TODAY

Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.

US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.

On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.

Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.

Strait of Hormuz

Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.

During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.

In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.

The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.

“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.

A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.

Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.

Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.

For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.

READ: Iran ready to reassure world it is not pursuing nuclear weapons, president says

Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets

Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.

As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.

Nuclear file

The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.

A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.

Extent of ceasefire

Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.

This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.

Context

Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.

Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.

READ: Trump says Iran talks ‘constructive’ but blockade will remain until final deal is reached

Al Jazeera’s Heidi Pett reports on the Syrian legislative elections in Hasakah and the town of Kobane – areas recently reintegrated under government control after being held by pro-Kurdish fighters for more than a decade.

US president says any potential agreement with Tehran will be ‘good and proper’ as mediation efforts continue.

Cuba has announced the first shipment in an expected donation from China of about 60,000 tonnes of rice, as the Caribbean island contends with an ongoing humanitarian crisis.

In a series of social media posts on Sunday, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel confirmed that the first load of 15,000 tonnes had arrived a day earlier in the port of Havana.

He also expressed “deep gratitude” to China, as well as to members of the European Parliament who denounced the pressure campaign his government faces.

Since January, the United States has increased its sanctions against Cuba, as part of a hardline turn under the second term of President Donald Trump.

“Thank you very much for the solidarity, and for the firm and unequivocal condemnation of the collective punishment to which our people are being subjected,” Diaz-Canel wrote, likening Cuba’s situation to “genocide”.

While Trump has sought to check China’s growing influence on Latin America, Cuba has increasingly relied on the Asian superpower for assistance.

Already, China has donated solar panels to Cuba to help update its ageing energy grid and transition the island away from fossil fuels. Currently, Cuba relies on imports for nearly 60 percent of its oil supply, according to the International Energy Agency.

But since the start of the year, the Trump administration has largely blocked the export of oil to Cuba.

The de facto oil blockade began shortly after January 3, when the US launched a military operation to abduct and imprison Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Trump followed that operation with the announcement that no more oil or funds would be transferred from Venezuela to Cuba.

By the end of the month, he had also issued an executive order identifying Cuba as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the US and threatening economic penalties to any country that supplies it with oil.

Since then, only a single Russian tanker has been permitted to reach the island. Earlier this month, Energy Minister Vicente de la O Levy announced that the island had exhausted its oil supplies.

While Cuba is no stranger to power outages, the recent crisis has caused island-wide blackouts and has brought public services — including transportation and medical care — to a standstill in many areas.

But Trump has continued to impose sanctions on the island’s communist government, in an apparent effort to force regime change.

Media reports have indicated he has sought Diaz-Canel’s resignation and would be open to a situation akin to Venezuela’s, where Maduro’s government has been left largely intact, though Maduro himself has been replaced.

Trump has also repeatedly suggested he may consider a military response should Cuba fail to give in to his demands, though his administration has sent mixed messages about possible intervention on the island.

“Other presidents have looked at this for 50, 60 years, doing something, and it looks like I’ll be the one that does it,” Trump said last week from the Oval Office.

Negotiations between the two countries, however, are likely to be strained after the Trump administration unveiled a murder indictment against Cuba’s former president, Raul Castro, for the 1996 downing of two planes run by Cuban exiles.

Since the 1960s, Cuba has been under a sweeping US trade embargo that has weakened its economy.

US officials, however, have blamed the Cuban government for economic mismanagement and the oppression of its people, particularly political dissidents.

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio disclosed that the Trump administration offered $100m in humanitarian aid to Cuba, on the condition it implement “meaningful reforms”.

In Sunday’s posts, however, Diaz-Canel sought to project defiance in the face of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign.

“The ‘maximum pressure’ strategy — which some in the US morbidly trumpet — is part of a strategy intended to justify the false narrative of an impending collapse, and thereby pave the way for military intervention,” he wrote.

Diaz-Canel added that Cuba would continue to strengthen its ties with the US’s economic and political rival, China.

“The cherished bonds of friendship and cooperation that unite us grow stronger in these crucial times,” he said.

Strategic ambiguity, the US policy of neither explicitly supporting nor opposing Taiwanese independence, has been considered effective for decades in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping on May 14-15, 2026, in Beijing revealed signs that this formula’s effectiveness is beginning to be limited. China pushed the US not merely to “not support” but to actively “oppose” Taiwanese independence. The US responded by displaying an inconsistent position. Taiwan openly asserted its sovereignty. All three responses emerged within less than 24 hours, and no international forum was able to manage the contradictions.

AT His strategic ambiguity is not simply a matter of US foreign policy. It reflects deeper limitations in the global governance system in addressing unresolved sovereignty issues. At the same time, China is actively promoting an alternative world order through its Belt and Road Initiative, non-interventionist principles, and multipolarity agenda, which indirectly influence how the Taiwan issue is positioned on the international stage. Without a concrete framework for joint governance, the potential for miscalculations across the Taiwan Strait will continue to increase.

On May 16, 2026, the day after Trump left Beijing, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement. Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It is not under Chinese rule. This statement was not new rhetoric.

What makes this significant is the context. Trump had just called a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan a bargaining chip in negotiations with Xi Jinping. China had just successfully pushed the US to soften its tone on Taiwan. In less than 24 hours, three main actors make statements that cannot all be true at the same time. And there is no one international institution that has the authority to decide which is more valid.

This isn’t a sudden diplomatic failure. It’s the result of a policy of strategic ambiguity that has been in place for more than five decades and is now beginning to show its limitations.

Strategic ambiguity was once effective because all parties had an incentive not to test its limits. That situation is changing. China is becoming increasingly assertive. militarily and increasingly actively shaping an alternative global order. Taiwan is becoming more assertive in claiming its political identity. The US under Trump is increasingly unpredictable. In these conditions, the ambiguity that once served as a buffer for stability has now become a source of uncertainty. The global governance system lacks adequate instruments to fill the gaps left by this increasingly outdated formula.

Starting from the background, a US strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan was born of deliberate compromise. In the Shanghai Communique (1972), Washington used the word “recognizes” China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, not “accepts.” The difference in vocabulary was no accident. It opened diplomatic normalization with Beijing without formally abandoning Taipei.

This formula was then codified through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and three joint US-China communiques. During the Cold War era and the two decades that followed, this formula remained relatively stable because China was not yet strong enough to challenge it militarily and Taiwan was not yet confident enough to challenge it politically. As noted by T.Y. Wang in the journal Politics and Policy, strategic ambiguity is designed not only to deter China from attacking Taiwan but also to restrain Taiwan from taking steps that Beijing might deem provocative.

But the conditions that made that formula effective have changed structurally. Taiwan’s democratization since the 1990s has produced a political identity increasingly independent of the “One China” narrative. The PLA’s military modernization has changed the cost calculations of conflict. And Trump’s return to the White House has brought a transactional approach that, as noted by the Global Taiwan Institute, exacerbates existing ambiguities with conflicting signals that are record arms sales accompanied by a striking rhetorical silence on US security commitments to Taiwan.

On the ground, this uncertainty has already resulted in a measured escalation. Military exercises: Justice Mission 2025 In December 2025, a full-scale blockade of Taiwan was simulated, with over 90 aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait in a single day. These median line violations were not an anomaly. Since 2022, they have become increasingly routine and have rarely elicited an organized response from the international community.

The most important part to understand next is about the One China Policy. The One China Policy affirms that a single label includes three irreconcilable positions. Beijing maintains that Taiwan is an unreturned province and that reunification is a non-negotiable goal. Taipei maintains that the Republic of China (ROC) is a sovereign state that predates the People’s Republic of China and that the two have never ruled each other. Washington maintains its own version, based on the Taiwan Relations Act, that recognizes Beijing’s position without explicitly endorsing it.

These three positions exist simultaneously because they have never been tested in an international forum that has the authority to decide which is more valid. Brookings Institution; he noted that this policy was originally designed for a period when China was not yet acting like a revisionist power. Now, conditions have changed, and the old formula requires a recalibration that has yet to materialize.

There’s a compelling argument here. Strategic ambiguity has also served as a deterrent to war. It prevents China from attacking because it’s unsure whether the US will intervene. It also prevents Taiwan from declaring formal independence because it’s unsure whether the US would defend it. In this logic, ambiguity is a feature, not a bug.

However, analyst Brandon K. Yoder in the European Journal of International Relations, The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on credibility, which is currently eroding. When Trump called weapons for Taiwan a “negotiating chip,” he indirectly communicated to Beijing that the US commitment was conditional. When commitments are conditional, their deterrent effect is significantly weakened.

What results is not new stability, but rather an increasingly unpredictable gray area. Each party operates based on its own assumptions about the limits that can be tested. Without governance mechanisms that explicitly clarify these limits, the risk of miscalculation continues to grow.

The Taiwan issue cannot be read in isolation from China’s broader agenda of reshaping the global order. Over the past two decades, Beijing has not only protested the existing international system but also actively developed an alternative.

The Belt and Road Initiative, which now encompasses more than 140 countries, is more than just an infrastructure project. As analyzed in China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, BRI serves as both a governance and economic mechanism, linking infrastructure development with new standards of connectivity and cooperation that reflect the Chinese model of development without political conditions.

Beyond the BRI, China is actively pushing three major initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. They share a common thread that is strengthening the norm of sovereignty, rejecting intervention based on Western values, and promoting multipolarity as a substitute for single-party hegemony. Bruegel noted that the concept of “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” popularized by Xi at Davos 2017 has even been included in several UN General Assembly resolutions, demonstrating how far China has succeeded in pushing its global narrative into multilateral institutions.

The relevance to the Taiwan issue is that the more countries accept China’s sovereignty-based, non-interference-based governance framework, the more limited the space for international mechanisms to challenge Beijing’s claims to Taiwan. China’s global governance agenda and its claims to Taiwan are not separate issues. They are part of the same project: redefining who has the right to set the rules of the game in what have traditionally been called “internal affairs.”

This also makes Trump’s and Xi’s bilateral approach a more suitable instrument for China’s interests. When the Taiwan issue is managed through negotiations between the two great powers, broader norms, such as the right to self-determination and representation of sovereign entities, are not discussed. Observer Research Foundation noted that BRI cooperation with the UN from 2015 to 2019 was more about mutual legitimacy than structural integration, and a similar pattern is seen in the way China uses multilateral forums to validate its diplomatic positions without actually committing to the process.

Trump’s and Xi’s meeting in May 2026 shows a pattern that deserves serious attention. That is, the Taiwan issue is now managed almost entirely outside the multilateral framework. There are no regional forums, no UN mechanisms, no activated joint protocols. There are just two leaders, two delegations, and an agenda far broader than just Taiwan.

Observation: Both sides reveal a glaring asymmetry. In China’s version, Taiwan is referred to as the “most important issue,” and Xi warned of potential conflict if handled incorrectly. In the US version, Taiwan is not mentioned at all. CSIS noted that the meeting resulted in a commitment to “strategic stability” without concrete instruments to realize it. The lack of crisis communication protocol. Limited incident management framework. There isn’t any commitment to refrain from provocative military exercises.

This is not simply a shortcoming of the meeting. It reflects a more systemic limitation. namely the limitations There is no sufficiently authoritative multilateral platform to address this issue. The UN Security Council is hampered by Beijing’s veto power. ASEAN adheres to the principle of non-intervention, which actually benefits China’s narrative. The G20 has no mandate to address sovereignty disputes.

The result is what could be called a governance deficit. This doesn’t mean there are no institutions, but rather that the existing ones are insufficiently effective for the situation. And it’s in this deficit that military escalation moves in to fill the space that structured diplomacy should be filling. Modern Diplomacy noted that the US approved an $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan by 2025 while simultaneously sending ambiguous rhetorical signals, a combination that makes it difficult for both China and Taiwan to read exactly where the real line is.

The following three recommendations are not intended to resolve the Taiwan status question. Their purpose is more limited and more immediate. namely for reducing the risk of miscalculation before a minor incident escalates into an uncontrollable crisis. All three rely on existing political conditions and momentum.

First, the momentum of the Trump-Xi meeting should be used to establish a permanent, dedicated military crisis communication channel for incidents in the Taiwan Strait. The most relevant precedent is the Washington-Moscow hotline, established after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, precisely because the world had nearly come to war due to miscommunication, not intention. CNBC noted the May 2026 meeting resulted in a relatively constructive atmosphere between the two leaders. This is a rare window of opportunity and should be used for something concrete.

Second, Indonesia, as a BRICS member and ASEAN dialogue partner with a relatively balanced working relationship with Washington and Beijing, could propose a regional consultation forum focused on managing incidents in the Taiwan Strait. This would not be a forum to decide Taiwan’s status, but rather a technical mechanism for de-escalation procedures and crisis communication. ASEAN has the foundation for this through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and Indonesia’s current position within BRICS provides added legitimacy in Beijing’s eyes.

Third, the US, China, Japan, and South Korea need to negotiate a joint commitment that no party will change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through force. This is inspired by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which successfully committed European countries not to change their borders by force, despite many of their mutual distrust. The agreement did not resolve existing disputes, but it did raise the costs of escalation measurably. With Xi seeking economic stability before 2027 and Trump seeking to avoid military engagement far from the US mainland, both sides’ calculations are now more open to this type of commitment than in previous periods.

It can be concluded that strategic ambiguity is one of the most ingenious products of Cold War diplomacy. It maintained stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades, not by solving the problem, but by making all parties unsure whether testing its limits was a good idea.

The conditions that make that formula work are changing simultaneously. China is stronger and more assertive. Taiwan is more assertive in its political identity. And the US under Trump is sending signals that are more easily read as conditional than committed. These three changes are not occurring one after the other, but simultaneously, and the global governance system has not yet responded accordingly.

The Trump-Xi meeting in May 2026 is neither a turning point in the war nor a step toward a resolution. It is a reflection of the current situation: three actors with three different interpretations, no referee, and increasingly little room for error.

What’s needed isn’t a final solution on Taiwan’s status, as that won’t come anytime soon. What’s needed are concrete steps that reduce the risk of miscalculation while keeping all options open. Crisis channels, regional consultative forums, and non-escalation commitments are small steps but have clear historical precedent. The question is whether the political will for these small steps can still be found amidst the escalating rivalry.

Baltimore, United States – Muslim Americans are grieving after two gunmen last week opened fire at the Islamic Center of San Diego, killing three people.

But at the annual conference for the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) in Baltimore, community leaders stressed the urgency of turning the sorrow into action.

Nearly 25,000 people turned out for the annual event, held on Saturday and Sunday. Speakers addressed the recent shooting, pointing to the courage of the three victims as examples for the broader community in a time of heightened Islamophobia.

“We owe them more than condolences. We owe them resolve,” said Lena Masri, a lawyer at the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).

She explained how the victims — a security officer, a caretaker and a neighbour — sacrificed their lives to save others. The security officer, Amin Abdullah, exchanged fire with the shooters, while the other two victims, Mansour Kaziha and Nadir Awad, rushed to help and called for emergency services.

“They protected the physical space of our community: the masjid [mosque], the school, the children, the teachers, the worshippers,” Masri explained.

“Our responsibility is to protect the civic space of our community: the right to worship, the right to speak, the right to organise, the right to defend Palestine, the right to build institutions.”

That was the recurring theme of the conference: that the Muslim American community cannot afford to be passive and must draw on its strength to push back against bigotry and hate.

Speakers emphasised voting, organising and donating to community institutions and candidates who align with Muslim Americans. They also underscored the need to hold officials accountable and push for an end to Israel’s atrocities in Palestine.

“We owe Gaza more than grief. We owe Gaza advocacy that cannot be intimidated into silence,” Masri said.

Islamophobia and Palestinians’ dehumanisation

Symbols of Palestine could be seen everywhere at the conference, from bags emblazoned with watermelons and flags to keffiyeh-patterned scarves, shirts and water bottles.

At a bazaar featuring dozens of vendors, conference-goers left messages of solidarity on a tent that will be sent to Gaza by the charity Life for Relief and Development (LIFE).

In speeches and on panels, advocates drew a link between anti-Muslim bigotry in the United States and Israel’s abuses in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and Lebanon.

Some of the loudest promoters of Islamophobia in the US are also staunch Israel supporters, among them right-wing commentator Laura Loomer and Congressman Randy Fine.

Both Loomer and Fine are allies of US President Donald Trump, whose administration has unleashed a crackdown to deport critics of Israel who live in the US but are not citizens.

Altaf Husain, a professor at the Howard University School of Social Work, said anti-Palestinian voices are trying to “scare” Muslims as a means of silencing criticism of Israel.

“They want to shut this down, so it’s a direct connection,” Husain told Al Jazeera.

He said the large turnout at the ICNA conference shows that the community is not intimidated and will not back down.

In the response to the shooting in San Diego, Husain pointed out that the community raised more than $3.5m for the victims’ families and moved to bolster security around Muslim institutions.

Layers of security

Saad Kazmi, the president of ICNA, said the organisation relied on three layers of protection to secure this weekend’s event: its own security guards, an outside firm and local law enforcement agencies in Baltimore.

While there is anxiety in the community over the rise of Islamophobia and Trump’s immigration crackdown, he said Muslim Americans must take matters into their own hands and work with “sensible” people across the political spectrum to defeat hate.

“We are very thankful that we live in a country that is ruled by the Constitution and law,” Kazmi told Al Jazeera.

Kazmi added that the shooting in San Diego only added to the community’s determination to assert and protect its rights. The Islamic centre in the city, he noted, did not shut down after the attack.

“If anything came out of this, it is that there are more attendees to the masjid, more people who believe that the way forward is to strengthen ourselves, strengthen our community and march on,” Kazmi said.

After the shooting, Loomer doubled down on her anti-Muslim rhetoric, calling on immigration authorities to target the Islamic Center of San Diego.

She also called for the deportation of all Muslims from the US, describing them as an “invasive species”. But few Republicans disavowed Loomer, who maintains close ties to the White House.

Rather, more than 60 Congress members have joined the Sharia-Free America Caucus since it was established in December. CAIR has designated the caucus a hate group.

At the state level, governors and local legislators have disparaged Islam while also pushing to penalise Palestinian rights activism.

Texas and Florida, for example, have labelled CAIR a “terrorist” group, while implementing measures against “Sharia law” that critics consider anti-Muslim dog whistles.

Rights under attack

In March, after CAIR sued Florida Governor Ron DeSantis over its “terrorist” designation, a federal court blocked the label from being imposed.

In his ruling, Judge Mark Walker wrote that DeSantis’s executive order (EO) targets the Muslim community as a whole.

“It should be lost on no one that Defendant’s EO targets one of America’s largest Muslim civil rights organizations for indirect suppression of speech. But, as we all know, it is easy for those in power to target minority groups with little pushback,” Walker wrote.

“Sadly, history teaches that it is often minority religious groups who find themselves in the crosshairs.”

On Saturday, several panels praised the US legal system and the laws that protect freedom of religion and speech. But the panellists argued that human rights do not defend themselves; people must step up to protect them.

“You’ve got to imagine rights are a territory, and you have to occupy that territory. If you do not actively occupy that territory, that territory will be taken from you. And that is exactly what has been happening,” Tom Facchine, an imam from New Jersey, said.

Last year, Palestinian immigrant Leqaa Kordia found her rights in jeopardy when immigration agents knocked on her door and detained her over her activism against Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza.

Kordia spent more than a year in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention before an immigration judge ordered her to be released in March.

But Kordia — who is still fighting deportation — told ICNA conference attendees on Saturday that she has no regrets, encouraging them to remain politically active and engaged.

“Speaking up, it comes with a cost … It cost me my health, my life, literally my freedom, and I’m living in uncertainty that tomorrow I’m going to be here, or I’m going to be deported,” she said.

“It comes with a cost, but it’s worth it. It’s worth it because silence, it costs even way more than speaking.”

President Donald Trump was able to purge his most vocal critics within the Republican Party, as Americans voted for the congressional candidates who will run in November’s midterm elections.

One of the most prominent politicians to be unseated was Representative Thomas Massie, who pushed for the release of the Epstein files.

The Democratic Party partially released a report about performance that noted “a persistent inability or unwillingness to listen to all voters”.

Host Steve Clemons asks former Trump aide Hogan Gidley, and Matt Duss – former adviser to Senator Bernie Sanders – about the challenges facing both parties.

There are moments in history when civilizations continue to advance materially while progressively losing confidence in the values  and structures that once gave direction and coherence to collective life. Institutions continue to function, markets continue to expand, and technological progress accelerates uninterruptedly, yet beneath this movement emerges a quieter uncertainty.

As Simone Weil observed, “to be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized

need of the human soul.”[1] Yet contemporary societies often struggle to sustain those forms of

belonging and shared meaning that once anchored human communities. The crisis is

therefore not simply political or economic. It concerns meaning itself.

Artificial intelligence has appeared precisely within such a historical juncture. Most contemporary discussions approach AI primarily as a technological revolution, or as an element of economic and geopolitical competition between great powers. Governments now frame it as a strategic race, corporations present it as the next engine of productivity, and Silicon Valley often speaks of AI in the language of inevitability and destiny, recalling Aldous Huxley’s fear that technological progress might ultimately weaken rather than deepen human civilization.[2]

 But such interpretations may ignore something deeper still. AI may be less the cause of a civilizational transformation than one of its clearest symptoms. It reflects a broader historical transition in which inherited moral and symbolic frameworks are dissolving faster than new forms of collective meaning can emerge.

Slouching Towards Bethlehem[3]

This condition closely resembles what Antonio Gramsci described as an interregnum: a period in which the old world is dying while the new world struggles to be born. [4] Such periods produce not only political instability, but also moral exhaustion, the erosion of shared narratives, and declining confidence in beliefs once considered self-evident. Civilizations have passed through similar moments before.

The enduring fascination of Edward Gibbon’s monumental The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire lies not merely in its account of imperial decline, but in its portrayal of the slow weakening of the moral and symbolic foundations that once sustained an entire civilization.[5] Rome did not collapse overnight. Its institutions remained impressive long after few still believed in the civilization they were meant to serve. Administrative power survived even as collective meaning and aspirations deteriorated.

That pattern feels strangely familiar.

Never before have technological capacities appeared so extensive while social distrust, political fragmentation, and loneliness have become so pervasive. Hyperconnectivity was supposed to bring societies closer together. In many cases, it has done the reverse.

AI in the Anthropocene

AI emerges from within this historical condition . It appears perfectly suited to societies organized around abstraction, speed, quantification, and technological mediation. In this sense, AI is profoundly historical. It results from a long civilizational development in which rationalization, efficiency, and technical calculation have come to replace older moral, religious, and symbolic frameworks as primary sources of legitimacy and meaning. What distinguishes AI from previous technologies is that it extends these same principles into domains traditionally considered irreducibly human. Activities once understood as distinctly human, such as reasoning, creativity, interpretation, and even emotional interaction, are now becoming technologically mediated.

The deeper unease therefore concerns anthropology as much as technology. What remains distinctively human when machines become capable of imitating reasoning, generating art, and mediating human relationships?

Such moments of civilizational disorientation are not entirely unprecedented.

The Renaissance confronted a similar rupture. Medieval Europe had long possessed a relatively coherent worldview capable of organizing religion, politics, morality, and human identity within a common order. By the late fifteenth century, however, this equilibrium was beginning to fracture under the pressure of new scientific discoveries, religious wars, and the weakening of older political and spiritual authorities. Thinkers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola sought, in radically different ways, to redefine humanity’s place within a rapidly changing world.[6] Pico celebrated human beings as creatures capable of shaping themselves through freedom and intellect, while Machiavelli recognized more soberly that periods of transition dissolve inherited certainties and force societies to confront instability and power directly.

Both understood that historical transformation is ultimately existential before being institutional. Our own transition may prove even more radical because technology no longer transforms only economic or political life, but cognition itself.

AI now mediates everyday experience itself: how people search for information, communicate, work, and make sense of the world around them.

Algorithms no longer merely distribute information. They shape attention, influence perception, and affect how individuals relate emotionally to public life and to one another. Under such conditions, the distinction between human judgment and technological mediation becomes far less clear.

The Price of Nostalgia

One striking feature of the contemporary digital environment is the degree to which individuals now participate voluntarily in their own data extraction. Recent Instagram trends such as the viral “What Were You Like in the ’90s?” challenge encourage users and celebrities alike to upload curated archives of personal photographs spanning decades of their lives. Presented as nostalgia and entertainment, these trends also generate immense quantities of highly valuable visual and behavioural data: faces across time, emotional reactions, aesthetic preferences, social interactions, and patterns of self-presentation. Whether or not such material is directly incorporated into future AI systems, the broader objective remains significant. Human memory, identity, and even nostalgia itself increasingly becomes raw material for computational analysis and commercial platforms.

Reactions to AI therefore oscillate easily between fascination and anxiety. Beneath both lies a deeper uncertainty about whether modern societies still possess a coherent understanding of what human beings are for, beyond economic productivity and consumption.

Friedrich Nietzsche anticipated aspects of this crisis more than a century ago. His declaration that “God is dead” did not merely constitute a theological provocation but signalled the emergence of a civilization in which traditional moral structures would lose authority long before new ones could replace them.[7] Nietzsche feared not nihilism alone, but the possibility that societies might become incapable of generating new forms of transcendence once older ones had collapsed. We saw how his worldview provided an intellectual base for Fascism.

I Read, therefore I Am

In increasingly mediated environments, the act of sustained reading itself begins to take on a countercultural character. To read is, in some sense, to resist. We have access to more information than any previous generation, yet physical books can still provide a sense of orientation. The books people return to, annotate, or simply keep close over time often reveal something enduring about the way they think and who they are.

The central issue, therefore, is not simply whether artificial intelligence will become more powerful. The deeper question is whether societies organized around AI can still sustain stable forms of responsibility and belonging strong enough to preserve coherent collective life. This is ultimately a political and civilizational problem before it is a purely technical one.

Much contemporary discourse still assumes that technological advancement naturally produces historical progress. History offers little evidence for such confidence.

Civilizations do not endure simply because they innovate technologically. They endure because they preserve, or reinvent, systems of meaning capable of holding societies together over time.

The Roman Empire mastered engineering yet gradually lost the moral cohesion that had once sustained it. Renaissance Europe produced extraordinary creativity precisely because it confronted existential instability directly rather than attempting to ignore it.

Contemporary Western societies appear caught between immense technological sophistication and growing uncertainty about their own civilizational narrative.

AI therefore represents more than innovation. It reflects a transformation in how human beings understand themselves, authority, knowledge, and reality itself. The danger is not simply that machines become too powerful. It is that societies now outsource judgment, imagination, and responsibility while slowly losing the cultural and moral resources required to govern these technologies wisely. Yet periods of interregnum are not necessarily periods of decline alone. They are also moments in which civilizations redefine themselves.

AI For Good ?

Historical transitions create possibilities as well as dangers. The Renaissance emerged from the crisis of medieval Europe. Modern democracy emerged from the upheavals of industrial society. Today’s uncertainty may likewise force Western societies to confront questions long obscured by economic growth and technological optimism:

What constitutes a good society? What forms of belonging remain possible in a hyper-mediated world? What aspects of human life should never be reduced to data, prediction, or optimization?

AI cannot answer these questions. But its emergence makes avoiding them increasingly difficult.

[1] Simone Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind (1949/1952).

[2] See Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932) and his later essays such as Brave New World Revisited (1958), where he warns that technological efficiency and social conditioning could erode authentic human experience.

[3] The phrase alludes to the final lines of W.B. Yeats’ poem “The Second Coming” (1919): “And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, / Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?”

[4] Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (written 1929–1935, published posthumously). The “interregnum” concept appears in Notebook 3: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”

[5] Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (6 volumes, 1776–1789). Gibbon famously attributed part of the decline to the rise of Christianity and the erosion of civic virtue.

[6] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486) — often called the “Manifesto of the Renaissance”; Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532) and Discourses on Livy.

[7] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882, §125 – “The Madman”) and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The full phrase is usually rendered “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”

Tehran, Iran – Iran and the United States have evoked historical and geographical references to the MENA region as the world awaits the announcement of a possible deal to end the conflict between the two countries.

Iranian officials have revived key moments in the nation’s history to drive forward a message of a David-versus-Goliath battle between the two sides, with the underdog ultimately victorious.

This comes as US President Donald Trump announced that a deal with Iran had been “largely negotiated”, with Tehran also indicating there could be an agreement soon. Both sides have been keen to portray any deal to end their 66-day conflict as a victory.

Historic messaging

Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei drew parallels to the march of the Romans against the Persians in the third century, with the invading party ultimately being forced to “come to terms” with the latter.

Baghaei also posted an image of Roman Emperor Valerian after he was captured by Persia’s King Shapur I in the year 260. It is an illustration repeatedly drawn on by Iranian authorities in recent months to evoke nationalist sentiments and promote the idea that the country is again bravely standing up to another invading force.

Sunday also happened to mark the anniversary of a more recent conflict, when Iran – under a new revolutionary government still in place today – fought an eight-year war with its neighbour, Iraq, from 1980 to 1988.

Every year, the Islamic Republic celebrates the 1982 recapture of Khorramshahr, a city with an Arabic-speaking majority in the western Iranian province of Khuzestan.

Khorramshahr marked a turning point for the Iranian side in a protracted war that killed hundreds of thousands from both sides, with that battle being one of the bloodiest.

It has been used in government discourse and messaging during the latest war with the US and Israel to symbolise the country’s long history of resistance and determination to maintain the sovereignty of its lands.

Ahmad Vahidi, the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), used the battle to signal that Tehran would continue to fight the US and Israel in the region.

“The liberation of Khorramshahr is a lasting model for victory in future Khorramshahr, and the liberation of Quds sharif [Jerusalem], and the destruction of the evil Zionist regime by the axis of resistance and the fighters of the Islamic world,” he said, in reference to Israel.

Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s relatively moderate president, linked the event to the current standoff.

“Iran’s Khorramshahr today is the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz,” he wrote on X. “Resistance, sacrifice and fighting off aggression are rooted in the culture of this land.”

Preparing for peace

Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s slain Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said both former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and US President Donald Trump failed to fully recognise Iran’s power when starting a war.

“The first was buried in the trenches of Khorramshahr, while the second has been afflicted with a political crisis in a quagmire created by the Zionist regime,” he wrote on X.

Kazem Gharibabadi, a member of Iran’s negotiating team and its deputy foreign minister for international affairs, linked the issue of Khorramshahr with the United Nations Charter and the country’s current concerns.

“Any nation that falls victim to aggression and occupation has an intrinsic right for legitimate defence to safeguard its territory, independence and integrity,” he said.

Gharibabadi added that Tehran is currently following the same logic of “peace-seeking paired with power, diplomacy paired with integrity and decisive defence”.

First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said the recapture of the city in 1982 showed that the new government could defeat aggression on its own terms.

Tehran now aims to “overcome our savage enemy” through holding its ground, he wrote on X.

The latest barrage of messaging from leaders in Tehran came after Trump appeared to suggest that he wanted to take control of Iran.

On his Truth Social account on Saturday, the US president posted a photo of the US flag covering the map of Iran, with the question: “United States of the Middle East?”

In response, the X accounts of multiple Iranian embassies abroad posted a US map covered with the flag of the Islamic Republic, with the question: “United States of Iran?”

The Trump administration has emphasised that it wants a long-term suspension of uranium enrichment in Iran and the extraction of high-enriched nuclear material from the country.

It also wants the Strait of Hormuz – through which one-fifth of the world’s oil shipments normally pass, but which Iran has blockaded – reopened fully without any tolls from Iran, officials have said.

Israeli officials have remained largely silent about a US deal with Tehran, but have reportedly been pushing to resume the war.

With 18 examples of the OA-1K Skyraider II delivered to the U.S. Air Force’s Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the service is now looking forward to demonstrating the aircraft’s unique rapid-deployment capability later this year. AFSOC also says it plans to add laser-guided Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets to the OA-1K’s armament options and is looking at boosting standoff capability in the form of Red Wolf mini cruise missiles. All of this comes at a time when the Pentagon is looking to cut back OA-1K numbers amid concerns surrounding its survivability and utility in a high-end fight, specifically with China, which stands today as the U.S. military’s pacing threat.

Lt. Col. Robert Wilson, chief of the AFSOC Armed Overwatch Requirements Branch, briefed journalists, including from TWZ, on the latest plans for the OA-1K ahead of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Week, taking place from today in Tampa, Florida.

Beginning with an overview of the program, Lt. Col. Wilson stressed that the OA-1K — a militarized derivative of the popular Air Tractor AT-802 crop duster — is not viewed as a replacement for legacy platforms like U-28 (which he previously flew) or the MC-12. Instead, it is “a new, purpose-built solution for today’s complex environments.”

The thinking behind the Skyraider II reflects the transition from the Air Force’s focus on counter-terrorism operations in the post-9/11 period to a more complex threat picture. Now, the service has to be more prepared to fight against a much wider range of adversaries across the spectrum of conflict.

As Wilson explained, “the OA-1K represents a new era for AFSOC, with the flexibility to support not only counter-terrorism-like missions, but also crisis and contingency response, competition with more advanced adversaries, and even aspects of full-on conflict. To meet this wide range of mission sets, OA-1K is a multi-role capability platform that is essentially a Swiss Army knife of airborne capability.”

OA-1K Skyraider II Walk-Around Tour With Its Test Pilot

The OA-1K multi-role mission remit therefore covers close air support (CAS), armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and precision strike.

At this point, Wilson explained, “we’re in the midst of production and delivery of aircraft, and we’re reaching a point where we are getting very close to demonstrating capabilities such as the weapons employment, the ability to provide ISR capability, so we’re kind of transitioning the program from what was previously developmental and conceptual to actually getting to the point where we’ll be looking to get into operational tests.”

To keep pace with changing threats, the Skyraider II has a modular design that provides flexibility for future upgrades, which could include expanded payloads, such as more advanced weapons, or more exquisite intelligence-collection capabilities.

Reflecting on the potential for future enhancements in terms of external sensors and other payloads, Wilson continued: “We really think of this as levers that can be manipulated with a combination of fuel, weapons, and exquisite capabilities that can be increased or decreased based on the mission set to most effectively apply the capability to whatever mission it’s going out to accomplish that day.”

The OA-1K is also expected to enhance overall ground-force lethality and situational awareness through its provision of modern datalinks for joint integration.

All of this is expected to come with a much lower price tag than would be the case for traditional crewed aircraft.

According to Wilson, the cost-effectiveness of the OA-1K translates to a cost per flying hour of roughly $2,500. For comparison, an F-16C/D costs roughly ten times this amount per hour to operate.

“The OA-1K is one of the most affordable AFSOC platforms, which then frees up higher-end assets that are more costly, for other mission sets around the world, and that dollar amount makes it roughly 50 percent more cost-effective than even an MQ-1, which is an unmanned platform, and it’s more cost-effective than armed platforms like the U-28,” Wilson added.

NB: Wilson subsequently clarified that he had misspoken and that the cost comparison was between the OA-1K and other crewed platforms, like the U-28.

In terms of fielding, AFSOC has taken possession of its 18th OA-1K and is expecting a handful more throughout the end of the fiscal year. The initial cadre of crews is still training at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base in Oklahoma, with plans to station the aircraft in the future at both Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona.

The next step in standing up this capability will involve demonstrating the rapid deployment abilities of the OA-1K. This is something that was part of the original requirement but which is also seen as increasingly vital for SOF missions, which already demand a high level of expeditionary agility. The ability to rapidly disassemble and reassemble the Skyraider II would become even more important in a potential confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific theater.

“With rapid disassembly and reassembly, OA-1K can be loaded into a mobility aircraft like a C-5 or C-17 for rapid worldwide deployment, supporting missions around the world at a moment’s notice, and importantly, we’re talking a matter of hours instead of days or weeks that it would have otherwise required to fly around the world wherever it needs to go,” Wilson explained.

To start with, AFSOC is looking at testing this deployment capability using larger transport aircraft, primarily to maximize the number of OA-1Ks that can be moved at once, although Wilson said the exact number that will fit in a C-5 or C-17 will be determined as part of the operational test process later this calendar year.

Once deployed, the OA-1K is expected to operate “from nearly anywhere,” including short dirt surfaces, grass strips, and unimproved runways. As such, it will give the Air Force a combination of rapid deployment and austere environment capability that it otherwise doesn’t possess.

As noted earlier, there have been repeated questions about the survivability and general utility of the OA-1K in more contested environments, something that TWZ has looked at in depth in the past. But Wilson is confident that its mix of capabilities means it can still be relevant, even when facing a high-end opponent.

“First, it complicates things for the adversary because you may not have the aircraft in predictable locations,” Wilson contended. “It ensures that armed overwatch is provided for the joint force to increase their own survivability, and finally, it also ensures the persistent presence of the capability at a low cost compared to other platforms, freeing up higher-end assets for other locations.”

All of this can be achieved with a relatively tiny logistics footprint, with only a handful of contract maintainers required, and the disassembly/reassembly process can be done safely even in austere environments. Each two-person aircrew is being trained in this process, which includes conducting functional check flights in these locations before the aircraft conducts its mission. The actual process of disassembly and reassembly takes just a matter of hours.

With traditional Air Force platforms, deployments can take days or weeks, not just in terms of physically having to fly the aircraft to wherever it needs to go around the world, but all the planning that’s necessary for the crews, ground support services, etc.

“We have demonstrated this capability by doing a timed disassembly and reassembly in a controlled environment in a hangar,” Wilson added. “We’ll next look to conduct the activity in an actual mobility aircraft during our operational test later this calendar year.” After that, AFSOC will look to conduct the rapid disassembly and reassembly of the Skyraider II as part of exercises, likely next year.

“Just like anything else, the more reps and sets that we accomplish, the more ready we will be whenever we need to conduct it operationally,” Wilson said.

While Wilson did not mention it by name, this mode of operating ties directly into broader Air Force plans for the Agile Combat Employment, or ACE, concept, which is designed to ensure that combat airpower can still be brought to bear in a timely way, even when conventional airbases are put out of action or otherwise held under threat — the kinds of conditions likely in a conflict with a near-peer competitor, like China or Russia. In fact, the OA-1K has a particular role to play in this sort of scenario, since it’s even questionable if more advanced platforms will be able to execute as envisioned in a major conflict under ‘ACE rules.’

Wilson is also confident that, even without recourse to these kinds of expeditionary basing tactics, the OA-1K offers a suitable degree of survivability for many different scenarios.

“We have a certain built-in survivability capability for the platform,” Wilson explained. “The contractor has built in cockpit and engine armor, for example, to ensure that it’s survivable, and it does have defensive systems. So I would say it does have a baseline level of defensibility and survivability, and then we are certainly working on, with funding, ensuring that it is modernized and equipped, not only for survivability, but for really any other capability for the platform as well, to ensure that it remains relevant for the future.”

As for that first operational deployment, that could occur “in the coming years,” provided that the program continues to mature as anticipated.

There are potential pitfalls ahead, not least the question about how many OA-1Ks the Air Force will eventually receive.

Wilson reiterated that the program of record still calls for 75 aircraft, but admitted that this could be a challenge to achieve. As it stands, the U.S. Special Operations Command, as the procurement agency for the OA-1K, has cut its planned purchase down to 53 airframes, citing resource constraints.

“As the capability sponsor, I would say less than 75 is not desirable,” Wilson noted. “Any decrement below that is essentially a result of resource constraints and budget limitations. We will continue advocating to ensure that we get closer and ultimately achieve that program of record, but as you can imagine, budget constraints that impact various programs have decreased the final fleet size to less than that currently.”

The prospect of a potentially smaller OA-1K fleet means that having the aircraft working alongside other platforms, including drones, may become more important. Already, however, AFSOC sees the value of crewed/uncrewed missions for the Skyraider II.

“The integration of manned and unmanned assets is something that we’re certainly looking at in terms of capability,” said.

When it comes to weapons capabilities, Wilson confirmed that APKWS laser-guided rockets are compatible with the OA-1K and are something that AFSOC wants to have as part of the ordnance options for the platform.

APKWS is quickly becoming a weapon of choice for a wide range of platforms, offering a low-cost, high-volume, precision weapon that is equally effective for both ground attack and counter-drone missions. APKWS was proven incredibly effective on light attack aircraft experiments that tangentially led to the procurement of the Skyraider II, working as the primary weapon for those aircraft. So it should come as no surprise that it will be integrated onto the Skyraider II. It’s actually somewhat surprising it isn’t already.

As far as the Red Wolf cruise missiles, Wilson was a little more circumspect. “That is certainly an area that we are looking to explore to allow for inclusion of that weapon into the planned set,” he said.

As we have explained in the past, adding Red Wolf, or a similar standoff weapon, to the OA-1K armory is one way of ensuring the aircraft can be more relevant and survivable, providing it with a true long-range strike capability.

Putting aside the Red Wolf, it is also somewhat surprising that so little weapons integration work appears to have been carried over from earlier iterations of the armed Air Tractor concept, since similar versions of this aircraft have been flying for years, including in combat.

The Air Force service sees the OA-1K as far more than a light attack aircraft and more as a modular platform that will be able to be configured for irregular warfare, armed overwatch, ISR, strike, and more. Clearly, by pushing its rapid-deployment capability, the service is seeking to underscore the relevance of the aircraft in the Pacific theater. Meanwhile, recent conflicts in the Middle East — where traditional airbases were pummelled by drone and missile attacks — have demonstrated that the Air Force still has a requirement to conduct combat operations in other, less-contested environments too.

Once the OA-1K starts demonstrating its rapid-deployment capability, AFSOC hopes that the aircraft will further demonstrate that it fills a niche that no other crewed Air Force platform currently can.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Convictions handed down amid an intensified crackdown by Bahraini authorities on individuals accused of having ties to Tehran.

Bahrain has sentenced nine people to life in prison for carrying out what authorities describe as “hostile and terrorist acts” in cooperation with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Two other defendants were also jailed for three years each after being convicted of collaborating with the IRGC in what prosecutors described as “terrorist and espionage” activities, state media reported on Sunday.

The convictions were handed down during an intensified crackdown by Bahraini authorities on individuals accused of ties to Tehran. The crackdown followed a wave of Iranian strikes on Bahrain after the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran in late February. Iran began striking all of its Gulf neighbours in response, saying it was targeting American interests, including military bases.

Prosecutors said some of the defendants photographed vital and strategic sites in Bahrain on behalf of the IRGC. Others were accused of facilitating the transfer of funds from Iran to Bahrain, including through cryptocurrency transactions, to finance the operations. Authorities also alleged that individuals inside the country were recruited to support some of the plans.

Bahrain began arresting individuals allegedly linked to Iran in March, shortly after the conflict began.

Earlier this month, authorities detained a further 41 people.

Less than two weeks later, more than 60 people were stripped of their citizenship for allegedly supporting Iranian attacks on Bahrain and “colluding with foreign entities”.

The London-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy described the move as “dangerous” and said it constituted a clear violation of international law.

Other Gulf states have also arrested individuals accused of cooperating with Iran. Last month, the United Arab Emirates said it had dismantled a group allegedly planning to carry out what officials described as “terrorist acts”.

Bahrain is home to a large Shia population. Many of its members have long accused the authorities of political and economic marginalisation. The government denies discriminating against Shia citizens, accusing Iran of fuelling unrest in the country.

Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman has invoked ancient Persia’s victory in the face of a failed invasion by the Roman Empire. The post suggests the US has been forced to make concessions in a deal to end its war on Iran on Tehran’s terms.

Clashes have broken out between protesters and riot police after an antigovernment rally in the Serbian capital, Belgrade.

Large crowds of demonstrators poured into central Belgrade on Saturday, many carrying banners and wearing T-shirts emblazoned with the “Students win” motto of the youth movement that organised the gathering.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has sought to rein in mass demonstrations that have challenged his hardline rule in the Balkan country. The size of Saturday’s turnout suggested that dissent remains strong more than a year after protests first began with demonstrators demanding accountability for a train station tragedy in northern Serbia in November 2024 that killed 16 people.

Anticorruption protests forced then-Prime Minister Milos Vucevic to resign in January 2025 before the authorities moved to clamp down on the movement. Many in Serbia blamed the concrete canopy collapse at the station on alleged corruption-fuelled negligence during renovation work carried out with Chinese companies.

On Saturday, Serbia’s state railway company cancelled all trains to and from Belgrade in what appeared to be an effort to prevent at least some people from travelling to the capital from other parts of the country.

In a video posted on Instagram on Saturday, the president said protesters “have shown their violent nature and that they cannot stand political opponents”. Vucic, who was en route to China for a state visit, added: “The state is functioning and will continue to work in line with the law.”

Students on Saturday demanded early elections and the rule of law, accusing the government of crime and corruption. They said they now plan to challenge Vucic in this year’s elections, which they hope will unseat his right-wing populist government. Vucic said on Thursday that the parliamentary elections could be held between September and November.

Clashes were first reported near a park camp of Vucic loyalists outside the Serbian presidency building. The camp was set up before another large antigovernment rally last March as a human shield against protesters. Folk music blared from a fenced-off area surrounded by rows of riot police in full gear.

The Serbian president has come under international scrutiny for his hardline tactics against demonstrators over the past year, including arbitrary arrests and the use of excessive force. The Council of Europe’s commissioner for human rights, Michael O’Flaherty, criticised Serbia’s government in a report after he visited the country last week and said he “will monitor the situation closely”.

O’Flaherty also cited “reports of police protecting unidentified and often masked attackers of journalists and protesters”. He said the overall human rights situation has deteriorated since his previous visit in April 2025.

Serbia is seeking to join the European Union while cultivating close ties with Russia and China. Democratic backsliding under Vucic could cost the country about 1.5 billion euros ($1.8bn) in EU funding, the bloc’s top enlargement official warned last month.

The crisis caused by the US-Israel war on Iran has affected the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at different levels.

Oman has barely felt any shock as its ports and terminals continue operating as usual. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been able to reroute some oil exports through terminals in Yanbu and Fujairah, respectively, to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, on the other hand, have been practically cut off from the global market and are facing the prospect of economic contraction.

Under these circumstances, the GCC states more than ever need to demonstrate unity and address the crisis through collective action. The issue of solidarity is not about showing benevolence to neighbours. It is about setting up mechanisms now that can diminish the consequences and value of any future threat of closure. It is about the survival of the whole idea of GCC unity and the leverage it has on the global scene.

Collective action, common interest

Even if some sort of agreement is reached between the warring sides today, the GCC will continue to suffer under the shadow of the nearly three-month closure. States face the risk of losing clients due to the risk of not fulfilling their obligations or being perceived as a risky supplier. Only a joint effort can stop a free fall.

So far, self-interested approaches are winning over collective action. For instance, the UAE’s exit from OPEC was largely driven by the perception of the Emirati leadership that the Strait of Hormuz crisis was an opportunity to grab greater oil market share.

If this trend of unilateral crisis response continues, it would have grave economic consequences for the whole GCC and threaten its existence. With no burden-sharing mechanism, Gulf countries would end up competing against each other in a zero-sum game. This would reduce the influence the GCC has as a regional bloc and diminish its ability to sway energy markets.

Up until now, there have been some demonstrations of solidarity in rhetoric. During the GCC consultative meeting in Jeddah on April 28, Gulf leaders attempted to show unity and discuss possible ways out of the crisis. The meeting led to discussions about what the GCC states could do in practical terms, yet there are still no signs that these discussions have moved beyond the expert level.

Nevertheless, there are practical steps the GCC can take now that could help address the present crisis and ensure stability in the face of future risks. One of them could be the introduction of swap arrangements.

Swap as an instrument of solidarity

There are three relevant swap mechanisms that the GCC could consider: physical, contractual and quality swap deals. Physical and contractual swap deals allow one party to deliver an equivalent commodity to fulfil a contract on behalf of another.

A quality swap, on the other hand, exchanges one grade or product for another to align the feedstock needs of refineries or optimise transport costs.

Thus, instead of Kuwaiti, Qatari or Bahraini cargo physically passing through the Strait of Hormuz, a buyer can receive an acceptable substitute at Yanbu, Fujairah, Duqm, Ras Markaz, Sohar, Qalhat, Singapore, India, Korea, Japan or Europe, while the parties involved settle the accounts through future delivery, cash compensation, product exchange, or a retained-volume fee.

The swap does not require the trapped commodity to move immediately. It requires a transparent title, valuation and reconciliation, so that a substitute commodity can be delivered to the end user.

The strongest swap deals, therefore, resemble clearing systems. They are most reliable when they are established before the crisis, but they can also be assembled during a crisis if the parties already have pre-existing experience of trading, a trusted customer base or alternative physical infrastructure to be utilised.

In fact, the swap deals are not something completely unfamiliar to the GCC member states. In 2013, when Egypt failed to fulfil its contractual gas obligations, Qatar agreed to export its own liquefied natural gas (LNG) directly to the customers that Egypt otherwise could not serve while it channelled its gas for domestic needs.

In 2021, the UAE’s Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) won a tender to swap 84,000 tonnes of Iraqi fuel oil for 30,000 tonnes of Grade B fuel oil and 33,000 tonnes of gas oil to supply to Lebanon. In 2024, the state-owned Oman LNG conducted about two swap tenders per month, with Atlantic cargoes originating from the United States delivered to Spain, while the company delivered its LNG to clients in Asia.

All of these examples show that Gulf countries and their national energy companies have the required expertise to carry out intra-GCC swaps.

The most practical way to implement such deals now would be to establish an energy swap facility through a coordinated clearing mechanism among national oil companies, major regional refiners, selected traders, insurers, banks and key Asian and European buyers.

Its function would be to match blocked obligations with delivery alternatives and to reconcile the value later.

Insurance for the future

The implementation of any swap arrangement would require substantive effort to operationalise, not to mention a high level of political will, trust and mutual determination. Moreover, at present, there are physical limitations before any arrangement, as the GCC infrastructure does not have the capacity to reroute export volumes that pass through the Strait of Hormuz completely.

In the immediate term, swap arrangements imply that one group of countries – Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE – would sacrifice a bit of income and market share to the advantage of the others, namely Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, by allocating part of their current export, storage or transport capacities. But in the longer term, all would benefit.

The critical call is on Saudi Arabia, which has the largest options to bypass Hormuz and provide the largest pool of deliverable crude. Its command of customer credibility, global familiarity with Saudi oil grades, Red Sea export infrastructure and Aramco’s trading capacity make it the main pillar of any future swap system.

Complementing its role as market regulator within OPEC/OPEC+ with the leadership within the GCC, Riyadh can help stabilise the market by covering priority cargoes for strategic buyers.

The UAE can also play a major role by utilising its export capacity through Fujairah, and so can Oman, which has crude storage capacity at Ras Markaz, refining capacity at Duqm, LNG experience and ports that can receive and dispatch cargoes without having to cross the Strait of Hormuz.

If such swap deals are implemented, they can strengthen the GCC unity and help the members avoid internal economic rivalry in the future. More importantly, they can encourage the launch of a larger regional infrastructure drive that would lessen dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and diminish its value as a geopolitical tool to be used against the Gulf.

If there are a well-functioning swap mechanism and infrastructure in place that can be used whenever a threat of closure is made, then clients would feel more confident in continuing their relationships with all Gulf suppliers. In the longer term, this could serve as the GCC’s insurance against any new turbulence in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is in the early stages of the search for a replacement for the C-146 Wolfhound cargo plane. The C-146s are unassuming twin-engine turboprop aircraft with civilian-style paint schemes that provide important logistical, medical evacuation, and other support, particularly to far-flung U.S. special operations forces. However, they are also based on a long-out-of-production design that was never in widespread use anywhere, and that makes them increasingly difficult and costly to sustain.

Col. Justin Bronder, head of SOCOM’s Program Executive Office for Fixed Wing (PEO-FW), spoke to TWZ and other outlets about the C-146 replacement plans at a roundtable on the sidelines of the annual SOF Week conference yesterday. The Wolfhounds are part of what SOCOM refers to as its Non-Standard Aviation (NSAv) fleets.

There are some 20 Wolfhounds in service today, which are operated by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The C-146, which AFSOC began flying in the early 2010s, is a militarized version of the Dornier Do-328, something we will come back to later on. The Air Force also has another Do-328, nicknamed Cougar, that has been used to conduct research and development and test and evaluation activities in support of SOCOM.

“So we have had a highly successful Non-Standard Aviation program, again that really developed under the crucible of where those operations that the Command [SOCOM] was in many parts leading in the really peak days in the War on Terror,” Col. Bronder explained. “So those aircraft, again, battle-proven C-146 Wolfhound aircraft, [were] set up at various TSOCs [theater special operations commands], providing the direct support.”

However, “those aircraft were fairly constricted by their short range, [and] by being a unique aircraft. There wasn’t a large global backbone to sustain them,” he continued. “So it was a successful model, but maybe not a very cost-effective one.”

The Air Force’s official C-146 fact sheet says the aircraft can fly up to 1,500 nautical miles while carrying 2,000 pounds of cargo. The Wolfhound does offer the flexibility to operate from shorter runways and semi-prepared airstrips, as well as roads.

“We’re looking for ways to recapitalize that fleet with something that’s more cost-effective, leverages a commercial kind of sustainment enterprise better, and then it again provides maybe a more capable aircraft to cover down on larger areas faster,” Col. Bronder added. “So those are the types of requirement spaces we’re working through as we plan out what the next phase of NSAv looks like.”

The Do-328 was first developed in the 1980s as a commuter airliner. A jet-engined 328JET derivative followed in the 1990s. Both variations only saw relatively limited sales. Just 217 examples were reportedly built, inclusive of both turboprop and jet-powered versions, during the production run in the 1990s. Only a fraction of those aircraft are still flying. Several attempts have been made to revive production of modernized versions of the design, but so far without success. Last year, Deutsche Aircraft unveiled the first prototype of its new D328eco, but, at the time of writing, it has yet to fly.

With the exception of a lone example operated by the Botswana Defence Force, the U.S. Air Force is the only military user of the Do-328. All of the Air Force’s examples were acquired second-hand. The C-146s supplanted an even smaller fleet of Bombardier Q-200s, a version of the De Havilland Canada DHC-8, or Dash 8, which AFSOC had begun flying in the NSAv role in the late 2000s.

Since the early 2010s, the C-146s have been criss-crossing the globe, providing discreet support to U.S. operations forces, sometimes right at the tactical edge. As one known example, Wolfhounds were heavily involved in supporting the opening phase of the French intervention in the northwest African country of Mali in 2013. C-146s continue to be used to move special operations forces and cargo, as well as to help evacuate injured personnel and perform other light utility-type missions worldwide. They have even sometimes been employed as VIP transports in more far-flung locales.

The C-146 fleet has also received various upgrades over the years. This includes unspecified modifications that have enabled the aircraft “to land at more austere, semi-prepared runways,” which “resulted in an approximately ten-fold increase in the number of available runways worldwide,” according to a declassified annual Air Force report published in 2015, which this author previously obtained via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

As Bronder made clear yesterday, SOCOM and AFSOC are still very early in the process of laying out the requirements for a successor to the C-146. Any desire for boosts in range, performance, payload, and other capabilities will need to be balanced against the need for any future NSAv aircraft to be able to operate from the same kinds of remote and austere locations as the Wolfhound does today.

SOCOM is certainly looking to move quickly on securing a replacement for the C-146. It is asking for $55 million to buy the first three of these new NSAv aircraft in its Fiscal Year 2027 budget.

“The current C-146A fleet will be divested of on a schedule that maintains this critical TSOC capability, as transition to the new aircraft occurs,” the budget documents also note.

In the meantime, the Wolfhound fleet will continue providing important, if not often overlooked, support to American special operations forces around the world.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Russia pounded Ukraine’s capital overnight on Saturday with drones and ballistic missiles, including a powerful hypersonic Oreshnik missile, killing at least four people and damaging residential buildings. Footage shows people sheltering underground, while firefighters work above.

The man was rushed to ⁠shore after being bitten on Sunday near ​Kennedy Shoal, but died shortly afterwards.

A man has died after a shark attack off the coast of Queensland in northeast Australia, police say.

The man was rushed to ⁠shore after being bitten on Sunday near Kennedy Shoal, a shallow reef about 45km (28 miles) off the coast, a Queensland Police Service spokesperson said.

The man was met by an ambulance but died shortly afterwards, the spokesperson said without identifying him.

According to local media, beaches in the area have been closed while police assess safety conditions.

The incident is the second fatal shark encounter in Australia in a little more than a week.

On May 16, a 38-year-old man died after being bitten by a shark near Perth off the west coast.

The majority of shark attacks occur along Australia’s east and southeast coasts with an average of about 20 incidents recorded each year, according to the Institute of Health and Welfare.