement age for officers to 52, and mobilising youth to combat insecurity. 

However, under the same military, in 2026 (data for 2025), Niger reached its worst-ever ranking on Global Terrorism Index (GTI) as the 3rd most terror-impacted country in the world. This was significantly higher than when it was under an elected government, in which it was ranked between 8th and 10th. 

The silence

As the violence spreads under the junta, public criticism becomes more dangerous. 

State-owned newspapers in Niger do not often report comprehensively on the security crisis. Most of what appears tends to highlight that a security meeting was held, or that some terrorists were killed, or it focuses on accusing France of being responsible for the country’s security problems. This narrative has gone as far as Abdourahamane Tchiani alleging that Nigeria is collaborating with France to launch an attack on Niger through terrorists deployed at the Nigeria/Niger border. The Nigerian government and independent fact-checkers denied that. 

But when activists or independent journalists speak about insecurity, they get arrested.

Gazali Abdou Tasawa, a correspondent of DW Hausa, was arrested and jailed in January 2026 for reporting on displaced persons in Niger. He was not the first. 

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has documented that in October 2025 six journalists were arrested in Niamey – Moussa Kaka and Abdoul Aziz of Saraounia TV; Ibro Chaibou and Souleymane Brah from the online publication Voice of the People; Youssouf Seriba of Les Échos du Niger; and Oumarou Kané, founder of the magazine Le Hérisson – over their alleged role in circulating a government press briefing invitation on social media criticizing the introduction of the mandatory payment for “Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland”, a form of security levy in Niger to combat terrorism. 

Moussa Ngom, Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)’s Francophone Africa representative, explained that “arrest and detention have become tools-of-choice for Nigerien authorities to try to control information they find undesirable.” For this investigation, HumAngle reached out to journalists in Niger to speak on insecurity. Three of them declined to speak and one promised to speak but never replied to our questions. 

However, recently, a few activists have begun to speak out. A prominent Nigerien activist, Maikoul Zodi, recently called on the military junta to account for two years of broken promises on security – the central justification offered for seizing power on July 26, 2023.

Writing on his Facebook page, Zodi was blunt about what he sees as the junta’s failure. “Niger is still bleeding… the same villages are burning… the same families are burying their dead.” He asked directly what tangible improvements had been made on the ground since the coup. 

His statement reflects a shift in civil society’s posture from solidarity with the transition to demands for results. “Compassion alone is no longer enough. There must be accountability,” he wrote, as violence continues spreading into regions that had previously been spared. 

“I think the CNSP should present a transparent report of the security situation, with concrete figures and data,” reacted Tahirou Halidou, a concerned Nigerien.

One day after that Facebook post, Zodi was interrogated by the police because of the publication. 

What the numbers buried 

The junta’s promise of improving security has not become a reality. 

To understand what changed, HumAngle analyzed conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project which maps political violence worldwide in real time, covering equal 31-month periods before and after the coup – from January 2021 to February 2026. 

ACLED data does not necessarily give us a complete picture of the dire  situation in Niger, given that most of its information relies on open-source reporting from NGOs and journalists who have been repressed by the junta, and so may not be able to accurately capture what is really happening on the ground. 

While the ACLED number of recorded incidents for the period under review rose only modestly, the outcomes of insecurity became dramatically deadlier in Niger Republic. Worse, the violence is spreading toward communities that were never hotspots.

“Although we are aware of insecurity in some villages a few kilometres away from ours, we had never experienced violence before the military coup,” said Ousmane*, an IDP who left his village Gadori in Diffa and moved to Maradi in early 2025.  

According to ACLED data, total recorded conflict events rose modestly after July 26, 2023 – from 1,879 to 2,221, an increase of 18.2 percent. Taken alone, that figure might suggest a country holding steady. But fatalities tell a radically different story: deaths surged from 2,983 before the coup to 4,855 afterwards, a 62.8 percent increase. The same rough number of incidents, but significantly more people dying in them. The deaths per incident climbed by 37.7 percent, meaning that even setting aside the raw count, each individual attack became deadlier on average.

One of the deadliest attacks recorded under the junta was on Dec. 10, 2024, when Jihadists affiliated with the Islamic State attacked Nigerien soldiers at a market in Chetoumane, Tillabéri region, killing at least 90 soldiers and over 50 civilians.  The junta suspended BBC for reporting the attack. 

The Junta Redistricted the Violence by IT HumAngle

The displacements

Before the coup, areas surrounding the Nigerien border with Nigeria were relatively safe, but not anymore. “In Dan Issa here, we had never experienced a situation when people were as afraid to go to villages as they are now,” one of the residents told HumAngle. “There is a silent displacement in the villages due to incessant cases of kidnappings.” 

Dosso, Aichatou’s region, appeared in the ACLED displacement data for the first time, with six distinct locations recording forced civilian movement: Dogondoutchi, Banizoumbou Kobia, Boumba, Kassalama, Kontalangou, and Tounouga. 

The entire Gaya corridor, the southern road connecting Niger to Nigeria and Benin, recorded zero displacement events in the 31 months before the coup. After it, the route became newly active, with JNIM and ISSP both documented operating along it. These are not places with histories of insurgent attack. They are places that were, until recently, buffers that absorbed refugees from further north without themselves being overrun. But that buffer has collapsed.

Tillabéri’s Abala district recorded nine distinct new displacement locations after the coup, compared to only two locations before the coup. A cluster triggered in a single week in October 2023 – Maimagare, Mandaba, Tamattey, Dangna, and Badak Toudou – marked the opening of that sub-region to what the data suggests was a systematic IS Sahel campaign of threats designed to clear villages. 

By early 2026, even Niamey itself was no longer exempt: an Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) attack on Air Force Base 101 in January 2026 produced the capital’s first recorded displacement event.

Across the full dataset, 51 locations recorded displacement for the first time after the coup. Only four sites of chronic, pre-existing displacement persisted into the post-coup period. The coup expanded the footprint of violence into entirely new territory. Generally, according to the United Nations Refugee Council (UNHCR), as of 2026, Niger has recorded over one million displacements, more than half of whom are internally displaced (IDPs). 

As the new wave of violence reached new places, more people fled their homes. Confirmed displacement events – i.e. ACLED incidents explicitly noting that people had fled or evacuated – rose by 83.3 percent, from 30 in the pre-coup period to 55 after. Abandoned settlement events declined, from 27 to 18, but that apparent drop carries a grim explanation: many of the communities that might have been abandoned had already been emptied. There were fewer inhabited places left to abandon.

The nature

The nature of the violence also transformed. Events recorded by ACLED explicitly as “violence against civilians” fell by nearly 31.7 percent. This decrease does not, however, reflect the full picture and reading it literally can be misleading.

ACLED records each conflict event under a single type based on its primary event: a gun battle is coded “Battles” even if the notes confirm civilians were killed; a roadside bomb is “Explosions/Remote violence” even when the target was a civilian vehicle. Only when deliberate civilian targeting is the defining characteristic, before they flag it as “Violence against civilians” and set the civilian targeting variable. However, three columns allow a closer accounting of civilian contributions to those increased overall fatality numbers: the “civilian_targeting” flag itself; the “interaction code”, which records the actor types involved; and the free-text “event notes”, which often documents civilian casualties in events coded under other categories.

Events that ACLED explicitly classifies as “Violence against civilians” did fall from 785 to 536 incidents. However, battles surged. The dominant interaction in battles by far was state forces against rebel groups, accounting for 182 clashes and 944 deaths before the coup and climbing to 382 clashes and 2,009 deaths afterwards. There have been clearly stated large combatant tolls in these events. But embedded in the ACLED event notes for those same battles are post-coup civilian-involved incidents, together contributing to 447 deaths when you count the fatality column of the rows’ note that explicitly records “civilian casualties”. This goes up from 23 battle events and 108 deaths before the coup to a more-than-threefold rise.

Most explosions and remote violence surges follow the same state-versus-rebel pattern: IED attacks on military convoys classified as “State forces-Rebel group” jumped from 46 to 155 events. Yet ACLED’s own civilian_targeting flag registers a 230 percent increase in civilian-linked explosion-related deaths (from 33 to 109). 

Reviewing these columns in those months before and after the July 2026 coup gives a narrower picture than the overall event counts suggest. 

More battles. Triple the bombs. Fewer labels, same bodies. by IT HumAngle

The increase in the death toll aligns with the assessments of other security monitoring bodies. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies noted that fatalities linked to extremist groups were projected to reach more than 1,600 in 2024 alone — a 60 percent increase from 2023. The Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S4) Initiative found that attacks on Niger’s own security forces in the first nine months of 2024 were more frequent than in any previous year. The CNSP had promised to protect its soldiers, but the opposite happened.

The HumAngle ACLED analysis also tracked attacks on state forces specifically: incidents targeting the military nearly doubled, rising from 198 to 366 – an 84.8 percent jump. Fatalities in those incidents climbed from 623 to 1,555, a 149.6 percent jump. By the post-coup period, state-force targeted deaths accounted for 32 percent of all fatalities recorded – up from 21 percent before the coup. The lethality of each individual attack on security forces also rose: from 3.2 deaths per event before the coup to 4.3 after.

“Those numbers reflect a simple reality that the security vacuum created by the rupture with Western partners has been exploited ruthlessly by non-state armed groups,” said Ikemesit Effiong, an analyst and a managing partner at SBM Intelligence, an African security intel firm based in Lagos, Nigeria. “A massive increase in violence metrics is more than a failure of policy; it is a failure of legitimacy,” he told HumAngle.

Jihadist groups, freed from the surveillance, intelligence-sharing, and operational pressure that Western and regional partnerships had provided, adapted their tactics. They hit less often but harder, and with dramatically more lethal results. JNIM, the al-Qaeda affiliate that had previously operated mostly in southwestern Tillabéri, expanded into southern Dosso. Islamic State Sahel Province consolidated control over the Abala sub-region and extended pressure southward toward Niamey. 

Tera, in Tillabéri, became the single deadliest location shift in the dataset: event counts rose by only a third, but fatalities exploded from 198 to 991 – a 401 percent increase. Gaya, on the Nigerian border, went from near-silence to an active conflict zone. Dioundiou appeared in the data for the first time, with 49 events and 144 fatalities recorded where none had existed before. The geography of the war had moved.

The war moved south. by IT HumAngle

In January 2026, the Jihadists affiliated with the ISSP conducted an unprecedented daring attack on the Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey. The attack included the first-time use of drones, which were reportedly engaged by the airport’s air defence systems. The attack sent a chilling message that the terrorists are getting bolder and ready to wage more sophisticated attacks on some of the state’s most protected infrastructure. 

“The use of drones by ISSP shows a level of technical sophistication and intelligence gathering we haven’t seen this close to the capital before,” said Effiong, the security analyst. “For the military regime, if they cannot secure the perimeter of the country’s premier international gateway, they cannot claim to control the state.”

The protection bubble

What the full body of evidence suggests is that the junta in Niger built a bubble around Niamey and the corridors of power that connect it to key military installations. Inside that bubble, things are calmer. Attacks on urban centres remain relatively rare. The capital’s residents can move through their days with a reasonable sense that yesterday’s normal will resemble tomorrow’s.

“The distinction is now visible,” Effiong told HumAngle. “Regime security focuses on Niamey’s checkpoints and the presidential palace; peripheral areas are being sacrificed.” 

Outside that bubble — in Dosso, in the new displacement clusters of Abala, in the villages whose names appear in ACLED event notes for the first time after July 2023 — the junta’s promise of peace has not arrived. 

“This emboldens groups like ISSP and JNIM because it reveals a risk-reward calculation: the junta’s air power is limited, and their reaction times are slow,” Effiong said.

The Islamic State Sahel Province has moved closer to Niamey than at any point in the country’s history, with militants increasingly controlling key roads into the capital, effectively tightening a noose that the junta’s propaganda apparatus does not mention.

Aichatou knows this too well. She is in Maradi, far from everyone who once knew her, far from the brother whose body she could not bury, far from the relatives she could not trace, and far from the neighbours who once gave her a sense of community.

The promise of security reached Niamey.

It did not reach her.

This article was produced with support from the African Academy for Open Source Investigations (AAOSI) and the African Digital Democracy Observatory (ADDO) as part of an initiative by Code for Africa (CfA). Visit https://disinfo.africa/ for more information.

Inside a hangar located near a motorway and a port, sleek fiberglass unmanned attack boats, resembling oversized canoes and painted naval grey, await engine fitting. These boats, initially built by Ukrainian special forces, have been effective in pushing the Russian Black Sea Fleet from nearby waters. If conflicts intensify in the Middle East between Israel and the U. S. and Iran, these British boats may be deployed. Such vessels are increasingly recognized as the future of naval warfare, as well as suitable for various offshore roles like search and rescue.

The manufacturing facility belongs to Kraken, a fast-expanding British defense company that has secured a contract to supply 20 small attack boats to Britain’s Royal Navy and has other agreements with U. S. Special Operations Command. Fueled by venture capital, similar companies globally are producing autonomous attack craft essential for potential conflicts, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or NATO actions against Russia in the Baltic. Kraken offers various drones; the 8.5-meter Scout Medium is highly popular, though it hasn’t confirmed whether any of its boats have been used in the Middle East or Black Sea.

The U. S. military has deployed similar boats like the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft in Gulf operations. U. S. Central Command has been testing unmanned vessels for years, while European nations have advanced their skills with NATO’s Task Force X-Baltic. These vessels, whether autonomous or remotely operated, can carry weapons and surveillance tools, showcasing the rapid evolution of naval warfare, as evidenced by Iranian attacks on commercial ships.

Heavy jamming in Ukraine and the Gulf has led to challenges in keeping remote human-piloted systems operational and has shifted focus towards developing autonomous systems that do not require a communication link. Reports indicate that there were several problems in last year’s tests of these autonomous systems, which is not surprising given the contested regions like the Black Sea and Baltic Sea. Currently, the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel Lyme Bay is expected to load drones for potential mine clearance in the Gulf, but only when the conflict ends and it is safer to operate such craft.

If this mission proceeds, it would highlight the reduced number of functional warships in the UK’s financially constrained navy and showcase changes in military technology. However, experts do not believe that vessels built by companies like Kraken will completely replace traditional warships, despite the reminder from Trump’s “armada” of the significant power that traditional ships hold. Notably, U. S. commanders have deployed these vessels away from battle zones to reduce risks.

Kraken claims it can produce as many as 500 remote-controlled vessels within the current year, with plans to double that by 2027 through partnerships with shipyards in Germany and the Pacific region. Kraken’s founder, Mal Crease, aims to establish a leading maritime offshore systems manufacturer by applying his experiences from Formula One racing and high-performance offshore boats. He acknowledges the complexities of producing quality systems amid conflict while also striving to mass-produce boats in peaceful environments.

Kraken’s team utilizes modular construction to rapidly assemble a variety of vessels by hand, similar to how supercars are made, allowing for quick scale-up in production. However, uncertainties about military spending in the UK remain, with ongoing debates regarding the Defence Investment Plan and budget allocations between the prime minister and the Treasury.

A broader trend is evident as new defense firms such as Kraken and others emerge, differing from traditional defense contractors like Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, which are known for long development times and high costs. Newer companies, some less than two years old, are more agile and focused on producing weapons systems quickly and affordably.

Many former military personnel are now working with these companies and engaging with clients in various countries, including Ukraine, which is both buying and manufacturing these systems. Reports suggest that missile supplies, like the Tomahawk and Patriot missiles, are dwindling, while drone manufacturers expect to produce hundreds of thousands or even millions of systems annually. Ukraine, in particular, has rapidly grasped the importance of these new technologies and has been sharing its expertise with nations in the Middle East. Conversely, Western nations outside the conflict have been slower to adapt, but some firms are already making swift advancements.

With information from Reuters

Tehran says it will respond ‘in kind’ to any attacks on its infrastructure, warns Trump threats an ‘incitement to war crimes’.

At least 34 people have been killed, including six children, as the United States and Israel carried out massive attacks across Iran, targeting a top university as well as residential areas, after US President Donald Trump set a Tuesday deadline for Tehran to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz or face strikes on its power plants and bridges.

The Fars news agency reported on Monday that an air attack killed 23 people, including four girls and two boys aged below 10 years, in Tehran province’s Baharestan County.

At least five people were killed in an attack on a residential building in the city of Qom, according to the political and security deputy of the governor, Morteza Heydari. Six others were killed in Bandar-e Lengeh, in southern Iran, authorities said.

At least a dozen cities were hit across Iran, including Bandar Abbas, Ahvaz, Mahshahr, Shiraz, Isfahan and Karaj.

US-Israeli strikes also hit Sharif University in Tehran, one of Iran’s leading scientific universities, often compared with the US’s Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Al Jazeera’s Tohid Asadi, reporting from Tehran, said the facility was severely hit, with extensive damage reported in the compound’s mosque and laboratories.

“The Sharif area has witnessed other attacks, including one on a gas facility,” Asadi said, adding that other civil facilities, including roads, power plants and bridges were also targeted across Iran.

“Iran’s Ministry of Science and Technology told us that at least 30 universities have been hit” since the beginning of the war on February 28, he said.

Iran vows retaliatory attacks

The attacks follow Trump’s expletive-laden threat on Truth Social, demanding that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz or face “hell”. Iran has warned of retaliatory attacks, saying it will respond “in kind” to any attacks on its infrastructure, with senior officials condemning the president’s remarks as an “incitement to war crimes”. The strait, through which some 20 percent of global oil and gas passes, has been under effective blockade by Iran in response to the war.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Iranians were unfazed by Trump’s threats and that they would not be forced into any unfavourable deal. He said Trump’s statements were “an indication of a criminal mindset” and amounted to an “incitement to war crimes and crimes against humanity”.

Baghaei also warned that Iran would respond to any attacks on its infrastructure by launching similar attacks in the region.

Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, said a single misstep by either country could severely disrupt global energy flows and international trade.

Velayati added that while the US has learned certain lessons from Iran’s history, it “has yet to understand the geography of power”.

Meanwhile, Israel also faced several missile attacks, with alarms going off in parts of the country. According to the official Israeli radio station, four volleys of Iranian missiles were launched in the early morning hours on Tuesday.

Rescue workers pulled two bodies from the rubble of a building struck in Haifa, while two residents remained missing.

Ambulance and civil defence services reported several injuries, some serious, in more than 20 locations, including Tel Aviv, Petah Tikva and Ramat Gan.

The Ynet News outlet said a 34-year-old woman was “seriously injured” by interceptor missiles in Petah Tikva.

The Channel 2 broadcaster published images of smoke rising over Gush Dan and Bnei Brak, as well as a video of minor damage to a building in Tel Aviv.

Assam, India – Amoiya Medhi says attending an election rally organised by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in her hometown in India’s northeastern state of Assam is a matter of both religious compulsion and personal gratitude.

On March 29, Medhi was among thousands of men and women who thronged the rally held on the outskirts of Jagiroad, an industrial town in central Assam’s Morigaon district, ahead of the state assembly election scheduled on Thursday.

Nitin Nabin, the BJP’s national president and chief guest at the event, trumpeted the welfare schemes launched by Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma’s government – schemes that Nabin claimed benefitted the Assamese people, especially women.

Medhi, 38, nodded in agreement as she listened attentively to the speeches. “This government has done so much for everyone, including women,” she told Al Jazeera. “I am going to only vote for the BJP.”

Like Medhi, dozens of women attending the rally said they were the beneficiaries of multiple government schemes, including Orunodoi, a direct benefit transfer scheme that saw nearly four million women receive 9,000 rupees each on March 10 – the largest such disbursement in the state’s history, which included a three-month bonus to mark the Bihu festival held in April.

The disbursement came barely a month before Thursday’s vote in which Sarma, 57, is seeking a third consecutive term for his party.

Since becoming the chief minister in 2021, Sarma has been accused of pursuing a hardline Hindu supremacist agenda (popularly known as “Hindutva”) coupled with a xenophobic campaign targeting Muslims. They constitute 34 percent of Assam’s 31 million population, according to the last census conducted in 2011. That’s the highest among Indian states, with only the federally-governed territories of Indian-administered Kashmir and Lakshadweep higher.

An overwhelming nine million of Assam’s 10.3 million Muslims speak Bengali and not Assamese. They historically migrated to Assam in waves – a majority of them moving during British rule, when Bengali-speaking Hindu and Muslim communities moved from East Bengal (now Bangladesh) to work in Assam’s tea estates and rice fields.

‘Protecting our Hindu identity’

For decades, the BJP and other Hindu groups have labelled the Bengali-speaking Muslims as “foreigners”, accusing them of being undocumented immigrants from Bangladesh. Assam founded special tribunals to try these Muslims, sending hundreds to detention centres built across the state.

Thousands of “miya”, as Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam are pejoratively called, have also been declared “doubtful” voters. The “miya” issue has shaped the BJP’s politics in Assam. Leading the charge against them, Sarma himself publicly admitted that he had instructed BJP workers to file an objection with the Election Commission of India to remove half a million Bengali-speaking Muslims from electoral rolls.

In 2024, Sarma told the state assembly that his government “will take sides” and “will not let miya Muslims take over all of Assam”. Two months ago, a 17-second artificial intelligence-generated video, produced and shared by the BJP on X, showed Sarma holding a rifle and shooting at pictures of two Muslim men, with the caption saying: “No Mercy”. The clip, titled ‘Point Blank Shot’, was deleted after outrage.

Champa Hira, another woman attending the Morigaon rally, said while the BJP’s financial aid and other welfare schemes have been a major draw, her support for the party goes beyond financial benefits.

“For us, it is also about protecting our Hindu identity,” she told Al Jazeera.

“Our Hindu religion is born out of the lotus,” Hira said, referring to the BJP’s election symbol. “We will let the lotus bloom once again for such schemes and also for our Hindu identities.”

In the run-up to the polls, the BJP’s political messaging on roadside billboards, wall graffiti and posters had the party showcase its anti-Muslim policies pursued in the past decade.

The party boasts about clearing around 20,000 hectares of government land – an area more than three-and-a-half-times the size of Manhattan – from the “osinaki manuh” (“strange people” – a veiled reference to Bengali-speaking Muslims). The eviction drives, which intensified after Sarma became the chief minister in 2021, are a part of the BJP’s “war” on Bengali-speaking Muslims to “reclaim every inch of land” allegedly encroached by them. Without providing evidence, Sarma has repeatedly accused the Bengali-speaking Muslims of a conspiracy to change Assam’s demography and reduce Hindus to a minority. The government’s crackdown also saw dozens of Muslims “pushed back” to Bangladesh – their alleged homeland – or their properties bulldozed.

Alongside such hardline policies targeting Muslims, the BJP also touted the launching of various welfare schemes for women and youth. And has promised an increase in financial aid from $13 to over $32 in the Orunodoi cash transfer scheme. In the Udyamita scheme, an entrepreneurial fund reserved for rural women to bootstrap their businesses, the increase is from $107 to $269.

Akhil Ranjan Dutta, who teaches political science at Assam’s Gauhati University, says the Hindu nationalist party is using a strategy that mixes “heightened polarisation and a developmental pitch” to woo the Assamese voters.

“To me, it is a cocktail of Hindutva and welfarism,” Dutta told Al Jazeera. “The BJP is experimenting with a brand of Hindutva by co-opting Indigenous armed struggle and cultural nationalism, while solidifying Hindu identity and othering the Bengali Muslims.”

The Bengali-speaking Muslims say the BJP’s election promises have heightened their anxiety. In its manifesto, the party has promised more crackdowns on the community, including a proposal to implement a Uniform Civil Code, which, according to critics, will override Muslim personal laws on marriage, divorce and inheritance.

The Uniform Civil Code, a longstanding demand from Hindu groups, is already in place in two BJP-ruled states, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home state of Gujarat. The BJP has also promised a pushback against “Love Jihad”, an unproven conspiracy theory floated by right-wing Hindu groups, under which Muslim men allegedly lure Hindu women into marriage and convert them to Islam.

A former Assamese parliamentarian from the main opposition Congress party, who requested anonymity fearing reprisal from the government, agreed with political scientist Dutta. “The BJP has managed to turn Hindus against Muslims and enjoy support,” he added.

BJP spokesman in Assam, Kishore Upadhyay, rejected the allegation, claiming the government’s eviction drives were not targeted at any community.

“It is directed only against illegal encroachment, irrespective of religion or identity. Unfortunately, successive Congress governments in the past allowed or even facilitated such illegal settlements, creating today’s challenges,” he told Al Jazeera.

“It is also important to highlight that this is about restoring land rights of indigenous and tribal communities, protecting forest areas and ensuring proper land governance.”

Will welfare schemes help BJP?

Opposition parties and analysts say the BJP is mainly milking two cash transfer schemes – Orunodoi and Udyamita – to influence voters in this election.

In December 2025 and January this year, the government distributed cheques of $107 each under the Udyamita scheme. Additionally, it withheld a monthly honorarium of $13 for poor women under the Orunodoi scheme for three months, but handed it out last month in the run-up to the election.

Isfaqur Rahman of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) said the Sarma government’s disbursement of cash only days before the polls will help it in securing significant numbers of female votes. “If cash is disbursed to them on the eve of the election after making the beneficiaries wait, it will help influence their choice to vote,” Rahman told Al Jazeera. “This is nothing more than vote buying by the BJP.”

Economist Joydeep Baruah agreed, saying that distributing a lump sum of money will “bear a positive political result for the ruling party”, as he estimated that that at least 10 to 15 percent of the scheme’s four million women beneficiaries could vote for the BJP.

“While the rural wages in Assam have been stagnant due to a growing unemployment, the Orunodoi financial aid converts into 10-15 percent of their monthly income,” said Baruah, who teaches economics at state-run Krishna Kanta Handiqui State Open University in Assam’s main city of Guwahati.

Baruah said such populist schemes help in sustaining pro-incumbency.

“That way, the BJP is establishing more of a patron-client relationship, with patrons being the BJP and the clients being the beneficiaries,” he told Al Jazeera. “Such a transactional relationship materialises on the ground.”

Dipika Baruah, a 34-year-old woman in Kathiatoli town in central Assam’s Nagaon district – who is not related to economist Baruah – said the government grants empowered her to live with dignity.

“The money helped me keep the flame in my stove going,” she told Al Jazeera as she shopped at Mama Bazar, a marketplace named after Sarma, who is fondly called “mama” (maternal uncle in Assamese and Bengali) by his supporters. “This was possible because of mama. Women will only vote for Mama.”

Pre-poll surveys in Assam also suggest that cash transfer schemes will help the BJP consolidate votes in its favour.

An opinion poll conducted by political research firm, Vote Vibe, revealed that 54 percent of respondents believe the government’s cash transfer schemes will consolidate and even attract opposition voters. The survey also showed 38 percent of female respondents saying the schemes had strengthened the BJP’s voter base, while 21 percent of females said the schemes will poach opposition votes.

BJP spokesman Upadhyay told Al Jazeera the allegations of influencing voters by transferring cash before the election are “factually incorrect and politically motivated”.

“It [Orunodoi] is a long-standing welfare initiative aimed at supporting economically vulnerable women-led households, not a last-minute electoral measure,” he told Al Jazeera.

‘Kill us all at once’

Back at the BJP rally in Morigaon, where its leaders delivered fiery speeches calling for the expulsion of “infiltrators from Bangladesh”, Amir Ali remembered his sister Afsana.

On February 18, 1983, one-year-old Afsana was among an estimated 1,800 Bengali-speaking Muslims massacred by a Hindu and Indigenous mob in what came to be known as the Nellie massacre. The killings were in 14 villages, including Ali’s Matiparbat, a 40-minute drive from where the BJP rally was held.

Ali, now in his 50s, said he attended the BJP rally only to prove that he is not an “illegal immigrant” but a citizen of the state.

“When children were massacred, we had no choice but to vote to prove that we are not illegal Bangladeshis,” he told Al Jazeera. “Likewise, we have no choice now but to prove we are not infiltrators or ‘strangers’ as Sarma claims.”

In a quaint corner of Jagiroad town, Noorjamal shares Ali’s sentiments. Two years ago, he was rendered homeless after the houses of nearly 8,000 Muslims were bulldozed during a government eviction drive.

“The chief minister says he is evicting Bangladeshis from government land, but how are we Bangladeshis if my father and forefathers were born and died in India?” Noorjamal’s mother Maherbanu Nessa asked.

“The way Himanta ‘mama’ is bulldozing our homes, he might as well just kill us all at once.”

In a communication sent to India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, the United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) said on January 19 this year that Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam are facing racial discrimination, resulting in forced evictions, hate speech and excessive use of force by the law-enforcement agencies.

An investigation by The New Humanitarian, an independent news outlet, published on March 24 found that between May 2021, when Sarma became Assam’s chief minister, and early 2026, more than 22,000 structures were demolished and 20,380 families evicted in the state, an overwhelming majority of them being Bengali-speaking Muslims.

As Sarma’s BJP vows to “break the backbone of miyas” after the election, Ali and Nessa worry about survival amid such hostilities.

“We have nothing to resist this cruel government but prayers and our votes,” Ali told Al Jazeera. “But maybe, if not today, then someday we will find peace in this land. We are still hopeful.”

The ongoing war of choice launched by the United States and Israel against Iran has shattered the geopolitical status quo in our region. As Washington finds itself entangled in another Middle Eastern quagmire, reports suggest that US President Donald Trump’s administration is increasingly in need of a political off-ramp.

The Hormuz littoral states possess a rare, collective opportunity to provide the American president with an exit strategy. By taking the initiative to establish a new, locally managed security architecture for the Strait of Hormuz, our nations can further elevate their strategic significance in regional geopolitics and the global economy. The alternative to this win-win scenario is prolonged conflict that would ensure that a new regional order is eventually imposed unilaterally by Tehran.

Seeking to balance their positions, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states appear trapped between two bad options. Confronting Trump, especially in the middle of a war, would undoubtedly carry significant costs and unpredictable reactions from an increasingly unpredictable leader.

At the same time, their inability to avoid being seen by Iran as at least passive participants in the aggression against the country makes them legitimate targets under its increasingly assertive military doctrine, which seeks to prevent the repetition of such wars for the foreseeable future.

Yet, this reality also demonstrates the limits of the United States’ security patronage. These limits—especially during what appears to be a historically unconditional alliance with Israel in which Israeli interests increasingly trump American interests in the region—suggest that the status quo is unsustainable.

A new order will inevitably replace the existing one, as conditions for all regional states will further deteriorate if the conflict continues to escalate. There is no longer any scenario in which Iran remains a target while the GCC carries on as usual, as was the case during the 12-day war in June 2025.

Iran’s ability to choke the flow of maritime traffic with $20,000 drones that can be produced underground and launched from anywhere in the country suggests that it possesses immense leverage. Iranian officials have clearly stated that it will now be utilised to forge a new order for Hormuz.

Relations between Iran and the GCC states have seen ups and downs since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The relationship was defined by hostility for a long time until it underwent a radical, positive transformation in the past few years.

Iranian attacks against the military and economic infrastructure in the GCC states, along with the recent expulsion of Iranian diplomats from some GCC capitals, undoubtedly constitute a severe setback and a regression toward the past.

However, this crisis has also demonstrated that security is a collective good; the current war proves how one state’s insecurity renders all states in the region insecure. A security architecture built at the expense of a neighbour is no longer viable. Iran has already begun dismantling the former order, but the new order does not need to be exclusively Iranian in its design.

For a path forward, we can look to Europe’s successful historical experiences in achieving a regional order. From the Congress of Vienna, which stabilised Europe following Napoleon’s wars of aggression, to the gradual economic, political, and security integration that followed World War II, these milestones should not serve as templates, but as sources of inspiration for our region.

The Strait of Hormuz suffers from a legal anomaly, as it remains one of the few critical maritime arteries of its kind lacking a dedicated international regulatory treaty. Unlike Turkiye, whose sovereign control and regional stability are in part anchored in the Montreux Convention regulating the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Hormuz operates without a codified maritime framework, which has made it uniquely vulnerable to superpower impositions throughout history. The current war can thus, to some extent, be understood as a product of this unregulated environment.

Convening a “Congress for Hormuz” could help regional states collectively design a security architecture, fill this legal vacuum, and ensure the stability of not only our own region but the global economy as well.

The ultimate goal of such a platform should be the codification of a treaty that formalises the status of the strait and provides the legal certainty currently absent, while also elevating the strategic weight of regional states in the global economy by ensuring that the management of Hormuz remains a local prerogative.

In the short term, this framework can serve to reopen the strait, providing Trump with a way out of the quagmire by claiming that his regional allies have helped reopen it. In the long term, this framework would protect GCC countries from a patron willing to sacrifice international law and regional stability for the benefit of its principal ally, Israel, an ally that none of us will ever be able to replace or compete with.

The future of Hormuz belongs in the hands of its inhabitants, not the superpowers who have exploited it and are currently destabilising it to pursue their own, or Israel’s, interests.

While a multilateral platform and a formal treaty represent the ideal path towards long-term stability, it is imperative to recognise that the current existential war launched against Iran—a conflict facilitated by the regional status quo—has made the emergence of a new order a non-negotiable necessity for Tehran.

Should the GCC states choose to prioritise the requests of their Western allies over regional integration—which is likely to also prolong the conflict, inflicting costs on all sides—Iran will undoubtedly proceed to forge this new order unilaterally.

In such a scenario, the resulting framework would also be an imposed order, born of strategic necessity and survival rather than consensus. Under these conditions, the common ground for shared peace, regional stability, and collective prosperity would be significantly diminished. This would be a lost opportunity.

The GCC states must now decide whether they wish to be the architects of this new regional era, or passive observers.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.