Stay informed and up-to-date with the latest news from around the world. Our comprehensive news coverage brings you the most relevant and impactful stories in politics, business, technology, entertainment, and more.
The war that Donald Trump declared won last month looks rather different from the inside of the Pentagon. The resulting stalemate has drained American military stockpiles, emboldened Iranian commanders, and left the US with far worse options than before the conflict began.
The administration’s triumphalist framing has struck a jarring note among those who have spent careers studying the Iranian military and the limits of American power projection. Declaring victory when the enemy is still standing, still armed, and still controlling the waterway you went to war over is not a strategy. It is a wish dressed up as a press release.
At the heart of the impasse are two demands that Tehran has consistently and categorically rejected. Iran will not surrender what it regards as its sovereign right to develop its uranium program, and it will not yield control of the Strait of Hormuz. Those two positions were Iran’s red lines before the fighting started. They remain Iran’s red lines now. Nothing in between has changed.
What has changed is the arithmetic of munitions. The United States entered this conflict with a military built around expensive, technologically sophisticated weapons systems, precision instruments that take years to design, years more to manufacture, and that have now been expended at a rate the American defense industrial base is poorly positioned to replenish. Iran, by contrast, relies on a dispersed network of robotic small boats, undersea mines, tactical ballistic missiles, and unmanned systems. These weapons are cheap, simple, and easy to produce at scale.
The United States essentially deployed a Ferrari into a demolition derby. The Iranians didn’t need high-end technology; they just needed a relentless volume of cheaper assets to overwhelm the defense.
Trump, for his part, has shown no appetite for nuance. “We have totally obliterated their military capacity, there’s nothing left, believe me, nothing,” he told supporters at a rally in Georgia. Pentagon planners reviewing the same battlefield data have reached a rather different conclusion.
The American strikes produced mixed results. Iran does not maintain a conventional naval fleet or a modern air force in the Western sense. Its control of the strait rests not on destroyers or fighter wings but on a distributed, resilient system of asymmetric capabilities. The Iranian systems that dispersed into the terrain absorbed the strikes and began reconstituting almost immediately. Defense analysts point out that the Iranians have adapted from what they observed, replenished their stocks, and may now be better positioned than when the conflict began.
The strategic picture is further complicated by the political pressures that shaped the original decision to go to war. Analysts describe a decision driven less by tactical opportunity than by commitments made to Israeli leadership and to influential pro-Israel donors whose support was central to Trump’s political coalition. The result was a military campaign calibrated to political timetables rather than operational logic.
Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, a member of the Armed Services Committee, called the conduct of the conflict “a case study in how not to use military force.” Representative Thomas Massie of Kentucky, before his defeat in his primary, was more pointed: “We went in without a declaration of war, without a clear objective, without an exit strategy, and now we’re supposed to celebrate because we used up half our missile inventory and the Iranians are still there.”
The regional picture adds further complexity. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf monarchies are acutely aware of their own exposure. A major Iranian strike on above-ground oil and desalination plants could critically impede the GCC’s government’s ability to maintain economic prosperity. The GCC states have no appetite for an escalation that leaves their vital water infrastructure in ruins. While they favor the containment of Iran, preventing a regional war is a matter of sheer survival.
The broader strategic damage extends well beyond the Gulf.
The conflict has exposed, with uncomfortable clarity, the brittleness of an American military model that prioritized theoretical sophistication over the practical demands of sustained combat. The long-overlooked vulnerability of the missile supply chain has now emerged as the primary constraint on future American options. Restoring that capacity, according to officials, will require years of industrial retooling.
Washington has come to realize that Iran acutely recognized US vulnerabilities, designing asymmetric systems specifically to deplete America’s most expensive capabilities with its cheapest assets. This is not a temporary setback; it is a structural crisis.
For now, President Trump appears caught between the political cost of acknowledging stalemate and the military risk of a second round of strikes that the Pentagon itself doubts would achieve different results. The operational pause is not a logistical necessity. The forces are forward-deployed and ready. The pause is a search for a rationale, a way to resume the fight that does not require the White House to explain why the first attempt failed.
By most accounts, the search has not yet succeeded.
The Middle East has been a difficult region to deal with in oil markets. When it comes to energy geographies, the region has proven to be a disproportionately significant part of the world’s energy resources, with export facilities traversing a handful of maritime routes and political situations that have been tense, if not outright volatile, at times. The change in 2025 and into 2026 isn’t the nature of the forces but rather the confluence of overlapping pressures: ongoing sanctions enforcement, multiple theaters of conflict, OPEC+ tensions that are more public than ever in previous years, and disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea, which now seem to have become a semi-permanent part of the shipping route landscape.
There is no background information for commodity traders, market analysts, and energy investors. It’s a real-time, constantly evolving dynamic that can make all the difference in the day-to-day performance of prices, and it’s particularly important when prices are sliding around rapidly, and the stories behind them are changing just as fast.
The Behavior of Prices and the Risk of Middle East Supplies
The area is responsible for about one-third of the world’s crude production. That should make it significant in and of itself. What makes matters worse is that export infrastructure is concentrated in a handful of terminals, pipelines, and maritime corridors where a disproportionately large share of oil is exported. The disruption of any of them (even for a moment) reduces a large supply signal to an extremely short time frame.
Traders who follow crude oil price live data are the first ones to witness this. Real-time feeds are a reflection of more than just the fundamental supply-demand elements, but the market’s real-time assessment of the value of geopolitical risk and how much it “should” be worth at any given moment. A news event, which is a minor detail in a more stable environment, can cause future prices to move $5 or more in less than an hour. The consistent and tough question – and it is a tough one – is, which events actually have physical supply implications and which ones are sentiment-driven moves that die in a session or two?
The Strait of Hormuz
About 20-21 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products go through the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 20% of the world’s oil consumption. No readily available bypasses can be found that can absorb that flow at a similar cost. There are partial alternatives, including the IPSA pipeline and Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, but they would not even come close to filling the deficit should the Hormuz be closed en masse.
It is a strait between Oman and Iran. Geography makes it so that any serious disruption in U.S.-Iran relations or of security conditions in the Gulf in general puts Hormuz back on the market’s agenda. Traders are all familiar with this: when there is a lot of Iranian tension, the futures positioning will always reflect the chokepoint risk, even if there is no incident per se.
Production Outages That Don’t Make the Front Page
The issue of the supply is something that generally doesn’t get the same kind of attention it should get, but the clearest example of this recurring issue is Libya. In recent years, internal political squabbles about how to divide up oil revenues have led to several production shutdowns that have temporarily increased the tightness of the light sweet crude grades refined by European and Asian plants. The disruptions are likely to persist when there is no political agreement, and the pattern is robust. In recent years, Iraq’s export pipeline to the North through Turkey has also been down for extended periods of time. These relatively inconspicuous disruptions can add up and impact medium-term supply dynamics, though not necessarily have the same impact as a more conspicuous incident.
Key Risk Factors Shaping Market Sentiment in 2026
The Middle East is a geopolitical risk that has many variables. It’s a combination of interwoven pressures that work in various ways and to varying effects on the length of the price impact. The issues that currently have the greatest attention of serious analysts are generally of three types:
Export infrastructure and production infrastructure are currently under physical threat to production.
Sanctions regimes and the dynamics of their enforcement.
Disruption of shipping routes and attendant disruption of the trade economics.
Everything is unique, and sometimes they are not in the same direction at the same time. That’s part of what makes the current situation more complicated than any one risk headline implies.
Active Conflict Zones and Exposure to Infrastructure
The latest example of large-scale infrastructure targeting is the 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities in the country, which was carried out using drones and missiles. The loss in output occurred temporarily, amounting to about 5.7 million bpd, the largest sudden supply shock in modern oil market history. The recovery was quicker than many expected, partly because of the operational robustness of Aramco and partly because the situation was swiftly contained diplomatically. But the event has permanently changed the way markets view the vulnerability of infrastructure in the Gulf, and that repricing has not been complete.
The Persistent Iranian Supply Question
Iran’s petroleum sales have also been sustained in the face of sanctions, largely via Asian markets out of reach to Western sanctions. A full-fledged deal between Tehran and Western governments has yet to be hammered out, as of early 2026. That has left volumes of Iranian supply in a limbo of sorts: they could be rapidly reduced by stepped-up enforcement, and they could be dramatically increased by a change in diplomatic circumstances. Both of these results can have significant price consequences, and even the uncertainty can be a factor in the market without a clear decision.
Infrastructure Concentration Risk
The concentration levels in Saudi Arabia’s export system warrant a more significant focus than is generally found outside of export specialist circles. Abqaiq processes and stabilizes a huge percentage of Saudi crude before it is shipped to export terminals, removing the sulfur from it. That kind of ‘single point of failure’ is not typical in most industrial supply chains. In the case of oil, it’s a structural aspect of the market and one that has been proven, not just thought.
OPEC+ Internal Dynamics
However, OPEC+ compliance has been quite lackluster at times, notably from Iraq and Kazakhstan, which have had a history of overproduction. This gives rise to an everlasting discrepancy between OPEC+ declarations and the actual supply data. For analysts, the bottom line is that it is important not to take production decisions at face value but to also consider the track record of implementation once a deal has been agreed on to see what the real supply impact was.
Non-State Actor Activity and Shipping Friction
Since late 2023, the Houthis have started to attack commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea more frequently, and these attacks have persisted through 2025. What those disruptions drove home is that it’s not necessary to blow a wellhead to impact oil market economics. A round-the-Cape voyage will increase the time in transit by about ten to fourteen days, as well as the fuel costs. During periods of increased Houthi activity, insurance costs for tankers traveling in the Gulf area skyrocketed. Both impacts are not a direct factor in the crude benchmarks, but both impact the effective landed cost of Middle East barrels in destination markets.
How the Market Prices Geopolitical Risk
Knowing the difference is important, as geopolitical events do not affect oil prices in a single manner. Some effects are immediate and visible: a surge in the price of Brent futures within minutes of an incident report. Others come more slowly, via changes in freight rates, changes in the repricing of insurance, and changes in buyer behavior, which may take days or weeks to be reflected in trade flow data. The rate of these impacts varies, and so do their effects.
Then there is the issue of what the market “already” had in place whether there was an event or not. When there is a constant regional tension, there is usually some risk premium in prices. The incremental market move may therefore be less than anticipated when an event then reinforces concerns, the surprise element of the event, which is typically the one that produces the biggest market moves, is already discounted.
Risk Premium in Practice
Geopolitical risk premiums in times of heightened Middle East tension have varied from around $4 to $10 per barrel, depending on the market participants’ views on the probability of actual physical supply disruptions in the case of Brent crude, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. That’s a fairly broad window for economic trading, and it has a tendency to close up very fast when the tension subsides and without a supply event, which is the more common scenario.
The geopolitical risk premium factors analysts may consider are:
The nearness to active conflict, producing fields, or the working export terminals.
Production capacity that would be available to make up for the loss of production elsewhere.
The availability and magnitude of the IEA’s strategic stockpiles to be tapped.
Current tanker market conditions and the viability of an alternative route.
Diplomatic messages sent by governments in the area, including the United States and other great powers
Past examples of similar events, which have had identifiable supply impacts.
It is not easy to give exact weights to these inputs. Part of the reason for the price action to seemingly be different with comparable geopolitical events can be due to different analysts forming different conclusions from the same events.
Historical Supply Disruptions and Price Responses
The following table shows some of the more significant supply events that took place in the Middle East and the approximate market impact. The trend of most entries was that the first price movement has been greater than the actual physical supply effect, at times much greater, and then it has partially retraced to a more stable situation.
Event
Year
Estimated Supply Impact
Approximate Brent Price Reaction
Abqaiq/Khurais Attacks (Saudi Arabia)
2019
~5.7 mb/d temporary loss
~15% intraday spike
Libyan Civil War Output Collapse
2011
~1.4 mb/d reduction
~$20/bbl over several weeks
U.S. Re-imposition of Iran Sanctions
2018
~1-1.5 mb/d reduction
~15% sustained over several months
Iraq-Northern Field Disruptions
2014
Partial northern output loss
~$10/bbl elevated premium
Houthi Red Sea Disruptions
2023-24
Rerouting; limited direct supply loss
Moderate – primarily freight cost impact
Iran Sanctions + Red Sea Friction
2025-26
~0.8-1.2 mb/d constrained Iranian output
Persistent $4-8/bbl risk premium in Brent
The 2025-2026 entry is a more diffuse form of market pressure than those acute events listed above. It is not one particular incident, but rather sanctions enforcement and Iranian volumes kept low and shipping activity in the Red Sea continuing to cause friction in the transport system, which has kept transport costs elevated. The World Economic Outlook from the IMF pointed out that this type of persistent supply constraint is likely to have a longer-lasting impact on medium-term price expectations than acute supply shocks, which markets have historically been able to absorb and turn around in relatively short periods of time. Thus, a slow-burning risk premium can be more ‘sticky’ than a dramatic risk premium.
Broader Market Implications
Crude oil benchmarks are not the only place where supply risk from the Middle East exists. It extends out to related markets in ways that are not always apparent when the world’s focus is on the Brent or WTI headline price.
The second-order victim is likely to be refined product markets. In times of crude supply shortages or increased uncertainty, refinery margins and regional product availability may be affected to a greater extent, and the effects on end consumers may be magnified, especially in regions where there is little local refining or a high concentration of import logistics. The energy crisis of 2022 in Europe was a prime example of how the upstream pressure to supply energy flows through the downstream more quickly than most market players would have thought.
Other segments of the market that are impacted by increased supply risks in the Middle East are:
Tanker freight rates, which can also rise sharply without reference to crude prices during times of major-scale rerouting.
In oil-dependent economies, currency markets can be affected by changes in the prices of the oil that the state supplies, which change expectations of fiscal revenue and sovereign credit risk.
LNG markets with some short-term fuel switching demand in the exposed economies as a result of regional geopolitical pressure.
In agricultural commodity markets, where there is known overlap between energy input costs and food production, processing, and transport economics
Strategic Reserve Releases (SRRs) as a Counterweight
During the IEA’s coordinated strategic reserve release in 2022, it was seen that policy tools are in place to mitigate short-term supply shocks and that they can be implemented on a material scale when political conditions are right. However, there are drawbacks to those processes. During that time, reservoir levels were lowered significantly, and a rebuild takes time. There are also doubts about the effectiveness as a deterrent because, over time, markets will factor in the possibility of a release during the next big disruption event, effectively canceling the effect of a release in advance.
Geopolitical Risk Analysis: What It Does and Doesn’t Accomplish
It’s easy to fall into the temptation, because of the amounts of money potentially involved, of viewing geopolitical risk analysis as a predictive tool. It generally lacks it there. It’s actually helpful for comprehending markets and its actions, as well as for charting structural weaknesses that are price-relevant. What it doesn’t do well is tell you when an event will happen, or how big the market’s reaction will be when it does.
Instead of getting lost in qualifications, the specific limitations should be called out:
Escalation and de-escalation are non-linear and unpredictable to a great extent. Conflict situations that appear to be intractable can be solved in a flash, and stable times can fall apart in an instant. Both directions remain silent and don’t herald themselves.
When demand for a commodity is the same, the market price may be quite different in the two market conditions. There are interactions between the geopolitical trigger and positioning, sentiment and open interest that are not modelable in advance.
Secondary effects (such as freight repricing, product supply shifts and insurance cost changes) happen at varying rates to the initial crude price move, and thus the total impact of the market is more difficult to gauge in real time.
Analytical path dependency can occur when geopolitical narratives set up a framework that later information gets filtered through, without being recognized as such.
All this does not negate the analysis. It’s about calibration and about honesty when the power of explanation runs out, and speculation sets in.
Conclusion
Middle East supply risk is not a succession of shocks that will come and go and be completely addressed but rather a structural state in global oil markets. The combination of production weight, geographic concentration of export infrastructure, and political complexity of the region always comes with a certain level of supply uncertainty as a base case. The level of that uncertainty and the extent to which that uncertainty is priced into securities on a given day are what change.
The hard part for traders, analysts, and energy investors is not recognizing that there is risk – that’s obvious. It’s gaining a good enough sense of what matters most at a given moment, what the big picture supply-demand dynamics are, and at what point a careful study of the facts begins to look like well-informed guesswork. The clear understanding of that boundary is, in fact, probably more valuable than any single analytical framework that can be applied to the boundary.
Disclaimer
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute financial advice, investment advice, or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any financial instrument, commodity, or derivative product. Trading in energy markets, including crude oil futures, CFDs, and related instruments, involves substantial risk of loss, including the possible loss of capital invested. Past market behavior and historical price patterns referenced in this article are not reliable indicators of future performance. Geopolitical developments described may not materialize as anticipated or may evolve in ways that differ materially from historical precedent. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult a qualified financial professional before making any investment or trading decisions. Nothing in this article should be interpreted as a trading signal, directional market recommendation, or endorsement of any specific trading approach.
Marcelo Bielsa is widely revered as a pioneer of coaching, but his unconventional methods risk ruining Uruguay’s World Cup chances before the tournament has even begun, with rumours of dressing room unrest.
Nicknamed “El Loco”, which means madman, the 70-year-old’s bold, attacking approach has proved an inspiration to a younger generation of coaches, including Pep Guardiola and USA boss Mauricio Pochettino.
Recommended Stories
list of 4 itemsend of list
Yet, his famously demanding standards have often caused friction during a nomadic coaching career, and his stint in Uruguay has been no exception.
The Argentinian’s arrival initially generated huge excitement, which was fuelled by landmark victories over Brazil and Argentina in qualifying.
But they needed that flying start just to make it through after winning just three of their final 12 qualifiers.
The tipping point for many in the squad came at the Copa America in 2024.
Uruguay finished a creditable third, eliminating Brazil along the way, but Bielsa’s intensity during the monthlong tournament did not endear him to his players.
Luis Suarez hit out at Bielsa’s methods after retiring from international football months later, claiming he had reduced former Liverpool striker Darwin Nunez to tears at half-time of a 2-0 win over Argentina, such was the force of his criticism.
Bielsa accepted that after the former Barcelona striker’s backlash, his “authority was affected” with the rest of the dressing room.
Results have also regressed, with Bielsa stating he was “ashamed” by a 5-1 friendly defeat by the USA in November.
Now, as his third World Cup with a third different nation approaches, the question is whether Bielsa can win back the faith of his players for a country so used to punching above its weight on the world stage.
And there are doubts as to how his high-energy style will fare in the gruelling conditions of Miami and Guadalajara, where Uruguay will face Saudi Arabia, Cape Verde and Spain in Group F.
Pochettino hails Bielsa as a ‘genius’
Bielsa made his name winning three league titles in Argentina with Newell’s Old Boys, where the stadium now bears his name, and Velez Sarsfield.
“For me, he’s a person I will always admire,” said Pochettino, whom Bielsa recruited for Newell’s as a 13-year-old.
“He’s a genius. A person with charisma and a personality very different from us, normal coaches, and that’s what makes him special.”
Bielsa’s sides in Bilbao with Athletic Club, where he reached the Europa League and Copa del Rey finals in 2011-12, and Marseille, where he led Ligue 1 at the halfway stage in 2014-15, were also admired but ended up empty-handed as their energy ran out.
In Leeds, murals still bear Bielsa’s face, four years on from his departure, after he led a sleeping giant of English football back to the Premier League for the first time in 16 years in 2020.
His time there ended in familiar fashion with an exhausted squad that was relegated to the second tier the season after he departed.
Yet, the esteem with which he is held for his daring tactical approach endures.
“To be loved is this biggest title, bigger than the Champions League or Premier League or whatever,” said Guardiola, who went to visit Bielsa in Argentina before setting out as a coach at Barcelona.
“To be loved is the most important thing, and I think Marcelo has that more than any other manager in the world.”
Bielsa, who oversaw Argentina’s group-stage elimination in 2002 and Chile’s round-of-16 loss to hosts Brazil in 2014, has already hinted that he may not remain as manager of Uruguay beyond July, saying his job with the team ends with the World Cup.
“Our job ends with the World Cup,” Bielsa said at an event organised by the Uruguayan Football Association last Friday.
Although he did not elaborate on his remarks, local media reported that the Argentinian will not continue once his current contract expires at the end of the June 11-July 19 tournament.
“It is a miracle in any professional’s sporting career to take part in the World Cup,” he said. “I will be forever grateful to Uruguay for allowing me to enjoy a competition like the World Cup.”
The US has leveraged threats to extract major concessions from Caracas, with Claver-Carone allegedly playing a key role. (Archive)
A mastermind of Trump’s hardline Latin American policies, Mauricio Claver-Carone no longer serves in the administration. But according to well-placed sources, he’s “picking who can operate” in Venezuela, controlling access to the government, and creating conflicts of interest.
Speaking with reporters on May 21, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez was on her way to New Delhi to discuss energy issues, and that he would be in India as well.
“This is an important trip, I’m glad we’re able to do it,” Rubio chirped after explaining the trio of nations would discuss how to increase Venezuelan oil sales to India.
His statement — and his announcement of Rodriguez’s trip before she had — perfectly illustrated Washington’s newfound dynamic with the Venezuelan government. Following over twenty years of hostile relations with Venezuela’s socialist-oriented leadership, the US Secretary of State was apparently so intimately involved with day to day affairs in Caracas that he was claiming responsibility for Rodriguez’s international itinerary.
In fact, according to an insider who enjoys close contacts within both the Venezuelan and US governments, Rubio’s influence over Rodriguez is said to be traced to one “gatekeeper”: former Trump Latin America envoy Mauricio Claver-Carone. “Mauricio [Claver-Carone] is picking who can operate and Delcy [Rodriguez] is taking instructions,” the source told The Grayzone.
A former senior US official with access to leadership in both Caracas and Washington offered the same assessment, remarking to The Grayzone, “Mauricio’s calling the shots on private sector economic positions, and if anyone wants in, they have to go to him.”
Hand-selected by former National Security Advisor John Bolton to serve as his Latin America charge during Trump’s first term, Claver-Carone no longer occupies an official governmental role. Instead, he has leveraged his legacy in the public sector to establish a Miami-based investment firm called the Lara Fund which could become a key player in the MAGA financial feeding frenzy in Caracas.
Described by the New York Times as the “architect of Trump’s tough Latin America policies,” Claver-Carone is a Cuban-American regime change zealot who once engaged in fisticuffs with Cuban diplomats as a young man. During Trump’s first term, he unleashed a financial “flamethrower” on Cuba, issuing scores of new sanctions that unraveled the Obama-era normalization policy and plunged the island back into economic misery.
Claver-Carone has similarly masterminded many of the policies that define Trump’s relationship with Venezuela, from its recognition of the previously unknown Juan Guaido as the country’s “interim president” to the deportation of hundreds of Venezuelan migrants from the US to El Salvador’s maximum security CECOT prison. Many of those migrants had been prompted to journey to the US by the economically crushing sanctions unleashed at Claver-Carone’s direction.
The Grayzone’s sources described the Trump veteran as the architect of the military invasion that saw Maduro spirited away to a federal penitentiary and installed Rodriguez as president following a stand-down by Venezuelan security forces.
“If he was in charge of implementing the kinetic side, maybe [Rodriguez] thinks she has to listen to him on finance,” the Venezuela insider said of Claver-Carone.
A report this January by investigative journalist Aram Roston described Claver-Carone as a “key backer” of Rodriguez following Maduro’s abduction, and cited sources who claimed he exercised decisive influence over Venezuela policy despite having left the administration.
Claver-Carone is now said to be at the heart of the most sensitive and consequential task Venezuela faces: the restructuring of its $170 billion in defaulted sovereign debt. Forced from several previous positions by corruption scandals and rancorous clashes, an operative with no official governmental position appears to be shaping the economic contours of Project Venezuela.
“He’s got a lock on everything”
This May, the US Treasury Department authorized Caracas to hire a financial advisor to assist with the herculean task of restructuring its debt. The Venezuelan government selected Centerview Partners, a top-drawer investment and financial advisory firm based in New York City.
According to the former US senior official, Claver-Carone’s romantic partner and business colleague, Jessica Bedoya, boarded a private jet to Caracas soon after the big announcement, arriving with a top advisor from Centerview. It was her second trip to the Venezuelan capital, they said, after visiting in February to discuss financial matters.
Claver-Carone did not respond to calls to his personal phone from The Grayzone, or to detailed questions sent by text and email.
His partner, Bedoya, is the founder of the Lara Fund investment firm where he serves as managing partner. Her bio notes that she has also worked in the CIA and National Security Council.
Jessica Bedoya and Mauricio Claver-Carone’s headshots, as featured on Lara Fund’s webpage
Some insiders worry that her reported presence in the Venezuelan capital, together with Claver-Carone’s outsized influence, could represent a conflict of interest, allowing them to steer debt restructuring agreements to their own personal benefit.
“Now he’s got a lock on everything,” the Venezuela insider said of Claver-Carone. “He could say to anyone who wants to work in Venezuela, I’m the guy. I have the keys. If you want to play ball, invest with me.”
The former US official said Claver-Carone was raising capital for his Lara Fund while he served as a special government employee at the State Department. While Bedoya was running the firm, they said Claver-Carone was leveraging his position inside the Trump administration to pitch potential investors.
“Arbitrary and authoritarian actions that showed him to be a real thug”
When Trump appointed Claver-Carone to serve as the first American president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 2020, he hired Bedoya as his chief-of-staff. The couple’s secret romance at the bank triggered an embarrassing ethics investigation after a hand-written contract was discovered showing they had agreed to pursue “absolute happiness,” and included a clause with punishments including “candle wax and a naughty box” if either party breached the deal.
An independent probe ordered by the IDB discovered that Claver-Carone had increased his paramour’s salary by 40% – a $133,000 reward in less than a year. Investigators also found that the couple had racked up expenses on an IDB credit card during romantic getaways.
Claver-Carone refused to participate in the investigation while accusing its authors of “fabrications.” In the end, IDB governors voted unanimously in favor of his firing. The US government endorsed their decision.
“President Claver-Carone’s refusal to fully cooperate with the investigation, and his creation of a climate of fear of retaliation among staff and borrowing countries, has forfeited the confidence of the bank’s staff and shareholders and necessitates a change in leadership,” they wrote.
The Argentine governor of IDB, Guillermo Francos, delivered a similarly harsh assessment of Claver-Carone’s tenure. “Claver was a disaster for several reasons,” Francos remarked in 2022. “For having an inappropriate relationship, for having disproportionately increased the salary of this inappropriate relationship, for having lied, and for these arbitrary and authoritarian actions that showed him to be a real thug.”
When Claver-Carone returned to the second Trump administration, it was not long before his proclivity for conflict jeopardized his position.
Throughout 2025, Claver-Carone’s spiteful attitude reportedly complicated Trump administration attempts to prop up a key right-wing ally in South America, Argentine President Javier Milei. Milei’s chief of staff happened to be Guillermo Francos – the former IDB governor whom Claver-Carone held personally responsible for outing his secret relationship with Bedoya. According to the Argentine paper Clarin, Claver-Carone attempted to retaliate by unsuccessfully pressuring Milei to fire Francos. He then attempted to undermine a major IMF loan package to Argentina by demanding the country first sever its credit line from China. This was met with an apparent rebuke from Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who visited Buenos Aires to express confidence in the IMF loan just weeks after Argentina’s central bank extended its credit line from Beijing.
The following month, in May 2025, Claver-Carone announced he was leaving the State Department to return to his Lara Fund. His departure gave the appearance that he had been forced out of his job. However, he maintained his clout through his direct line to Rubio.
The former US official told The Grayzone that Claver-Carone is now angling to become a Cuban American version of Jared Kushner, the Trump son-in-law who has leveraged his proximity to the president and role as Middle East negotiator to rake in billions from Israel and several Gulf monarchies despite having no official government title. To do so, he has allegedly inserted himself into the byzantine process of restructuring Venezuela’s debt.
When the Trump administration announced that Venezuela could hire a financial advisor to assist with its sovereign debt, Rodriguez initially planned a public bidding process for the coveted position. But then, according to the ex-US official, Claver-Carone issued support for Centerview, leading to the firm’s selection. (Opposition bloggers have speculated that Centerview was chosen because one of its partners, Matthieu Pigasse, is a self-described “pro-market socialist” who previously worked on deals with Maduro and Venezuela’s state owned PDVSA oil company.)
In recent weeks, according to sources, Claver-Carone has attempted to undermine financial advisors who had been working with the Venezuelan government to restructure its debt since 2014.
They said that when Claver-Carone’s partner, Bedoya, arrived in Caracas this month, allegedly on a private jet with Pigasse, she began pushing to remove the advisory mandate from David Syed, a seasoned French lawyer who had advised Caracas on debt-related issues for over a decade, and is considered incorruptible.
“The effort to push [Syed] out created a lot of tension,” remarked the Venezuela insider. “You can’t understand debt restructuring by parachuting in without his knowledge.”
Syed did not respond to The Grayzone’s request for comment. Hamouda Chekir, another Centerview partner who works on Venezuela’s debt, did not respond to calls and text messages sent to his personal phone.
Scandal-stained firms as vehicles for extracting profit from Venezuela
Just before leaving the State Department in May 2025, Claver-Carone convinced Rubio not to renew a sanctions waiver that allowed Chevron to sell Venezuelan oil in the US market. In doing so, he eliminated a mechanism which was explicitly designed to promote transparency and prevent local officials from skimming cash.
This January, after abducting Maduro, the Trump administration granted confidential licenses to a pair of notoriously corrupt trading houses, Vitol and Trafigura, to export Venezuelan oil. The deal came months after Trump’s re-election campaign received a whopping $6 million donation from a senior trader at Vitol.
Robert Bachmann, an analyst at the Swiss watchdog Public Eye, told the Washington Post at the time, “Trump is taking advantage of firms that know how to circumvent regulation.”
Both companies had been caught engaging in a series of elaborate bribery schemes across Latin America and Africa. In 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) forced Vitol to pay a $135 million penalty for bribing officials for licenses in Mexico, Ecuador and Brazil. Trafigura paid a similarly staggering fine in 2024 for a lucrative bribery scheme in Brazil. In the US, Vitol was rung up by the California Attorney General for manipulating spot market prices of oil.
But almost as soon as the Trump administration entered office, it neutered the DOJ corrupt foreign practices division charged with enforcing the judgments against Trafigura and Vitol on the grounds that it was “impeding America’s national security objectives.”
Now, the profits these scandal-stained firms generate through oil sales abroad – including to Israel – are channeled back into a US-run account with little public oversight. A percentage of sales is then delivered back to the Venezuelan government. Where the rest goes is anybody’s guess.
“The Venezuelans are the owners of the oil, and we know nothing. There is no transparency,” said José Guerra, an economist aligned with the Venezuelan opposition, complained to the Washington Post about the Trafigura and Vitol licensing agreements.
Trump, for his part, has essentially admitted Venezuelan oil profits are channeled into a slush fund for his international rampage. “We’ve taken out so much oil in Venezuela, we’ve paid for the cost of the war [with Iran] about 25 times over,” the president boasted during a May 23 campaign rally. While the president’s claim was absurd, as Venezuela is currently exporting only about one million barrels of oil a month – hardly enough to cover a full day of warfare – it revealed his avaricious attitude toward the entire operation.
Among certain Venezuelan opposition activists, Claver-Carone has become a figure of contempt who is partially blamed for Trump’s declaration that their de facto leader, the coup plotter and Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Corina Machado, “doesn’t have the support within, or the respect within, the country.”
The Trump administration’s embrace of Delcy Rodriguez, and the Venezuelan president’s faithful compliance with Washington’s financial schemes, have prompted some top Democrats to adopt Machado as a partisan cudgel. This January, Chris Murphy, a ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, praised the opposition leader as “impressive” following a meeting on Capitol Hill, while taking a nasty swipe at Rodriguez. Machado “reminded us that Trump replaced Maduro with Maduro’s head of torture,” Murphy proclaimed.
We held a bipartisan meeting with Maria Corina Machado, the opposition leader in Venezuela.
Machado is impressive, and is walking a fine line – standing up for her country while trying to placate Trump. She reminded us that Trump replaced Maduro with Maduro’s head of torture. pic.twitter.com/WsamMv5eG7
If the Democrats take Congress after this year’s midterm elections, the Trump administration’s dealings in Venezuela will face intense scrutiny from the House Oversight Committee. Bipartisan pressure will then build for fresh elections to usher in a new government. “Delcy Rodríguez is a terrible person,” the regime change-obsessed Florida Republican Sen. Rick Scott told the Wall Street Journal this month. “We’ve got to have an election soon.”
In the meantime, a flock of MAGA-aligned financial vultures has swooped into Caracas to feast on the petro-state’s post-Maduro carcass. Donald Trump Jr. is said to be hunting for opportunities in the capital for his 1789 Capital fund, while a startup backed by pro-Trump tech oligarchs Peter Thiel and Palmer Luckey, Erebor Bank, just struck a lucrative deal to reconnect Venezuela’s central bank to the global economy. In the midst of this frenzy, a figure with no government title, Claver-Carone, appears to be establishing the new pecking order.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
With ground maneuver a huge risk thanks to the ubiquity of deadly aerial drones, Ukraine is increasingly relying on uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) to move supplies, rescue the wounded, shoot down drones, lay mines and even fight battles. As a result, the head of the country’s defense technology incubator has been tasked with ensuring that there are enough of these systems to meet the voracious demand.
These efforts are being closely watched. Five years into an existential fight, Ukraine has become a global leader in ground drone technology. Kyiv is deploying these systems at a scale and pace that even the most advanced militaries can’t come close to keeping up with.
In an exclusive hour-long interview earlier this month, Brave1 CEO Andrii Hrytseniuk spoke with us about how Ukraine is set to produce tens of thousands of UGVs this year, how they are being used, and the importance of artificial intelligence in increasing the efficiency of these robots in combat.
This is the second of a two part interview. The first part focused on Ukraine’s interceptor drones, which you can read here.
Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.
Brave1 CEO Andrii Hrytseniuk. (Brave1)
Q: President Zelensky set a goal of producing 50,000 unmanned ground vehicles this year. How is that going? And how can you hit that target?
A: We are moving according to the plan that was announced by President Zelensky. And this is a very ambitious goal, but we feel pretty confident that we will be able to execute this plan and this task and the armed forces will get many times more drones than in previous years.
I held a Staff meeting. Three key issues.
First – UGVs. It is unmanned ground vehicles that are currently one of the most urgent needs of our Defense Forces, and production and supply must keep pace with demand. The volume of contracting for UGVs must be significantly higher…
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) April 27, 2026
Q: How do you reach that goal?
A: On the frontline, we use only Ukrainian drones, maybe just a few international ones, but about 99% of the drones that are used on the battlefield are fully manufactured here in Ukraine, and this is the high priority area for us for the last two years. There are 280 Ukrainian companies, private companies, that are producing UGVs. And in total, there are 550 different models of UGV. This is a big variety, starting from small to very big UGVs. And there are different types of categories of ground vehicles.
Inside A Ukrainian Secret Ground Drone Factory | Shaping the Future of Ground Battlest
Q: What are some of those categories?
A: The first are those used for logistics. Their main purpose is to provide transportation in the gray zone, because it’s very dangerous on the last 10 to 15 kilometers from the front line, and there are a lot of drones used for transportation of goods, like construction materials, ammunition and provisions. It’s very risky for soldiers and our philosophy is that we should not risk our soldiers.
Everything that is possible to be done by drones has to be done by drones for transportation. In March, we performed 9,000 missions. In April, more than 10,000, so the implementation of logistics by drones is permanently increasing.
Ukraine’s ‘Khartia’ brigade turns to land drones to survive the drone-saturated frontline
Q: What are the other categories of UGVs?
A: The second category are special UGVs that are used for evacuation of wounded soldiers.
You can see an example of one of those rescue missions in the following video.
A Ukrainian robotic evacuation vehicle equipped with an armored capsule successfully rescued a wounded soldier from a frontline position.
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) May 22, 2026
The third one is combat UGVs. And we have more than 10 different models of combat UGVs. They are used for attacking Russian soldiers and hitting Russian armored vehicles. Also they are used as anti-drone aerial defense systems. We use combat UGVs to hit Shaheds, to hit FPV drones, including those using fiber optics and even small Russian planes.
A: We have different combat UGVs using 5.45mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm and 12.7mm guns. And we have a variety of different grenade launchers, like the Mk19 and others.
Interesting use of Ukrainian UGV Droid TW-7.62 equipped with an FN MAG machine gun to shoot down FPV drones over Kramatorsk, Ukraine.
Q: Can you provide any details about what kinds of sensors these weapons use to engage drones?
A: I will not share the technical details, but I can tell you that combat UGVs without artificial intelligence do not work at appropriate effectiveness. All combat turrets that we are using have elements of artificial intelligence, and it allows them to be as effective as they are.
Q: How are the UGVs using AI to target drones?
A: First of all, this is machine vision. This is object recognition, identification, classification, tracking and providing recommendations for the operator on what to do.
Q: So basically, these systems acquire the target, determine how far away they are, at what altitude and speed and that they open fire on their own?
A: Yes. We are more advanced than Russia in combat turrets and combat UGVs, that’s why I would avoid sharing the technical details about how we are doing that.
Ukraine’s New AI-controlled Turret Is Taking Down Russian Drones | Sky Sentinel in Action
Q: How common is the use of fiber optic cables to guide UGVs?
A: For UGVs, fiber optics is not used.
Q: Not at all?
A: There are some experiments, but the use cases for fiber optics on UGVs are very, very limited. Only a very small percentage of UGVs use fiber optics.
Q: Why?
A: UGVs typically have multiple missions. They go forward and go back, and when you’re using fiber optics, typically, this is a one-way mission.
One of the UGVs with a fiber optic control system tested by Ukraine’s Brave1 incubator. (Brave1)
Q: What can you tell me about how troops communicate with UGVs for combat missions?
A: Without the Delta command and control system, all these advanced technologies on the battlefield will not be working. The Delta command and control system, which is number one in the world, is absolutely crucial. And this is for all our drones, multi-domain operations, everything.
War in Ukraine: An advanced digital map. The Delta system #shorts #warinukraine #united24media
Q Can you provide any details about how that works?
The suffocating smoke still hangs over her ruins, thick with the acrid stench of explosives powder and dust carrying the scent of betrayal and the mark of courage. Her streets, once filled with children’s laughter, became Israeli fields of slaughter. Now they echo with the names and memories of martyrs.
The mass graves, the broken concrete, and the twisted steel are not just evidence of Zionist hatred. They are witnesses to those who stood with her, and to those who failed her. Today, Gaza’s rubble holds more memories than all the nation’s libraries.
Palestine will remember
She will remember the selfless sacrifices of doctors and healthcare workers who refused to abandon their sick patients as bombs rained on their hospitals; the journalists who became the news, targeted for daring to expose the truth; the mothers who wrapped their children in the red, black, green, and white flag of a nation Israel is desperate to erase.
These are not tales of despair, but of defiance, insisting on its right to breathe life amid death.
Gaza will not forget
She will not forget the silence of Western democracies. In a tragic inversion, most European nations, shackled by the ghosts of their past, traded morality for absolution. The self-proclaimed champions of human rights offered Palestinians on the altar of yesterday’s victims to atone for Europe’s sins.
Gaza will not forget the Biden administration, which vetoed every U.N. Security Council resolution calling to end the genocide. Nor Donald Trump, who poured fuel on the fire, then demanded recognition for dousing his own flames.
This week, Arab, Muslim, and world leaders gather like moths around the American arsonist-turned-firefighter, “celebrating” the ashes of Gaza.
Palestine will remember
She will remember the people who rose for Gaza, from Yemen to Dublin, from Cape Town to London and Madrid, while Arab capitals from Cairo to Riyadh slept. Ireland and Spain led the boycott, while Arab countries from the Gulf to Jordan opened their ports and highways to provide alternative routes for Israeli goods, even as Yemen imposed a sea blockade in the Red Sea.
Gaza will not forget — nor forgive — the Arab governments that opened their ports when shipyard workers in Italy refused, delivering American weapons used to annihilate her children and destroy her hospitals.
Palestine will remember
She will remember South Africa — not an Arab or Muslim nation — that led her case before the International Court of Justice, charging Israel with genocide. A country once scarred by apartheid became the moral conscience of a world too timid to speak. In that act of solidarity, South Africa rekindled the universal truth that justice knows no borders.
Palestine will remember the Lebanese resistance that gave its leaders for Gaza’s defense; Yemen, poor in wealth but rich in dignity, whose solidarity never wavered; and Iran, steadfast against Israeli hubris. She will remember Ireland and Spain, who did not turn away when Arabs did, proving that true solidarity transcends borders, faith, and kinship, resting only on shared humanity.
She will remember the heroes of the flotillas who braved waves of hatred and siege to carry messages of compassion; the nameless volunteers who left the safety of their countries to heal the wounded and feed the hungry; the American students who turned campuses into encampments of resistance; the artists, actors, and musicians who risked careers for justice; the employees who lost their jobs protesting the complicity of Google, Microsoft, and other tech giants in Israel’s crimes.
Gaza will not forget those who betrayed her
Palestine will forever be grateful to those who dared to speak the truth when it was dangerous, who marched when it was forbidden, who grieved when it was unfashionable.
Palestine will remember. History will remember. Justice will remember.
For nearly two years, Gaza has endured a genocide so relentless it defies descriptive language. Israel’s war machine has turned hospitals into morgues, UN schools into mass graves, and refugee camps into craters. Yet Gaza refuses to die.
Each time she is bombed “back to the Stone Age,” she rises — like the phoenix — to rebuild, not only her structures but her indomitable will. In that defiance lies the occupier’s greatest fear: memory.
Israel can destroy buildings but not erase remembrance. The siege may starve Gaza’s body, but it nourishes Palestine’s collective soul.
Gaza’s children will grow up with memories no child should bear. But they will also inherit something indestructible: dignity. In every demolished home and every shattered family lives a story that refuses burial.
Gaza’s memory will not fade. For the mind, unlike stone, cannot be occupied. It is the eternal archive of a people’s resilience, passed from one generation to the next, weaving the indelible tapestry of Palestine today.
The ruins of Gaza stand not only as testimony to Israel’s genocide but to the moral collapse of those who enabled it.
Gaza will rise again, brick by brick.
But what will never be resurrected is the Israeli lie, which, for eight decades, cloaked the Zionist project in the guise of victimhood, occupying Western narratives and manufacturing consent.
Gaza will rise — and the Israeli myth will remain buried beneath her rubble, forever.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
Harare, Zimbabwe – Precious Mvundura woke up with joint pain, a high fever and a pounding headache on a chilly autumn morning in eastern Zimbabwe.
The 37-year-old initially thought it was just the flu. But when the headache persisted for three days, she became worried.
Her five-year-old son had also fallen ill and was sweating heavily.
In early May, the pair sought help from a village health worker in Chishakwe, a rural farming community outside Zimbabwe’s third-largest city, Mutare. Both tested positive for malaria.
“I felt relieved,” Mvundura told Al Jazeera.
“From the moment I took that medication, I started getting better.”
Her son has also recovered and is back in school.
Their ordeal comes as malaria cases and deaths surge across Zimbabwe after US funding cuts disrupted key malaria control programmes.
Shortly after returning to office for a second term in 2025, US President Donald Trump slashed foreign aid funding, including programmes backed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In Zimbabwe, the cuts disrupted tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria research, prevention and treatment programmes.
Among the affected initiatives were the Zimbabwe Entomological Support Programme in Malaria (ZENTO) at Africa University in Mutare, which provided scientific research to support the country’s National Malaria Control Programme, and the Zimbabwe Assistance Programme in Malaria II (ZAPIM II), which helped strengthen malaria diagnosis, treatment and prevention in high-burden districts.
USAID had disbursed $270m for health and agriculture programmes in Zimbabwe in 2024.
Malaria cases jumped to 65,399 between January and April 2026, up from 36,000 recorded during the same period in 2025 and 17,000 in 2024, according to Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health National Malaria Control Programme weekly surveillance report.
Deaths have also risen sharply, reaching 174 between January and April 2026, compared with 85 during the same period last year and 34 in 2024.
Mvundura and her son survived because they sought treatment early. In many other cases, the disease has been fatal.
Shortages of mosquito nets, test kits
Thomas Chuchu, the health programme lead at Save the Children Zimbabwe, said several malaria elimination activities previously supported by ZAPIM II had been disrupted.
“In practice, elimination has continued through government and other partners, but with weaker operational capacity and slower implementation,” Chuchu told Al Jazeera.
Zimbabwe’s dependence on donor funding for essential medicines, diagnostic kits and mosquito-control supplies has left the country vulnerable [Farai Shawn Matiashe/Al Jazeera]
The ZAPIM II programme ran through Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health system in 11 districts across the provinces of Central and East Mashonaland and the province of Matabeleland North.
Before falling ill, Mvundura said she had not been using mosquito nets or repellents.
“I only started using a mosquito net a friend shared when I fell sick,” she said.
In December 2025, Caroline Mawombedzi was diagnosed with malaria while living in Burma Valley, a farming community about an hour’s drive from Mutare.
She had last contracted the disease in the late 2000s while still a child.
In mid-May, her five-year-old daughter was also diagnosed with malaria by a village health worker in Chishakwe after suffering severe headaches and stomach problems.
Although her daughter received treatment, Mawombedzi said she could not afford preventive measures such as mosquito nets.
“I am unemployed. I cannot afford to buy a mosquito net. We have not been sleeping under a mosquito net for years,” she said.
Virginia Chakandinakira, a village health worker serving Chishakwe, said malaria diagnostic kits and drugs are now in short supply.
“I used to get plenty of malaria test kits and drugs. But in 2025, they did not give me. I referred everyone showing malaria to a nearby Chitakatira clinic,” she said. Chitakatira is a rural settlement about an hour’s drive from Chishakwe.
“I only received test kits and drugs in February. However, the supplies are limited. The authorities told us they were only distributing them to hotspot communities.”
Research programmes crippled
Professor Sungano Mharakurwa, the director of Africa University’s Malaria Institute, said the abrupt withdrawal of US support had worsened the malaria outbreak by affecting the programme.
ZENTO was contributing data from the surveillance of malaria-carrying mosquitoes, which guided strategies employed by the National Malaria Control Programme to control malaria transmission, he said.
The Trump administration’s funding cuts have also effectively put a stop to the US President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), launched in 2005 by former President George W Bush to control and eliminate malaria worldwide. Mharakurwa said the PMI had played a major role in funding malaria medications, and communities had been left exposed without it.
He said the Malaria Institute later secured funding from the United Methodist Church General Board of Global Ministry, but it fell far short of previous US assistance.
Zimbabwe’s dependence on donor funding for essential medicines, diagnostic kits and mosquito-control supplies has left the country vulnerable.
Itai Rusike, the director of Zimbabwe’s Community Working Group on Health, said the government needed to strengthen domestic health financing to reduce dependence on foreign donors.
“It is risky for a country to depend substantially on external partners, as donors can withdraw financial support anytime should their interests shift,” he said.
Climate change fuels spread
Experts say climate change is also driving the spread of malaria and other vector-borne diseases across Africa.
Rising temperatures are allowing malaria to spread into higher-altitude areas, which were once less vulnerable to outbreaks.
Zimbabwe experienced El Niño between 2023 and 2024, a climate phenomenon marked by unusually warm temperatures in the Pacific Ocean, which typically disrupts rainfall patterns across Southern Africa.
Heavy rainfall followed in 2025 and 2026, creating ideal breeding conditions for mosquitoes.
Chuchu, from Save the Children Zimbabwe, said that the current spike in malaria cases was closely linked to the heavy rains during the 2025–2026 season.
“The rains created favourable breeding conditions for mosquitoes, particularly in already endemic provinces such as Mashonaland Central, Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West,” he said.
Health workers say malaria diagnostic kits and medicines are now in short supply in rural Zimbabwe [Farai Shawn Matiashe/Al Jazeera]
“The effect of heavy rains is likely being amplified by weakened prevention systems, including reduced mosquito-net coverage, delayed vector-control activities, reduced community surveillance, and challenges with timely testing and treatment following the discontinuation of ZAPIM,” he added.
Professor Mharakurwa, meanwhile, said that above-normal rainfall required equally strong preparation and resources to contain malaria transmission.
Government efforts
Zimbabwe aims to eliminate malaria by 2030, in line with the target set by the African Union.
Over the years, the government, working with international donors and aid organisations, has relied on indoor residual spraying, mosquito-net distribution, mass testing and public awareness campaigns to contain outbreaks, particularly in rural communities.
Health workers continue to carry out indoor spraying campaigns in malaria-prone areas, while village health educators use community meetings and radio programmes to encourage early testing and treatment. Authorities have also expanded surveillance and rapid-response systems in high-risk districts.
But some of these efforts have weakened following the disruption of donor-funded programmes. Key malaria elimination activities previously supported by ZAPIM II included active case tracking, targeted distribution of long-lasting insecticidal nets and district rapid-response systems.
For years, the government and aid organisations distributed mosquito nets annually to vulnerable communities, such as Chishakwe. But since the US funding cuts, shortages have become increasingly common.
Village health workers say malaria diagnostic kits and treatment drugs are also running low in some rural areas, forcing suspected malaria patients to travel long distances to clinics for testing and treatment.
Health experts warn that unless funding gaps are urgently addressed, Zimbabwe risks losing years of progress made in reducing malaria infections and deaths.
For Mvundura and her son, surviving malaria still feels like escaping death.
Michele Spagnuolo allegedly used insider information to profit from bets on people on Google’s most-searched list.
Published On 28 May 202628 May 2026
A Google software engineer has been charged with fraud by US authorities after allegedly using insider information to win more than $1.2m in bets on the prediction market platform Polymarket.
Michele Spagnuolo, an Italian citizen residing in Switzerland, is accused of using confidential information to wager on the results of Google’s annual most-searched list, according to a criminal complaint unsealed on Wednesday.
Recommended Stories
list of 3 itemsend of list
US prosecutors accuse Spagnuolo of using an account named “AlphaRaccoon” to make trades on various markets linked to the results of Google’s 2025 Year in Search.
The total sum of the bets was approximately $2.75m, according to the complaint, filed in federal court in New York.
Among the bets, Spagnuolo successfully predicted that indie pop musician d4vd would top the list for the most-searched for person last year, hours after accessing confidential data at Google, according to prosecutors.
Spagnuolo, 36, faces charges of commodities fraud, wire fraud and money laundering.
“Today’s charges reinforce a decades-old message: corporate insiders cannot use confidential business information to turn a profit in our markets,” US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Jay Clayton said in a statement.
“Insider trading compromises the integrity of our markets, and the American people want this greed-driven conduct investigated and prosecuted,” Clayton added.
Bets on Maduro’s capture
Google said in a statement that it is working with law enforcement and that using confidential information to place bets is a serious breach of company policy.
Spagnuolo has been placed on leave, according to a Google spokesperson.
A Polymarket spokesperson said the company had worked closely with the US Attorney’s Office on the investigation and that the firm “is the only prediction platform to date whose cooperation has led to insider trading charges in the United States”.
“We are committed to maintaining accurate, fair, and transparent markets as well as enforcing our rules and working with our regulators and law enforcement,” the spokesperson added.
Last month, a US soldier was charged with using classified military information to place bets on Polymarket regarding the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.
Prosecutors accuse Gannon Ken Van Dyke, 38, of cashing in on the US operation against Maduro, to the tune of more than $400,000.
Parisians cooled off in the city’s Saint-Martin canal as an unprecedented heatwave pushed temperatures across Europe far above seasonal norms. Swimmers ignored long-standing bans, swimming outside designated bathing sites.
Uganda has closed its border with neighbouring DR Congo for four weeks in an effort to contain an Ebola outbreak. Authorities say at least seven cases, including one death, have been confirmed, while hundreds are being monitored.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Warning: This story contains details some may find distressing
A girl whose teenage rapists were spared custody has told the BBC she wants “freedom” from fear. She and her parents spoke anonymously to BBC Newsnight presenter Victoria Derbyshire.
“I just want to be able to go for a walk without being scared that I’m going to see them,” the girl said of her attackers, whose sentences are to be reviewed.
Her father said the boys who raped her should have custodial sentences, as the attack will have a “lifelong impact” on his daughter.
Two boys, then aged 14, were convicted of rape, while a third, then 13, was found guilty of rape by aiding and abetting the attack. Their sentences are being referred to the Court of Appeal, after an outcry when they were given youth rehabilitation orders.
Elsewhere, three-time former champion Novak Djokovic faced Frenchman Valentin Royer on Court Philippe Chatrier, which has a roof, and was on court for three hours and 44 minutes.
The 39-year-old Serb lost a tight third set on a tie-break but regrouped to win 6-3 6-2 6-7 (7-9) 6-3.
In his post-match press conference, Djokovic suggested scheduling matches at Grand Slams later in the evening could be “something to consider” as a potential alternative if extreme conditions are expected.
French Open organisers monitor the temperature through two wet bulb sensors – one on Chatrier and another on Court 14.
If the threshold is reached, a 10-minute break may be introduced after the second set of women’s matches and the third set of men’s matches.
If temperatures continue to rise, matches can be suspended until the heat drops.
No French Open match has ever been halted because of extreme heat.
Women’s 15th seed Marta Kostyuk said the conditions so far this week are not quite as bad as those she experienced when playing at the same venue for the Olympics in 2024, but added: “It’s still hot and it’s very dry. I always felt like I need to drink, I want to drink more and more. It was tough.”
On Monday, former finalist Casper Ruud said he felt he was “walking around like a zombie” and feared he had heat stroke after struggling with cramping in 33C temperatures.
One player who escaped the worst of the conditions on Wednesday was men’s second seed Alexander Zverev, who played in the night session when temperatures had dropped to about 18C.
A runner-up at Roland Garros in 2024, Zverev continued his bid for a maiden Grand Slam with a dominant display to beat Czech player Tomas Machac 6-4 6-2 6-2 in one hour and 48 minutes.
Eid al-Adha, one of the most important dates in the Islamic calendar, comes at a critical time for Iranians this year.
Meat from sacrificed animals is often eaten at Iranian tables, but a blockade on Iranian ports and sanctions by the US has led to escalating costs across the country.
Unlike Nowruz, the Persian New Year, Eid al-Adha is not as widely celebrated in Iran, but mosques and other institutions still observe the ritual of animal sacrifice, known as qurbani, through authorised livestock and slaughter centres.
Here, animals are sacrificed according to Islamic law in a hygienic environment. But another goal of the network is to control runaway inflation by offering meat at lower prices than market rates.
Meat substitutes
A Tehran municipality body announced on Tuesday that each kilogramme of sacrificial meat would be sold at 7.4 million rials ($4.30) at designated shops.
The price for a similar cut on the market can be more than three times that, depending on its quality and the location of the butchers. The minimum wage is currently less than $100 per month in Iran.
“I usually buy meat for a stew or a few dishes around every three weeks; for some families in the neighbourhood, it has become a sort of luxury,” said a middle-aged woman, who lives with her husband and son in Tehran.
She told Al Jazeera that chicken, eggs and legumes have become replacements for red meat, but the costs of these staples have significantly increased, too.
Masoud Rasouli, a meat-packing industry representative, told the state-linked Mehr news agency earlier this week that demand for red meat has decreased by 50 percent compared with last year.
He said some meat was imported to counter any effects of the US blockade, but local demand is currently so low that “existing livestock population is enough for all the needs of the market”.
Data released by the state-linked Iranian Labour News Agency this week showed that the current cheapest government-announced price for one kilogramme of meat during Eid is equal to the price of a 50kg live sheep 10 years ago.
According to the Statistical Center of Iran, year-on-year inflation stood at more than 73 percent in the first month of the Persian calendar year that ended in late April.
Iranian rice was up by 173 percent and chicken by 191 percent in that month compared with a year before, while liquid cooking oil more than quadrupled. Figures for the next month are expected to be worse.
Controlling inflation
Price-control measures – which have been implemented by authorities to fight a decade of rampant inflation – have been unable to adequately compensate for the ever-decreasing purchasing power of Iranian households living under local mismanagement and US sanctions – and now war and a blockade.
A young man working at a butcher shop in southwestern Tehran said they have had to increase prices several times over recent months after suppliers announced hikes.
“Our sales were a bit higher today because of the Eid, but we see even our most frequent customers far less these days. Most of the conversations with the customers are about the prices,” he told Al Jazeera.
Iran and the US have been holding negotiations through regional mediators to potentially end the war. But amid exchanges of fire and inflexibility over demands, no breakthrough has emerged even as both sides say a memorandum of understanding has mostly been negotiated.
Religious messaging
Beyond greetings and congratulatory phone calls with regional peers, Iranian authorities also used the Muslim festival this year to issue political messages.
On Wednesday morning in the capital, the authorities organised a large prayer to mark Eid at the University of Tehran, which was led by ultraconservative Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami.
He said that “submitting to humiliation” is an example of “evil” and the height of vice, at a time when he believes the other side, the US, seeks a surrender from Iran.
“Your enemies, the Iranian nation’s enemies, and this mad enemy sitting in the Black House – which is wrongly referred to as the White House – want your humiliation. But this madman will take that wish to his grave,” he said about US President Donald Trump.
Khatami, a member of the powerful Guardian Council and the clerical Assembly of Experts, also praised the supporters of the government who have taken to the streets every night for almost three months and said this “unprecedented” phenomenon would be repeated on the nights of Eid al-Adha.
President Masoud Pezeshkian had a relatively softer approach, but his comments were still laden with religious symbolism.
“In today’s turbulent world, where the fire of tyranny, occupation, and the arrogance of the hegemonic powers burns bright, Eid al-Adha conveys the message of dignity, liberty, and fearlessness in the face of the pharaohs of our time,” he said.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in a message on Wednesday that he hoped for harmony in the Muslim world, amid this difficult time for the region.
“We pray that, by the auspiciousness and blessing of this great Eid, we will witness the deepening and strengthening of Islamic solidarity for cooperation and mutual assistance in confronting war, discrimination and occupation, especially in the West Asia region, and that our world will return to the path of reviving peace and justice,” he said.
Indonesian authorities have shut down several screenings of a new documentary about alleged human rights abuses in Papua, including Indigenous land seizures. Al Jazeera’s Jessica Washington explains the controversy.
World number two Elena Rybakina suffered a surprise second-round defeat by world number 55 Yuliia Starodubtseva in the biggest French Open upset so far.
Despite winning the opening set, Rybakina looked far from her clinical best as Starodubtseva mounted an impressive comeback to win 3-6 6-1 7-6 (10-4).
Known for her big serve and precise hitting, reigning Australian Open champion Rybakina committed 71 unforced errors and landed just 53% of her first serves.
It is the first time Kazakhstan’s Rybakina has failed to reach the third round at Roland Garros since 2020.
Rybakina’s early exit also means Aryna Sabalenka will keep her world number one ranking regardless of her result at Roland Garros.
A funeral has been held for Mohammed Odeh, believed to be the leader of Hamas’s military wing, who Israel said was killed in a strike on a busy area in Gaza City on Tuesday. Odeh’s family has reportedly confirmed his death, despite no official comment from Hamas.
![Zimbabwe’s dependence on donor funding for essential medicines, diagnostic kits and mosquito-control supplies has left the country vulnerable. [Farai Shawn Matiashe/Al Jazeera]](https://i0.wp.com/www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/A-village-health-worker-holding-a-malaria-test-kit-in-Chishakwe-Village-Mutare.-Farai-Shawn-Matiashe_Aljazeera-1779883034.jpg?w=640&ssl=1)
![Virginia Chakandinakira, a village health worker serving Chishakwe, said malaria diagnostic kits and drugs are now in short supply.. [Farai Shawn Matiashe/Al Jazeera]](https://i0.wp.com/www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/A-villager-holding-malaria-drugs-in-MUtare.-Farai-Shawn-Matiashe_Farai-Shawn-Matiashe-1779883004.jpg?w=640&ssl=1)
