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The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy claims it has greatly expanded how it defines the Strait of Hormuz, which it has closed to most shipping since the start of the now-paused war. The move comes as that closure has wide-ranging impacts on the global economy and with U.S. President Donald Trump mulling new military actions against Tehran amid deadlocked peace negotiations and a tenuous ceasefire barely holding.

Under its new definition, the IRGC claimed a tenfold expansion “forming a complete crescent” of “about 20 to 30 miles to one now over 200 to 300 miles,” Political Deputy of IRGC Navy Mohammad Akbarzadeh said in a TV interview, according to the official Iranian FARS news agency.

“The Strait is no longer viewed as a narrow stretch around a handful of islands but instead has been greatly ​enlarged in scope and military significance,” Akbarzadeh noted. “In the past, the Strait of Hormuz was defined as a limited area ​around islands such as Hormuz and Hengam, but today this view has changed. The Strait is now defined as a strategic zone stretching from ‌the ⁠city of Jask in the east to Siri Island in the west.”

We asked the White House and CENTCOM for reactions to the IRGC Navy announcement. The White House dismissed it.

“During Operation Epic Fury, Iran was crushed militarily – their ballistic missiles are destroyed, their production facilities are dismantled, their navy is sunk, and their proxies are weakened. Now, they are being strangled economically by Operation Economic Fury and losing $500 million per day thanks to the United States military’s successful blockade of Iranian ports,” White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly told us. “The Iranian regime knows full well their current reality is not sustainable, and President Trump holds all the cards as negotiators work to make a deal.”

CENTCOM has not responded to our query.

The reported expansion is the second announced by Iran since the start of its conflict with the U.S. and Israel.

The IRGC did not specify what actions it would take under its expanded definition. However, while the vast majority of Iran’s naval forces have been destroyed during Epic Fury, it has been attacking ships in the region with cruise missiles, drones and its fleet of small attack boats that remains largely intact. In addition, Iran has reportedly continued mining the Strait even after the April 7 ceasefire.

Both U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Iran say the IRGC launched strikes against U.S. Navy warships and commercial vessels they were helping to protect during the short-lived Project Freedom on May 4. That was an effort, created by Trump, to help guide ships through the Strait that was paused after about 36 hours. CENTCOM forces responded with strikes on attacking ships. Days later, another exchange of fire took place, with CENTCOM saying it bombed Iranian targets after destroyers came under fire transiting the Strait to the Gulf of Oman.

Meanwhile, the Navy has disabled four Iranian vessels trying to run the ongoing blockade.

The IRGC said the new definition was created in response to yesterday’s statements by President Donald Trump repeating that Iran’s Navy has been destroyed by U.S. attacks during the now-paused Operation Epic Fury.

“This very design and implementation of the new plan shows that this force is present on the scene with authority,” Akbarzadeh proffered.

As we noted yesterday, frustrated by the pace of negotiations, Trump threatened new military action against Iran ranging from resuming Project Freedom to new airstrikes against Iranian targets and perhaps even a ground incursion to retrieve Iran’s highly enriched uranium.

The closure of the Strait is having a direct impact in the U.S., spurring Trump to consider pausing the federal gas tax as a form of relief for American consumers as energy prices soar, The Washington Post noted. The move — which requires congressional approval to pass — would mark the latest in a string of government interventions to address fallout from the war.

“Since the war began in late February, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil, an international benchmark, has skyrocketed from about $70 to more than $107. U.S. gas prices — now an average of $4.50 a gallon — have reached levels not seen since 2022 and contributed to Trump’s falling approval ratings ahead of the November midterms,” the Post stated.

The impacts of the closure are even greater in Asia, which relies more heavily on oil that normally transits the Strait. For instance, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi asked his nation’s 1.4 billion people to spend less on fuel, fertilizer, and travel, The New York Times reported. 

Modi “made these sweeping recommendations in a national address on Sunday after securing a big win for his party in recent state elections,” the newspaper added. “With that victory in hand, he no longer has to worry that voters might punish his candidates for higher prices of fuel, food and transport, which are tightly controlled by India’s government. Instead of subsidizing the losses and running huge budget deficits, India’s leader appears emboldened to ask its people to bear the burden.”

The killing of Izz al-Din al-Haddad, the recently appointed head of Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, has dealt a symbolic blow to the Palestinian group in Gaza, but the impact on its military operations is far from certain.

Al-Haddad was killed on Friday in a sophisticated dual-strike on a residential apartment in Gaza City’s Remal neighbourhood and a vehicle attempting to flee the scene. The delivery of heavy munitions into a densely populated area, packed with displaced civilians, killed seven other Palestinians, including women and children, and wounded 50 people.

Yet, despite Israeli claims that the killing will cripple the group’s operational capacity, analysts argue that its decentralised nature is built to absorb such shocks. As the region watches to see how the resistance faction will respond, al-Haddad’s death raises critical questions about the future of the fragile “ceasefire” and who remains to lead the Qassam Brigades.

Operational impact: Will the Qassam Brigades collapse?

The killings of Qassam Brigades commanders, including Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and Yahya Sinwar’s brother Mohammed, left al-Haddad as the key military figure managing the fight against Israel.

Saeed Ziad, a Palestinian political analyst, told Al Jazeera that while the loss is a “massive symbolic and moral blow” to Palestinians, the immediate operational impact on Hamas’s armed wing will be limited.

“The Qassam Brigades are not built on a hierarchical, sequential structure, but a parallel one,” Ziad explained. “Over the past two decades, Hamas has transitioned into a decentralised guerrilla force. Units operate as isolated, self-sufficient groups with their own logistical supply lines and combat doctrines.”

“If a brigade or battalion loses its commander, the group already knows its mission and has the resources to execute it independently,” he said. Reorganising the Qassam Brigades’ central command to cope with the loss will likely take mere days, not months.

Furthermore, al-Haddad had successfully utilised the October ceasefire with Israel to rebuild the group’s infrastructure. “Over the past 200 days, he reconstructed the resistance’s capabilities – its tunnels, weaponry and combat formations – making it capable of defending itself once again,” Ziad noted.

Who is left in the Hamas military leadership?

Israeli officials have boasted that they are close to dismantling Hamas’s central command, claiming that only two members of the military council before the pre-October 2023 attacks on Israel – Mohammed Awad and Imad Aqel – are alive.

However, analysts point out that Hamas’s military wing, which boasted roughly 50,000 fighters before the war, possesses a deep bench of cadres and a strict protocol for leadership succession that enables it to quickly recover when commanders are killed.

“The resistance typically appoints a first, second, and third deputy for every active commander, from the general commander down to the platoon leaders,” Ziad said. “Filling these voids happens rapidly.”

Hamas immediately confirmed Haddad’s death, with spokesperson Hazem Qassem officially mourning him as the “General Commander” of the Qassam Brigades. He stressed that despite his death being a “massive loss”, the group’s “long journey of resistance continues”.

The ‘Ghost’ of the Qassam Brigades

Born in the early 1970s, al-Haddad joined Hamas upon its inception in 1987. He rose through the ranks from an infantry soldier to commander of the group’s Gaza City Brigade, overseeing six battalions – each consisting of 1,000 fighters plus 4,000 support personnel.

He played a foundational role in establishing al-Majd – Hamas’s internal security apparatus designed to track down Israeli intelligence collaborators. But it was his ability to survive multiple assassination attempts – including bombings of his home in 2009, 2012, 2021, and three separate times during the current genocidal war on Gaza – that earned him the moniker “Ghost”.

Al-Haddad left an indelible strategic mark on the movement as a primary architect of the October 7, 2023 attacks. He personally oversaw the breach of the eastern fence, directed elite units that stormed the Re’im military base and the Fajja outpost. According to intelligence reports, it was al-Haddad who handed localised commanders a paper hours before the attack detailing the operation and ordering the capture of Israeli soldiers.

In January 2025, an Israeli air raid killed his son, Suhaib, but al-Haddad survived and continued to command operations and oversee the detention of Israeli captives until a deal was reached.

A fragile ‘ceasefire’ on the brink

Shortly after Friday’s strike, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz issued a rare joint statement, boasting that the killing was carried out under their direct orders.

Mohannad Mustafa, an analyst of Israeli affairs, said al-Haddad’s killing shows that Israel is attempting to “normalise” blatant violations of the “ceasefire” agreement, while the Netanyahu-Katz statement was an appeal to Washington to allow it to continue the killing campaign. At least 871 Palestinians have been killed since the “ceasefire” was announced on October 10, 2025, most of them civilians.

“Netanyahu is pitching this to the US administration as a necessary step to ‘disarm Hamas’ under the Trump plan,” Mustafa told Al Jazeera. “But the reality is that Israel never wanted this ceasefire. It was imposed on them.”

By systematically killing civilians, police, and military figures without offering immediate justifications for “ceasefire” breaches, Israel aims to provoke a response. “The ultimate goal is to force Hamas to retaliate, leading to the collapse of the agreement and giving Israel the green light to launch ‘Gideon 2’ – a military operation to occupy the entirety of the Gaza Strip,” Mustafa added.

With Netanyahu lacking a definitive strategic victory, such as the total surrender of Hamas, Ziad said the Israeli leadership is now leaning heavily on a “philosophy of assassinations” to project a “picture of victory” to its domestic base.

But history has shown that killings of leading military figures, such as al-Haddad, rarely have a significant long-term impact on armed Palestinian movements like Hamas.

“For the fighters and the society in Gaza, these killings create a blood covenant,” Ziad said. “It hardens their resolve. Retreating after the loss of leaders like Deif, Sinwar, or Haddad is viewed as a betrayal of that blood.”

An Ebola outbreak caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain has killed dozens in Democratic Republic of the Congo and is spreading into Uganda, raising fears of regional transmission. Health officials say instability and shared borders are complicating containment efforts as the World Health Organization declares a global health emergency.

By the time the announcement that Abu Bilal Al-Minuki was killed reached the outside world, the strike itself was already hours old. In the early hours of Saturday, May 16, somewhere in Metele, in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, a compound had been hit. 

First, US President Donald Trump posted a statement on Truth Social. Another came from Bayo Onanuga, Special Advisor to Nigeria’s president on Information and Strategy, on Facebook and X. Al-Minuki, described as one of the most senior figures inside Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), was dead, both statements claimed.

“Tonight, at my direction, brave American forces and the Armed Forces of Nigeria flawlessly executed a meticulously planned and very complex mission to eliminate the most active terrorist in the world from the battlefield. Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, second in command of ISIS globally,” Trump said in the post.  

The Nigerian military said special forces were deployed to block escape routes while air components executed precision strikes against what was described as a “concealed and fortified terrorist enclave.” The mission was completed, the military added, “without casualties or equipment loss on the part of friendly forces.”

During a televised interview, the Director of Nigeria’s Defence Media Operations, Major Gen. Michael Onoja, explained that the US military provided intelligence and surveillance support, while Nigeria deployed boots on the ground for the operation. 

“There were no foreign boots on the ground during this operation. What we received were intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance support and other force enablers,” he said.

There was only one problem: according to the Nigerian military itself, Al-Minuki had already been killed once before – in 2024.

For nearly two years, Al-Minuki’s name – also known as Abubakar Mainok or simply Abu-Mainok – had existed in the strange afterlife of Nigeria’s counterterrorism war; a conflict where terrorist commanders are frequently declared dead only to reappear later through propaganda videos, from Abubakar Shekau to Abu Mus’ab Al-Barnawy. 

“Our determined Nigerian Armed Forces, working closely with the Armed Forces of the United States, conducted a daring joint operation that dealt a heavy blow to the ranks of the Islamic State,” President Bola Ahmed Tinubu said in a statement issued from Aso Villa on Saturday. “Early assessments confirm the elimination of the wanted IS senior leader, Abu-Bilal Al-Manuki, also known as Abu-Mainok, along with several of his lieutenants, during a strike on his compound in the Lake Chad Basin.”

However, in the counterinsurgency operations in northeastern Nigeria, where insurgency and information warfare have become deeply intertwined, certainty is always expensive.

Strategic realignment 

Saturday’s strike was the first major public success to emerge from the military partnership between Nigeria and the US. The operation, designated under Nigeria’s existing counterterrorism framework as falling under Operation Hadin Kai, commenced at 12:01 a.m. and ended at 4:00 a.m. on May 16, according to a statement from the Joint Task Force North-East spokesperson, Lt.-Col. Sani Uba.

The operation reflects a rebuilding of the partnership after it had been almost damaged after a single catastrophic night on Christmas Day 2025, when Donald Trump ordered missile strikes into Sokoto State. Trump framed the strikes as retaliation against militants killing “innocent Christians”—a language that resonated with parts of his domestic base but landed badly across northern Nigeria, where the conflict is far more complicated than the religious framing imposed on it from abroad.

Several of the missiles reportedly malfunctioned. One strike landed near a civilian settlement with no known militant presence. Nigerian officials found themselves balancing two competing realities: the military needed American intelligence and surveillance capabilities, but the Nigerian government could not afford to appear subordinate to the US narrative of the war.

The months that followed produced a quieter arrangement. American military personnel arrived in northeastern Nigeria – eventually around 200 troops – under a structure designed carefully around optics as much as operations. Nigerian authorities retained formal command. The Americans supported intelligence gathering, aerial coordination, and technical operations around the A-29 Super Tucano fleet already deployed against insurgent groups in the Lake Chad Basin.

The choreography surrounding the recent announcement of Al-Minuki’s death was as deliberate as the operation itself. Donald Trump spoke first. Tinubu issued his statement a few hours after Trump posted on Truth Social. Major Gen. Samaila Uba, Director of Defence Information, released a detailed press statement under the Armed Forces of Nigeria letterhead, complete with Al-Minuki’s full array of aliases — Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Minuki, Abor Mainok, Abubakar Mainok, Abakar Mainok — and a comprehensive accounting of his alleged roles. 

Everyone involved in the recent communication appeared determined not to repeat the Sokoto embarrassment on  Christmas Day, when Washington’s messaging had almost completely overshadowed Abuja’s.

“Nigeria appreciates this partnership with the United States in advancing our shared security objectives,” Tinubu said. “I extend my sincere gratitude to President Trump for his leadership and unwavering support in this effort. I look forward to more decisive strikes against all terrorist enclaves across the nation.”

The statement was noted for its tone and content. Tinubu’s public gratitude to Trump marks a significant shift from the friction that defined the relationship only five months ago, when parts of Nigeria’s political and diplomatic establishment, along with some ordinary Nigerians, were quietly furious over both the Christmas strikes and the framing of responding to the claims of Christian genocide that accompanied them. 

So who exactly was Al-Minuki?

Trump described him as “the second in command of ISIS globally.” AFRICOM called him “the director of global operations for ISIS”. The Nigerian Defence Headquarters offered the most specific claim: that as recently as February 2026, Al-Minuki “may have been elevated to the position of Head of the General Directorate of States, placing him as the second most senior leader within the ISIS global hierarchy.”

The same statement linked him to the 2018 Dapchi kidnapping of more than 100 schoolgirls, to the facilitation of fighters into Libya between 2015 and 2016, to weapons manufacturing and drone development, and to “economic warfare” coordination across the Sahel.

“His death removes a critical node through which ISIS coordinated and directed operations across different regions of the world,” the Defence Headquarters’ (DHQ) statement said.

Al-Minuki was a product of the insurgency itself. Born in 1982 in Mainok, a town along the Benisheikh axis of Borno State, he took his nom de guerre (pseudonym) from his hometown. Those who knew him in his early years, during the rise of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, told HumAngle that he was a young man who ran a small barbing salon in Mainok village, about 58 kilometres west of Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria. Long before his name became associated with violence and insurgency, he was known simply as a village barber.

Before pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015, he was a senior Boko Haram commander with a documented antagonism toward Abubakar Shekau. His split with Shekau was a result of competing visions of insurgency: Shekau operated through spectacle, brutality, and deliberate isolation from the Islamic State central command. The faction that became ISWAP sought structure, territorial governance, and integration with the IS international hierarchy. When IS reportedly requested fighters for Libya during the height of the Syrian conflict, Shekau refused. Al-Minuki, then commanding ISWAP’s Lake Chad division, complied — one reason, analysts say, he rose within IS’s provincial bureaucracy while Shekau remained suspect in its eyes.

The DHQ’s assertion that Al-Minuki served as “Nigeria-based al-Furqan GDP Office Emir” from 2023 onward is consistent with what analysts had been tracking for several years: his role as the connective tissue between ISWAP’s local operations and the IS’s transnational administrative architecture. His designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US in June 2023 under Executive Order 13224, cited in Saturday’s military statement, reflected assessments that he had become central to ISWAP’s financial networks, weapons procurement, drone acquisition, and communications between the Lake Chad insurgency and IS-linked structures across West Africa and the Sahel. 

The “second in command of ISIS globally” framing is a political claim, pitched to an American domestic audience that requires a recognisable villain. Still, it doesn’t situate Al-Minuki well within ISIS’s formal hierarchy. 

Al-Minuki had long occupied a powerful position within the ranks of ISWAP, but his influence deepened after the deaths of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and, later, the death of Abu Rumaisa or Abba, both sons of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf in 2023, as reported by HumAngle. Their deaths created a vacuum at the centre of the ISWAP leadership structure and how it interacts with the Islamic State global networks, thrusting Mainok into a more strategic role in coordinating operations of the terror group across the Lake Chad region.

Al-Minuki was the man most responsible for keeping ISWAP wired into the Islamic State’s international infrastructure. His death is a meaningful disruption, but not the decapitation of a global terrorist hierarchy. 

ISWAP has repeatedly demonstrated that it can regenerate leadership after losses. It replaced leaders and survived the loss of top commanders. Its resilience has never derived primarily from any single commander; rather, it has stemmed from the political and economic conditions within Borno and across the Lake Chad Basin that continue to enable recruitment, taxation, and territorial control. The DHQ acknowledged as much, noting that “Battle Damage Assessment is ongoing, while follow-up exploitation operations are being conducted to clear remaining terrorist elements in the area.”

“Mistaken identity” 

The official statement from the Army said it was common for numerous terrorists to use the same names or aliases, suggesting that both the individual killed in 2024 and the commander killed in this strike shared the same name. It did not acknowledge any mistakes. 

“This time around, this individual [we killed] is the original owner of that name,” the Director of the Defence Media Operation said. 

Meanwhile, Bayo Onanuga, President Tinubu’s spokesperson, in a Facebook post on Saturday, claimed the discrepancy between the person killed in 2024 and the one killed now was due to a case of mistaken identity. He also warned that sceptics had “rushed to question the authenticity of the Nigerian-American joint military operation” and said the criticism was “premature and not grounded in the realities of modern counterterrorism operations.” He noted that Nigeria’s Armed Forces were “operating in one of the world’s most complex insurgency environments where targets often move across borders and use multiple identities.”

Nigeria has lived through this before. Shekau was declared dead multiple times across more than a decade until soldiers grew to distrust the announcements and civilians in Borno learned to reserve judgment until they saw real change on the ground.

The Presidency’s warning that “premature dismissal of military claims can inadvertently undermine operational morale and strategic messaging” is a legitimate concern. But it is also an argument for public deference rather than public accountability. 

For now, Trump has another example to point to as evidence that American military engagement abroad delivers results. Tinubu also has a successful joint operation that projects competence and international partnership without appearing commanded from outside.

The Armed Forces of Nigeria, in Major Gen. Uba’s words, have demonstrated “unwavering resolve to confront terrorism and deny extremist groups the ability to threaten national, regional and international security.”

But in the displacement camps and farming communities scattered across Borno State, the significance of Saturday’s strike will be measured differently. 

Russia has announced a successful test of its long-delayed Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which President Vladimir Putin now says will be operationally deployed later this year. The weapon, developed to deliver multiple nuclear warheads over great distances, has had a very mixed track record of testing so far, and was once planned to be fielded in 2020. All this makes today’s announcements more significant, although they have yet to be independently verified.

The test-launch from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk region took place at 11:15 a.m. Moscow time today, according to the Kremlin. Around half an hour later, Russian officials said that the missile hit its target at the Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia’s Far East.

The commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Sergei Karakayev, informed Putin of the successful test. The Russian leader monitored the launch via video link from his office bunker.

Putin called the test a “major event and unconditional success.”

“The positive results of the Sarmat missile system launch will allow us to deploy the first missile regiment armed with this missile system to combat duty in the Uzhur formation of Krasnoyarsk Krai by the end of this year,” he added, referring to the 62nd Red Banner Rocket Division at Uzhur in Siberia.  

Putin says the missile’s range could exceed 35,000 kilometers (21,748 miles).

The RS-28 Sarmat, known to NATO by the codename SS-29 Satan II, is Russia’s new-generation heavy ICBM, intended to replace the Soviet-era R-36M2 system (SS-18 Satan).

A video shows the launch of the R-36M2 ICBM (SS-18 Satan):

Russian Intercontinental ballistic missile SS-18 Satan R36M2 Voevoda

The Sarmat is a silo-launched, liquid-fueled, nuclear-armed ICBM. The missile will reportedly have a host of capabilities intended to defeat ballistic missile defenses, ranging from decoys and other countermeasures to a fractional orbital bombardment capability, and independent post-boost vehicles (IPBV). There have even been suggestions that it could carry a payload of multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.

While these features are all relatively novel, the fact that the Sarmat is liquid-fueled might seem like something of a throwback to the Cold War. However, as we have discussed in the past, it does bring certain benefits:

A liquid-fueled ICBM might seem somewhat dated, but it does offer the advantage of a more capable and dynamic propulsion arrangement. But unlike a solid fuel design, it has historically been difficult to keep these types of missiles in a fueled state indefinitely, often meaning that launch crews had to go through a lengthy process of fueling the weapon shortly before launch. However, a hydrazine-based liquid rocket fuel with nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as the oxidizer provides a more stable, less corrosive option that allows for long-term storage of missiles in a fueled, ready state when combined with the right component materials and environmental controls.

Details of the missile were presented by Putin back in 2018, at the same time he unveiled several previously unknown strategic weapons systems.

An official video of the Sarmat released by the Russian Ministry of Defense in 2018:

Ракетный комплекс «Сармат»

The first successful test launch of the Sarmat took place in 2022, also from Plesetsk. However, it was followed by a failed test launch in February 2023. A further test in September 2024 was also unsuccessful, leading to the destruction of the Yubileynaya test silo at Plesetsk. 

The original plan was for the Sarmat to become operational in 2020, something that obviously did not come to pass.

Exactly what has caused the problems is unclear. The delays could be due to technical issues with the missile, Russia’s sluggish economy, or, very likely, a combination of factors. 

Indeed, there were delays in the development of the Sarmat even before Russia launched its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has led to international sanctions and other strains on the country’s defense industrial base.

On the other hand, the slow progress made by the Sarmat so far means that it will now enter service after the demise of the New START Treaty, which expired in 2021.

New START had placed hard limits on the number of deployed and non-deployed land-based ICBMs, total available launch tubes for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers that Russia and the United States could have in total. The agreement also set a firm limit on total deployed and non-deployed systems.

With those limits now gone, Russia will be able to replace the R-36M with Sarmat on a one-for-one basis, while still maintaining its other ICBMs if it desires, and moving ahead with other strategic weapons modernization programs, including the Avangard nuclear-armed hypersonic boost-glide vehicle.

A video released in conjunction with the fielding of the Avangard missile complex at the Dombarovsky Strategic Rocket Forces base:

Ракетный комплекс «Авангард»

Even under New START regulations, Russia had fewer than 520 deployed “launchers” as of September 2018, with the treaty allowing for a maximum of 700 such systems. These “launchers” in this context comprise land-based ICBMs, SLBM launch tubes, and heavy bombers.

Meanwhile, the lifting of New START limits on America’s nuclear arsenal means that, at this point, it is unclear whether or not the new LGM-35A Sentinel ICBMs will carry multiple warheads. Like the Sarmat, the Sentinel has faced issues, chief among them major delays and spiraling costs, driven heavily by complexities associated with building new infrastructure. Regardless, the ongoing development of the Sentinel in the United States is also spurring work on the Sarmat program.

At this stage, it remains to be seen whether the apparent success of the test today allows the Sarmat to enter service before the end of the year. So far, its test history has been distinctly patchy. If the missile can be perfected, however, it could pave the way for Russia to deploy even more strategic missiles in the future, with the potential for triggering a new arms race.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The Pentagon says it is working to amend its proposed Fiscal Year 2027 budget to request new funding for E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft to replace the U.S. Air Force’s aging E-3 Sentry jets. The original version did not ask for any money for E-7, which had raised the prospect of a new fight with Congress over the future of the program. Legislators intervened earlier this year to reverse a previous attempt to axe the Wedgetail. Secretary Pete Hegseth, previously a chief advocate for the cancellation, says his Department’s “mindset” has now fundamentally changed.

Rep. Tom Cole, an Oklahoma Republican, asked Hegseth for an update on the E-7 during a hearing before members of the House Appropriations Committee earlier today. In his question, Cole, who is Chairman of the committee, also highlighted the loss of one of the Air Force’s existing E-3s, also known as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, in an Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia in March. That has put new emphasis on the Wedgetail program. The latest conflict with Iran has also just added to the already significant strains on the dwindling fleet of aging E-3s, as TWZ has previously explored in detail.

“Let me ask you a specific question, and you may want to get back to me on this, I don’t know, but we’ve had some discussion over – you know, we lost one E-3. On the ground, thank goodness. Looks like no crew loss,” Rep. Cole said, leading into his question. “This committee has been interested in investing in the E-7. The Pentagon signed the contract for five additional planes. [It is] not in the Air Force budget [for Fiscal Year 2027]. Is there going to be a fix to that? Where are we at on thinking about the E-7?”

As of April, the Air Force had awarded contracts to Boeing for a total of seven developmental E-7s. Versions of the Wedgetail are already in service in Australia, South Korea, and Turkey. The United Kingdom is also set to field a fleet of these aircraft. However, a U.S.-specific configuration is now in the works.

“I am well aware of that dynamic. I know our department had taken the position that it was … other satellite ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities] that was probably going to be capable of a lot of that in the future,” Hegseth said in response to Rep. Cole’s question. “But I think that mindset was indicative of a mindset that we’ve shed, which is the divest-to-invest mindset, which was an austerity mindset, that we’re going to get continuing resolution after continuing resolution. So, we [sic] got to get rid of these platforms in order to invest in these platforms. And there are gaps that need to still be filled. And there are systems that still need to be funded that are used on the battlefield right now, say, MQ-9s, A-10s, you name it.”

“And the E-7 is one of those,” Hegseth continued. “So, we’ve actually sent a budget amendment to OMB [Office of Management and Budget at the White House] to add that. I think it has a future. It has a place on the battlefield. And we’ll get more information for you on that, as well.”

The continuing resolutions referenced here are short-term federal government spending packages that Congress routinely approves when it cannot pass a full annual budget.

Secretary Hegseth also touched on the Air Force’s long-term plan, which remains unchanged publicly, to eventually push most, if not all, air moving-target indicator (AMTI) tasks into orbit. His comments today implicitly acknowledge that cancelling the E-7 program would have risked a serious capability gap in the near term, with the hopes of a better solution coming in the future. This is something TWZ had been sounding the alarm on since last year. Despite major investments and prototyping activities already underway, those space-based capabilities are still years away, at best, from becoming a reality. The Air Force’s original plan to replace a portion of its E-3 fleet with E-7s underscored the expectation that airborne early warning aircraft would also continue to play a vital role for years to come.

As a replacement for the E-3, the E-7 is a much more modern and capable aircraft. The Wedgetail is arguably the best airborne look-down sensor platform anywhere in the world at present, which is especially valuable for spotting long-range kamikaze drones, as well as cruise missiles. The Boeing 737-based design is also adaptable to other mission needs, including battle management and serving as a networking node using its own expansive communications and data-sharing suite. TWZ highlighted all of this in March, when Australia announced it was sending one of its E-7s to the Middle East to help Gulf Arab States defend against Iranian attacks.

Northrop Grumman MESA Radar – Boeing E-7 AEWC

Hegseth’s comments today on the change in mindset at the Pentagon do not touch on the argument that he and others made last year, that the E-7 was too vulnerable to be viable in future conflicts. This was despite an accompanying plan for the acquisition of more of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes that the U.S. Navy currently flies to fill airborne early warning capability gaps in the absence of an Air Force Wedgetail fleet. TWZ and others had quickly pointed out that the same survivability questions applied equally to the E-2D, which is also not as capable an aircraft as the E-7, which you can read more about here.

When previously arguing for its cancellation, Hegseth and others had also cited cost overruns and delays that had befallen the Air Force’s Wedgetail program since it first kicked off back in 2022.

As noted, Congress had interceded to save the E-7 from purgatory, at least in Fiscal Year 2026, appropriating more than $1 billion in new funding for the program. Of the seven Wedgetails the Air Force has on order now, five were put on contract just this past March. The service had previously ordered two other jets to support rapid prototyping efforts. Even so, the Air Force had continued to sound somewhat noncommittal about the future of the E-7 program.

“We, of course, as we always do, follow congressional direction, and we will do the [E-7] rapid prototypes. We will fund those rapid prototypes,” Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink told TWZ and other outlets at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in February. “They told us to deliver a plan for additional aircraft. Now we will do that.”

“By the way, ‘deliver a plan’ does not mean we’re going to put it in the budget,” Meink also said at that time. “We will deliver a plan of what it takes to do it, and then we’ll have a discussion with them [Congress].”

This is what turned out to be the case, at least initially, with the E-7 again being absent from the Air Force’s proposed 2027 Fiscal Year budget when it was rolled out in full last month.

“The Department [of the Air Force] is committing to work with you to figure out how to adjust the [20]27 budget submission to fund the E-7, and then work the [20]28 [budget] going forward,” Meink said at a separate hearing more recently, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

Despite the Pentagon saying its position on the E-7 has now completely changed, when the Air Force might begin flying the jets operationally remains to be seen. The service’s original goal was to have Wedgetails flying real-world missions in 2027, but the schedule had already slipped to 2032 by the beginning of last year. Though it is back underway now, the program was effectively frozen for much of 2025, which could easily have set the timeline back even further. Steps could also now be taken to try to accelerate the acquisition and fielding of the aircraft.

In the meantime, the E-3 fleet, which has already shrunk dramatically in recent years, continues to struggle to meet operational requirements. Demand for AWACSs has now surged further due to the latest conflict with Iran. As noted, the Iranians also destroyed one of these prized aircraft in March. The Air Force has said that it is looking into replacing various aircraft lost in the fighting with Iran so far, but it is unclear if this will include regenerating a previously retired Sentry from storage. That would be a long and costly process, but there is no other realistic source available for a replacement E-3, the very last of which were delivered in the early 1990s.

As it stands now, the Pentagon and the Air Force look to have fully dropped their opposition to moving ahead with fielding the already sorely needed fleet of new E-7s.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

It could cost nearly $1.2 trillion to develop, field, and operate a new missile defense shield like the one the Trump administration proposes to establish under its Golden Dome initiative, according to a new estimate. Deploying and sustaining a constellation of 7,800 space-based anti-missile interceptors accounts for more than 60 percent of that projected price tag. This puts a particular spotlight on the potential costs of what is arguably viewed as the most critical and controversial aspect of the Golden Dome plan. At the same time, even with this grand investment, the ability of the space-based interceptor layer would only be able to engage 10 targets simultaneously, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

CBO released a detailed cost estimate of what it described as a notional “National Missile Defense System” yesterday. CBO’s $1.191 trillion figure covers various expenses over a 20-year timeframe. This is more than double the projected price tag that CBO had put forward last year. President Trump first announced plans for a new national missile defense architecture in January 2025. The initiative was originally dubbed Iron Dome before being renamed Golden Dome.

“The analysis is based on the objectives laid out in the President’s executive order titled ‘The Iron Dome for America.’ The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) implementation of that order – an initiative now called the Golden Dome for America (GDA) – is in the early stages,” CBO’s latest estimate explains up front. “Although documents from DoD’s budget request for the 2027 fiscal year provide five-year projections of funding plans for GDA, details about what and how many systems will be deployed – the ‘objective architecture’ – have not been released, making it impossible to estimate the long-term cost of the GDA system being contemplated by DoD. In the absence of specific plans for GDA’s objective architecture, CBO has estimated the cost of a notional NMD architecture based on the defensive systems and capabilities that are called for in the executive order.”

“DoD’s stated cost appears to cover a shorter time frame than CBO’s analysis and may reflect a different scope of activities and budget categories. Even so, that stated cost is far lower than CBO’s estimate for a notional NMD architecture consistent with the ‘Iron Dome” executive order,” CBO’s assessment adds. “That difference suggests either that GDA’s objective architecture is more limited than CBO’s notional NMD system or that DoD expects significant funding from other accounts to contribute to GDA (or both). For example, procurement of interceptors might be funded directly through the services’ missile procurement accounts instead of the GDA fund.”

For its part, the Trump administration has most recently pegged the price tag for Golden Dome’s “objective architecture” at approximately $185 billion. Last year, President Trump himself had put forward a $175 billion figure, which he said would include systems to be fielded “in less than three years.” TWZ has noted on several occasions now that the administration’s estimates may just cover a portion of the planned Golden Dome architecture, which could easily cost hundreds of billions in total to field and operate.

CBO’s analysis is broken into six main elements – the space-based interceptor constellation, upper wide-area surface sites, lower wide-area surface sites, regional sectors, self-defense for four existing surface sites, and a space satellite constellation for tracking targets – as well as a collection of miscellaneous ancillary costs. The surface site and regional sector categories primarily consist of costs associated with expanding on existing land and sea-based anti-missile interceptor and sensor capabilities, such as Aegis Ashore, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, and the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI).

An all-new constellation of 7,800 space-based interceptors is, by far, the largest single component of CBO’s projection. This capability is estimated to cost $723 billion to acquire, and then another $1 billion annually to operate and maintain ($20 billion over 20 years), for a total of $743 billion. This is 60 percent of the total estimated $1.191 trillion price tag, and 70 percent of the projected acquisition costs.

CBO provides a detailed breakdown of how it arrived at these figures.

“The average cost per SBI [space-based interceptor] satellite would be $22 million. That average is for the initial 7,800 SBIs as well as the nearly 1,600 SBIs that would be needed each year thereafter because of the satellites’ short five-year service life. The need to periodically replace SBIs means that the acquisition costs would be spread over the life of the system,” according to the cost assessment. “The total is based on a cost of $500 per kilogram to launch the SBIs into orbit. Although that launch cost is lower than typical launch costs today, it is thought to be achievable using the new generation of heavy-lift rockets, such as the Space-X [sic] Starship, that are being developed. Even lower launch costs may be realized in the future, but that could have only a limited effect on total costs for the SBI layer because, even at $500 per kilogram, launch costs account for less than 5 percent of the total.”

“Both the very large number of SBIs needed to engage just 10 targets simultaneously and the SBIs’ short service life are the result of how the satellites move in orbit. To be close enough to reach their targets within the three to five minutes available in the boost phase, SBIs must be in LEO at altitudes of roughly 300 to 500 kilometers,” it continues. “However, the characteristics of satellite motion in LEO affect the size of constellations meant to provide continuous coverage over specific locations on Earth. (For boost-phase SBIs, “coverage” is relative to an ICBM’s [intercontinental ballistic missile] launch location, not the location of the ICBM’s target.)”

“Satellites in LEO cannot be fixed over specific points on Earth; they orbit in a band centered on the equator and bounded equally north and south by their orbital inclination (usually measured in degrees of latitude). Therefore, constellations of many SBIs are needed to ensure that a sufficient number (20, for example, if two shots are needed against 10 ICBMs) are always close enough to potential launch locations to reach targets during the boost phase,” the assessment adds. “The total number of satellites in a constellation depends mainly on the speed of the interceptors, how quickly they can be launched, the number of simultaneous targets the system needs to handle, and the latitudes to be covered.”

“Because atmospheric drag at the altitudes at which SBIs would orbit causes their orbits to decay over time, each satellite would need to be replaced roughly every 5 years. (By contrast, the service life of surface-based interceptors can be 20 years or more, and surface-based interceptors can be maintained and upgraded during that time.),” CBO also says. “For CBO’s notional constellation, roughly 30,000 satellites would be needed to keep 7,800 in orbit for 20 years.”

All this being said, CBO’s notional space-based interceptor architecture is still predicated only on defeating a relatively limited strike (a single wave of 10 ICBMs) from “a regional adversary,” a term typically used to describe countries like North Korea and Iran. The Trump administration has indicated in the past that Golden Dome is intended to defend against a much broader array of threats, including from peer adversaries like Russia and China.

Furthermore, CBO points out that its cost estimate does not include additional space-based interceptors designed to engage missiles during the mid-course portion of their flight, which are also being explored now as part of the Golden Dome plan.

“Although the notional NMD system analyzed by CBO would be far more capable than defenses the United States fields today, it would not be an impenetrable shield or be able to fully counter a large attack of the sort that Russia or China might be able to launch,” the latest cost estimate also stresses. “As a result, the strategic consequences of deploying an NMD system with the capacity considered here are unclear because they hinge on an adversary’s perception of the defense’s capability and how that adversary chose [sic] to respond.”

“Such a deployment could prompt regional adversaries to increase their inventories of long-range missiles (nuclear or conventional) or to pursue more effective countermeasures to improve their chances of penetrating the NMD system,” the assessment notes. “Peer or near-peer adversaries could overwhelm CBO’s notional NMD system with salvoes of many missiles in a large-scale attack with their current nuclear forces, although they still might choose to increase their arsenals of long-range missiles (both nuclear and conventional) to ensure they maintain that capability.”

With this in mind, “DoD could opt to build a national missile defense system that was smaller or larger than (or altogether different from) CBO’s notional system. A larger system designed to handle a full-scale Russian ICBM attack, for example, could include more space-based interceptors or more NGIs at the three upper wide-area surface layer sites,” it also cautions. “It could also include more interceptors at lower levels. A smaller system, by contrast, might be able to engage fewer missiles or protect fewer areas. The total number of regional sectors in CBO’s notional system is based on providing some terminal coverage to the entire country as suggested by the language in the ‘Iron Dome’ executive order.”

As mentioned, putting interceptors in space has been one of, if not the highest profile aspect of the stated Iron Dome/Golden Dome plan from the very start. Space-based weapons were also a central element of the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was directly referenced in the original executive order outlining the new missile defense initiative. Infamously dubbed “Star Wars” by its critics, SDI never came close to achieving its ambitious goals. Its planned anti-missile capabilities in orbit were especially hampered by technical challenges and high costs.

The U.S. Space Force is already leading a new SBI program, with a stated goal of demonstrating a relevant capability integrated into the larger Golden Dome architecture by 2028. Space Force has already awarded deals with a combined value of $3.2 billion to 12 companies for SBI-related work. Several firms, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Anduril, have already announced work on prototype interceptor designs.

The Northrop Grumman video below includes a computer-generated clip depicting a space-based interceptor engaging a target outside the Earth’s atmosphere, starting at 0:13 in the runtime.

Northrop Grumman Third Quarter 2025 Highlights

Over the past year and a half or so, U.S. military officials have voiced particular support for the space-based component of Golden Dome, saying that advances in relevant technologies in the decades since SDI make it a more viable concept today. They have also downplayed the costs, as well as the geopolitical ramifications of further weaponizing space, as necessary to defend Americans against growing missile threats.

“I think there’s a lot of technical challenges,” Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said during a live interview as part of Defense One‘s State of Defense 2025: Air Force and Space Force virtual conference last year. “I am so impressed by the innovative spirit of the American space industry. I’m pretty convinced that we will be able to technically solve those challenges.”

“Depends on where you sit, right, you know? But to say that it’s the responsibility for the U.S. government to protect its citizens from emerging threats makes perfect sense to me,” he added at that time when asked about the potentially destabilizing impacts of Golden Dome. “And we clearly see a country like the PRC [People’s Republic of China] investing heavily in these kinds of threats, whether it’s hypersonic [weapons], whether it’s threats from space. And so now it’s time for the U.S. government to step up to the responsibilities to protect American citizens from those threats.”

“We’re basically responding to a warfighting domain where our adversaries have already put interceptors in space, and we want to make sure that we rebalance that in terms of deterrence,” Saltzman said more recently in response to a question from our Howard Altman at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in February.

“Interceptors by definition refer to a handful of well-acknowledged capabilities that other countries have, like ground and air-launched anti-satellite missiles or capabilities like the SJ-21, which has a grappling arm,” a Space Force spokesperson later clarified to TWZ when asked for further details about the “interceptors in space” Saltzman had mentioned.

This all highlights the very real prospect of actual fighting in space during future conflicts, something the U.S. military is increasingly preparing for, as you can read about more here. What would be necessary to protect 7,800 anti-missile interceptors in orbit, as well as critical associated space-based sensors and communications constellations, could easily add to Golden Dome’s total cost.

As CBO makes clear in its latest assessment, much is still unknown publicly about the actual scale and scope of Golden Dome, and what it might therefore cost in the end. At the same time, space-based interceptors are a very real part of the planned architecture, with work underway now to develop those capabilities.

The concept that CBO has outlined already involves an extreme expenditure of money and resources, all for a capability it still assesses to be useful only against relatively limited barrages from rogue states. Those are threats that could well be addressed using far less expensive surface-based systems, though not ones that can intercept targets in their boost phase.

As underscored now by CBO’s latest cost projection, a relevant constellation of interceptors in space remains likely to be the most costly and complex aspect of Golden Dome, if it comes to fruition at all.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Every major war in the Middle East has left the region permanently altered in ways that nobody fully anticipated at the time. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war created a refugee crisis whose consequences are still being negotiated seventy-eight years later. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran reorganized the entire regional security architecture around a new fault line that nobody had planned for. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq created a vacuum that Iran filled faster and more effectively than anyone in Washington had anticipated, reshaping the balance of power across the Levant in ways that took a decade to fully understand.

The 2026 Iran war belongs in that category. Not because the outcome is clear, it is not, and the ceasefire that is currently holding is fragile enough that anyone claiming certainty about what comes next is not paying close enough attention. But because the war has already crossed several thresholds that cannot be uncrossed, set several precedents that will shape behavior for years, and broken several assumptions that the regional order was quietly depending on without anyone fully acknowledging it.

Here are seven dynamics that will define the Middle East that emerges from this war, whenever the shooting finally stops for good.

1.      Iran Survives, But the Rules It Played By Are Gone

2.      The Gulf Has Been Permanently Unsettled

3.      The Normalization Project Is Frozen

4.      The US-Israel Relationship Has a New Fracture

5.      China Emerged as the Indispensable Power

6.      The Nuclear Domino Is Now Spinning

7.      The Gulf’s Self-Image Is Broken, and Rebuilding It Will Take a Generation

Authorities have confirmed ‘Timmy’ the whale, whose rescue drew global attention, has been found dead off the coast of Denmark. The news comes two weeks after his complicated rescue off Germany’s Baltic coast and release into the North Sea.

Rousey won the fight with her signature armbar lock, forcing Carano into submission just 17 seconds into the bout.

Mixed martial arts (MMA) star Ronda Rousey has re-retired after demolishing fellow combat sports trailblazer Gina Carano in their long-awaited non-title comeback bout in Los Angeles, defeating her rival by armbar after just 17 seconds.

After a hype-filled build-up, the bout on Saturday was a jarring anti-climax, with Rousey flooring Carano almost immediately before wrestling her into an armbar to end the fight.

American stars Rousey, 39, and Carano, 44, are widely regarded as two of the most important female fighters in the history of MMA, helping to take the sport into the mainstream during their fighting heydays more than a decade ago.

Carano had parlayed her success into a Hollywood career, appearing in several action movie roles, but had not fought since 2009 before her appearance in Saturday’s featherweight bout.

Rousey, a 2008 Olympics judo bronze medallist who subsequently found huge success in the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), retired from the sport in 2016 after suffering back-to-back defeats against Amanda Nunes and Holly Holm.

The fighters were lured back into the cage for Saturday’s card at the Intuit Dome with the promise of a bumper payday that will reportedly see each fighter earn several million dollars from the streaming giant.

Rousey (13-2-0 MMA) secured her 10th submission win, returning to the cage following an exit from MMA in December 2016.

She insisted afterwards her return to the ring was a one-off and ruled out the possibility of fighting again after paying tribute to Carano.

“Gina is the only person who could have brought me back into MMA – she’s my hero,” Rousey said. “She changed my world, and we changed the world, and I’ll never ever forget that or be able to pay that back enough.

“I’m so glad we finally got to share this moment.”

Asked about possibly extending her comeback, Rousey added: “There’s no way I could have ended it better than this. I want to have some more babies, got to get cooking.”

Carano (7-2-0 MMA) ⁠⁠had been inactive in the sport since August 2009, returning to MMA after a conversation last year at Rousey’s encouragement. She admitted the fight was too fast for her, regretting what ⁠⁠more she could have done in a short timeframe.

“I feel great,” Carano said after the loss. “I wanted to fight, ⁠⁠and I didn’t get that. But she trained. She ⁠⁠had her game plan. I have so much love and respect for her, and this was a victory in my life. She changed it. I woke up at 3am every morning thinking about ‌‌her. I fell back in love with mixed martial arts. There’s ‌‌so ‌‌many things to think about here. It’s just [that] the fight didn’t go my way.

“I wanted that to last longer – I felt like I was so ready, I felt so good,” she said. “But I haven’t been here for 17 years. I wanted to hit her.”

Carano, 44, is unsure whether she’ll return to MMA, choosing to keep the door open.

Carano said the mere fact of getting in shape for her return – she revealed before the bout she had shed more than 100 pounds (45kg) in the two years leading up to the contest – was a victory.

“Right now, just getting in the cage was a victory, getting here after 17 years is a victory. Fighting a legend was a victory. I feel great, I just wanted to fight, and I didn’t get to do that.”

Iran to reveal its plan for Strait of Hormuz soon as Israel attacks Lebanon and Gaza, killing and wounding dozens.

Iraq’s new prime minister Ali al‑Zaidi has formally taken office in Baghdad, pledging sweeping economic and financial reforms. Al-Zaidi only has a partial cabinet as parliament is yet to approve key ministers, including interior and defence.

Activist group Led By Donkeys has snuck a big screen streaming pro-immigration messages into a far-right Unite the Kingdom march. The stunt prompted boos from the crowd and attempts to shut the screen down. Tens of thousands of people attended the rally.

Forced to defend against thousands of Iranian drone and missile attacks before and after the ceasefire in the now-paused U.S.-Israel war on Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appears to have taken a play from Russia and its war with Ukraine in an attempt to secure some of its energy facilities with massive metal ‘cope cages.’

An image posted on X by Israel’s I24 News outlet shows what it claims is caging around oil tanks near Dubai International Airport. In the far-right section of the photo, what appears to be a more complete metal enclosure of some of the fuel tanks can be seen, while in the foreground, construction looks to be taking place on caging for additional tanks.

This seems to be the first sighting of these structures in the UAE and across the Gulf Arab nations. It is unclear when construction on the structures began or how many of these barriers the UAE is building or plans to build. We have reached out to the UAE Embassy in Washington for more details.

As we have reported in the past, the idea behind these kinds of metal structures is to mitigate the damage caused by incoming munitions by creating a barrier between the point of weapon impact and the target. The caging depicted is not designed to protect against Iranian ballistic missiles, and even cruise missiles could be a challenge. These kinds of structures are made to help defend against one-way attack munitions, such as the Shahed-136, many of which Iran has launched against the UAE. They can also protect from near-field small suicide drone attacks, although these have not been a major issue in the UAE during this conflict.

As noted earlier, while these structures may be new to the UAE, it is not the first time metal caging and even mesh nets have been used to protect critical energy infrastructure. Russia has employed these measures on its oil storage facilities in attempts to protect them from repeated Ukrainian drone attacks for a number of years now.

You can see some of those defensive measures in the following images and videos.

Russia Puts Cope Cages on Oil Storage Tanks

Hours after hunkering down during Russia’s most intense Shahed-136 drone barrage of the war, the head of the country’s defense technology incubator spoke with us about the interceptor drones his country developed to defend against them.

Some of these small munitions cost about $1,000 a piece and can reach speeds of nearly 200 miles per hour. Some also have AI-assisted guidance. They have proven to be a far cheaper alternative to effectors like Patriot interceptors – costing more than $5 million a piece – and even far less advanced missiles for downing Shaheds, which have caused widespread destruction across Ukraine for years. In an hour-long interview, Brave1 CEO Andrii Hrytseniuk talked about how Ukraine developed Shahed interceptors, their effectiveness and the growing interest from the U.S. – which produced its own drone-killing interceptor that Ukraine has used – and other allies. He also spoke about Ukraine’s burgeoning uncrewed ground vehicle industry, which we will discuss in the second part of this interview.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity.

In total, we have more than 150 Ukrainian companies who are producing interceptors. And these are interceptors of different architecture. Some are small rocket type first-person view (FPV) drones. In some cases, they resemble small planes. In some cases, they resemble big planes. Some of them are X wings, like a combination between FPV and fixed wing. We use different varieties in different regions and different conditions. 

Q: How do you determine which interceptors are right for the job?

A: As an example, in case the Shaheds are coming from the Black Sea, where we have Odessa and other cities on the coast, small interceptors are used only in the last kilometers. The planes are used like loitering munitions, flying for hours and when they find a Shahed, they destroy it.

We need some interceptors that are capable of flying for hours and for hundreds of kilometers. For some, we need just a small diameter zone of protection.

Q: Given the success you’ve had with interceptor drones, have the U.S. and allies in the Gulf reached out, considering the death and destruction caused by Shahed drones launched by Iran?

You can see video of one of those attacks below.

A: I am permanently discussing and we are involved in discussion of interceptors and the potential of interceptors. And of course, it’s one of the top priorities for all countries to build the capability to use interceptors.

Ukraine is able to produce more than 2,000 interceptors per day, and this is not a maximum per day, more than 2,000. And for us, this is not a threshold, not a limit. In the case of export contracts and procurements, we can do much more than 2,000 per day. As an example, during the terroristic attack of Russia, they used more than 1,300 Shaheds and this was just during the last 24 hours. So of course, we need to have a huge number of interceptors.

Q:  Did you use more than 1,000 interceptors to defend against them?

A: I will not share details of how many Shaheds were destroyed by interceptors or other types of weapons, but in total, we were able to hit 97% of all Shaheds. This is the public information from our air defense command.

The following video shows some of the aftermath of the recent Russian Shahed barrage.

Search and rescue operations are ongoing in Kyiv following a Russian strike on a residential apartment building.

As of now, five people have been killed by Russia, and more than 10 people remain missing.

Around 40 people were injured in the attack, while 28 have been rescued… pic.twitter.com/n7z2mB42lu

— MFA of Ukraine 🇺🇦 (@MFA_Ukraine) May 14, 2026

Q: So when the U.S. and allies ask for help, what do you tell them and what is the current status of exports? The last time I wrote about this issue, the law prevented exports.

A: Brave1 works with Ukrainian and international companies to build and test solutions. We are not deeply involved in export questions. So I cannot comment here, because I’m not aware of the current status.

Q: The U.S. sent its own interceptor drones, the Merops system, to Ukraine in 2024. It proved so effective that it was sent to the Middle East to protect U.S. assets during the now-paused war against Iran. How much, if anything, did Ukraine learn from it?

A: Most successful defense manufacturers learned from our military and Brave1 – both Ukrainian manufacturers, and Merops. Without the direct input of the Ukrainian military and experts, Merops would never have become such a high-performing system, as it is now.

Q: What can you tell me about the relationship between Ukraine and the U.S. and allies as a result of what’s taking place in the Middle East?

A: It’s extremely interesting, and a lot of questions are coming to us, and we are sharing our experience.

Q: Have you had direct conversations with the U.S. military?

A: We are working with the majority of our allied countries. We have calls, sessions, conferences where we are sharing our experience, and the results of Brave1 transforming and improving the Ukrainian defense industry. Everyone is interested. This is the magic that it’s possible to do in such a short period of time. Right now, in Brave1, we have more than 2,300 different Ukrainian companies that are building weapons. And when the war started, it was a majority of state run companies and a very small number of private companies, and right now there is a huge list of companies.

Ukraine’s $2,000 Drone Is Destroying Russia’s $50,000 Shaheds. And Everyone Wants It

Q: You told me that Ukraine has a wide variety of interceptor drones, from the small ones to the bigger ones. How many different kinds of interceptors do the U.S. and allies need to defend against what Iran was launching?

A: I believe that the minimum is 10.

Q: 10? Why?

A: It takes 10 different types of architecture. For us, it’s important to have more different products, because it creates competition between Ukrainian companies, and they are much quicker, building new innovations, and they run faster to get ahead of the competitors – of their rivals. Also, it’s important to have not only interceptors. Interceptors themselves do nothing. This is the combination of variety of technologies, radars, permanent control system, the navigation systems, the systems for remote control, because the soldiers operating them should be not on the front line. They need to be in shelters. So this is the variety of different sub technologies, and as a whole, this is the segment of drone-based aerial defense.

Q: Wild Hornets, for instance, claims its Sting interceptor can be operated by soldiers from 2,000 kilometers away. How common is that?

A: Right now our pilots are able to manage interceptors from any place in the world.

Wild Hornets 2,000 Km

Q: Could pilots at the Tampa, Florida headquarters of U.S. Central Command, which oversees American military efforts in the Middle East, operate interceptor drones?

A: Let’s imagine I’m sending my pilot to the U.S. on a business trip and something happens, and my pilot will be needed to manage interceptors. He will be able to do it from New York or California.

Q: Getting back to the 10 different kinds of interceptor drones the U.S. and allies need. What different kinds? What are the differences?

A: Interceptors against ISR drones. Interceptors against Shahed heavyweight kamikaze drones. Interceptors against decoys. Interceptors that are capable of flying extremely high. Interceptors that are capable of increasing their speed to catch jet kamikazes. Interceptors that can throttle very quickly. Interceptors that have a long flight time and can fly a long distance. So there are a variety of different interceptors.

Q: How do you use AI?

A: We have a very responsible attitude about the ethical aspects of AI. Human-in-the-loop sometimes is used, but mostly we use human-on-the-loop where it’s a synchronous usage of human to arm, disarm, to cancel decisions, but not the human-in-the-loop where we need to wait for the human decisions, because speed of decisions should be taken into account. The effective hitting of Shahed drones is much higher when the human is not in the loop, but on the loop.

Q: Has Ukraine learned any lessons watching the U.S. and its allies defend against Iranian Shahed drones?

A: That’s the best question from all my interviews, for the last period of time. I can tell this subjectively from myself, not a representative of Brave1 or the country. One of the main lessons is that you should never be sure that you are secure enough and your technologies are perfect, because you don’t know what is in the pocket of your enemy. And you always need to be ready for the worst case scenario and permanently improve the level of readiness to counteract or react to absolutely non-predictable different things. And the speed of your reaction is crucial.

You can see one such Iranian Shahed attack on U.S. forces in the following video.

Video footage filmed by an American servicemember of an Iranian one-way attack drone, likely a Shahed-136, nearly impacting a radar tower at a U.S. military base in the Middle East earlier this week, possibly located at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. pic.twitter.com/zsPyuFXK1c

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) March 8, 2026

Q: Is there anything in particular you’ve seen about the performance of Iranian drones against the U.S., Israel, the UAE and other countries that surprises you and that you need to develop new ways to defeat them?

A: No. As you know, there is a strong cooperation between Russia and Iran, and Iranian technologies appear to have been used on the battlefield by Russia, and I’m sure vice versa as well.

Q: Have you seen anything different about how Iran is using these drones?

A: I didn’t see anything different. The things that I saw were the same, but I’m not a military expert. We are focusing on technologies.

You can see Iran’s Shahed drone attack on the U.S. Navy’s facility in Bahrain on the opening day of the war below.

Q: What about Ukrainian companies? How closely are they watching this conflict, and when they talk to you, are they saying anything about what they’ve learned and can use to improve Ukrainian weapons?

A: Everyone would like to help. And because we see that Ukraine, this is the only country who knows – and proven for years – how to defend itself against Russian new technologies. And of course, for us, it’s very painful to see because we have this experience. We know what to do, but all these tens of millions [of] people are facing these problems, but we could help.

Q: In March, President Donald Trump said: ‘We don’t need their help in drone defense. We know more about drones than anybody. We have the best drones in the world, actually.’ What do you think about that?

A: I cannot comment.

Q: Would you say there was a difference in the level of interest from the U.S. and allies at the beginning of the war to now? 

A: Of course, absolutely different interest. Previously, it was almost zero interest. And right now, this is number one topic.

Q: What advice would you give to the U.S. about defeating Shaheds?

A: Number one is, do not believe that you have plenty of time, a lot of time for preparation. The time is gone. The second one is cost matters. And the expenses for defense should be less than the expenses of your enemy to attack you. Number three is permanently focus on asymmetrical solutions.

Q: Like what?

A: When Ukraine didn’t have enough air defense missiles, we invented interceptors (drones). When we had a lack of 155mm ammunition, we invented FPV drones. When we had a lack of helicopters, we invented drone bombers. We had a lack of naval fleet, so we invented naval drones. 

And we see that such tremendous change of new technologies on the battlefield posed a lot of different new innovations everywhere, and we are the Ukrainian government cluster that analyzes all military ideas of different industry players. We see that every month the number of ideas is increasing, nothing. This is just opening new doors to a new era of new technologies.

Q: Have interceptor drones been able to replace those fired by high-end systems like the Patriot air defense system and others?

A: No. It’s not about replacement. Interceptors will never replace Patriot. Patriot is a great technology, the best in the world missiles for protection against ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles. But of course, it absolutely doesn’t make any sense to use it against Shaheds. It’s extremely expensive, extremely it is overkill.

In our next installment, Hrytseniuk talks about how Ukraine plans to meet President Volodymyr Zelensky’s directive to produce 50,000 uncrewed ground vehicles this year.

Contact the author: howard@TWZ.com

Military and law enforcement clashed with demonstrators outside La Paz, Bolivia, in an attempt to clear roadways that had been blocked as part of nationwide antigovernment protests.

As many as 3,500 soldiers and police were deployed as part of the operation that began in the early hours of Saturday. Around 57 people were arrested, according to the citizens’ rights ombudsman’s office.

Miners, schoolteachers, Indigenous groups and unions have helped to organise the protests, which aimed to convey outrage against the government of centre-right President Rodrigo Paz.

Bolivia is in the grips of an historic economic crisis, considered the worst the country has seen in decades.

The government’s foreign currency reserves have cratered, as exports from Bolivia have slowed down.

Key among those was natural gas. Vast reserves of the fuel were discovered in the late 20th century, and for nearly three decades, those natural gas deposits powered Bolivia’s economy, transforming the South American country into a major energy exporter.

But in 2022, the dynamic switched, amid mismanagement and dwindling supplies. Since then, Bolivia has had to import fuel from abroad, exacerbating its economic crisis.

Currently, many parts of the country have experienced long lines for fuel and shortages of basic supplies like food.

Paz, who was elected in October, had campaigned on alleviating the economic stress. But since taking office, he has spurred outrage by ending a two-decade-old fuel subsidy and pushing to privatise state-owned companies.

Earlier this month, the protests forced the repeal of a land reform measure, Law 1720, that critics claimed could be used to dispossess small, rural landowners, in favour of bigger holdings.

The Bolivian government has estimated that 22 roadblocks have been erected across the country in recent weeks.

Some of the protesters have demanded Paz’s resignation: His election in October marked the end of nearly two decades of rule by the Movement for Socialism (MAS).

But Paz’s office has blamed the demonstrations for cutting off key supplies to cities like La Paz, which holds the seat of government.

Food prices have increased since the blockades began, and the government claims three people have died after being unable to reach hospitals.

According to presidential spokesperson Jose Luis Galvez, Saturday’s crackdown on the protesters was designed to create a “humanitarian corridor” to ensure the free flow of supplies to hospitals in La Paz.

Earlier this week, Paz also thanked his Argentinian counterpart, Javier Milei, for delivering humanitarian assistance to Bolivia.

“This gesture of solidarity not only strengthens the historic bonds of brotherhood between our nations, but also represents vital relief for our communities in times of great need,” Paz wrote on social media on Friday.

Milei responded by denouncing the protesters as anti-democratic.

“Argentina stands with the Bolivian people and supports their democratically elected authorities against those who seek to destabilise the country and obstruct the path toward freedom and progress,” the Argentinian president said.

During his first year, U. S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive negotiating style led to some gains with other countries, but when it comes to Iran, this approach seems to be failing. Instead of softening his stance, Trump has shown increasing frustration over the ongoing crisis, which has lasted for 11 weeks, and his tough tactics might hinder efforts to end the conflict that is impacting the global economy.

Analysts believe that one key issue is the Iranian leaders’ need to maintain their image at home, complicating any negotiations. Despite the U. S. and Israeli strikes weakening Iran’s military, Iran still controls the important Strait of Hormuz, allowing it to exert significant influence. Trump’s strategy has been marked by extreme demands and mixed messages, which may not lead to a quick resolution. His desire to frame any outcome as a U. S. victory, while expecting total defeat for Iran, poses further challenges, as no government, including Iran’s, can afford to be seen as surrendering.

The deadlock with Iran happens as Trump faces domestic pressures, including rising gasoline prices and low approval ratings due to an unpopular war ahead of the midterm elections. White House spokesperson Olivia Wales defended Trump’s tactics, claiming that he is a skilled negotiator and suggesting that Iran is becoming more desperate for a resolution.

In a notable threat, Trump warned on social media of destroying Iran’s civilization if a deal is not reached. He later backed down but has repeated his threats to damaging Iranian infrastructure. Trump’s harsh language towards Iranian leaders has continued, and while he claims Iran is on the verge of collapse, the Iranian response has been to portray their endurance as a victory.

Inside the White House, there has been no effort to moderate Trump’s messaging. Polls show his core supporters remain behind him, but some former allies now criticize his extreme threats and the ongoing conflict.

Some of Trump’s strongest statements on his Truth Social platform have come at crucial moments, like when he announced a blockade of Iran’s ports, which led to Iranian retaliation and threatened a fragile ceasefire. He recently rejected a peace proposal from Iran, calling it a “piece of garbage. ” Analysts like Dennis Ross said Trump’s lack of consistency in messaging undermines his intentions. During a visit to Beijing, Trump avoided harsh comments on Iran, focusing instead on relations with China, an ally of Iran.

Some experts believe it would be beneficial for Trump to lower his rhetoric if he truly wants to resolve the conflict. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Saeed Khatibzadeh, criticized Trump for talking too much. Trump claims that his unpredictability is a negotiation tactic, which has sometimes worked in trade discussions. However, in situations like the military actions in Venezuela and the Gaza ceasefire talks, his pressure tactics had positive outcomes.

Despite his desire to seem dangerous in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, analysts say this strategy is unlikely to succeed, given the entrenched nature of Iran’s leadership and their pride. Trump’s threats may have strengthened Iran’s current hardline rulers, who trust him even less after U. S. attacks during negotiations. Nate Swanson, a former State Department official, noted that the expectation of Iran capitulating under pressure is a misconception.

Barbara Leaf pointed out that Trump’s approach has been based on a misunderstanding of Iran’s resilience. Some experts warn that his tactics could backfire, making Iran more determined to develop nuclear capabilities for self-protection. There is a mismatch in timelines, as Trump prefers quick deals while Iran often prolongs negotiations. Academic Abdulkhaleq Abdullah suggested that Iran’s inflexibility is a bigger issue than Trump’s statements. Trita Parsi argued that Iranian leaders might see Trump’s unpredictable behavior as a sign of desperation, leading them to wait him out.

With information from Reuters

Right-wing challenger Flavio Bolsonaro faces new scrutiny over a film funding scandal, which could affect his race against incumbent Lula.

A new poll has reaffirmed the tight race for Brazil’s presidency this year, with both the left-wing incumbent Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his right-wing challenger, Flavio Bolsonaro, tied in a head-to-head contest.

On Saturday, Datafolha, the polling firm for the Grupo Folha media conglomerate, released its latest numbers, tracking the candidates’ progress in the run-up to October’s generation election.

Nearly 2,004 responded to the latest survey, which asked them to identify whom they would vote for if Lula and Bolsonaro progressed to a run-off.

Lula, now 80 years old, is angling for a fourth nonconsecutive term.

Brazil’s presidents are limited to two four-year terms at a time, and Lula first served as president from 2003 to 2011, championing social programmes to reduce hunger and increase federal assistance to the poor.

Bolsonaro, on the other hand, is hoping to continue his father’s far-right political legacy. The eldest son of imprisoned former President Jair Bolsonaro, Flavio — a senator representing Rio de Janeiro — has pledged to seek his father’s release should he be elected.

Jair Bolsonaro is currently serving a 27-year prison sentence for attempting to plot a coup and subvert the election results in 2022, which saw an end to his term and the beginning to Lula’s latest.

Saturday’s poll results put Lula and the younger Bolsonaro in a dead heat.

Both candidates received 45 percent of the polled voter support, with an additional 9 percent indicating they would cast “null” ballots. The remaining 1 percent was undecided.

But the poll, conducted on May 12 and 13, was conducted before the latest scandal involving the younger Bolsonaro’s campaign gained public traction.

Controversy over film deal

On May 13, The Intercept Brasil, a news publication, printed a report containing leaked WhatsApp messages between Bolsonaro and a banker arrested for an alleged fraud scheme, Daniel Vorcaro.

Bolsonaro had reportedly approached Vorcaro to finance a film about his father’s life, called Dark Horse.

The Bolsonaro family has long maintained that Jair Bolsonaro is a victim of political persecution, and it had tapped US actor Jim Caviezel to play the ex-president.

According to The Intercept’s reporting, Flavio Bolsonaro and his brother Eduardo Bolsonaro had soliciting funding from Vorcaro, who ultimately pledged $24m, or 134 million Brazilian reals, to the film project.

In a statement, Flavio Bolsonaro acknowledged that he had reached out for financing, but he denied the exchange had anything to do with Vorcaro’s alleged fraud scheme.

“It is necessary to separate the innocent from the criminals,” the statement said. “In our case, what happened was a son seeking PRIVATE sponsorship for a PRIVATE film about his own father’s life.”

Left-wing lawmakers, however, have called for an investigation into the incident.

The controversy over the Dark Horse film is not the only scandal to have rocked Flavio Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign in recent months.

In December, the senator entered the presidential race with his imprisoned father’s blessing.

But shortly afterwards, he faced criticism for statements appearing to suggest he might withdraw from the race in exchange for his father’s freedom. He later clarified that his candidacy was “irreversible”.

In April, Brazil’s Supreme Court also gave the go-ahead for federal police to investigate whether Flavio Bolsonaro had made defamatory statements about Lula.

While Lula was the frontrunner by a wide margin in late 2025, Bolsonaro has since narrowed the gap, leading to the two candidates racing neck and neck before October’s election.

Caracas, May 15, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan oil production has moved past 1 million barrels per day (bpd) for the first time in over seven years.

The latest OPEC monthly report placed the Caribbean nation’s April output at 1.031 million bpd, as measured by secondary sources. The figure increased by 46,000 bpd compared to the previous month.

For its part, state oil company PDVSA reported April’s production at 1.136 million bpd, up from 1.095 million bpd in March. Direct and secondary measurements have differed over time due to disagreements over the inclusion of natural gas liquids and condensates.

With the oil industry under crushing US coercive measures, crude production plummeted from around 1.9 million bpd when the first sanctions were levied against PDVSA. Following the US imposition of an export embargo in January 2019, output fell under 1 million bpd, hitting decades-lows around 350,000 bpd in 2020 before a steady recovery in recent years.

Since the January 3 US military strikes against Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed control over the nation’s energy sector, with revenues deposited in US Treasury-run accounts before being partially returned to Caracas at US officials’ discretion. 

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on Thursday that “for the first time in over a decade the wealth of Venezuela is benefitting the people of Venezuela,” though he did not mention the impact of US sanctions first imposed in late 2014.

While US coercive measures remain in place, the White House has issued a series of licenses allowing Western corporations to return to the Venezuelan energy sector.

BP, Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell are among the companies to have struck oil and natural gas contracts with the Venezuelan government led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez in past weeks, taking advantage of a recent pro-business legislative overhaul that slashed royalties and taxes, granted private partners increased control over operations and sales, and opened the way for disputes to be settled in international arbitration bodies.

Lesser-known companies Overseas Oil and Crossover Energy have likewise inked agreements for energy projects in the South American country. 

ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips are also evaluating prospects for a return to Venezuela, according to the Wall Street Journal. The two oil giants saw their assets nationalized by the former Hugo Chávez government in the 2000s after refusing to accept the country’s reforms asserting sovereignty over the industry. Both corporations would go on to secure compensation via international arbitration, with an award of over US $10 billion to ConocoPhillips still outstanding. 

The recent rebound in oil production coincided with an increase in US-sourced diluent imports. Exports also surged in April to 1.23 million bpd, the highest figure in over seven years. Apart from a growing number of cargoes to US refineries, Indian refiner Reliance is receiving increased shipments after securing US Treasury approval.

In contrast, two tankers reportedly headed to China and Cuba, respectively, will return their cargoes to Venezuelan ports after being intercepted by US naval forces. Prior to the January 3 operation and US control over oil exports, China had been the primary destination for Venezuelan crude. Caracas had likewise been the main supplier of oil to Cuba in the last two decades.

Venezuelan and US authorities have offered no clarity on the return of export proceeds to the South American country, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating that Caracas needs to submit a “budget request” before accessing its funds. The Venezuelan Central Bank’s handling of US-disbursed resources will be subjected to outside auditing, with Pentagon and CIA contractor Deloitte reportedly among the companies hired.

Despite the absence of official data on Venezuelan export revenues and the portion being returned to the country, the Rodríguez administration’s injection of foreign currency into exchange tables run by public and private banks increased in April and May. US authorities reportedly mandated that PDVSA revenues be funneled directly to private sector importers via forex auctions as opposed to having the Venezuelan Central Bank run foreign currency assignments.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

The first picture of the U.S. military’s new AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) has emerged. Flight testing of the JATM is known to have started years ago, but it has never been seen publicly before now. The missile is expected to augment and ultimately replace the venerable AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) in U.S. service.

Photographer Jonathan Tweedy took pictures of several U.S. Navy test jets departing Eglin Air Force Base in Florida on May 13. This included an F/A-18F Super Hornet from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31 (VX-31) carrying the AIM-260 on the fuselage station outboard of its right engine intake. The jet also has a modified FPU-13/A drop tank with an infrared search and track (ISRT) sensor on its centerline station, as well as flight data pods on its wingtips. The Aviationist was the first to publish Tweedy’s pictures of the VX-31 jet with the JATM.

Eglin is routinely used as a staging point for U.S. military aerial weapons testing, as well as other aviation research and development and test and evaluation work. The base is situated right next to extensive over-water ranges over the Gulf of Mexico, off the coast of the Florida panhandle.

When it comes to the AIM-260, Tweedy’s picture confirms the design is very minimalist, at least externally, with only four fins at the tail. Unlike the AIM-120, it has no mid-body control surfaces, or even strakes running along the sides. The JATM’s overall configuration reflects optimization for maximum speed and range.

The JATM in this case looks to have a live high-explosive warhead, as indicated by a yellow band at the front end of the body. There are also two black bands toward the rear, which could point to the location of the missile’s rocket motor.

The nose cone has a distinct light gray color compared to the rest of the predominantly white body. There are square markings at various points at the rear of the body, which are often seen on aerial munitions and aircraft during testing to help with visual tracking, as well.

Overall, the AIM-260 seen in Tweedy’s pictures looks entirely in line with what had previously been depicted in official renderings of the JATM, both in terms of its design and markings.

The Navy is developing the AIM-260 in cooperation with the Air Force. In the past, officials have explicitly cited the growing reach of Chinese air-to-air missiles, and the PL-15 in particular, as key drivers behind the JATM program. China continues to develop and field more capable air-to-air missiles, as you can learn more about this past TWZ feature. A boost in maximum range is therefore known to be a central requirement for the AIM-260, which is reportedly designed to hit targets out to at least 120 miles, if not further.

Another known requirement for the AIM-260 is to have a form factor that is roughly the same as the AIM-120, making it easier to integrate on existing aircraft. Details about the JATM otherwise remain limited. As TWZ has previously written:

“An advanced rocket motor with highly loaded propellant has long been seen as a likely route to give the AIM-260A significantly greater range, as well as speed, over the AIM-120 without making the new missile larger. A core known requirement for the JATM is that it has to have the same general form factor as the AMRAAM, in large part to ensure that it can fit inside the internal bays on stealth fighters like the F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In addition to crewed aircraft, AIM-260As are expected to arm future stealthy drones like the ones under development under the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program.”

…

“The AIM-260A’s rocket motor is also likely to be a dual-pulse design that retains energy across the flight envelope to further extend range and help dramatically with endgame maneuverability. Thrust vectoring capability would also be a requisite to give the missile sufficient agility in the absence of additional control surfaces.”

…

“An active electronically scanned array radar (AESA) seeker is likely. Multi-mode seeker capability, potentially with imaging infrared and passive radiofrequency (RF) guidance capabilities, could be extremely valuable in the face of an ever-expanding countermeasure ecosystem, although we have no idea if this is a feature now or not. It’s also possible it could be introduced in later variants. Advanced networking capabilities would be a key feature, allowing the missile to get additional targeting information from an array of third party sources. This is especially imported for engaging targets beyond the reach of the launch platform’s own sensors and it can allow the aircraft firing the missile, especially a stealthy one, to avoid having to switch on its radar and increase its vulnerability to detection as a result. Multiple networked JATMs might even be able to prosecute engagements cooperatively.”

Overall, the JATM program, which traces back to at least 2019, remains largely classified. As noted, flight testing of AIM-260 has been underway for some time and has already included multiple live-fire shots. There has also been movement in recent years to get the missile into production and fielded operationally.

Navy Super Hornets, along with U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors, are expected to be the first types to fly operationally armed with AIM-260s. The missiles will surely be integrated onto a host of other aircraft, including the Air Force’s future F-47 and whatever design the Navy might choose to become its sixth-generation F/A-XX fighter.

What the projected timeline might be for the AIM-260 entering operational service now is unclear. When the program first emerged publicly in 2019, the goal was for the missiles to be fielded in 2022. There were reports late last year that JATM had suffered a new three-month delay due to funding issues, based on a fact sheet distributed by some members of the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services. However, the committee subsequently said that the information was incorrect.

As an aside, the Navy announced back in 2024 that it had begun limited fielding of another, different very-long-range air-to-air missile, the AIM-174B, which is derived from the surface-launched Standard Missile-6. The AIM-260 is expected to be complementary to the AIM-174B, as you can read more about here and check out our video below.

How The Navy’s New Very Long-Range AIM-174 Will Pierce China’s Anti-Access Bubble

The first public sighting of an AIM-260 this week certainly points to new progress toward finally fielding this new air-to-air missile.

Special thanks again to Jonathan Tweedy for sharing the pictures of the AIM-260 on the VX-31 Super Hornet with us.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com