NEWS

The U.S. Air Force has concluded what it describes as a “critical exercise” with Anduril’s YFQ-44 Fury ‘fighter drone’ prototype, flown out of the base that is the heart of flight testing, the legendary Edwards Air Force Base, California. The drills involved the Air Force’s Experimental Operations Unit and were intended to demonstrate how CCAs can be deployed and sustained in a contested environment. For the exercise, the YFQ-44A flew from Edwards back to Anduril’s Southern California test site.

As well as the Experimental Operations Unit (EOU), which falls under Air Combat Command (ACC), the exercise involved personnel from Air Force Materiel Command’s (AFMC) 412th Test Wing. This wing is headquartered at Edwards Air Force Base, and the squadrons attached to it are responsible for flight testing of virtually all the aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory.

Multiple sorties were flown — we have asked Air Combat Command for more details on exactly how many and their scope. The exercise took place last week, according to Anduril’s vice president of autonomous airpower, Mark Shushnar.

The YFQ-44 is one of two designs now being developed as part of the first phase, or Increment 1, of the Air Force’s CCA program. The other is General Atomics’ YFQ-42A Dark Merlin. We have reached out to Edwards to see whether the YFQ-42 was originally expected to take part in the exercise before its recent takeoff accident.

Imagery published by the Air Force shows a YFQ-44A carrying inert AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) on pylons under the wings, something that we first saw earlier this year, during captive-carry evaluations, as you can read about here. It should be noted that the Fury, at least as it exists now, does not have an internal munitions bay.

The primary function of the exercise was to explore the practicalities of what the Air Force calls the Warfighting Acquisition System. This framework is intended to speed the delivery of CCAs to operational units by enabling operators to get their hands on the drones earlier in the program. In this way, they can refine tactics and procedures before deliveries to the front line.

ACC has stressed in the past how it wants CCAs to operate seamlessly within the existing command structures and legal frameworks that govern all Air Force weapons systems.

“This experimental operations event was executed by EOU members from start to finish. Every sortie generated and flown was done with a warfighter, not an engineer or test pilot, kicking the tires and controlling the prototypes,” explained Lt. Col. Matthew Jensen, EOU commander. “We are learning by doing, at a speed and risk tolerance accepted by the USAF’s most senior leaders, to ensure CCA is ready to operate and win in the most demanding combat environments.”

Above all, the sorties stressed operational and logistical procedures for using CCAs in a contested environment. The issue of logistics is a critical one, including how CCAs will get to the area of operations and how they will be maintained in the field.

According to Shushnar, Anduril’s Menace-T command, control, communications, and compute (C4) solution was used as the main ground element for YFQ-44A flight operations during the exercise. “EOU operators used Menace-T’s ruggedized laptop to upload mission plans, initiate autonomous taxi and takeoff, task the aircraft while in flight, and manage post-flight data ingestion and checks,” he explained. “That enabled the EOU to conduct operations out of a simulated forward operating base, successfully launching, recovering, and turning YFQ-44A without the infrastructure of a large, established base.”

This is entirely in line with the Air Force’s drive toward short-notice and otherwise irregular deployments, often to remote, austere, or otherwise non-traditional locales. Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is the term the service currently uses to describe a set of concepts for distributed and disaggregated operations.

While the warfighters of the EOU were at Edwards to carry out the practical aspects of CCA employment, exploring tactics, techniques, and procedures, the 412th Test Wing, meanwhile, was on hand to gather data from the test events.

“By uniting the distinct test authorities of AFMC and the operational authorities of ACC, officials were able to fast-track the event, enabling groundbreaking, hands-on experimentation by operators at a uniquely early stage of development,” the Air Force explained in a media release.

“The collaboration we saw in this exercise is the cornerstone of our acquisition transformation. By embedding the operators from the EOU with our acquisition professionals, we create a tight feedback loop that lets us trade operational risk with acquisition risk in real-time,” said Col. Timothy Helfrich, portfolio acquisition executive for fighters and advanced aircraft. “This isn’t just a test; it’s a demonstration of how we are adopting a more agile process. An 85 percent solution in the hands of a warfighter today is infinitely better than a 100 percent solution that never arrives.”

The CCA program is viewed as a pathfinder for the Warfighting Acquisition System, and success with this could lead to the same approach being employed to get other systems into operational service much more quickly than in the past.

The Air Force has not yet determined whether it will procure one or both Increment 1 CCA designs at scale. Whichever option it selects is expected to become its first operational “fighter drones,” built to carry live munitions into combat alongside crewed aircraft.

CCAs will also extend the sensor coverage of the crewed fighters they accompany. More broadly, the Air Force views them as a way to add vital combat mass and unlock new tactical options, particularly in high-end conflicts against adversaries like China. Back in late 2024, Brig. Gen. Douglas “Beaker” Wickert, commander of the 412th Test Wing, told TWZ that, “[the-then Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall] “has been very clear that we are out of time, that our Air Force has never been older or smaller than it is right now, and that the People’s Liberation Army has been specifically designed to defeat us.”

“The investments we’re making right now in modernization and testing for the USAF are designed for success and aimed at changing Chairman Xi’s calculus about pushing back aggressively against the international rules-based order. What we are doing here and across USAF flight-testing is extremely consequential.”

Since then, Wickert has moved on to become Director of Air, Space and Cyberspace Operations at AFMC, but the test wing’s remit remains the same. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force has doubled down on its rapid expansion, including many of its own CCA programs.

If all goes to plan, the completion of this recent exercise at Edwards could well be a key milestone in fielding a combat-ready force of CCAs and go some way toward realizing the Air Force’s ambition for a new capability that should extend the reach and the survivability of its crewed aircraft.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

U.S. Army officials say the modular design of the service’s new MV-75A Cheyenne II tiltrotor will make it easier to reconfigure baseline versions for the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) mission. This also means that the aircraft can be readily restored to a configuration optimized for the air assaults. The Army currently operates HH-60 Black Hawk MEDEVAC helicopters purpose-built for this role. The service says the Cheyenne II will give commanders in the field important new flexibility, as well as help streamline the acquisition and fielding of the tiltrotors.

Army officials have touted the MV-75’s modularity in the context of the MEDEVAC role, also commonly referred to as the “dustoff” mission, on several occasions this week at the Army Aviation Association of America’s (AAAA) 2026 Warfighting Summit. TWZ has been in attendance at the conference, which wraps up today.

The Army plans to supplant a significant portion of its existing H-60 Black Hawk helicopters with MV-75s in the coming years. A subset of the service’s current Black Hawk fleet consists of the aforementioned HH-60 variants outfitted for the MEDEVAC role. Standard UH-60 transports can also be used to retrieve casualties, but are not equipped with the same array of specialized features found on the “dustoff” variants, which you can read more about here.

There are also plans for a special operations-specific configuration of the Cheyenne II, which TWZ has already explored separately.

The “MV-75, as I mentioned, that’s our signature system. Unmatched range. Unmatched speed. Unmatched mission flexibility,” Army Maj. Gen. Clair Gill, the Program Acquisition Executive for Maneuver Air, told attendees at AAAA on Wednesday. “We’re going to build a modular aircraft that we can use for multiple purposes. So it’s going to have a capability that we can put a MEDEVAC ‘plug’ into it, and generate medical capability for the warfighter.”

With MV-75, “we’re no longer going to have a purpose-built [MEDEVAC] variant. It’s going to be what we like to call a configuration. No longer is ‘tail number 25’ coming off the product line going to be the special operations variant, or the medical evacuation variant,” Army Maj. Thomas Barth further explained during a panel discussion at AAAA yesterday. “You can input what that is via the A kit, and then a B kit – for MEDEVAC, that being the patient handling system, the sensor, and the hoist.”

Barth is leading the integration of MEDEVAC capabilities onto the Cheyenne II and has personal experience as a “dustoff” helicopter pilot.

It should be noted that Army officials separately said at AAAA this week that they expect all MV-75s to be equipped with a hoist.

At the panel discussion, Barth did not elaborate on the “sensor” that will be included in the MEDEVAC configuration. However, existing Army HH-60s do have a sensor turret under their noses that contains electro-optical and infrared video cameras. This is something not found on the service’s standard UH-60s. Bell, the MV-75’s prime contractor, also released a computer-generated video this week, seen below, which depicts a MEDEVAC version of the Cheyenne II with a sensor turret under the nose. Depictions, at least so far, of the baseline MV-75 configuration do not include this sensor turret.

Meet the Cheyenne II

“Being able to have that capability from the beginning of the platform is going to be great. And I really look at modularity from a tactical perspective for MEDEVAC,” Barth added. “Let’s say I have to provide MEDEVAC, and I have an aircraft or a patient handling system that goes down, but I have an aircraft that has a perfectly good patient handling system in it, but that aircraft’s in maintenance. I can now modularly reconfigure my fleet internally to be able to meet the needs of the commander.”

The MV-75 will also offer a massive leap in capability over existing HH-60s, just on account of its increased speed and range. Those attributes have always been among the most attractive elements of the aircraft, and especially so for the MEDEVAC mission. The time it takes to get casualties, especially ones with very serious injuries, to higher levels of care can easily mean the difference between life and death. Medical professionals regularly use the term “golden hour,” which refers to the first 60 minutes after a serious injury occurs, where the chances of saving that person’s life or otherwise preventing serious permanent damage are highest.

Army officials see the added operational flexibility that the Cheyenne II offers going beyond just the MEDEVAC mission.

“Providing flexibility for the warfighter, and really for the commander, is the most important to us. So the aircraft is modular from birth,” Army Col. Jeffrey Poquette, who is managing the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) program under which the MV-75 is being developed, also said, while speaking alongside Barth at AAAA. “The commander can maybe take a day to say we need more MEDEVAC aircraft, or we need more assault aircraft.”

“We’re going to let our land component commanders tell us how much of that [MEDEVAC capacity] they need so they’ve got options,” Maj. Gen. Gill had also said on Wednesday. “Maybe in a defense [sic], they want to maximize MEDEVAC capability, put all the plugs in, go heavy MEDEVAC. If not, if they can strip that out, [and] we’ve got more assault capability. So we’re pretty excited about that.”

All of this does raise personnel, training, and force structure questions, especially when it comes to the MEDEVAC role. The Army currently assigns HH-60s to dedicated air ambulance units. “Dustoff” crews specifically train for this mission set and have developed a relevant institutional knowledge base in the process. The Army has already been exploring how MEDEVAC tactics, techniques, and procedures will adapt to its new tiltrotors using surrogate test articles on the ground.

With the MV-75, “we’re delivering a platform that – it’s an a la carte menu of sorts, and there’s certainly some limitations there,” Army Col. Jacob Whiteside, who was also on the panel alongside Poquette and Barth, said yesterday. “That’s the conversation that we use freely and regularly to make sure that we deliver this flexibility to the warfighter, and that’s our job is to consistently advocate for that.”

Whiteside is currently the Director for Transformation and the Lessons Learned Manager at the Transformation and Integration Directorate within the Army’s Aviation Center of Excellence.

As Maj. Barth noted when talking about the A and B kits for the MV-75, the Army also sees the focus on modularity as offering advantages just for acquiring the aircraft in the first place by helping streamline the production line.

“Frankly, this is going to be a very expensive airplane that we’re going to buy, so we can’t have single-purpose aircraft,” Maj. Gen Gill had also said during his talk at AAAA. “So we’re thinking about how we incorporate modularity.”

Gill pointed out at that time that those discussions around modularity are already extending to other capabilities for the MV-75, including aerial refueling. That, in turn, might lead the service to acquire its own fleet of uncrewed tankers, as TWZ has previously reported.

The current estimated unit cost of the MV-75A in any configuration is unclear. We do know that Bell’s winning bid in the FLRAA competition was priced out at just over $8 billion, in total. This was roughly twice the price point for the competing bid from a team made up of Sikorsky and Boeing, which had submitted an advanced compound helicopter design, as you can read more about here.

There are questions now about the Army’s planned schedule for fielding the MV-75, as well as when the first flight of the aircraft will occur. The service has walked back from pronouncements made as recently as January that it would start delivering Cheyenne IIs to operational units next year. Those statements had reflected a larger effort to accelerate the program dramatically.

“It’s going to happen when it’s going to happen. So we are moving as fast as we can,” Army Maj. Gen. Clair Gill, the Program Acquisition Executive for Maneuver Air, had said. “If I was king, and I had all the money in the world and all the engineers, and there were no limits, we probably would be able to do it in a matter of months.”

Regardless of when the first operational aircraft arrive, the Army’s clear goal is to leverage the aircraft’s modular design to begin integrating the MEDEVAC capability into the fleet in short order thereafter.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The smartest thing Trump can do for the United States is to adopt a “cake-sharing” strategy to cope with the arrival of a multipolar era. He wants to ensure that America still gets the largest slice of the cake, with its power base rooted in traditional energy—oil and natural gas.

This aligns well with “Cold War thinking.” From the perspective of oil reserves, the United States plus its friendly Gulf states accounts for about 55%–60% of the global total. If Venezuela—now under U.S. control—is added, the share rises to 72%–77%.

Spreading out the energy map, according to estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Greenland holds approximately 39 billion barrels of oil equivalent (combining East and West Greenland). Cuba has 4–5 billion barrels.

Nigeria, a major oil-producing country in Africa, has 37 billion barrels of oil reserves. The Trump administration has threatened military action against it under the pretext of “persecuting Christians.”

Iran’s oil reserves stand at 2,086 billion barrels, accounting for 13.3% of the global total.

The regions Trump has singled out—Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Nigeria—clearly show that he is deciding how to “share the cake” with China and Russia based on the traditional energy map.

Although reserves and actual output are two different things, for Trump this is irrelevant. What he puts on the negotiating table is merely a piece of paper for “bidding”—he doesn’t need to worry about minor details.

On the other side of the negotiating table, China’s chips are new energy and critical minerals. In the area of critical minerals, Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Nigeria all possess rich potential, and all have varying degrees of investment and cooperation ties with China.

One reason Trump scorns “new energy” may be that, within his limited term, competing with China in the new energy field is simply impossible. In the traditional energy domain, however, the United States holds a significant advantage.

Successfully pocketing Venezuela has encouraged Trump to take risks in Iran. Originally, Trump wanted to approach Beijing for a major deal from the position of a traditional energy hegemon, but Iran’s fierce resistance has dampened his ambitions. The United States has been outmaneuvered by Iran, and Trump has postponed his visit to China.

Iranian President Pezeshkian publicly stated: “China is now also seen by the United States as its main enemy; we are just next in line. They want to take us down first, then deal with China.” Behind this statement lies the landscape of U.S.-China competition over energy and critical minerals.

It cannot be said that Trump is unrealistic—this “cake-sharing” strategy has its own rationality. Nor can it be said that Trump has overestimated America’s military strength, because he knows very well that the United States cannot even handle the Houthis, let alone Iran. One can only say that the success of the “decapitation operation” in Venezuela has inflated his sense of luck, and Israel has exploited this psychology to successfully lure Trump into risking involvement in Iran.

The United States and Israel jointly eliminated the appeasement faction in Tehran and greatly underestimated Iran’s counterattack capability. They wanted to control oil but ended up being controlled by Iran on oil export routes. This is a complete strategic failure, and its medium- to long-term damage to the United States far exceeds the energy sector.

We don’t even need to discuss the rise and fall of petrodollars versus petroyuan—just look at the new energy sector. This round of energy crisis has greatly heightened the global urgency for new energy development, and the countries and regions most urgently in need are precisely America’s allies worldwide, including the Gulf states.

America’s allies are mostly developed countries. They have long recognized that China is a superpower in new energy. Before the Iran war, the broader Western camp was developing new energy while trying to reduce dependence on Iran. Now, however, the sense of urgency has pushed these countries to rely even more deeply on China.

These countries and regions include France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, as well as India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. They are either industrially advanced or rapidly industrializing countries that heavily depend on stable energy supplies.

In the core area of the Iran war—the Gulf states—are also actively accelerating the development of new energy industries, with the solar industry as the key focus. China is the only source capable of providing cheap, high-quality equipment and products. After the war ends, Iran may also exchange oil for the components needed for new energy development with China, achieving economic diversification like the Gulf states and reducing reliance on oil exports.

China’s solar equipment originally suffered from overcapacity; now it stands to gain relief.

What revolves around the core issues of new energy is nothing more than industrial supply chains and critical minerals. In this regard, mainland China’s industrial strength needs no emphasis. In critical minerals, the Democratic Republic of the Congo—China’s deep cooperation partner—will see half of its cobalt mines belong to Chinese enterprises. Given that Congo holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, China will possess an indisputable “cobalt dominance.” Cobalt is a key mineral for lithium-ion batteries.

In addition, graphite and tantalum are also dominated by China. Tantalum is a critical metal for capacitors, which are essential for stabilizing wind and solar power generation. Graphite is the anode material for lithium-ion batteries and an indispensable mineral for renewable energy storage systems and solar panel production.

Currently, renewable energy plus nuclear power accounts for 40% of global electricity generation, while fossil fuels still account for 60%. However, when looking at the global share of “capacity” (installed capacity) for renewable energy plus nuclear, it has already reached about 55%. Among this, renewable energy accounts for 49.4% and nuclear for about 5%.

“Capacity” refers to installed capacity—in plain terms, the theoretical maximum power generation. The actual global generation share of renewable energy is about 32%. The gap between theoretical and actual values exists because renewable energy generation is less stable than fossil fuels. Adding nuclear’s actual generation share (about 8%), the actual generation share of so-called low-carbon energy reaches 40% globally.

There is no doubt that the oil crisis will inevitably trigger a “green energy surge.” Looking ahead five years, the actual generation share of green energy will exceed 50%. Assuming nuclear can grow to 10% of actual generation and renewables grow by 8%, China’s additional revenue from the global renewable energy business in the next five years could reach the level of hundreds of billions of dollars.

From this perspective, China—which strongly supported green energy development from the very beginning of the climate agenda—did so not so much for carbon reduction as for industrial preparation in the name of energy security. Expanding the global new energy business is merely an added value.

Of course, the key technologies for manufacturing new energy equipment may be even more important than critical minerals. Last November, China imposed export controls on certain lithium batteries, key cathode and anode materials, and their manufacturing equipment and technologies. Given that China controls about 96% of global anode material production capacity and 85% of cathode material capacity, the impact of these export controls is enormous.

On April 15, according to Reuters, China has held preliminary consultations with solar panel production equipment suppliers and is considering restricting exports of the most advanced technologies and equipment to the United States. If true, Beijing is raising the stakes in new energy, waiting for Trump to come to the negotiating table in May.

Admittedly, Trump has no intention of developing new energy. However, considering that the Democrats may return to the White House in three years, Beijing is now blocking America’s path to new energy development, essentially laying the groundwork for U.S.-China competition three years from now.

If Trump’s energy strategy map on the table also included a new energy layer, he should realize that the setback in the Iran war has allowed the new energy domain to encroach upon the traditional energy domain, enabling China to expand its energy power without firing a single shot. As for critical minerals, the United States has made no outstanding progress—at least nothing sufficient for Trump to boast about.

Now, the “cake” being pushed in front of Xi Jinping is getting bigger and bigger. On the surface, Beijing has gained it effortlessly, but today’s harvest is mainly due to strategic 布局 made one step ahead. These layouts are often “low-profit” but highly effective investments, and new energy is merely one of them.

In an uncertain world, those who provide “certainty” win. Therefore, the winner of the Iran war is China—even if Beijing is extremely reluctant to admit it.

Army officials have shared new details about plans to launch extremely long-range drones from the service’s forthcoming ME-11B High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES) surveillance and reconnaissance planes. With ranges of around 620 miles (1,000 kilometers) or more, the uncrewed aerial systems will help keep the Bombardier Global 6500 bizjet-based ME-11Bs as far away from enemy air defenses as possible. In this way, the Army expects to gain a penetrating aerial intelligence-gathering capability without the need for a very stealthy or otherwise highly exquisite and costly aircraft.

“There will be nothing in the world that we can’t touch with a combined range of HADES and what we can launch off of this thing,” Andrew Evans, Director of Strategy and Transformation with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, or G-2, told TWZ and other outlets today. “I don’t think anybody’s safe in the future from a sensing perspective.”

Evans comments came at a roundtable with several Army officials about HADES on the sidelines of the Army Aviation Association of America’s (AAAA) 2026 Warfighting Summit.

To take a step back quickly, the Army selected the Bombardier Global 6500-based bid from the Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) as the winner of the HADES competition in 2024. Flight testing of the first ME-11B prototype is now slated to kick off this summer. The service is expecting to take formal delivery of that aircraft from SNC before the end of the year. Two other prototypes are currently in various stages of conversion.

Each HADES aircraft will have a built-in suite of sensors, as well as a robust array of communications systems to pass the data it collects along to other nodes in near-real-time. The Army says it is following an incremental approach to integrating systems with the initial trio of prototypes. The service is also using a modular open-systems approach to make it easier to add new and improved capabilities down the line.

Details about what sensors the baseline HADES configuration will have are limited, but we do know it will include a version of the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System-2B (ASARS-2B), something TWZ was first to report back in 2024. ASARS-2B was originally developed for the U.S. Air Force’s U-2 Dragon Lady spy planes, and it features synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging and ground moving target indicator (GMTI) modes, as you can read more about here.

For more than a year now, the Army has also been talking about launching very long-range so-called “launched effects” from the HADES aircraft. This term is a catch-all used to describe drones configured designed to perform a wide variety of missions that can be deployed from aircraft (fixed wing and rotary; crewed and uncrewed) in flight, as well as platforms on the ground or at sea. The process of converting Global 6500s into ME-11Bs includes integrating four underwing pylons, which the aircraft will be able to use to launch drones and carry podded sensor systems.

At the roundtable today, Evans, the Director of Strategy and Transformation, offered a detailed explanation of how the Army arrived at this plan and what it expects to gain from the blend of capabilities in response to a question from our Jamie Hunter.

“So, someone’s going to eventually ask about survivability. It’s going to tie it all together in here,” Evan said. “We did the research. I’ll save you time on doing the research.”

“In 70 or 80 years, there would be 0.1% of the time when you wouldn’t be able to fly ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions] because you would be afraid of the threat, potentially, or the threat would be too high to fly,” he added. “That means that 99.9% of the time of a life of the system, it is a useful system for deterrence, for building pattern of life, target development, and so on and so forth. So we’re building a system that can be used for 99.9% of the useful life of the system.”

“So we’re, I think, wise in the approach, saying, all right, if there’s still that 0.1% of the time where you need to be resilient enough to survive in a situation, how do you do that? Well, how do you combine the best of both? Because there’s no one perfect solution, right?” he continued. “What’s really, really good for conflict is not very good for the 99% of the time you need it for campaigning [routine operations], and vice versa. So what we’ve determined strategically is that there’s a way to combine both of these things.”

This is where Evans says the air-launched drone capability comes in.

“We can have a useful asset for campaigning 99.9% of the time, but we can pair with it launch effects [for] when we aren’t going to put that capital system in harm’s way,” he said. “We’ve already engineered hard points into HADES to be able to receive these launch effects in the future. So once we mature the capabilities and determine which way forward we want – what type of launch effects, what type of performance we need out of these things – and we marry those two things up, now we have the best of both. We have something that’s supremely capable in campaigning and probably the best joint asset in the world at being able to do penetrative launch effects. And now you have a bit of a utopia.”

Furthermore, “we believe that in the role of HADES, there’s also an opportunity to be a bit of a quarterback of an ecosystem of sorts. So you can imagine how that might look,” Evans also noted. “That isn’t going to quarterback everybody’s assets, but the ones that have the most strategic importance and match that type of mission profile. There’s certainly a space for it to do that.”

In terms of the range of drones launched from HADES, the Army has put forward the 620-mile (1,000-kilometer) figure in the past. Speaking today, Evans alluded to even greater potential reach.

There are questions about the scale and scope of coverage that a single ME-11B will be able to achieve using “launched effects” type drones designed to be lower cost, and that will likely have a limited sensor payload. The concepts of operations the Army is putting forward for HADES point to a need for expendable designs, as well. These are drones that, in turn, are most effective when employed in large networked swarms to cover broad areas cooperatively. The ME-11B, at least as it is being presented now with its four underwing pylons, does not seem set to carry very large numbers of uncrewed aerial systems.

“This is important breakthrough technology. so I’m not going to reveal too much about what we’re discovering in this space,” Evans said. “But know that it’s going to change the game. It takes us from a sensing platform to a sensing and platform, and the ‘and,’ I’ll just let you use your imagination.”

Evans’ deliberately vague comments here might point to a broader airborne drone controller role in HADES future. ME-11B crews could potentially oversee larger and more capable drones, including Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) types now in development. CCAs or other heavier types would be able to carry bigger sensor suites and otherwise bring additional capabilities to the table, including the ability to provide close-in defense for HADES itself during missions.

Survivability has certainly been a hot topic of discussion around HADES since the Army first announced its intention to acquire a new fleet of business jet-based ISR aircraft. The service had highlighted growing concerns about the vulnerability of its now-retired fleets of turboprop ISR planes, which had provided key intelligence-gathering capacity globally for decades, tracing back to the Cold War. TWZ and others have repeatedly noted that these concerns are very real, especially in the context of a future high-end fight in the Pacific against China, but also apply to non-stealthy jets like the Global 6500.

For routine operations, the ME-11B does a major leap in capability over the turboprop ISR aircraft the Army previously operated, both in terms of its mission systems and its general performance. HADES can fly higher, faster, and farther, and do so while carrying a bigger sensor payload. Higher altitudes also offer greater fields of view for the aircraft’s sensors. The improved performance also translates to being able to get to and from operating areas more rapidly and the ability to remain on station longer. The underwing pylons will offer additional flexibility beyond the drone launch capability.

“The deployability of this platform, being able to fly 6,000 miles at 0.87 Mach, and go globally without the world will require the ability to rapidly change sensors,” Army Col. Joe Minor, the Capability Program Executive for Aviation within the office of the Program Acquisition Executive for Maneuver Air, also said at today’s roundtable at the AAAA conference. “With those hard points and cleared envelopes for pods, it gives us that ability to rapidly configure and update even more quickly than we could internally or within the canoe [fairing under the fuselage]. So those hard points being built in from the beginning is part of that [sic] building the right platform and air vehicle from the start, with the ability to integrate and evolve very quickly as you move forward.”

Using the Global 6500 as the underlying aircraft offers maintenance and other logistical benefits. This is an in-production aircraft with a significant global user base. This includes the U.S. Air Force, which operates a fleet of E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) aircraft based on this platform.

The Army says it has already been seeing an important boost in ISR capability with contractor-owned and operated ISR-configured business jets, including Global 6500-based types. The service has been utilizing those aircraft for eight years now as a transitional ‘bridge’ force to lead into the fielding of HADES.

Many of “our previous platforms were centered around the COIN [counterinsurgency] fight,” Army Col. Matt McGraw, head of the 116th Military Intelligence Brigade, the Army’s main aerial ISR unit, who was also at the roundtable today, said. “If you’re flying a platform operating full motion video [cameras], you’re tracking maybe one or two targets at most. A platform today, on these bridge aircraft with MTI and SAR, you’re tracking a couple 100 targets at the same time.”

There do continue to be significant questions about the true extent of what the Army’s ME-11Bs will be able to offer, in any context, given the expected size of the fleet. The Army currently plans to buy just six production HADES jets on top of the three prototypes. The service previously operated dozens of turboprop ISR aircraft.

“We work for the United States Army, on behalf of the United States Army. And so if the Army’s given direction to cap a fleet size based on budget pressure, and of the other things that we have to balance as an army – like, if the Army only built ISR [aircraft], we build 1,000 of these things,” Evans said at the roundtable today. “But we don’t. We build a lot of things. And ISR is an enabler to [the] ground lethality that we deliver.”

“The Army’s got a tremendous amount of budget pressure. The Army has a top line that’s not keeping pace with inflation,” he added. “And so until our top line increases to support the world’s premier land force, then we’re going to be capped inside programs like HADES.”

As it stands now, the Army certainly looks to be hoping that even the small fleet of HADES will be able to punch well above its weight, thanks in no small part to the ability to launch very long-range drones from relative safety deep in hostile territory.

Jamie Hunter contributed to this story.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Top negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf says US naval blockade of Iran’s ports is ‘a clumsy and ignorant decision’.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC) says the Strait of Hormuz is closed and that any ship that attempts to pass through the waterway will be targeted, a dramatic reversal less than 24 hours after the critical shipping lane was reopened.

In a statement carried by Iran’s Student News Agency, the IRGC navy said on Saturday the strait will be closed until the United States lifts its naval blockade on Iranian vessels and ports. It said the blockade was a violation of the ongoing ceasefire agreement in the US-Israel war on Iran.

“We warn that no vessel of any kind should move from its anchorage in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, and approaching the Strait of Hormuz will be considered cooperation with the enemy, and the offending vessel will be targeted,” it said.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s parliament speaker and a senior negotiator in talks between Washington and Tehran on ending the war, said in a television interview that “the Strait of Hormuz is under the control of the Islamic Republic”.

“The Americans have been declaring a blockade for several days now. This is a clumsy and ignorant decision,” he added.

The reassertion of control came just hours after Iran had briefly reopened the strait, in line with a 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. Oil prices dropped on global markets after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that the waterway was “completely open for all commercial vessels.”

More than a dozen commercial ships passed through the waterway before the IRGC reversed course.

Iranian gunboats reportedly fired on two commercial ships on Saturday, according to United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO). India’s Ministry of External Affairs also said that two Indian-flagged ships were involved in a “shooting incident” in the strait.

Some merchant vessels in the region received radio messages from the IRGC Navy, warning that no ships were being allowed through the strait.

US President Donald Trump said Tehran could not blackmail Washington by closing the waterway and warned that he would put an end to the ceasefire if a deal before its expiry on Wednesday is not reached. Trump added that the naval blockade would “remain in full force”.

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, meanwhile, said the navy was ready to inflict “new bitter defeats” on its enemies.

‘Two competing blockades’

Al Jazeera correspondent Zein Basravi said that Iran and the US are back where they were the previous day.

“Less than 24 hours ago, world leaders were praising what they thought was a breakthrough in this conflict, hoping Iran was signalling a confidence-building measure by opening the Strait of Hormuz, potentially leading to a ceasefire deal and a permanent end to the war,” he said.

“As disappointed as people may be, this isn’t entirely surprising. What we’re seeing now is a return to square one,” he added, saying there are now “two competing blockades in place”.

Al Jazeera’s Ali Hashem, reporting from Tehran, said Iran was using the strait to send a message.

“It’s clear that Iran is dealing with a situation in which they are not sure what’s on the table. So the Strait of Hormuz is once again the only space for engagement, even if it’s a negative engagement. And it’s the space where they are sending and conveying messages to the Americans, showing their leverage,” he said.

Caracas has two avenues known as “Cotas”: Cota Mil, also known as Boyacá Avenue, which borders the Waraira Repano national park from East to West on the North edge of the capital. And Cota 905, or Guzmán Blanco Avenue, which heads south. In both cases, the name refers to their altitude above sea level.

Cota 905 was inaugurated by Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1953. Years later, Venezuelan families began building informal settlements around it. By the late 1970s, it had become a complex area, with difficult access that to some extent isolated it from the rest of the city. 

Between 2014 and 2021, armed gangs took control of the area, turning it into the city’s most dangerous barrio, terrorizing 300,000 residents and ensuring that not even the garbage collection service dared to enter. Every day we heard news of clashes with police forces or even of the “occupied territory” expanding into nearby areas.

Over these years, the government alternated between attempts to negotiate with the gangs –in an effort to turn the neighborhood into a “peace zone” –and a “heavy-handed” crackdown on crime. There were police operations as part of the so-called “Operation Liberation of the People” (OLP), followed by raids by the elite FAES unit. Finally, the massive “Operation Gran Cacique Indio Guaicaipuro” was launched in 2021, with the establishment of 34 checkpoints in what appeared to be an invasion of enemy territory by security forces.

Although no one questioned the need for the government to regain control of Cota 905, Operation Cacique Guaicaipuro sparked strong criticism of police actions, including the arrest of dozens of young people who were later proven to have no connection to criminal gangs. The barrio’s kingpin, Carlos Luis Revete, alias “El Koki,” escaped the operation but was killed months later in a shootout near Caracas. 

Since then, residents of the area have noted a decline in crime and drug trafficking. However, they complain that the government should follow up its intervention by addressing other basic needs: street cleaning, improving services, replacing damaged roofs, creating decent spaces for education, culture, sports, and recreation, generating local employment. Above all, there was also the issue of lifting the stigma after all those years. Making people understand that Cota 905 produces more than just criminals.

Still, in Venezuela, whenever the state takes a step back, organized communities step forward. One initiative I had the chance to get to know was “The Cota 905 Tour: A Thousand Stories, Over a Hundred Murals, One Route,” a community-led cultural tour that transforms the neighborhood into an open-air art gallery.

This project was conceived by Jefferson Cárdenas, a young man known as “Gorra,” who spent a couple of years in prison for theft and weapons possession until another group came to his rescue: Free Convict, a Venezuelan hip-hop group made up of former inmates and prisoners who use music as a tool for social reintegration and personal transformation. In fact, many of these rappers have joined him in this new social initiative. 

Jefferson recruited a couple of neighbors and began taking out trash, clearing brush, sweeping, and installing light bulbs. Little by little, other neighbors started donating small amounts of cement or paint they had stored at home. Some neighbors –who are currently out of the country –also did their part. So did some small business owners in the neighborhood: from the owner of a 30-year-old bodega that is a neighborhood institution, to newer ventures like a pizzeria (which I highly recommend!) and a bakery. Meanwhile, graffiti artists and muralists also decided to contribute their art for free.

To begin the tour, it takes some effort to go up an endless amount of painted staircases that are a testament to urban creativity. Then, amid its labyrinthine streets, we witness murals on walls and house façades. Over a dozen artists and collectives contributed more than 100 artworks.

The key word if self-management. The initiative has relied on grassroots organizations in the barrio and also helped them reactivate.

But the tour isn’t just about taking in the views. Visitors are joined by local historians, and there are impromptu concerts, theater plays designed to raise awareness, traditional games, local cuisine, and even souvenirs for sale featuring positive messages about Cota 905. Given its success, the organizers are considering new possibilities, such as tours at sunrise or sunset.

The Venezuelan government, which in recent years has launched various initiatives in Cota 905 but without much consistency, has acknowledged the tour success. The Ministry of Tourism has officially recognized it, and even groups of foreign tourists have come to experience it.

Jefferson’s team has helped redefine the Cota 905 territory. Artists and musicians now come here to shoot music videos, taking advantage of the incredible views. The most breathtaking photos are taken from the so-called “Eye of God,” a spot that lives up to its name, reaching a height of 1,200 meters. Once used by criminals to maintain control over the city, it is now a local attraction.

To those who might be reluctant to visit Cota 905, Jefferson responds clearly: “I didn’t agree with the police operations –there were too many clashes between law enforcement and gangs. It was a war, but ultimately the state had to do something. This neighborhood was a problem for all of Venezuela, but today we want to be part of the solution. We need these initiatives to work because there are still many kids waiting for opportunities: before, they were given radios, drugs, and weapons; today we want to give them paint, balls, and microphones, so they’re seen in the media as an example and not as a tragedy.” 

The group, which tries to stay away from strong political or religious stances, wants to grow food, introduce horseback rides, and more. “This mountain was hurt,” Jefferson continues. “My brother was killed but my son was born here. We have plenty of reasons to commit to this barrio. Hopefully authorities could give us a helicopter ride so we could point out from above everything that needs fixing. But until then, we’ll continue with our work.”

The story of Cota 905 is not unique, nor is it a novelty. The barrios in the major Venezuelan cities, Caracas above all, have always had to overcome marginalization. When Chávez came to power, many of them remained as “green spaces” in local maps, even though they were home to hundreds of thousands of families in piled-up hillside houses. And if they were classified as green areas, it meant they had no public services nor were they part of public policies. But that never stopped the people from organizing to defend their rights, resist against state violence, and build a future together.Venezuelan barrios can be precarious, hostile, violent. But if we are willing to walk and listen to them, we realize that they are also spaces of profound beauty and solidarity. The struggle continues.

Bayern Munich are keen on Aston Villa‘s Morgan Rogers, Curtis Jones is preparing to leave Liverpool this summer, and Real Madrid are considering appointing former manager Jose Mourinho.

Aston Villa‘s Morgan Rogers is a target for Bayern Munich, who have joined Chelsea and Manchester United in wanting the 23-year-old England forward. (Football Insider), external

England midfielder Curtis Jones, 25, is preparing to leave Liverpool this summer, with Aston Villa ready to step up their interest. (Teamtalk), external

Manchester City continue to prioritise a move for Newcastle United‘s England defender Tino Livramento, 23, but are also looking at alternatives. (Teamtalk), external

Real Madrid are considering appointing former manager Jose Mourinho, who is in charge of Benfica. (Record – in Portuguese), external

Real Madrid will make a decision on manager Alvaro Arbeloa’s future at the end of the season. (Marca – in Spanish), external

Real Madrid are planning a major overhaul of their squad in the summer, with France midfielder Eduardo Camavinga, 23, possibly leaving. (Sport – in Spanish), external

Coventry City’s promotion to the Premier League means the loan move of Nigeria midfielder Frank Onyeka, 28, from Brentford will become permanent. (Talksport), external

Lorient are considering former Lens and Southampton boss Will Still as a candidate to become manager. (L’Equipe – in French), external

Napoli president Aurelio de Laurentiis has brought forward a meeting with manager Antonio Conte to discuss his future amid reports linking him with the Italy team. (Corriere dello Sport – in Italian), external

The recently concluded 14th Ministerial Conference of the WTO produced mixed results. While the multilateral system remains stuck on Appellate Body appointments, one of the most extensive pre-conference discussions focused on the Chinese-led Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA). With 129 member states backing the IFDA, including countries like Bangladesh and several least developed countries (LDCs) from Africa, this has put India’s position as a key representative of the third world into question.

However, a thorough examination of India’s position reveals deeper concerns about the WTO within the ever-changing framework of global economic governance. In this article, I argue that India’s opposition to the IFDA is based not merely on apprehensions about China’s strategic influence, but also on other considerations founded on the grounds of jurisdiction, sovereign right to regulate and the procedure.

The Jurisdictional Argument & Potential Fragmentation of the International Trade Regime:

India’s primary objection to the IFDA emerges from a very pivotal question in the field of international law, challenging the jurisdiction and mandate of the WTO. In a rules-based transnational system, international organizations operate on a mandate-based framework. This mandate is primarily derived from the substantive provisions of their founding agreements and the consent of member states. Historically, the WTO’s mandate has centred on trade, specifically the regulation of trade in goods and services, as well as certain trade-related aspects of intellectual property and investment. While instruments such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) incidentally touch upon investment, they do so only insofar as it is in relation with trade.

Given that the WTO’s mandate and primary focus are on trade, India maintains that the regulation of investment as an autonomous domain fall outside its negotiated competence. This position is grounded in the collapse of the “Singapore Issues,” which included investments as one of its four development agenda and were explicitly dropped from the Doha Developmental Agenda in 2004. The reintroduction of investment facilitation through the IFDA is thus viewed as lacking a legitimate mandate, raising serious concerns about the WTO’s overreach.

Another factor closely linked to the lack of mandate is the plurilateral character of the proposed agreement. Unlike multilateral agreements, which bind all WTO members on the basis of consensus, plurilateral agreements apply only to a subset of willing participants. While such arrangements are not unprecedented within the WTO framework, India views the IFDA as a symbolic representation of a broader trend towards fragmentation. The primary concern of New Delhi is the risk that plurilateralism brings to the system. India’s apprehension stems from creation of a two-tier system within the WTO, wherein economically powerful states effectively set the rules, leaving others in a position of reactive compliance. This seriously undermines the foundational principle of sovereign equality among the WTO members and erodes the consensus-based decision-making model that has historically been a salient feature of the WTO.

Right to Regulate

A further dimension of India’s opposition to the IDFA pertains to the preservation of regulatory autonomy. The IFDA, although framed as a facilitative instrument, introduces disciplines that may constrain domestic policymaking. The current bilateral system on which international investment law is based relies heavily on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and dedicated chapters on investment in comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPA). This empowers developing countries such as India to specifically negotiate foreign investment policy in accordance with domestic requirements and national priorities.

However, under the IFDA’s plurilateral approach, India’s apprehension is grounded in obligations relating to non-discrimination, administrative review, and procedural standardisation, which over time may limit the flexibility required to implement industrial policy, promote local value addition, or regulate sensitive sectors in the public interest.

Further, India is also careful of the potential consequences that may arise from incorporating investment-related disciplines within the WTO framework. Although the IFDA does not formally include investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, its provisions could nonetheless be invoked indirectly in arbitral proceedings under bilateral investment treaties (BITs).

Given India’s prior experience with investment treaty arbitration and the subsequent revisiting of its Model BIT in 2016 to ensure regulatory balance, this concern carries considerable weight. While at face value these provisions might seem benign and aimed at facilitation of flow of investments, their pro-investor interpretations might create problems by exposing India to international liability.

Another vital dimension of India’s critique pertains to the procedural legitimacy of the IFDA negotiations. It is quite commonly observed that the legitimacy of outcomes is intricately linked to the legitimacy of the processes that produce them. These negotiations were initiated through a Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) which remains controversial within the WTO system. India’s argument relies on the absence of an explicit mandate which contradicts the WTO’s decision-making framework, which is based on consensus.

Beyond these factors, India’s position can also be understood as a negotiation strategy. By resisting the incorporation of new issues such as investment facilitation into the WTO package, India seeks to preserve negotiating leverage in ongoing and future discussions. Accepting the IFDA could open a pandora’s box for the introduction of other areas, including digital trade and e-commerce, thereby shifting the balance of negotiations away from priorities of developing countries, such as agricultural subsidies.

It is important to note that India does not oppose investment facilitation in principle; rather, its criticism is related to the form, venue, and legal consequences of introducing non-trade disciplines at the WTO. India has, in fact, undertaken substantial domestic reforms aimed at improving the ease of doing business and attracting foreign investment. Its objection is more precisely directed at the form, forum, and legal implications of embedding such non-trade disciplines within the framework of WTO.

In summary, the refusal of India to sign the IFDA is a reflection of careful consideration of complex legal factors combined with prudence regarding institutional development and developmental policy. It underscores a broader tension within the contemporary multilateral trading system aiming to balance the ever-expansive rule-making to protect & promote investments, with preservation of regulatory policy space for host states.

The attacker has been identified as a “58-year-old Moscow man”, but no motive has been established.

A gunman who killed at least six people in Kyiv and took hostages has been shot dead by Ukrainian police, officials said.

The attack occurred on Saturday in the capital’s Holosiivskyi district, where the assailant opened fire on civilians in the street before barricading himself inside a nearby supermarket, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said on Telegram.

Special tactical police units stormed the supermarket after roughly 40 minutes of failed negotiations, Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko said on Telegram. The gunman shot at police officers during the standoff.

“We tried to persuade him, knowing that there was likely a wounded person inside,” Klymenko told The Associated Press news agency. “We even offered to bring in tourniquets to stop the bleeding, but he did not respond.”

Ultimately, authorities were given the order to “neutralise” the attacker, he said.

At least 10 others were hospitalised, including one child, and four hostages were rescued, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a post on X.

Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko said the attacker was a 58-year-old born in Moscow.

Klymenko said the man was carrying a legally registered gun and had approached licensing authorities as recently as December 2025 to renew his weapons permit, submitting a valid medical certificate at the time. He added that investigators would determine which medical institution issued the document.

Zelenskyy offered his condolences to the families of the victims, saying he had instructed officials to make all verified information publicly available. “We expect a swift investigation,” he wrote.

Follow the live build-up, with full team news coverage, ahead of our text commentary stream of the crunch EPL clash.

Iran says it has reopened the Strait of Hormuz, which it largely closed after being attacked by the U.S. and Israel. The move was prompted by a temporary ceasefire in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy. However, the U.S. blockade on Iranian ports enacted on Monday remains in place, President Donald Trump announced on his Truth Social social media site.

All this comes as the U.S. and Iran appear closer to reaching a deal to end the war, which we will discuss in greater detail later in this story. The temporary ceasefire between the two countries ends April 21.

“In line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage for all commercial vessels through Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire, on the coordinated route as already announced by Ports and Maritime Organization of the Islamic Rep. of Iran,” Sayyed Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, stated on X Friday morning.

That route is a narrow five-mile stretch between the islands of Qeshem and Larak, roughly 15 miles from the Iranian shoreline.

In a post on his Truth Social site, U.S. President Donald Trump hailed the decision but said it did not change the ongoing blockade.

“THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ IS COMPLETELY OPEN AND READY FOR BUSINESS AND FULL PASSAGE, BUT THE NAVAL BLOCKADE WILL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT AS IT PERTAINS TO IRAN, ONLY, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS OUR TRANSACTION WITH IRAN IS 100% COMPLETE,” Trump stated. “THIS PROCESS SHOULD GO VERY QUICKLY IN THAT MOST OF THE POINTS ARE ALREADY NEGOTIATED.”

The president added that “Iran has agreed to never close the Strait of Hormuz again. It will no longer be used as a weapon against the World!” However, there was no immediate response from Tehran.

Regarding any peace deals, Trump said on his Truth Social network that the “U.S.A. will get all Nuclear ‘Dust,’ created by our great B2 Bombers – No money will exchange hands in any way, shape, or form.”

This was a reference to the Operation Midnight Hammer attack on Iranian nuclear facilities last year.  Iran is believed to have about 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% of the explosive uranium isotope, U-235 stored at these locations.

“This deal is in no way subject to Lebanon, either, but the USA will, separately, work with Lebanon, and deal with the Hezboolah situation in an appropriate manner. Israel will not be bombing Lebanon any longer,” Trump added.

It remains to be seen how this will play out. Iran’s state TV, citing a senior military official, highlighted that “only civilian vessels will be allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz via designated routes and with permission from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy.”

“The passage of military vessels through the strait remains prohibited,” it said.

Despite the closure, ships have still transited the strategic body of water through which about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas exports pass. Ship traffic through the Strait actually “increased from last month’s unusually low levels, with crossings rising and activity extending across a broader mix of vessel types and cargoes,” according to the global trade intelligence firm Kpler.

There is also still the issue of mines in the section of the Strait outside the Qeshem-Larak passage. Demining is one of the issues being discussed today in an international meeting being held in Paris, a French official told us. We’ll discuss this meeting in a little more detail later in this story.

Trump, however, claimed that “Iran, with the help of the U.S.A., has removed or is removing all sea mines!”

We have reached out to shippers and maritime analysis and security firms to get a clearer picture of what this decision means from their perspectives.

“This is good news,” a spokesman for Hapag-Lloyd told us. “There are still some open questions on our end, but they might be resolved within the next 24 hours. Top priority for the passage is safety and security for the seafarers, the vessel and the cargo of our customers. If all open issues are cleared (i.e. insurance coverage, clear orders of Iranian government/military about the exact sea corridor to be used and the sequence of ships leaving) we would prefer to pass the strait as soon as possible. Our crisis committee is in session and will try to resolve all open items with the relevant parties within the next 24-36 hours.”

The reopening of the Strait “marks a turn for global shipping, as it allows over 750 vessels previously trapped in the Middle East Gulf to begin clearing approximately $17 billion in stranded energy and dry bulk cargoes,” Kpler told us. “As of April 17, 2026, there are 862 vessels currently operating within the Mideast Gulf. The core of the backlog is composed of approximately 187 laden tankers carrying roughly 172 million barrels of crude and refined products, along with a specialized cluster of 15 LNG vessels that remain almost entirely stalled following the collapse of recent ceasefire talks.”

The Strait reopening and a looming new round of peace talks appears to have provided a boost to the world economy.

“Oil prices are falling by more than 10%, and Wall Street is rallying toward another record after Iran said the Strait of Hormuz is fully open, which would allow oil tankers to exit the Persian Gulf again and carry crude to customers worldwide,” The Associated Press reported. “The S&P 500 rallied 0.7% as U.S. stocks sprinted toward the finish of a third straight week of big gains. The Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 1%, and the Nasdaq composite added 1%.”

Stocks “have rallied more than 11% since late March on hopes that the United States and Iran can avoid a worst-case scenario for the global economy,” the wire service added.

BREAKING: President Trump and Iran’s foreign minister say the Strait of Hormuz is now fully open. Crude oil prices tumble 10% after the announcements. https://t.co/d44au7X8UP

— The Associated Press (@AP) April 17, 2026

UPDATES

Our coverage for the day has concluded.

UPDATE: 5:45 PM EDT–

Trump told CBS News that Iran has “agreed to everything,” and will work with the U.S. to remove its enriched uranium.

He insisted that doing so will not involve U.S. ground troops. But when asked who would retrieve it, he would only say “our people.”

“No. No troops,” he told the network. “We’ll go down and get it with them, and then we’ll take it. We’ll be getting it together because by that time, we’ll have an agreement and there’s no need for fighting when there’s an agreement. Nice right? That’s better. We would have done it the other way if we had to.”

The president said the material would then be brought to the U.S.

“Our people, together with the Iranians, are going to work together to go get it. And then we’ll take it to the United States,” he said.

NEWS President Trump tells me:

-No ground troops will be required to remove enriched uranium from Iran

-Iran has agreed to stop backing all proxy groups like Hezbollah and Hamas

-I asked if Iran has agreed to stop enriching uranium *forever.” He said, “They’ve agreed to…

— Weijia Jiang (@weijia) April 17, 2026

UPDATE: 5:24 PM EDT –

Speaking to the White House press corps, Trump addressed questions about the peace process.

“We’ll see how it all turns out, but it should be good, some very good discussions, and hopefully that subject that you like to talk about will be very good,” he said. “And we’ve done a good job, but we’ll see … the talks are going on and going over the weekend, and a lot of good things are happening that includes Lebanon.”

Asked about differences with Iran on how all this is developing, Trump said: “If there are, I’m going to straighten it out. .. don’t think there’s too many significant differences.”

As for the blockade: “When the agreement is signed, the blockade ends,” he proclaimed.

Earlier on Friday, Iranian officials said they would close the Strait again if the blockade is not lifted.

“We’ve had some very good discussions… Talks are going on. It’ll go on over the weekend — and a lot of good things are happening,” says @POTUS in Arizona.

“As soon as the agreement gets signed, that’s when the blockade ends.” pic.twitter.com/PjNlBvwSAo

— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) April 17, 2026

UPDATE: 1:34 PM EDT –

Trump told Axios that U.S. and Iranian negotiators will probably meet this weekend, and he expects them to hammer out a final deal to end the war. The deal should come “in a day or two,” Axios reporter Barak Ravid added on X.

UPDATE: 1:28 PM EDT –

Trump told Reuters on Friday that the U.S. will work with Iran to recover its enriched uranium ​and bring it back to the United States.

“We’re going to get ‌it together. We’re going to go in with Iran, at a nice leisurely pace, and go down and start excavating with big machinery… We’ll bring it back to the United ​States,” Trump said during a phone interview.

The ⁠United States will work ‌with Tehran to recover its enriched uranium and bring ​it back to ‌the United States, President Donald Trump told Reuters on Friday.

“We’re going to get it together. ‌We’re going to go in with Iran, at ⁠a nice leisurely pace, and go ‌down ​and… pic.twitter.com/ZfwJTFrIbr

— Iran International English (@IranIntl_En) April 17, 2026

UPDATE: 1:17 PM EDT –

Seyyed Mohammad Mehdi Tabatabaei, a spokesperson for Iran’s president, pushed back on Trump’s claim that Iran promised never to close the Strait again.

“The Twitter rhetoric and baseless statements of the enemy are aimed at stripping the Iranian nation of their sense of pride for the great victories they have achieved through their resolute defense,” he stated on X. “The conditional and limited reopening of a portion of the Strait of Hormuz is solely an Iranian initiative, one that creates responsibility and serves to test the firm commitments of the opposing side. If they renege on their promises, they will face dire consequences.”

لفاظی‌های توئیتری و اظهارات بی‌پایه دشمن، در جهت سلب احساس افتخار ملت ایران برای پیروزی‌های بزرگی است که در دفاع مقتدرانه کسب کرده‌اند.
بازگشایی مشروط و محدود بخشی از تنگه هرمز ، صرفا ابتکاری ایرانی، مسئولیت‌آفرین و برای آزمون تعهدات قطعی طرف مقابل است. بدعهدی کنند، بد می‌بینند.

— سيد مهدي طباطبايي (@tabaei1356) April 17, 2026

UPDATE 12:51 PM EDT –

Iran considers the continuation of the U.S. blockade on its ports a ceasefire violation and would close the Strait of Hormuz again if the blockade is not lifted, the IRGC-affiliated Fars News reported citing an informed source close to the Supreme National Security Council.

We’ve reached out to the White House for comment.

Iranian official to Fars:

If the maritime blockade continues, it will be considered a violation of the ceasefire, and the Strait of Hormuz transit route will be closed.

— Clash Report (@clashreport) April 17, 2026

With new talks potentially set to be held in Pakistan over the weekend, the U.S. and Iran are negotiating over a three-page plan to end the war, Axios reported Friday morning. One of the key elements under discussion is “that the U.S. would release $20 billion in frozen Iranian funds in return for Iran giving up its stockpile of enriched uranium,” the outlet noted, citing two U.S. officials and two additional sources briefed on the talks.

The Memo of Understanding (MoU) also states the two sides are negotiating over a “voluntary” moratorium on nuclear enrichment by Iran. It also deals with the Strait of Hormuz, “though the sources said there are still significant gaps on that issue,” Axios posited.

It’s unclear if the MOU refers to Iran’s ballistic missiles and its support for regional proxies.

🚨 SCOOP: The U.S. and Iran are negotiating over a three-page plan to end the war, with one element under discussion being that the U.S. would release $20 billion in frozen Iranian funds in return for Iran giving up its stockpile of enriched uranium. https://t.co/w84Yd8JHgp

— Axios (@axios) April 17, 2026

“Trump is directly talking to the Iranians,” U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) told Fox News. 

“He is negotiating himself,” Graham proffered. “He was on the phone with the Iranians a couple of days ago, and it got rather sporty—to the point that Trump loudly told Iran what would happen if they keep playing games. He actually lost his voice. I’d hate to be the Iranian on the receiving end of that.”

Senator Graham:

Trump is directly talking to the Iranians. He is negotiating himself.

He was on the phone with the Iranians a couple of days ago, and it got rather sporty—to the point that Trump loudly told Iran what would happen if they keep playing games.

He actually lost… pic.twitter.com/rMPjT9SYYc

— Clash Report (@clashreport) April 17, 2026

Despite rising hopes that the war in Iran could soon end, the country’s deputy foreign minister on Friday rejected any call for a temporary ceasefire. Instead, Tehran is seeking a comprehensive end to conflict across the Middle East, Saeed Khatibzadeh told reporters today. That includes fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, currently paused on the first full day of a shaky 10-day ceasefire.

“We are not accepting any temporary ceasefire,” Khatibzadeh said on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum hosted by Turkey’s Foreign Affairs Ministry. Any end to the fighting must include all conflict zones “from Lebanon to the Red Sea,” he added, describing it as a “red line” for Iran.

The cycle of violence “should end here once and for all,” Khatibzadeh continued, according to Al Jazeera.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) said it is ready to resume fighting if needed.

The Army and the IRGC have their “finger on the trigger” and are “prepared to deliver a powerful, destructive, and regret-inducing response to any aggressive or criminal action by the US-Israeli enemy and their allies against the Iranian nation,” the IRGC said Friday.

As we noted earlier in this story, the leaders of nearly three dozen nations met – mostly virtually – at a conference in Paris today to discuss the future of the Strait of Hormuz.

Co-chaired by French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the conference on the Initiative for Maritime Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz looked at ways of protecting shipping after the fighting ends.

Starmer said the U.K. and France will lead a multinational mission to “protect freedom of navigation” in the Strait as soon as conditions permit. He added that the mission would be “strictly peaceful and defensive,” with the aim of reassuring commercial shipping and supporting mine clearance efforts.

Starmer invited other countries to join, saying that roughly a dozen countries had committed to contributing assets.

Kaja Kallas, European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, said leaders also discussed ensuring that Iran imposes no tolls on passage through the Strait.

“Any pay-for-passage scheme will set a dangerous precedent for global maritime routes,” she stated on X. “Iran has to abandon any plan to levy transit fees. Europe will play its part in restoring the free flow of energy and trade, once a ceasefire takes hold.”

Kallas added that the EU’s Aspides naval mission is already operating in the Red Sea “and can be quickly strengthened to protect shipping across the region. This could be the fastest way to provide support.”

Yesterday, a spokesman for Aspides told us that there were no changes in its mission.

Under international law, transit through waterways like the Strait of Hormuz must remain open and free of charge. This is what leaders made clear in their call on reopening the Strait today.

Any pay-for-passage scheme will set a dangerous precedent for global maritime routes.… pic.twitter.com/Jeufv4hQou

— Kaja Kallas (@kajakallas) April 17, 2026

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

The EU’s special representative for the Gulf said Saturday that any lasting solution for the Middle East must be led by countries in the region rather than imposed from outside, Anadolu reports.

Speaking at a panel during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in southern Turkiye, Luigi Di Maio said the current crisis in the Gulf is another sign of the “further erosion of international law.”

“If we want to try to find a solution for avoiding again another crisis, like the ongoing crisis or a wider crisis, a farther spillover, we need to work all together,” he said.

Di Maio said the EU remains committed to multilateralism and international law, while stressing that Europe does not want to be “part of this war.”

At the same time, he said European countries are supporting Gulf partners in self-defense, including intercepting drones and missiles from Iran under bilateral agreements.

READ: US, Iran likely on Monday to hold 2nd round for technical talks in Islamabad: Sources

He also warned that instability in the Gulf affects the wider world, not only because of oil and gas, but also due to trade in fertilizer, helium for semiconductors and other goods moving through the Strait of Hormuz.

Di Maio said the collapse of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal showed the importance of involving regional countries in negotiations.

“Every solution for the Middle East has to be a region-led process,” he said.

He said stronger connectivity and defense cooperation can make the region more resilient to future crises, adding that “autonomy does not mean isolation.”

He praised mediation efforts by Turkiye, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, saying they had helped secure a ceasefire and could contribute to a broader agreement.

READ: French soldier killed in attack on UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon: Macron

UN Children’s Fund calls on Israeli authorities to investigate and ‘ensure full accountability’.

The United Nations Children’s Fund says it is “outraged” after Israel killed two drivers it had contracted to deliver clean water to families in Gaza.

UNICEF said in a ⁠statement the incident occurred during routine water trucking on Friday morning at the Mansoura water filling point in northern Gaza, which supplies Gaza City. Two other people ‌were wounded in the attack.

The agency said it had suspended activities at the site and called on Israeli authorities to investigate and “ensure full accountability”.

“Humanitarian workers, essential service providers, and civilian infrastructure, including critical water facilities, must never be targeted,” it said.

It said that “the protection of civilians and those delivering life-saving assistance is an obligation under international humanitarian law”.

More than 750 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces since the US- and Qatar-brokered “ceasefire” in Gaza took effect last October, according to Palestinian health authorities.

More than 72,000 people have been killed since Israel launched its genocidal war against Palestinians in Gaza on October 7, 2023, following a Hamas-led attack on southern Israel.

Meanwhile, in the occupied West Bank, a Palestinian man was shot and killed by Israeli forces in Khirbet Salama, the official Palestinian news agency WAFA reported.

Muhammad Ahmad Suwaiti, 25, was pronounced dead at the scene, WAFA said.

Israel’s military said a person carrying a knife in the illegal settlement of Negohot was killed. It did not say who was responsible.

Using the biblical term for the West Bank, the Israeli military said in a statement that “a terrorist who infiltrated the community of Negohot in Judea and Samaria was identified and eliminated in a rapid response”.

Israeli forces and settlers have killed more than 1,060 Palestinians in the occupied West Bank since the start of the Gaza war in October 2023, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health.

Tehran, Iran – United States President Donald Trump’s announcements about securing major concessions from Tehran have riled supporters of the Iranian establishment, prompting rejections and clarifications from the authorities.

Several current and former senior officials, state media and the Islamic Republic’s hardcore backers expressed anger, frustration, and confusion after the US leader made a series of claims, with days left on a two-week ceasefire reached on April 8.

Trump on Friday said Iran and the US would jointly dig up the enriched uranium buried under the rubble of bombed Iranian nuclear sites, and transfer it to the US. He claimed Iran had agreed to stop enriching uranium on its soil.

He also said the Strait of Hormuz had been opened and would never be closed again, while the US naval blockade of Iran’s ports remained in place, and sea mines were removed or were in the process of being removed.

Trump also emphasised that Iran would not receive billions of dollars of its own frozen assets abroad due to US sanctions, and that the 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon was completely unrelated to Iran.

Amid Pakistan’s ongoing efforts to mediate another round of negotiations, Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the Iranian delegation to the Islamabad talks earlier this month, rejected all of Trump’s claims.

“With these lies, they did not win the war, and they certainly will not get anywhere in negotiations either,” he posted on X early on Saturday.

By Saturday noon, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released a statement, saying the Strait of Hormuz is once again heavily restricted and under “strict management” of the armed forces. It cited continued “acts of piracy and maritime theft under the so-called label of a blockade” by Washington as the reason.

‘Haze of confusion’

In the hours it took between Trump’s flurry of announcements on Friday and official responses from Iranian authorities, supporters of the establishment voiced serious concerns about any major concessions.

“Is there no Muslim out there to talk to the people a bit about what is happening?!” Ezzatollah Zarghami, a former state television chief and current member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council that controls the heavily restricted internet in Iran, wrote on X.

Alireza Zakani, the hardline mayor of Tehran, said if any of Trump’s claims are true, then the Iranian establishment must beware “not to gift the vile enemy in negotiations what it failed to achieve in the field”.

A fan account on X for Saeed Jalili, an ultrahardline member of the Supreme National Security Council who has opposed any deals with the US for decades, said “dissent” may be at play. It said Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen or heard from outside of several written statements attributed to him, must release a voice or video message to confirm what is happening.

Jalili’s main account distanced itself from the comment, saying the fan account – which was subsequently deleted – was a sign of “infiltration” by enemies of Iran who were trying to sow discord.

Iranian state media released another written statement attributed to Khamenei on Saturday to mark Army Day, but made no mention of the political drama unfolding hours earlier, or the negotiations with the US.

The dissonance was clearly on display on state television and other state-linked media on Friday, especially those affiliated with the IRGC.

Multiple state television hosts and analysts harshly attacked Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi because he tweeted on Friday that the Strait of Hormuz was “declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire, on the coordinated route as already announced by Ports and Maritime Organisation”.

One of the hosts demanded Araghchi must immediately clarify. Another said the top diplomat’s tweet was in English, and since the Iranian people do not have access to X due to the state-imposed near-total internet shutdown for seven weeks, the message was not directed at the people.

With a huge Hezbollah flag in the background, a furious presenter on state television’s Channel 3 claimed that Araghchi was somehow “the representative of the people of Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq” because they are a part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” of armed forces, so he should demand concessions on their behalf from Trump.

Morteza Mahmoudvand, a representative for Tehran in the Iranian parliament, went as far as saying Araghchi would have been impeached had it not been for “the excuse of war”.

The Fars and Tasnim news sites, which are affiliated with the IRGC, also heavily criticised Araghchi and called for further explanations on Friday evening, with Fars arguing that “Iranian society was plunged into a haze of confusion.”

Armed supporters in the streets

Critical comments from supporters of the Iranian government also flooded social media, including local messaging applications and the comments section of state-run sites.

“We took to the streets every night with clear demands, but you shook hands with the killer of our supreme leader and handed our strait to the Zionists,” one user wrote on Friday in the local app Baleh, in reference to Israel.

“After all these years of sanctions and war and costs imposed on the people, if you are to give up the uranium and the strait, then why did you play with the people’s livelihoods and the blood of the martyrs for so long?” another user wrote.

A large number of analysts and media personalities, including Hossein Shariatmadar, the head of the Kayhan newspaper, who was appointed by late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also voiced criticism and demanded answers on Fars and other outlets.

Regardless of whether there will be more mediated negotiations in Pakistan or whether the war will continue, Iran continues to encourage and arm backers to take to the streets to maintain control.

State media on Friday aired footage of more armed convoys moving through the streets of Tehran while waving the flags of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi and other groups. The video below shows women and children crewing heavy machineguns mounted on the back of pick-up trucks during a rally in downtown Tehran.

With no end in sight to the state-imposed internet shutdown that has wiped out millions of jobs in Iran, in addition to steel factories and other infrastructure that were destroyed, the Iranian economy continues to suffer.

The timing of the back-and-forth between Trump and the Iranian officials meant that oil prices dropped before Western markets closed on Friday, and the Iranian currency experienced more volatility.

The rial was priced at about 1.46 million against the US dollar on Saturday morning, the first day of the working week in Iran. But it shot back up to about 1.51 million after the IRGC announced the repeated closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Reports of Iranian gunboats opening fire on a tanker in strait, after Tehran said it is closing the waterway until the US lifts the blockade of its ports.

Iran says it has closed the Strait of Hormuz again, calling the decision a response to a continued blockade of its ports by the United States.

The Iranian military on Saturday said control of the strategic waterway, through which 20 percent of the global oil flows, has “returned to its previous state”, with reports saying Iranian gunboats fired at a merchant vessel as it attempted to ‌cross.

The closure of the strait came hours after it was reopened, with more than a dozen commercial ships passing through the waterway, after a US-mediated 10-day ceasefire deal was reached between Israel and Lebanon.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on Saturday said in a statement, cited by the Iranian media, that the ongoing US blockade of Iranian ports represented “acts of piracy and maritime theft”, adding that the control over Hormuz is “under the strict management and control of the armed forces”.

“Until the US restores full freedom of navigation for vessels travelling from Iran to their destinations and back, the status of the Strait of Hormuz will remain tightly controlled and in its previous condition,” it said.

By 10:30 GMT on Saturday, no fewer than eight oil and gas tankers had crossed the strait, but at least as many ships appeared to have turned back, having begun to exit the Gulf, the AFP news agency reported.

The toing and froing over the strait cast doubt on US President Donald Trump’s optimism the day before, that a peace deal to end the US-Israel war on Iran was “very close”.

Trump had celebrated the reopening of the strait on Friday, but warned the US attacks would resume until Iran agreed to a deal, which included its nuclear programme.

“Maybe I won’t extend it,” Trump told reporters on board Air Force One about the temporary ceasefire agreement in place. “So you’ll have a blockade, and unfortunately we’ll have to start dropping bombs again.”

Asked whether a potential deal could be made in this short timeframe, Trump said: “I think it’s going to happen.”

But Iran says no date has been agreed for another round of peace talks, accusing the US of “betraying” diplomacy in all negotiations.

The conflicting and changing reports about the strait and how much freedom ships have to transit through it have deterred many vessels from crossing, according to John-Paul Rodrigue, a maritime shipping specialist at Texas A&M University.

“Ships have been attempting transit since the announcement, but it looks like many of them are heading back because the situation is unclear,” Rodrigue told Al Jazeera. “There is contradictory information being issued by all parties.”

Reporting from Tehran, Al Jazeera’s Tohid Asadi said “uncertainty is the name of the game” as far as the Strait of Hormuz is concerned.

“Iran is looking for a comprehensive end to the war across the region, security assurances, sanctions relief, the unfreezing of frozen assets, regional relations – and on top of all of that – the nuclear dossier and Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium,” he said.

“But right now, uncertainty is the name of the game. The fragile situation makes it hard to talk about the possibility of successful negotiations down the road.”

Michael Shoebridge, Director of Strategic Analysis Australia, says the US may be forced to end its blockade of Iran in order to see the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Brent crude falls more than 9 percent after Iran said it will reopen the strategic waterway, only to shut it down again over US blockade of its ports.

Oil prices have plummeted to their lowest point in weeks after Iran said the Strait of Hormuz was open for passage during a ceasefire in Lebanon, and United States President Donald Trump said he expected to ⁠reach a deal to end the war soon.

Brent crude, the international benchmark, fell more than 9 percent to $90.38 a barrel on Friday, taking it below $91 for the first time since March 10.

The plunge came after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the strait was “completely open” and would remain so for the duration of the 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, which took effect on Friday.

Hailing Tehran’s announcement, Trump declared the waterway “ready for business and full passage,” but said the US Navy’s blockade of Iranian ports would remain in “full force” until the sides reached a peace deal.

On Saturday, however, Iran rowed back on its decision to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, warning that it would continue to block transit through the key waterway as long as the US blockade of Iranian ports remained in effect.

The announcement came after Trump said the blockade “will remain in full force” until Tehran reaches a deal with the US, including on its nuclear programme.

Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through Hormuz and further limits would squeeze already constrained supply, driving prices higher once again.

Amid the escalation, Pakistani officials say they are trying for more talks between the US and Iran ahead of the April 22 ceasefire deadline.

Meanwhile, ship tracking data displayed by MarineTraffic earlier on Saturday showed a significant uptick in vessels crossing the strait, which is located between Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

“It’s busy out there, the busiest I’ve seen it since the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed at the beginning of the war,” Michelle Wiese Bockmann, an analyst at maritime intelligence firm Windward, said in a post on X.

“Last night there were few ships taking the risk but overnight there seems to have been a change.”

While Iran allowed a limited number of vetted ships to transit the waterway since the start of the war, traffic has remained at a trickle compared with pre-conflict levels.

The near-total closure of the strait has triggered one of the worst energy shocks in history, driving up fuel prices and prompting governments to roll out emergency measures.

Oil prices have swung wildly since the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28, hitting a post-conflict peak of $119 a barrel on March 19.

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

Leo is the third pontiff to visit the fossil fuel-rich country after John Paul II in 1992 and Benedict XVI in 2009.

Pope Leo XIV is set to arrive in Angola on the third leg of a landmark African tour that has unfolded alongside an escalating war of words with United States President Donald Trump over the Middle East conflict.

Leo, the third pontiff to visit the fossil fuel-rich country after John Paul II in 1992 and Benedict XVI in 2009, is expected to arrive at 3pm local time (14:00 GMT) on Saturday in the capital, Luanda, where billboards bearing his image have been erected to welcome him.

The pope, who visited Cameroon for three days before flying to Luanda, is also slated to meet Angola’s President Joao Lourenco and deliver a speech in the country, where about 44 percent of the population identifies as Catholic.

Leo’s increasingly forceful calls for world peace are likely to resonate in Angola, which emerged in 2002 from a 27-year civil war that erupted after independence from Portugal in 1975.

Throughout his Africa visit, the first pope from the US has issued pointed warnings about corruption, the exploitation of the continent’s vast resources and the dangers of artificial intelligence.

‘Stick to matters of morality’

The pope’s Africa visit has also been marked by a clash with Trump, who has called the 70-year-old head of the Catholic Church “weak on crime” and “terrible for foreign policy”. Trump had also shared what appeared to be an AI-generated image of himself as Jesus, prompting a backlash from leaders across the religious spectrum.

The pope had responded by saying he was not afraid of Trump and that he would continue to speak out against war, marking a rare public clash between a pontiff and a sitting US president.

Speaking to reporters on Thursday, Trump said he had the right to disagree with the pontiff. “I have no disagreement with the fact the pope can say what he wants, and I want him to say what he wants, but I can disagree,” he said.

After US Vice President JD Vance urged the Vatican to “stick to matters of morality”, Leo said on Thursday that the world was “being ravaged by a handful of tyrants” and intensified criticism of those using religion to justify war.

During his stop in Cameroon, Leo also urged the country’s leaders to tackle corruption and condemned “those who, in the name of profit, continue to seize the African continent to exploit and plunder it”.

Leo’s warnings against corruption and exploitation may resonate in Angola, where one-third of the population lives below the poverty line despite vast fossil fuel reserves.

On Sunday, he will celebrate an open-air Mass in Kilamba, outside Luanda, before travelling by helicopter to Muxima, home to a 16th-century church and major pilgrimage site.

On Monday, Leo is due to travel to Saurimo to visit a retirement home and hold another Mass. He will then fly to Equatorial Guinea, the final stop of his 18,000km (11,185-mile) African tour.

England’s Lionesses are no strangers to making history.

The past decade has been rich in landmark moments; a first tournament medal, a first major trophy, and a first title defence – on foreign soil to boot.

When Sarina Wiegman’s side play Iceland in Reykjavik on Saturday (17:30 BST) they will reach another milestone – the 500th fixture for England’s senior women’s team.

The game is important for securing qualification for next year’s World Cup in Brazil, with England keen to win more silverware in the famous white shirt.

But regardless of the result, the match will be etched in history as a reminder of how far the English women’s game has come.

In 1921, the Football Association (FA) banned women’s football, considering the game “most unsuitable for females”, external.

The decision consigned women’s football to park pitches and small venues for half a century before the decision was overturned in 1971.

To mark 500 not out, BBC Sport takes a look at 11 defining moments in the history of England’s women.

The U.S. Air Force has begun test flights on an extremely lavish 747-8i Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) that Qatar donated to the U.S. last year for use by President Donald Trump. The jet, now dubbed VC-25B Bridge Aircraft, is set to serve in the Air Force One role while the White House awaits the extremely delayed delivery from Boeing of two fully-outfitted VC-25B Air Force One aircraft 

“I can confirm that the VC-25B Bridge Aircraft has begun flight test,” an Air Force spokesperson told The War Zone Friday afternoon. “We expect the aircraft will be delivered to the Presidential Airlift Group no later than summer 2026.”

Aviation Week was the first to report the news of the test flight.

The Air Force declined to provide additional information about the testing program, including when it began or how many flights have taken place. It also remains unclear when the 747-8i will conduct real VIP missions or if it will receive a new official designation. With questions swirling about the legality and ethics of a president receiving a gift plane, the Pentagon last May took delivery of the aircraft and said it would rapidly undertake the required modifications.

The jet, using the call sign VADER01, was spotted by flight trackers over Texas yesterday. It took off from Majors Field in Greenville, Texas, flew over Tulsa, Oklahoma, Amarillo and Abilene, Texas, before landing back at Majors Field. The airport is home to L3 Technologies, which is modifying the jet. The facility at Greenville is a hub for this exact kind of modification work on the Pentagon’s larger aircraft.

Video and photos taken by aviation photographers show that the aircraft was in a white base livery, though it will reportedly get Trump’s red, dark blue and white paint scheme. The aircraft was delivered from Qatar in its maroon, white and gray striped scheme originally.

Aviation photographer TT-33 operator was kind enough to share some images with us. The photos were captured as the aircraft was landing at Majors Field yesterday. You can see more of his work here.

The photos show remarkably few modifications to the VC-25B Bridge Aircraft’s communications system, which already had an extensive broadband satellite communications suite when Qatar handed it over. These additions include a handfuls of new aerials and what appear to be two UHF satcom ‘platter’ antennas.

As TWZ has previously noted, converting any aircraft into one that is secure and safe enough to transport the president is a complex undertaking. The aircraft needs to provide constant, secure communications, including what is needed to order a nuclear strike. Historically, it also needs to be physically hardened both inside and out to withstand myriad threats, from the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear weapon going off to incoming surface-to-air missiles to enemy intelligence-gathering efforts. To do this requires significant modifications right down to the aircraft’s outer structure.

In this case, it is likely impossible for the jet to receive EMP hardening and, at least based on the limited photos available, we cannot find any clear additions that would indicate the installation of an integrated self defense suite of any kind. The VC-25As are speckled with missile approach warning sensors and many laser countermeasures turrets (DIRCM). They also include the legacy Matador infrared countermeasure system above their jet engines and APU. This is in addition to other defensive features which are less visible and remain closely guarded secrets.

Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM)

At the very least, this aircraft will have to feature some kind of DIRCM setup to repel shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles, and modular units are available that can be attached in a canoe to the bottom of the aircraft. These systems, such as Elbit’s C-MUSIC or Northrop Grumman’s Guardian, are in service with foreign VVIP 747s, as well as commercial aircraft, including those flying for Israeli airline El Al. You can read all about these systems here. Still, while they offer far less defensive capacity compared to what is seen under the belly of a VC-25A, they would offer a significant layer of protection.

It’s also possible a more elaborate and fully integrated defensive system could be installed in the coming weeks, but it’s hard to imagine this would allow the jet to enter service this summer.

Adding a further layer of complexity to the procurement and fielding process of any new presidential airlift aircraft, there are tight controls around sourcing spares for aircraft with this mission, and specific rules about vetting individual parts to protect against espionage and sabotage. Clearly many practices and requirements had to be relaxed in order to rush this ‘bridge’ aircraft into service.

There are also questions about where this jet could actually fly operationally. Without a fully specialized design meeting all the requirements for the traditional Air Force One mission, it will likely be limited to domestic use or other very low threat areas. Given all that, and its reported conversion price tag approaching $400 million, there are legitimate questions about why it is needed at all.

As we noted earlier in this story, the flight test of this aircraft came as Boeing is far behind in the process of converting two other 747-8is originally built as commercial airliners into new fully customized VC-25B Air Force One aircraft. This led to the emergence of Trump’s idea of procuring an ‘interim’ Air Force One.

On Friday, the Air Force told us that it “is collaborating with Boeing to implement acceleration initiatives and expect the first delivery of the VC-25B in mid-2028.” If this is the case, then this ‘bridge’ aircraft will have served at most around two years until the first full-up VC-25B is delivered.

We have reached out to Boeing for additional details.

While it is not yet known when the ‘bridge’ VC-25B will actually transport the president, we know there is great pressure to get it doing exactly that from the White House. Judging by its configuration so far, whatever possible appears to have been done to make that happen.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Al-Noor is a UNRWA centre in Gaza providing education and support for visually impaired children. Operating since 1962, it faces unprecedented pressure as Israel’s war on Gaza has left more than 1,500 people visually impaired since 2023.