NEWS

The incident adds to concern that Moscow’s war on Ukraine risks spilling over to entangle neighbouring NATO states.

A Romanian fighter jet has shot down a drone, suspected to be Russian, that breached the country’s airspace.

The incident on Friday marked the first time the Eastern European country has intercepted an intruding aircraft since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, President Nicusor Dan noted.

However, concern that Moscow’s war on Ukraine risks entangling neighbouring NATO states is on the rise. Romania is one of several alliance members to confront repeated stray drones recently, as Russia and Ukraine launch hundreds of drones daily.

Dan reported that a Romanian F-16 jet shot down the drone after it entered the country’s airspace, adding that the fighter had shot over an uninhabited area.

A Romanian military source told the Reuters news agency that Russia was the suspected point of origin, given the pattern of previous incursions in the region.

Romania’s Ministry of National Defence said a radar first detected the drone about 20km (12 miles) east of the Black Sea port of Sulina, before it crossed into national airspace on a path through Braila, Fetesti and Buzau county.

Two Italian Eurofighter Typhoon jets, deployed to Romania under NATO’s air policing mission, were joined by two Romanian F-16s. One F-16 engaged the target with an air-to-air missile, downing it over unpopulated ground near the village of Padina. No casualties or injuries were reported.

Romania, an EU and NATO member sharing a border with Ukraine, has recorded dozens of drone incursions since the war began. This incident marked the first successful interception.

In late May, a drone struck an apartment building in the city of Galati, injuring two people – the first time such a strike hit a populated area in a NATO country.

NATO and European Union officials condemned the incident. The European Commission said it showed Russia’s war had “crossed yet another line”.

A month later, a Ukrainian sea drone exploded at the port of Constanta. Kyiv said that it had launched the vessel, which had been knocked off course by Russian jamming.

The Baltic states have also reported repeated airspace violations in recent months, incursions that contributed to the collapse of Latvia’s government in May.

NATO chief Mark Rutte has said Moscow’s “reckless behaviour is a danger to us all”. United States ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, has pledged the alliance will “defend every inch” of its territory.

As Israeli politicians and protesters keep up their demands to annex and settle in Gaza, recent satellite images reveal the construction of a huge earthen barrier dividing the territory. Al Jazeera’s Hala Al Shami explains.

Leaders of India’s youth-led “Cockroach” movement are set to hold talks with government representatives on Friday in an effort to resolve a growing political crisis triggered by national examination paper leaks. Despite the dialogue, protest leaders have made clear that nationwide demonstrations will continue until their key demands, including the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, are met.

The negotiations come after activist Sonam Wangchuk ended a 26-day hunger strike overnight, raising hopes of a possible breakthrough in the weeks-long standoff that has brought tens of thousands of young protesters to the streets of New Delhi.

The movement has become the biggest youth-led challenge to Prime Minister Narendra Modi since he first took office in 2014. Opposition parties have backed the protesters’ demands and disrupted the ongoing monsoon session of parliament, turning the issue into one of the most significant political crises of Modi’s third term.

Government and Protest Leaders Prepare for Talks

Representatives of the self-styled Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), which emerged from an online satirical movement into a nationwide protest campaign, will meet government ministers at a neutral venue.

CJP spokesperson Saurav Das said the movement hoped the government would engage seriously with protesters’ concerns.

“We hope that the government comes with an open mind and listens to the people of this country who have been on the streets for so long,” Das told reporters. “We will explain our demands in greater detail, and we hope the government will respond positively.”

However, he stressed that negotiations would not halt the movement.

“We are not backing out,” Das said. “Real change begins at the grassroots, and that is exactly what we intend to continue.”

Education Minister’s Resignation Remains Central Demand

While the government has indicated its willingness to continue discussions, protesters insist accountability must begin with the removal of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan.

Thousands gathered again at Delhi’s Jantar Mantar protest site on Thursday, where demonstrators vowed to remain until Pradhan resigns.

“We will continue protesting until Dharmendra Pradhan is removed,” protester Sudesh Singh said. “If we stop now, we compromise the future of millions of students.”

The demonstrations were sparked after authorities cancelled the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET), India’s highly competitive medical entrance examination, following the discovery that question papers had been leaked. Nearly two million students were affected by the cancellation, triggering widespread anger over repeated failures in India’s examination system.

From Online Satire to National Movement

The Cockroach Janta Party began as an online satirical campaign involving only a few hundred young supporters. It rapidly evolved into a nationwide movement after the examination scandal, attracting millions of followers on social media and drawing large crowds to protests across the country.

Monday’s march toward parliament saw tens of thousands of protesters defy restrictions before clashes broke out with police, who used tear gas and batons to disperse demonstrators.

Further confrontations occurred on Wednesday night when more than 10,000 people gathered in central Delhi.

Analysts say the movement reflects broader frustrations among India’s youth over limited employment opportunities, repeated examination scandals and declining confidence in public institutions.

Security Tightened Across the Capital

Authorities have significantly increased security measures around the protests.

The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation announced that 17 metro stations in central Delhi would remain closed again on Friday, marking the third major shutdown of the capital’s transport network this week.

Mobile internet services around the protest area were also disrupted, with Reuters journalists reporting patchy connectivity throughout Friday morning.

Officials say the restrictions are necessary to maintain public order, though protesters argue they are intended to suppress demonstrations.

Government Plans Legal Reforms

Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced on Thursday that his cabinet would consider legislation aimed at strengthening punishment for those responsible for examination paper leaks.

The proposed amendments would seek faster prosecutions and tougher penalties for individuals involved in leaking examination papers.

Protest leaders, however, argue that stricter punishments alone will not solve the problem.

They say systemic reforms are needed to restore confidence in India’s examination process and prevent future leaks before they occur.

Political Stakes Continue to Rise

The protests have quickly evolved from a dispute over examination integrity into a broader political challenge.

Opposition parties, led by the Congress Party, have embraced the movement’s demands, seeing an opportunity to pressure Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ahead of several important state elections scheduled for next year, including contests in Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Punjab.

Political analysts warn that the growing movement could reshape India’s political landscape if the government fails to address the concerns of young voters, who form a crucial part of the BJP’s electoral base.

The protests have also been accompanied by an unprecedented surge in online criticism, memes and satire targeting Modi, reflecting what observers describe as diminishing public hesitation to openly challenge one of India’s most influential political leaders.

Friday’s talks may provide the first opportunity for both sides to de-escalate the crisis, but with demonstrations set to continue regardless of the outcome, pressure on the government is unlikely to ease in the near term.

With information from Reuters.

Governments have become remarkably efficient at producing information. During crises, official statements, emergency regulations and public updates appear almost instantly. Yet recent global emergencies have exposed a fundamental paradox: more information does not necessarily create greater public trust.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated this with exceptional clarity. Around the world, governments introduced unprecedented public-health measures, revised policies at remarkable speed and communicated with citizens almost continuously. Despite these efforts, public responses varied dramatically. Accurate information competed with rumours, institutional confidence fluctuated and misinformation often spread faster than official corrections.

The challenge extended well beyond the pandemic. Whether societies face natural disasters, armed conflicts, cyberattacks or public-health emergencies, governments confront the same question: how can accurate information become trusted information?

Most discussions of crisis communication focus on governments and public institutions. Established frameworks such as the CDC’s Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model and Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) have shaped modern practice by emphasising transparency, consistency and timely communication.

These principles remain indispensable.

Yet they share an important assumption-that once reliable information is produced, effective communication naturally follows.

Recent experience suggests otherwise.

Between governments and citizens lies an often-overlooked stage of communication. Official information rarely reaches the public directly. Instead, journalists, editors, producers and broadcasters interpret complex events, provide context and translate institutional language into messages ordinary audiences can understand.

This intermediary role becomes especially important during uncertainty.

People rarely judge information on facts alone. They also respond to clarity, consistency and the credibility of those delivering the message. Two governments may release nearly identical information yet receive very different public reactions because the communication itself inspires different levels of confidence.

Television illustrated this particularly well during the COVID-19 pandemic. While social media accelerated both verified information and misinformation, television remained one of the most trusted sources of crisis reporting because journalists explained changing regulations, interpreted complex developments and provided continuity during uncertain periods.

In such moments, credibility becomes inseparable from presentation.

This raises a broader question. If governments are responsible for making decisions, who ensures those decisions are understood?

Despite its practical importance, that question has received surprisingly little attention.

One researcher exploring this overlooked dimension of crisis communication is Kazakh journalist Kydyr-Zhan Mukhatayev. His work examines what happens after official information reaches television audiences.

Using Kazakhstan’s experience during the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, Mukhatayev argues that broadcasters should not be viewed as passive channels transmitting government messages. Through editorial judgement, presentation and audience engagement, they actively influence how information is interpreted, trusted and ultimately acted upon.

When Information Isn’t Enough

A Case Study with Broader Implications

Mukhatayev explores this relationship through two complementary studies based on Kazakhstan’s broadcasting experience during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The first examines the professional role of television journalists during prolonged uncertainty. Rather than focusing exclusively on government communication, it considers how broadcasters themselves contributed to public understanding through responsible reporting, editorial judgement and effective communication.

The second expands the discussion beyond the pandemic, presenting crisis broadcasting as an interconnected system in which institutional credibility, journalism, visual communication and audience psychology continuously influence one another.

Although grounded in Kazakhstan’s experience, the questions raised extend far beyond one country. They suggest that successful crisis communication depends not only on what governments say but also on how professional media transform official information into messages citizens are prepared to understand, trust and follow.

How Trust Is Actually Built

Mukhatayev’s research brings these elements together into a single analytical perspective. Rather than viewing broadcasting as a channel for delivering official information, it presents television journalism as an active component of crisis management capable of strengthening-or undermining-public confidence.

Beyond COVID-19

The Next Crisis Will Test More Than Governments

Japan has identified a high concentration of valuable heavy rare earth elements in deep sea mud recovered from waters near the remote Pacific island of Minamitori, marking another step in its efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese critical mineral supplies.

The Japanese government said on Friday that analysis of rare earth rich mud collected earlier this year showed medium and heavy rare earth elements accounted for about 54% of the total rare earth content. However, officials did not disclose the overall size of the deposits, saying the limited scope and duration of sampling meant the available data was insufficient to estimate total reserves.

The samples were collected during a month long expedition in February by Japan’s scientific drilling vessel Chikyu near Minamitori Island, approximately 1,900 kilometres southeast of Tokyo. The mission marked the world’s first successful continuous recovery of rare earth bearing seabed mud from depths of around six kilometres beneath the ocean surface.

Strategic Push for Mineral Security

The project forms part of Japan’s broader strategy to strengthen supply chain security for critical minerals following tighter Chinese export restrictions on heavy rare earth elements and magnets, which are widely used in defence systems, electric vehicles, semiconductors and other advanced technologies.

Researchers recovered approximately 50 metric tons of seabed mud during the expedition.

Analysis identified several strategically important rare earth elements, including yttrium, used in aerospace, semiconductor and energy technologies; gadolinium, widely used in medical imaging and other high technology applications; and dysprosium, a key component in high performance permanent magnets used in electric vehicle motors.

Commercial Mining Trial Planned

Japan plans to conduct a month long large scale mining trial in the same waters beginning in February 2027.

The trial aims to recover approximately 350 tons of seabed mud each day. The material will first be dewatered on Minamitori Island before being transported to mainland Japan for separation, refining and smelting tests.

The project will evaluate whether domestic deep sea rare earth production can become commercially viable. A comprehensive assessment of industrial scale production is expected by March 2028, according to Kazushige Kikuchi, project manager at the Japan Agency for Marine Earth Science and Technology, which operates the Chikyu research vessel.

China Remains Dominant Supplier

Japan’s exploration efforts come amid growing concern over China’s control of global rare earth supplies.

Beijing introduced export controls on several heavy rare earth elements and related magnets in April 2025 and later tightened restrictions on exports to Japan in January, followed by two additional rounds of measures the following month targeting major Japanese companies.

Rare earth elements are essential components in advanced manufacturing, including electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, military equipment, consumer electronics and semiconductor production.

Analysis

Japan’s latest findings highlight the growing strategic importance of securing independent supplies of critical minerals as geopolitical competition increasingly shapes global supply chains. Although the newly analysed deposits have yet to be proven commercially viable, the discovery strengthens Japan’s long term effort to reduce reliance on Chinese exports. If future mining trials demonstrate economic feasibility, deep sea resources could become an important pillar of Japan’s critical minerals strategy while encouraging other resource poor countries to accelerate investment in seabed mining technologies despite ongoing environmental concerns.

With information from Reuters.

Zambians will vote on August 13 in presidential and parliamentary elections, with polls and investors widely expecting President Hakainde Hichilema to defeat a fragmented opposition led by Brian Mundubile.

For investors, however, the central question extends beyond the election outcome. The focus is on whether a second Hichilema administration can transform Zambia’s post-default economic stabilisation into stronger, broad-based growth while maintaining fiscal discipline.

IMF Programme Seen as Key Test

One of the first issues investors will monitor is whether Zambia secures a new programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after its previous $1.7 billion arrangement ended in January.

The earlier programme helped underpin Zambia’s sovereign debt restructuring after the country became Africa’s first pandemic-era sovereign default. Markets now view a successor agreement as an important indicator of policy continuity.

Investors will closely watch how quickly negotiations conclude and whether any new programme shifts its focus from crisis management toward promoting long-term economic growth while preserving fiscal discipline.

Copper Industry Remains the Economic Backbone

Copper continues to dominate Zambia’s economy, accounting for about 70% of export earnings while serving as a major source of government revenue, foreign investment and employment.

Investors are watching whether planned investments can translate into higher production. Major projects include Vedanta’s return, continued expansion by Barrick Gold, and First Quantum Minerals’ ongoing investments.

The government has maintained that mining tax rates will remain unchanged, providing policy stability. However, investors are paying close attention to a proposed local-content law that would require mining companies to increase domestic procurement to around 40% over the next three to four years from roughly 20% today.

Mining companies have warned that many local suppliers currently lack sufficient financing and technical capacity, potentially creating supply chain challenges during a period of major expansion.

Growth Reforms Still Needed

Despite recent macroeconomic improvements, investors argue that broader structural reforms remain necessary.

Among the priorities are increasing exploration spending to discover new mines, improving tax collection efficiency, and reforming Zambia’s grain market to reduce the government’s role in purchasing maize harvests.

A record maize crop is expected this year, but analysts warn that government purchases of surplus grain could increase fiscal pressure, particularly alongside election-related spending.

Some forecasts suggest Zambia’s fiscal deficit could exceed official government targets if these pressures continue.

Reliable Power Critical for Mining Expansion

Electricity supply has become another major concern following drought-induced power shortages that exposed Zambia’s heavy dependence on hydropower.

Although investment in solar energy is increasing, investors say expanding copper production will depend on creating a more reliable and diversified electricity system capable of supporting future mining operations.

Election and Climate Risks

While most observers expect a relatively orderly election, monitoring groups have highlighted concerns including alleged voter card confiscation, vote buying and the possibility of localized unrest if results are disputed.

Weather also remains a significant economic risk. Zambia remains highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture and hydropower, leaving the economy vulnerable to future droughts similar to the severe 2023–24 El Niño event that caused widespread crop failures and electricity shortages.

Analysis

The election itself is unlikely to unsettle investors if Hichilema secures the expected victory. Instead, markets will judge whether his government can move beyond economic stabilization toward sustained, private sector-led growth. A new IMF programme, continued mining investment, reforms to agriculture and tax collection, and a more resilient energy sector will be the key indicators of success. While Zambia has made notable progress since its debt default, structural challenges and climate risks continue to test the country’s long-term economic outlook.

With information from Reuters.

Chadwick Boseman’s brothers are taking the late US actor’s widow to court over her handling of his multimillion-dollar estate.

Derrick Boseman and Kevin Boseman have filed a petition with a Los Angeles court to force the Black Panther star’s widow, Taylor Simone Ledward, to distribute money to family members, and to have her removed as controller of his estate.

They claim she has mishandled distribution of the funds and “cannot be trusted with the continued administration of the estate”.

Boseman died at the age of 43 in 2020, four years after being diagnosed with colon cancer. He is best remembered for playing the lead role of T’Challa, king of Wakanda, in Oscar-winning 2018 Marvel blockbuster Black Panther.

According to court documents seen by BBC News, Boseman had assets worth $3.8m (£2.9m) but died without a will.

A court decided that 50% should go to Boseman’s widow, who was also appointed the estate’s administrator, with 25% to each of his parents.

The actor’s brothers filed the court petition last week on behalf of their parents, Leroy and Carolyn Boseman.

The petition said Ledward “has still not distributed the estate” and “continues to exert unilateral control” over it.

Ledward is also accused of creating a “lack of transparency” around his assets, and of keeping the actor’s parents “in the dark” about the deals and operations of a company that was set up to manage his image and rights.

The brothers claim Ledward’s “misconduct is causing ongoing harm” to Boseman’s elderly parents and depriving them “of financial assets at a vulnerable age when such support is most critical”.

“Moreover, the needless continuation of these proceedings denies Decedent’s [Boseman’s] family closure and causes emotional distress,” the court filing said.

“Imagine flipping through the channels and stumbling on a film starring your deceased son or brother, knowing that someone you do not know or trust is profiting from his image without your input or consent.”

Ledward – an R&B artist who uses the name Sahn – started dating Boseman in 2015 and they got married just six days before the actor’s death in August 2020.

The BBC has asked her lawyer for a comment.

In a statement to US media, the late actor’s brothers said: “On behalf of our parents, we are committed to ensuring that transparency, accountability, and respect guide the resolution of these matters.

“Our hope is that this process brings clarity, honors the court’s orders, and ensures the responsible stewardship of Chadwick’s legacy.

“We love our brother, and we remain committed to preserving his legacy with dignity, integrity, and respect.”

London, United Kingdom — On his fourth day as prime minister, Andy Burnham did not stay at Downing Street in London. Nor did he go to Manchester, the home of Number 10 North. He went to Glasgow.

Hours before King Charles and Queen Camilla opened the 2026 Commonwealth Games, Burnham held his first in-person meetings with Scotland’s First Minister John Swinney and Wales’ First Minister Rhun ap Iorwerth. The talks were meant to demonstrate, in Burnham’s own words, that growth is needed “in every postcode across the whole of the UK”. A meeting with Northern Ireland’s First and Deputy First Ministers, Michelle O’Neill and Emma Little-Pengelly, is pencilled in for a wider UK tour in August.

Notably absent from the agenda, at Burnham’s insistence, was any discussion of a second Scottish independence referendum.

Just days after being appointed prime minister, Burnham is testing a proposition that will define his premiership. He’s selling a vision that the office itself can be partly relocated out of London to Manchester, the city he governed as mayor from 2017 until his return to UK Parliament in the Makerfield by-election last month.

What Number 10 North actually is

Stripped of rhetoric, Number 10 North is a written ministerial statement. On July 21, Baroness Smith of Basildon, Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal, confirmed on the government’s behalf that devolution and local growth policy functions are moving out of the housing ministry and the Treasury and into a new Manchester-based operation. There, civil servants will work inside a restructured Office for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, led by Cabinet Secretary Dame Antonia Romeo.

The interim headquarters is Heron House, in the New Islington area of Manchester, chosen partly for its proximity to a planned Manchester Digital Campus.

Caroline Simpson, the outgoing chief executive of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, has been named Burnham’s deputy chief of staff, and will be in charge of day-to-day office operations. Downing Street says Burnham himself expects to work from Manchester “at least one day a week”, though officials caution his diary may change, and insists the arrangement carries no additional cost to taxpayers.

Burnham calls it “the nerve centre of a rewired Britain” and rejects suggestions it is symbolic. “Not a gimmick,” he told his first Cabinet meeting about Number 10 North.

Plumbing, but no water

Number 10 North “establishes the plumbing, but the water isn’t flowing yet”, said Mirte Boot of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) North. The institutional architecture is firming up, but fiscal devolution – ie, the transfer of money and tax-raising power – that would make such a policy meaningful doesn’t yet exist, she added.

Still, she calls it “a step in the right direction” after what she describes as “too much power condensed into one postcode”. Leaving Westminster isn’t enough; Number 10 North will need “strong political leadership aside from the prime minister”, she added.

The verdict that Number 10 North contains vision and ambition but currently lacks a detailed plan and delivery mechanism is a recurring response from independent voices.

Jonathan Carr-West of the Local Government Information Unit calls Burnham’s devolution agenda “the most ambitious statement … from a senior politician in a generation”, while warning that English councils are so financially hollowed out that the vision “requires a vehicle” it does not yet have.

Malcolm Morgan, a transport researcher at the University of Leeds, puts it more bluntly: genuine devolution means spending, taxation and regulatory power, not just relocated functions, and “devolution does not create more funding”.

That funding question sits unresolved alongside the national one. The 2026 English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act expanded mayors’ control over transport, planning and housing, but left fiscal devolution to a separate Treasury “roadmap” due alongside the autumn budget. According to Centre for Cities, a UK urban policy think tank, the UK remains the most fiscally centralised country in the G7: some 95 percent of tax revenue flows straight to Whitehall.

Devolution, or recentralisation?

For Scotland’s SNP government, the Number 10 North framing is beside the point. First Minister Swinney responded that “rhetoric alone will not cut it” and argued that four consecutive Holyrood elections have handed his party a mandate for Scottish self-determination, something Westminster keeps ignoring, he said. In Glasgow, Burnham declined to engage with that argument directly.

Meanwhile, Wales’ Ap Iorwerth struck a more cooperative note but still said he expected “that Number 10 North would not become Whitehall with a different postcode”.

He also used the meeting with Burnham to press for a new Wales Bill granting policing and justice powers, and a replacement for the Barnett Formula funding mechanism, which Westminster uses to calculate annual changes to the block grants allocated to the UK’s devolved governments, so Wales would have funding parity with Scotland.

Reform UK’s Nigel Farage, from the opposite political direction, warned that a Number 10 in the south and one in the north would simply “fight against each other”.

What it means in Manchester

In Bury, Greater Manchester, Scottish-born Debe Conway sells children’s books at markets and has lived in the area for 56 years, but remains unconvinced about the new prime minister.

Her biggest concern is immigration, which she called Burnham weak on. And as for Number 10 North, she wants to know how it’s being paid for, and asks how long it will last, considering that the UK has had seven prime ministers in the last 10 years.

Rich Carver, who has run pizza restaurants in Manchester for 15 years and is currently “soaking up the energy in the city”, says he cares more about what will happen in the next 10 years.

He’s also tired of the succession of governments and wants this one to last. He likes Burnham and is optimistic enough about the city’s trajectory that he is opening a new restaurant in the coming weeks, something he would not have done five years ago.

“We are all one country,” he says, hoping the rest of the UK (and the media) give the new prime minister time and the chance to implement his vision. Whether that time produces growth, or just relocated offices, is the question Number 10 North still has to answer.

A major fire broke out at a Wildberries e-commerce warehouse in St Petersburg after a Ukrainian drone attack. Ukraine also targeted another Wildberries warehouse on the outskirts of the city, as well as facilities in Tver and Crimea.

The United States has continued to attack Iran for a 13th consecutive night on Thursday and explosions were reported in multiple Iranian cities on Friday morning.

In addition to the ongoing attacks, shipping disruptions continue to intensify. Ship tracking data revealed that just one tanker successfully crossed the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday, marking the lowest level since May 7.

However, shipping data from London Stock Exchange Group shows that two Chinese supertankers carrying crude oil from Saudi Arabia successfully exited the Bab al-Mandeb strait on Friday. This is despite the naval blockade Yemen’s Houthis announced against Saudi Arabia on Monday.

Here is a recap of what happened on Thursday night and Friday.

Where did the US attack Iran?

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that at 01:00 GMT on Friday, it concluded its latest round of strikes against Iran.

CENTCOM said it targeted Iranian military command centres, drone storage facilities, communication networks, coastal surveillance sites and maritime capabilities.

On Friday, Iranian media reported explosions or attacks across multiple Iranian cities. State broadcaster IRIB reported that explosions were reported in Khondab, Khorramabad, Konarak and Jask. Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that two people have been injured following an early morning drone attack on Khorramabad, citing the deputy governor of the western Lorestan province.

Iran’s Mehr news agency reported on Friday that US missile strikes hit the cities of Andimeshk and Omidiyeh in the Khuzestan province. There were no casualties or injuries.

Al Jazeera’s Tohid Assidi reported from the Iranian capital, Tehran, that explosions were heard on Qeshm island, located in the Strait of Hormuz, on Friday.

Attacks on the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas have injured two people, Iranian media reported on Friday.

Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency reported on Friday that four people were killed and five others were injured in a US missile attack near the southwestern city of Ahvaz.

Where did Iran strike in the Gulf?

Bahrain: In a statement carried by Iran’s Mehr news agency, the Iranian army said it used drones to target fuel storage tanks, equipment warehouses and troop living quarters at Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain.

Jordan: The military added that aircraft hangars, maintenance facilities and accommodation sites at the Muwaffaq Salti/Al-Azraq base in Jordan were also hit, warning that any actions against Iran’s interests would undermine regional security and economic stability.

What have leaders on either side said?

On Thursday, US President Donald Trump stepped up his rhetoric against Tehran. He told the US news website Axios that he may launch the largest strikes on Iran yet, after Tehran carried out another wave of retaliatory attacks on US allies in the Gulf, including hitting a telecommunications tower in Kuwait.

Trump said he was “considering a massive attack” that would be “bigger than ever before”.

“I am close to making a decision. We are all set for it,” Trump said.

Separately, Trump threatened, on his Truth Social platform, that if Iran attacked ships, the US would use Tehran’s frozen assets to pay for repairs.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on Friday that using frozen state assets to pay for future claims sets a dangerous global precedent.

“Seizing another nation’s assets to pay for unrelated future claims is an incendiary precedent,” Araghchi wrote on X.

He cautioned that “those who celebrate or profit from such funds should remember: once governments normalise confiscation, no one’s assets are safe. Ensuing chaos will not be pretty or peaceful”.

Burnham’s first day as prime minister in No 10 North will include talks with business leaders, including representatives of the Federation of Small Business, the Confederation of British Industry and the British Chambers of Commerce, about how to generate growth and investment.

Labour wants to create a plan that would pull from existing devolution strategy and local growth policy, to allow civil servants, mayors, councils and businesses to work together more closely.

Burnham’s first week in power has seen him make a series of interventions aimed at easing the cost of living, including announcing a 20% cut in business rates for pubs, social clubs and live music venues from April next year.

However, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has criticised his ambitions for being “too small”.

Speaking on Thursday, she urged him to tackle high energy costs for businesses as well as a gap in defence funding.

“When you are mayor of Manchester, you are handed a big pot of someone else’s money, and you decide where to spend it,” she said.

“I’m sure this is great fun. It can make you very popular. But it is not the same as being prime minister.

“Andy Burnham needs to do better. He is behaving like he’s still the mayor of Manchester. He is now the prime minister of the United Kingdom, he needs to start acting like it.”

Ukraine replaced its top military and political defence personnel in the past week even as its armed forces arguably achieved their best performance in three years.

Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov’s ouster on July 15 was followed six days later by the replacement of Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskii. Both men were followed out the door by some of their most capable lieutenants.

Ukraine seemed to have found a winning formula, making 2026 Russia’s worst year of the war for manpower losses, territory and economic performance at home.

Some 193,500 Russian troops have been killed or seriously wounded so far this year, said Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence – averaging losses of 32,000 a month for the first time, according to Syrskii – and Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service estimates Moscow is unable to reach recruitment targets.

This pain has produced a net gain of just 81.1sq km for Russia, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank that assesses territorial movements using geolocated open sources, and the trend of gains to losses is improving in Ukraine’s favour.

If June was a disastrous month for the Russian operation, netting it just 30sq km, July has so far been worse, with Russian forces making net losses of 1.6sq km a day, according to the ISW.

Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy, which boomed in 2022-24, has seen growth this year flatten at just 0.2 percent, Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted.

Ukraine has replaced defence ministers and commanders-in-chief before, but this was the first simultaneous shake-up of the war and seems to have come amid an internal debate about strategy.

On the day after Fedorov’s ouster, which produced street protests against the move, Syrskii spoke of “an effective strategy that is currently demonstrating concrete results”.

A day after his own sacking, Syrskii wrote a column on the Militarnyi news website saying, “The Minister should not … be a war strategist. This is not his task and not his responsibility.”

“War strategy, planning of operations, the situation on the front — by law, I am responsible to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief,” he said.

The nub of disagreement seems to have been unmanned warfare.

Syrskii created the world’s first Unmanned Systems Forces, the SBS, and fought the world’s first war in which First Person View (FPV) drones caused an estimated 95 percent of enemy casualties.

Ukraine’s middle and long-distance drones have devastated Russian logistics and oil supply, slackening the force it can deliver to the front.

Fedorov pressed hard in this direction during his six months on the job, buying more drones in four months than the Defence Ministry had bought in all of 2025, and even spending soldiers’ payroll money to swell orders.

Syrskii disagreed. “Against us is an enemy that is superior in everything, who fights, in particular, with artillery, aviation, and infantry. I cannot transfer a million-strong army ‘to drones’ in two months and say: now we are fighting like this,” he wrote on Militarnyi.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who recently told The Financial Times that “the sky will be decisive in this war,” said on July 20 he was “continuing to determine what adjustments should be made to Ukraine’s defence strategy and what priorities in production and supply to the military must be implemented as quickly as possible”.

What is Ukraine doing that is working?

Ukraine developed the use of short-range drones on the battlefield to reduce its own exposure and lower casualties. That strategy has yielded results, effectively halting Russia’s advance this year.

Syrskii said Ukraine gained more territory than it lost in May, the month in which it began to strike Russian logistics using the overland route from Russia into its southern regions of Zaporizhia and Kherson.

By the end of May, Ukraine was also disrupting logistics in the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, forcing Russia to float fuel and materiel across the Sea of Azov to Crimea. Ukraine then targeted those ships.

Since June 6, Ukraine’s commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi said, Ukraine had disabled 196 fuel tankers and destroyed three-quarters of Russia’s ferry capacity across the Kerch Strait, the closest crossing from Russia’s Krasnodar Krai to Crimea.

As an added benefit, Brovdi said, Russia had been forced to redeploy 200 units of its own unmanned forces command, called Rubicon, to protect an equal number of ships, weakening its frontline.

“That’s how many vessels will be destroyed by SBS “Birds” in the Black and Azov Seas during the remainder of July and the first half of August – it’s a matter of honor,” he wrote on his Telegram messaging channel.

The SBS has also struck 117 electrical substations and power stations this month, Brovdi said, most of them in Crimea, plunging much of the peninsula into darkness.

Apart from hampering the armed forces and the economy, that has been a drain on Moscow, which was earmarking five billion rubles ($64mn) in compensation for darkened homes and furloughed employees, in addition to measures announced the week before.

Ukrainian Navy spokesman Dmytro Pletenchuk said Russian shipping had been paralysed in the Sea of Azov, and that the Kerch Bridge was being allowed to stand “so that the Russians can leave the Ukrainian Crimea,” because “it will reduce our losses during possible future actions directly in Crimea.”

Ukraine’s long-range strikes this week destroyed a Tupolev-95 strategic bomber at the Engels airfield 800km from Ukraine, and a MiG-29 fighter plane at the Khalino airfield in Kursk, in addition to numerous air defence radars and launchers.

Ukraine also struck the Slavneft-Yanos refinery in Yaroslavl, which it described as the largest “in the central part of the country”.

In a shift from its usual military and energy targets, Ukraine struck four warehouses of the Wildberries online retail group, which it suspects Russian recruits use to order much of their protective gear and weapons.

Russia has retaliated this month by targeting Ukraine’s port infrastructure on the Black Sea, to prevent it from exporting the grain harvest.

Container shipper Maersk said on July 22 it was diverting container traffic originally intended to be offloaded at Odesa or Chornomorsk to Romania’s Constanta. This also meant that Ukrainian outbound container traffic waiting in Chornomorsk could not be loaded unless moved to Constanta.

Ukraine has retaliated in turn, claiming to have bottled up Russia’s grain exports coming down the Don river to the Sea of Azov, via which Russia exports 30 percent of its grain.

Russia is also retaliating by increasing the number of ballistic missiles in its nightly strikes on Ukraine’s cities.

Since June 26, Russia has included missiles in almost every strike, contrary to past practice, when it held back its missiles for one massive combined missile and drone strike a week.

Ukraine says it has learned how to intercept 95 percent of drones and 87 percent of cruise missiles, but fewer than half of Russia’s ballistics.

“You hope that ballistics will do for you what everything else has failed to do,” Zelenskyy wrote to Putin in June.

An analysis by Militarnyi suggested Russia was dipping into its missile reserves to achieve this, using more than its monthly production capacity in the first two weeks of July.

This is concerning, Jess Phillips told us: “Not even training your moderators on your website. They should be ashamed of themselves.”

Unlike some other swinging sites, FabSwingers does not require identity verification, which can make it harder for police to identify suspects when allegations are reported. It also means a banned user can create a new account – although FabSwingers says it can detect this, without explaining how it does so.

FabSwingers told the BBC its moderation processes involve up to five site administrators, who moderators report to, alongside AI and “automated controls”.

Since 2023, the website has been mentioned in at least 329 police reports across the UK – according to Freedom of Information requests submitted by the BBC – including in allegations of rape, sexual offences, coercive control, harassment, blackmail, stalking, assault and possession of extreme pornography. Although, it does not mean FabSwingers was responsible for what was alleged in the reports.

Jess Phillips said she believes the site “falls foul” of the Online Safety Act, adding she would encourage the regulator Ofcom “to look into it very, very seriously right now and shut it down”.

Ofcom says it is “extremely concerned” to hear of the BBC’s findings and is speaking to the site’s provider, but it has not so far launched an investigation.

The vast majority of those contacting the BBC were women who wanted to thank Ruth O’Grady, the subject of the Swingers podcast, for sharing her story.

“I’m still not in a place where I want anyone I love to know some of these things about my past,” one woman told us. “But I feel a little less alone now.”

If you would like to contact BBC Journalist Catrin Nye and the Swingers investigation team about this story you can email on swingersinvestigation@bbc.co.uk, external

Additional research by Emily Parsons

EDITOR’S ANALYSIS

Houthi blockade for now is shaping who moves Saudi crude, not whether it moves, analysts say, even as oil prices soar.

As oil prices hit $100 a barrel on Thursday, experts say they are watching to see which vessels Yemen’s Houthis allow to pass through in the Red Sea as that will indicate how the crude market trends.

Brent futures rose $6.58 or 6.96 percent, to $100.65 a barrel, exceeding $100 for the first time since late May.

That was on the back of the Iran-aligned Houthis saying they were cutting off the passage Riyadh had been using to ship parts of its crude oil once Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz to retaliate against United States and Israel attacks.

On Monday, the Yemeni group declared a naval blockade on shipments from Saudi Arabia and said they would target Saudi, Israeli, and United States-linked tankers in the Bab el-Mandeb, which links the Red sea to the Indian Ocean.

On Thursday, the Houthis attacked two Saudi Arabian oil tankers, the group said, with a Saudi news agency later confirming that one of the two vessels was set ablaze.

It is not clear if the second one was also hit, according to marine analysis firm, Windward.

“The Houthis are quite mercurial and there is no complete clarity on what the blockade means,” said Michelle Bockmann, a senior maritime intelligence analyst at Windward.

“We’re watching now the ability of Chinese-owned tankers at [Saudi port] Yanbu if they are allowed to go through Bab el-Mandeb. Two have gone through but those had been loaded before the blockade was announced.”

The Houthis have previously relied on China for help, including for drone components, and “the Chinese have previously had a free pass”, said Bockmann, including between 2023 and 2025 when the Houthis attacked cargo ships aligned with Israel and the US in the Red Sea in the wake of the war on Gaza.

Windward tracking shows the cargo that moved through the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint on July 20 was Saudi in origin but Chinese in crew and destination, and it drew no interdiction. The two vessels passed through the same corridor that Western- and Saudi-linked operators were being warned to avoid.

The enforcement is calibrated to affiliation rather than cargo and the blockade is shaping who moves Saudi crude, not whether it moves, Windward said.

“No one has ever been able to predict their actions… but they know you don’t have to do a lot to get the oil markets to react,” said Bockmann referring to the rise in benchmark oil prices on Thursday.

Rachel Ziemba, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, underscored that the standoff in Bab el-Mandeb is happening while crude buffers have nor been replenished after the peak of the Hormuz crisis earlier this year.

“The multiple chokepoints are new and an example of littoral states looking to use their leverage,” Ziemba said.

Diesel also impacted

For now, both the Houthi threats and the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz through which nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil transited before the US-Israel war on Iran, has sent prices soaring, including at the pump in the US reaching the national average of $4.09 per gallon (3.4 liter).

“Today’s rise in oil prices could cause $0.10 to $0.20 rise over the next week or two per gallon average price in US,” said Patrick De Haan, head of petroleum analysis at GasBuddy.

But De Haan is looking beyond the two straits and says he’s watching the availability of diesel as price per gallon averages $5.34.

“Diesel prices are being impacted more significantly,” he told Al Jazeera.

One reason behind that is that Ukrainian drone attacks have taken offline some of Russia’s oil refineries. The shortages are being felt domestically leading to Russia banning diesel exports, De Haan said.

“Oil exports are one story, but supplies of diesel gasoline, jet fuel is another story,” he said.

Another unknown in the mix is the role of China which, historically has been a major importer but slashed those imports in the past few months, helping stabilise global prices as some pressure on demand eased.

“It’s been one of the reasons that oil prices haven’t gone up dramatically – that china slashed its imports, and no one predicted that,” De Haan said. “For now, we don’t know if china is using its own strategic reserves or if it will start import again.”

Between those geopolitical plays and the upcoming hurricane season in the US, there is “another wildcard ahead for global refining capacity” and prices, De Haan said.

The White House has formally registered its opposition to a move by Congress to block work on the nuclear-powered Trump class battleship unless the U.S. Navy provides assurances that key weapon systems are “sufficiently mature.” The House Armed Services Committee has already demanded a report from the Secretary of the Navy outlining the steps the service is taking to ensure the battleship program won’t exacerbate existing construction delays on aircraft carriers and submarines.

Earlier this week, the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a Statement of Administration Policy regarding the latest draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for Fiscal Year 2027 that is now making its way through the House of Representatives. The document offers support for and opposition to various sections of the proposed legislation, which is also known as H.R. 8800.

“The Administration appreciates that H.R. 8800 would provide authorization of the 18 ships requested in the Budget. These ships are a direct commitment to restoring America’s maritime dominance and maritime industrial base,” OMB’s statement, which was published on July 21, declares. “In addition, the Administration appreciates the bill’s support of the Battleship program by fully authorizing the $1 billion in advance procurement necessary to accelerate the delivery to the Fleet.”

“However, the Administration opposes the bill’s excessive reporting requirements in section 131 regarding the Administration’s priority Battleship program,” it continues. “The Administration strongly opposes any reporting requirements that delay the Battleship program without supporting national security requirements.”

On July 21, USNI News also reported that OMB was pressing members of Congress to include funding to start work on the first Trump class battleship in a proposed temporary spending bill, or Continuing Resolution. A temporary funding package could be needed if legislators cannot pass a more formal budget by September 30, when the current fiscal year ends.

When it comes to Section 131 of H.R. 8800, the provision is brief, but pointed. At the time of writing, it reads, in full:

“The Secretary of the Navy may not enter into a contract or other agreement that includes a scope of work for the construction of the lead ship of the Battleship program until the date on which the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that the weapon systems planned for inclusion in such lead ship are at a sufficiently mature technology readiness level.”

The section does not name any particular weapon systems or define what level of technological readiness would be deemed sufficient. To date, the Navy has described the planned Trump class battleship as a 35,000-ton-displacement warship with a diverse array of weapons. The ship is set to be able to fire nuclear and conventional missiles, including hypersonic types, from several very large Vertical Launch System (VLS) arrays. It will also have an electromagnetic railgun, a pair of traditional 5-inch naval guns, various laser directed energy weapons, and additional weapon systems for close-in defense.

TWZ previously reported on this provision, which has been in the proposed legislation since at least May. As we wrote in the past:

“In terms of technological maturity, the railgun presents particular questions. Between 2005 and 2021, the Navy had an active railgun program. Despite promising developments, plans for an at-sea test were repeatedly pushed back before the entire effort was shelved. Major technical hurdles were cited as a key factor in that decision. The railgun itself was effectively placed in storage at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico.“

“However, it emerged earlier this year that the Navy had conducted a new round of testing of the railgun at WSMR in February 2025. Whether the Navy has any plans to pick up where it left off with this prototype design, which was developed by BAE Systems, or pursue a new one remains unclear. General Atomics, which previously supported U.S. Army railgun efforts, has publicly expressed interest in being involved in arming the Trump class.”

“While the Navy has been very active in developing and fielding laser directed energy weapons, this is another area where the service has faced continued challenges in expanding their operational use. The plans for the Trump class specifically call for a 300-kilowatt-class laser, which is far more powerful than any of the designs the Navy has integrated on its warships to date. The service currently has eight Arleigh Burke class destroyers with the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN), as well as another one of those warships with the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS). HELIOS is a 60-kilowatt-class design, though there has been talk about scaling up its power rating to 150 kilowatts. ODIN’s power rating does not appear to be officially confirmed, but it is understood to be significantly lower than that of HELIOS. You can read more about all of this here.”

“The Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) hypersonic missile, another key component of the future Trump class arsenal, is also still in development. The first test launch from a warship, the stealth destroyer USS Zumwalt, is expected to come next year. IRCPS is the Navy half of a joint program with the U.S. Army, which is working to field a land-based version of the same missile. The Army refers to its complete weapon system as the Dark Eagle. The Army had suffered significant setbacks in the past with the Dark Eagle, but the service had blamed those issues on the launcher rather than the missile.”

For its part, OMB’s July 21 statement does not respond to any particular concerns that might be raised by Section 131, either.

Section 131 represents just one small portion of the questions, concerns, and criticism that members of Congress have leveled at the Trump class battleship program. The first one of these ships, currently set to be named the USS Defiant, has an estimated price tag of $17 billion. This would make the vessel more expensive than each of the next three Ford class aircraft carriers. The future USS Defiant is also not currently expected to enter service until 2036. The Navy has already outlined plans to order 14 more of these battleships between Fiscal Years 2029 and 2055, as well.

With this in mind, as noted, the House Armed Services Committee has separately asked for a report from the Secretary of the Navy, to be delivered no later than March 1, 2027, on the potential industrial impacts. A particular issue is the strain that work on the Trump class could have on America’s limited nuclear shipbuilding enterprise. Currently, there are only two U.S. shipyards qualified to build nuclear-powered vessels and only one supplier of naval reactors. Currently, the only nuclear-powered ships in the Navy are aircraft carriers and submarines. The service has not operated a nuclear-powered surface combatant in decades, and it has been even longer since one was built in the United States.

TWZ has repeatedly raised questions about the basic industrial capacity to support the battleship program since it was first rolled out to the public in December 2025. It is worth noting here that third, fourth, and fifth Ford class carriers now under construction – the future USS Enterprise (CVN-80), USS Doris Miller (CVN-81), and USS William J. Clinton (CVN-82) – have all suffered delays. Concerns are also regularly voiced about potential setbacks in the construction of new Virginia class and Columbia class submarines. Navy officials have been saying for years now that there is little, if any, margin left in the Columbia class delivery timeline, which is a critical matter of national security. It is essential for those boats to be delivered on a tight schedule to ensure there is no gap in the ability of the leg of America’s nuclear triad to meet operational requirements.

The battleship effort is of particular significance to President Donald Trump and has been presented as a signature program for his administration. At the same time, the schedule that has been laid out so far means that major decisions about how to proceed in acquiring these ships, if at all, will run into the next administration. Any delays will only push that timeline further to the right at a time when there are already major competing priorities for defense spending. Some members of Congress have openly questioned whether the battleship effort is the best use of available resources already.

The annual NDAA is still far from being finalized. The House’s version will need to be reconciled with the one being advanced in the Senate before the bill can be put to a vote, let alone sent to Trump’s desk to be signed into law (or vetoed). This is a process typically marked by lengthy negotiations, and Section 131, as well as other provisions, could change in the future or be removed entirely.

Whether or not a larger political fight around the Trump class battleship emerges remains to be seen. However, OMB has now made clear publicly that the administration is against the inclusion of the guardrails around the program that the current version of H.R. 8800 proposes to establish.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

A US Democratic Congressman challenges UN Ambassador Mike Waltz during a congressional hearing, playing an Al Jazeera video to question troop safety in Jordan. Some lawmakers do not trust the Trump administration to be open about the danger posed by Iranian strikes on US bases.

The Question Islamabad Has Not Answered

On the night of 16 March 2026, Pakistani warplanes struck a walled compound in Kabul’s ninth police district. Afghan officials say more than four hundred people died. The United Nations mission in Afghanistan has independently confirmed at least two hundred and sixty nine deaths and some one hundred and twenty injuries. Islamabad’s account was simple: the site held ammunition and military infrastructure, and any civilian harm followed from secondary explosions rather than the strike itself. Four months later, Amnesty International published an investigation reaching the opposite conclusion, built not on Taliban testimony but on satellite imagery spanning three years, verified video, and independent geolocation of the wreckage. On 9 July, Amnesty asked Pakistan’s foreign ministry for the evidence behind its military target claim. As of publication, no response has arrived. That silence, more than any single photograph, is now doing the analytical work in this dispute.

A Conflict Escalating Since October

The Omid strike did not occur in isolation. Cross border hostilities between Pakistan and the Taliban administration have intensified since October 2025, and the UN mission in Afghanistan has documented more than seven hundred and fifty civilian casualties in the first three months of 2026 alone, spread across a series of Pakistani air operations against targets it describes as militant infrastructure. The Omid center, a drug rehabilitation facility expanded after 2021 to house roughly two thousand patients, was neither obscure nor newly built. Its treatment programs featured in a 2023 Al Jazeera documentary, and signage identifying the site as a medical facility was visible above its main gate. This is the backdrop against which the competing claims about the March strike have to be weighed. It is a theatre where verification has become as contested as the fighting itself, and where each side’s evidentiary standard has become a proxy for its wider legitimacy claim.

How Open Source Evidence Reshaped the Dispute

The strongest version of Pakistan’s position would rest on operational intelligence unavailable to outside observers: a genuine military use of the site that satellite imagery and testimony could not capture, perhaps weapons storage concealed within a facility that also treated patients. That is a coherent claim in the abstract, and cross border conflicts involving non state or quasi state administrations often do see dual use of civilian infrastructure. The problem for Islamabad is not that this claim is inherently implausible. It is that four months of opportunity to substantiate it, including a direct written request from an investigating body, has produced silence rather than documentation.

Set against that silence is a body of evidence that does not depend on Taliban cooperation. Amnesty’s investigators analysed satellite imagery of the compound from April 2023 through 15 March 2026, tracking the site’s physical layout and, in imagery from just three days before the strike, the presence of large numbers of people in the patient and administrative areas. A video recorded in 2025 and verified by the organisation shows the interior housing arrangements for patients. Separately, and this is the detail that most changes the analytical picture, broadcast journalists reviewing Pakistan’s own released strike footage identified at least four buildings struck with guided munitions, while a conflict researcher affiliated with the open source investigation group Bellingcat independently geolocated the strikes to the rehabilitation center’s buildings using imagery unconnected to either Amnesty or the Taliban administration.

This matters because it breaks the framing in which the dispute is simply Pakistan’s word against an adversary regime’s word. Geolocation from Pakistan’s own footage and independent satellite analysis are not Taliban sources, and they are not filtered through UNAMA’s access constraints in Afghanistan, real as those constraints are. A rigorous critique of Amnesty’s methodology would need to engage with this layer of evidence directly rather than treating the investigation as resting solely on interviews inside Afghanistan. It does not.

None of this settles the question of what Pakistani planners believed they were targeting at the moment of the strike, which is a distinct question from what the site actually was. Precision guided strikes can be aimed at accurate coordinates built on flawed intelligence, and an honest accounting of the incident would distinguish between deliberate targeting of a known medical facility and a targeting failure rooted in faulty threat assessment. Pakistan’s silence forecloses that distinction rather than resolving it in its own favour. A government confident in a genuine intelligence failure, as opposed to a deliberate strike, has strong incentive to say so, since the reputational and legal exposure of the two scenarios differs sharply. The absence of any account, four months on, is itself informative.

There is a genuine access problem in Afghanistan that deserves acknowledgment rather than dismissal. Restrictions on UN personnel operating inside the country, including limits on female staff, have long constrained what any investigating body can independently confirm through interviews on the ground. That constraint is real and worth stating plainly. But it is analytically distinct from the evidentiary chain that actually carries this case, since satellite archives, geolocation of released military footage, and broadcast forensic review do not depend on access to Afghan territory at all. Conflating the two, treating a legitimate critique of ground level access with a wholesale dismissal of imagery based verification, is where the strongest version of Pakistan’s defence collapses into a weaker one. Under international humanitarian law, the burden of demonstrating that a strike met the tests of distinction, precaution and proportionality sits with the party that carried it out, not with the investigating organisation. Silence does not discharge that burden. It simply leaves the imagery based record as the only account on file.

The Stakes Beyond One Strike

This dispute reaches well past the fate of one investigation into one strike. Pakistan is not a party to the Rome Statute, and the UN Security Council has shown no appetite for a binding inquiry into cross border strikes in Afghanistan, leaving no institution with the authority to compel either side toward resolution. Into that vacuum, open source verification, satellite archives, independent geolocation, forensic review of released military footage, has effectively become the closest available substitute for enforcement, even though it carries no legal power to compel compliance or impose consequences. How this case resolves, or fails to resolve, will help set the operating norm for a growing number of asymmetric conflicts in which a state conducts cross border strikes against a non state or quasi state administration controlling the affected population. If credible, independently corroborated evidence of civilian harm at a protected medical site produces no formal accountability, the lesson other militaries draw from this dispute will be that silence is a survivable strategy, and that the proportionality and precaution requirements of international humanitarian law can be managed through delay rather than compliance. That is the systemic risk this case actually tests, well beyond the question of what happened at one rehabilitation centre in March.

Three Paths From Here

Three trajectories are plausible over the coming months, none of them mutually exclusive in sequence.

The likeliest path, on available evidence, is continued silence accompanied by informal briefings to allied capitals disputing Amnesty’s methodology without engaging its strongest evidentiary points, particularly the independent geolocation. This preserves ambiguity domestically while avoiding a formal admission that could carry legal exposure under international humanitarian law. It is a moderately likely outcome, on the order of an even chance or somewhat better given precedent in comparable disputes involving other militaries.

A less likely but plausible path is a formal Pakistani rebuttal that engages directly with the satellite and geolocation evidence, offering an alternative account of what the imagery shows or asserting an intelligence failure rather than deliberate targeting. This would be the more legally cautious route and would represent a meaningful shift from the current posture. Call this a modest possibility, distinctly less likely than continued silence but not remote.

The least likely path in the near term is a referral to an international investigative mechanism with independent access, given both Pakistan’s incentive to avoid binding scrutiny and the Taliban administration’s own resistance to international access inside Afghanistan, which cuts against any process requiring cooperation from both sides. This remains a low probability outcome absent significant diplomatic pressure from third parties with leverage over Islamabad.

The clearest near term indicator to watch is whether Pakistan’s foreign ministry issues any substantive written response to Amnesty’s evidentiary request before the anniversary of the strike in March 2027. A specific, documented reply, even one contesting the findings, would mark a break from the pattern observed since March. Continued non response through that date would itself be a data point confirming the first scenario.

The Precedent Being Set

What is being tested in Kabul is not only one contested strike but the durability of official denial once satellite archives, geolocation researchers, and broadcast forensic review become standard evidentiary tools in conflicts fought behind restricted access. For Western policy planners, the operative signal is the widening gap between what open source verification can now establish and what official statements are willing to confirm, a gap increasingly shaping how allied governments calibrate cooperation. For investors reading South Asian risk, cross border escalation between Islamabad and Kabul remains an active, under priced variable, with legal exposure now harder for militaries to contain through silence alone. For rights and development organisations, the case is a template for how methodology itself becomes the battleground before accountability is even reached.

Silence was once a viable strategy for governments awaiting the news cycle to move on. Satellites do not move on.

Trump says he is considering a ‘massive attack’, as Iran’s Araghchi says ‘mindless aggression’ won’t help a deal.

Caracas, July 22, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan campesinos have urged authorities to halt efforts to evict them from productive lands in the northwestern state of Falcón.

The José Leonardo Chirino campesino council, which organizes around 120 families in the Barimisagua estate, located in the Iturriza municipality, has accused landowner Jacobo Salas Romer of  “intimidation” against campesinos.

Over the past two weeks, campesinos have denounced the use of heavy machinery to destroy their crops, while multiple families saw their houses set on fire.

“The Salas Romer family maintains a permanent harassment against more than 100 families in these lands,” campesino council spokesperson Gustavo Ladino told Venezuelanalysis. “They have bribed security forces, and some institutions have lent themselves to serve the interest of this fascist family.”

He added that the Barimisagua estate belongs to the Venezuelan state after it was abandoned by the former owners. Rural families began settling into the Barimisagua lands in 2000 and gradually expanded production in the estate. The campesinos have sown crops including corn, beans, and sweet potato, in addition to planting fruit trees and undertaking small-scale cattle rearing.

In a 2025 public statement, the rural collective criticized the National Land Institute (INTI) for not following the procedures established in the Venezuelan Land Law to assign idle estates to campesino organizations once they have developed productive activities for an extended period.

The campesino spokesman called on Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, Agriculture Minister Vladimir Padrino López, and Attorney General Larry Devoe to guarantee the rural families’ right to “contribute to the country’s food security.” 

“We are calling for support from the Venezuelan authorities,” Ladino said. “We urge the government to conduct an inspection and deliver the necessary title deeds so that we can produce while being free from intimidation.”

The local activist additionally condemned efforts to criminalize land struggles by charging local leaders with crimes such as trespassing and tying them down in legal proceedings.

In an assembly on July 18, the rural families ratified the campesino council’s spokespeople and issued a press statement vowing to “consolidate social justice in the countryside.”

Salas Romer belongs to a powerful Venezuelan oligarchic family. His brother, Henrique, was governor of Carabobo state and lost to Hugo Chávez in the 1998 presidential election. The family business appeared in the Panama Papers investigation into offshore capital flight.

The 648-hectare Barimisagua estate has been at the center of a protracted legal struggle for many years, with Salas Romer attempting to secure protection orders from local agrarian courts on environmental grounds as a means to evict the rural families. The campesino council has rejected offers to relocate to a different plot in Falcón state, arguing that the land is insufficient for the number of people involved.

In recent years, rural grassroots organizations have raised the alarm regarding the resurgence of landowner violence in the countryside as well as an expanding influence of agribusiness oligopolies. Rice producers have staged multiple protests demanding that authorities regulate imports during harvest season and bind agroindustrial corporations to established crop prices.

With the economy heavily constrained by US sanctions, the Nicolás Maduro government moved to liberalize agricultural policies, transferring state competencies to the private sector, including provisioning of seed and fertilizer inputs and access to tractors. Fuel subsidies were likewise phased out, with small-scale producers highlighting it as a major factor driving up production costs.

Campesino organizations have warned against efforts led by agribusiness and cattle rancher associations to reform or sideline the 2001 Land Law, which heavily favored access to land for small-scale producers. In June, the Venezuelan National Assembly preliminarily approved a new Law to Protect Cattle Rearing.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Cali, Colombia.

Caracas, July 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores returned to court on Wednesday for a brief hearing in which Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein approved a schedule for proceedings that will see their trial begin on June 1, 2027.

The calendar was jointly proposed by US Justice Department prosecutors and the respective defense teams.

Under the agreed timetable, prosecutors are expected to complete the bulk of their disclosure of unclassified evidence by September 22, while classified evidence is scheduled to be turned over by November 15. A preliminary hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence has been set for November 17.

Following this phase, and no later than March 11, 2027, Maduro’s legal team will formally file pretrial motions. Barry Pollack, one of Maduro’s attorneys, has disclosed plans to invoke immunity and seek a dismissal of charges against the Venezuelan leader. The approved procedural calendar also includes a second round of pretrial motions, which would address additional evidence.

The hearing marked the third court appearance since Maduro and Flores were kidnapped by US military forces in Caracas on January 3 and transferred to a federal detention center in Brooklyn.

During their arraignment on January 5, both pleaded not guilty to all charges, including narcoterrorism, drug trafficking conspiracy and weapons possession. At the time, Maduro stated in Spanish that he was Venezuela’s “constitutional president” and considered himself “a prisoner of war.”

The case was initially mired in controversy as Washington blocked Maduro and Flores from having their legal expenses covered by the Venezuelan government headed by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez. In April, the US Treasury Department granted a waiver to allow Caracas to pay the legal fees of the attorneys representing Maduro and Flores.

The latest hearing had originally been scheduled for June 30, but prosecutors requested a postponement, citing security concerns related to transporting the defendants and coordinating police operations in New York, as law enforcement resources had been heavily committed to the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Wednesday’s hearing saw dozens of international solidarity activists gather outside the federal courthouse in New York to express solidarity with the Venezuelan president and first lady and demand their immediate release.

In Caracas, hundreds of supporters of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), along with members of grassroots and communal organizations, gathered at Plaza Caracas for a rally led by Caracas Mayor Carmen Meléndez and Maduro’s son, National Assembly Deputy Nicolás Maduro Guerra.

“In the face of this unjust trial, the people have raised their voices (…) Today has been an emotional day—200 days without hugging my father, without seeing Cilia in person (…). This kidnapping has been extremely difficult for my family,” Maduro Guerra said.

He added that “despite Venezuela having been subjected to a military aggression, the country’s political leadership made the courageous, wise, and intelligent decision to resolve any conflict and any differences through politics and diplomacy.”

The Venezuelan government, including Acting President Rodríguez, have offered no comment in recent weeks concerning the US prosecution of Maduro and Flores.

In a June interview with Spanish journalist Javier Negre, Rodríguez said that Maduro remains Venezuela’s legitimate president but stopped short of demanding his liberation, instead claiming that he has the right to “demonstrate the truth” before the US justice system.

Washington and Caracas restored diplomatic and consular relations on March 5, ending a seven-year hiatus. Shortly afterward, the White House formally recognized Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader.” 

The Trump administration recently stepped in and requested that a Florida court grant Rodríguez immunity from a civil action brought by three US citizens who spent time in prison in Venezuela. Judge Darrin Gayles entered a default ruling against Maduro and several other high-ranking current and former Venezuelan officials who did not respond to a lawsuit. He also awarded US $314 million in damages to the plaintiffs over alleged “torture” claims.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Iran on Thursday threatened RAF Fairford in the U.K. after claims emerged that U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer bombers launched from there attacked the Islamic Republic on Tuesday. RAF Fairford is a major hub for U.S. military aircraft, with strategic assets, like the B-1s, being forward deployed to the base and tactical and other assets often using it as a pit stop during flights ‘across the pond.’ As an example, Iran’s threat came hours after two EA-37B Compass Call electronic warfare jets arrived at the base from the United States.

“The American aggressor army, which used to launch cruise missiles from its vessels in the Indian Ocean in its aggression after the official resumption of the war, with the end of the missile reserves of the aforementioned vessels, yesterday switched to using B1 planes flying from Fairford Air Base, England,” the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-connected Tasnim news outlet claimed on Telegram. “As the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated, any base that is used to invade Iran’s territory is our legitimate goal.”

Asked about the threats, British officials told us that the country is prepared to defend itself.

 “Our Armed Forces are ready to keep the United Kingdom safe from any kind of attacks, whether it’s on our soil or from abroad,” a government official told TWZ. “The UK stands ready 24/7 to defend itself. This includes through operating a layered approach to air and missile defense, provided by Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force assets equipped with a range of advanced capabilities, working closely with our NATO allies.”

“In the Defense Investment Plan we have made air and missile defense a priority after years of underfunding, dedicating £790 million to enhance protection of the UK homeland and overseas bases from air, drone and missile threats,” the official added. “That is complemented by more than £2 billion of funding to deliver further air defense and counter-drone capabilities, and to upgrade and sustain our Typhoon fleet.”

Iranian officials did not specify how they would strike RAF Fairford, and it is unclear how they could. In March, Iran reportedly fired two missiles at Diego Garcia, a joint U.S.-U.K. base on an island in the Indian Ocean. That’s about 2,400 miles away, or about the same distance as Fairford is from Iran. However, one missile was reportedly shot down by a U.S. warship while the other failed in flight. Given that, whether Iran could actually launch a successful attack on Fairford using those weapons is questionable at the least. Far more likely, if Iran would actually even try anything at all, would be a near-field attack like Operation Spider Web launched by Ukraine in June 2025 against Russian bombers using short-range drones hidden in trucks near airfields. One-way attack drones launched from vessels at sea is another very real attack vector Iran has trained for and equipped itself to execute, a threat you can read all about here.

You can see video of one of those strikes below.

The threats came after Axios reported that B-1B bombers from the base took part in Tuesday’s strikes on Iran. TWZ cannot independently confirm that and CENTCOM declined comment. However, open-source trackers made that claim early Wednesday morning before the Axios story was published.

Bomber Run 63 – Ops Beginning Again? #IranWar‌ #FreeIran‌

Overnight, B-1B “Lancer” bombers flying from RAF Fairford (EGVA) conducted strikes in Iran as the US ramps up operations again. Although 2 bombers launched, it appears it was pre-planned that only 1 of them would… pic.twitter.com/Q7Ic3Ahqk3

— DefenceGeek 🇬🇧 (@DefenceGeek) July 22, 2026

As we noted earlier and have discussed in the in the past, RAF Fairford has served as a major hub for aircraft heading to the region as well as long-range bomber missions on Iran.

“U.S. Air Forces in Europe operating locations, including the 501st Combat Support Wing at RAF Fairford, routinely host transient U.S. military aircraft in accordance with access, basing, and overflight agreements with Allies and partners,” an Air Force spokesperson told us in response to our questions about the Compass Calls.

The EC-37s landed shortly after 7 a.m. British Summer Time (BST), or about 2 a.m. EDT, according to local aviation photographer Matt Belcher, who was kind enough to share photos he took of the aircraft.

The Compass Calls are heavily modified Gulfstream G550 business jets. They leverage the Conformal Airborne Early Warning (CAEW) configuration developed first for the Israel Defense Forces, which has large ‘cheek’ fairings on either side of the fuselage, among other distinctive features.

The Air Force is planning to procure 10 of these jets to replace the aging and decreasing fleet of turboprop EC-130H Compass Call planes, of which only four remain. The 43rd Electronic Combat Squadron flew the first training sortie for the EA-37B on May 2, 2025, and one made the type’s maiden voyage to Europe in January.

Many of the EA-37B’s mission systems are directly ported over from the EC-130H, which is why the two very different aircraft share the same nickname. Both aircraft are designed to provide critical stand-off jamming support, including against enemy radars and communications systems. They also have a secondary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) function given their ability to spot, track, and geolocate various types of emitters.

The EA-37B also offers new capabilities that go beyond what is found on the EC-130H. The Air Force has said in the past that the aircraft’s designation reflects its ability to not only attack, but also destroy certain targets, as you can read more about here.

The Compass Calls had previously been deployed to RAF Mildenhall in the early days of Operation Epic Fury. On April 1, CENTCOM announced for the first time that they had been used in combat as part of Epic Fury. The possibility that they are returning to the region, or adding additional electronic warfare capabilities to the total force deployed there, can be considered a potential indicator of what’s to come. These are often the last assets we see move into place ahead of major combat operations.

All this comes as the U.S. is building up forces amid increasing intensity of attacks on and by Iran and President Trump’s statement to Axios today that “I am considering a massive attack. Bigger than ever before. I am close to making a decision. We are all set for it.”

In addition, Houthi attacks on Saudi ships in the Red Sea raise the specter of a U.S. military response there. 

“I am considering a massive attack. Bigger than ever before. I am close to making a decision. We are all set for it”, Trump told me https://t.co/AZnZNyEPrP

— Barak Ravid (@BarakRavid) July 23, 2026

Last week, we reported that at least 12 F-16 Fighting Falcons were deployed to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan from Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany. Other aircraft have rotated into the CENTCOM area of operations as well.

Going for GOLD: 4 flts of 3x “SP” F-16CJ (TABOR11,21,31,41) are inbound to Muwaffaq Salti AB, Jordan (OJMS) from Spangdahlem AB, Germany (ETAD). 4x KC-135R/T “GOLD” team tankers are up to support the movement.

This #Coronet East (#CE097) returns the ftrs from the 480th Squadron… pic.twitter.com/IkL6HKkrOe

— Aux OSINT (@AUX_OSINT) July 17, 2026

In addition, “special-operations forces have deployed to the region from their U.S. bases,” The Wall Street Journal reported, citing flight-tracking data and U.S. officials. “Squadrons of jet fighters have been staged across the Middle East, and bomber aircraft at bases in the U.S. and U.K. are on high alert to ramp up operations, according to one of the officials.”

Beyond aircraft, “more than 150 medics have arrived at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany in recent days,” the Journal added. The hospital is the primary location for treating troops injured in combat in the Middle East.

The U.S. has been surging forces toward the Middle East, giving Trump options to expand the Iran war

Among the things moving/on alert:
-fighter squadrons
-special operations forces
-medics
-long-range bombers https://t.co/peSx70S85v w/ @laraseligman

— Shelby Holliday (@shelbyholliday) July 22, 2026

Other assets have been rotated out, like the B-52 Stratofortress bombers that departed from Fairford earlier this month. The U.S. also returned F-22 Raptors that were flying out of Ovda Air Base in Israel back to the United States. Other aircraft, such as A-10s and F-15Es, have also returned home from or have been replaced in the CENTCOM region. So clearly there is a lot of shifting of aviation assets taking place even amid current operations.

While adding new forces to Europe and the Middle East does not necessarily mean that Trump will dramatically escalate the conflict, it gives him options to do so. In addition, the public nature of some of these movements also has a messaging effect, letting Tehran and the Houthis know that Trump is ordering more assets to the region.

Regardless, the direct threat against RAF Fairford, no matter how nebulous, is new and will certainly be taken seriously by security officials at the installations and others in region.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Mexican journalist Alejandro Leyva Aguilar was shot dead while eating at a street food stall in Oaxaca. He had spent years reporting on alleged corruption and criminal violence. His murder marks the fourth journalist killing in Mexico since June.