NEWS

Let us begin with what has been forgotten. 

There is a field, roughly 22 kilometres southwest of Sokoto, between the Dange Shuni and Bodinga local government areas in North West Nigeria, that carries no particular weight to the eye. Grass grows there. Wind moves through trees at predictable intervals. The surrounding bush is in full silence, neither mourning nor celebrating. Nothing marks what happened here, and that, of course, is precisely the point.

The place is called Satiru. Or was called Satiru. The grammar is slippery, because the British, when they finished with it in the spring of 1906, did not simply defeat it. They made sure to erase it – razing buildings, enslaving survivors, most of whom were women and children, and stripping the site with the cleansing method of an administration that understood that a crushed rebellion, left with a location, becomes a shrine. And shrines become consciousness and arguments. Better to leave nothing. Better to leave nowhere.

And then the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Attahiru II, the Muslim ruler (Sarkin Musulmi) whose fighters helped carry out the slaughter, reportedly pronounced a curse on anyone who would rebuild or farm on the ground. As the British Resident Burdon telegraphed proudly to High Commissioner Frederick Lugard: “All Sokoto went out yesterday to inspect [the] battlefield and raze Satiru to the ground. No wall or tree left standing.” The scholars Paul Lovejoy and J.S. Hogendorn, writing in the Journal of African History, note that “the deserted site of Satiru is on the edge of a forest reserve. It has not been inhabited since its destruction and the official curse.” More than a century later, that is still true.

This is what erasure looks like when it succeeds. For 120 years, the ruins of Satiru have remained untouched, a vanished town erased by British colonial forces after a 1906 uprising led by poor clerics, fugitive slaves, and peasants challenging both imperial taxation and the aristocratic order of the Sokoto Caliphate. 

But this story is not only about a massacre buried in colonial archives. It is about how modern Nigeria inherited the use of overwhelming force to suppress communities marked as threats. 

The thing Satiru was

Before it became a problem requiring artillery, Satiru was an answer to a different problem. To understand it, you need to understand the particular moral atmosphere of the Sokoto Caliphate in its late decline – the spiritual hangover, you might call it, of a revolution that had once been genuine.

Usman Dan Fodio launched his jihad in 1804 with an argument that was partly political and partly theological, but entirely serious: that the Hausa rulers of the time had corrupted Islam, that the ordinary people – the talakawa, the poor commoners – were being ground down by a system that dressed itself in religious language while behaving in wholly irreligious ways. Dan Fodio and his followers built the caliphate on the promise that this would change. That Islamic governance would be just. That scholars who held power would be answerable to something beyond their own appetites.

By the end of the nineteenth century, that promise had curdled into something its founders would not have recognised. The Fulani aristocracy that administered the caliphate had made a comfortable accommodation with power. Tribute collectors arrived in the villages. The talakawa paid. Palace scholars – the senior ulama (religious scholars), with their elaborate networks of family and commerce – found, in the more elastic corners of Islamic jurisprudence, reasons why this was all acceptable. The poor continued to be poor. The aristocracy continued to wear piety as a garment while extracting what they could.

The scholars of Satiru – humble men, as Lovejoy and Hogendorn describe them, “poor Muslim scholars engaged in farming and teaching,” with origins far outside the Fulani elite – found different reasons. Malam Siba, who founded the Satiru settlement in approximately 1894, was of Nupe origin. A second key figure, Maikaho, came from Gobir, the country that Uthman Dan Fodio himself had subjugated. A third, Malam Bawa, was from Zamfara, which had revolted against Sokoto on several occasions across the nineteenth century. What distinguished these men from the mainstream was not their learning – they were, by caliphate standards, minor figures – but their refusal to make the peace that more successful scholars had made with power. As Lovejoy and Hogendorn paraphrase the alleged statement of Malam Siba himself: he “was fed up with the exactions of the ruling class and was not going to obey the instructions of anyone anymore… [but instead] was going to set up a new great regime.”

What grew at Satiru, on the frontier of four fiefdoms – Danchadi, Dange, Shuni, and Bodinga – was something the caliphate’s administration regarded as an irritant and then, gradually, as something worse. The community refused to pay taxes. It refused to provide unpaid labour. It attracted, in growing numbers, fugitive slaves fleeing from the plantations and estates of the aristocracy. This last detail matters enormously. By 1906, British Resident Burdon would report that the adherents of the Satiru cause were “nearly all run away slaves.” Local tradition in Satiru itself held, as recorded by A.S. Mohammad in his foundational social history of the revolt, that “the leaders of Satiru abolished slavery and as a consequence… slaves flocked to them. The freedom of these fugitives was effectively and strenuously guarded.”

This was, in other words, not an uprising of the godless. It was an uprising of the structurally abandoned — poor clerics, dispossessed peasants, and fugitive slaves –   against the two interlocking systems that were destroying them simultaneously: the late-caliphate aristocracy that extracted their labour, and the British colonial administration that had, since 1903, added new demands of jizya (poll tax) and jangali (livestock tax) to communities that had never before paid such taxes to Sokoto. As a Sokoto citizen wrote bitterly at the time, and as quoted in Lovejoy and Hogendorn’s account: “We have been conquered. We have been asked to pay poll tax and cattle tax. We have been made to do various things, and now they want us to fight their wars for them.”

The movement Satiru had built was, in the framework laid out by Lovejoy and Hogendorn, a form of revolutionary Mahdism – distinct from all the other currents of Mahdist thought that ran through the caliphate at the time. It drew its support from peasants, fugitive slaves, and subject populations. It had no aristocratic supporters, no wealthy merchants, and no members of the established ulama. It was ethnically diverse in a way that the aristocracy was not: Hausa from various origins, Zamfarawa, Gobirawa, Gimbanawa, Kabawa, and Azbinawa – but, strikingly, no Fulani. The battle lines, as Lovejoy and Hogendorn note, mapped onto class so precisely that “the ethnic dimension… reflected the class division.” On the day of the final battle, “all the faces on the battlefield had Gobir, Kebbi, Zanfara, Katsina and other such tribal marks. Not a single Fulani talaka [commoner] joined them.”

What Satiru wanted, ultimately, was the recovery of the original promise – the caliphate that Dan Fodio had said was coming, and that had not arrived. You can call this politics, or you can call it theology. At Satiru, they did not distinguish between the two.

The spark and the suppression

The movement had been building for years, connected by threads of correspondence and travelling clerics to similar currents of dissatisfaction across both the British and French colonial zones in are now Nigeria and Niger Republic. On the French side of the boundary, a blind Zarma cleric named Saybu Dan Makafo had been the central animating figure – charismatic, mystically inclined, and reportedly possessing gifts of ventriloquism that contributed to his reputation as a waliyyi, a saint. 

In December 1905, violence broke out at Kobkitanda, 150 kilometres south of Niamey, in French territory in today’s Niger Republic. Saybu and his followers killed two gardes-cercles (colonial police) from Dosso. The French responded, the Mahdists absorbed losses, and Saybu fled east – eventually arriving at Satiru, where the local community had already been living in a state of armed readiness and messianic expectation.

The revolt was supposed to begin on the Eid El-Kabir (Babbar Sallah), February 5, 1906. It was postponed – there was an internal dispute about the recognition of Isa, the village head of Satiru, as the messianic successor figure who would accompany the Mahdi. The Satirawa (people of Satiru) resolved the question on February 13, when they attacked the neighbouring village of Tsomau. Fourteen people died.

The British response was swift and catastrophically misjudged. Acting Resident H.R. Preston-Hillary moved immediately with a column of about seventy mounted infantry under Major Francis Blackwood, armed with a single Maxim gun. He appears to have been entirely unaware that the rising at Satiru was connected to the weeks of violence that had already convulsed French territory. He rode toward the village with the assumption of a man who believed the gap between his weapons and his opponents’ was so vast that the details of the situation hardly mattered.

He was wrong. 

The Mahdists attacked the British column. Hillary and Blackwood were killed, along with three other white officers and 25 African soldiers. The West African Frontier Force (WAFF) suffered such heavy losses that it was “forced to retreat in disarray.” It was, as Lugard would later acknowledge, “the first serious reverse suffered by the West African Frontier Force since it was raised in 1898.”

The Satiru Mahdists were also severely wounded — their leader, Malam Isa, was struck during the initial encounter and would die two days later, on the morning he was supposed to unfurl the green flag and declare the jihad formally. He did not live to see what his movement had achieved: a genuine military victory over the empire. For a brief, burning moment, the talakawa had won.

The British did not pause to understand what had happened. They regrouped.

The reckoning

On March 10, 1906, a combined force of the British-run West African Frontier Force (WAFF) troops and Sokoto fighters approached Satiru. The Satirawa had dug trenches. But they did not stay behind them. They charged, repeatedly, in massed formation, against troops equipped with Maxim guns firing destructive volleys. Historian Richard Dusgate would later call what followed “the most bloodthirsty expedition in the history of British military operations in Northern Nigeria.” Margery Perham, in her biography of Lugard, noted that subsequent reports – kept secret at the time – found that the “killing was very free, not to say slaughter,” that the soldiers “killed every living thing before them,” and that “the fields were running with blood.”

At least 2,000 Satirawa were killed. An estimated 3,000 women and children were herded to Sokoto, many distributed among the aristocracy as effective slaves – a thinly disguised reassertion of the master-slave relationship that the very people of Satiru had staked their lives on dismantling.

Saybu Dan Makafo, blind and wounded, survived. He was captured and brought to Sokoto, where he was tried. His boy guide, according to a story collected by H.A.F. Johnston, reportedly shouted at the trial that if Saybu was given water, he would vanish into thin air – an indication of the extraordinary tension surrounding the proceedings. The public executioner decapitated him on March 22. His head was mounted on a stake in the market. Four subordinates suffered the same fate.

The political accounting that followed the massacre revealed what the British understood the suppression to mean and to communicate. The Colonial Office initially received dispatches that accurately attributed the uprising partly to the fugitive slave crisis –  Lugard’s own initial cable described the rebels as “outlaw fugitive slaves.” A marginal note in the Colonial Office files, as documented by Lovejoy and Hogendorn, captures the official response with bracing economy: “Better say nothing of slaves.” By May 9, Lugard had incorporated a sanitised version of events into his official reports. The slave dimension was quietly removed from the record. The most dangerous thing about Satiru – that it had articulated a class argument, that it had offered sanctuary to the enslaved, that it had made the connection between colonial taxation and pre-colonial extraction explicit – was the thing the British were most determined to forget.

The Sokoto aristocracy was rewarded for its loyalty. Marafa Muhammadu Maiturare, the Sokoto official who had commanded the local levies and whose authority was partly credited with preventing a general rising, eventually became Sarkin Musulmi in 1915. Hassan, the sarki of Dange, the fief nearest to Satiru, who had greeted Burdon warmly in the hours after the Mahdist victory, would become Sarkin Musulmi in 1931. The collaboration was not forgotten. It was promoted.

What the grammar inherited

Nearly a century and two decades later, an eight-year-old boy named Sa’id watched through a crack in the wall of his grandmother’s hut as the men of his family were dragged outside and shot.

His village, Kajen Shuwa, sat in Marte Local Government Area of Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, a Shuwa Arab community of cattle herders and storytellers, ethnically and linguistically distinct from the dominant groups of the region. Between 2014 and 2015, at the height of the military’s campaign against Boko Haram, soldiers arrived looking for a Boko Haram cell in a village called Kajen Kanuri. The names were similar enough. No interpreter had been brought. No local guide accompanied the unit.

More than 40 men died.

“They had the wrong village,” Imam Abdulkarim, now living with displaced survivors at the Garin Shuwa IDP camp in Bauchi, told HumAngle. “It was later we realised they were sent to Kajen Kanuri.”

One of the survivors told HumAngle in 2026 how the events unfolded as he watched from where he had hidden himself in a tree. He said he was watching when the men were gathered and ordered to produce Boko Haram members. The people apparently did not even understand what was being said to them, so the soldiers simply lined all the men up in a place resembling a ditch and shot every single one of them. Just like that. No trial. No evidence. Nothing. Everyone was killed.

Sa’id is nineteen now. He teaches Quran to children at the displacement camp — children who have their own mornings they cannot stop replaying. He speaks slowly. He flinches at loud sounds. When he told his story to HumAngle, tears came before words, and other residents of the camp stepped in to complete the parts his voice could not carry. They knew the story. They had assembled it over the years, in the way that displaced communities assemble the things they are not allowed to say publicly – from fragments, from the accounts of those who were in different parts of the village when it happened, from the silence of those who were not there to tell anything.

“The families of the killed couldn’t even raise their voices,” Abdulkarim said. “Everyone was afraid that he might be targeted too.”

No soldier was prosecuted. No investigation was publicly announced. No family received notification, compensation, or the minimum of official acknowledgement that their men had been killed by mistake.

What happened to Kajen Shuwa is not exceptional in the region’s chronicle of the last decade. Amnesty International’s 2015 report documented execution-style killings, torture in detention, and mass graves of individuals who had never been charged, tried, or formally arrested — people killed not for what they did, but for who they resembled, where they lived, what language they spoke when soldiers arrived. The Nigerian military’s response to that report was not to open investigations. It was to call Amnesty International a liar.

And then the world moved on, as it always does – to the next atrocity, the next set of statistics that briefly animated international concern before fading into the background noise of a continent the world has learned to observe without fully attending to.

Zaria massacre 

If Kajen Shuwa happened in the shadows – a remote village, an Arabic-speaking minority, a story reaching the press years after the fact — then what occurred in Zaria, Kaduna State, in the country’s North West, in December 2015 happened in full view, and still went unanswered.

The Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, was a Shia organisation with roots deep in Zaria’s social fabric. It ran schools and clinics. It was also an organisation that had long attracted the suspicion of the Nigerian state – not because it was violent, but because it was organised, independent, and loyal to a leadership structure that fell outside the state’s system of control.

On Dec. 12, 2015, an IMN procession blocked a road, delaying a military convoy carrying the then Chief of Army Staff. What followed, as documented in meticulous detail by both Amnesty International and the Kaduna State Government’s own commission of inquiry, was a massacre. Soldiers attacked IMN members across multiple locations. The Hussainiyya Islamic Centre was demolished. El-Zakzaky’s residence was destroyed. Three of his sons were killed. El-Zakzaky himself, elderly and partially blind – the parallel to the blind Saybu Dan Makafo feels almost too pointed – was arrested. He and his wife would remain in detention for years, their release ordered repeatedly by courts and resisted repeatedly by the government.

The Kaduna State commission produced a report of unusual honesty. It confirmed that at least 347 IMN members had been buried in a mass grave at Mando. It found the military’s response disproportionate. It recommended the prosecution of specific officers, and it named the mass grave by location. But not one recommendation was implemented.

The IMN was formally proscribed in 2019, an organisation that had existed for four decades and operated schools and hospitals, banned by the government that had killed hundreds of its members, as though the banning were the logical conclusion of the killing rather than an additional punishment for surviving it.

The grammar of impunity

There is a grammar to this. Lovejoy and Hogendorn identified it in the colonial records of 1906 in three steps: a community marked as dangerous, the deployment of force that is “excessive by design,” and the systematic management of the record. 

At Satiru, the British made the decision consciously – the marginal note that said “better say nothing of slaves” was an administrative instruction to suppress an inconvenient truth. The communities targeted after them have had to live inside the silence that administrative instruction created.

But this never worked permanently. What the scholars Godwin Odeh and Williams Efe argue, in their analysis of the Satiru uprising’s historiography, is that the episode was not merely a military or religious event but a demonstration of “the impossibility of subjugating a group permanently without facing a crisis of cultural relevance.” They invoke Amilcar Cabral’s formulation: that culture “is a means by which people assert their opposition to domination… one of the fundamental tools of struggle for emancipation.” The argument is that Satiru never fully ended – that its logic persisted, became available, got taken up again in different forms by different communities facing different versions of the same problem.

The circumstances were different, the enemies differently named, and the legal justifications modernised, but the underlying grammar remained recognisable.

This is not a metaphor. What the British established in 1906 and what successive Nigerian governments have absorbed so completely is a particular relationship between the state and the communities it finds inconvenient. The relationship has a fixed sequence: a community is marked; disproportionate force arrives; the record is managed; and then, reliably, comes the silence. The silence is not passive. It is constructed and maintained by the same institutions that produced the violence –  maintained through the denial of accountability, the obstruction of independent investigation, and the prosecution of those who speak too loudly about what they witnessed.

The families of Kajen Shuwa could not grieve publicly because grief, in that context, was dangerous. The IMN, after Zaria, could not even gather to mourn without risk of further confrontation with the same security forces that had killed their members.

But the cycle continues. 

Previous World Cup appearances: 6
Best performance: Fourth place (2022)
First appearance: 1970 (Mexico)
Top goal scorer: Youssef En-Nesyri (3)
Most appearances: Achraf Hakimi, Hakim Ziyech (10)
Player to watch: Brahim Diaz
FIFA world ranking: 8

The FIFA World Cup begins on June 11. You can follow the action on Al Jazeera’s dedicated World Cup 2026 page with all the latest news, match build-up and live text commentary, and keep up to date with group standings, real-time match results and schedules.

Four years ago, the Morocco made history by becoming the first African and Arab team to reach the World Cup semifinals in Qatar, eliminating Spain and Portugal along the way, before narrowly losing to France.

They come into the 2026 edition again boasting a strong squad and hoping to replicate – or go even further – than their sensational 2022 run.

However, the Atlas Lions also find themselves in rather more chaotic circumstances this time around with a managerial departure less than three months out from the tournament, and bruised by a wild Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) final that provoked a diplomatic row with Senegal.

AFCON hangover

The squad is still dealing with the fallout from one of the most incendiary episodes in African football history.

January’s final in Rabat descended into chaos when Senegal’s players walked off the pitch in protest after Morocco were awarded a contentious stoppage-time penalty following a VAR review with the game at 0-0.

The decision to award the spot kick sparked trouble among the Senegal fans in the crowd. Eighteen spectators were were later jailed following the disruption.

After Senegal finally returned to the pitch after a lengthy delay, Real Madrid and Morocco star Brahim Diaz missed the penalty with a poor attempt at a panenka. Senegal went on to win the game 1-0 with a goal in extra-time.

However, the saga did not end there. In March, CAF stripped Senegal of the title and awarded it to Morocco, ruling that Senegal had forfeited the game by leaving the pitch.

Senegal have appealed at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), and have made allegations against CAF and Morocco.

For the Atlas Lions, being belatedly crowned champions by officials has done little to ease the pain as well as a sense of injustice, and the ongoing saga continues to leave a toxic fallout for the team.

The Regragui saga

Walid Regragui, the coach who masterminded the 2022 run, parted ways with the team in March.

It is likely that he ultimately paid the price after the manner of Morocco’s narrow defeat to Senegal in the AFCON final on home soil, as well as reported arguments between him and the country’s football federation over the direction of the team.

His replacement, Mohamed Ouahbi, led Morocco’s Under-20 side to the 2025 Youth World Cup title as the federation said a “strategic decision” was behind the appointment.

“It’s a desire not to waste time and to take a different direction,” a source close to the federation told the AFP news agency.

But for Ouahbi, 49, stepping up to a first senior World Cup under such acrimonious circumstances is an extremely challenging task – especially as he has only ever managed youth teams in his career.

“I’m not here to build, because the foundations are already in place. I’m here to keep performing,” Ouahbi said after his appointment.

Whether the new coach has the authority and tactical acuity to thrive at the highest level remains to be seen, and it will be a bit of a baptism of fire.

Brahim Diaz hopes to shake off panenka nightmare

Up until that penalty miss, talented forward Brahim Diaz had been the best player at the tournament, driving Morocco to the final as he won the Golden Boot with five goals.

The Real Madrid playmaker is quick, clever and capable of producing something out of nothing – giving Morocco a touch of genuine magic between the lines.

He may be carrying a psychological weight into this tournament after the AFCON final fracas, but Morocco will hope he will channel that frustration into having an outstanding World Cup.

Teenage star Bouaddi makes the cut

While much of the squad is fairly well established, the exciting 18-year-old Lille midfielder Ayyoub Bouaddi, who has switched allegiances after representing France at junior level, made the squad.

“A dream come true, but above all the start of a new chapter, with even more work, rigour and responsibilities,” Bouaddi said on X.

“I am aware of the privilege I have to defend ‌these colours, and I will give everything to represent my country in the best possible way.

“A thought also for France. My choice in no way diminishes the pride and gratitude for having been able to wear that jersey in my youth.”

Perhaps surprisingly, Youssef En-Nesyri, who scored the winning goal against Portugal in the 2022 quarterfinal, did not make the cut.

Elsewhere, Bilal El Khannouss is a highly technical and creative attacking midfielder, while Sofyan Amrabat gives the side combative energy in defence.

Marseille defender Nayef Aguerd has been selected, despite not playing since March due to injury.

Hakimi: The world’s best right back?

Last season, the PSG right back scored 11 goals and provided 14 assists en route to helping his club win a historic treble of the Champions League, Ligue 1 and the French Cup – he was subsequently named CAF African Player of the Year.

This season has been less productive so far in terms of goals and assists. Hakimi increasingly attracts intense attention from opponents keen to neutralise his threat. His season has also been overshadowed by issues off the pitch as it was announced earlier this year that he will stand trial for rape in France – allegations which Hakimi denies.

Despite the off-field issues and reduced returns this season, his overlapping runs, delivery and goalscoring threat – on top of his defensive prowess – arguably means he remains the best right back in the world.

How does Morocco’s group look?

Group C certainly has its challenges for Morocco, not least in their opening game against Brazil. While the Brazilians no longer quite hold the fear factor of previous tournaments, they are still packed with quality.

Nevertheless, Morocco will fancy their chances of getting something from that game and sending a statement to their rivals.

Easier ties await after that, and although an improving Scotland are no pushovers and Haiti could provide an unknown quantity, Morocco should be winning both of those games if they are to mount a serious push for the title.

Morocco also faced Brazil and Scotland in the France 1998 World Cup. The Atlas Lions put in a respectable performance then – recording a 3-0 win over Scotland while losing by the same score to Brazil and drawing with Norway – but finished third in the group and failed to progress to the round of 16.

Morocco’s group matches at the World Cup

⚽ June 13: Brazil vs Morocco (New Jersey, US), 6pm ET (22:00 GMT).
⚽ June 19: Scotland vs Morocco (Boston, US), 6pm ET (22:00 GMT).
⚽ June 24: Morocco vs Haiti (Atlanta, Georgia), 6pm ET (22:00 GMT).

Al Jazeera’s prediction

Last 16.

An inexperienced coach and turmoil around the squad will probably lead them to fall short of matching their 2022 exploits.

Morocco’s World Cup squad

Goalkeepers: Yassine Bounou (Al Hilal), Munir Mohamedi (RS Berkane), Ahmed Tagnaouti (Royal Armed Forces).

Defenders: Noussair Mazraoui (Manchester United), Anass Salah-Eddine (PSV Eindhoven), Youssef Belammari (Al Ahly), ‌Nayef Aguerd (Marseille), Chadi Riad (Crystal Palace), Issa Diop (West Ham United), Redouane Halhal (KV Mechelen), Achraf Hakimi (Paris St-Germain), Zakaria El Ouahdi (Genk).

Midfielders: Samir El Mourabet (Strasbourg), Ayyoub Bouaddi (Lille), Neil El Aynaoui (Roma), Sofyan Amrabat (Real Betis), Azzedine Ounahi (Girona), Bilal El Khannouss (Stuttgart), Ismael ‌Saibari (PSV ‌Eindhoven).

Forwards: Abdessamad Ezzalzouli (Real Betis), Chemsdine Talbi (Sunderland), Soufiane Rahimi (Al Ain), Ayoub El Kaabi (Olympiacos), Brahim Diaz (Real Madrid), Yassine Gessime (Strasbourg), Ayoub Amaimouni-Echghouyabe (Eintracht Frankfurt).

Hungary’s political landscape has undergone a major shift following the electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after 16 years in power. The new governing Tisza party, led by Prime Minister Péter Magyar, is now reversing several institutions created under the previous administration, including the controversial Sovereignty Protection Office.

The office was established in 2023 under former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to monitor what the government described as foreign political interference in domestic affairs.

What Happened

The Tisza party has submitted a bill to parliament proposing the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO), arguing that it has no genuine public function and was used for political purposes.

According to the bill, the agency was designed to pressure opposition figures, journalists, civil society organizations, and media outlets by labeling them as serving “foreign interests.”

The SPO did not immediately respond to requests for comment. During its operation, it published studies aligned with the former government’s positions on issues such as migration, Ukraine, and relations with the European Union.

Why the Office Is Controversial

Critics have long argued that the Sovereignty Protection Office functioned as a political tool rather than an independent watchdog. It was frequently accused of targeting government critics and reinforcing narratives favorable to the ruling party at the time.

The European Commission had also launched infringement proceedings against Hungary over the law that created the agency, raising concerns about its compatibility with EU standards on media freedom and democratic oversight.

Opponents compared the SPO to similar legislation in other countries that restrict foreign-funded organizations, warning that it risked undermining press freedom and civil society independence.

Political Shift After the Election

The proposed abolition comes after a major political transition in Hungary, where the Tisza party defeated Orbán’s Fidesz in parliamentary elections, ending more than a decade of uninterrupted rule.

The new government has signaled a broader effort to dismantle institutions seen as politically aligned with the previous administration and restore institutional neutrality in governance.

What Comes Next

The bill will now be debated in parliament, where the Tisza party holds a governing majority. If passed, it would formally dissolve the Sovereignty Protection Office and potentially roll back other measures introduced under Orbán’s leadership.

The move is likely to deepen political divisions in Hungary, where debates over media freedom, foreign influence, and relations with the European Union remain highly contentious.

With information from Reuters.

Mérida, June 2, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government launched the First National Meeting of the 2026 Communal Coffee Plan on Saturday, May 30, as part of efforts to deepen popular control and increase coffee production for export. 

The central event took place in the Ospino municipality of Portuguesa state, where authorities inaugurated the El Cafetal social property company (EPSDC), a coffee-processing plant transferred to collective communal management.

According to officials, the infrastructure will serve nearly 80 coffee-producing communes from the central-western states of Portuguesa, Lara, Yaracuy, and Trujillo. The facility, previously ran by the state-owned Venezuelan Coffee Corporation, was transferred to a network of several communes.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez opened the event, emphasizing the role of grassroots production in the sector. 

“Coffee is one of the most important items where the communal economy already has the entire production chain organized,” she stated during a tour of the relaunched plant.

Rodríguez hailed output growth to nearly 4 million quintals in the 2025-2026 cycle, with 1.8 million quintals destined for national consumption and 2.1 million for export. According to official figures, production increased by around 25 percent over the past five years.

In her address, Venezuela’s acting president emphasized the importance of increasing exports to international markets while maintaining accessible prices domestically. “This is the path of a country that builds a sovereign future,” Rodríguez concluded.

Communes Minister Ángel Prado, who led an assembly with thousands of coffee producers and communards on Saturday, echoed the target of boosting non-oil exports from communal organizations. “You can count on the communal economy, President,” he said in his speech.

Agriculture Minister Vladimir Padrino López, who previously served as defense minister, also attended the event and called for joint efforts between his ministry and communal structures to support coffee producers. 

“We have to merge, work with a special synergy because in the end, where is the campesino? Where is the coffee grower? He is in a communal circuit, he is in a commune,” Padrino expressed. 

For their part, grassroots producers hailed the transfer of the processing plant as a long-awaited conquest. Yamileth Ortiz, a spokeswoman from El Cafetal Commune in Portuguesa state and a worker at the plant since 2008, emphasized the project’s potential to elevate coffee production in the Caribbean nation.

“There is an expectation to receive crops from at least 10 states and strengthen the national links between coffee-producing communes,” she told reporters.

The Venezuelan government has facilitated fuel supplies, seeds, and technical guidance to support producers taking part in the El Cafetal project. In recent years, Venezuelan coffee growers have highlighted fuel shortages, overpriced inputs, and a lack of access to credit as obstacles to maintaining production levels. Rural organizations have likewise denounced the influence of agribusinesses in establishing crop prices.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Muhammad Ali’s legacy extends far beyond his world titles and Olympic gold, his widow has said, as his hometown prepares to mark 10 years since the boxing icon’s death with a global “Day of Compassion”.

Ali, who died on June 3, 2016, after a long battle with Parkinson’s disease, is being honored this week at the Muhammad Ali Center in Louisville, which is encouraging people worldwide to mark Wednesday’s anniversary with acts of service and care.

“He transcended boxing into every space you can imagine,” Lonnie Ali said in an interview at the centre. “Muhammad lived by this mantra: Service to others is the rent we pay for our room here on Earth.

“He showed up every day with kindness and empathy in his heart for people who are in need.”

Known in his hometown as the “Louisville Lip”, Ali rose from a modest background to become a three-time heavyweight champion and 1960 Olympic gold medallist.

As his fame grew in the 1960s, he became an outspoken voice on civil rights and the Vietnam War, cementing his status as one of the most influential athletes of all time.

The Ali Center, where Lonnie Ali serves as lifetime director, hopes the “Day of Compassion” will grow into an annual event highlighting volunteerism and service.

“The day will focus on one of the core values that made up Muhammad Ali,” she said, warning that the United States is “losing touch with our humanity and with each other”.

“We’re becoming increasingly polarised and separated, and sort of retreating to people who think like us, look like us – and not really reaching out,” she added.

Lonnie Ali also challenged political leaders to “lead with compassion”, criticising moves that have weakened the landmark 1965 Voting Rights Act. “We should always be thinking about how we can uplift a community, not how we can make it harder for them.

“You can’t have equal representation when you’re denying people voting rights,” she said.

She said she still draws hope from how Louisville came together during a weeklong celebration of Ali’s life in 2016, when thousands lined the streets as his funeral procession passed his childhood home and millions watched the service online.

A decade later, Ali’s face now appears on a US postage stamp – another sign, she said, that his message of courage, faith, and service still resonates “from kings and princes to ordinary fans who never met him, but felt they knew his heart”.

Russia’s influence across its traditional sphere of influence is facing growing challenges as the war in Ukraine continues to consume military, economic and diplomatic resources. For decades, Moscow maintained strong ties with former Soviet states through security guarantees, energy supplies and economic integration. However, several longtime partners have increasingly sought closer relations with the West, raising concerns in the Kremlin about the erosion of its geopolitical position.

One of the most notable examples is Armenia, a longtime Russian ally that has recently deepened engagement with the United States and Europe while exploring a path toward eventual European Union membership.

What Happened

Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned Armenia that pursuing closer integration with the European Union could come at a significant economic cost. Ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, Putin suggested that Yerevan could lose access to discounted Russian oil and gas if it continues moving toward the EU.

The warning comes as polls indicate that the party of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has pursued a more Western-oriented foreign policy, is likely to perform strongly in the vote.

Russia has already taken measures that many observers view as pressure tactics, including temporary restrictions on certain Armenian exports and warnings about possible reductions in economic cooperation.

Why Armenia Is Moving Closer to the West

Relations between Moscow and Yerevan have cooled significantly in recent years. Armenia signed a partnership agreement with the United States last month and has taken legislative steps that could eventually support EU membership aspirations.

Pashinyan’s government argues that Armenia must diversify its international partnerships and reduce its dependence on any single power. Supporters of closer Western ties point to economic opportunities, political reforms and security cooperation as key motivations behind the shift.

Russian officials, however, view Armenia’s growing engagement with Western institutions as part of a broader effort by the United States and Europe to weaken Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus region.

Russia’s Wider Struggle to Retain Influence

The dispute with Armenia highlights a broader challenge facing Russia as it attempts to preserve its global standing while remaining heavily focused on the war in Ukraine.

Across multiple regions, Moscow is confronting increasing competition from Western powers. In Europe, countries once considered friendly to Russia are strengthening ties with the European Union and NATO. In the Balkans, political pressure is growing on governments that have traditionally maintained close relations with Moscow.

Russia also faces challenges in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniestria, where pro-European political forces are gaining influence. In Central Asia, Moscow is closely watching expanding Western engagement in a region it has long regarded as part of its strategic sphere.

Beyond its neighborhood, Russia’s relationships with partners such as Cuba, Venezuela and Iran are being tested as geopolitical dynamics shift and Western pressure intensifies.

What Comes Next

The outcome of Armenia’s parliamentary election will be closely watched in both Moscow and Western capitals. A victory for Pashinyan’s party could strengthen Armenia’s efforts to deepen ties with Europe and the United States, potentially leading to further tensions with Russia.

For the Kremlin, the situation represents a broader strategic dilemma. As the war in Ukraine continues without a clear resolution, Russia must balance military commitments with the need to maintain influence among traditional allies increasingly exploring alternative partnerships.

The coming months are likely to reveal whether Moscow can preserve its position in regions it has long considered part of its sphere of influence or whether Western engagement will continue to reshape the geopolitical landscape across Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and beyond.

With information from Reuters.

Messi works on ‘specific exercises’ as he recovers from muscle fatigue in his left hamstring before the World Cup.

Lionel ‌‌Messi has trained on his own ⁠⁠during Argentina’s first practice session at their base camp in the United States, where the squad has assembled this week for their World Cup preparations.

The defending ⁠⁠World Cup champions held their first pretournament training in Kansas City, Missouri, on Monday.

The ⁠⁠Inter Miami captain has been dealing with muscle fatigue in his left hamstring ⁠⁠since May 24 but is expected to be ready for Argentina’s opener against Algeria on June 16 in Kansas City.

Messi, ‌‌38, joined Argentina at their training base and worked on “specific exercises” along with several teammates who are also dealing with fitness concerns.

“The players who are suffering from ⁠⁠niggles and injuries continue ⁠⁠to work with the physiotherapy team on specific exercises on the pitch and are making good progress,” Argentina’s Football ⁠⁠Association said.

Argentina, ranked number three in the world, will play their final ⁠⁠tune-up match against Iceland on June 9 in Auburn, Alabama.

Messi, the two-time MLS MVP and eight-time Ballon ‌‌d’Or winner, is competing in his record sixth World Cup. The midfielder is Argentina’s ‌‌all-time ‌‌leader in caps (198) and goals (116) since making his debut with the national team in 2005.

Video shows a car accident occurring on a road in Kuwait City as missiles flew overhead. Kuwait’s military said they intercepted incoming drones and missiles after Iran targeted US installations in Kuwait and Bahrain.

Rebecca Bennett has won a high-stakes Democratic Party primary in the US state of New Jersey, setting up a contest against Republican Tom Kean Jr, backed by President Donald Trump, for one of the most competitive seats in the upcoming midterm elections.

Bennett, a former US Navy helicopter pilot, defeated three Democratic rivals in New Jersey’s 7th Congressional District, securing about 47.2 percent of the vote, according to projected results on Tuesday.

Her nearest competitor, Tina Shah, received 20.2 percent.

Kean and Bennett will now square off in November for a seat that has changed party hands twice within the past eight years and ranks as a key target for Democrats hoping to capture the House of Representatives.

Independent analysts rate the contest as a toss-up.

The race has attracted heightened attention because of Kean’s prolonged absence from Congress.

The Republican incumbent has missed more than 100 House votes since early March due to an undisclosed illness.

Despite his absence, Kean ran unopposed in the Republican primary with Trump’s backing.

Kean said on Tuesday that he remained focused on his recovery and expected to return to in-person work within weeks.

Hours before polls closed, Kean released a statement promising greater transparency about his health while suggesting his return to in-person work could take longer than previously anticipated.

On May 21, he said he expected to be back within “a couple of weeks”.

“Right now, I am focused on my recovery and, under the advice of healthcare professionals, I will transition from virtual to in-person work within a matter of weeks,” Kean had said.

Bennett targets cost of living, Kean’s absence

At an election night gathering in Somerville, New Jersey, Bennett sharply criticised Kean’s record and absence from Washington.

“You are failing us, and you do not deserve to represent us in Washington,” she told supporters, calling the congressman a “coward”.

Bennett built her campaign around her military service and economic issues, arguing that higher grocery and gasoline prices during the US-Israel war on Iran, combined with Trump’s tariffs, were squeezing working families.

Democrats have increasingly focused on the conflict’s economic impact, with higher energy costs contributing to inflation and broader cost-of-living pressures across the country.

The 7th Congressional District, which includes suburban communities, farm towns and Trump’s golf club in Bedminster, has emerged as one of New Jersey’s key battlegrounds.

The seat has changed hands repeatedly in recent election cycles, with Democrat Tom Malinowski defeating Republican Leonard Lance in 2018 before Kean unseated Malinowski in 2022.

Bennett’s victory over Tina Shah, Brian Varela and Michael Roth now sets up a high-stakes general election contest in a district both parties consider crucial to their House ambitions.

Kean, 57, is the scion of a storied New Jersey political family.

His father, Thomas Kean, served two terms as governor and later chaired the 9/11 Commission, a panel set up in 2002 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US. He is also a descendant of William Livingston, New Jersey’s first governor.

The Republican congressman will also enter the race with the backing of Trump, who reiterated his support on the eve of the primary, despite Kean’s prolonged absence from Washington.

“Tom Kean has my Complete and Total Endorsement for Re-Election,” Trump wrote on social media, adding: “HE WILL NEVER LET YOU DOWN!”

Voters in the district have ousted incumbents in recent midterm elections, making the race one of the most competitive House contests in New Jersey.

Elsewhere in New Jersey, Analilia Mejia won the Democratic nomination in the 11th Congressional District, while LaMonica McIver secured the Democratic nomination in the 10th Congressional District.

Opposition leader and dozens of other defendants handed lengthy prison terms for ‘forming a terrorist alliance’.

A Tunisian court has handed down sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment against opposition leader Rached Ghannouchi and dozens of other defendants in the so-called “secret apparatus” case involving the Ennahdha party.

The Tunis Court of First Instance on Tuesday sentenced Ghannouchi, the leader of Ennahdha and a former parliamentary speaker, to life in prison plus 30 years on terrorism-related charges, reported Tunis Afrique Presse, Tunisia’s official news agency.

Eleven other defendants, including Ali Laarayedh, an adviser to former Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh, were handed life sentences in addition to prison terms of up to 96 years, Tunis Afrique Presse reported.

Thirteen others were handed prison terms of between 10 and 48 years, according to the news agency.

The court found Ghannouchi and the other defendants guilty of “forming a terrorist alliance” and other crimes, including “placing skills and expertise at the disposal of a terrorist alliance and of persons linked to terrorist crimes”, according to Tunis Afrique Presse.

The court ordered all defendants to be placed under administrative monitoring for five years.

Authorities opened the case against Ghannouchi and his co-defendants in early 2022 following a complaint by the public prosecutor’s office and lawyers for the families of leftist politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, vocal Ennahdha critics who were assassinated in 2013.

Lawyers representing Belaid and Brahmi’s families accused what they called Ennahda’s “secret apparatus” of involvement in the assassinations, as well as “conducting espionage and infiltrating state institutions”.

Ennahdha denied the allegations, describing them as “politically motivated”.

The public prosecutor’s office at the Ariana Court of First Instance initially took up the case, before handing it over to the judicial counterterrorism unit in 2023.

In April, Ennahdha said Ghannouchi had been urgently transferred from prison to hospital after a sharp deterioration in his health and called for his immediate release.

The opposition National Salvation Front also called for Ghannouchi’s release, citing his deteriorating health.

Tunisian security forces arrested Ghannouchi at his home during a Ramadan gathering in 2023, before a court of first instance ordered his imprisonment on charges of making statements that “incite chaos and disobedience”.

On April 15, a court sentenced Ghannouchi and three other Ennahdha leaders to 20 years in prison in what came to be known as the “Ramadan soirée case”.

Tunisian authorities have denied accusations that Ghannouchi and the other detainees are being held on political grounds.

The US military says it carried out ‘self-defence’ strikes on Iran’s Qeshm Island after Iran earlier launched missiles and drones at US bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. Despite the exchange, the US says the US-Iran ceasefire remains in effect.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Tuesday evening said “U.S. forces successfully defeated multiple Iranian ballistic missiles and drones” in attacks launched at allies Kuwait and Bahrain. Iran said the strikes were in response to U.S. attacks. This is yet another round of tit-for-tat strikes that have become something of regularity since the ceasefire deal was reached between the U.S. and Iran.

In a post on X, CENTCOM said “Iran launched several ballistic missiles toward regional neighbors; however, all failed to hit their intended targets. Two Iranian missiles fired at Kuwait fell short or broke apart enroute, and three missiles launched at Bahrain were immediately intercepted by U.S. and Bahrain air defense forces. Moments earlier, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces shot down three one-way attack drones launched by Iran toward civilian mariners that were rightfully transiting regional waters.”

Additional video showed what appears to be Patriot munitions fired to intercept Iranian missiles.

American forces “also conducted self-defense strikes on an Iranian military ground control station on Qeshm Island,” CENTCOM stated. “No U.S. personnel were harmed. CENTCOM forces remain vigilant and ready to defend against unwarranted Iranian aggression during the ongoing ceasefire.”

Kuwait officials say they came under ballistic missile attack, while explosions were reported in Bahrain.

“Kuwaiti air defenses are currently confronting hostile missile and drone attacks,” Kuwait’s Army stated on X. “The General Staff of the Army notes that if explosion sounds are heard, they are the result of air defense systems intercepting the hostile attacks. Everyone is requested to adhere to the security and safety instructions issued by the competent authorities.”

“The siren has been sounded,” Bahrain’s Interior Ministry stated on X. “Citizens and residents are urged to remain calm and head to the nearest safe place.”

Iran said it launched retaliation strikes.

“Following the hostile actions of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and Qeshm Island, American bases in Kuwait were hit,” the official Iranian IRIB news outlet claimed on X in a post that included video of what appears to be missiles landing.

IRIB posted another video it claimed showed an air defense munition exploding in a civilian area. TWZ cannot independently confirm any of these claims.

The Iranian news outlet also showed video of what it said were missiles flying over Bahrain.

A swarm of drones lit up the evening sky near Taiwan’s Taipei 101 skyscraper in a dazzling display depicting a giant robot, a sports car, and Earth. The light show was part of Computex Taipei, one of Asia’s largest technology exhibitions.

Macron, who has acknowledged French ‘responsibility’ in the genocide, called the memorial a reconciliation ‘milestone’.

French President Emmanuel Macron has presented a memorial in Paris dedicated to the victims of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, as France pursues closer ties with the East African country and continues to grapple with its role in the historic atrocity.

Speaking at the inauguration event alongside his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame on Tuesday, Macron said the monument marked “the culmination of a long and patient quest for truth”.

“An unprecedented reconciliation has emerged between Rwanda and France,” said Macron. “This monument, while it is an achievement, is not an end. It is a milestone on a path we have opened.”

Dubbed “L’Archive” (The Archive), the monument consists of two black brass steles, and it bears an engraved tribute to the estimated 800,000 men, women and children, mostly ethnic Tutsis, massacred between April and July 1994.

The memorial’s inauguration comes five years after Macron travelled to Kigali and first acknowledged France’s failure to heed warnings of impending massacres in Rwanda.

Macron has said Paris and its Western and African allies did not have the will to halt the genocide, though he has stopped short of issuing a formal apology.

‘Requires real courage’

Speaking at the ceremony, Kagame hailed France’s efforts to assume its share of responsibility, and praised Macron for his “courage and humanity”.

“France was not alone in falling short, far from it,” said Kagame, who had long accused France of “complicity”.

“Many other countries did so as well, but none has gone as far as France in setting the record straight and accepting its part in the tragedy.

“Confronting historical responsibilities requires real courage because it generates a fierce opposition by those with a case to answer,” Kagame said.

When the genocide against the Tutsis occurred in 1994, France had been a long-standing backer of Rwanda’s Hutu-dominated government, leading to decades of tensions between the two countries, including a break in diplomatic ties between 2006 and 2009.

A commission set up by Macron and led by historian Vincent Duclert concluded in 2021 that France had been ⁠blinded by its colonial attitude to events leading up to the genocide ⁠and bore a “serious and overwhelming” responsibility ⁠for failing to foresee the slaughter.

However, it said there was no evidence that Paris was complicit in the killings.

‘Part of France’s public history’

Duclert said the unveiling of the monument was a “powerful” step. “The genocide against the Tutsi is now fully part of France’s public history,” he said.

The French courts, acting on the principle of universal jurisdiction to try the most serious crimes committed worldwide, have convicted several Rwandans for their part in the massacre.

In May, France’s judiciary ordered the resumption of an almost two-decade investigation into accusations that the widow of late Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, who has lived in France since 1998, was involved in the genocide.

Introduction: