TODAY

In August 2026, Kazakhstan will hold an unusual election. The newly established unicameral parliament—the “Kurultai”—will, for the first time, be formed entirely through party lists. Independent candidates and regional representatives will no longer enter the core of state power. As a representative institution of so-called “steppe democracy,” the Kurultai has undergone multiple transformations throughout history, both in its functions and in the composition of its participants. According to recent constitutional arrangements, this mechanism has been elevated to an unprecedented level. This raises a key question: what direction does this transformation reveal in the current round of political modernization?

Historically, the Kurultai functioned as an important mechanism of consultation in steppe society, not as a system of mass participation, but as a platform composed of multiple layers of elite actors. Its participants included khans and sultans who held political authority, biys who were responsible for adjudication and governance, military leaders who organized mobilization in times of war, as well as tribal elders and influential akyns and zhyrau who shaped public discourse. In addressing critical issues such as succession, warfare, and internal conflict, the Kurultai did not rely on formalized procedures or fixed institutional rules. Instead, decisions were reached through authority, negotiation, and consensus. Although ordinary people did not possess direct institutional channels of participation, their interests and attitudes indirectly constrained decision-making through tribal structures, public opinion, and their willingness to comply with and implement decisions.

During the Soviet period and the early years of Kazakhstan’s independence, the Kurultai gradually lost its function as an operative political institution and became a symbol of historical memory and cultural identity. It was not until 2022, amid a serious crisis of political trust, that this traditional symbol was revived and institutionalized as the “National Kurultai,” reintroduced as a new format of public dialogue within the framework of state governance. Its declared purpose is to strengthen interaction between the government and society. In terms of composition, the National Kurultai formally continues the tradition of “broad participation,” including regional representatives, members of parliament, professionals from various sectors, and leaders of social organizations with a degree of public influence. However, this diversity is largely structural rather than functional. It reflects broad inclusion, but does not necessarily translate into a substantive mechanism for reconciling competing interests. The institution lacks the capacity to independently coordinate diverse social demands.

Moreover, the agenda-setting process and operational logic of the National Kurultai remain distinctly top-down. Key issues are primarily defined by the state, while participants tend to act as interpreters and endorsers of pre-established policy directions. In this sense, “consultation” often takes the form of explaining and legitimizing the state agenda. Through the participation and symbolic endorsement of elite actors, the state is able to construct an image of “broad public dialogue,” thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of its reform agenda. In this respect, the National Kurultai should not be seen as a simple continuation of a traditional consultative institution, but rather as an institutionalized platform for political communication and discursive integration. Its core function lies not in generating genuinely competitive policy alternatives, but in organizing a process of “consensus production” aimed at shaping values, mobilizing society, and reproducing the legitimacy of ongoing reforms.

In 2026, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced a major reform of Kazakhstan’s parliamentary system, proposing the transition to a unicameral “Kurultai Parliament.” Its members will be elected entirely through proportional representation based on party lists. The reform abolishes both the presidential quota and the special quota previously allocated to the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. At the same time, quota guarantees for women, youth, and persons with disabilities will be retained, but incorporated into party list mechanisms rather than being directly allocated by the state.

From the perspective of institutional design, this reform strengthens the role of political parties as key intermediaries within the political system, positioning them as the primary channel through which social demands are transmitted to the state. In the context of electoral competition, parties are expected to secure support by more effectively representing public interests, while also integrating fragmented social demands. Compared with the previous mixed model of representation, which included multiple categories of actors, a party-centered system enhances the coherence of political positions: social demands are systematically aggregated and restructured before entering the political arena, thereby improving, to some extent, the efficiency of policy articulation and decision-making.

Building on this, if meaningful and substantive competition among political parties can be established, this model has the potential not only to integrate social interests but also to more fully reflect the diversity of social groups. Political parties could function not merely as instruments of organization and coordination, but also as a crucial link between diverse societal demands and the process of state decision-making—balancing efficiency in representation with breadth and inclusiveness.Under such conditions, the consultative model of the Kurultai may gradually evolve from an elite-driven mechanism of integration into an institutionalized system of interest articulation grounded in party competition, thereby enhancing, to a certain extent, its capacity for bottom-up representation.

In Nigeria’s North East, the Boko Haram insurgent group once carved out territory and declared a caliphate. In the North West, terrorist groups operate as fluid, profit-driven networks, embedding themselves in local economies. In the Middle Belt, communal violence reflects deeper contests over land, identity, and survival. In the South East, separatist agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has fused with armed enforcement and criminal opportunism. Along the southern waterways, oil theft and piracy threaten economic lifelines.

Across all these theatres, one institution has remained consistently engaged: the Nigerian military, often as the default responder in the absence of effective civilian governance. Public perception often frames this engagement as a failure as attacks continue and civilians remain vulnerable. A closer, evidence-based reading tells a more complex story, however, though available data remains incomplete and, at times, contested. 

The Nigerian military appears to have adapted under pressure and recalibrated aspects of its doctrine, and, in key moments, helped reverse trajectories that once pointed toward state collapse. It has delivered tangible gains, some strategic, others tactical, many costly. Still, those gains sit on unstable ground because governance gaps, political interference, corruption, and weak institutional follow-through have repeatedly blunted them. Communities liberated from one threat find themselves exposed to another. 

The North East war: reversing a collapse

By early 2015, Nigeria was on the brink of losing control in the North East. Boko Haram had evolved from an insurgent group into a territorial force controlling large swathes of Borno State and parts of Yobe and Adamawa. It administered territory, collected taxes, and imposed its authority over local populations. Gwoza was declared the headquarters of a so-called caliphate. Entire communities were displaced, and military formations overrun.

The turning point came with a shift in military posture, in which command structures were reconfigured, and the operational headquarters was relocated to Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, bringing leadership closer to the frontline. Coordination with regional forces under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) also intensified as air and ground operations were synchronised.

The results were immediate and significant, though the durability of these gains has varied across locations. Key towns like Monguno, Bama, Dikwa, and even Gwoza, the symbolic heart of Boko Haram’s territorial claim, fell back under government control in rapid succession. Data from ACLED shows that between 2015 and 2025, the military recovered at least 259 territories. 

With this territorial success, supply routes were disrupted, and fighters were killed in large numbers. Civilians began to return to these areas, in some cases under fragile security conditions. 

It marked the collapse of Boko Haram’s experiment with territorial governance, and the battle for Sambisa Forest reinforced this shift.

For years, Sambisa had functioned as a strategic sanctuary where fighters trained, hostages were held, and leadership structures operated with relative security. It also carried psychological weight. As long as Sambisa remained intact, Boko Haram retained a sense of permanence.

The military’s assault on the forest required sustained effort involving navigating difficult terrain, dealing with improvised explosive devices, and confronting entrenched fighters. Airstrikes softened targets while ground troops advanced in phases, enabling special forces units to penetrate deeper into the forest.

The symbolic impact was significant, though not decisive in ending insurgent capacity. Boko Haram could no longer claim a fixed territorial base for as long as was once the case. Its command structure was disrupted, and its image of invincibility weakened.

And so Boko Haram fragmented into factions. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) emerged as a more structured and strategic actor while the Shekau-led faction became more erratic, marked by extreme violence and unpredictability.

The military adjusted again.

Operations shifted from territory holding to mobility and disruption. Intelligence-led raids targeted leadership and logistics. Airpower became central to deep strikes in difficult terrain. Operation Lafiya Dole, the codename for the counter-insurgency operation, transitioned into Operation Hadin Kai, reflecting a recalibrated effort.

Today, the insurgency remains active, particularly in remote areas and along the Lake Chad basin. But the scale and nature of the threat have changed.

The North West: fighting a war without frontlines

The North West posed a different challenge. Armed groups here are diffuse. It lacks a central command and is driven by economic incentives rather than ideology, so groups form, splinter, and realign quickly. Local grievances and criminal enterprise also intersect here.

Estimates suggest tens of thousands of terrorists operate across this region, covering multiple states including Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Kaduna. This fragmentation complicates the military response, as frontlines, headquarters, and leadership structures (the usual strategic targets) are not clear. The military has responded by leaning heavily on airpower and targeted ground operations. This has not gone without major problems, such as the repeated “accidental bombing” of civilian populations, which have drawn criticism from rights groups and affected communities. 

Still, airstrikes have been used to hit camps deep within forested areas that are difficult for ground troops to access. Intelligence plays a critical role in identifying targets. Data shows that the sustained air campaign has yielded at least 909 strikes and 10,237 fatalities in 10 years. ACLED data shows that about 560 of these fatalities were civilians.

Ground forces usually conduct follow-up operations to recover weapons and temporarily secure areas.

Large numbers of kidnapped victims have been rescued during coordinated operations. Livestock, often a key economic asset for communities, has been retrieved. Such attacks have also killed some high-profile terrorist leaders, but they have also led to the loss of officers. 

In some areas, these operations appear to have had a temporary stabilising effect, though violence frequently resurges. Communities report periods of reduced attacks, farming activities have resumed in limited corridors, and confidence in security presence has improved, though often temporarily. 

Still, armed violence regenerates as the effects of weak governance in the North East are the same in the North West: new leaders emerge, and fighters disperse and regroup. Economic incentives remain strong. 

The Middle Belt: stabilising a political conflict

Violence in the Middle Belt is often described as a farmer-herder conflict, but the region’s violence reflects a complex mix of land disputes, ethnic tensions, and environmental stress. Armed militias operate alongside opportunistic criminal actors, while cycles of reprisal deepen mistrust between communities. 

There are too many dynamics in play here to reduce the crisis to a “military versus any specific group” conflict. Most of the time, softer kinetic actions, such as arrest and deterrence, are used. 

In certain corridors, the presence of military forces has reduced the frequency of mass casualty events. But the limits are clear. Several parts of the region still depend on self-help vigilante groups, who are often outgunned during terror attacks. 

There is also a growing distrust between communities and security operatives, who are sometimes accused of slow response and complicity. In April, residents of Gashish, a rural community in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area of Plateau State, staged a protest over continued attacks in the community despite military presence. A checkpoint manned by troops of Operation Enduring Peace was destroyed during the demonstration. 

The military has denied such accusations, but independent verification remains limited. 

However, in other areas, the visibility of armed forces has also had a deterrent effect on opportunistic attacks. 

At its core, the conflict in the region is driven by political and environmental factors. It revolves around identity and access to land and water. While military deployments can suppress violence temporarily, they cannot resolve competing claims or rebuild trust between communities. Without political solutions, stability remains provisional.

The South East: managing a hybrid threat

The South East presents a hybrid security challenge. Separatist agitation, particularly linked to IPOB, has evolved into a mix of political mobilisation and armed enforcement. The group has enforced sit-at-home orders through violence and intimidation while the Eastern Security Network (ESN) operates in forested areas.

The military’s response has been presented as targeted and intelligence-driven. Operations focus on dismantling camps, intercepting arms, and arresting key figures. Urban centres are secured to prevent escalation into wider insurgency.

Yet the approach carries risks.

Heavy-handed operations have generated grievances. Allegations of abuses have eroded trust in some communities. This complicates intelligence gathering, which is critical in a conflict where fighters blend into civilian populations. 

The Niger Delta and maritime domain: securing economic lifelines

In the South South and along Nigeria’s maritime corridors, the military, particularly the navy, has delivered some of its most visible successes. A decade ago, the Gulf of Guinea was a global hotspot for piracy. Sustained operations, including improved surveillance, increased naval patrols, and collaboration with international partners, have changed that landscape. These have led to the destruction of illegal refining sites and to arrests that disrupt networks involved in oil theft.

These gains have helped to protect revenue streams, stabilise energy production, and reinforce Nigeria’s position in regional maritime security, although illegal activities have not been fully eradicated. 

“The Nigerian military is overstretched”

According to World Bank data collected from development indicators in 2020, Nigeria has roughly 223,000 active personnel across the army, navy, and air force. The army, which carries out most internal operations, has about 140,000 to 150,000 troops.

In the battlespace, there are simultaneous operations in at least six theatres. That constitutes multi-domain internal security warfare. Nigeria has about 0.1 per cent of its population under arms. When compared to countries facing sustained internal conflict, which often exceed 0.3 to 0.5 per cent, the country is operating below the threshold needed to dominate territory.

On the geography front, Nigeria is over 923,000 square kilometres, with vast forests, porous borders, and ungoverned rural space. It is impossible to hold ground everywhere with the limited available personnel. So troops are cycled, which then leads to fatigue because units stay deployed for long periods with limited rest.

Retired Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai, the country’s former Chief of Army Staff, recently said, “The military is overstretched, defence budgets are diverted to routine policing duties, and the Armed Forces’ preparedness for conventional threats is reduced.”

However, there are also welfare issues and equipment gaps, especially at the tactical level in remote theatres. The result is predictable: Tactical wins, like killing terror commanders or rescuing hostages are visible, but strategic stagnation remains because you cannot sustain presence everywhere.

The structural constraint: why gains do not hold

Despite these efforts, Nigeria’s security situation remains volatile. 

In many areas, once the military has cleared armed actors, there is limited follow-through by civil authorities, as local administration is weak. So, communities do not experience the full return of the state, allowing armed groups to exploit this gap to re-enter or reorganise.

Economic conditions sustain conflict. Studies have shown that high levels of poverty and unemployment, particularly among young people, create a pool of potential recruits when armed groups offer income, however precarious.

Trust deficits also weaken intelligence because communities that distrust state actors are less likely to share information. This limits the effectiveness of intelligence-led operations and increases reliance on force.

Finally, strategy remains fragmented. Nigeria faces different types of violence that require tailored responses. Yet policy often treats them through a similar lens. Counterterrorism approaches are applied to terrorist attacks, while military solutions are prioritised in conflicts that require political negotiation.

The Nigerian military has played a significant role in preventing state collapse in multiple regions.

At the height of Boko Haram’s expansion, the possibility of sustained territorial loss was real. That threat has been largely reversed. In the North West, despite persistent violence, terrorist groups have not been allowed to consolidate into a territorial authority. In the South East, tensions have been contained below the threshold of full insurgency. In the maritime domain, economic lifelines have been secured.

However, good governance remains the only real pathway out of a cycle of violence. 

Yet the reality remains harsh. Lives are still lost daily. Families continue to sell everything they own to pay ransoms. The military has contributed to pushing back elements of the threat with measurable, though uneven, success, but it has not eliminated them.

Additional data provided by Mansir Muhammed. 

We can analyze China’s current stance on the escalating Iranian conflict by understanding its true position. China does not desire a full-scale war that would destroy its oil interests, but it is not averse to the continuation of the neither-peace-nor-war situation that drains its adversaries, such as Washington. This positions China as a player that pushes for calm during critical times, while simultaneously providing Iran with the economic lifeline it needs. Here, China plays a dual and complex role in the Iranian conflict (the Iranian-American/Israeli conflict), balancing its strategic support for Tehran to safeguard its energy interests and undermine American influence with its pursuit of a ceasefire to avoid widespread economic chaos.

Based on current developments up to early May 2026 and statements by Iranian officials that war is a possibility, the regional and international landscape reveals a divide between actual military escalation and cautious diplomacy. The Chinese position and the likelihood of war can be analyzed based on several factors. China views the current conflict with Iran as a proxy war, prioritizing stability over stability. China considers Iran a strategic partner, and its stance is characterized by a delicate balance. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly called for de-escalation and a complete ceasefire to prevent further escalation in the Middle East, while simultaneously condemning American escalation. China has stated that American and Israeli military operations against Iran violate its sovereignty and has expressed grave concern about the potential imposition of a blockade on Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz. While Beijing seeks to protect its investments and economic interests, China is deeply concerned about any disruption to oil and energy supplies, especially since a direct war would lead to imported inflation, negatively impacting its economy. Therefore, China’s current stance is characterized by a cautious, mediating role. China is attempting to play the part of a peace broker but is also wary of the potential damage a war could inflict on its relations with the United States, especially given the ongoing diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.

Regarding the likelihood of war (and the expected scenarios), despite the tense rhetoric, a full-scale, direct war between the United States and Iran remains a risky prospect for all parties. Current indicators suggest that a war is already underway (indirectly), particularly since the start of direct military operations (US/Israeli strikes) against Iran and its allies in February 2026. This indicates that a direct war remains a strong possibility. The option of blockade and proxies also remains a possibility. Chinese intelligence and military assessments suggest that Iran might prefer to carry out its threats through proxies in the region or by disrupting oil shipments in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than engaging in a direct war, to avoid a conventional military defeat. Despite Chinese diplomatic efforts to contain the situation, and despite the escalation, attempts are still underway, such as Pakistani mediation, to reach a ceasefire. This indicates a desire among the parties to keep the door open for political solutions.

As for my perspective on the proxy war between China and Iran against the United States and Israel, the current conflict is likely to continue as a proxy war of attrition, with limited and precise strikes, rather than a full-scale ground invasion. China will likely exert further pressure, continuing to push for diplomatic solutions because any large-scale war would threaten the stability of global energy supplies, on which it depends. It’s worth noting that the region is going through a critical moment and a dangerous phase of mutual deterrence. Iranian officials’ statements are as much messages of deterrence as they are an acknowledgment of the potential for escalation.

Regarding China’s role in the continuation of the war or its support for Iran (strategic and economic support), China considers the Iranian Strait of Hormuz and its purchases of Iranian oil as a vital economic lifeline. China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil (approximately 80-90% of exports), providing Tehran with crucial funding to sustain its activities. China also seeks to help Iran circumvent US sanctions, assisting Iran in bypassing these sanctions through an unofficial oil fleet, thus keeping the Iranian economy afloat. Furthermore, there is a strategic Chinese-Iranian partnership opposed to the West and US sanctions against Tehran. China views Iran as a partner in undermining the US-led global order through organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Moreover, China is exploiting the current situation to its advantage. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security analyses suggest that the continuation of the Iranian war drains US resources and provides China with an opportunity to enhance its influence, absorbing the shock of the war and potentially emerging with strategic gains.

At the same time that China is playing a role in halting the Iranian war through mediation diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, with China acting as a hidden mediator to urge Tehran to cooperate and reach a ceasefire with the United States to protect its economic interests, despite China’s support for Iran, the war harms China by closing the Strait of Hormuz and threatening its energy security. This prompts Beijing to urge an end to the war and the reopening of waterways. Therefore, China is pursuing a policy of diplomatic pressure, consistently calling for restraint and believing that the best solution is an immediate ceasefire, according to statements by its permanent representative to the United Nations.

Accordingly, we conclude that a full-scale war is theoretically possible but practically unlikely as a final option due to the exorbitant cost to all parties. However, the continuation of retaliatory strikes and economic sanctions remains the most probable scenario at present.

The U.S. Air Force said its new interim Air Force One jet, dubbed the VC-25B Bridge aircraft, has officially completed modifications and flight testing and is being painted in the red, white and blue livery sought by President Donald Trump. The extremely lavish 747-8i Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) – donated by Qatar to the U.S. last year for use by Trump – is set to serve in the Air Force One role while the White House awaits the delayed delivery from Boeing of two fully-outfitted VC-25B Air Force One aircraft. There are no plans to retire the VC-25As that currently serve as Air Force One until both full-up VC-25Bs are operational.

The Air Force said the VC-25B Bridge aircraft is on schedule to roll out in its new paint scheme and be delivered to the Presidential Airlift Group this summer. It is not clear when it will start flying Trump. The White House referred us to the Air Force for additional information.

The jet recently underwent flight testing in Texas, which you can see in the following photos that aviation photographer TT-33 operator was kind enough to share with us at the time.

The USAF now says that with the Boeing VC-25B deliveries delayed far past its initial 2024 target and VC-25A heavy maintenance cycles being extended, an interim capability became “an absolute imperative.” How accurate this claim actually is isn’t clear. Trump has been talking about an interim Air Force One aircraft for some time since deliveries of the new VC-25Bs were pushed back beyond his second term. We heard of no actual requirements originating for this capability from within the USAF prior to the new administration or far in advance of Trump’s deal with the Qataris to source the jet. Very early in the new administration, Elon Musk was even working to find out how to get Trump a new Air Force One as fast as possible, for instance.

The Air Force claimed that in February 2025, a dedicated task force launched a “full-court press” on the VC-25B Bridge program while simultaneously working to accelerate Boeing’s long-term VC-25B production.

Though questions were swirling about the legality and ethics of receiving the gifted plane, the Pentagon last May took delivery of the aircraft and said it would rapidly undertake the required modifications.

It’s one thing to have a donated ultra-luxury jet, but turning it into one safe and connected enough to carry a president is another story.

As TWZ has previously noted, converting any aircraft into one that is secure enough to transport the president is a complex undertaking. The aircraft needs to provide constant, secure communications, including what is needed to order a nuclear strike under extreme conditions. Historically, it also needs to be physically hardened both inside and out to withstand myriad threats, from the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear weapon going off to incoming surface-to-air missiles to enemy intelligence-gathering efforts. To do this requires significant modifications right down to the aircraft’s outer structure. It is very unlikely, if not impossible, that this aircraft was hardened against EMPs in the timeframe required for fielding it.

The VC-25As are speckled with missile approach warning sensors and many laser countermeasures turrets (DIRCM). They also include the legacy Matador infrared countermeasure system above their jet engines and APU. This is in addition to other defensive features which are less visible and remain closely guarded secrets.

Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM)

In previous coverage, we noted that at the very least, “this aircraft will have to feature some kind of DIRCM setup to repel shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles, and modular units are available that can be attached in a canoe to the bottom of the aircraft. These systems, such as Elbit’s C-MUSIC or Northrop Grumman’s Guardian, are in service with foreign VVIP 747s, as well as commercial aircraft, including those flying for Israeli airline El Al. You can read all about these systems here. Still, while they offer far less defensive capacity compared to what is seen under the belly of a VC-25A, they would offer a significant layer of protection.” We still don’t see any evidence of the aircraft being modified with defensive countermeasures.

L3Harris, known for its communications systems and aircraft alterations, was selected to undertake the “complex modification of the bridge aircraft,” the Air Force explained. The company already delivers “secure, reliable and resilient communications” for VC-25A and the executive airlift fleet “but has extensive experience with self-protection and customization of VIP aircraft,” the Air Force added. “The accelerated timeline was further made possible by a mission-focused partnership with Boeing, who provided the necessary engineering data to support the required structural modifications.”

In addition, “elite specialists from multiple government agencies developed advanced protocols to detect and – if necessary – neutralize potential technical hazards on previously owned aircraft,” according to the Air Force. “Their rigorous approach on the Bridge aircraft has literally ‘written the book’ and set the benchmark for integrating used airframes into the secure military inventory.”

In response to our question about what modifications the jet received, the Air Force told us the following:

“Safety and security were at the forefront of this program. We deliberately minimized interior aesthetic modifications to focus on modifications for safety, security and mission execution. We assessed which requirements were necessary for an interim capability. We had greater flexibility in developing our mission requirements.

After safety and security, we focused on the mission communications systems.

We have made deliberate decisions such as the reduction of the number of airstairs, less chiller space, and exclusion of the Golden Eagle mission [to fly the remains of former presidents] to minimize structural modifications, while prioritizing modifications focused on safety, security and secure communications.”

We also asked whether this jet will be able to fly overseas and into higher-risk areas, but have not gotten a response. At this point, based on the limited info we have at this time, that seems unlikely. But if this is the case, the question then can be raised why the USAF is spending billions on two full-up Air Force One aircraft if standards have been so relaxed that this simpler aircraft can do all their missions? We will update this story with any pertinent details the USAF provides.

To help speed up the delivery process of this interim Air Force One jet, the Air Force said it “constructed an at-scale mockup of the interior, complete with virtual reality views, to enable early commissioning activities for White House staff.”

“Our commitment to providing the president with a secure, resilient and reliable airborne command post is unwavering,” said Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Ken Wilsbach. “The VC-25B Bridge program is a testament to the Air Force’s ability to innovate and rapidly evolve to ensure the continuity of our government under any conditions.”

The Air Force said the estimated delivery of Boeing’s VC-25Bs is now expected in 2028. If that holds up, then this ‘bridge’ aircraft will have served at most around two years until the first full-up VC-25B is delivered.

We will continue to follow developments in this program and provide updates when warranted.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Addressing the cameras following reports of spiralling youth violence, including the killing of the 21-year-old former Israeli soldier Yemanu Binyamin Zalka last week, Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir was clear.

“This will be a total war,” he said, announcing a national operation to target a surge in youth violence. “We will restore security to the streets and calm to parents. Anyone who harms Israeli civilians will face the strong hand of the Israel Police and pay a heavy price.”

The response was sharp, aligned itself with the victim, and promised a solution.

That, critics say, is a sharp contrast to Ben-Gvir’s response – or lack of one – to the ongoing epidemic of violence in Israeli towns and villages populated by Palestinians, which has so far led to the deaths of almost 100 people and, according to Israel’s own finance ministry, costs the country up to $6.7bn a year.

Allegations of two-tier policing, to the detriment of what Israelis refer to as the “Arab sector”, have dogged Israel’s police for decades. But the situation has gotten worse under the current administration of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which has been in power since the end of 2022, and Ben-Gvir, a far-right politician who is in charge of the police.

The statistics since Ben-Gvir came into office back up the narrative that the crime wave in Palestinian communities has gotten significantly worse. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the murder rate in Israel’s Palestinian communities increased from 4.9 per 100,000 in 2020, to 11 per 100,000, on par with the murder rate in Sudan and Iraq.

In contrast, the murder rate in Israel’s Jewish society stood at approximately 0.6 per 100,000.

That increase can not totally be attributed to the current government – Netanyahu himself was prime minister in 2020, when the murder rate was lower. But critics argue that the introduction into government of figures like Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who they say are openly disdainful of Palestinians, has contributed to the sharp uptick in violence.

Analysts and experts who spoke to Al Jazeera had little doubt over the Netanyahu government’s culpability in the increased murder rate.

“They really don’t mind that Palestinians are killing each other, as they’ve been left to do for years,” lawmaker Aida Touma-Suleiman, a Palestinian member of the Hadash party and a longstanding critic of the lack of policing in Palestinian communities in Israel, said.

“It would never occur to the police that they should provide a service to Arab neighbourhoods,” she said of the lack of physical police presence within Palestinian communities. “It’s about enforcement. It’s hostile.”

While police stations are standard in Israel’s Jewish-majority areas, there are only about 10 in Palestinian-majority areas.

Among the decisions that have most angered Palestinian advocacy groups in Israel was the government’s December approval of a $68.5m cut to an economic development programme for Palestinian communities in Israel, in order to fund more policing in the communities.

Critics agreed that more funding was needed for the police, but bemoaned that the money was coming from a fund designed to address the root causes of criminality by addressing housing and economic development, areas where Palestinian communities are notoriously underfunded in comparison to Jewish ones.

Hardwired poverty

Palestinian citizens of Israel make up around 21 percent of the country’s population. Disadvantaged economically, they are the descendants of Palestinians who did not flee after the 1948 establishment of Israel – an event they know as the Nakba, when an estimated 750,000 Palestinians were ethnically cleansed and forced out.

Often concentrated in separate towns and villages from Israeli Jews, Palestinians frequently describe a reality of chronic underinvestment, with the presence of the state either limited or non-existent.

Joblessness has long been woven into their daily lives, analysts say, but the unemployment rate has worsened since Israel choked off access to the occupied West Bank, where many worked, after the Hamas-led October 7 attack on Israel and the start of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza in 2023.

The most recent official date, based on 2024 figures, shows that 37.6 percent of Palestinian households in Israel live below the poverty line.

Local criminal networks in Israel’s Palestinian towns and villages have grown in scale and influence in recent years, in some cases taking on the form of mafia-style organisations, untroubled, critics say, by the current government.

“There is a wide network of criminal gangs who exert control across Arab neighbourhoods,” said Daniel Bar-Tal, professor of social-political psychology at Tel Aviv University, adding that criminality and even murder were allowed to continue with the state’s own complicity.

“In part, the government just likes it. They get to say, ‘Look, this is Arab culture, this is Arab society. This is what they do.’ They also rely on the collaboration of the gangs to gather information on what’s going on in these communities,” he said, referring to numerous accounts of how friends who had reported criminal activity in their neighbourhoods were dismissed. “And lastly, it is because the police force is controlled by Ben-Gvir, a racist who actively enjoys dehumanising Arab society.”

Ben-Gvir has previously rejected accusations of racism and says he is only against those who harm Jews.

Policed by the enemy

From leveraging his position in government to urge on the genocide in Gaza, to defending officers under his charge filmed raping a Palestinian prisoner, Ben-Gvir’s actions have dismayed many of Israel’s self-styled liberals, just as they have shocked observers around the world.

However, following an uptick in crime in Israel, criticism of Ben-Gvir’s performance in his role as national security minister has begun to enter the domestic mainstream.

As well as more predictable opinion pieces in Israel’s liberal press, accusing the National Security Minister of being “busy on TikTok” while Zelka was killed, or concentrating his efforts on arresting professors wearing Palestinian flags on their kippahs while murder rates break records, there have also been criticisms from those closer to the establishment.

Earlier this month, Israel’s High Court intervened in a row between Ben-Gvir and Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, ordering the two to reach an accommodation after Baharav-Miara called for his ousting following what she claimed was his attempts to make political interventions in the police’s work.

“Nobody cares if Ben-Gvir’s good at his job,” political scientist Ori Goldberg said. “He’s there to punish Palestinians, even those in Israel. They’re punished through a lack of security, just as they’re punished through hostile planning, and a lack of healthcare punishes them. This is how the apartheid Israel always works.”

Follow our live build-up, with full team news coverage, ahead of our text commentary stream.

The United Arab Emirates’ announcement of its withdrawal from OPEC and the OPEC+ alliance, effective May 1, 2026, represents a major strategic shift in the global energy market, with direct and significant implications for China, the world’s largest oil importer. The primary impact of this UAE withdrawal on China is the enhancement of Chinese energy security, as it will increase available supplies. The UAE will now be able to raise its production towards its target of 5 million barrels per day by 2027, without being bound by OPEC quotas. This expansion will provide China with a substantial and stable source of oil outside the constraints of production alliances. Furthermore, the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC will impact China’s diversification policy, as China relies on imports to cover approximately 70% of its oil needs. The UAE’s departure will grant Beijing greater flexibility in purchasing from the spot market at potentially more competitive prices.

This also has a significant impact on import costs (prices) through prolonged downward pressure. The UAE’s increased oil production (up to 680,000 barrels per day above previous levels) is expected to put downward pressure on global Brent crude prices in the medium term (12-24 months), thus reducing China’s energy import bill. This could lead to short-term volatility, as, despite the potential benefit, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (due to current regional tensions in April 2026) limits the immediate ability to capitalize on the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC, since most of the UAE’s exports to China pass through this waterway.

China could benefit from the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC by enhancing its capacity for financial and trade cooperation and expanding trade in local currencies, particularly the Chinese yuan. The UAE’s departure from OPEC could (facilitate the expansion of oil trade agreements) in rubles, rupees, and yuan, moving away from OPEC’s traditional dollar pricing. This aligns with China’s drive to internationalize the yuan. Such a move could boost joint investments, given China’s existing stakes in UAE oil concessions. With Abu Dhabi freed from restrictions, these Chinese investments could generate higher returns through increased production. Furthermore, China might leverage the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC to bolster the strategic and geopolitical value of weakening OPEC’s influence. This withdrawal diminishes OPEC’s ability to control global supply, which benefits major consuming nations like China by reducing the likelihood of price shocks resulting from collective production cuts.

In this context, Chinese discussions and analyses have intensified, examining the potential benefits for China from the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC. Chinese experts are analyzing the likelihood and impact of such a move should it materialize, particularly given the UAE’s increasing production capacity and its desire for greater flexibility. If we assume the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC is indeed the case, China stands to be the biggest beneficiary for the following reasons. First, it would break the dominance of the petrodollar. The departure of a player the size of the UAE from traditional OPEC constraints opens the door wide to bilateral agreements for pricing oil in digital yuan (or Chinese yuan), thus supporting Beijing’s strategy of internationalizing the yuan to reduce its dependence on the Western financial system (SWIFT). In addition to the increased Chinese-Emirati supply, since Chinese companies such as CNPC and CNOOC hold stakes in oil concessions in Abu Dhabi, the UAE’s release from OPEC production quotas means these companies can increase production and secure China’s growing energy needs at preferential prices and with favorable terms. This facilitates the revitalization of joint UAE-China investments, allowing for deeper Chinese capital flow into the UAE’s refining and petrochemical sector. The exchange of finished goods and crude oil within an economic cycle based on local currencies reduces conversion costs and the risks associated with dollar fluctuations. This supports China’s policy of moving towards BRICS+. As the UAE is a member of the BRICS group, any move away from traditional OPEC frameworks aligns with the group’s overall direction to create a parallel financial system that supports the ruble, rupee, and yuan. This scenario, if it were to occur, would transform the relationship from one of buyer and seller to a comprehensive strategic partnership, making energy the driving force behind the new financial system that China seeks to lead.

Accordingly, the UAE’s withdrawal represents a strategic gain for China in terms of increased supply and potential cost reductions, but maximizing the benefit remains contingent on the stability of shipping lanes in the Arabian Gulf.

Zanardi, who lost his legs in a racing crash, was credited with helping transform the perception of disability in Italy.

Alex Zanardi, the Italian Formula One driver who became a Paralympic cycling champion after losing both legs in an accident, has died aged 59, his family announced.

Zanardi, one of his country’s most loved and respected sportsmen, who was credited with helping transform the perception of disability in Italy, died on Friday evening.

In a statement issued on Saturday through the charity he founded, Obiettivo3, his family said he died “suddenly”, but also “peacefully, surrounded by the love of his family and friends”.

“The family would like to express ⁠their heartfelt thanks to all those who are showing their support at this time and ⁠asks that their grief and privacy be ⁠respected during this period of mourning.”

Zanardi’s death comes six years after the four-time Paralympic gold medal winner suffered a second horror crash in June 2020, when his handbike crashed into an oncoming truck during a race in Tuscany.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni hailed Zanardi as “a great champion and an extraordinary man, capable of turning every trial of life into a lesson in courage, strength and dignity”.

Cordiano Dagnoni, head of the Italian Cycling Federation, said he “transformed the culture of our country, bringing joy and happiness to those fortunate enough to know him, and hope to so many in Italy and around the world”.

He said there would be a minute’s silence observed at this weekend’s races in tribute to the athlete.

Zanardi raced for Jordan, Minardi and Lotus in F1 in the early 1990s before switching to the CART championship in the United States where he was series champion in 1997 and 1998.

He returned to F1 with Williams in 1999 before heading back to CART.

Zanardi almost died in a horrific accident in 2001 at the Lausitzring track in Germany, after which he had both legs amputated.

His car had stalled in the middle of the track after a spin and was struck by another car at a speed of more than 300km/h (186mph).

Yet he went on to become one of the best-known figures in Paralympic sports, winning two gold medals at the 2012 London Games and two more in Rio de Janeiro, four years later.

In June 2020, he was involved in another terrible accident, this time in Tuscany. He suffered serious head injuries and only returned home 18 months later.

Zanardi, born in Bologna on October 23, 1966, leaves his wife Daniela and son Niccolo.

Takaichi signs six agreements with Vietnam, including on technology, agriculture and space, during a trip to Hanoi.

Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi says the country will boost ties with Vietnam, with a focus on energy and critical minerals.

Takaichi met her Vietnamese counterpart, Le Minh Hung, on Saturday in Hanoi, where they signed six agreements on issues ranging from infrastructure to agriculture to space cooperation.

“The two sides identified economic security as a new priority area for bilateral ‌cooperation,” Takaichi told reporters after the meeting.

“With regard to critical minerals … both sides agreed to strengthen close coordination to ensure stable supplies and reinforce supply chains,” she added.

Hung said the two leaders also “reaffirmed the importance of resolving disputes in the South China Sea through peaceful means based on international law”.

Japan and Vietnam share concerns about China’s territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, and both have sought to hedge against United States-driven trade disruptions by broadening economic and security ties.

Crude oil supplies

The push for deeper cooperation between the two states comes after ⁠new investment in Vietnam from Japan, one of its largest foreign investors, fell about 75 percent year-on-year to $233m in the first quarter, even as bilateral trade rose 12.3 percent to $13.7bn over the same ⁠period, according to Vietnamese government and customs data.

Vietnam ⁠has been seeking support from Japan and other countries ⁠for oil supplies as conflict in the Middle East drives prices higher and disrupts supply chains.

Under the $10bn Power Asia Initiative to support Asian countries’ energy self-reliance, Japan will assist in arranging crude oil supplies ⁠for Vietnam’s Nghi Son Refinery and Petrochemical Complex, Hung said.

Takaichi was also set to meet President To Lam, who is also the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, on Saturday afternoon and deliver ⁠a keynote speech at Vietnam National University, marking a decade since former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy.

The collapse of the US-based budget carrier due to a doubling in jet fuel prices will cost thousands of jobs.

Low-cost US carrier Spirit Airlines has said that all of its flights have been cancelled as it started an “orderly wind-down of operations,” after a potential White House bailout fell through.

“Spirit Aviation Holdings, Inc., parent company of Spirit Airlines … today regretfully announced that the Company has started an orderly wind-down of operations, effective immediately. All Spirit flights have been cancelled, and Spirit Guests should not go to the airport,” the airline said in a statement in the early hours of Saturday.

Spirit had 4,119 domestic flights scheduled between May 1 and May 15, offering 809,638 seats, according to the latest data from Cirium.

The collapse of the carrier due to a doubling in jet fuel prices during the two-month-old Iran war will cost thousands of jobs. It is also a blow to US President Donald Trump, who had proposed $500m to save Spirit despite opposition from some of his closest advisers and many Republicans in Congress.

Spirit had reached a deal with its lenders that would have helped it emerge from its second bankruptcy by late spring or early summer. But those plans derailed after the US war on Iran triggered a spike in jet fuel prices, upending Spirit’s cost projections and complicating its bankruptcy exit.

A Spirit board meeting had ended without an agreement to rescue the company, a person close to the discussions told the Reuters news agency late on Friday.

“Unfortunately, despite the Company’s efforts, the recent material increase in oil prices and other pressures on the business have significantly impacted Spirit’s financial outlook,” Spirit said in a statement announcing its “orderly wind-down”.

Trump on Friday said the White House had given Spirit and its creditors a final rescue proposal, after talks hit an impasse over a $500m financing package that would have helped the airline keep operating through bankruptcy.

“If we can help them, we will, but we have to come first,” Trump told reporters. “If we could do it, we’d do it, but only if it’s a good deal.”

Spirit’s restructuring plan assumed jet fuel costs of about $2.24 a gallon in 2026 and $2.14 in 2027, but prices had climbed to about $4.51 a gallon by the end of April, leaving the carrier unable to survive without new financing.

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy told Reuters he had tried to get many airlines to buy Spirit but found no takers. “What would someone buy?” Duffy asked. “If no one else wants to buy them, why would we buy them?”

A creditor close to the deal said, “The Trump administration made an extraordinary effort to try and save Spirit, but you can’t breathe life into a corpse. Given that, the company should make its intentions clear for the sake of its customers and employees.”

No US carrier of Spirit’s size – it accounted for 5 percent of US flights at one point – has liquidated in two decades. Spirit helped keep fares lower in markets where it competed against major carriers.

Its collapse shows how the Iran war’s fuel-price shock has exposed weaker airlines. Across the globe, airlines have been increasing prices to reflect the high cost of jet fuel and some airlines have also cut flights.

German airline Lufthansa last month said it cancelled 20,000 flights in a bid to protect itself from the soaring cost of oil.

On Friday, Indian carrier Air India also said it has increased fuel surcharges on all flights and said it will cut 100 flights a day across domestic and international routes.

The Himalayan nation restores centuries-old statue, stolen in the 1980s, to its original temple in capital Kathmandu.

A centuries-old Buddha statue stolen from a Nepali temple has been reinstalled in its original location, one of several artefacts returned from foreign museums and collectors in recent years.

The statue, dating to the 13th century, was carried in a palanquin back to its pagoda-style temple in the capital, Kathmandu, to the sound of traditional music on Friday.

“I feel so happy, we all do. Our god is coming back,” temple-goer Sunkesari Shakya, 67, told the AFP news agency, recalling the day the statue was stolen, wreaking “havoc” in the community.

In a ceremony attended by a visiting United States envoy, the statue, which returned from New York in 2022, was placed back on its original stone plinth. The event coincided with the festival of Buddha Jayanti, marking the birth of the founder of Buddhism.

A replica that locals had been worshipping instead was moved to another area of the temple.

The statue was taken from the temple in the 1980s and later emerged at Tibet House US, a cultural centre in New York, where it was gifted by an unknown monk, according to Nepal’s Department of Archaeology.

Sergio Gor, Washington’s special envoy to South and Central Asia, told AFP, “One of the things we are focusing on is to be able to bring back some of these incredible artefacts that decades past got into the wrong hands.”

“We are trying to right a wrong from the past,” said Gor, who was on a three-day visit to Nepal.

Many in the Himalayan nation of 30 million people are deeply religious, and the country’s Hindu and Buddhist temples, as well as heritage sites, are an integral part of everyday life.

But many sites are bereft of centuries-old sculptures, paintings, ornamental windows and even doors, which were often stolen after the country opened up to the outside world in the 1950s.

Many pieces were taken with the help of corrupt officials to feed art markets in the US, Europe and elsewhere, although their export remains illegal.

About 200 artefacts have been returned to Nepal, according to the Archaeology Department, including wood and stone carvings, paintings, scriptures and idols of gods and goddesses. At least 41 artefacts have been placed back in their original locations.

“This is very important. Our statues are not just objects of art but part of a living heritage,” conservation expert Rabindra Puri told AFP.

Puri said there was growing momentum to return stolen artefacts. More than 400 are officially listed as missing, but experts estimate the actual number to be in the thousands.

Authorities are specifically seeking to return more artefacts from the US, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

US President Donald Trump says the latest Iranian peace proposal includes demands he ‘can’t agree to’.

United States President Donald Trump has voiced frustration with Iran’s latest peace proposal, saying “they’re asking for things I can’t agree to”, and cautioning against ending the conflict too early, only for tensions to resurface “in three more years”.

At the same time, Washington has warned that ships paying tolls or fees to Iran to transit the Strait of Hormuz could face US sanctions, signalling a tougher stance on maritime activity linked to Tehran.

Meanwhile, a new Washington Post-ABC News-Ipsos poll shows 61 percent of Americans believe Trump’s use of military force against Iran was a mistake.

Here is what we know:

In Iran

• Fourteen soldiers were killed on Friday during operations to defuse unexploded ordnance in the northwestern Zanjan province, local media reported.
• Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei urged his people to wage economic battle and “disappoint” its enemies, as the war with the US and Israel and years of sanctions take a toll.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy said it would enforce “new rules” over waters near its coast, aiming to turn them into a “source of security and prosperity” for the region.

War diplomacy

• The US Department of State imposed new measures on entities linked to Iranian petroleum exports, including China-based Qingdao Haiye Oil Terminal, accusing it of importing millions of barrels of sanctioned crude and enabling billions in revenue for Tehran. Beijing rejected the move as unlawful “unilateral sanctions”.
• The State Department said it cleared more than $8.6bn in military sales to Israel, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

In the US

• Trump said he was unhappy with Iran’s new proposal for peace talks, which Iran’s state news agency IRNA said was delivered via mediator Pakistan. “They’re asking for things that I can’t agree to,” he said.
• Analyst Sultan Barakat said Iran and the US are “really desperate” to end the war in a way that allows them to “save face”.
• Trump told top US lawmakers that hostilities in Iran had ended, after coming under pressure from Congress to seek authorisation for the conflict as it headed into its third month.
• The US Treasury Department slapped new sanctions on three Iranian foreign currency exchange firms to try to stem the flow of Tehran’s “financial lifelines”.
• The USS Gerald R Ford left the Middle East after taking part in operations against Iran, a US official said, according to reports. Two other aircraft carriers – the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George HW Bush – are among 20 US ships still in the region.
• Mark Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said US military capability “has not changed” as Washington returns to its typical posture of two carrier groups.
• “The Ford carrier group had left the United States last June, and its deployment has been extended twice. The crew and the ship are tired, so the United States is sending the group home,” he added.

In Lebanon

• Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health said 12 people were killed on Friday in Israeli strikes on the country’s south, including in a town where Israel’s army had issued a forced displacement order despite a ceasefire.
• Lebanon’s parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, said Israel is using the ceasefire as cover to intensify attacks.

Donald Trump says US forces are ‘like pirates’ taking over Iranian ships and cargo near the Strait of Hormuz. The US is maintaining a blockade of Iran’s ports and has seized at least three Iranian flagged vessels.

Seoul – Shekinah Yawra had no other option but to spend the night at a South Korean jjimjilbang, a 24-hour bathhouse, after every hotel near central Seoul sold out in late March.

But sleep was secondary for the 32-year-old Filipino who had made her way to Seoul’s Gwanghwamun Square at 7am to secure a spot in a crowd that city officials estimated would grow to hundreds of thousands.

All this was for a glimpse at the seven-member K-pop supergroup BTS, who returned to the stage on March 21 after almost four years away from the limelight for their staggered, mandatory military service.

Though she failed to secure one of 22,000 free tickets for BTS’s first return concert in the square, Yawra was still ecstatic to stand on the sidelines and watch the concert live on a big screen set up for the occasion.

“We all came just for this,” she told Al Jazeera, recounting how friends had flown in from the Philippines for a single night to catch the concert.

Worldwide, more than 18.4 million viewers tuned in for the Netflix livestream of the concert.

With an estimated 30 million fans worldwide – who refer to themselves as the BTS ARMY – the K-pop group is the most visible symbol of “Hallyu”, or the “Korean Wave”, and the global surge of interest in South Korean popular culture and the financial revenues being generated as a result.

In late March, BTS’s 10th studio album, Arirang, topped the charts in the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom, the world’s three largest music markets. The group’s upcoming world tour is expected to generate more than $1.4bn in revenue across more than 80 shows in 23 countries.

Domestically, inbound tourist numbers for the first 18 days of March rose 32.7 percent from the previous month, according to Ministry of Justice data, as the return concert approached and hotel prices surged across central Seoul amid the demand for rooms.

In the week leading up to the concert, sales of BTS merchandise – from BTS glow sticks to blankets – surged 430 percent at the Shinsegae Duty Free retail outlet in central Seoul, the company said.

Over the concert weekend, revenues also rose 30 percent at the city’s Lotte Department Store and 48 percent at Shinsegae overall, compared with the same March weekend a year earlier, in 2025.

As far back as 2022, the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute (KCTI) – a government-sponsored think tank and research organisation – estimated that a single BTS concert in Seoul could generate up to 1.2 trillion won ($798m) in overall economic impact.

KCTI researcher Yang Ji-hoon told Al Jazeera that a sample study of the crowd at the BTS comeback event at Gwanghwamun Square highlighted the uniqueness of fandom-driven tourism. More than half of those at the concert were foreign visitors and many required long-haul travel to attend.

“In Europe and the United States, travel tends to be concentrated within its own regions,” Yang said.

“So, for people to overcome such travel barriers and come to South Korea, it usually requires more than just ordinary motivation or typical spending – it’s not something that happens easily,” he said.

K-pop’s transition to the global mainstream

The scale of BTS’s return to the entertainment world reflects a broader state-backed strategy.

When music promoter Hybe requested Seoul city support for the Gwanghwamun square comeback concert, authorities approved it on public-interest grounds, treating the event as a showcase of national cultural influence.

Almost befitting an official event, more than 10,000 state personnel were deployed for security, logistics and crowd control.

According to data retrieved by South Korean publication Sisain, through a public information disclosure request to the Seoul government, close to 130 million won ($87,400) of city funds were spent as part of logistics for the comeback concert.

South Korean government support for BTS has a precedent.

As members of the boyband approached South Korea’s mandatory military service age, policymakers debated special exemptions for members of BTS, which was estimated to have generated $4.65bn annually to the country’s economy.

After BTS’s forthcoming concerts in Mexico City sold out in just 37 minutes, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum urged South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung to “bring the acclaimed K-pop artists more often”, noting nearly one million fans in Mexico had attempted to secure 150,000 tickets.

South Korea’s cultural influence is also extending beyond music.

South Korea’s cosmetics exports surpassed $11bn last year, according to global accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), overtaking France in cosmetics shipments to the US, while South Korean food and agricultural exports reached a record $13.6bn, according to data from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs.

KCTI researcher Yang described the growing interest as a phase of “transition to the global mainstream”, where South Korean products are internationally recognised and content output is measured against worldwide benchmarks such as the Billboard charts and the Academy Awards.

He also warned that structural reform is now essential to keep pace with the wave of interest in South Korea.

“As the industries expand in scale, they must also evolve in its underlying systems, infrastructure, and workforce,” he said.

“Rather than focusing solely on direct financial support, future governmental policies should move toward strengthening foundational conditions – such as improving labour environments, addressing unfair practices, building relevant infrastructure, and establishing more robust statistical and data systems,” he said.

Politicians appear to be paying attention.

During his election campaign last year, President Lee framed the next phase of cultural expansion as “Hallyu (Korean Wave) 4.0”, with promises to grow the sector into a 300 trillion won ($203bn) industry with 50 trillion won ($34bn) in exports.

In line with this vision, the government set the budget to bolster “K-content”, support the “pure” arts sector and strengthen the overall culture-related fields at a record 9.6 trillion won ($6.5bn) — reflecting the president’s view of the cultural sector as a strategic national industry rather than merely a consumer market.

South Korea’s strategy appears to be paying off.

South Korea now ranks 11th globally in “soft power”, according to Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index, placing the country as both “influential in arts and entertainment” and “products and brands the world loves”, just behind the US, France, the United Kingdom and Japan.

The darker side of K-pop: Pressure to become a perfect idol

Amid its global success, the darker side of the K-culture industry has received more scrutiny.

Mega-promoter Hybe has been embroiled in a prolonged dispute with K-pop’s New Jeans, a band considered to be a potential heir to BTS and their all-female colleagues Blackpink. The highly public legal dispute that started in 2024 highlights industry tensions over creative control and artist autonomy.

Since the early 2000s, K-pop has also grappled with the legacy of “slave contracts”, or highly restrictive agreements limiting artists’ freedom. Although reforms by the Fair Trade Commission have improved protections for performers, contractual obligations in the K-pop industry are exacting on new performers and their strict work routines have long been documented.

From their trainee years, aspiring idols endure gruelling schedules that involve long workdays and little sleep.

Many top stars often face contractual restrictions on socialising, using their phones or dating. They are also typically limited in what they can say publicly, relying on agency-managed messaging to communicate with fans and the media.

While the rise of social media and other online platforms has opened new avenues for more direct expression and interaction in recent years, concerns over burnout and depression have continued to shadow the industry, with several high-profile stars taking their own lives.

Beauty standards associated with the K-culture genre have also become another flashpoint for controversy.

A 2024 report by South Korean economy news site Uppity found 98 percent of 1,283 respondents born between 1980 and 2000 viewed physical appearance as among the most desirable “social capital” an individual can possess.

Nearly 40 percent of respondents in the survey had undergone cosmetic procedures, while more than 90 percent held neutral or positive attitudes regarding undergoing medical procedures to enhance beauty.

According to the International Society of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, South Korea has the world’s highest rate of procedures, with 8.9 per 1,000 people compared with 5.91 per 1,000 people in the US and just 2.13 per 1,000 in neighbouring Japan.

Yoo Seung-chul, a professor of media studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, said that K-culture has reinforced the normalising of beauty as a significant metric of personal and social value.

“K-culture has reinforced systems and structures around self-expression,” Yoo told Al Jazeera.

“With the rise of webtoons that incorporate themes like plastic surgery, there has been a noticeable reduction in the stigma towards going under the knife among younger audiences in their teens and early twenties,” Yoo said, explaining that popular plastic surgery platforms such as Unni have further normalised the trend by connecting people to clinics and reviews of these clinics and their surgeons.

At the same time, globalisation has reshaped the K-culture industry itself. Many new K-pop acts now include international members to broaden appeal.

Hybe has expanded this strategy through its US subsidiary, Hybe America, producing globally oriented groups like Katseye, which only has one South Korean member in its six-member girl group.

The shift has prompted debate.

Even BTS’s latest album Arirang – a nod to South Korea’s most iconic folk song – has divided fans over its use of English lyrics and foreign producers.

“K-content is being designed with global audiences in mind from the outset. In film, there has been a noticeable rise in genres like horror and science fiction, which are easier to export internationally,” Yoo said.

“This global orientation is also reflected in K-pop agencies recruiting foreign members for idol groups,” he said.

But international audiences do not always prefer highly globalised versions of Korean content, Yoo said, adding, in fact, that many are drawn to K-pop’s “sense of locality”.

As audiences increasingly seek authenticity, Yoo argues the industry faces a defining challenge.

“Industries and companies need to figure out how to preserve a sense of local identity while effectively marketing to global audiences,” Yoo added.

“Striking that balance will be crucial in shaping the next phase of Korea’s cultural exports.”

Caracas, May 1, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced on Thursday an increase in the so-called “integral minimum income” to the equivalent of US $240 per month for public sector workers.

At a public rally in Caracas, Rodríguez stated that the private sector was also urged to establish employees’ incomes at $240 per month or more. The amounts are set in US dollars but paid in bolívares at the day’s official exchange rate set by the Central Bank.

The latest adjustment involved an increase of the “economic war bonus” from $150 to $200 a month, alongside a $40 monthly food bonus. Venezuela’s monthly minimum wage has remained frozen at 130 bolívares, roughly $0.27 at the present exchange rate, since the last increase in March 2022.

The economic war bonus for pensioners was raised from $58 to $70 a month, and for public sector retirees from $130 to $168. The acting president further introduced a new, one-time “professional and academic recognition” bonus, ranging between $60 and $120, aimed at strategic sectors such as security, education, and healthcare. She also urged labor inspectorates to address workers’ demands regarding employment conditions.

The acting president described the latest income hike as “the most significant increase in recent years,” while acknowledging that it remains insufficient in the face of rising living costs. The announcement also included a commitment to develop a special plan to improve conditions for elders in the medium term.

“When I see workers protesting, I tell them ‘you are right!’” Rodríguez stated. “We want to recover wages, and this is a first step to protect the workers’ purchasing power.” In the lead-up to May 1, the Venezuelan leader had argued that salary adjustments must be “responsible” in order not to trigger inflation.

Rodríguez emphasized that the latest bonus adjustments, while maintaining the minimum wage freeze, were agreed upon in discussions between government representatives, trade unions, and business sector associations.

The tripartite negotiations are also advancing in a proposal to reform Venezuela’s Labor Law. On Thursday night, Labor Minister Carlos Castillo confirmed that a labor reform is being evaluated.

“We are discussing it,” he said in an interview with state broadcaster VTV. “It has to come out of the negotiating table and generate consensus.” 

The labor reform plans, as well as the continued bonus-over-wage policies, have drawn fierce criticism from trade unions. Center-right, right-wing, and left-wing labor organizations staged a number of rallies in multiple states on May 1st.

Organizations such as the Central University of Venezuela Professors Association (APUCV) rejected the bonus increase, arguing that it deepens the “de-waging” of salaries and undermines labor rights.

“Continuing the policy of replacing wages with income is another severe blow against the university. It disregards merit, experience, and hierarchy. It also destroys collective bargaining agreements and the institutions responsible for social security,” the group said in a statement.

In recent months, labor protests have intensified in sectors such as education, healthcare, and public services. Workers have demanded that any wage increase be fully incorporated into base salaries rather than delivered through discretionary bonuses, noting that Venezuela’s Constitution mandates at least one annual adjustment to the legal minimum wage. Unions have likewise demanded the repeal of statutes such as the 2792 Memorandum that suspended several collective bargaining rights.

These sectors have also voiced opposition to business-backed proposals to reform the Organic Labor Law (LOTTT) in ways that could reduce benefits and social security contributions. Fedecámaras and other private sector associations have demanded reforms that cheapen labor costs for employers and increase flexibility for dismissals.

Venezuela’s landmark 2012 Labor Law, one of the last major legislative projects of former President Hugo Chávez, prohibits unjustified dismissal and outsourcing, establishes one of the longest maternity leaves globally, guarantees the right to work for women and people with disabilities, and extends pension rights to all workers, including full-time homemakers and the self-employed.

The latest bonus adjustment was announced during the closing rally of the “Great Pilgrimage for a Free and Peaceful Venezuela,” a series of mobilizations across the country calling for an end to wide-reaching US sanctions imposed on the country.

The measures followed a string of recent oil agreements with transnational corporations and optimistic forecasts regarding the Venezuelan economy. However, since January, the Trump administration has imposed control over the Caribbean nation’s oil export revenues, with the disbursement amounts and timings left at US officials’ discretion.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

US President Donald Trump said he is “not happy” with the latest peace proposal from Iran and warned that the alternative to talks is to “blast the hell out of” the country.

The U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division turned heads yesterday with social media posts that seemed to suggest the unit had begun fielding a new version of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) armed with a turreted 30mm cannon. Multiple outlets and large social media channels subsequently reported the news this way. TWZ asked the Army and defense contractor BAE Systems for more information, and both have clarified that the two AMPV 30s delivered this week are company-funded prototypes that are only set to be tested.

The Army will evaluate the AMPV 30s as part of the Transformation In Contact (TIC) 2.0 initiative. TIC efforts, in general, have been focused on helping accelerate the fielding of new and improved capabilities, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures to go with them. However, presently, the service has no plans to acquire this variant of the AMPV.

The Army selected the Bradley-based AMPV as the replacement for its long-serving M113 family of armored personnel carriers and related vehicles in 2014. The service’s current program of record includes five AMPV variants, all of which are turretless. The M1283 general-purpose personnel carrier, the M1284 medical evacuation vehicle, the M1285 medical treatment vehicle, the M1286 command and control version, and the M1287 mortar carrier vehicle.

So it came as something of a surprise when the 1st Cavalry Division announced the arrival of the AMPV 30s yesterday.

“Big news! The 1st Cavalry Division has just received the Army’s FIRST AMPV 30mm prototypes,” a post from the 1st Cavalry Division’s official account on X had declared. “Our troopers are leading the charge once again by integrating this next-generation capability into the formation and transforming how armored Divisions fight.”

The 1st Cavalry Division, which is based at Fort Hood in Texas, also shared a set of pictures of the vehicles yesterday through the U.S. military’s Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) website. “The AMPV features a remote 30mm turret capable of using programmable airburst ammunition, designed to target small drones and unarmored ground threats, embodying the Transforming in Contact initiative to dominate the modern battlefield,” per a common caption attached to all of these images.

As an aside, some were quick to point out a certain irony in the idea that the Army had fielded a new version of the AMPV with a cannon-armed turret. An AMPV in this configuration looks very similar to the Bradley on which the original turretless variants were based.

Despite the phrasing of the 1st Cavalry’s social media posts, the AMPV 30s are “an internal research and development type effort from BAE Systems,” an Army spokesperson told TWZ today. “It is not something the Army procured, nor is there a requirement for the system at this time.”

“This system will be participating in TIC, but again, there is no Army requirement,” the spokesperson added.

“BAE Systems provided two prototype AMPV 30s to the U.S. Army to participate in the upcoming Transformation in Contact (TiC) 2.0 initiative,” the company told TWZ in a separate statement. “The vehicles were developed through self-investment and based on the proven chassis of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). Over the next several months, the Army will run the AMPV 30s through field evaluations to benchmark the platform’s capabilities against what Soldiers require to maintain advantage on the modern battlefield.”

“Our mission was speed and innovation, and we delivered beyond expectations. With today’s battlefield evolving faster than ever, it’s paramount that Soldiers have the capabilities they need to win the fight,” a BAE Systems spokesperson also told TWZ today. “Throughout this effort, our team demonstrated how we can integrate new design solutions in a time-effective and more cost-efficient manner for the Army.”

BAE Systems also confirmed that the turret on these up-gunned AMPVs is the Medium Caliber Turret-30 (MCT-30) from Norway’s Kongsberg Defense. This is a remotely operated design that contains a Mk 44 Bushmaster II automatic cannon, as well as a fire control suite that includes electro-optical and infrared cameras. It is interesting to note that the Marine Corps is in the process of acquiring a variant of its 8×8 wheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) equipped with MCT-30. BAE is also the prime contractor for the ACV family. In addition, the Army has two variants of the 8×8 Stryker wheeled armored vehicle armed with XM813 cannons, which are based on the Mk 44, but neither uses the MCT-30 turret.

An AMPV equipped with the MCT-30 was first shown publicly back in 2024. The turret in that case was also fitted with a Javelin anti-tank guided missile launcher. BAE Systems also previously announced the development of what it calls the External Mission Equipment Package (ExMEP) for these vehicles, which consists primarily of a new top plate that allows for the relatively rapid integration of various turrets. The company has said in the past that ExMEP can accommodate “more than 30 turret systems.”

In 2024, BAE had delivered another AMPV variant to the Army for evaluation, which was armed with a turreted 120mm rapid-firing mortar called NEMO (a contraction of “NEw MOrtar”). Patria in Finland, in cooperation with Kongsberg, supplied the mortar turret. The Army has not yet moved to acquire that version, either.

Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle – Patria NEMO 120mm Mortar Variant

What interest the Army might ultimately have in the AMPV 30 remains to be seen. The service continues to operate Bradley variants and is working to update them with new capabilities, including Iron Fist active protection systems (APS). A test last year also demonstrated the ability of the vehicle to fire a loitering munition from its TOW missile launcher, which could open up new operational possibilities. The Army is also pursuing a separate replacement for the Bradley, tentatively designated the XM30, which will be armed with a larger 50mm cannon as its main weapon.

The mention of the counter-drone mission in relation to the prototype AMPV 30s delivered to the 1st Cavalry Division could point to a potential use case for the Army. The service previously had an air defense variant of the Bradley, the M6 Linebacker, which had a launcher for Stinger short-range heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles rather than TOWs. The last M6s were converted into standard M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles in the mid-2000s, and no direct replacement for that capability was ever acquired.

In the meantime, the threat posed by drones has continued to grow, prompting a surge in demand across the U.S. military and elsewhere globally for new capabilities to shoot them down or otherwise defend against them. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, in particular, has underscored the critical importance of protecting heavy armored vehicles from uncrewed aerial attackers.

A Ukrainian drone from the 79th Air Assault Brigade drops a 40mm HEDP grenade on a Russian UR-77 Meteorit, causing a catastrophic payload explosion. pic.twitter.com/SsaQCKXsNL

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) August 14, 2023

BAE Systems has previously shown another version of the AMPV in a more dedicated air defense configuration with a turret armed with a 30mm XM914 cannon, which fires a smaller round than the XM813, as well as Stinger missiles. The vehicle, seen in the picture below, also featured several small-form-factor radars to help spot and track incoming threats. An AMPV in a counter-drone or more general anti-air configuration would also be better able to keep up and otherwise operate with Army units equipped with other variants of that vehicle.

The Army could also have different demands for new, turreted AMPVs depending on how the XM30 effort continues to evolve. Designs from American Rheinmetall and General Dynamics Land Systems have been competing to secure that contract. However, a program pause and a new request for information for a different, but very similar-sounding vehicle earlier this year have raised questions about the XM30’s overall future.

Cost and other factors have scuttled several previous Bradley replacement efforts. If serious issues arise with the latest XM30 program plans, it might lead to at least a portion of the Bradley fleet ultimately being replaced by turreted AMPV variants instead.

A positive Army assessment of the AMPV 30 could be a boon for BAE, even if the service does not buy any of those vehicles, in the end, too. The combat effectiveness of older Bradley variants has recently been demonstrated in the conflict in Ukraine, and other potential customers could be attracted to the idea of a derivative with a new turret and other more modern features.

For now, anyway, the Army is set to put the AMPV 30 through its paces, but has no plans to buy any of them for its own use.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates to abandon OPEC is far more than just a change in policy, but represents a change in the paradigm of worldwide energy governance. In a region that, already, has been influenced in oil market operations by geopolitical frictions, climate changes, and alliances, the UAE action begs an immediate question: is the era of shared oil control becoming one of autonomy of choice?

OPEC had been a mainstay of oil prices globally. Through the coordination of production quotas, the member states were trying to control supply and manipulate prices. Nevertheless, the emergence of non OPEC producers, especially the United States of America with its own shale revolution and the increasing influence of Russia could have calories undermined the power of OPEC. Responding, the organization became OPEC+, a more wide-ranging alliance that tried to reassert itself by coordinating more.

But with this change, new fault lines were also presented. OPEC+ is not a close bloc, but an adaptable arrangement anchored on overlapping, and indeed competing, interests. Its success largely relies on the collaboration of key actors such as the Saudi Arabia and Russia countries having different geopolitical interests. Such delicate equilibrium has rendered the sustainability of cohesion even more of a challenge.

It is here that the withdrawal of the UAE is noteworthy. Abu Dhabi has been rethinking its economic and strategic priorities. Although oil is still significant, UAE has been spending on renewable energy, international financial and logistics as well as technology. It has a long term vision of diversification and global competitiveness rather than oil dependency.

These goals might not have been consistent with staying within OPEC quota system. Designed to stabilize the prices, production limits may limit the capacity of a country to operate at capacity or flexibly respond to market opportunities. Like any exit, the UAE will have more flexibility in its output policy, which will enable it to harmonize the national economic objectives with energy policy.

This is indicative of a larger conflict over collective discipline and national sovereignty. The success of OPEC has been pegged on compliance with quotas by its members. But when the economic priorities move apart, they are more difficult to maintain. The UAE motion indicates that in some cases the advantages of independence can now surpass the benefits of action.

This is reflected in this concept of OPEC 2.0. The basic model is also more fluid and pragmatic compared to its predecessor, which was more or less a cohesive cartel. It is based on momentary agreements, but not the institutional unity. Although this flexibility maybe handy when dealing with a crisis in the short term, it also casts an element of stability in the long term.

Should other producers start to emulate the UAE, the effects may be far reaching. A disintegrated system can have difficulties in controlling supply even more resulting into a greater price volatility. The global markets would, in that case, not be fueled by coordinated policy but rather competition among the producers.

Simultaneously, the move that the UAE made should not be construed as a total denial of collaboration. Energy diplomacy is not going away but changing. Nations can move towards selective and form partnerships depending on similar interests as opposed to unbreakable unions. This would result in a more energetic yet unpredictable energy environment.

The decision is also representative of a larger trend in the Middle East geopolitically. States in the Gulf are claiming to be more independent economically and in the foreign policy. They havebbeen diversifying collaborations, looking into new spheres, and establishing themselves as international centres of commerce and innovation. Energy policy is evolving merely as a part of a broader strategic approach.

To people worldwide, the ramification is ambivalent. In the short run, on the one hand, a decrease in coordination among the producers may result in instability in the market and price variations. Conversely, over competition can lead to efficiency and speed up investment in alternative power sources. This might promote the movement of the world towards non fossil fuels in the long run.

Finally, the UAE withdrawal is a turning point. It highlights a transition into the flexible interestdriven strategies including strict institutional structures. There is a growing challenge of a more complicated and multipolar reality to the classical structure of oil governance with its emphasis on unity and joint control. The future of the global energy could probably not be characterized by one powerful protagonist, but a system of changing alliances and strategic choices. The adaptability in this new order can become important than unity. The UAE has decided to take that direction and their move might potentially determine the next chapter of energy politics across the world.

US President Donald Trump has said that all state permits for the 2026 recreational red snapper fishing season have been approved, a move he says will expand access for anglers across southeastern coastal states.

In a post shared on Truth Social on Friday, Trump described the decision as a “huge win” for fishermen in states including Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina.

“For years, our Great Fishermen have been punished with VERY short Federal fishing seasons despite RECORD HIGH fish populations and the States begging to oversee these permits,” he added.

The policy centres on coordination with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which regulates fisheries and sets quotas and seasons in federal waters.

Recreational red snapper fishing

For years, recreational red snapper fishing has been tightly controlled at the federal level, often limited to brief seasonal openings that critics say restrict access.

At its lowest point in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the red snapper spawning stock fell to about 11 percent of its historical level, prompting strict conservation measures under a long-term rebuilding plan set to run through 2044.

Several southeastern states have since pushed for more flexibility, seeking a greater role in setting fishing seasons and expanding the number of days anglers can fish.

Catch limits and size requirements would still apply, with anglers typically limited to one fish per day in the South Atlantic.

Supporters argue the changes better reflect what they describe as a recovering red snapper population and would improve access for recreational fishermen.

“State management and expansion of Gulf snapper season have been a major boon for our Gulf of America communities, allowing so many Floridians and visitors to enjoy the Red Snapper our waters have to offer,” said Governor Ron DeSantis in a release of November 2025.

“I was proud to announce that Florida anglers will soon be able to enjoy more Atlantic Red Snapper fishing as well. The Trump Administration has taken action to rein in the bureaucracy and return this power to the states, where it belongs,” he added.

A similar approach has already been rolled out in the Gulf of Mexico, where states have taken on a larger role in managing recreational red snapper seasons.

But Ocean Conservancy, a US-based ocean conservation nonprofit, says there are growing warning signs under that system, including what it describes as a decline in the average size of fish and reports from anglers who say they must travel farther to catch a keeper.

The group also notes that recent Gulf Council meetings have included public testimony from fishermen raising concerns about a downturn in the stock.

The group says the Gulf population is about 10 times larger, meaning management approaches that appear sustainable there may not translate to smaller, more vulnerable stocks.

Concerns over overfishing risks

Marine scientists and conservation groups warn that loosening federal oversight could increase the risk of overfishing, particularly if monitoring and enforcement vary across states.

Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, regulators must set annual catch limits to prevent overfishing, but critics say longer fishing seasons could undermine those safeguards.

“These exempted fishing permits are an end run around sustainable management,” said Meredith Moore of Ocean Conservancy in a release shared with Al Jazeera.

“Just last year, NOAA’s own analysis showed a two-day season was needed to prevent overfishing. There is no doubt that allowing months-long seasons will lead to overfishing, while unproven data collection means we may not realise the damage until it is done.”

Others warn the impact could be felt beyond stock levels, affecting the long-term future of the fishery.

“Overfishing means sacrificing the chance to teach the next generation to fish in order to fill coolers this season,” added JP Brooker, the group’s Florida conservation director.

“Red snapper is a favourite of Floridians and out-of-state anglers. No one likes short fishing seasons, but if we don’t follow the science and let these fish recover, we could soon lose this cherished fishing season for good,” he added.

Ocean Conservancy estimates highlight the scale of concern. Federal regulators have set the South Atlantic recreational catch limit at 22,797 fish, yet a recent two-day season in Florida alone landed 24,885 fish.

The group estimates that catches could reach 485,000 fish over a 39-day season, more than 20 times the annual limit and potentially in breach of federal law.