Dec. 16 (Asia Today) — “Decade of the Spy” was a label used by U.S. media in the 1980s, when major espionage cases involving the former Soviet Union were uncovered year after year. In 2025, the phrase has resurfaced in a different context: most information is now digital, physical distance matters less, and the security environment has shifted toward a broader “all-against-all” competition.
Against that backdrop, South Korea is pushing amendments to Article 98 of the Criminal Act, commonly referred to as the Espionage Act. Enacted in 1953, the law has historically been applied primarily to North Korea, even as alleged espionage activity linked to other countriesh as increased. The proposed revision would allow espionage acts carried out on behalf of any foreign country to be prosecuted under the same statute.
But practitioners argue that changing the law is not enough. Bae Jeong-seok, an adjunct professor at Sungkyunkwan University’s Graduate School of National Strategy and a former National Intelligence Service counterespionage bureau chief with more than 30 years of experience, said revising the law is “normalization,” not a full upgrade of counterintelligence capacity.
In an interview with Asia Today on Dec. 8, Bae said counterespionage should be treated not only as a criminal matter but as a national security function that requires long-term operations and can carry diplomatic value.
-What structural limitations existed for counterespionage activities under the current legal framework?
“Today’s intelligence environment is not like the Cold War, when you mainly focused on one adversary. It involves many state actors. But in South Korea, activity linked to foreign intelligence services other than North Korea often could not be charged as espionage. It was handled under separate laws protecting military secrets or industrial technology. In counterintelligence, the core is recruiting sources and running counter-operations, including using double agents, to gather more information. If everything is treated only as a standard criminal case, it limits intelligence work that needs time and flexibility.”
-How does this revised espionage bill compare to major advanced nations?
“This is not ‘toughening’ the law so much as bringing South Korea in line with what many advanced countries already have. But legal tools to deal with influence operations are still limited. Efforts to shape public opinion, cultivate media ties, or influence policymaking can be hard to prosecute under traditional espionage charges. A separate reporting-based system like the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act, which requires disclosure of certain activities performed on behalf of foreign principals, is also needed.”
-What will change with this amendment?
“It can help deter and disrupt foreign intelligence activity. If recruiting agents or providing information to a foreign intelligence service is itself treated as espionage, authorities can investigate earlier and more directly. That reduces the risk of South Korean citizens being recruited. It also gives counterintelligence more room to run long-term operations instead of moving immediately to prosecution in every case.”
-What aspects of the amendment require further refinement?
“The most important point is allowing strategic decision-making. Counterespionage should not be limited to catching spies and quickly building a prosecution. It requires understanding how networks operate over time, then recruiting and turning sources. In some cases, captured agents can also be used as leverage in security and diplomatic channels. Without that kind of approach, you fall behind in modern intelligence competition.”
-Beyond legal amendments, what direction should counterespionage personnel, technology, and organizational culture take?
“Police are expanding counterespionage efforts, but the main responsibility should remain with the NIS, which has the specialized experience. Police, which have investigative authority, can focus on arrests and prosecution. Coordination between the two needs to improve. Over the long term, South Korea should consider a dedicated counterintelligence body. This work requires continuity, and the typical government job-rotation system is not well suited to long-term operations.”
– Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
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