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Iran on Thursday threatened RAF Fairford in the U.K. after claims emerged that U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer bombers launched from there attacked the Islamic Republic on Tuesday. RAF Fairford is a major hub for U.S. military aircraft, with strategic assets, like the B-1s, being forward deployed to the base and tactical and other assets often using it as a pit stop during flights ‘across the pond.’ As an example, Iran’s threat came hours after two EA-37B Compass Call electronic warfare jets arrived at the base from the United States.

“The American aggressor army, which used to launch cruise missiles from its vessels in the Indian Ocean in its aggression after the official resumption of the war, with the end of the missile reserves of the aforementioned vessels, yesterday switched to using B1 planes flying from Fairford Air Base, England,” the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-connected Tasnim news outlet claimed on Telegram. “As the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated, any base that is used to invade Iran’s territory is our legitimate goal.”

Asked about the threats, British officials told us that the country is prepared to defend itself.

 “Our Armed Forces are ready to keep the United Kingdom safe from any kind of attacks, whether it’s on our soil or from abroad,” a government official told TWZ. “The UK stands ready 24/7 to defend itself. This includes through operating a layered approach to air and missile defense, provided by Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force assets equipped with a range of advanced capabilities, working closely with our NATO allies.”

“In the Defense Investment Plan we have made air and missile defense a priority after years of underfunding, dedicating £790 million to enhance protection of the UK homeland and overseas bases from air, drone and missile threats,” the official added. “That is complemented by more than £2 billion of funding to deliver further air defense and counter-drone capabilities, and to upgrade and sustain our Typhoon fleet.”

Iranian officials did not specify how they would strike RAF Fairford, and it is unclear how they could. In March, Iran reportedly fired two missiles at Diego Garcia, a joint U.S.-U.K. base on an island in the Indian Ocean. That’s about 2,400 miles away, or about the same distance as Fairford is from Iran. However, one missile was reportedly shot down by a U.S. warship while the other failed in flight. Given that, whether Iran could actually launch a successful attack on Fairford using those weapons is questionable at the least. Far more likely, if Iran would actually even try anything at all, would be a near-field attack like Operation Spider Web launched by Ukraine in June 2025 against Russian bombers using short-range drones hidden in trucks near airfields. One-way attack drones launched from vessels at sea is another very real attack vector Iran has trained for and equipped itself to execute, a threat you can read all about here.

You can see video of one of those strikes below.

The threats came after Axios reported that B-1B bombers from the base took part in Tuesday’s strikes on Iran. TWZ cannot independently confirm that and CENTCOM declined comment. However, open-source trackers made that claim early Wednesday morning before the Axios story was published.

Bomber Run 63 – Ops Beginning Again? #IranWar‌ #FreeIran‌

Overnight, B-1B “Lancer” bombers flying from RAF Fairford (EGVA) conducted strikes in Iran as the US ramps up operations again. Although 2 bombers launched, it appears it was pre-planned that only 1 of them would… pic.twitter.com/Q7Ic3Ahqk3

— DefenceGeek 🇬🇧 (@DefenceGeek) July 22, 2026

As we noted earlier and have discussed in the in the past, RAF Fairford has served as a major hub for aircraft heading to the region as well as long-range bomber missions on Iran.

“U.S. Air Forces in Europe operating locations, including the 501st Combat Support Wing at RAF Fairford, routinely host transient U.S. military aircraft in accordance with access, basing, and overflight agreements with Allies and partners,” an Air Force spokesperson told us in response to our questions about the Compass Calls.

The EC-37s landed shortly after 7 a.m. British Summer Time (BST), or about 2 a.m. EDT, according to local aviation photographer Matt Belcher, who was kind enough to share photos he took of the aircraft.

The Compass Calls are heavily modified Gulfstream G550 business jets. They leverage the Conformal Airborne Early Warning (CAEW) configuration developed first for the Israel Defense Forces, which has large ‘cheek’ fairings on either side of the fuselage, among other distinctive features.

The Air Force is planning to procure 10 of these jets to replace the aging and decreasing fleet of turboprop EC-130H Compass Call planes, of which only four remain. The 43rd Electronic Combat Squadron flew the first training sortie for the EA-37B on May 2, 2025, and one made the type’s maiden voyage to Europe in January.

Many of the EA-37B’s mission systems are directly ported over from the EC-130H, which is why the two very different aircraft share the same nickname. Both aircraft are designed to provide critical stand-off jamming support, including against enemy radars and communications systems. They also have a secondary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) function given their ability to spot, track, and geolocate various types of emitters.

The EA-37B also offers new capabilities that go beyond what is found on the EC-130H. The Air Force has said in the past that the aircraft’s designation reflects its ability to not only attack, but also destroy certain targets, as you can read more about here.

The Compass Calls had previously been deployed to RAF Mildenhall in the early days of Operation Epic Fury. On April 1, CENTCOM announced for the first time that they had been used in combat as part of Epic Fury. The possibility that they are returning to the region, or adding additional electronic warfare capabilities to the total force deployed there, can be considered a potential indicator of what’s to come. These are often the last assets we see move into place ahead of major combat operations.

All this comes as the U.S. is building up forces amid increasing intensity of attacks on and by Iran and President Trump’s statement to Axios today that “I am considering a massive attack. Bigger than ever before. I am close to making a decision. We are all set for it.”

In addition, Houthi attacks on Saudi ships in the Red Sea raise the specter of a U.S. military response there. 

“I am considering a massive attack. Bigger than ever before. I am close to making a decision. We are all set for it”, Trump told me https://t.co/AZnZNyEPrP

— Barak Ravid (@BarakRavid) July 23, 2026

Last week, we reported that at least 12 F-16 Fighting Falcons were deployed to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan from Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany. Other aircraft have rotated into the CENTCOM area of operations as well.

Going for GOLD: 4 flts of 3x “SP” F-16CJ (TABOR11,21,31,41) are inbound to Muwaffaq Salti AB, Jordan (OJMS) from Spangdahlem AB, Germany (ETAD). 4x KC-135R/T “GOLD” team tankers are up to support the movement.

This #Coronet East (#CE097) returns the ftrs from the 480th Squadron… pic.twitter.com/IkL6HKkrOe

— Aux OSINT (@AUX_OSINT) July 17, 2026

In addition, “special-operations forces have deployed to the region from their U.S. bases,” The Wall Street Journal reported, citing flight-tracking data and U.S. officials. “Squadrons of jet fighters have been staged across the Middle East, and bomber aircraft at bases in the U.S. and U.K. are on high alert to ramp up operations, according to one of the officials.”

Beyond aircraft, “more than 150 medics have arrived at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany in recent days,” the Journal added. The hospital is the primary location for treating troops injured in combat in the Middle East.

The U.S. has been surging forces toward the Middle East, giving Trump options to expand the Iran war

Among the things moving/on alert:
-fighter squadrons
-special operations forces
-medics
-long-range bombers https://t.co/peSx70S85v w/ @laraseligman

— Shelby Holliday (@shelbyholliday) July 22, 2026

Other assets have been rotated out, like the B-52 Stratofortress bombers that departed from Fairford earlier this month. The U.S. also returned F-22 Raptors that were flying out of Ovda Air Base in Israel back to the United States. Other aircraft, such as A-10s and F-15Es, have also returned home from or have been replaced in the CENTCOM region. So clearly there is a lot of shifting of aviation assets taking place even amid current operations.

While adding new forces to Europe and the Middle East does not necessarily mean that Trump will dramatically escalate the conflict, it gives him options to do so. In addition, the public nature of some of these movements also has a messaging effect, letting Tehran and the Houthis know that Trump is ordering more assets to the region.

Regardless, the direct threat against RAF Fairford, no matter how nebulous, is new and will certainly be taken seriously by security officials at the installations and others in region.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Mexican journalist Alejandro Leyva Aguilar was shot dead while eating at a street food stall in Oaxaca. He had spent years reporting on alleged corruption and criminal violence. His murder marks the fourth journalist killing in Mexico since June.

Ali al-Zaidi will hold talks with senior Iranian officials on bilateral cooperation, shared interests and security.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is in Iran on his first official visit since assuming office in May.

The Iraqi News Agency (INA) on Thursday said al-Zaidi and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian oversaw the signing of several agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) pertaining to foreign affairs, finance, the economy and energy in Tehran.

Speaking at a joint meeting of senior Iranian and Iraqi delegations in Tehran, al-Zaidi thanked Iran for helping Iraq in its fight against the ISIL (ISIS) group, and reaffirmed his country’s commitment to security cooperation with Tehran, saying that Iraq would not accept hostile action against Iran by any party.

“Iraq will never forget Iran’s support in the fight against the [ISIL/ISIL] terrorist group,” he said, according to Pezeshkian’s office.

Pezeshkian said a comprehensive strategic cooperation plan would serve as a roadmap for expanding relations between Tehran and Baghdad, stressing that the security of the two neighbouring countries was closely linked.

Over the course of the two-day visit, al-Zaidi will hold talks with other senior Iranian officials on bilateral cooperation, shared interests and regional security, he said on X.

“We will meet with senior officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran to discuss issues of mutual interest, bilateral cooperation, regional developments, and ongoing efforts to consolidate security and stability across the region,” he said.

“Iraq and Iran are bound by historic and civilizational ties, shared borders, and common interests. These enduring bonds call for continued engagement in a spirit of dialogue, cooperation, and mutual respect in a manner that promotes sustainable development and prosperity for the peoples of both countries, while contributing to security and stability at the regional and international levels.”

Iraq remains heavily reliant on Iranian natural gas and electricity, while bilateral trade exceeds $12bn annually, making it one of Iran’s largest trading partners.

A deep religious bond also exists between the two countries, as millions of Iranian Shia pilgrims cross the border to visit Iraq’s holy sites every year. During the week-long funeral held for Iran’s slain Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei earlier this month, the procession travelled through the Iraqi Shia pilgrimage cities of Najaf and Karbala.

The Iranian government has also cultivated close ties with influential Shia parties and armed groups in Iraq that form the backbone of Iraq’s security forces.

Political analyst Ghaleb Al-Daami told Al Jazeera that al-Zaidi’s visit came as Baghdad tries the difficult task of maintaining relations with both the warring parties, the United States and Iran.

Al-Daami said the main objectives of al-Zaidi’s visit were to tell Iran to stop its support for armed groups in Iraq and to deliver a message from the US, which has expressed support for Iraq acting as a mediator amid the US war on Iran.

Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, told CBS News in 2018 that his own nation was not planning to acquire a nuclear weapon, but that “without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible”.

Earlier US media reports suggested the deal could allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium in the future – which can be used as fuel for power plants, but also potentially to make nuclear bombs. However, Trump’s remarks appear to deny this.

Rosemary Kelanic, the director of the Middle East programme at the US-based Defense Priorities think tank, said it would be “quite shocking” if the US were to allow Saudi Arabia uranium enrichment facilities.

“The US has never done that before. We have never helped another country enrich on their own soil,” she said, adding that this was because “if you can produce your own nuclear fuel, you become a much bigger risk” for building nuclear weapons.

The agreement will now be sent to the US Congress for review.

Some lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle are expected to oppose the deal, though Trump’s Republican Party controls both the upper and lower chambers and opponents of the deal do not appear to have the votes needed to block it.

The conflict in Yemen has entered a new chapter with a declaration by the Houthis that they are imposing a maritime siege on all shipping to Saudi Arabia.

The Yemeni rebel group, also known as Ansar Allah (or supporters of God), has attacked a number of Saudi tankers in the Red Sea.

This development has placed the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the strategic waterway that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean, at the heart of the war between the United States and Iran, and amplifies pressure on global trade routes.

The Iranian-backed Houthis, who seized Yemeni capital Sanaa in 2014, have threatened to close the strait, the route through which much of Europe’s energy supplies pass. It is also a key passage for imports to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis’ decision to announce a maritime blockade cannot be separated from the turmoil created by the ongoing war between Washington and Tehran, which erupted on February 28 when the US and Israel attacked Iran.

Houthis raise stakes for Saudi’s support

On Monday, Yemen’s internationally recognised government claimed responsibility for an air strike on Sanaa airport, saying that it was a measure to prevent an Iranian plane from landing in Yemen’s Houthi-controlled capital. But the Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia for it.

The Houthis responded by firing missiles into Saudi Arabia – a key backer of the Aden-based Yemeni government – and later upped the stakes by announcing a naval blockade on the kingdom.

These developments mark a major escalation in Yemen’s civil war. Saudi Arabia, which has sought in recent years to avoid a new war on its southern borders, is facing a more complex equation with the threat shifting from land to sea, and the targeting of one of the most important alternative routes for its oil exports.

All of this raises the question: will this escalation cause a new confrontation between the Yemeni government and the Houthis? And if so, what does the balance of power look like between the Houthi and government sides after more than a decade of war? Has the balance changed enough to increase the odds of a military resolution to the conflict?

There has been talk of potential escalations in recent years, but this now seems more likely, especially since it intersects with local, regional and international events and the return of the US-Iran war.

The Yemeni government has restructured its military with a single decision-making centre, and regional messages suggest the military option has not been shelved, as was once thought.

So, will retaking Sanaa return to the table as a military objective to be thought of seriously, and what does that mean practically? And how ready are the parties, especially the Yemeni government, for battle?

The structure of government-affiliated forces

The anti-Houthi camp today comprises the National Army as the official framework of the Ministry of Defence, in addition to new formations with independent commands, such as the Giants Brigades, and the Guardians of the Republic forces in al-Makha, or Mocha, in the west.

These different groupings – all on the anti-Houthi side in the conflict – have emerged over the years due to the weakening power of the central government, the growth of independent figures, and the backing of regional countries.

The number of National Army personnel in the field is estimated at about 400,000, according to recent statements by the Defence Ministry. Its organisational structure includes Yemen’s seven military regions, but troop deployment is concentrated in Marib, Taiz and the country’s southern and eastern governorates, as a result of Houthi control over vast parts of the country’s northwest, including Sanaa.

Also backing the army are the Emergency Forces, comprising between 30,000 to 40,000 personnel, and the Homeland Shield Forces, created in 2022 with between 30,000 and 40,000 recruits, and tasked with taking over camps in Hadramout and the southern governorates in December 2025, following the defeat of separatist forces who previously controlled those areas.

Fighting late last year between the Yemeni government and affiliated forces on one side, and United Arab Emirates-backed separatists on the other, has led to changes in Yemen’s south and west.

After the defeat of the 75,000-strong separatist Southern Transitional Council, following a Saudi intervention on the side of the government and the withdrawal of the UAE from Yemen, the group’s organisational cohesion has been impacted. But they have not been disarmed, and remain in many locations in the south, with some elements absorbed – even if nominally – into government structures.

Another formerly-UAE backed force, the Tariq Saleh-led Guardians of the Republic, is estimated to number about 20,000 fighters. They are stationed primarily on the Red Sea coast and are considered among the most heavily armed formations, due to the past Emirati support.

The Giants Brigades are among the most prominent combat formations in the anti-Houthi camp, with an estimated 20,000 fighters and a presence on the Red Sea coast, in Aden, and in some southern areas.

Consequently, the total size of the forces affiliated with the government and the anti-Houthi camp is estimated at more than 500,000 personnel, albeit with a clear disparity in levels of training, discipline and institutional integration.

Quality of armament and military equipment

The types of weapons held by these forces do not differ as significantly as the level of their operation and management. The National Army relies on conventional weapons inherited from the Yemeni army pre-war, including light and medium weapons, armoured vehicles, tanks and field artillery, alongside various communication and transport capabilities.

The Homeland Shield Forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, are considered among the most relatively well-equipped modern formations. They rely on tactical vehicles, light armoured vehicles, and superior communication systems suited for rapid deployment missions and the protection of institutions.

The Emergency Forces rely on light to medium armament focused on urban operations and rapid deployment missions, more akin to a field military force with rapid intervention duties, combining a security character with combat capability.

The Giants Brigades rely on medium and heavy armament, armoured vehicles and fire support units, and they are recognised for their capability to conduct offensive ground operations compared with other forces.

As for the formations affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council, they rely on diverse weaponry, though readiness varies as a result of the organisational changes they have undergone.

In recent years, the majority of government forces have also developed their drone capabilities, both within regular units and some irregular formations. These assets are now used for reconnaissance and surveillance missions, and occasionally for limited tactical support.

Balance of power with the Houthis

Official military records in Sanaa indicate that Houthi-affiliated army units comprise more than 200,000 fighters and can also mobilise tens of thousands of members from their volunteer Popular Committees for rapid intervention and support.

However, these figures, much like the military rosters in the government camp, may not accurately reflect the actual combat strength on the ground due to the inclusion of reserve or inactive names in registries.

Although government-affiliated forces may possess more manpower, the balance of power in Yemen is not determined solely by numbers.

Despite sustaining significant damage to its forces and assets from US and Israeli strikes over the past few years, the Houthi side benefits from a more centralised command structure and possesses experience in managing asymmetric warfare.

This is in addition to possessing missile, drone and maritime threat capabilities that have proven their impact in the Red Sea and the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait. It appears that the military balance in Yemen is more a balance of organisational and war management rather than a balance of weaponry and numbers.

Readiness of government forces for a major battle

Indicators suggest government forces are capable of engaging in defensive battles, holding territory or managing extensive security deployments. However, they face significant challenges should they consider launching a large-scale offensive.

The most prominent of these challenges was the multiplicity of military decision-making centres – before Saudi Arabia assumed control of this decision-making following the UAE’s withdrawal – and the varying levels of training and discipline, compounded by the difficulty of operational coordination.

Geography is also a factor, as the Houthis’ control over the mountainous northwest grants them a defensive advantage, whereas government forces are dispersed across multiple fronts, limiting their ability to mobilise at a decisive point.

The scenario of entering Sanaa

So far, there are no clear public indications that any international power, including the US, has adopted a declared plan to support a large-scale military operation to take Sanaa.

Although Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have elevated the level of international interest in the Yemeni file, the international strategy has been focused on degrading Houthi capabilities related to the sea and smuggling, rather than on a ground offensive. However, reports have emerged from sources within the Yemeni state regarding a possibility of waging a war against the Houthis with US support.

If an operation towards Sanaa is considered, its success would require complex conditions, most notably unifying the government’s military command, providing broad domestic and regional political cover, and ensuring the ability to manage the city after seizing control of it. Some of these conditions may have already been met.

Has Saudi Arabia provided cover to confront the Houthis?

The Yemeni government’s military decision-making is largely tied to Saudi political and military support, and any broad move against the Houthis remains contingent upon Riyadh. But Riyadh has preferred to focus on protecting the kingdom’s southern borders, securing shipping lanes and preventing the expansion of the Houthi threat deep into Saudi territory.

It seems that Saudi strategy has previously leaned towards managing the conflict rather than resolving it, by combining limited military pressure, diplomatic moves and de-escalation tracks to reduce the security and economic costs of the war.

The Saudi position may have shifted recently in light of international and regional events, particularly concerning the security of navigation in the Red Sea. Riyadh may be pushed to re-evaluate its options regarding the Yemeni file, and the one currently on the table may be a military one.

Inflation has fallen both in the UK – down to 2.6% in the year to June helped by slowing diesel and petrol prices – and in the US to 3.5%.

But questions remain whether the slow down will prove short-lived due to the renewed conflict in the Middle East.

New data released on Thursday showed that UK petrol prices have risen by 5p a litre since the beginning of July, hitting reaching almost £1.56.

Diesel is at £1.72 a litre, on average, according to the RAC.

Average gasoline prices in the US have surpassed $4 a gallon once more, up from $3.92 a month ago, according to motorist advocacy group AAA.

“More expensive fuel and energy can ripple through the wider economy, increasing costs for businesses and ultimately feeding through into the price of food and other goods,” said Jonathan Raymond, investment manager at Quilter Cheviot.

“This creates another headache for central banks as they continue their battle against inflation.

“If energy prices remain elevated, policymakers may come under pressure to keep interest rates higher for longer or even raise them. This would come as a blow to mortgage holders and borrowers already feeling the strain.”

The Bank of England, which sets UK interest rates, has held them at 3.75% in its last four meetings.

Paul Dales, chief UK economist at Capital Economics, said he believed the Bank will “almost certainly” hold them again. But he said analysts still expected that interest rates could be cut next year if energy price rises ease.

Kevin Warsh, the newly-appointed chair of the US Federal Reserve, last week told Congress that the central bank had “no tolerance to persistently elevated inflation”.

US President Donald Trump had pushed Warsh’s predecessor, Jerome Powell, to cut interest rates.

Trump has made it clear he expects Warsh to fulfil his demand for reductions in borrowing costs for Americans.

But the Fed held US interest rates between 3.5% and 3.75% at Warsh’s first meeting last month. He also told Congress that he was committed to “restoring price stability” in the wake of the Middle East conflict impacting prices.

Fatima ‘Teema’ Mahmud uploaded a short clip on her Telegram Status that morning; it showed a leaked intimate video involving individuals in northern Nigeria. The time was 8:13 a.m.; minutes later, she uploaded another one and another. By midday, she had uploaded dozens of similar pieces of content. By evening, there were hundreds.

Some of the updates advertised leaked, non-consensual intimate videos that had circulated across social media timelines in the region days earlier. Others promoted sex work services, paid erotic video calls, and private VIP groups featuring explicit videos of women, particularly northern actresses. Among them, and pinned prominently at the top of Fatima’s Telegram profile, were screen records of what she claimed were sexual and nude videos of children, advertised under paid access tiers.

The next morning, the cycle began again.

This reporting was never supposed to become an investigation into child sexual abuse material. It began with a simpler question: where do the leaked intimate videos that circulate on northern Nigerian social media end up?

Every few weeks, another such video appears. The names change, but the outrage follows a familiar script: WhatsApp groups begin asking for links, X users post screenshots before directing followers to Telegram, and Facebook pages recycle the same clips. For a day or two, timelines become courtrooms. Then attention shifts elsewhere, and the people at the centre of those scandals disappear from public conversation, but the links do not.

One such link appeared in May. An X account, now suspended, promoting what it described as a leaked intimate video involving a woman, instructed followers to continue on Telegram. Instead of downloading the material, HumAngle followed the trail, using a pseudonymous account to trace the same path thousands of other users take whenever another intimate video erupts across northern Nigerian social media.

For three months, HumAngle watched what that trail led to: an ecosystem that had evolved to survive platform bans, rebuild audiences almost overnight, and transform some of women’s most private moments into commercial products. Within that ecosystem, children appeared to have become one of its most valuable commodities.

Following the trail

It started with “Teematv” on X. HumAngle stumbled on the account promoting a teaser video following a scandal involving a Kaduna-based woman, whom HumAngle will not name to avoid re-victimising her. The X account claimed to have the “full video” and encouraged followers to access it on Telegram.

We created a pseudonymous account and followed the trail.

The first Telegram channel, “Teematv” (@teematv9), which is the main feeder channel and had over 40,000 subscribers before it got suspended in June, looked much as expected: pornography, leaked videos, and VIP subscriptions. But the longer the investigation continued, the less it resembled another anonymous pornography page. The channel did not exist in isolation. Every video and image posted linked to something else, and subscribers were encouraged to save the phone numbers provided by the administrators. “Add my contact,” she often tells subscribers. 

Once saved, these numbers unlocked Telegram Status updates, which promoted private VIP groups, which led to new administrators, who promoted replacement channels. When one account disappeared, another had already taken its place.

It felt less like browsing social media and more like walking through a marketplace where every stall owner knew the next. The journey was remarkably consistent, and the pattern held across every operator HumAngle traced; the public channels attracted attention, Telegram Status sustained it, and private conversations completed the sale. Each platform served a different purpose within the same business. X functioned as a storefront, where explicit clips and provocative teasers attracted attention and encouraged users to click through. Telegram became the marketplace itself, while WhatsApp and private Telegram conversations handled the transactions.

Looking closer, the structure reflected an operation built specifically to survive the content moderation it was navigating.

The pattern started with what appeared, and what did not appear, on X. Operators such as Teema used their X accounts to post pornographic clips into X’s video feed, content that the platform’s moderation has grown relatively permissive toward, and whose recommendation algorithm readily surfaces more of it once a user engages with it repeatedly. At no point during our three months of monitoring did HumAngle observe child sexual abuse material posted directly on X. 

Whether by experience or deliberate caution, the operators appeared to understand the distinction: ordinary pornography might slip through a platform that has relaxed many of its guardrails around adult content, but material involving children almost certainly would not survive there. The Telegram link attached to those X posts was, in turn, rarely the final destination. It served as an additional layer of security, requiring users to either save a phone number or send a private inquiry before anything further was revealed.

Only after that number was saved did the next stage begin, through Telegram Status. There, too, the same caution applied. Rather than posting material involving children directly, operators uploaded blurred collages or screenshots, with titles and scenes presented as proof that a fuller collection existed, along with a caption advertising group access and a price, directing interested buyers into a private conversation. Nothing that could be mistaken for the material itself appeared in a space Telegram or outside observers could easily flag; the proof of possession and the point of sale were kept one careful step apart. HumAngle observed screenshots of children naked and being abused.

The advertisements rarely remained online for long. Telegram Status updates disappear automatically after 24 hours, and the administrators appeared to exploit that feature deliberately, because the posts remain accessible on the profile itself to anyone who has saved their contact. On some days, one operator uploaded close to 200 Status updates, rotating through advertisements, teaser clips, and promotional graphics before repeating the process the following morning.

The result was a constantly changing catalogue. One day, the focus might be leaked intimate videos. The next, sex work services. Then paid video calls. Then another newly emerging leaked-video scandal that had just begun trending elsewhere on social media. The operators appeared to respond quickly to public attention: whenever an intimate video began circulating widely online, it often appeared inside the network within hours, repackaged as a commercial product, a short preview posted publicly with the full video available, administrators claimed, after payment. The scandals that dominated social media for a day or two became inventory.

Identifying the operators

There was one problem with Telegram usernames: they rarely lasted. By the time HumAngle finished documenting one account, another had often appeared. The usernames, invitations, and even profile photographs changed. But the people behind them did not.

To understand who was operating the network, our investigation moved beyond monitoring channels and focused instead on the digital traces the administrators had left behind, rather than the material they were advertising. The approach was deliberate: HumAngle had already decided it would not purchase access to private VIP groups or attempt to obtain any material advertised as involving children. 

Beyond the obvious ethical concerns, doing so could expose journalists to illegal content and compromise the investigation itself. Instead, we focused on the operators’ own mistakes, and the first was surprisingly ordinary: money.

Like any online business, the administrators eventually needed customers to pay. Across multiple Telegram channels and Status updates, Teema repeatedly instructed interested buyers to save a phone number before making enquiries or completing payments. Unlike her usernames, the number rarely changed. It became the first real-world lead.

A search through Truecaller, a popular caller identification service, returned the name “Fatima Mahmud”. One result was not enough, so the same number was cross-checked against Nigerian online banking applications, including OPay and PalmPay, both of which use registered phone numbers as account identifiers and display the associated account name before a transfer is completed. Both returned the same name. For the first time, the investigation had connected one of the network’s most active operators to a real-world name, confirmed through two independent verification methods.

Finding the person behind that name proved harder. Searching “Fatima Mahmud” and “Teema” on social media produced dozens of unrelated results, and many of the accounts connected to the investigation had already been suspended or had disappeared before they could be examined. So HumAngle changed direction, following relationships rather than names: Telegram usernames led to older accounts, older accounts led to replacement accounts, and replacement accounts led to suspended X profiles, each revealing another fragment of the same digital footprint.

The same process and the same dual verification through Truecaller and banking app records identified a second recurring figure in the network who used several online identities: Deejah, Nanadady, and Deharjah. Once again, the payment trail pointed to one name: Khadija Adamu.

Despite the frequent account suspensions and identity changes, traces of her activity remained visible. As recently as July 17, Khadija remained active. In a Telegram Status update, she told followers her phone had been damaged and appealed for financial support to replace it, posting her Union Bank account details. The account name she provided, Khadija Adamu Abubakar, was confirmed through a mobile banking application search, adding a third independent verification to the identity already established through Truecaller and her OPay and PalmPay records. Fatima’s administrator account was also active at the time of publication.

Khadija’s operation mirrored Teema’s in structure, but she operated across a considerably wider segment of the online sex trade, advertising leaked intimate videos, homosexual pornography, sex work, paid sexual video chats, sex toys, sexual stimulants, and VIP groups promoted as containing child sexual abuse material. Of that range, child sexual abuse material appeared to be one of her primary products, and her pricing across the board was consistently higher than Teema’s, with VIP access advertised at between ₦50,000 and ₦100,000. From what HumAngle observed, she made no attempt to obscure or apologise for any of it.

A further question remained: were the photographs attached to their profiles genuine? At first glance, they appeared convincing: young Hausa women in casual portraits and self-portraits, but reverse-image searches using Google Lens and facial-recognition software found that several did not belong to the account holders at all. Instead, they matched publicly available photographs of Hausa actresses and other individuals whose images had been lifted from elsewhere online. The people running the accounts had carefully concealed their own identities behind someone else’s faces.

Fatima addressed this directly in the description of her main feeder channel, Teematv (@teematv9), which had more than 40,000 subscribers before it was suspended on June 12. “I post pretty Hausa girls on my page. If you see your picture here, then know [that] you are pretty,” she wrote. “Some of you are complaining. I just leave compliments as the caption. I mean no harm. [It] is just for fun.”

A final search, this time relying on Facebook’s “People You May Know” recommendation feature after the administrators’ phone numbers were saved as contacts, surfaced a profile that strongly matched the identity already established for Khadija. Fatima’s case proved less conclusive; several profiles appeared, but none could be verified with sufficient confidence. The search stopped there. We do not possess the legal powers available to law enforcement agencies, but what the reporting established was enough: two operators had been identified through the payment infrastructure they themselves had created, and neither appeared to be working alone.

The product

The advertisements followed a consistent commercial logic, and the same pricing structure recurred across all operators and channels documented in this investigation.

Individual leaked Hausa intimate videos, after a short teaser had been posted publicly, typically sold for between ₦2,000 and ₦5,000. Buyers seeking larger collections were encouraged to pay for VIP memberships instead, which administrators claimed offered hundreds of additional videos. The advertisements suggested a tiered business: casual customers bought individual videos, regular customers subscribed, and those willing to spend more were offered access to increasingly exclusive groups.

At the top of the pricing structure were advertisements for group access explicitly involving children. Unlike the adult-content advertisements, which typically promoted individual clips, these posts promised something larger: a collection, membership, exclusivity. They were usually brief: a blurred collage or screen record, a short caption, sometimes only a few words, followed by a price. Most commonly, that price was ₦50,000, though some operators, like Khadija, advertised memberships as high as ₦100,000. The wording varied slightly from one administrator to another, but the sales strategy did not, and the same pattern appeared consistently across multiple Status updates, different administrators, and different channels over the three months of monitoring.

At first, HumAngle questioned whether the advertisements were genuine; exaggerated claims to lure paying customers are common online. But the consistency, repeated across unrelated administrators using nearly identical language, made coincidence difficult to sustain as an explanation.

Teema’s advertisements illustrated how the claims were built up over time. In a sequence of Status updates viewed chronologically, she claimed her VIP collection had grown from around 600 videos to more than 800, and eventually to over 1,200. HumAngle could not independently verify those figures, but documented them as part of the marketing strategy: growth itself had become a product, with a larger claimed catalogue used to strengthen the sales pitch.

The operators appeared to understand a basic principle of online commerce: that people rarely arrive intending to make their largest purchase but are guided towards it. Every stage encouraged the next. The channels resembled a subscription business more than an ordinary social media page. Only the product was different, and its advertisements did not appear hidden in obscure corners of the internet. They appeared alongside the same promotional posts advertising leaked intimate videos, prostitution, and paid video calls. Children were not presented as something separate. They were presented as another product category, another premium tier.

HumAngle also decided not to attempt to identify the children referenced in the advertisements. INTERPOL’s International Child Sexual Exploitation database, the tool specialist law enforcement units use to identify victims and offenders worldwide, treats abusive images and videos as evidence tied to real children, real locations, and real offenders, material to be handled by trained victim-identification specialists rather than pursued independently. Attempting to trace the children through the material risked compounding the harm the investigation was seeking to expose.

The network

For much of the investigation, Teema and Khadija appeared to be running separate operations: different Telegram channels, different X usernames, different pricing. It was easy to assume they were competitors. Then one Status update changed that.

While reviewing Teema’s Telegram Status one afternoon, HumAngle noticed she was no longer advertising her own channel, but Khadija’s. Only days earlier, one of Khadija’s Telegram accounts had disappeared or been removed before we could complete the documentation of its activity. The replacement account appeared almost immediately, and Teema introduced it to thousands of followers. Over the following days, the same promotion resurfaced repeatedly across dozens of Status updates before disappearing after 24 hours, only to return.

Tracing the followers who interacted with those promotions on X uncovered dozens of accounts exhibiting remarkably similar behaviour. When one profile disappeared, another announced its replacement. When Telegram removed a channel, fresh invitation links circulated through WhatsApp Status updates and newer Telegram accounts. The audience rarely needed to search; the network guided them. Investigators documented several accounts operating under different versions of Teema’s identity, including @teematv2 and @teematv3, with Khadija running parallel replacements under her own aliases.

Around them was a wider ecosystem. Channels such as AREWA GIDAN DADI, Arewagidanharkazallah, and Sadearharka surfaced repeatedly throughout the investigation.

HumAngle found no evidence that these accounts were all controlled by the same individual, nor could we establish that every operator knew every other one personally. What our investigation does establish is narrower but significant: the accounts consistently promoted one another, shared audiences, and directed followers towards replacement channels, forming a distribution network that platform bans repeatedly failed to disrupt.

The blind spot

The most surprising thing about the network was not that it existed, but that it appeared to operate in plain sight. The operators behaved less like people trying to disappear than people confident they would not be noticed. That raises a broader question: why did a network operating so openly prove so resilient?

Part of the answer may lie in language. Almost every account documented in this investigation communicated primarily in Hausa, and the cities referenced in conversations, such as Kano, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Katsina, Sokoto, and Abuja, pointed overwhelmingly to audiences in northern Nigeria. This was not simply a Nigerian online marketplace; it was a Hausa-speaking one. 

Researchers have increasingly warned that many widely spoken African languages remain “low-resource” from the perspective of artificial intelligence and automated content moderation. While Hausa is spoken by tens of millions of people across West Africa, there are comparatively fewer linguistic datasets and moderation tools to help technology companies automatically identify harmful content in the language, meaning abusive or exploitative content can be harder to detect at scale than equivalent content in English. 

Nothing in HumAngle’s investigation suggests the operators tried to hide the language they used; on the contrary, their marketing relied on local expressions and reflected the culture of Arewa social media. The same characteristics that made the network accessible to its intended audience may also have made it less visible to moderation systems built primarily around better-resourced languages.

This is not a uniquely Nigerian, or even uniquely Hausa-language, problem. Investigations in other parts of the world have documented strikingly similar patterns, in which mainstream platforms funnel users toward Telegram-based child sexual abuse material (CSAM) marketplaces that survive enforcement through rapid replacement. 

A BBC Eye investigation published in July found that Instagram’s advertising system in India was itself directing a test account toward paid child sexual abuse material sold through Telegram channels, with material advertised for as little as the naira equivalent of one US dollar; Meta’s own moderation team initially cleared one flagged advertisement as compliant with its policies, and only acted once BBC journalists sought formal comment. 

A separate investigation by Sudan’s Ayin Network documented Telegram channels operating an almost identical structure to the one described here: administrators charging roughly $30 for VIP access to material described as exclusive, channels going dark after reports only to be quickly recreated with subscribers migrated across, and content sourced from economically vulnerable communities with little legal recourse. 

Malaysiakini’s Kini News Lab has separately described Telegram as functioning as a “dark mall” for this kind of material, in which promotional content on more visible platforms consistently routes interested users toward Telegram, where moderation is comparatively lighter. 

Another investigation, conducted by the Brazilian outlet Núcleo with the Pulitzer Centre’s AI Accountability Network, found dozens of Telegram bots capable of generating AI-manipulated child sexual abuse imagery, most operating despite Telegram’s own public commitments on child safety.

These investigations point to a recurring global pattern. Broader research suggests the problem extends far beyond the networks examined in any single investigation. Research conducted by UNICEF Innocenti, ECPAT International, and INTERPOL across 13 countries in Africa and Southeast Asia found that, depending on the country, up to one in five internet-using children aged 12 to 17 had experienced online sexual abuse within a single year. Social media platforms were among the environments where children most frequently encountered the abuse. 

Nigeria was not included among the countries studied, leaving no comparable national estimate of how many Nigerian children may be affected. UNICEF and the WeProtect Global Alliance have warned that online child sexual exploitation is becoming increasingly complex as offenders adapt quickly to new technologies, encrypted platforms, and gaps in national responses, arguing that effective responses require cooperation between technology companies, law enforcement, child-protection organisations, and governments, rather than isolated moderation decisions by individual platforms. UNICEF Nigeria has separately noted that violence against children increasingly occurs in both physical and digital spaces, while support for victims remains limited.

As we identified the operators of these accounts, an obvious question emerged: if journalists could trace those digital footprints using publicly available tools, what prevented authorities from doing the same?

Nigeria does not lack the relevant laws. The Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act criminalises the production, distribution, and possession of child sexual abuse material, alongside offences relating to the use of digital platforms to facilitate unlawful activities, including the non-consensual distribution of intimate images.

The Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act recognises image-based sexual abuse, and children receive further protection under the Child Rights Act and the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act. 

The activity documented in this investigation appears to fall squarely within conduct already prohibited under Nigerian law. Over three months of monitoring, HumAngle found no public record of investigations or prosecutions specifically targeting the Hausa-language Telegram ecosystem documented in this reporting, even as channels disappeared, replacement channels emerged, subscribers migrated, and the marketplace continued operating.

The threat was not entirely new to Nigerian authorities. In 2023, the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) said it had observed increasing cases involving child sexual abuse material, sextortion, and revenge pornography, and had established a Cybersecurity Response Team, in partnership with organisations including Meta and the United States National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). That year, the agency said it was investigating six cyber-tip reports involving online child exploitation and sextortion, drawing on NCMEC’s CyberTipline, the centralised reporting system through which tech companies and the public flag suspected child exploitation to law enforcement worldwide. What remains unclear is whether the Hausa-language network HumAngle documented had ever entered that reporting system.

The network appeared to exploit precisely the jurisdictional and institutional gaps that researchers have long warned about: Telegram channels directed users toward WhatsApp, WhatsApp conversations led back to Telegram, and X attracted new audiences, with each platform seeing only one part of the picture while the operators appeared to see the whole. Platform enforcement removed accounts. Law enforcement, at least publicly, appeared largely absent, aside from the small number of cases NAPTIP said it was already investigating. 

What follows

Before publication, HumAngle shared its findings with Telegram and NAPTIP, seeking answers about the network, its operators, and the apparent gaps that allowed it to persist. The advertisements, the Telegram links, the payment instructions, and the phone numbers had all been public. The operators had made no effort to hide them.

Indian authorities release the two men after years in prison although both remain under tight court-imposed restrictions.

Indian authorities have released prominent Kashmiri human rights activist Khurram Parvez and journalist Irfan Mehraj on bail after years in prison on “terrorism” financing charges although both remain under tight court-imposed restrictions.

The two men walked free from a New Delhi jail late on Wednesday, their relatives said, as India’s National Investigation Agency seeks to overturn their bail – the latest chapter in what rights groups call New Delhi’s sweeping crackdown on activists, journalists and dissidents in India-administered Kashmir since 2019 when it scrapped the region’s autonomy, granted under the Indian Constitution.

Parvez, programme coordinator for the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS), was arrested in 2021 by the National Investigation Agency at his home in Srinagar.

Mehraj, a freelance journalist who worked with the same rights group as a researcher, was arrested in 2023.

Both face charges of “funding terrorism” and “propagation of secessionist agenda” under India’s stringent “antiterrorism” laws, which in effect allow authorities to hold people without trial indefinitely.

The National Investigation Agency accuses the two of using the JKCCS to fund militant-linked activities and promote a separatist agenda. Both men deny the allegations.

A lower court granted them bail last week, but the agency appealed. The Delhi High Court refused on Tuesday to suspend the release order although it imposed tougher restrictions on the men’s movements and activities while it hears the appeal.

Under their bail conditions, the two must arrange their own stay in the capital, where they are facing trial, and cannot travel to Kashmir, according to a court document seen by the news agency AFP. Proceedings in the case will continue in the coming weeks.

Human rights violations

The JKCCS has for decades documented alleged rights violations by Indian government forces in Kashmir, including torture and unlawful killings, and has drawn attention to thousands of unmarked graves in border areas suspected of holding victims of “enforced disappearances”.

International rights groups, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, have consistently called for the men’s release, saying they were jailed for their work.

In 2023, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention said Parvez’s arrest was an “act of reprisal for his human rights work, and an attempt to silence him and Kashmiri civil society as a whole”.

After their release, the Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights and the World Organisation Against Torture said the two were arrested on “trumped-up charges” and called on Indian authorities to drop the case, describing the proceedings as politically motivated.

Journalists in Indian-administered Kashmir say they have faced harassment and arrests since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government annulled the region’s partial autonomy.

From 2019 to 2023, more than 3,600 people were arrested there under “antiterrorism” laws, more than half of whom remain in prison, according to government figures.

Muslim-majority Kashmir has been divided between India and Pakistan since their independence from British rule in 1947. Both countries claim the territory in full.

Rebel groups have fought the Indian government since 1989, demanding independence or a merger with Pakistan. The conflict has killed tens of thousands of people, mostly civilians.

England and Australia will not play Tests in the north of England after Old Trafford and Headingley not chosen to host.

There will be no Ashes matches in the north of England next year, when Australia arrive for Test cricket’s oldest rivalry.

Headingley in Leeds and Manchester’s Old Trafford have both staged some of the most dramatic clashes in the long history of Ashes cricket.

Don Bradman, arguably cricket’s greatest batsman, scored two triple centuries at Headingley in the 1930s.

Both grounds played host to remarkable individual feats by England hero Ian Botham during the 1981 Ashes series.

Headingley was also the venue for a remarkable unbeaten century by England’s Ben Stokes in a one-wicket win during the 2019 series.

But both venues have been left off the schedule for the 2027 Ashes – a decision criticised by new British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, then the mayor of Greater Manchester – when it was announced in 2023.

The England and Wales Cricket Board confirmed on Thursday the exact fixture list for next year’s Ashes, with all five matches limited to the Midlands and south of England.

Hampshire’s Rose Bowl, near Southampton, will stage its first Ashes Test from July 21 – the fourth of the series.

It will become the 10th ground in the United Kingdom to stage a men’s Ashes Test.

The series will start at Trent Bridge in Nottingham on June 18, with Lord’s – as is traditional – staging the second Test on June 30 and Edgbaston in Birmingham the third on July 8.

The Ashes will conclude at the Oval in south London with the July 29-August 2 Test.

Old Trafford and Headingley are both set to stage Ashes Tests in 2031.

Australia triumphed 4-1 on home soil during the 2025-26 Ashes. The last Ashes series in England ended in a 2-2 draw in 2023.

England’s last Ashes series success was a 3-2 home victory in 2015.

They are also due to play a one-off Test against Bangladesh at Lord’s from May 28.

The 2027 World Test Championship final will be held at the Oval starting on June 9, the second time the venue has hosted the title match.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio says Iran will continue to ‘pay the price’ for what he said was the failure to stick to agreements, telling reporters that President Trump’s policy is ‘a head for an eye’.

Sailors on board a Thai cargo ship that was hit by a deadly attack in the Strait of Hormuz are suing the ship’s owners, claiming they ignored warnings issued by Iran. Al Jazeera’s Tony Cheng has the story.

Millionaires including former footballer Gary Lineker and music producer Brian Eno have written to new prime minister Andy Burnham asking to be taxed more.

In an open letter, 120 well-off Britons told Burnham: “We can afford it. We’re not talking about higher taxes on those who get up and go to work for their income every day, but on the very richest whose income is derived from the wealth they hold.”

Organised by Patriotic Millionaires, the letter said it would lead to a more equal society, and urged a “devolution of wealth and power from the very richest”.

People can already quietly give money or stocks voluntarily to the Treasury using its donation facility.

The group supports a 2% tax on wealth over £10m.

“Millionaires are a patriotic bunch,” the letter states. “We love this country and we want it to succeed.

“But success requires investment and a primary source of untouched capital investment is sitting with us, in untaxed potential.”

The renewed call for higher tax on the wealthy follows a similar campaigns in previous years.

Burnham did not rule out a wealth tax when asked about it by Lineker a few days before he became prime minister.

He suggested he may have “to ask for a little more” tax at some point.

The latest call from Patriotic Millionaires said there is a “need to embrace a new kind of devolution of wealth and power, from the very richest in order to reinvest back into our greatest asset in every region”.

It added that in its own poll, the majority of millionaires wanted a higher tax on themselves.

“There are a few people left with outdated economic thinking and few others desperate to hold onto every penny they can… Those that can’t see past the end of their own self interest have no place in designing a Britain for the future,” the letter said.

Other signatories include film director Richard Curtis who directed Notting Hill and Ian Gregg, the former managing director of bakery chain Greggs, who is the son of the firm’s founder.

Indian activist Sonam Wangchuk says he will end his hunger strike if the government guarantees that police will not use force against student protesters or take punitive action against them. Demonstrators are calling for the education minister to resign over a medical exam scandal.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov ‘reaffirmed ​readiness’ for a political ​and diplomatic settlement to Russia-Ukraine war.

The top United States and Russian diplomats have discussed the war in Ukraine on the sidelines of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in the Philippines.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Thursday in Manila, with Russian media reporting that the meeting was just over half an hour long.

The sit-down came as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he had spoken with US envoys in a bid to revive stalled talks aimed at ending the years-long war.

Lavrov “reaffirmed Russia’s readiness for a political and diplomatic settlement of the conflict”, a statement from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, adding that the minister told Rubio that ⁠Moscow remained committed ⁠to proposals put forward by presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir ⁠Putin at their August 2025 meeting ⁠in Alaska.

Lavrov also “stressed that it was unacceptable to continue supplying weapons to the Kyiv regime”, the ministry said. The minister condemned “a destabilising policy by European countries, which are still seeking to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia,” it added.

The US State Department offered few details about the meeting, with a spokesperson only saying that Rubio and Lavrov “discussed the US-Russia relationship and the need to end the Russia-Ukraine war”.

The two were also expected to discuss the conflict in the Middle East, which has seen Moscow condemn Washington’s strikes on its ally Iran.

“The war in Ukraine, I think, has in many ways impeded the ability of Russia and the United States to find areas of agreement on other topics,” Rubio told reporters on Wednesday.

“That doesn’t mean we won’t seek to find other areas of potential cooperation. But by the same token … we’d like to see that war come to an end,” he added.

Rubio said the US remained open to playing a role in ending the conflict “if that opportunity presents itself”.

For his part, Lavrov earlier indicated the meeting would “be useful in any case”.

“It’s good to ask questions and get answers,” Lavrov said to reporters on Wednesday, adding that he would ask Rubio about the latest statements by Trump predicting that a settlement is getting close.

Discussions aimed at ending the conflict in Ukraine have been at a standstill, with US attention now focused on the Middle East and Moscow maintaining its demand that Kyiv cede territory.

On Thursday, Zelenskyy said in a post on X that he had “a good, important conversation on how to reinvigorate diplomacy” with US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

Rubio spoke briefly with Lavrov at a gala dinner on Tuesday, and the two participated in a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum on Thursday morning.

Trump has voiced support for Ukraine’s campaign of long-range drone strikes targeting Russian energy infrastructure, saying it could “help bring about an end” to the conflict.

Ukraine has been escalating its drone strikes, hitting refineries, oil depots and cargo ships at sea, which has caused fuel shortages in Russia.

In late June, a massive barrage of Russian missiles and drones killed at least 30 people in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv.

The Philippines is hosting a meeting of foreign ministers from Southeast Asia.

They are expected to address regional security issues, including the civil war in Myanmar and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

But renewed fighting between the US and Iran has overshadowed the gathering.

Ministers have called for hostilities to end.

The conflict has hit Asia hard – disrupting its energy and food supplies, international commerce and raising fears of a global economic slowdown.

Will it also affect ASEAN’s efforts to tackle issues within the region?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Richard Heydarian – Political Scientist and Author of Indo-Pacific: Trump, China and the New Struggle for Global Mastery

Phar Kim Ben – Professor in ASEAN studies at International Islamic Univeristy of Malaysia and former Director of Political & Security Community at ASEAN Secretariat

Don McLain Gill – Lecturer at De La Salle University and Indo-Pacific Research fellow with Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

Officials say 76 of the roughly 179 people believed to have been aboard survived, and 53 bodies have been found so far.

The expected death toll from Guyana’s ferry disaster over the weekend has climbed to around 100, with the authorities facing mounting pressure to explain how the country’s worst maritime disaster in decades occurred.

Officials said on Tuesday that 76 of the roughly 179 people believed to have been aboard survived, while 53 bodies have been recovered as divers continue searching for the remaining missing.

Families have gathered in the northern town of Charity, waiting for news of loved ones still unaccounted for.

“I know my baby is in that boat,” said Samantha Ramin, who lost two of her three children.

The body of her young daughter has been found, but her baby boy is still missing.

“I know he is down there. I know he is down there,” she said. “I want to see them find my baby.”

The 87-year-old vessel, MV Barima, left Georgetown for Port Kaituma on Saturday but began taking on water and capsized off the Essequibo coast. Although its manifest listed 133 people, authorities now believe as many as 179 were aboard.

Anger has grown over the length of time it took to rescue survivors, some of whom told reporters they spent hours stranded in the water.

Passengers have also alleged the ferry was dangerously overloaded with people and heavy cargo, including engines, vehicles, fuel containers and commercial goods. One survivor said the boat was more crowded than on any of his previous trips, describing cargo packed tightly below deck.

Survivors also allege the ferry suffered engine trouble shortly after departure but that the crew attempted repairs at sea rather than turning back, and that concerns about water entering the vessel were dismissed by crew members as routine.

Government officials say the ferry was actually under its capacity limits for both passengers and cargo, but acknowledge that conflicting accounts make it too early to draw firm conclusions. The head of the Maritime Administration Department said a full investigation is needed to establish facts such as how the vessel was loaded and whether supervisory staff acted properly.

Prime Minister Mark Phillips said Tuesday that the government has nothing to hide and pledged that anyone found responsible – including for negligence or criminal wrongdoing – will face legal consequences.

Police have already detained the rescued captain, along with at least one other crew member. Both reportedly tested positive for marijuana.

Asked why such an old vessel remained in service, officials said a US$12.7 million replacement ferry purchased from India was awaiting the completion of a special pier at Port Kaituma. The MV Barima last underwent major repairs in 2024 and had additional maintenance scheduled for October.

The incident was witnessed by the daughter of Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, another prominent political prisoner.

An intense heatwave has worsened the already harsh conditions faced by inmates at Tunisia’s Mornaguia prison and recently caused jailed opposition leader Rached Ghannouchi to temporarily lose consciousness, according to the daughter of another prominent political prisoner who says she witnessed the incident.

Haifa Chebbi, daughter of imprisoned 81-year-old opposition politician Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, said in an emotional live video posted on Facebook after a visit to the jail on Tuesday that she saw the 85-year-old Ghannouchi faint in the stifling heat and she felt barely able “to breathe or even walk on my own feet” by the time she left.

She said the temperature inside Mornaguia prison reached 52 degrees Celsius (126 degrees Fahrenheit) during her visit. Detainees spend most of their time confined to cells no larger than 16 square metres (172 square feet), she added, and are only allowed to spend two hours a day outside.

In 2022 her father helped establish the National Salvation Front (FSN), a broad coalition of secular, liberal and Islamist groups opposed to the increasingly authoritarian rule of President Kais Saied. He was among 37 opposition figures charged with “conspiracy against state security” in 2025, and was sentenced to 12 years in jail.

United Nations human rights chief Volker Turk described the imprisonment of the 37 defendants as “a setback to justice and rule of law”.

“The process was marred by violations of fair trial and due process rights, raising serious concerns about political motivations,” Turk said in a statement in 2025.

Ghannouchi, a former parliament speaker and leader of the Ennahda political movement, has been imprisoned since 2023. He was rushed to hospital on April 30 following a sharp deterioration in his health, but is now back in Mornaguia prison.

In her video, Haifa was careful not to blame prison staff for conditions in the jail, saying they were doing everything they could and that elderly prisoners in particular were receiving special attention.

She said the incident she witnessed highlighted the toll prison conditions are taking on elderly inmates, several of whom are spending their fourth summer behind bars.

She named several other imprisoned opposition figures, including lawyers Abir Moussi and Ayachi Hammami, prominent radio journalist Ziad El Hani, and activist Chaima Issa.

Linking the detentions to wider unrest over water and electricity shortages, Haifa said the crisis extends beyond prison walls. She called on Tunisians to take action to achieve meaningful political change, saying: “We are responsible for everything that will happen, whether negative or positive.”

The attacks reflect a surge in violence as armed gangs continue raiding villages in northwest and central Nigeria.

At least 20 people have been killed in northwest Nigeria after armed gang members attacked villages in Zamfara State, according to the AFP news agency.

“Today, between 3pm [14:00 GMT] and 4pm [15:00 GMT], a large number of bandits have invaded our communities, targeting all the people they meet,” Nasiru Lauwali, the representative of the Sauna district in the local government zone of Talata Mafara, told AFP on Wednesday.

The attacks come amid increasing violence in northwest and central Nigeria, where armed gangs or bandits have raided villages in recent weeks. They are accused of stealing livestock and kidnapping residents for ransom.

Late on Tuesday, at least three suspected bandits were killed by security forces in the country’s Kwara State, according to Nigeria’s The Punch news website. The news service said that security forces managed to rescue a businessman, Tuhkur Sanni.

Kidnappings have become common in Nigeria, as armed groups seek large ransoms from the government and citizens.

The situation has been worsened by a security crisis, partly fuelled by the Boko Haram rebellion in the country’s northeast. In 2024, attackers earned more than $1.6m in ransom payments, according to SBM Intelligence.

Dozens of students and teachers were rescued earlier this month, 56 days after they were kidnapped from three schools in the southwestern state of Oyo.

Eight of the suspected kidnappers were arrested and an unspecified number were killed, according to a statement issued by President Bola Tinubu.

Defence Minister Christopher Musa said the suspects planned to use the hostages as leverage to pressure the government to release some of their commanders from prison.

A Ukrainian F-16 has shot down a Russian fighter jet for the first time, according to the highest-ranking U.S. military officer. This engagement would represent a significant development in the air war over Ukraine and a notable addition to the air-to-air tally for the Ukrainian F-16s, which already includes “more than a thousand” drones and cruise missile ‘kills.’ It would also be a remarkable addition to the F-16 story, with the jet, which was built to shoot down Soviet combat aircraft, downing a Russian-flown fighter over Europe more than half a century after it first flew.

Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly confirmed the milestone during a hearing before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee in Washington, D.C.

LIVE: Hegseth, Caine and others testify on supplemental funding request

He told lawmakers:

“I want to highlight the incredible work that the Ukraine industrial base is doing as they scale their air-to-air capabilities,” Caine said. “It ranges from their surface-to-air capabilities to their air-to-air capabilities.”

After being asked by Senator Richard Durbin about the potential impact of a three-year halt in funding for Ukrainian air defenses, Caine added:

“I’ll note that recently we had the first air-to-air kill where a Ukrainian F-16 shot down a Russian fighter. So I think their ability to scale their layered air defense has come a long, long way over the past couple of years with the help and assistance of many.”

No further details were provided, leaving unanswered questions about when and where the engagement occurred, the identity of the Russian aircraft, the weapon employed, and the evidence that led U.S. officials to conclude the kill had taken place.

Nevertheless, it marks the first time a senior U.S. military official has publicly stated that a Ukrainian F-16 has destroyed a crewed Russian combat aircraft in air-to-air combat.

Since beginning operations, Ukraine’s F-16s have already downed huge numbers of Russian cruise missiles and one-way attack drones while also conducting air-to-ground strike missions.

The engagement referenced by Caine may have been the July 8 shootdown of a Russian Su-35S multirole fighter. Ukrainian military officials announced the destruction of the aircraft at the time, while pro-Kremlin Russian military bloggers also acknowledged the loss, claiming the pilot survived and returned safely to base.

⚡️ CONFIRMED!
On July 8, 2026, a Russian Su-35 multi-role fighter was shot down on the eastern sector!

🇺🇦 Glory to Ukraine!
✊ Together to victory! pic.twitter.com/r8S9fgQaC5

— Ukrainian Air Force (@KpsZSU) July 8, 2026

A Telegram channel affiliated with the Ukrainian Air Force, Sunflower, claimed the Russian was “the very same experienced enemy pilot who had been causing us a lot of trouble in this area.”

Earlier speculation suggested the Su-35S may instead have been destroyed by a Patriot surface-to-air missile after being lured into range by one or more Ukrainian F-16s. No evidence was presented to substantiate that theory.

Regardless of the precise circumstances, destroying a Su-35S would represent a notable achievement given the aircraft’s superior long-range air combat capabilities.

The Su-35S is among Russia’s most capable fighters and has long been regarded by Ukrainian pilots as one of their most dangerous opponents.

At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the late Ukrainian MiG-29 Fulcrum pilot Andrii Pilshchykov, better known by his callsign “Juice,” described the Su-35S as the greatest airborne threat because of its powerful radar and R-77-1 active radar-guided air-to-air missiles. The upgraded R-77-1 reportedly has a range of around 68 miles, improved resistance to electronic countermeasures, and a true fire-and-forget capability—something Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighters lacked.

The Su-35S later gained an even more formidable weapon: the R-37M very-long-range air-to-air missile. Introduced into combat during the summer of 2022, the missile reportedly has a range of up to 124 miles, allowing Russian fighters to threaten Ukrainian aircraft while remaining deep inside Russian-controlled airspace. That range likely refers to only larger, less agile aircraft targets and is very much a “sales brochure figure,” with all the caveats that entails. Nevertheless, Pilshchykov bluntly described the weapon as “fucking dangerous.”

The longest-range modern air-to-air missile available to Ukrainian F-16s is the AIM-120C-8 version of the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). An active-radar-guided air-to-air missile is something that Ukraine long campaigned for. Pilshchykov told TWZ back in 2022: “The lack of fire-and-forget missiles is the greatest problem for us.”

As we have discussed in the past, while official performance figures are classified, the AIM-120C-8 is generally assumed to be able to hit targets at a distance of between 75 and 100 miles. Of course, in practical applications, a whole range of factors impacts any missile’s reach, above all, the energy and altitude state of the launching aircraft and the target.

Combined with the Su-35S’s sophisticated electronic warfare systems and Russia’s numerical advantage, these technical capabilities have allowed Russian fighters to operate with relative confidence. In 2022, Pilshchykov recalled occasions when as many as two dozen Su-35s patrolled along the Russian side of the border, waiting for opportunities to engage Ukrainian aircraft.

Based on available reports, Russia was initially satisfied with the results of its R-37M tactics, which relied heavily on surprise. Fighters launched air-to-air missiles at moments the target did not expect, after first employing diversionary and deception measures to mask the attack. However, increased Ukrainian aircraft losses forced Kyiv to develop new tactics to counter the threat.

According to Russian accounts, Ukraine’s tactical changes were enabled by NATO intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, which provided Ukrainian forces with near-real-time information on Russian fighter activity and detected long-range missile launches. Armed with this warning, Ukrainian pilots reportedly had sufficient time to execute defensive maneuvers, combining aggressive evasive flying with electronic jamming to break the missile’s lock and reduce the likelihood of a successful kill.

Several stills from a newly released Russian MoD video showing one or more VKS Su-35S multirole fighters departing on, conducting, and returning from a combined CAP/SEAD mission. The loadout shown here can often be seen in such videos: one Kh-31PM ARM, one R-37M long-range AAM… pic.twitter.com/KmPvdr1HKV

— Guy Plopsky (@GuyPlopsky) July 14, 2026

Whether or not these tactics helped the F-16 score a famous air-to-air kill is unclear, but they reflect the cat-and-mouse nature of the air war in Ukraine.

Certainly, the Su-35S is far from immune to Ukrainian air defenses.

According to the Oryx open-source tracking group, nine Su-35s have been destroyed in the war. The figure could be higher since Oryx only tabulates losses for which it has visual confirmation.

There have also been close calls.

Russian accounts describe a Su-35S flown by Colonel M. Stefanov landing at an airfield, where, during a post-flight inspection, maintainers counted 28 holes in the fuselage.

If Caine’s statement reflects U.S. intelligence assessments — as seems likely — it suggests Ukraine is becoming increasingly proficient at integrating its Western-supplied F-16s with its broader, layered air defense network. At the same time, Russia has never enjoyed air supremacy over Ukraine, its aircraft even being at risk in some of the areas on its side of the front lines and even in Russia itself.

Even so, this should not be viewed as a turning point in the air war. Russia still fields significantly larger numbers of combat aircraft, retains extensive long-range surface-to-air missile coverage, and continues to pose a serious threat to Ukrainian aviation.

One successful engagement, even against one of Russia’s premier fighters, does not fundamentally alter the balance of air power. It does, however, demonstrate that Ukraine’s expanding fleet of Western fighters, integrated air defenses, and increasingly experienced air defenders of all kinds continue to raise the risks faced by the Russian Aerospace Forces.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Days after declaring the Bab al-Mandeb (BAM) Strait closed to Saudi vessels, the Houthis of Yemen claim to have struck two ships in the Red Sea. The United Kingdom’s Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) group has confirmed an attack on at least one vessel in that area.

“The Yemeni armed forces have carried out a significant military operation targeting two Saudi oil tankers that violated the ban imposed by the armed forces in the Red Sea,” the Houthis claimed on Telegram. “The operation involved a number of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones. Thanks to God’s help, the strikes were accurate and caused a large fire on both vessels.”

TWZ cannot independently verify the Houthi claim. However, in a post on X, UKMTO stated that a master of an oil tanker “reports being struck by an unknown projectile which has caused a fire onboard that the crew are currently fighting.”

The incident took place 70NM southwest of Al Shuqaiq, Saudi Arabia, the organization added. “There are no reported casualties and no environmental impact. Authorities are investigating. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO.”

US and Iran trade new threats as more explosions are reported in Iranian cities, including Sirik, Ahvaz and Bushehr.

The main job of the U.S. Air Force’s growing fleet of F-15EX Eagle IIs has been and continues to be air-to-air combat, especially in defense of the U.S. homeland. However, operational and test units are laying the groundwork for F-15EXs to also take on air-to-ground missions.

Despite its primary mission set, air-to-ground capabilities are inherently a part of the F-15EX’s design. The Eagle II is a member of the extended F-15E Strike Eagle family, having been derived from the F-15QA developed for Qatar.

Last week, the Oregon Air National Guard’s 142nd Wing shared that one of its F-15EXs had dropped training bombs for the first time ever during a trip to Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho back in May. The 142nd, based in Portland, Oregon, is currently the Air Force’s only operational unit flying the Eagle II.

“The crew dropped a total of 24 BDU-50s and 12 BDU-56s over 10 missions with zero safety incidences and satisfactory scores,” according to an official release. “These ‘bombs’ were loaded onto the F-15 EXs and dropped in the Mountain Home firing range complex.”

The BDU-50/B and BDU-56/B are inert training bombs with the same shape and weight as live 500-pound-class Mk 82-series and 2,000-pound-class Mk 84-series bombs, respectively. In U.S. service today, bombs in the extended Mk 82 and Mk 84 families are far more commonly employed in combination with Paveway laser guidance or Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GPS-assisted guidance kits.

The BDU-50s and BDU-56s are still useful tools for training more general ‘dumb bombing’ skill sets for aircrew and for handling of air-to-ground weapons on the ground. This includes things like going through the procedures for targeting and safe release from an aircraft, as well as loading and unloading the bombs from planes.

Basics are especially important for the members of the 142nd, which previously flew F-15C Eagles with no operational air-to-ground capability. It’s also worth noting here that the F-15C was a single-seat type, while the F-15EX is a two-seater. However, the Air Force’s plan, at least initially, has been for a single pilot to fly the Eagle II, something we will come back to later on.

The 142nd does have some personnel with air-to-ground mission experience from prior assignments, but this is still a new mission set for the unit as a whole, which requires new training regimens.

Three pilots from the 142nd “attended a 9-month training course to understand the science behind dropping bombs and the tactics involved. They were tasked with creating a program to train the rest of the wing’s pilots on the basics so they could make the first steps to be able to drop munitions,” according to the official release. Earlier this year, weapons loaders from the Wing also “traveled to Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. where they worked with F-15 E-models assigned to the 59th Test and Evaluation Squadron to become certified on loading bombs.”

The Air Force’s Test and Evaluation community has already been validating the F-15EX’s air-to-ground capabilities. This testing is now extending overseas. Earlier this month, the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron brought an Eagle II from Eglin Air Force Base in Florida to Kadena Air Base in Japan to support a munitions load training event. An F-15E Strike Eagle also took part in that training. Pictures the Air Force released on Monday show that live GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb IIs (SDB IIs), also known as StormBreakers, were among the munitions that ground personnel at Kadena practiced loading onto the jets.

Two active duty squadrons of F-15EXs are set to be established at Kadena, taking the place of units previously based there that had flown F-15Cs. The Air Force has been deploying F-15Es and other fighters to the base on a rotational basis to fill the gap in the meantime.

The Air Force has previously announced plans to stand up National Guard F-15EX squadrons in California, Louisiana, and Michigan. The service’s proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year outlines plans to dramatically expand the total size of the Eagle II force, which could lead to a dozen squadrons or more flying the jets in the end, as you can read more about here. How this might change the Air Force’s plans for employing the jets remains to be seen.

In its 2027 Fiscal Year budget request, the Air Force continued to stress that “the F-15EX aircraft will be used predominantly in defensive and offensive counter-air missions at both Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Combat Command (ACC) operational squadrons.” However, it did also note that the “F-15EX will perform the Homeland Defense mission and provide Combatant Commanders (CCDR) with strike packages capable of operating in Highly Contested Environments (HCE).”

As TWZ has been reporting for years, it has been more or less clear from the start that the F-15EXs would eventually take on more of a multi-role mission after entering service, despite the emphasis on the air-to-air role. This has also raised the possibility that Eagle IIs could be flown with Weapon System Officers (WSO), another pilot with multi-role skills, or a mission specialist, in their backseats, just like their F-15E cousins.

“We currently don’t have conformal fuel tanks [CFTs] for it [the F-15EX], but there is a plan to get us conformal fuel tanks. And then when we do, we can start talking about putting all kinds of air-to-ground capabilities into the airplane, potentially putting WSOs or other experts in the backseat as well to have us do any number of multi-role capabilities that it’s just physically not possible to in the C model,” now-retired Col. Michael Kosderka, then commander of the 142nd, told TWZ in an interview back in 2024. “So the X has tremendous growth capability. It’s really exciting.”

The F-15EX is capable of being fitted with the same CFTs as the F-15E, which give the aircraft more hardpoints for stores on top of providing extra fuel. The current status of the plan to get CFTs for the Eagle IIs assigned to the 142nd is unclear. The initial pair of jets for the Wing were delivered without them. The picture released of the F-15EX at Mountain Home for the air-to-ground training in May, seen at the top of this story, shows that jet, at least, still lacks them. The default configuration for Eagle II test jets includes the CFTs, as seen below.

“Basically, what it’s going to do is turn a wing with a primary mission that is on life support, frankly, into something that has America’s newest fighter, and we’re going to be relevant with that airplane for decades to come,” Kosderka added at that time.

“Gen. Kelly made it very clear in his public address here that the F-15EX is going to have an inherent capability that we need to put to work from day one, to include limited air-to-ground capability,” Lt. Col. Robert Waller, then commander of the 40th Flight Test Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, also told TWZ in a separate interview in 2024. Waller was referring to now-retired Gen. Mark “Grace” Kelly, who was head of Air Combat Command at the time.

All of this makes perfect sense given the F-15EX’s inherent ability to carry a lot of payload, including both air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, over a long distance. The Eagle II can also accommodate outsized stores. These are attributes that have already made the F-15E one of the most heavily in-demand platforms in the Air Force today.

Strain on the aging Strike Eagle fleet, which has been further magnified by the total loss of four of those aircraft this year during operations against Iran, might prompt the Air Force to consider further expanding the air-to-ground role of the Eagle II. Additional planned F-15EX purchases could very well enable the retirement of at least some older F-15Es, as well as other aircraft. In 2024, Congress blocked an attempt by the Air Force to divest roughly half of its Strike Eagles.

There is already substantial overlap between the F-15E and F-15EX communities, as underscored by the 142nd Wing’s milestone air-to-ground training at Mountain Home in May.

Air-to-air missions still look set to be the dominant task for the F-15EX fleet, at least in the near term, but work is being done now to ensure the jets can also take on air-to-ground missions if the call comes.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com