NEWS

The Minnesota Timberwolves eliminated Nikola Jokic’s Denver Nuggets while the New York Knicks put on one of the most dominant displays in NBA playoff history, destroying Atlanta to advance, and the surging Sixers beat the visiting Celtics again to force a decisive Game 7

Sixth-seeded Minnesota will play the San Antonio Spurs in the Western Conference semifinals after completing a 110-98 win on Thursday for a 4-2 series upset defeat of third-seeded Denver.

Three-time NBA Most Valuable Player Jokic top-scored for Denver with 28 but it was not enough to fend off the dogged Timberwolves, who were playing without star man Anthony Edwards due to injury.

The clash in Minneapolis was tight throughout, with no team gaining a double-digit lead until the game’s dying moments.

The Timberwolves edged the first half, leading 57-50 at the break.

Jokic roared to life. The Serbian superstar scored 14 points in the third quarter alone to ensure a nail-biting finish.

Having already been ejected for unsportsmanlike conduct from game four after a shoving match, Jokic enraged the home crowd by sparking another brawl, with Jaylen Clark.

With his Timberwolves leading by five with 90 seconds remaining, Jaden McDaniels sank a long jump-shot for two to rouse the home fans and force a Nuggets timeout.

When play resumed Denver could only turn over the ball again. McDaniels closed out the win with two free throws, ending his night with a career-high 32 points, to top-score overall.

“It’s a great night. It’s a great victory for us. Hopefully … we’ve got 12 more to go,” said Minnesota coach Chris Finch.

“We came into these playoffs not trying to beat Denver, but trying to win a championship.”

A visibly crestfallen Jokic, whose side last won the NBA championship just three years ago, said they “just didn’t do a good job”.

“I needed to play better. I must play better,” he added.

Edwards – out with a bone bruise and hyper-extended left knee – could return for the Timberwolves’ series with the high-flying Spurs.

Knicks crush Hawks in record-setting rout

Elsewhere on Thursday, the Knicks routed the Atlanta Hawks 140-89.

It was the most points scored and the biggest win by the Knicks in a playoff game, setting up an Eastern Conference semifinal with either the Celtics or the 76ers, who are tied 3-3 after a Philadelphia win.

The Knicks wrapped up their 4-2 series victory in emphatic style, leading the Hawks by as many as 61 points before benching their starters for the final quarter.

New York’s 47-point half-time lead, at 83-36, was the widest in NBA postseason history.

OG Anunoby top-scored with 29 points, including 26 in the first half, before he was rested. None of New York’s starters played more than 29 minutes.

“We can’t just meet the moment, we’ve got to exceed it, and I thought we did a great job of doing that tonight,” said Karl-Anthony Towns, who recorded a triple-double with 12 points, 11 rebounds and 10 assists.

Having finished third in the Eastern Conference, the heavily favoured Knicks had been down 2-1 early in the playoff series, before roaring back.

They are the first team to advance to the East’s semifinals – their fourth straight year of reaching that stage.

The Hawks briefly led at the start of the game, going up 11-9 before the wheels dramatically came off. They trailed 40-15 at the end of the first quarter.

The final 51-point margin of defeat was not quite the largest in playoff history, which stands at 58 points.

“Obviously you hate to lose anything. And to lose the way we did, I think, particularly given the enthusiasm and support that we’ve had from the people in this building … disappointed on a lot of levels,” said Hawks coach Quin Snyder.

Sixers dump Celtics again to send series to Game 7

The Celtics-76ers playoff series is headed for a decisive game seven in Massachusetts after Philadelphia beat Boston 106-93.

The Celtics had held a 3-1 series lead, but the 76ers proved dominant on their home court to make it 3-3.

Tyrese Maxey top-scored with 30 points. Paul George added 23, and 2023 Most Valuable Player Joel Embiid poured in another 19, plus 10 rebounds and eight assists.

It is the 23rd playoff series between the two historic rivals – an NBA record.

The U.S. Air Force plans to fully retire its fleet of E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) aircraft in Fiscal Year 2028. The BACN jets provide highly specialized communications capabilities that allow for the rapid transfer of data between various aerial platforms, as well as forces on land and at sea, which you can read more about here. The Air Force more than doubled its fleet size in recent years, but now wants the mission to be taken over by space-based systems.

In their Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2027, the Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach, and Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman state that the E-11A “will be fully divested” in FY2028.

In our previous coverage of the E-11A, we described the basic capabilities of the platform as follows:

The BACN payload is an extremely robust communications gateway that can rapidly send and receive data transmitted through various waveforms to and from a wide array of aerial platforms, as well as forces on the ground. In addition to being able to “translate” between various communications and data sharing systems, these aircraft have been vital communications relay nodes in Afghanistan, where the country’s mountainous terrain limits the reach of line-of-sight links.

In the short term, the capabilities provided by BACN will be bridged by the Hybrid SATCOM Terminal program. In a 2024 demonstration by Northrop Grumman, this type of satellite communications solution made use of commercial space Internet providers to establish a resilient multi-orbit, multi-constellation network.

The Posture Statement further adds that the Air Force is “executing a deliberate and balanced strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2), and Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) capabilities to meet the intent of the National Defense Strategy.”

This strategy includes “a generational shift away from legacy systems” like the E-11A and “towards next-generation capabilities in both air and space.” This also calls for continued investment in the DAF Battle Network, which is described as “a key capability to fuse sensor data and remain resilient against all adversaries.”

The Air Force has previously described the DAF Battle Network as an “integrated system-of-systems connecting sensor, effector, and logistics systems enabling better situational awareness, faster operational decisions, and decisive direction to the force.”

Another option could be BACN-like solutions provided in podded form to various aircraft. Examples of these include the Smart Node Pod from Northrop Grumman, which is already in production.

Until recently, the Air Force seemed very much committed to its BACN fleet.

Back in 2021, the service confirmed it planned to acquire six more E-11As over the next five years; this would provide a total of nine BACN jets. This reflected the high demand for the fleet, which meant all of the existing operational examples had historically been forward deployed in Afghanistan, where one of them crashed after suffering an engine failure in 2020.

The BACN fleet has also conducted extensive operations in the Persian Gulf region, Central and South America, and elsewhere.

The E-11A has remained active in combat operations up to this day, including being deployed in support of Operation Epic Fury against Iran. It was also involved in the operation to capture Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, an effort known as Absolute Resolve.

Another driver behind the force expansion was the Air Force’s retirement of four EQ-4B Global Hawk drones that were also equipped with the BACN communications package. These were later converted into the RangeHawk configuration to support hypersonic testing.

In 2022, the Air Force confirmed that the first of the additional six E-11As was now operating in the Middle East, having formally joined the 430th Expeditionary Electronic Combat Squadron at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

It’s worth noting that the Air Force’s three oldest E-11As are based on older Bombardier BD-700 and Global 6000 business jets, while the newer airframes are based on the Global 6500 bizjet.

The aircraft has also taken on additional functions, such as in 2021, when at least one E-11A was involved in a combined U.S.-UAE exercise focused on employing “multiple platforms… together to execute and refine tactics, techniques and procedures to counter Unmanned Aerial System threats,” according to the Air Force.

In the past, we’ve also noted how the value of the BACN platform extends beyond Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Its capabilities would be equally useful for supporting operations over the vast expanses of the Pacific, where the U.S. military is increasingly focused on preparing for a potential future high-end conflict with China. It would also be suited to working on NATO’s eastern flank, where U.S. allies have been expanding their force posture in recent years to help deter Russian aggression.

More generally, as a fixed-wing bizjet platform, the E-11A lacks the low-observability characteristics to survive in highly contested airspace, so it would need to operate from considerable standoff distances when confronted by the kinds of peer- and near-peer adversaries that they are intended to help defeat. This is undoubtedly part of the reason for the Air Force deciding to discard the BACN fleet. In the same way, it also gave up its E-8C Joint STARS without any direct replacement, driven by the concern that platforms of this kind will simply be too vulnerable in the future.

After all, both China and Russia are developing very long-range anti-air missiles expected to be optimized for high-value targets such as BACN. In addition, airborne ISR platforms will increasingly face sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks before they even get to their operating areas. 

Furthermore, pushing the E-11A further away from the warfighter is a fundamental problem for its mission, especially when it comes to connecting to forces on the ground. BACN works as a bridge between forces using disparate radios and even the same radios, and is particularly valuable since units on the ground that are trying to communicate with other units or aircraft can be blocked by line of sight, especially in terrain. Regardless, the farther the E-11A flies away from its target area, the less it is capable of providing meaningful connectivity to the forces operating there, just due to the horizon.

Ultimately, the E-11A’s high-demand, low-density status may also have counted against it. Even after the Air Force decided to increase the fleet numbers, it remains a highly niche capability and one that comes at a lot of cost, with an extensive training, maintenance, and logistics burden needed to support it.

The Air Force’s ambition to migrate the BACN’s capabilities to space-based assets parallels, to some degree, its aim for its future airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) architecture. However, the service does at least still see a need for traditional crewed AEW&C aircraft, too. Partly this is due to the fact that the Air Force does not expect new space-based capabilities to be operational before, at best, the early 2030s. The service is seeing a similar shift with its ground moving-target indicator (GMTI) capabilities, which are being transferred from the now-retired E-8C JSTARS to a distributed network of space-based sensors to keep tabs on targets on land and at sea.

At this stage, it’s far from clear whether the terminals required for BACN’s successor have already been installed on aircraft, ships, and issued to ground units, and whether the system will be able to translate Link 16 and other waveforms.

Time will tell if space-based assets can take over the BACN’s role in what is a notably abbreviated timeframe.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

American Airlines has resumed flights as Donald Trump moves to rebuild ties following the abduction of Nicolas Maduro.

The first direct commercial flight between the United States and Venezuela has landed in Caracas, ending a seven-year suspension imposed by the US Department of Homeland Security over security concerns.

Flight AA3599, operated by Envoy Air, a regional subsidiary of American Airlines, departed Miami at 10:11am ET (14:11 GMT) on Thursday, five minutes ahead of schedule, according to airport data.

It arrived in the Venezuelan capital roughly three hours later and was due to return to Florida later in the day. Earlier, the airline said that a second daily flight between Miami and Caracas would start on May 21.

The return of nonstop flights comes months after a dramatic shift in US-Venezuela relations, following Washington’s January operation that led to the abduction of former President Nicolas Maduro, and marks the first direct air link between the two countries since diplomatic ties were severed in 2019. For years, travellers had used indirect routes through other Latin American hubs.

Translation: “For nearly seven years, there were no direct commercial flights between the United States and Venezuela. Under President Trump, we are changing that today. Flights between Miami and Caracas have resumed,” The US State Department posted on X. 

Coffee and arepas in the aeroplane

At Miami International Airport, American Airlines marked the occasion with a small ceremony, decorating the departure gate with Venezuelan flags and balloon displays in the country’s yellow, blue and red colours.

Passengers were served coffee and arepas, a traditional Venezuelan dish, on board the flight.

Thursday’s service was operated by an Embraer E175 regional jet with a capacity for about 75 passengers.

US Transportation Secretary Sean P Duffy said the flight signalled more than the return of an air route.

“Today is about more than just another flight, it’s a critical milestone in strengthening the United States relationship with Venezuela and unleashing economic opportunity in both countries,” Duffy added.

He added that the resumption followed extensive work by the department and praised American Airlines for restoring a route he described as vital, saying more flights are expected in the coming months.

High ticket prices

Despite the celebratory mood, high ticket prices remain a key barrier, alongside strict US visa requirements that have left many potential travellers without the documentation needed to fly.

Recent searches on the airline’s website show return fares for early May starting at more than $1,200, before dropping to just more than $1,000 later in the month, suggesting prices may ease as services expand.

By comparison, flights via Bogota typically range from $390 to $900 round-trip, with Avianca among the main carriers.

American Airlines was the last US carrier operating in Venezuela before suspending flights in 2019, while Delta and United had already withdrawn in 2017 amid a deepening political crisis that drove millions to leave the country.

“Parents will be able to reconnect with children, grandparents with grandchildren, and families with the place they once called home,” Miami-Dade County Mayor Daniella Levine Cava said before the departure. “Miami-Dade is home to the largest Venezuelan community in the United States.”

Donald Trump’s rhetoric and actions against Iran, Venezuela and Cuba over the last year have few parallels in modern history. They have to be seen as marking a new stage. As such they call for a reevaluation of analysis and strategy on the part of the Left.

Trump’s repeated threat to bomb Iran “back to the Stone Ages where they belong” is unmatched by the rhetoric of even the most notorious and brutal heads of state over the recent past. Decapitating the entire leadership of a country to compel total submission, as Washington and Tel Aviv have done in Iran, is also a novelty in war strategy. The kidnapping of Venezuela’s president and First Lady as a first step in attempting to establish a colonial relationship by taking complete control of the country’s principal source of revenue, namely petroleum, represents a throwback to practices associated with centuries-old imperial rule

These are examples of “hyper-imperialism,” a concept theorized by Samir Amin to describe the United States “as the sole capitalist superpower.” More recently, the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research has observed that U.S. hyper-imperialism persists despite a marked erosion of its economic and, though to a lesser extent, financial power. Its military supremacy is not only unrivaled, but is complemented by hybrid warfare, most notably “hyper-sanctions” and the use of lawfare.

What needs to be added to the concept of hyper-imperialism, particularly Trump’s version of it, is its sui generis nature. To find a parallel for the kind of hegemony the United States now exercises – highlighted by the continuous indiscriminate use of force and the threat of it – one would have to look back to the Roman empire or even earlier. One of Trump’s innovations is his deployment of the military to reinforce the system of economic sanctions, examples being the interdiction of oil tankers, the quarantine of Cuban oil, and full-scale war against Iran.

Trump II’s foreign policy hardly represents a complete break from the past. The groundwork was laid by past Democratic and Republican administrations. However, his actions force the Left not only to reformulate strategies, but to reconsider past evaluations and analyses of nations of the Global South subjected to extreme forms of imperialist aggression. The resistance to U.S. aggression must be given greater weight when evaluating governments. In addition, the popular desperation and exhaustion that erode revolutionary fervor and distance people from those same governments should be understood in light of the daily trauma people endure as a direct result of imperialist actions.

What Trump’s hyper-imperialism tells us

The starting point is to recognize that since Trump’s return to the White House, Iran, Venezuela and Cuba have been in a de facto state of war, which is an escalation of the multiple forms of hostility and aggression of past years. This is key to how all three nations should be judged. While the Left’s commitment to democracy needs to remain unquestionable and unwavering, in these cases primary responsibility for democracy’s somewhat uncertain prospects lies with the siege imposed by imperialist powers. No one other than James Madison said “Of all the enemies to public liberty, war is perhaps the most to be dreaded.”

The encirclement imposed by hyper-imperialism on Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela illuminates salient features of imperialism going back in time: first, Washington has honed the sanctions regime into a powerful tool, sometimes inflicting damage comparable to armed intervention; second, imperialism is the principal driver of the pressing economic problems facing the three nations; third, the justification for the actions taken against the three nations does not hold up under scrutiny; and fourth the brutality of the sanctions system underscores the need for its complete elimination. The discussion below looks at these points.

Tehran’s response to Operation Epic Fury underscores the crushing impact of sanctions. The nation’s leaders have made clear that the lifting of sanctions – as well as “international guarantees of U.S. non-interference” in the nation’s internal affairs – is a non-negotiable condition for ending the current conflict. That is to say, the Iranian leaders place the destruction caused by the sanctions on a similar footing as the bombs.

In the case of Venezuela, the events leading up to the abduction of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores on January 3, 2026 reveal the far-reaching and highly coordinated machinery underpinning the sanctions regime. The second Trump administration’s tracking of the “ghost fleet” carrying Venezuela’s sanctioned oil—and its interdiction of several of those vessels— underscores how far Washington has gone in perfecting sanctions enforcement since the early years of the Cuban Revolution.

The first Trump administration pioneered in promoting “overcompliance” in which Washington’s well-publicized monitoring was designed to assure that companies and financial institutions world-wide would shun all transactions with Venezuela, even ones not specifically targeted by the sanctions. The aim was to impose a veritable blockade. Mike Pompeyo and Elliot Abrams spearheaded a campaign – drawing on the FBI, the Treasury, U.S. embassies, and the intelligence community – to scrutinize the dealings of companies worldwide with Venezuela, in what amounted to a warning shot to companies throughout the world. Even firms that engaged in oil-for-food swaps, which were not proscribed by the sanction regime, were warned that they ran risks. Companies under investigation were likewise told that penalties could be suspended if they halted all dealings with Venezuela.

A retrospective look at the first Trump administration’s sweeping enforcement measures and their devastating impact reinforces the argument that the sanctions have been so harmful that they need to be dismantled unconditionally and entirely. This position contrasts with that of liberals such as the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), which criticized the sanctions against Venezuela yet called for using “negotiations to flexibilize financial and oil sanctions” as leverage to secure concessions. Indeed, power brokers in Washington also favored sanctions relief as a bargaining tool to push the Maduro government to enact market-oriented reforms to the benefit of U.S. capital.

A full grasp of the scale and severity of Washington’s “war” on Venezuela undercuts the notion upheld by some on the left who argue that the sanctions were no more to blame for the nation’s pressing problems than government mismanagement. An even harsher position on the left affirms that the sanctions “do not explain the root causes of the societal collapse we have lived through.” 

Likewise, the forcible removal of Maduro and Flores demonstrates that Washington was intent on dismantling a government whose example and policies ran counter to U.S. interests. Prior to the January 3 kidnapping, some on the left in Venezuela and elsewhere denied that Washington sought to remove Maduro from power because they were convinced that he had effectively sold out. But they were wrong insofar as Washington clearly wanted Maduro out. Pedro Eusse, a leading member of the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), which broke with the Maduro government in 2020, wrote in July 2025, “Everything indicates that the true intention of the US and its allies’ policy of aggression toward the Venezuelan government has not been its overthrow, but its subordination.”

In the case of Cuba, the extreme measures of the Trump II administration against the nation also shine light on the cruelty and effectiveness of the system of sanctions per se. Trump’s navy-enforced quarantine on oil shipments is a first for the nation since the October 1962 missile crisis. The result has been recurring 16-hour blackouts that have disrupted water delivery, hospital operations, food production, and garbage collection.

The quarantine spotlights Cuba’s near total dependence on oil, in contrast to nearby Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, which generate a significant share of their electricity from coal and natural gas. The dependence stems precisely from the sanctions, which impeded imports and pushed Cuba into relying almost entirely on Venezuelan oil—only for Trump to cut off that supply too.

Indeed, the quarantine underscores Cuba’s reliance on Venezuelan oil and the reciprocal solidarity that saw fuel exchanged for Cuban medical personnel. That’s a plus for Maduro. The program undercuts the claim of some on the left that Maduro’s foreign policy, in the words of the PCV, never moved beyond an “anti-imperialist rhetoric” without substance.

The Washington-crafted narrative on Cuba and the reaction to it by the mainstream media and the Left are curious. In contrast to the demonization directed at Venezuela and Iran, Washington’s condemnation of Cuba has been relatively hollow and has gained little traction in mainstream outlets or left-leaning circles. The anti-Cuba vilification—driven by hardline anti-Communism—remains largely confined to the far right, epicentered in Miami. The official rhetoric is a departure from the wording in 1982 when the State Department designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism due to “its long history of providing advice, safe haven, communications, training, and financial support to guerrilla groups and individual terrorists.” Now the Trump administration’s justification for the same designation is that the Cuban government grants “safe harbor to terrorists” and refuses to extradite them.

As false as the narco-terrorism case against Maduro is, it nonetheless offered a rationale that undoubtedly resonated with at least a slice of public opinion. Compare that to Marco Rubio’s line on Cuba which flatly denies the catastrophic effects of the oil quarantine. Rubio claims “we’ve done nothing punitive against the Cuban regime” and adds, the blackouts “have nothing to do with us.” Instead Rubio faults the Cuban leadership on grounds that “they want to control everything.” A classic case of victim-blaming, but with few buying into it. A YouGov survey in March found that only 28 percent of U.S. adults support the U.S.’s blocking of oil shipments to Cuba, as opposed to 46 percent opposed.

In addition, Rubio’s assertion that the only novelty is that Cuba is “not getting free Venezuelan oil anymore” is blatantly fallacious. Rubio is well aware of Venezuela’s swap with Cuba involving the latter’s International Medical Brigades, which maintain a sizeable presence in Venezuela and elsewhere. This is precisely why Rubio has vigorously attempted to sabotage the program throughout the region, unfortunately with a degree of success.

If the oil quarantine demonstrates anything it’s that the hardships facing the Cuban people are rooted in Washington’s war on Cuba, now going on 65 years. Criticism of Cuban government policies, or of socialism itself, comes in a distant second place.

The Trump II disaster should be an eye opener

Trump’s bullying offensive abroad has fueled mounting opposition to interventionism and has even fostered anti-imperialist sentiment in the United States. Just one week into the 2026 Iranian bombings, 53 percent of the U.S. population opposed the strikes, in sharp contrast to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq, which enjoyed large majority support at the outset. That the former editor of The New Republic called the U.S. war on Iran imperialistic is telling. In a New York Times op-ed, Peter Beinart wrote “Donald Trump’s foreign policy vision is imperialism.”

One lesson of recent events is particularly relevant for the Left: the demonization of heads of state is a sine qua non for military intervention. In the case of Iran and Venezuela, the discrediting combines some fact with a large dosage of fake news. In the case of Maduro, the demonization which dates back to shortly after he assumed office in 2013, was taken to higher levels as a result of the controversial presidential election of July 28, 2024, which the opposition claimed was fraudulent. Subsequently the corporate media consistently tagged the word “autocrat” and “dictator” onto Maduro’s name. Six months later, Trump was in office and the vilification escalated to a new pitch. Indeed, the branding of Maduro as a narco-terrorist was an indispensable prelude to the bombing of boats in the Caribbean and the subsequent kidnappings – notwithstanding the doubts raised by some media outlets regarding the veracity of the claim.

The takeaway is that the Left needs to distinguish between criticism and demonization and take cognizance of the possible dire consequences of the latter.

The demonization of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his inner circle also set the stage for imperialist actions, but, of course, his government could not be placed in the same category as those of Cuba and Venezuela.

Furthermore, as in Venezuela and Cuba, harsh sanctions have been conducive to shadow economies, clientelistic networks, and fraudulent dealings, patterns well documented in numerous studies on sanctions throughout the world.

Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, a prolific scholar on Iran who is highly critical of the government, told Jacobin “While the Islamic Republic is paranoid, it is also very much under siege from all sides.” He also notes the intrinsic relationship between the sanctions and the nation’s pressing problems: “Sanctions and structural weaknesses of the Iranian economy feed off one another — there’s a symbiotic relationship between them.”

In short, any serious reading of Iran must foreground the role of sanctions—an approach that inevitably tempers the tendency to cast its leadership in purely demonizing terms.

The lessons of July 28, 2024

The issue of the accurateness of the July 28, 2024 election tallies in Venezuela needs to be reframed. Those elections could not have been democratic, regardless of the announced results, because Venezuelan voters had a gun pointed at their heads: reelect Maduro and the sanctions continue; elect an opposition candidate and the sanctions will be lifted.

The overwhelming majority of Venezuelans knew full well what was at stake. Luis Vicente León – the nation’s leading pollster, himself a member of the opposition – reported that 92 percent of the population believed that the sanctions negatively impacted the economy, and most characterized the effect as “very negative.” (The poll puts the lie to the State Department’s repeated claim that the sanctions only harm government officials.)

A similar scenario played out in the Nicaraguan presidential elections of 1990 when opposition candidate Violeta Chamorro upset the Sandinistas in the midst of a devastating, U.S.-promoted civil war. But there was a fundamental difference. Far from demonizing the Sandinistas, Chamorro accepted a power-sharing transition agreement with them. In contrast, for over a decade prior to the July 28 elections the opposition’s main leader, María Corina Machado, had ruled out negotiations with those who had allegedly violated human rights. She never tired of voicing the slogans “no immunity,” ”no to amnesty,” “no agreements with criminals,” often with specific reference to the Chavistas and to Maduro himself. Maduro and his followers had every reason to fear the type of repression that the opposition initiated during the two-day abortive coup it staged in April 2002 against the Chavista government. Even opposition pollster León admitted that the fear was well-founded.

Marta Harnecker, the renowned leftist theoretician, wrote that the Sandinistas erred in holding the 1990 elections amid U.S. promoted violence and sabotage. Harnecker labeled the decision to organize elections “on terrain shaped by the counterrevolution” a “strategic error.”

A reevaluation and reinterpretation of the July 28 elections is instructive. The hard-core Chavistas accept the official results which showed Maduro winning with nearly 52 percent of the vote. The opposition refutes that claim. A third position is defended by supporters of Maduro who nevertheless express skepticism and point out that because of a massive hacking attack from outside the country, it may be impossible to ever know the true count.

The debate about the accuracy of the official results of July 28 sidesteps the overriding issue of whether the elections should have been held in the first place. Indeed, the idea of conditioning elections on the lifting of sanctions was not far-fetched. A year before the elections, Maduro, in a reference to the United States, declared: “If they want free elections, we want elections free of sanctions.” Subsequently, Elvis Amoroso, the Chavista head of the nation’s electoral council, tied the participation of European Union electoral observers to its lifting of sanctions. At the same time, the Biden administration indicated its willingness to bargain with the Venezuelan government along those lines.

Carlos Ron, a former vice-minister and currently an analyst for Tricontinental, told me that the Chavista leadership ruled out delaying the elections in order to demonstrate its democratic credentials in the face of the international smear campaign. Ron said “At that moment, greater importance was placed on the need to defend the democratic character of the Bolivarian political process and its continuity, and abide by the Constitution, in the face of imperialist pressures.”

Maduro’s intentions may have been commendable. But the decision overlooked one compelling reason to suspend the electoral process. Tying the holding of elections to the removal of the sanctions would have placed the entire blame for setbacks to democracy where it belonged: U.S. intervention in Venezuela’s internal affairs.

In defense of democracy

As a rule, the Left has always championed the defense of democracy. In this sense, the Left’s vision compares favorably with U.S.-style “liberal democracy,” shaped by the influence of big money and other inherently undemocratic practices such as gerrymandering, the Electoral College and voter suppression.

Historically, however, the Left has faced formidable obstacles on this front. For instance, it has come to power in countries like Russia, China and Cuba that were lacking in democratic tradition. That, however, was the least of the problem. Its main problem has been, and continues to be, imperialist hostility which limits options.

Precisely for that reason, the Left needs to tread cautiously in the way it frames the issue of democracy in nations that are in the crosshairs of imperialism. In the three countries discussed in this article, the Left can’t deny that democracy has been infringed upon. The Maduro government, for instance, stripped the PCV – the country’s oldest political party, forged in a history of militant struggle including two periods of clandestine resistance armed struggle in the 1950s and 1960s – of its legal status, transferring recognition to a marginal breakaway faction that appropriated its name and symbols.

Nor can it deny that discontent is currently widespread in the three nations, which became most evident in the Iranian “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests and those of the first days of this year. In Cuba and Venezuela, protests reflect widespread disillusionment, even while the mobilizations have been manipulated and financed from abroad.

One troubling sign in Venezuela is that the disturbances have spread out from upper-middle class neighborhoods where they were confined during the 4-month protests (the “guarimba”) of 2014 and, albeit less so, during those of 2017. The two days following the July 28, 2024 elections, for instance, protests were registered in Caracas barrios such as Petare, the city’s largest. Reflecting on the protests, long-standing Caracas resident and international commentator Phil Gunson reported “Petare is a traditionally Chavista zone, but ever since a few years ago, people have been distancing themselves from the government.”

The Left can’t turn its back on this reality. But nor can it join mainstream voices that channel dissatisfaction into blanket vilification of governments under imperial siege. Rather its line has to be basically: “What do you expect!” In the face of hyper-imperialist aggression these countries are at war, figuratively and in some cases literally speaking. Criticism needs to be framed within this context.

Lenin’s concept of democratic centralism – the principle designed to guide the internal workings of his political party – is instructive. In his writing throughout his political career, party democracy remained a constant, but the degree of centralism depended on the political climate in the nation. Along similar lines, the Left’s adherence to democracy can never be minimized. However, valid criticism of undemocratic practices in countries like Venezuela and Cuba in which the Left is in power needs to consider those actions as overreactions to imperialist aggression.

In this era of intensified hyper-imperialism, the Left is compelled to stand behind nations like Cuba and Venezuela, and recognize that the real blame for backsliding including violation of democratic norms lies with imperialism. The barbaric actions of Trump II are making this imperative clearer than ever.

Steve Ellner is a retired professor of the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela where he lived for over 40 years and is currently Associate Managing Editor of Latin American Perspectives. He is the author and editor of over a dozen books on Latin American politics and history. In 2018 he spoke in over twenty cities in the U.S. and Canada as part of a Venezuelan solidarity tour.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

This article was originally posted in CounterPunch.

Palestine and Israel representatives had been lined up close together at the FIFA Congress in Canada.

Palestinian football federation president Jibril Rajoub refused to stand alongside Israel FA ⁠Vice-President Basim Sheikh ⁠Suliman in a heated moment at the 76th FIFA Congress.

Both men were called to the stand by FIFA President Gianni Infantino at the event on Thursday, but Rajoub ⁠declined to be brought closer to Suliman, a Palestinian citizen of Israel.

Infantino put his hand on Rajoub’s arm and invited him with a gesture to come closer to Suliman, but in ⁠vain.

Asked what Rajoub said when he refused, Palestinian FA Vice President Susan Shalabi, who was in the room, told Reuters: “I cannot shake the hand of someone the Israelis have brought to whitewash their fascism and genocide! We are suffering.”

Israel has denied committing genocide in Gaza.

Infantino ‌then took the stand and said: “We will work together, President Rajoub, Vice President Suliman. Let’s work together to give hope to the children. These are complex matters.”

Speaking to the Reuters news agency after the congress ended, Shalabi said Infantino’s attempt to have Suliman and Rajoub shake hands showed little consideration for the Palestinian FA chief’s speech, in which he made yet another plea for Israeli clubs not to base teams in ⁠the West Bank settlements.

“To be put in a position ⁠where to have a handshake after everything that was said, this negates the whole purpose of the speech that the general [Rajoub] was giving,” she said.

“He spent like 15 minutes trying to explain to everyone how ⁠the rules matter, how this could easily become a precedent where the rights of member associations are violated with impudence, ⁠and then we’ll just wrap this under the carpet. ⁠It was absurd.”

Last week, the Palestinian Football Association (PFA) appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport against FIFA’s decision not to sanction Israel over clubs based in West Bank settlements.

The PFA has long argued that clubs ‌based in settlements in the West Bank – territory Palestinians seek as part of a future state – should not compete in leagues run by the Israel Football Association (IFA).

FIFA said ‌last ‌month it would take no action against the IFA or Israeli clubs, citing the unresolved legal status of the West Bank under public international law.

U.S. President Donald Trump is at an inflection point in the currently paused war in Iran. He is facing a legally mandated deadline tomorrow for seeking Congressional permission to continue the conflict while also reportedly meeting today with Epic Fury’s top general about future strikes. Meanwhile, Iran’s Supreme leader signalled that his country is not willing to give in to Trump’s demands, increasing the chances hostilities could continue.

This is all happening against the backdrop of a shaky ceasefire and stalled negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and continuing closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

A young girl in southern Lebanon joined hundreds mourning her father, one of three paramedics killed in an Israeli “double-tap” strike during the US-brokered ceasefire. At least 95 emergency responders have been killed in Lebanon, a pattern the UN says may amount to a war crime.

The United States has fallen to a “historic low” in the Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), or Reporters Without Borders, annual press freedom tracker, continuing a decade-long decline, the organisation has said.

The report on Thursday recorded a global drop in press freedom indicators in 2025, with, for the first time, more than half of the world’s countries labelled as “difficult” or “very serious”.

While the US, during the first year of US President Donald Trump’s second term, remained in the “problematic” category, it dropped seven spaces from 57th in the world to 64th. Norway led the list, with Eritrea ranked lowest among 180 countries.

In a statement, Clayton Weimers, executive director of RSF’s North America office, said the US was experiencing a “press freedom crisis”.

“Trump and his administration have carried out a coordinated war on press freedom since the day he took office, and we will live with the consequences for years to come,” he said in a statement.

“Our message is clear: Protect legal rights, ensure accountability for attacks on media professionals, and support independent media to restore American press freedom.”

The report pointed to both Trump administration policies and the wider consolidation of media companies in the US, which critics say opens the door to stifling certain points of view.

That has included Skydance Media’s acquisition of Paramount Global, which includes CBS News. Skydance is owned by David Ellison, whose father, Larry Ellison, is a confidant of Trump’s.

Paramount Skydance is also currently acquiring Warner Bros, which owns CNN.

All told, just six companies control most US media: Comcast, Walt Disney, Warner Bros Discovery, Paramount Skydance, Sony, and Amazon.

While Trump has long had an adversarial relationship with journalists, press freedom observers say the head of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has accelerated pressure on media figures and journalists during the president’s second term.

In March, FCC chair Brendan Carr said he would revoke the licences of broadcasters that are “running hoaxes and news distortions”, and that do not “operate in the public interest” in their reporting on the US-Israel war with Iran. Trump said he was “thrilled” by Carr’s statements.

Carr has also threatened to revoke the licenses of broadcasters for their coverage of Trump’s immigration policies, which critics say can have a chilling effect on local news organisations.

The effort has extended to television talk show hosts, who have been threatened by the FCC over jokes.

Most recently, Carr announced an investigation into several ABC channels.

That came days after the network’s flagship late-night host, Jimmy Kimmel, made a joke about the White House Correspondents Dinner (WHCD).

Kimmel had quipped that First Lady Melania Trump had the “glow of an expectant widow” before the event.

Days later, a gunman attempted to storm the WHCD in Washington, DC, which Trump was attending for the first time. The Trumps later connected Kimmel’s joke to the attack, calling for Kimmel’s firing.

Kimmel has said the joke was about the 79-year-old president and the 56-year-old first lady’s “age difference” and not a call for violence.

Critics of the FCC’s move included Republican Senator Ted Cruz, who said he does “not believe the FCC should operate as the speech police”.

The White House has repeatedly called Trump the most “transparent” president in US history, pointing to his regular news conferences.

The visit of King Charles III to the United States comes at a time of visible tension between Washington and London. His meetings with Donald Trump and symbolic engagements linked to the anniversary of the United States Declaration of Independence highlight Britain’s effort to preserve a relationship that has faced increasing political strain. Rather than seeking immediate policy breakthroughs, the visit underscores a broader diplomatic strategy focused on long term stability.

Worst tensions in decades
Relations between the US and the United Kingdom are being described by analysts as the most difficult since the Suez Crisis. Disagreements over global conflicts, defence commitments, and rhetoric from Washington have created friction not only with Britain but also with other European allies.

Political differences driving the strain
Tensions have been sharpened by clashes between President Trump and Keir Starmer, particularly over foreign policy decisions such as Britain’s stance on the Iran conflict. Criticism from Washington, alongside broader disagreements within alliances like NATO, has added to the sense of divergence.

Role of royal soft power
King Charles III’s visit is less about direct political negotiation and more about reinforcing deeper ties. Through speeches, public appearances, and outreach beyond government circles, the monarch is aiming to remind Americans of the longstanding cultural, security, and historical links between the two nations. His address to Congress and symbolic messaging emphasise shared values while subtly encouraging cooperation and openness.

Beyond politics to public diplomacy
The visit targets not just policymakers but the American public. By engaging across different states and institutions, the British monarchy is working to sustain goodwill that can outlast any single administration. This reflects a strategy of insulating the broader relationship from short term political tensions.

Questioning the special relationship
The idea of a “special relationship,” first popularised by Winston Churchill, is increasingly being reassessed. Some British officials argue the term feels outdated in a changing global order, where alliances are more transactional and expectations around defence and economic contributions are rising.

Analysis
The UK’s approach reveals a calculated reliance on continuity rather than confrontation. With limited leverage over US policy decisions, London is using soft power to maintain influence and access. The monarchy provides a unique diplomatic channel that operates above partisan politics, allowing Britain to keep communication lines open even during periods of disagreement.

However, this strategy has limits. Symbolism cannot fully offset structural tensions such as defence spending gaps, diverging foreign policy priorities, or shifting global power dynamics. While royal diplomacy can ease atmospherics, it cannot substitute for alignment at the governmental level.

In the longer term, the visit illustrates Britain’s recognition that its global role depends heavily on sustaining strong ties with Washington, even in less favourable political conditions. By playing a long game, the UK is attempting to ensure that current strains do not permanently weaken one of its most important strategic partnerships.

With information from Reuters.

The conflict involving Iran and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz have shaken global energy markets. Supply constraints and extreme volatility have driven oil prices sharply higher, exposing a growing structural divide in how major oil companies operate across the Atlantic.

European majors profit from trading strength
Companies such as BP, Shell, and TotalEnergies have benefited from strong oil trading performance. Their global trading networks allow them to move crude and refined products across regions, taking advantage of price differences created by supply disruptions.

These firms trade volumes far exceeding their own production, turning volatility into profit. In the current crisis, trading has significantly boosted earnings, offsetting weaker performance in other segments.

Volatility creates both gains and exposure
The sharp rise in Brent crude prices and market instability has created lucrative arbitrage opportunities. Companies have rerouted fuel shipments across longer and unusual routes to capture higher margins.

However, these strategies come with risks. Trading at such scale requires large amounts of capital, and holding cargoes for extended periods increases financial exposure if market conditions shift.

Trading as a shock absorber
For European majors, trading divisions have acted as a buffer during the crisis. Losses from disrupted production or regional exposure have been partially offset by gains in trading, highlighting the strategic importance of these operations in volatile markets.

US majors rely on production strength
In contrast, Exxon Mobil and Chevron focus primarily on large scale oil and gas production. Their output significantly exceeds that of European rivals, giving them a strong advantage when prices rise.

While they have more limited trading operations, their upstream strength allows them to generate substantial cash flow in high price environments without relying heavily on market arbitrage.

Structural differences in strategy
The divergence reflects long term strategic choices. European companies invested more heavily in renewables and diversified energy portfolios, which limited growth in their upstream production. US firms, by contrast, maintained a strong focus on expanding oil and gas output.

As a result, European majors depend more on trading to drive returns, while US majors depend on production scale.

Analysis
The Iran war has highlighted a clear split in the global energy industry between trading focused and production focused business models. European majors have shown that strong trading capabilities can generate significant profits during periods of disruption, effectively turning volatility into an advantage.

However, this model is inherently unpredictable. Trading gains depend on market conditions and may not be sustainable if volatility declines. In contrast, the US model offers more stable returns tied directly to production levels and commodity prices.

In the long term, this divide could shape investor perceptions and valuations. If European companies continue to rely heavily on trading while lagging in production, the gap between them and US rivals may widen. The industry is increasingly defined by a fundamental question: whether it is more profitable to move oil around the world or to produce it at scale.

With information from Reuters.

Driven by a race to get ahead of quickly evolving enemy capabilities, the U.S. Navy is now aiming to enter the next step of contracting for its 6th-generation crewed fighter – known as F/A-XX – by August. Despite intervention from Congress, the next-generation carrier-based fighter has remained in limbo since the Pentagon moved to effectively shelve the program last year.

That’s according to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Daryl Caudle, who spoke with reporters Monday at the Sea-Air-Space 2026 exposition near Washington, D.C. In response to a question from TWZ, Caudle acknowledged the uncertainty that has kept F/A-XX in a holding pattern, even as the Air Force’s future fighter, dubbed the F-47, has forged ahead. The current competitors for the F/A-XX are Boeing, which is also the F-47’s prime contractor, and Northrop Grumman.

“One of the challenges we’re seeing is, not only [are] our peer competitors improving their capability for anti-air, either air-to-air or surface-to-air, but the lower cost of entry of very capable weapons is also making more players on the field in which that level of stealth and technology is required,” Caudle, the Navy’s top officer, said. “So this is not about the need for a peer adversary. This is just having an aircraft that can operate with a level of uncertainty and with the acceptable level of risk.”

This is in line with arguments Caudle made in favor of moving ahead of F/A-XX in January, where he cited growing threats posed by smaller nation-state adversaries, including Iran, as well as non-state actors.

Today, Caudle again emphasized that he nevertheless had been “very vocal” on the need for a carrier-based next-generation fighter, and had expressed “many times” to Deputy Secretary of War Steve Feinberg that the service had to secure the aircraft. It’s important, Caudle said, for both the future carrier air wing and collaboration and planning with the MQ-25 Stingray, the Boeing-made carrier refueling drone set to reach initial operational capability later this year.

“It ties to our MQ-25 for stealth refueling. It ties to our reach. It ties to the work we’re doing for making the carrier air wing something that remains very effective into the future based on the range in which you can operate safely,” Caudle said. “So the need’s clearly there.”

MQ-25A Stingray first taxi test

While it was recently reported that the Navy, bolstered by funding from Congress for the new F/A-XX, planned to award a contract for the program by year end, Caudle said August was now the likely timeframe.

As noted, the Pentagon had moved to essentially shelve F/A-XX in its Fiscal Year 2026 budget request, with the Navy only requesting a relatively meager $74 million for the program. U.S. officials said at the time this decision had been driven largely by concerns about the ability of the U.S. industrial base to support work on two sixth-generation fighters, the other being the F-47, simultaneously.

Congress subsequently interceded, appropriating $1.69 billion for F/A-XX through a combination of regular spending bills and the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. From a budgetary perspective, the Navy’s next-generation fighter program remains well behind the F-47, which has already received billions in funding and could be in line to get approximately $5 billion more in Fiscal Year 2027. The Navy only appears to be requesting an additional $140 million for its new carrier-based combat jet in the $1.5 trillion proposed defense budget for the next fiscal cycle.

“We’ve got a lot of airframes out there. We’ve got an F-35 program. We’ve got a F-47 program. You know, we’re still building the [F/A-18 Super Hornet] … there’s a lot of airplanes being built,” Adm. Caudle said today. “The Air Force has got a lot of demand on the system. The Navy’s got a lot of demand … One of the contractors who would make this plane for us is in a place where they really can’t deliver in the timeframe we need it. So there was, you know, a check twice, cut once, kind of mentality here on this decision. And now there, I think we’re all on the same page on the reason why the hard look needed to be done. I’m good with it.”

As noted, Boeing and Northrop Grumman are in competition to produce the F/A-XX, a program that first took shape as a Navy request for information in 2012. An earlier down-select reportedly eliminated Lockheed Martin in March 2025. Last August, Northrop Grumman released a rendering of its concept for the aircraft, showing a streamlined nose and landing gear on the front of a carrier with the tagline, “Project Power Anywhere.” Boeing’s concept, released the same month, drew visual comparisons to its F-47 Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter for the Air Force.

Citing classification, Adm. Caudle said today he couldn’t provide any information on design or payload details that give the Navy confidence in pursuing F/A-XX despite the adversary threats he mentioned. However, he suggested speed was increasingly essential to having a chance at maintaining overmatch.

“We monitor very closely, red-team that very hard, and assess that threat with a predicted trajectory of whether or not the existing designs we’ve seen will still overmatch that,” he said. “So I think we’re okay there, but we do know that our existing airframes could become vulnerable to some of those threats by the time [it’s fielded] … because it takes time to deliver that, that our existing airframes could be vulnerable to some of those threats, and we want to make sure the air wing of the future can still participate.”

Despite Caudle’s comments today, it should be remembered that this is not the first time that major progress on the Navy’s next-gen fighter has supposedly been imminent. Last October, Reuters reported the program had been greenlighted by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, with a contract expected to follow in short order. 

Aside from funding moves from Congress to ensure the survival of the F/A-XX program, no public steps have been taken to advance the program since.

Contact the editor: Tyler@twz.com

The U.S. Marine Corps wants to field its first conventional takeoff and landing Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones in 2029, and is also looking at the possibility of fielding similar drones with short takeoff and landing capabilities. The news comes soon after the service outlined its plans for Kratos’ XQ-58 Valkyrie, and potentially other CCAs, to be paired with its F-35s as a “bridge” to an entire family of next-generation air combat capabilities, which could include a sixth-generation crewed fighter. You can read more about the implications of that in our previous coverage.

Updates on the latest developments within the Marine Corps’ CCA program were provided by Col. Scott Shadforth, a program manager for the Expeditionary and Maritime Aviation Advanced Development Team (XMA-ADT), at the annual Modern Day Marine conference in Washington, D.C., at which TWZ is in attendance.

The Corps’ CCA efforts currently fall under a program called Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Uncrewed Expeditionary Tactical Aircraft (MUX TACAIR). The MAGTF is the primary organizing concept around which the service deploys air and ground forces.

Shadforth defines the CCA program as “how the Marine Corps is going after increasing the lethality of existing and future tactical aircraft in a high-threat environment.”

The MUX TACAIR effort emerged out of a previous effort that the Marine Corps War Fighting Lab sponsored as part of a Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This earlier program was known as the Penetrating Affordable Autonomous Collaborative Killer — Portfolio (PAACK-P).

The Marine Corps is kicking off its CCA efforts with a landing gear-equipped version of the XQ-58. In contrast, the previous PAACK-P program involved the rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) variant of the XQ-58. Meanwhile, the MQ-58 designation refers to Marine-specific variants of Kratos’ Valkyrie now in development, although it remains unclear how official this is. 

As Shadforth explained, under MUX TACAIR, the Marine Corps is attempting to answer the question: “How do we take that essential [XQ-58] airframe itself and turn it into a conventional takeoff and landing [CTOL] platform so that it’s reusable at a higher rate?”

The OSD effort involved four flights of the XQ-58, culminating in the fall of 2024. At the beginning of this month, the Marine Corps completed a risk-reduction flight involving XQ-58 payloads and integration at China Lake.

Up to this point, the tests have all involved RATO variants of the XQ-58, but the Marines are targeting a first flight using conventional takeoff and landing sometime in the mid- to late summer of this year.

Shadforth confirmed that the “ultimate goal” for the MQ-58 effort is to get its hands on “deliverable prototypes” in the summer of 2029. In an ideal case, he added, these would be delivered to VMX-1 in Yuma, “so the Marine Corps can actually get their hands on the aircraft and fly the aircraft in a tactical environment and develop the CONOPS for how they’re actually going to employ those.”

VMX-1, or Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One, has multiple aircraft types in its inventory and is responsible for tests and evaluations of all types of Marine aircraft and associated systems, while assisting in the creation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). You can read more about its work here.

MUX TACAIR doesn’t start and end with the MQ-58, however.

Shadforth said that the Marine Corps is currently exploring further MUX TACAIR options with “several vendors,” including General Atomics and Anduril. Meanwhile, the branch is also working with Northrop Grumman as part of the MQ-58 effort.

As to how the CTOL MQ-58 will be best integrated with the fleet of Marine Corps F-35Bs, which feature short takeoff and landing (STOVL) at the heart of their capabilities, this is something the service is still weighing up.

According to Shadforth, the Marine Corps “is always going to be interested” in finding ways for fixed-wing aircraft to operate from shorter runways, suggesting that a STOVL-type CCA could well be part of its future plans. Of course, a return to the RATO-capable MQ-58 could be one way of achieving this.

For now, the Marine CCA effort is squarely focused on the CTOL variant of the Valkyrie, but Shadforth said that it’s also looking toward the future, including “other vendor offerings, whether they exist in reality or not, that remove the need for landing gear.” CCAs that offer either runway independence or that are able to operate from shorter or improvised airstrips represent a capability “the Marine Corps will be interested in exploring,” Shadforth added. One obvious candidate here would be the X-BAT, the jet-powered autonomous stealth ‘fighter’ drone designed to take off vertically and land the same way, tail first, after completing its mission. 

At this point, it should be recalled that Kratos said earlier this year that the CTOL version of the Valkyrie being developed for the Marines will still be able to make rocket-assisted takeoffs from static launchers. This means the drone will retain a valuable degree of runway independence, though it will have to touch down on a runway at the end of its sortie.

Before that, Kratos also unveiled a special launch trolley that allows variants of the XQ-58 without landing gear to take off from traditional runways, though not land back on them, as seen in the video below.

Kratos Valkyrie Trolley Launch System

An aircraft with some kind of STOVL capabilities “just kind of opens up the world to us, where we don’t need 7,000-, 8,000-, 9,000-, or 10,000-foot paved runways. Those are always capabilities that we’re interested in,” Shadforth said.

Overall, this is a somewhat surprising route, considering that the XQ-58 in its basic form is already runway independent. This would suggest the Marines, in the future, are looking specifically for something that combines STOVL performance with faster sortie rates. After all, the XQ-58 also requires some infrastructure for that and requires a reset time. A STOVL or VTOL type of CCA would also be able to deploy and operate alongside the F-35B more seamlessly.

“As far as how CCA is envisioned integrating with existing STOVL-type platforms, the Marine Corps is kind of on the front end right now of getting CCA out to the operational forces. A lot of that’s going to come through experimentation and evaluation. As we target the 2029 timeframe to get prototypes out to VMX-1, part of their mission set is going to be: now we’ve physically got these things, how are we actually going to employ them with the various tactical aircraft we have available?” he continued.

As well as the STOVL F-35Bs, these tactical aircraft include CTOL/carrier-capable F-35Cs and potentially legacy F/A-18 Hornets, as well as other Joint Force capabilities.

Shadforth continued: “Those are issues that are going to have to be explored and experimented with for how we’re going to see how those CCAs are going to operate. The point being there’s no set solution at the moment.”

In terms of missions, the Marine Corps is initially focusing MUX TACAIR on an “electronic warfare type platform,” Shadforth said. “Those are the payloads we’re interested in looking at at the moment.”

XQ-58A Valkyrie Demonstrator Inaugural Flight

But Shadforth confirmed that other efforts with different vendors are exploring how to use the space within the Valkyrie air vehicle to see what other payloads and capabilities are available to the Marine Corps. Not only usefulness but timeliness are important factors here, Shadforth added.

Kratos is known to be working on a miniature cruise missile called Ragnarok, which the XQ-58 can carry in its internal bay and externally under its wings, and you can read more about it here. Renderings have also shown Valkyries with AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) under their wings. The drone can carry Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) internally, and has demonstrated drone launch — launched effects are therefore almost certain to be included for the electronic warfare mission.

Within all this, it is important to remember that, at this point, the Marine CCA effort is still very much in the prototyping phase, led by the MQ-58. As Shadforth noted, the service has “not entered into a specific acquisition-type construct yet,” beyond developing these prototypes. Nevertheless, with a timeline now in place to get the first MQ-58s to Yuma, and with conventional takeoff and landing trials expected in the next few months, MUX TACAIR reflects the overall acceleration of the Corps’ CCA program.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

In international politics, the platforms a country sits on often matter as much as what it says. For decades, Somalia was largely the subject of global security discussions, rarely a decisive participant in them. Today, that reality is changing in ways that carry symbolic weight and practical consequences.

Somalia’s recent election to the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), alongside its membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), marks a turning point in its diplomatic trajectory. For quite some time, Somalia was merely being discussed in the world’s most influential security forums. It is now shaping the agenda on the table.

This shift reflects more than a procedural achievement. It signals the maturity of Somalia’s diplomatic and security institutions, and the steady rebuilding of its international credibility after decades of conflict and state fragility.

For much of the past three decades, decisions affecting Somalia’s security were often made in rooms where Somali voices were either absent or marginal. External actors debated intervention strategies, sanctions regimes, peacekeeping mandates, and humanitarian responses, while Somalia struggled with internal instability.

This membership in the UNSC and AU PSC changes that dynamic fundamentally. These bodies are not symbolic; they make binding decisions, adopt resolutions, authorise peacekeeping operations, and shape international legal frameworks. For Somalia, this may seem something simple, but its impact is profound. Somalia is now part of the process that determines policies affecting its own security and development.

That participation strengthens state-building in several ways. It reinforces institutional capacity within Somalia’s foreign policy apparatus, promotes transparency and accountability through engagement with multilateral norms, and aligns Somalia more closely with international legal and diplomatic standards.

Somalia is transitioning from being a recipient of international decisions to becoming a contributor to them. Somalia’s role on these councils also carries representational significance beyond its own borders.

As a member of the UNSC and AU PSC, Somalia now occupies a rare diplomatic position. It simultaneously represents the interests of the African continent, the Arab and Muslim world, and the least developed countries (LDCs). The concerns of these categories of states have often been overshadowed by the priorities of more powerful nations. Somalia now stands for them.

Somalia’s own first experience in rebuilding institutions after conflict, managing complex security transitions, and balancing sovereignty with international cooperation enables it to advocate not only for itself, but also for broader principles: Inclusive peace processes, sustainable development approaches to security, and equitable participation in global decision-making.

Peace in the world, peace at home

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s 2022 political manifesto, “Somalia at peace with itself, and at peace with the world”, is increasingly reflected in these recent memberships. This vision is proving effective, as Somalia’s participation in global peace decision-making demonstrates a growing alignment between its external engagements and internal stabilisation efforts.

The seats at the UNSC and AU PSC will directly reinforce Somalia’s state-building process. Active involvement in shaping international peace also reflects and supports the way peace and security agendas are being handled domestically.

A defining moment in 2026

The year 2026 represents a rare convergence of opportunity. Somalia’s simultaneous presence at the AU PSC and UNSC provides a diplomatic platform unmatched in its recent history. This dual role should enable it to act as a bridge between regional and global security frameworks. It can ensure that Somalia’s security priorities are reflected in the AU decision, and forwardly, that African priorities are reflected in global resolutions. It can also translate international commitments into regional actions that qualify for alignment with local contexts.

This not only affects diplomacy and policy discussions but offers an opportunity to advocate for real change that directly affects the daily lives of Somalis. Such issues may include counterterrorism, stabilisation support, humanitarian access, development financing, climate security, and mechanisms for inclusive politics. By shaping the content and direction of relevant resolutions, Somalia can help align international commitments more closely with national priorities.

A future shaped by participation

With greater influence comes greater responsibility. Membership in these councils demands consistency and adherence to international norms. Somalia is now ready to navigate these complex diplomatic landscapes, balancing national interests with collective global security obligations. And it is now capable of maintaining credibility through constructive engagement, principled positions, and reliable partnerships.

With Somalia now seemingly committed to momentum on these fronts, its growing international stance will become self-reinforcing. Each diplomatic success will strengthen national institutions, which in turn will enhance future influence.

Somalia’s presence at the highest levels of global and regional security governance marks a significant milestone in its long journey towards recovery and stability. It reflects years of diplomatic effort, institutional rebuilding, and gradual restoration of international trust. It also signals a future in which Somalia is increasingly defined not by crisis, but by stability.

For a country that once stood on the margins of global decision-making, this transformation is both historic and hopeful. It signals a shift from isolation to engagement, from being acted upon to helping shape outcomes.

For young Somali generations who grew up hearing that Somalia could not advance, these diplomatic achievements offer a different narrative. They inspire pride, restore confidence, and help rebuild trust in the nation’s future.

That challenge lies ahead. But after a period of turmoil, Somalia is well positioned to meet it, not as a passive observer, but as an active shaper of its own destiny. This is also part of the broader Somalia policy on defence diplomacy, founded on global collaboration and mutual interdependency.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Freedom of the press around the world has fallen to its lowest level in a quarter of a century, according to the leading Paris-based press freedom NGO, Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), or Reporters Without Borders.

Every year, RSF publishes a World Press Freedom Index used to compare the level of freedom enjoyed by journalists and media outlets in 180 countries. Its ranking uses a five-point scale to assess a country’s level of press freedom, ranging from “very serious” to “good”.

For the first time since RSF started producing the index in 2002, more than half of the world’s countries fall into the “difficult” or “very serious” categories for press freedom – “a clear sign that journalism is increasingly criminalised worldwide”.

Only seven mostly Nordic countries are ranked with “good” press freedom, with Norway, the Netherlands and Estonia in the top three. France ranks 25th with a “satisfactory” score, while the United States ranks 64th with a “problematic” score, falling seven places since President Donald Trump took office.

RSF reports that Trump “has turned his repeated attacks on the press and journalists into a systematic policy”, citing the detention of Salvadoran journalist Mario Guevara, who was later deported, while he was documenting a protest against immigration raids, as well as the suspension of several notable public media institutions.

In Latin America, RSF highlighted the dramatic fall of Javier Milei’s Argentina (98th, -11) and of El Salvador (143rd), which has dropped 105 places since 2014 following the launch of a war against the Maras criminal gangs.

The press freedom NGO said that “Eastern Europe and the Middle East are the two most dangerous regions for journalists in the world, as they have been for 25 years”, notably putting Russia (172nd) and Iran (177th) in the bottom 10.

It added that wars and restrictions on access to information are some of the driving factors for the decline in press freedom. It cited Israel’s attacks on journalists in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and Lebanon as an example of this, ranking Israel 116th.

“Since October 2023, more than 220 journalists have been killed in Gaza by the Israeli army, including at least 70 who were slain while carrying out their work,” it said.

Broadly speaking, RSF reported that “the criminalisation of journalism, which is rooted in circumventing press law and misusing emergency legislation and common law, is proving to be a global phenomenon”.

It reported that more than 60 percent of countries – 110 out of 180 – have criminalised media workers in various ways, notably citing India (157th), Egypt (169th), Georgia (135th), Turkiye (163rd) and Hong Kong (140th) as prime examples of state-imposed crackdowns.

“Although attacks on the right to information are more diverse and sophisticated, their perpetrators are now operating in plain sight,” Anne Bocande, RSF’s Editorial Director said.

She cited “authoritarian states, complicit or incompetent political powers, predatory economic actors and under-regulated online platforms” as the main causes “for the global decline in press freedom”.

Bocande called on democratic governments and citizens to do more to end this global criminalisation of journalists, particularly through “firm guarantees and meaningful sanctions”.

“Current protection mechanisms are not strong enough; international law is being undermined and impunity is rife,” she said. “Inaction is a form of endorsement,” while concluding that “the spread of authoritarianism isn’t inevitable”.

UN experts said Wednesday that reconstruction in the Gaza Strip cannot succeed without ending Israel’s occupation and ensuring rebuilding efforts are rooted in human rights and Palestinian self-determination, Anadolu reports.

“The occupation must end, and the dispossession and discrimination against Palestinians must stop if rebuilding is to have any real chance of success,” the experts said in a statement.

Citing the Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, they said more than 371,000 housing units have been destroyed or damaged, 1.9 million people displaced, and over 60% of the population remains homeless, with reconstruction needs estimated at more than $71 billion.

“The data confirms a pattern of structural discrimination that reconstruction efforts must urgently correct rather than reproduce,” they said, warning that women, persons with disabilities and older people face disproportionate hardship.

The experts said reconstruction must be inclusive, participatory, transparent and accountable, with Palestinians shaping decisions in line with their right to self-determination under international law.

READ: Former US official accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza, says Washington is complicit

They raised questions about governance of the process, saying the assessment does not address who would oversee reconstruction or whether the proposed “Board of Peace” by US President Donald Trump is consistent with international law.

The experts are also concerned that the assessment does not sufficiently embed human rights principles, warning that an emphasis on financial needs and infrastructure could reduce housing to mere shelter provision rather than ensuring dignity, security and long-term sustainability.

They said reconstruction could become “a race for profits” without safeguards protecting vulnerable groups.

“Reconstruction is not only about rebuilding structures – it is about restoring rights, dignity and equality,” they said.

They urged states and donors to place human rights at the center of Gaza’s reconstruction, warning failure to do so “risks entrenching injustice and prolonging the suffering of Palestinians for generations.”

READ: Israeli court extends detention of Gaza hospital director Abu Safiya ‘without charges’

Deliveries of the CH-53K King Stallion to the U.S. Marine Corps are starting to ramp up, with the planned 16-aircraft annual milestone now expected for Fiscal Year 2029. The Marine Corps also says that, for the future, they are open to developing a mine countermeasures version, something that would be able to replace the current MH-53E.

Updates on the latest developments within the Marine Corps’ CH-53K program were today provided by Col. Kate Fleeger, a program manager for the H-53 Helicopters Program, at the annual Modern Day Marine conference in Washington, D.C., at which TWZ is in attendance.

Fleeger confirmed that, while the legacy CH-53E and MH-53E are “both still healthy and viable” and critical components of the Marine Corps fleet, the focus is now very much on the CH-53K as the future of heavy lift.

Currently, four Marine Corps squadrons have CH-53Ks as part of their stable, and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461), which was the first fleet squadron, is fully outfitted with Kilos.

“We also have our training squadron, HMHT-302, which has received multiple CH-53Ks and will continue to be a dual type/model series training squadron throughout the transition from the Echo to the Kilo,” Fleeger explained. “We also have the CH-53K in our developmental test squadron, HX-21 at Patuxent River, and with our operational test squadron, VMX-1, in Yuma, Arizona.”

With the CH-53K “rocking and rolling across the board,” the 25th example off the Sikorsky production line in Stratford, Connecticut, was delivered earlier this week. Fleeger said that the service expects to add another eight aircraft for the rest of the year. This is part of a total Marine Corps program of record of 200 aircraft, a figure that has not changed. On top of this figure, Israel has procured 12 CH-53Ks, and Fleeger confirmed that the country is “in conversations” about the potential for additional aircraft.

As part of ongoing training work, HMH-461 has been putting the CH-53K through its paces “in every clime and place in CONUS,” Fleeger said. This has included taking the aircraft on detachments at the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) school in Yuma, and in exercises out of Twentynine Palms, California.

Fleeger said she is “extremely happy with how the aircraft is performing” with the operational fleet.

Meanwhile, the CH-53K is also still being tested, with the two units covering operational and developmental tests. “We are continuing to expand the envelope of the baseline aircraft that’s been delivered to the fleet, whether it’s expansion of the envelope with the existing equipment, or whether it’s modifications that allow for additional capability moving forward, and ultimately providing those modifications to fleet aircraft,” Fleeger explained.

Part of the recent mission expansion saw one CH-53K lifted by another example of the same type, to broaden options for the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel, or TRAP mission. The aircraft that was lifted had its gear boxes and engines removed, but this is common practice, Fleeger said. The purpose of the test was not only to set up and document the flight characteristics, but also the rigging procedures. In the test, the aircraft that provided the sling load weighed about 28,000 pounds, which is well below the 36,000 pounds maximum external load for the CH-53K.

“When you talk to the pilots that lift something like that, even something that heavy, there’s very little ‘feel’ in the cockpit that you have a significant load underneath,” she added.

One of the other elements of additional testing has involved aviation ground fuel delivery. This involved a CH-53K landing with fuel and then providing this fuel to a V-22 tiltrotor that landed next to it.

At the same time, the transition to the CH-53K has involved training pilots with four Containerized Flight Training Devices (CFTD) now delivered. “They are state-of-the-art, fully immersive environments that have some of the highest fidelity visual databases and digital acuity that you’ll see in flight simulation today,” Fleeger said.

“The pilots have every opportunity to see exactly what’s going to happen in the aircraft before they even get in the aircraft. The idea here is the first time a pilot sits in that cockpit on the flight line is kind of a non-event, because he’s basically seen everything he needs to see along the way.”

These new CFTDs consist of a mobile box with the “guts of the simulator inside.” As Fleeger explained, “Gone are the days of the big dome, fully motion-based simulators that we’ve had previously. The motion platform is no longer a big portion of what provides the training fidelity. The majority of that fidelity actually comes from the visual systems, the realism of the visual system, and the haptic cueing to the pilots.

Another training aid is the Advanced Aviation Training Device, or AATD, new for the H-53 community, but loosely based on some of the early developmental training systems that arrived with the V-22, with its interactive cockpit learning environment.

“This is a lower fidelity,” Fleeger said, “There’s just screens, computer monitors, if you will, that show the pilot the outside visuals. But the pilot also has a see-through virtual-reality goggle set that he puts on. It’s absolutely amazing technology that really allows you, with very little additional cost, to be able to get that immersive and simulated environment.”

The AATD is designed primarily as a familiarization training device or for refresher-level training. “You got a few minutes, you go spend some time in here,” Fleeger explained. “You brush up on some stuff. It can also be used for some of the more advanced activities, like tactics, techniques, and procedures development. You can get in there and try some things out before you get to the aircraft and do it in the real world.”

The AATD has been so successful at its current location in New River, close to the training squadron, that the Marines expect to expand throughout the rest of the fleet as it works through the CH-53K transition.

Concurrently, Fleeger says the service has been “very forward-leaning with our Marines in the maintenance shed and making sure that they have the training tools that they need in order to prepare for a state-of-the-art, very data-intensive, data-rich aircraft.”

Maintenance of the fleet benefits from a fully condition-based maintenance model, at least for some of the CH-53K’s components.

“We can look at the vibratory signatures, the temperature signatures on gearboxes, for example, and we can understand when that gearbox might be approaching the end of its life.” The result is that the fleet is increasingly able to manage the maintenance rather than having the maintenance manage them. They can decide when they want to change that gearbox, for example, depending on operational commitments, the amount of flight time they may have planned, the criticality of that flight time, the availability of spares, and so on.

All of this training, including shipboard evolutions, is building up toward the first operational deployment, with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, in Fiscal Year 2027. Last month, the CH-53K fleet hit 10,000 fleet flight hours, a big milestone considering there are currently only 25 aircraft in the fleet.

At this stage, there are 12 aircraft sitting on the production line in Stratford, in various phases of completion.

“The fact that there are 12 aircraft is a big improvement as we move forward in the ramp-up through low-rate initial production,” Fleeger explained.

Once Sikorsky hits the milestone of 16 production aircraft per year, this will trigger the start of the Marine Corps CH-53K transition from East Coast to West Coast, and thus across the entire heavy-lift fleet.

Fleeger said that the line will be “getting up there” toward full-rate production at the end of Fiscal Year 2028, with the milestone to be achieved in FY29.

“The East Coast squadrons will complete transition, and then the transition plan will move out to the West Coast, and we will start transitioning the West Coast squadrons there as well,” Fleeger added. The CH-53E is slated to be retired in 2032.

As for the Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon, it is slated to be withdrawn in 2027. Exactly what will happen with its primary airborne mine countermeasures mission, a general capability set that is increasingly in the spotlight, is unclear. Currently, the Navy is beefing its MH-60 Seahawk mine countermeasures capabilities to help offset the loss. Still, the unique heavy countermeasures sled-towing capability that will be gone when the MH-53E leaves the inventory is likely to be felt, as will the heaviest vertical lift capability organic to the U.S. Navy.

According to Fleeger, “there have not yet been conversations about the Navy procuring the CH-53K or producing a minesweeping variant.” However, she added that “we are certainly open to that in the future, should that need arise.”

Whether or not the CH-53K eventually adopts another new mission, the type is clearly keeping busy for the time being, as the Marine Corps looks forward to taking it on its first operational deployment next year.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Fifty-nine years of membership, ended with a statement on a Tuesday and an effective date of Friday. The United Arab Emirates announced it will exit OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1, citing national interests, its evolving energy profile, and a long-term strategic vision that no longer aligns with the organization’s direction. The Energy Minister did not consult Saudi Arabia before making the announcement. He did not raise the issue with any other member country. He simply said the time had come. 

The timing tells the whole story. OPEC was preparing to meet in Vienna on Wednesday when the news landed. The Iran war had already wiped out 7.88 million barrels per day of OPEC’s production in March alone, resulting in the biggest supply collapse for the producers’ group in recent decades, surpassing even the 2020 Covid shock and the 1970s oil crisis. The UAE had been absorbing Iranian drone and missile attacks for weeks. The Strait of Hormuz, through which the UAE ships its own oil, has been functionally closed or severely restricted since early March. And sitting across the OPEC table was Iran, the country that had been targeting UAE infrastructure repeatedly, and Russia, which had been a steadfast partner to Iran throughout the conflict.

Walking out was not an impulsive decision. It was the logical conclusion of a calculation that had been building for years.

Why Abu Dhabi Was Already Done With OPEC 

The UAE’s frustration with OPEC production quotas is not new. The quotas have capped UAE output at around 3.2 million barrels per day, while the country has the ambition and the capacity to produce closer to 5 million barrels per day by 2027, suggesting production could almost double without OPEC’s constraints. For a country that has invested heavily in expanding ADNOC’s capacity and has the infrastructure to back it up, being told by a cartel committee how much it can produce has become an increasingly poor trade. 

The UAE’s sovereign wealth fund is so large that its economy is now more significantly tied to global economic growth than to the global price of oil. That shift in economic identity matters enormously for understanding why OPEC membership has become structurally uncomfortable. OPEC exists to keep oil prices elevated through production discipline. The UAE increasingly benefits from a growing global economy that demands more energy, more investment, and more trade, all of which are better served by producing at full capacity and building relationships with the countries that need what Abu Dhabi has to sell. 

An energy industry source familiar with the decision said the UAE felt it was “the right time to leave” and that “this decision is good for consumers and good for the world,” adding that the UAE would gradually increase production to supply global markets once freedom of navigation is restored in the Strait of Hormuz. The framing is deliberate. The UAE is not positioning itself as a cartel defector but as a responsible producer responding to a global energy emergency, which is a considerably more defensible diplomatic position. 

The Saudi Rupture Running Underneath It All

The official UAE statement was carefully worded, full of appreciation for “brothers and friends within the group” and “the highest respect for the Saudis for leading OPEC.” None of that diplomatic courtesy changes the underlying reality, which is that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been on a collision course for some time and the OPEC exit is the most visible expression of that tension yet.

The two countries had joined a coalition to fight the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, but that coalition broke down into open recriminations in late December when Saudi Arabia bombed what it described as a weapons shipment bound for UAE-backed Yemeni separatists. That incident was the visible rupture of a relationship that had been quietly fraying for years over economic competition, differing visions for regional leadership, and diverging approaches to normalization, China, and the post-war order. Within OPEC, the two countries have clashed repeatedly over quota allocations, with the UAE consistently arguing it deserves a larger share based on its expanded capacity. 

The OPEC exit does not resolve any of those tensions. It sidesteps them entirely, which is probably the more elegant solution. By leaving, the UAE removes itself from a framework where Saudi Arabia holds dominant influence and gains the freedom to pursue its own production and partnership strategy without needing Riyadh’s agreement. That is a significant shift in the regional power dynamic, and it happened without a single confrontational statement.

What Remains of OPEC Now 

The UAE’s exit could prompt other members to follow suit, with analysts pointing to Kazakhstan as another significant producer that wants to grow beyond its current quota constraints. “If there is a time to leave, now is the time,” one Dubai-based energy consultant told CNN. 

The cartel’s power has always rested on a specific mechanism: spare production capacity held back from the market to stabilize prices. That spare capacity is concentrated almost entirely in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with the other nine member countries possessing little to none. Removing the UAE from that equation means OPEC’s effective spare capacity narrows considerably, and the burden of price stabilization falls almost entirely on Riyadh and Kuwait City. Saudi Arabia will hold an even greater share of the cartel’s remaining leverage, but leverage over a smaller and weaker institution is not the same as leverage over a healthy one.

OPEC has lost members before, but the UAE is a much larger producer than previous departures, and its absence may over time pose an existential risk to the cartel’s sustainability. The organization that has shaped global energy politics since 1960 is now facing its most significant structural test, and it is doing so while simultaneously dealing with a historic supply shock from the Iran war, a closed strait, and a global economy pricing in the possibility that the disruption is not temporary. 

The Geopolitical Implications

Freed from production quotas, the UAE’s most immediate strategic move is likely to deepen its relationship with the countries that need its oil most urgently, and China sits at the top of that list. More production could help the UAE improve ties with oil-importing partners such as China, and given the economic damage caused by the Iran war, the prospect of maximizing energy revenues now is undoubtedly attractive to Abu Dhabi. 

The UAE-US relationship also stands to benefit. With the UAE free to leverage its spare capacity in pursuit of its own strategic interests, the move will likely strengthen the UAE-US relationship, particularly in relation to managing the strategic petroleum reserve and responding to the ongoing Hormuz supply shock. Trump has been publicly critical of OPEC for years, accusing the cartel of exploiting American military protection to keep prices artificially high. An OPEC that is smaller and weaker, with a major member now operating independently and aligned with US interests, is a more congenial arrangement from Washington’s perspective. 

For the global energy market, the picture is more complicated. Once the Strait reopens fully and UAE production ramps up without quota constraints, additional supply should exert downward pressure on prices that have been elevated since February. Whether that actually happens depends on a sequence of events, including a durable Iran settlement and the restoration of free navigation through Hormuz, that are still very much in progress.

Our Take: A Geopolitical Move Dressed as an Energy Decision 

The UAE’s OPEC exit is not primarily an energy story. It is a geopolitical statement about where Abu Dhabi sees itself in the emerging regional order, and the answer is: outside the frameworks that no longer serve its interests, and free to build the bilateral relationships that do. The exit from OPEC follows the same strategic logic as the Abraham Accords, the Huawei contracts, the US base agreement, and the China infrastructure ties. The UAE has been running a multi-alignment strategy for years, positioning itself as indispensable to every major power simultaneously, and OPEC membership was becoming a constraint on that strategy rather than an asset.

What happens to OPEC matters for energy markets in the short term. What the UAE’s departure signals about the fracturing of Gulf institutional solidarity matters considerably more for the regional order that everyone in the Middle East is trying to rebuild in the aftermath of a war that nobody fully planned for and nobody has yet fully ended.

The deeper story is what the UAE’s exit reveals about the post-war Middle East taking shape right now. The institutions that governed the region’s energy politics, security arrangements, and diplomatic alignments for decades were built in a different world, one where the Cold War defined choices, where oil producers had unified interests, and where the US sat at the center of every meaningful regional framework. That world is gone. What the Iran war accelerated, and what the UAE’s OPEC exit makes structurally visible, is that the Gulf’s most capable states are no longer willing to subordinate their individual strategic interests to collective frameworks that were designed for a regional order that no longer exists. 

Abu Dhabi did not leave OPEC because of a quota dispute. It left because it has decided that in the world emerging from this war, the countries that move fastest, align most flexibly, and free themselves from inherited institutional constraints are the ones that will define what comes next. Whether that calculation proves correct depends on what the Islamabad talks produce, how quickly the Strait reopens, and whether the ceasefire holds long enough for the region to build something more durable than a pause. But the signal Abu Dhabi sent on Tuesday was unmistakable, and every government in the region heard it.