Relations between Washington and Caracas have long been tense, marked by U.S. sanctions on Venezuelan officials, accusations of narco-trafficking, and disputes over democracy and sovereignty. The latest flashpoint comes as the Trump administration expands military deployments in the Southern Caribbean, framing the move as part of a broader campaign against Latin American drug cartels. Venezuela, meanwhile, views the buildup as a pretext for regime change and a direct threat to its sovereignty.
What Happened?
U.S. Officials confirmed that seven warships and a nuclear-powered submarine are expected to arrive in the Caribbean shortly, in addition to 4,500 service members that include 2,200 Marines.
The Pentagon has not specified the mission’s scope, but the Trump administration has empowered the military to target drug cartels, including Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua and the Cartel de los Soles, which Washington accuses President Nicolás Maduro of leading.
On Thursday, August 28, 2025, Maduro addressed Venezuelan troops, vowing there was “no way” U.S. forces could invade, declaring Venezuela “stronger and more prepared” to defend sovereignty.
Venezuela has responded by deploying warships, drones, and 15,000 troops to the Colombian border, while also recruiting militia members to bolster defenses.
At the United Nations, Venezuela’s ambassador Samuel Moncada protested the U.S. buildup to Secretary-General António Guterres, calling it a “massive propaganda operation” to justify possible military intervention.
Why It Matters
The confrontation highlights the risk of military escalation in the Caribbean, a region already fraught with instability and migration pressures. For Washington, the naval buildup ties into Trump’s political focus on drug cartels and border security. For Venezuela, the moves reinforce long-standing accusations that the U.S. seeks regime change under the guise of counter-narcotics. Any clash could destabilize the broader region, disrupt energy markets, and draw in neighboring states such as Colombia, which has increased troop deployments along its shared border with Venezuela.
Stakeholder Reactions
President Nicolás Maduro: “There’s no way they can enter Venezuela. Today we are stronger than yesterday, more prepared to defend peace and sovereignty.”
Samuel Moncada, Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.N.: Called the operation “ridiculous,” criticizing the use of a nuclear submarine for anti-drug missions.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt: Claimed regional nations have “applauded” U.S. counter-narcotics operations.
U.S. Navy Admiral Daryl Claude: Confirmed deployments were tied to concerns about Venezuelan involvement in large-scale drug operations.
Colombian authorities: Deployed an additional 25,000 troops to the border to address cartel activity, cooperating with Venezuelan security forces.
What’s Next?
The U.S. is expected to maintain a strong naval presence in the Caribbean in the coming weeks, while Maduro continues to mobilize forces and rally domestic support. Venezuela may seek further backing from allies such as Russia, China, and Iran, framing the standoff as part of its resistance to U.S. pressure. Meanwhile, the United Nations could become an arena for diplomatic contestation, but absent mediation, the buildup risks sliding into a prolonged military standoff with unpredictable consequences for the wider region.
BEIJING, Aug 27 – China has criticized the US and Russia for asking the country to join nuclear disarmament negotiations. China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Guo Jiakun, stated that the nuclear forces of the two countries are not at the same level and that their strategic security environment and nuclear policies are different.
China pursues a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and a nuclear strategy of self-defense, and Beijing will not engage in an arms race with any other country. Guo called for countries with the largest nuclear arsenals to fulfill their special priority responsibilities for nuclear disarmament.
Trump emphasized the importance of denuclearization with Russia and China, stating that the power is too great to let nuclear weapons proliferate. Malaysia’s foreign minister also stated that China would sign up to a Southeast Asian treaty banning nuclear weapons in the region as soon as all documentation is ready.
Background According to Reuters, U.S. President Donald Trump had pledged during the 2024 election campaign to bring a swift end to the war in Gaza. Despite a two-month ceasefire at the start of his term, Israeli strikes resumed in March, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Palestinians and worsening humanitarian conditions in the territory.
What Happened: U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff announced that President Trump will chair a White House meeting on Gaza on Wednesday. The U.S. State Department also confirmed that Secretary of State Marco Rubio will meet Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar at the State Department at 1515 ET (1915 GMT) on the same day. Witkoff said the administration expects the Gaza conflict to be resolved by the end of the year.
Why It Matters: The Gaza war has caused over 62,000 Palestinian deaths, created a hunger crisis, displaced the entire population, and prompted international accusations of genocide and war crimes, which Israel denies. The White House meeting signals U.S. efforts to push for a resolution and manage international pressure on Israel while addressing the humanitarian crisis.
Stakeholder Reactions:
Steve Witkoff said on Fox News: “Yes, we’ve got a large meeting in the White House tomorrow, chaired by the president, and it’s a very comprehensive plan we’re putting together on the next day.”
On Israel’s role and hostages, Witkoff added: “We think that we’re going to settle this one way or another, certainly before the end of this year.”
Witkoff also noted that Israel is open to continuing discussions with Hamas, which has signaled willingness to negotiate.
What’s Next: President Trump’s meeting with senior U.S. and Israeli officials aims to establish a post-war plan for Gaza. Observers will be watching how the discussions influence ongoing humanitarian relief, potential ceasefire agreements, and broader U.S. diplomatic engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Resource competition has intensified between the two great powers, the US and China, due to trade and tariff wars. Recently, both the countries have made major policy shifts in the strategically significant rare earth sector.
China discreetly issued 2025 rare earth mining and smelting quotas to its state-owned enterprises, exhibiting deepening securitization of this sector. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) previously used to make the announcement public on their website.
The Pentagon became the largest shareholder in MP Materials after buying $400 million worth of stocks. It indicates expanding involvement of the US government in the domestic rare earth industry since MP Materials operates the sole mining facility in the US. This move faces severe backlash, with critics comparing it with China’s approach to market intervention.
Consequently, China has intensified its efforts to maintain overarching dominance over the global rare earth market, and the US strives to claw back its control over strategically important raw materials.
Quick guide to rare earth complexities
Rare earth elements (REEs) are a group of seventeen metallic elements. Their requirement in high-tech applications in medicine, the military, and green technologies is indispensable. The REEs are not so rare, as the name suggests. Yet the real limitation lies in locating them in clusters for economic viability. All the more difficult is smelting, separating, and processing these elements.
China is the net importer of REEs, mining 70%, with the rest being extracted by Myanmar, Australia, and the United States. However, China enjoys a near-monopoly in processing 90% of the rare earths globally.
Over the years, China has built self-sustaining rare earth supply chains domestically. That implies managing upstream extraction to midstream processing and, to a greater extent, even downstream manufacturing.
Just as access to oil shaped global geopolitics during the last century, access to rare earths is shaping current geopolitics in this great power competition. And China is weaponizing its preeminence over REE supply chains by tightening its control to offset the US.
China’s control over rare earths came with a huge brunt.
China discovered the strategic value of REEs in the formative years of building the country’s economic base. China has been investing heavily in the R&D since the discovery of rare earth deposits in Bayan Obo, Inner Mongolia, in 1927. Today, it holds the rank of largest known deposit of REEs and constitutes over 90% of China’s entire reserves.
Deng Xiaoping’s signature policy of 1978 is credited for kick-starting the opening up of the Chinese economy and integrating China into the global market. As a cherry on top for Chinese authorities came the “environmental decade” in the 1970s in the United States, marked by dozens of environmental legislations.
Rare earth extraction and processing have severe environmental repercussions. Certainly, US private firms were in search of a scapegoat to outsource environmental costs and exploit cheap labor.
Chinese authorities were willing to face the brunt of ecological damage for speedy economic growth. It turned out that the short-term economic interests overshadowed the long-term strategic interests of America.
What exacerbated the matter was illegal and unregulated mining of rare earths. The parallel economy flourished as global consumption for rare earth multiplied year on year. Chinese authorities have taken cognizance but struggle to put a stop to these activities.
China has doubled down on its efforts to curb unlicensed extraction and harden the compliance systems facing immense pressure from Trump’s tariff war.
Chinese market manipulation tricks came in handy.
By the 1990s, bifurcating prices of rare earths for the Chinese domestic market and international market had compelled many US businesses to shut down.
China carried out price manipulation in two tiers. First, it made sure to service its domestic needs by selling at cheaper rates than the products that were being exported. Second, pricing it underneath the other global firms in the international market but higher than the domestic price levels.
In the beginning, this created incentive for international companies to establish their manufacturing units in China. But eventually almost all firms went bankrupt, losing their competitive edge against Chinese SOEs.
In addition, China has been consolidating its rare earth assets to raise its global competitiveness and pricing power. In Dec 2021, three mega SOEs were merged to form a megafirm, China Rare Earth Group. Today, only two mega conglomerates are operating: China Rare Earth Group and China Northern Rare Earth Group. In fact, export quotas are entrusted to only these two mega firms.
Export quotas introduced in 1999 have expanded and tightened over the years. Though year-wise mining and smelting quotas have increased, the annual growth rates see a downturn. This time not disclosing the quotas publicly for ‘security reasons’ will exacerbate uncertainties in the international market. It seems like a calculated strategy of Chinese authorities to maintain their stronghold over the global market of rare earths but making sure to provide enough to maintain dominance.
Some scholars do articulate China’s policies to clamp down on its rare earth industry from a different lens, essentially, to address domestic interests. The Chinese authoritarian state is caught up in securing control and increasing production efficiency.
Trump responding vigorously to counterbalance Chinese dominance
The Pentagon becoming the largest stakeholder of MP Materials to cushion a strategic sector is nothing unusual. The US government and its agencies have a history of getting involved in sectors of national and economic significance. This underscores the fact that great powers have historically used market distortions as a tool to uphold their supremacy.
Establishing a cutting-edge supply chain with like-minded states would take over a decade and cost well over a trillion dollars in that period. Americans have to catch up on the long road ahead that the Chinese took decades to build. Therefore, Trump initiated the first-of-their-kind policy measures to hasten up the catching-up process. These policy initiatives are aimed at enhancing collaboration for clean energy technologies, building resilient supply chains, and reducing dependencies.
On April 30, 2025, the US and Ukraine signed a long-awaited minerals deal. Trump’s ambition to gain control over Greenland, a strategically located island in the Arctic, to the extent of using military force wasn’t just about national security. Rather driven by desire to control rich untapped resources, including rare earth minerals, copper, gold, uranium, iron, oil, etc.
Trump’s efforts will take years to bear fruit. Prior to that, the US must build an investment-friendly environment. A report by consultancy S&P Global found that on average it takes nearly 29 years to build a new mine for the critical minerals in the US, the second-longest in the world. The process to obtain a mining permit is lengthy and confusing, which harms efforts to counterbalance China’s near-dominant positioning.
world of weaponized interdependence
Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman argue cold war animosity was replaced by a new world of networks that accentuated harmonious relationships. They suggest countries are more entwined than ever, but rather than easing hostilities, interdependence is used by states against their adversaries.
Great power competition is being increasingly impacted by what they called “weaponized interdependence.” China’s dominance over the supply lines of rare earths gives it the edge to fight this battle for long.
“Asia dominated the Old World, while the West led the New World—and now we are coming to a truly global world.”– Parag Khanna, “The Future Is Asian,” Epilogue
The Future Is Asian(2019) by Parag Khanna takes us on a journey to show how political landscapes are revolving around Asia. The 21st century is not just about the story written in the halls of Washington or the skyscrapers of New York; rather, it is being drafted in the busy streets of Mumbai, Seoul’s high-tech corridors, and the skylines of Shanghai. Parag Khanna, a renowned global strategy advisor, author, and the founder of, makes him well suited to explore the nuances of Asia’s evolving role in the global arena. He gives us a picture of how global focus is shifting eastward and not just only toward China but rather toward a combination of diverse nations whose collective strength is reshaping global dynamics.
This book spans extensive areas in ten chapters covering Asian history, economics, and global relations of Asia with other continents. The book encompasses nearly all information from China’s infrastructure projects in Africa to K-pop with vast data and name-dropping events, which basically shows Khanna’s portrayal of the “Asia First” paradigm, which is not solely a story about China.
Khanna delivers his main arguments in the first chapter of the book, which is “Introduction: Asia First,” and the rest are basically data-oriented logic to support his argument.The basic premise of the book is that while everyone is focusing on China, Asia is not all about China. Khanna highlights the diversity of Asia beyond China by emphasizing that out of the almost 5 billion people living in Asia, only 1.5 billion are Chinese. Around 40 percent of global GDP is represented through this new Asian system consisting of around 5 billion people. Though China, through its BRI project, is reclaiming its historical roots of the ancient Silk Road and has even surpassed the USA in terms of PPP, it will not lead alone. As Asian countries don’t want the modern colonization of China, as they are still proud of their own nationality and history.
Khanna’s stance on U.S. concerns regarding Chinese neocolonialism in Africa and Asia is notably optimistic. His optimism is striking, but it raises questions about whether he is underestimating the risks, mainly the Sino-Russian strategic cooperation.
The fact that this book, unlike most Western history books, takes an Eastern perspective on world history to counterbalance Western narratives by integrating the lives and lessons of the Buddha and ideals of Confucius, the Mughal Empire’s legacy, China’s Ming Dynasty’s maritime explorations, and numerous other pillars of Asian history. This is the most striking factor of Chapter Two.
In the third chapter, Khanna introduces “Asianization,” pointing out that the previous centuries were basically defined by Europeanization and Americanization, but the 21st century is all about Asianization. He describes the broader Asianization of Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia through economic partnerships and integration such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by putting aside geopolitical tension and rivalry. As he states,
“Geopolitical rivalries will only speed the Asianization of Asia.”
– Parag Khanna, “The Future Is Asian,” Chapter 3: “The Return of Greater Asia”
Asia-nomics, described in the fourth chapter, portrays how Asia is coming to the forefront in the field of digitization, AI, and also startups and how it is accelerating Asia’s robust economy by referring to the development in digitization sectors of countries like Bangladesh and India and also the AI domination of China.
Chapter 5 expands the influence of Asian diasporas in the Americas and their growing cultural interaction. He gives a detailed overview of how Asian diasporas are becoming important economically and culturally in the US and in Latin America.This bidirectional flow works as a bridge and facilitates trade and innovation on both sides, often through cultural exchanges.
Chapter 6 analyzes the complex and ever-evolving relationship between Asia and Europe. Khanna points out the bittersweet legacies of colonization still remain a major factor in social integration in this case despite strong economic ties. This chapter underscores the paradox of Europe’s admiration of the Asian economy and, at the same time, an everlasting ambivalence toward Asian people.
Khanna explores Asia’s growing ties with Africa in Chapter 7 by framing it as a deliberate and strategic investment in infrastructure that rejects the historical concept of European colonialism. His optimism lies in the fact that Asian states like China, India, and Japan are building a “Pan-African connectivity, ma,” and this process is more developmental than commercial. He identifies Asia’s approach to Africa as noncolonial and pragmatic, showing a clear distinction from past colonial powers. As he states,
“Asians are racing to connect Africa, not to divide it.”
– Parag Khanna, “The Future Is Asian,” Chapter 7: “The Return of Afroeurasia”
Chapter 8 expands on Asia’s growing and often overlooked prospect of South-South cooperation. China holds a key position here as an important trading partner for Brazil, Chile, and Peru while also highlighting Japan’s and South Korea’s high-tech partnerships. This narrative extends to the spread of Asian values and cultural and educational exchange, which is a determiner of soft power.
The ninth chapter, on Asia’s Technocratic Future, is an intriguing argument of this book. Khanna makes the case against democracy in favor of pragmatist, meritocratic technocracy, clearly drawing inspiration from his residency in Singapore. According to him, Asians are more intrigued by the improved outcomes of technocracy. States throughout Asia are adopting a similar approach. Some of these traits are starting to appear in Western democracies as well.
Khanna did an impressive job in the last chapter, which focuses mostly on enhancing the shared perception among Asians of what it means to be Asian by fusing social and cultural exports of growing appeal, from Bollywood to K-pop and even the flavor of various cuisines.
In critically evaluating “The Future Is Asian,” it’s evident that Khanna’s logic is thought-provoking, yet they present some contradictions. The reader is quite impressed by the wide range of topics that this book covers without sacrificing depth. The sarcastic comments, exposition, and suitably appropriate examples are indeed praiseworthy.This book also works as a contribution to policymakers, students, and researchers who want to delve into the complex issues of Asia as a whole for comprehensive study.
While he claims that Asia is not just about China, which serves as a key source of confusion because all the data and facts he presented throughout the book do in fact support China’s ascent to power. Throughout the book, Khanna made references to Asia-nomics and Greater Asia as though the region were a single entity with a distinct global viewpoint. However, national identities remain powerful in Asia.
Khanna seemstoo enthusiastic about technocrats solving the region’s problems, oversimplifying the issues and the differences even by calling Modi a “technocrat” despite his promotion of nationalistic agendas.The future is undoubtedly Asian, but this book ignores the challenges of getting there and any potential drawbacks.
The Future Is Asian is like walking into the future as it is happening, something that people who only see the world from a Western perspective might not fully comprehend. Khanna’s positive view of Asia’s ascent provides a crucial narrative in opposition to the fear-mongering discourse prevalent in Western media. To those who are interested in global trends, realize that the future isn’t only Asian—it’s already here, being shaped in the vibrant streets and artistic places of this continent.
Note on References: All citations are based on the e-book version ofKhanna, P.(2019).The Future Is Asian:Commerce,Conflict and Culture in the 21st century(e-book edition).Simon & Schuster
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the only remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the United States (US) and Russia, is set to expire on February 5, 2026. The New START, which accounted for 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, was signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2011. The treaty was originally set for 10 years with a further one-time expansion for five years, and this extension option was already availed in 2021. However, after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the New START was deferred, and to date, its status has remained unchanged. As the treaty is approaching its end, and war in Ukraine continues, the questions about the future of arms control between the two states are arising, and security experts worldwide fear a new arms race between the Cold War rivals. The following article analyzes the evolving dynamic of arms control between the US and Russia amid the Ukraine war, and examines how, if timely measures are not taken, a renewed arms race may be imminent.
In 2022, after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Russia suspended its participation in the New START treaty due to US military support to Kyiv. Russia accused the US of violating the treaty by attempting to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Later on, Moscow also accused Washington of violating the treaty provisions by removing over “100 units of the US strategic offensive arm” from accountability without any verification. In addition, Russia asserted that the US wanted to inspect Russian facilities while restricting Moscow from carrying out verifications on American territory, as promised in the treaty. However, despite the suspension of the treaty, both parties promised that they would adhere to the limits set by the treaty. Whereas the Bilateral Consultative Committee (BCC), established jointly under the treaty, remains inactive. Resultantly, US-Russia relations have reached a low point in arms control measures.
After President Donald Trump returned to the Oval Office for his second tenure, there were hopes of a thaw between Moscow and Washington, especially after the beginning of ceasefire negotiations over Ukraine. Both sides officially signaled a willingness to engage positively on arms control. In February 2025, President Donald Trump said that he wanted to restart arms control discussions with Russia. Simultaneously, American Democratic lawmakers urged the Security of State, Marco Rubio, to renew the New START treaty with Russia. Further, in January 2025, Moscow Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Russia wants to resume arms control talks with the US, which is in the world’s interest. And even most recently, when President Trump was asked about the future of US-Russia arms control, he said that he would like to see arms control between the two states. However, as Russia-Ukraine ceasefire negotiations have failed to produce any positive outcomes, there seems to be less interest from the parties regarding arms control talks. For instance, Sergei Ryabkov, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, recently told Russian news agency TASS that there are no grounds for a full-scale resumption of New START in the current circumstances. Thus, given the current evolving geopolitical dynamics, a thaw aimed at the ongoing Ukraine war is highly unlikely.
At one point, there was no mechanism between the US and Russia to decide the future of arms control; on the other hand, there are some developments that might provoke a new arms race. According to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2025 report, both the US and Russia are attempting to upgrade their strategic forces and their delivery means. The US has been investing in the modernization of its nuclear forces on air, land and sea. In 2023, the US Department of Defence procured more than 200 modernized nuclear weapons from National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Furthermore, US President Trump has announced the Golden Dome missile defence project intended to counteract the aerial threats, particularly from Russia and China. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov has called the “Golden Dome” extremely destabilizing, which can act as an impediment in arms control talks.
In parallel, Russia has also been actively upgrading its nuclear forces to enhance its national security. President Vladimir Putin, in 2018, had unveiled the Avangard program, consisting of nuclear armed hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) which are nearly impossible to intercept. In response, the US also started developing its long range hypersonic missile, Dark Eagle, to be fielded by the end of fiscal year 2025. Besides this, Russia also announced the development of unmanned, nuclear armed torpedo Poseidon capable of targeting at a longer range of 10,000 km, and an invincible nuclear-powered, nuclear armed intercontinental cruise missile Burevestnikhaving an unlimited range. Furthermore, Moscow revised its nuclear doctrine in 2024, further lowering the nuclear threshold, and reaffirmed its right to use nuclear weapons in response to any nuclear or conventional attack that jeopardizes the sovereignty of Russia or its allies.
Moreover, the geopolitical developments such as France extending the nuclear umbrella to Europe, the US deployment of the Aegis missile defense system in Poland, have raised concerns in Russia. On the other hand, Moscow has stationed its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) on Belarus soil as part of its security. In addition, President Putin has announced plans to deploy Oreshnik, an intermediate-range hypersonic missile capable of carrying conventional as well as nuclear warheads in Belarus, which can reach the entirety of Europe. Similarly, most recently, Russia announced its intention to abandon the unilateral moratorium on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing the deployment of intermediate range missiles by Washington in Europe and Asia. The move came following the announcement of the repositioning of nuclear submarines by President Trump as part of pressuring President Putin to put an end to war in Ukraine. These developments paint a bleak picture of the future of arms control between US and Russia as they not only breed mistrust but also incentivize the states to expand their arsenals in the absence of any verification, leading to a potential Cold War style arms race.
Given the strained relationships between the US and Russia due to on-going Ukraine war, the absence of communication and heightened mistrust, the expiry of the New START treaty with no follow-up or legally binding obligations, could result in both states significantly increasing their nuclear arsenals, exceeding the limits set by the treaty. This arms buildup signals a rapid shift in the geopolitical dynamics, further reducing the prospects of arms control and prompting each side to adopt an aggressive posture. These developments incentivize the states to expand their arsenals in the absence of any verification, potentially leading to the resurgence of a Cold War style arms race. To achieve lasting peace, formal talks between Russia and the US must once again be initiated to settle basic incompatibilities and build a new, holistic arms control regime.
The international oil market is grappling with a persistent oversupply, driving sustained downward pressure on prices. By 2025, global energy systems are operating with significant overcapacity. OPEC+, aiming to regain market share, agreed in July to raise output by 548,000 barrels per day (bpd) in August, exceeding expectations, with a similar increase possible in September.
This aggressive move has intensified oversupply risks. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects global oil production in 2025 will reach 104.9 million bpd, outpacing demand at 103.8 million bpd. OPEC+ is phasing out production cuts, while non-OPEC+ supply is set to grow by 1.4 million bpd. Meanwhile, weak demand growth, especially in China and the U.S., has prompted the IEA to downgrade its 2025 demand forecast to 720,000 bpd. Despite geopolitical tensions, including Middle East conflicts, the structural oversupply remains dominant. Global inventories have risen steadily since February, with a sharp 93-million-barrel increase in May alone. Concurrently, U.S.-China trade tensions, fueled by Trump-era tariffs, have further clouded demand outlooks.
In this context, Trump has urged China to buy “plenty” of U.S. oil. While bilateral oil trade has continued despite tensions, it has been inconsistent. China’s imports of U.S. crude rose 81% in 2023 to 286,000 bpd. However, in 2024, amid escalating tensions and increased imports from Russia and Malaysia, U.S. crude shipments to China fell 53% to 217,000 bpd. From May to July 2024, China made no U.S. oil purchases, the longest pause since 2018, contributing to the lowest U.S. crude exports in over two years.
China, the world’s largest net energy importer, imported over 1 billion barrels of oil equivalent in 2024. It has adopted a defensive strategy, stockpiling reserves at low prices to manage cost and hedge against supply chain risks. This price-sensitive approach has become institutionalized, supporting both energy security and bargaining power.
However, this strategy is rooted in commercial logic rather than broader geopolitical planning. Despite energy security’s centrality to national interests, strategic implementation often lacks alignment.
Russia has emerged as China’s top oil supplier, accounting for 19% of 2023 imports. Yet, as China absorbs cheap oil globally, U.S. shale producers are losing ground due to high costs and limited export access, now a survival concern for the industry.
Meanwhile, major U.S. oil companies are under pressure. In 2024, profits of the top five oil giants fell significantly, with firms like Chevron slashing 15% to 20% of its workforce. This has weakened the traditional energy sector, a key Republican stronghold, thereby undermining Trump’s “energy dominance” strategy.
Facing a difficult midterm election, Trump has shifted focus toward China. On June 25, he signaled a possible easing of Iranian sanctions to allow oil exports to China while simultaneously urging China to resume large-scale U.S. oil purchases. This contradiction reflects a deeper conflict: oil majors’ long-term green transition vs. Trump’s short-term revival of fossil fuels. Stable export markets like China are vital for U.S. shale survival.
Trump’s policy balancing act between low oil prices and oil industry interests highlights China’s opportunity. His political vulnerability offers China a strategic opening to ease trade tensions and gain leverage through “oil diplomacy”.
For China, increased oil trade with the U.S. offers multiple strategic advantages:
Diplomatic Leverage: Responding to Trump’s call aligns with his style and offers a diplomatic gesture, not just economic cooperation.
Cost-Benefit Balance: While U.S. oil may be more expensive, it carries political value. In contrast, Russian oil may seem cheaper but could come with geopolitical costs, especially given Russia’s unpredictable behavior.
Deeper Engagement: Expanding cooperation with U.S. energy firms, many tied to Republican interests, could stabilize bilateral relations and open additional diplomatic channels.
Reserve Strategy: By expanding strategic reserves, China can manage higher purchase prices and potentially resell at favorable rates. U.S. light crude, with its higher quality, justifies a price premium.
State-to-State Negotiation: Positioning the oil trade as a government-level transaction rather than purely commercial can help secure favorable terms. Trump’s direct involvement could lead to better pricing and increased political capital.
Overall, strengthening oil trade with the U.S. serves as a practical adjustment in China’s energy and foreign policy. It helps counterbalance dependence on Russian energy, mitigates strategic vulnerabilities, and positions China more flexibly in global geopolitics. Engaging in “oil diplomacy” with the U.S. at this moment could enhance China’s strategic posture and create new leverage amid shifting global dynamics.
From NATO’s eastern frontier to the energy corridors of the Baltic, the partnership between Poland and the United States has become one of the most strategically consequential alliances of the 21st century. Forged through shared values and hardened by crisis, it’s a relationship that transcends party politics in both nations and speaks to a larger truth—namely, that while alliances can lead to instability and war, as shown by the interlocking obligations before World War I, alliances, whether bilateral or multilateral, can also promote international stability by deterring conflicts, enabling collective defense, and fostering cooperation and trade among member states.
Poland proves the point. Its journey from Soviet satellite to NATO membership in 1999 and European Union accession in 2004, following a decade-long process of integration and negotiation involving extensive political, economic, and legal preparations, is a story of determination and alignment with Western democratic principles. The drive toward NATO membership was reinforced by citizen advocacy and steady diplomacy, with the Polish-American community playing a quiet but influential role in building bridges between Warsaw and Washington. The U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey estimates there are nearly nine million Americans of Polish ancestry, making it one of the largest ethnic groups in the country.
From the outset, Poland understood that sovereignty in the modern era requires not only democratic governance but also a credible place within a collective security framework. Joining NATO was a strategic declaration that Poland’s future was bound to the transatlantic community. And it is precisely through NATO that the U.S.–Polish relationship contributes most visibly to international stability.
Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Poland responded with clarity and speed, welcoming millions of Ukrainian refugees, supplying critical military aid, and urging allies to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. Due to its geographic location bordering Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian exclave Kaliningrad, Poland took a proactive stance to bolster its defenses and NATO’s regional presence. Poland launched a $2.5 billion national defense initiative called the “East Shield” that was specifically aimed at strengthening the country’s roughly 418-kilometer border with Belarus and 232-kilometer border with Kaliningrad—representing some of the EU’s easternmost external boundaries—which serve as key frontlines for the bloc’s security and border control.
By shoring up NATO’s credibility and demonstrating readiness to act, Poland helped reduce the risk of wider escalation across Europe.
The U.S.–Poland defense relationship deepened accordingly. American troops are now a permanent presence on Polish soil. The U.S. Army’s V Corps forward command in Poznań, which operates from Camp Kościuszko—named for Tadeuscz Kościuszko, a national hero in both Poland and the U.S.—is responsible for coordinating and overseeing U.S. ground forces deployed in Europe. Missile defense systems such as Aegis Ashore strengthen NATO’s deterrent posture, and joint training exercises have become routine. These measures bind U.S. power to Poland’s geography, creating predictability in Europe’s most volatile region.
Poland’s overall defense spending speaks volumes. It’s approaching five percent of national GDP—more than double NATO’s longstanding benchmark of two percent of GDP for defense expenditures—and Poland’s procurement of Abrams tanks, “shoot-and-scoot” HIMARS rocket systems that are designed for rapid deployment relocation, and F-35 fighter jets ensures interoperability with U.S. forces. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth put it during a February 2025 press conference in Warsaw, Poland is a “model ally on the continent, willing to invest not just in their defense, but in our shared defense and defense of the continent.”
Transcending Party Politics
The relationship transcends party politics in both capitals, having remained robust under Republican and Democratic administrations in Washington—Trump, Biden, and now Trump’s second term—as well as across successive Polish governments of differing political orientations. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has reaffirmed that “Poland’s commitment to transatlantic relations and NATO must remain unquestionable,” regardless of political shifts in the U.S.
National security isn’t confined to the battlefield. Poland recognized early on that energy independence is a cornerstone of sovereignty, and it has acted decisively to cut reliance on Russian natural gas. The liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at Świnoujście, which is named after Polish President Lech Kaczyński, who prioritized energy security, now receives regular LNG shipments from the U.S., while the Baltic Pipe project brings natural gas from Norway and strengthens regional supply diversity. Looking ahead, nuclear energy partnerships with American firms promise long-term stability and reduced dependence on fossil fuels.
This alignment in energy policy enhances Poland’s resilience while advancing broader U.S. goals of promoting secure, market-based energy in Europe. In strategic terms, an LNG tanker docking in Świnoujście is more than commerce. It’s a visible symbol of transatlantic solidarity.
Contrasting Russian Reactions
Russia’s reaction to Poland’s NATO membership stands in striking contrast to its view of Ukraine’s Western aspirations. When Poland joined NATO in 1999, Moscow voiced strong opposition, arguing that NATO’s eastward expansion threatened Russian security. Apart from diplomatic protests and some hostile rhetoric, however, Russia ultimately conceded Poland’s accession as a fait accompli. Moscow maintained cooperative channels with NATO and Poland, even as relations were strained. Poland, with its long history of independence struggles and clear Western orientation, was not seen as part of Russia’s cultural or political sphere. Moreover, by the time Central Europe was firmly integrated into NATO, Russia had little leverage to reverse the process.
Ukraine, however, occupies a different place in Moscow’s worldview. Russia regards Ukraine not only as a strategic buffer on its border but also as central to its own identity and history. Unlike Poland, Ukraine is portrayed in Russian narratives as a “brother nation” whose alignment with the West represents a profound geopolitical and cultural loss. For this reason, Russia tolerated NATO’s enlargement to Poland and the Baltics but drew the line at Ukraine, seeing its aspirations for NATO and EU membership as a direct existential threat, responding with annexation, proxy wars, and, ultimately, full-scale invasion. The contrast underscores the strategic weight of Poland’s alliance with the United States.
For Poland, it’s a relationship rooted in hard history: the loss of independence from 1795 to 1918, when the country was partitioned among Prussia, the Hapsburg monarchy, and Russia; the devastation of Nazi occupation; the long shadow of Soviet domination; and decades of Communist rule. That experience forged a national resolve that sovereignty can never be taken for granted and must be anchored in strong alliances. Today those alliances—most of all with the United States—are essential pillars of stability in Europe.
In a span of a week, global politics had gotten some big headlines. Last Friday, Putin and Trump met in Alaska. The anticipated summit was the talk of the world for quite a while. Speculations to determination, the summit was an icebreaking summit for US and Russian relations. Especially the way President Donald Trump was dealing with Putin with threats and showing a little turn towards a hard line against Putin; however, that hard line again turned into “Brozone” in a three-hour meeting. Initially, it was meant to happen for seven hours. The meeting happened to end the war in Ukraine. After the meeting, nevertheless, there was no peace deal and no commitment. Trump deliberately passed the ball into Ukraine and Europe’s court.
Fast forward to Monday, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, with his European counterparts, arrived at the White House. Five European leaders and the secretary general of NATO, along with European Commission leaders, were the participants in this summit. What was the result this time? Well, unlike the last time, when Trump hosted Zelensky in the White House back in February, this time, Zelensky wasn’t bashed for any reason. The meeting was held with all the big names without any disruption, and European leaders knew just the weapon to use against Trump to keep Trump on their side: the art of diplomacy through “flattery.” Still, there was no peace deal or anything. The European leaders thought this time they might sway Trump to go harsh against Putin, which ultimately failed.
Trump, from the very beginning, was determined about some parts in the deal. Ukraine won’t be taken into NATO, and Ukraine must forget about Crimea, which he sees as a fault of the Obama administration. Steve Witkoff, Trump’s appointed special envoy in the Middle East, who basically arrives in every conflicting part of the world as a peace-bringer as Trump’s ambassador, mentioned a part that’s now a cornerstone of the security agenda. Witkoff mentioned “something like NATO’s Article 5.” NATO Article 5 states that an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all members, obligating each ally to take necessary action, including armed force, to assist the attacked party and restore security. It’s a profound part of NATO and what makes this military alliance different from every other alliance that’s out there. In the Alaska summit, Putin has agreed on some kind of “robust security arrangements” to secure the peace deal. So basically, Ukraine might secure its security by not joining NATO; however, there’s a catch. When Witkoff said something like “Article 5,” does it necessarily mean they are going to implement Article 5?
Here the debate comes. Something like Article 5 and implementing Article 5 don’t mean the same thing. And Witkoff wants European contribution to this security to play a bigger role. As Trump mostly follows a “unilateralist policy,” he doesn’t want to be the firsthand guarantor in the security arrangements. Whereas, the European leaders want to see Donald Trump playing a bigger role in this context. The EU already took a big initiative to spend on a military budget higher than ever, reaching 5% of the whole budget for every country before 2031. Back in March, the EU proposed “Sky Shield” for Ukraine. The European Sky Shield for Ukraine is a proposed European-led air protection strategy designed to defend western and central Ukraine from Russian missile and drone attacks during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “Sky Shield” aims to protect critical infrastructure, including Ukraine’s operational nuclear power plants, major cities like Kyiv, Lviv, and Odessa, and vital economic corridors. The plan would not include operations in the eastern parts of Ukraine; however, it hasn’t materialized yet.
Trump saw the Russia-Ukraine war as Biden’s war, which he never wanted to drag on in the first place. Before being elected, he boasted about ending the war in Ukraine. Though, he couldn’t stop the war after seven months. This is quite a stigma on his “Peacemaker” appearance. Trump was seen to have fallen out with Putin, even tariffing a major ally, India, for buying Russian crude oil. From almost falling out, the Alaska summit again showed Trump’s humility with Vladimir Putin.
European leaders couldn’t budge Trump from his unwillingness to get involved in the Russia and Ukraine war. There was a motion to send a peacekeeping force to Ukraine from the UK and France. But they couldn’t find their other allies beside them. Germany, Italy, and even Poland rejected the idea of sending their troops to Ukraine, not even as peacekeepers. The US isn’t backing up Ukraine with military and financial aid, likewise the Biden era. Europe has already surpassed the US’s financial aid to Ukraine and is soon going to surpass it in the military sector. In any of the scenarios, there is no sign of a security deal or any comprehensive peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine. And every week, Russia is taking up more land in the Donbass region. It already occupies 20% of the land in Ukraine, and there is no sign that they want to give the land back to Ukraine. Experts are rigid in the idea that Putin won’t give the lands back it occupied. Neither will Ukraine accept a Russian-compelling peace treaty. So the stalemate is firm.
Trump has announced there will be a trilateral summit with the Ukrainian president and Russian president. As the security guarantee fades away and the Russian army occupies more lands every week, the war looks far away from ending. A treaty like the 1994 “Budapest Memorandum” won’t be accepted by the Ukrainian side; likewise, the Minsk agreement won’t be accepted by Ukraine and the EU. The demand is something solid and binding. Some are talking about a “Reassurance Force” that will secure Ukraine and Europe too, or an “Ironclad” agreement like the US-Japan and the US-South Korea security mechanisms. Till the next summit, the world awaits to see a peace deal being activated at the border of Europe.
England score 11 tries in an emphatic 69-7 victory over USA in the opening game of the 2025 Women’s Rugby World Cup in front of a record crowd of 42,723 in Sunderland.
This holiday was created by Wow Bao—a company that offers Asian street food such as steamed dumplings, pan-seared potstickers, noodle bowls, rice bowls, and bao. They created this holiday to raise the profile of bao restaurants in the U.S. and to encourage people to try them. They chose the 22nd of August for this holiday because it was when their first bao-centric restaurant was established in Chicago.
Bao is food that developed in Chinese culture around the 3rd century and comes from Mantou. According to legend, bao was created by the military strategist Zhuge Liang while he was returning from his Southern Campaign near the province now known as Sichuan. In this story, he was attempting to cross a river guarded by a deity but couldn’t do so because the deity wanted the heads of 50 of his soldiers as payment for passage. Not wanting to sacrifice his troops, he decided to instead order 50 buns that looked like human heads to appease the deity. The deity accepted the buns as payment, and safe passage was granted to him and his army. The buns were then labeled Mantou or “barbarian’s heads.” Of course, no one really knows who invented bao; every province in China seems to have its own origin story.
Time to dig into why this rare-earth-mining stock is sinking.
Giving back all of its 5.7% gain from last week, shares of USA Rare Earth(USAR 2.24%) have been in free fall this week. Several news events out of the rare-earth-mining industry have investors feeling less than bullish on the stock’s prospects.
According to data provided by S&P Global Market Intelligence, shares of the metals stock have plunged 18% from the end of last Friday’s trading session through 12:25 p.m. ET on Thursday.
Image source: Getty Images.
News from around the world has investors feeling woeful
The week began on an inauspicious note when investors learned that rare-earth exports out of China have ramped up this summer. According to Bloomberg, the export volume of Chinese rare-earth products rose 69% from June to July. With rare earth products at the core of trade tensions between the U.S. and China, investors are hyperfocused on news that the world’s leading rare-earth producer has escalated its exports of the prized critical minerals.
Tuesday didn’t provide much relief. Reuters reported that Vulcan Elements, a producer of rare-earth magnets, recently signed a supply deal with ReElement for rare-earth oxides. USA Rare Earth recognizes the commencement of operations next year at its rare-earth-magnet production facility as a major catalyst. Investors are likely fretful about the company’s prospects if peers are inking rare-earth-magnet deals while USA Rare Earth isn’t enjoying the same interest.
Yet another factor behind the stock’s tumble this week is news from rare-earth peer Critical Metals(CRML -3.28%), which reported favorable drilling results from a project in Greenland. Besides magnet production, USA Rare Earth is also focused on mining at its resource in Texas. With the promising results that Critical Metals reported for its Greenland asset, investors may be finding USA Rare Earth less appealing.
What’s an investor to do now?
Because USA Rare Earth is a highly speculative investment, the volatility this week is unsurprising. Current shareholders should simply sit tight at this point, since nothing materially has changed for the company.
Scott Levine has no position in any of the stocks mentioned. The Motley Fool has no position in any of the stocks mentioned. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy.
Other one-off matches, such as the Italian Super Cup and Spanish Super Cup, have been held abroad in recent years.
AC Milan are also hoping to play their Serie A match against Como in Perth, Australia in February, as the fixture clashes with their San Siro stadium hosting the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics.
However, the plans have yet to receive approval from Fifa, Uefa, Football Australia and the Asian Football Confederation (AFC).
Fifa’s rules currently do not allow domestic league matches to be played abroad, but last year it set up a working group to look into the matter.
Last year, La Liga said it wanted to hold Barcelona v Atletico Madrid in Miami before dropping the idea because of time constraints.
In 2019, Barcelona also planned to stage a league match against Girona in Miami, but the idea was scrapped after opposition from the RFEF and its players’ union.
The Premier League has previously said it has no plans to play games overseas.
In 2008, then Premier League chief executive Richard Scudamore proposed playing an extra round of fixtures abroad, but the plans were shelved after criticism from fans and the media.
Some of the most sought-after road trips that Brits are keen to embark on this summer have been revealed for the ultimate staycation – from the stunning Scottish Highlands to the world-famous Lake District
Snowdonia National Park in Wales(Image: Getty Images)
The summer is in full swing, with many families looking for their next holiday getaway – but that idyllic location could be closer to home than you think.
Across the nation, there’s a collection of stunning destinations just waiting to be explored, and what’s more, they’re super easy to get to. Forget getting to the airport hours before your flight, ditch the 23kg packing limit, and avoid the stress, as staycations are dominating the summer holidays this year.
A new study from Škoda found that a whopping 83% of Brits are keen to explore more of the UK this summer, with many opting for driving holidays over trips abroad. The research also found that a number of these holidaymakers are prepared to drive more than 1,000 miles to reach their desired destination in the UK.
Rannoch Moor in the Scottish Highlands(Image: Getty Images)
The benefits? Travellers are able to stop and look at the sights whenever they desire, choose what time to leave, and have no luggage limits. In addition, it’s a more adorable way to travel rather than catching a flight ot taking the train, especially if you have a big family, and you don’t need a passport!
With this in mind, Škoda has revealed the most desired summer road trip locations for this summer. From meandering up the Snowdonia National Park to taking a fresh water dip in the Lake District – there’s a staycation to suit everyone, no matter how adventurous you are.
One of the top locations to visit is the Scottish Highlands, home to some seriously spectacular landscapes. The breathtaking scenes are home to the mythical Loch Ness, not to mention the restaurant scene for foodies and towering mountains for intrepid explorers.
One traveller raved: “We spent our last few Junes travelling around Scotland with long days and plenty of wildlife… Considering your route, the Cairngorms are fab for red squirrel, red deer, eagles, grouse etc. We saw all of these plus some in the glens of the eastern Cairngorms earlier this year. If you’re headed up to Lossiemouth, seals, dolphins, gannets (esp if your route brings you near Troup Head). We saw a few dolphins at Burghead this June and folk around said a pod of orca were hanging about as well. Moray Firth usually have dolphins as well. Essentially, you can’t go wrong!” Another who drove the North Coast 500 hailed it “an amazing bucket list trip”.
The Lake District is no well-kept secret, known for its fresh water lakes, historic towns, and mountains that it’s become another favoured spot for summer staycations. It’s an England national treasure, and in fact, it’s now considered a world treasure, having been declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
One tourist who drove the famous Hardknott pass between Eskdale and Duddon Valley raved: “Views to die for,” while another added: “Amazing drive, I have driven some great roads here and in the USA. This drive is up there with the best of them.”
Keswick, Derwentwater in the Lake District National Park of England(Image: Getty Images)
A trip to the Yorkshire Dales is certainly one to add to the list. Whether you’re looking for a scenic hike, a steam train journey, or just plenty of breathtaking historic sites, museums, farms, and breweries, it has something for everyone.
Here’s the top 10 staycations recommended to visit this summer for your next road trip:
The bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities using advanced bombers and massive ordnance marked a turning point in Donald Trump’s presidency, a man who came to power vowing to end “endless wars” and to withdraw the U.S. from its role as global policeman. With the announcement of a ceasefire between Iran, Israel, and the U.S. in June 2025, brokered by Oman under heavy international pressure, serious questions have emerged: Was the attack a tactical show of force meant to drag Iran back to the negotiating table, or a step toward broader conflict? Is Trump seeking lasting peace, or is he tempted by the drama of a military triumph? And can he leverage this fragile truce to return to diplomacy, or will he stay the course of escalation?
Trump entered the White House in 2016 by sharply criticizing the Iraq War and the massive costs of U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. He even justified the 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani as a measure to prevent war. At the time, he passionately declared, “We are no longer the world’s policeman.” But the June 2025 bombing campaign, nicknamed “Operation Midnight Hammer”, reflected a clear shift in his approach. The operation, which targeted Iran’s Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow sites, reportedly caused serious damage to the country’s nuclear program, according to U.S. sources. However, it was launched without congressional approval or broad international support.
Analysts believe several factors drove this decision: the perceived weakening of Iran following the depletion of its proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon; Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s push for U.S. military involvement against Tehran; and Trump’s need for a symbolic military “win” to bolster his domestic position amid growing anti-immigration protests and waning support among younger Republicans.
Yet, the ceasefire announced on June 24, 2025, facilitated by Oman and quietly backed by European powers and China, signaled that Trump may still be looking to contain the conflict. Reactions to the attack and subsequent truce have revealed deep divisions among Trump’s base and the international community. Steve Bannon, a staunch Trump ally, criticized the move as a betrayal of his anti-war promises, saying it was exactly what Trump had pledged never to do. Conservative figure Charlie Kirk warned that such conflicts could quickly spiral out of control. On social media, Trump supporters voiced concern about military spending and the potential for a drawn-out entanglement. Far-right commentator Jack Posobiec stressed that young Republicans prioritize fixing America’s domestic problems, like the economic crisis and social instability, over military adventures in the Middle East.
Global reactions were even harsher. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation condemned the strike as a violation of international law. The International Atomic Energy Agency warned that attacks on nuclear sites could have catastrophic environmental and humanitarian consequences.
The greater danger still looms. Bombing a country, without a ground invasion, rarely leads to peace. Iran, with its large population, complex military structure, and advanced missile and cyber capabilities, is not Iraq or Libya. A single miscalculation could unravel the ceasefire and plunge the region into deeper instability. If Iran retaliates, whether through asymmetric warfare or pressure on U.S. allies, the risk of escalation is high.
Trump still has the chance to change course. He could frame the strike as a final warning and use the ceasefire as a springboard back into diplomacy. A narrative like “We’ve shown our strength, now it’s time for peace” might resonate both domestically and abroad. But if he continues down the path of pressure, broadening the mission from containing Iran’s nuclear program to altering its behavior—or even regime change, he risks falling into the very trap he once called “the stupid wars of the Middle East.”
The success of the ceasefire and a return to diplomacy could solidify Trump’s legacy as a peacemaker. Its failure, however, may seal the end of his political career.
This summer, the global economic stage is hosting two wildly contrasting blockbusters in trade policy, each promising a different future for international commerce. On one side, we have China, rolling out the red carpet for a grand gala of zero-tariff delights for a vast swathe of African nations. On the other, we see the specter of a protectionist act, with U.S. President Donald Trump announcing plans to send out 150-plus letters to countries worldwide, each containing a polite (or not-so-polite) invitation to pay a new 10% or 15% cover charge. It’s a tale of two philosophies: one building bridges with open arms, the other, perhaps installing a very large, very expensive global toll booth.
Let’s first RSVP to China’s “Open Arms” party. Beijing’s commitment to high-level opening-up is currently in full swing, underscored by its long-standing and now significantly expanded zero-tariff policy for African nations. This isn’t just a fleeting summer fling; it’s a deepening relationship. Starting December 1, 2024, China granted 100% zero-tariff treatment to products from 33 African Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that have diplomatic ties with Beijing, making it the first major developing economy to do so. In a bold move this June 2025, China announced its intention to extend this 100% zero-tariff treatment to 98% of taxable goods from all 53 African nations with diplomatic ties, a policy set to fully mature through new economic partnership agreements. Imagine: a vast market of 1.4 billion consumers, suddenly accessible without the usual customs hurdles for everything from Rwandan dried chilies to Malagasy lamb.
This isn’t merely about trade figures; it’s a strategic embrace. China frames this as fostering “shared prosperity” and helping African nations build their “blood-making” capabilities – a rather vivid metaphor for self-sustaining economic growth. It’s about supporting industrialization, enhancing local value chains, and providing a crucial diversified export market for African goods, especially as traditional markets face headwinds. In essence, China is inviting Africa to a grand buffet, where the food is free, and the kitchen is open for new recipes. The message is clear: “Come on in, bring your best, and let’s grow together.” While some analysts raise eyebrows, suggesting it benefits China more or could impact local industries, the sheer scale and intent of this open-door policy represent a significant commitment to multilateralism and South-South cooperation.
Now, let’s turn to the other side of the global stage, where the curtain might soon rise on a very different kind of show: the “Global Toll Booth” policy. Reports indicate that Trump, known for his unique approach to trade, is currently sending out letters to over 150 countries, informing them that they’ll soon be subject to a blanket 10% or 15% “reciprocal tariff.” Think of it as a universal cover charge for entering the American market, with a potential surcharge for those deemed to have “taken advantage” in the past.
This approach, rooted in an “America First” philosophy, aims to slash trade deficits, encourage “reshoring” (bringing production back home) and “de-risking” (reducing reliance on specific, often adversarial, supply chain nodes). It’s less about a shared feast and more about ensuring America gets the biggest slice of the pie, even if it means baking a smaller pie for everyone. The humor here lies in the sheer audacity and scale: imagine the postal service grappling with 150-plus individually tailored tariff notices, each potentially sparking a new round of trade negotiations or, more likely, retaliatory tariffs. The central economic joke, of course, is the argument that “they pay for it,” while most economists agree that tariffs are largely paid by domestic consumers and businesses through higher prices, potentially increasing the overall U.S. price level by over 2% and leading to a significant loss in real GDP.
The contrast between these two approaches couldn’t be starker. China’s strategy is akin to a seasoned architect, meticulously designing new, interconnected trade routes and inviting everyone to build along them, especially those who need a leg up. It’s about fostering a complex, interwoven tapestry of global supply chains where every thread, no matter how small, contributes to the strength of the whole. The goal is deep integration, shared growth, and a vision of resilience through interdependence.
Conversely, the U.S. strategy resembles a determined gardener, carefully pruning away what it perceives as unhealthy or risky branches from the global supply chain tree. While the stated aim is resilience, the method risks fragmentation, higher costs, and a more unpredictable global trade environment. One approach seeks to expand the pie for all; the other aims to secure a larger, more controlled slice of a potentially shrinking pie.
For global businesses and consumers, these divergent paths present a fascinating, if somewhat bewildering, future. China’s zero-tariff policy offers tangible incentives for market access and development, potentially creating new growth poles in Africa and beyond. It signals stability and a long-term commitment to global engagement. Trump’s tariffs, however, introduce a significant element of volatility. Businesses would face increased costs, disrupted supply chains, and the constant uncertainty of shifting trade policies, forcing them to re-evaluate sourcing, production, and market strategies on a global scale. The humor might be lost when the price of your morning coffee or favorite gadget suddenly jumps due to an unexpected “reciprocal tariff.”
In the grand theater of global economics, China is betting on an ensemble performance where everyone gets a chance to shine, especially the emerging stars. The U.S., under Trump presidency, seems poised for a solo act, where the star demands a hefty entrance fee from the audience, regardless of their role in the show. As this summer unfolds, the world will be watching to see which blockbuster strategy ultimately fosters genuine prosperity and stability, and which one merely leaves everyone paying more for the ticket.
If we are going to make an overview of what is going on now through the lens of the so-called dangerous opportunity, we can list some challenges and opportunities that Iran and China both face through this tension. I will try to name challenges and opportunities.
Challenges
The first challenge is that the United States of America is in a big competition and rivalry against China, which is the main actor trying to compete against the Western order. The US tries to create a “burned land” within the Middle East by using the major strategy of balkanization. In this strategy, the United States attempts to create a weak, failed, chaotic space for China throughout the region to actually block any attempts to initiate the Belt and Road Initiative and land corridors from China to the western part of the world. You can see a clear idea of balkanization throughout the region, and of course, we can see this example in Syria. The main role that Israel and the United States try to duplicate in different parts of the region may be seen in Yemen, Iraq, and even Afghanistan. The challenge is that we will have a burnt land in the Middle East that actually makes it impossible to follow initiatives like the Belt and Road.
The second challenge could be an energy crisis in the Middle East. We know that China tries its best to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran to secure regional security and stability, and of course, energy stability within the Middle East and at the global scale. This crisis and tension, which Israel initiated through unprovoked actions, could lead to a worldwide energy crisis because Iran and Tehran have mentioned multiple times that there are different options available for Iran to affect the whole region if there is more tension or further attacks from any foreign actors, especially the United States or Israel.
The third challenge we can name is the corridor blockade or dead-end. We can name different initiatives and corridors made and created by the United States, such as I2U2, Quad, AUKUS, and of course IMEC, as initiatives to create a kind of blockade for China through maritime corridors. If the United States and Israel follow through with their goals in the current tension, there would be a kind of corridor blockade from the East to the West.
Another challenge we can name is about the Abraham Accords. China and Beijing should understand that this kind of alliance is not really just about Palestine or normalization with the Zionist regime; it is a big alliance and outsourcing of the regional order from Washington to Tel Aviv. In this regional order, which is totally supported and facilitated by Washington, the Middle East—or better said, Southwest Asia—would be a total ally of the United States. This could strongly affect the national interests of Beijing.
Last but not least, a challenge after the current tension between Iran and Israel is the possibility of initiating the next big conflict. Currently, we have two big open wounds from previous years: the Ukraine crisis and Palestine. The result and balance of power around these two hot zones will create a balance of power around a third hot zone, which is Taiwan. Therefore, the outcomes of Ukraine and Palestine will directly affect the Taiwan situation in the upcoming months and years.
Opportunities
The Chinese letter for crisis shows us that there is an opportunity in this kind of crisis. If we can name them:
The first opportunity is that supporting policy, especially for the nations of the region and the Global South, is simply being on the right side of history. Every actor who supports Palestine gains favorability within nations, especially in the Global South. As you can see, Iran has gained much soft power within the current tension with Israel in the region. This is a real comeback from the Arab Spring for Iran’s image in the eyes of the Middle Eastern people. Actually, China may understand that in the region there is a deep real desire to resist Israel. Every actor who stands against the operations of Israel will gain and has gained much favorability in the region and even the world. This is the big, big side of the resistance idea.
The second opportunity during this kind of conflict is that Iran can show and test its military capability against the Western alliances. It is not a clear and accurate vision if you consider the current situation and tension as a simple war between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Tehran, in the current 12-day war, stands and fights against Washington, the whole NATO, and some regional actors. Iran has not only avoided defeat in this situation but also tried to push the whole Israel and Western alliances to a ceasefire point.
The third opportunity is the chance and moment for almost all old actors in the region to shift their ideas towards a strong region without the US. It seems that even countries like Saudi Arabia and other regional states are thinking about a region without the presence of the United States. The good news is that if Iran and its allies can play a good role during the conflict and upcoming tension, there could be a regional order emerging from the regional actors, and there would be no vacuum of power.
The next opportunity I want to mention, after the experience of this war, is really important for Beijing nowadays and the current situation of the international order. China could not find any other strategy or reliable partner within the region with the capability of military, social soft power, enormous energy resources, and favorable geography other than Iran.
Conclusion
It seems that the fundamental strategy of the United States during the Trump administration for the Middle East, called “peace through strength,” is just a choice between two options: surrender or war. Surrender would mean a regional order controlled by Tel Aviv. Iran, as it seems, is trying to prepare itself for full-scale war. As mentioned in the early stage of this note, during the tension, this is a period of rebalancing of actors’ powers. Therefore, the ability and will of order-writers like China to play a role in this conflict will determine the upcoming role of this actor in the new world order.
If the world is asked in a random exercise to name leaders who have weaponized nationalism, crises, and emotional triggers in world history, the textbook examples will always consist of three defining figures in international politics: Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Benito Mussolini. Nonetheless, there are other highly famous political characters as well that mastered the art of political manipulation, realpolitik, and conflict engineering. One of them, like the previous crisis constructors, was not only an ideologue or a demagogue but also a strategic architect of German unification and realpolitik, Otto Von Bismarck.From orchestrating wars to rallying political crises, applying ruthless pragmatism to tapping the public’s pulse for unification, and operating narratives to politically alienating adversaries, the pattern of urgency, manipulation, and crisis manufacturing for peace in Europe continues to synchronize with the coursebook that conflict agitators follow in the 21st century.
From Trump to Modi, using conflicts as a unifier in domestic politics and a reinforcer for global overlordship, or regional dominion, has been the coursebook that has set a solid ground for performative crisis politics to take center stage. The national or global urgency engineered around military operations, internal threats, and the adventures of geopolitical adversaries gives a cogent justification model for crisis exaggeration. The use of national security as a justified political tool to wage war has been a mainstay for regional security and strategic stability to thrive in a world of permacrisis. The adventures from perilous military maneuvers, Operation Midnight Hammer to Operation Sindoor,both act as textbook examples of how populist leaders weaponize crises and geopolitical tensions to gauge the international reaction. The political maneuvering that encircles the psychological urgency, which is constructed around a tense war climate, helps to update the scorecards for the states losing their diplomatic traction. Even if Trump continues to use tariffs and geopolitical crises to flex America’s Goliath-like posture in international politics, the looming reactive outbursts that will emanate from the staggering public debt of America might become its political doomsday. Therefore, as long as the self-proclamation of Nobel Prize seeking continues, crisis termination dynamics will remain complex, transitory, and inflamed as Bismarckian practices continue to juggle regional adversaries. Public debt, economic protectionism, coercive diplomacy, and realpolitik continue to redirect conflict agitators and Trump’s diplomatic canvas in global politics, but fracturing de-dollarization adventures frequently maim America’s global dominion.
The persistence of the world to engage in perpetual low-level conflicts with diplomatic stalemates, all while trying to avoid full-scale wars but also achieve strategic complacency, has caused an overlap of concepts in international security. From deterrence theories to compellence tactics and securitization to preventive or preemptive strikes, the world has engaged in a cyclical discourse where compellence has emerged as a dominating force to calculate the adversary’s response and outmaneuver them in psychological scorecards. The constantly pushed incremental pressure and false dilemma create a risk-prone environment for regional rivals to engage in a miscalculated scenario of multiple escalation dynamics, which Bismarck did in the Franco-Prussian War. These manipulative practices to provoke adversaries while creating urgency and using prestige politics to ignite a chain reaction of desperate political moves across the border have constructed new political strategies, marked with political aggression, to cogently engage in warmongering exercises. With Modi following similar models to consistently push Pakistan towards strategic miscalculations by incrementing national pressure, the illusion of choice offered by him to follow a predetermined pathway of peace approaches has become an outdated doctrine for South Asia, especially for Pakistan. The political overspill of Bismarckian diagrams drawn by Modi and the international reluctance to grant a ‘win’ to India both display that urgency and crisis politics, with victimhood populism and political desperation to delegitimize opponents, have lost substantial ground. Following the same model, Trump seems to be lingering at his electoral promises of terminating conflicts around the globe and reviving the abstract idea of Pax Americana for international politics, portraying America’s influence as an urgent necessity for global regulation and recalibration. The ashes of dysfunctionalities after settling conflicts through coercive diplomatic and military endeavors are a grim feature of Trump’s diplomatic and ideological doctrinal moves. From transactional diplomacy for the Gulf to a reverse Kissingerian model for the Russia-China alliance, Trump’s diplomatic model seems to be more instinctive than consistent with ideological lexicons.
The Bismarck model of using political timing, psychology, and provocation—all three strategies—designed a cogent and adept method of foreign policy of weaponizing crisis and creating urgency to shroud political cognition, which Modi seems to be institutionalizing as an accepted practice against Pakistan on domestic grounds. The political instrumentalization of regular clashes and crises in South Asia to create a justification model for counteroffensive maneuvers and warmongering narratives revolves around important political events. From electoral needs to domestic diversions, or regional dominations to international tabbing of adversaries as regional disturbances, Modi appears to desperately wrap Pakistan in a diplomatic cloak of isolation. With the Bismarckian pointer of manipulative outlines, Modi would perilously engineer another crisis to conceal national failures post-Balakot-Sindoor. If Modi follows a similar pattern of crisis construction, just like Bismarck did, the launchpad for such military and political maneuvers would be the northern areas of Pakistan, particularly Gilgit-Baltistan. Despite the previous retaliation patterns of Pakistan, creating a risk-prone conflict with reactive outcomes, Modi will invite a berserk amount of regional pressure and escalation. Theoretically and practically, igniting a conflict with new external and domestic spectacles, Modi appears to be in a desperate cycle of reviving electoral domination and regional prestige. The retaliatory approach from Islamabad and Beijing would trap the conflict from two opposite sides, with Beijing’s militaristic adventures in the northern disputed territories. Even if proxies or informants engineer something like Pulwama or Pahalgam, India would still be in a high-risk gambit that could meet unimaginable results if the Bismarckian urgency and crisis weaponizing playbook gets mishandled and cloaks foreign policy objectives with electoral overlordship gambles.
England cruised past the United States in a match in Washington that had almost two hours of delays because of lightning strikes in the area.
Kick-off in the US capital was held up by an hour, with play in the one-off Test starting at 18:05 local time (23:05 BST) on Saturday.
England led 14-0 in the 29th minute when more reports of bad weather forced Scottish referee Sam Grove-White to take the players off the field for a further 40 minutes.
On both occasions, supporters inside the 20,000-capacity Audi Field in Washington were told to “exit the seating bowl” and “seek shelter in the concourse” on a message on the stadium’s video screen.
Despite the weather delays, England still managed to shine, scoring six tries to end their tour of Argentina and the United States with a perfect three-win record.
Steve Borthwick’s side started the match well, taking the lead through Curtis Langdon after a maul in the 11th minute, while Luke Northmore crossed under the posts seven minutes later. Both tries came with the USA down to 14 players with Chris Hilsenbeck in the sin-bin.
Alex Dombrandt and debutant Joe Carpenter then had tries chalked off after TMO reviews, before Cadan Murley deservedly added England’s third score by crossing on the left wing on the stroke of half-time.
Straight after the restart, Jack van Poortvliet went over while replacement Harry Randall produced a brilliant dummy to score in the 62nd minute.
Gabriel Oghre finished England’s sixth try, but the Red Roses were unable to completely shut the US out, as Shilo Klein crashed over in the corner right at the end.
Alongside Sale full-back Carpenter, Bath centre Max Ojomoh, Gloucester second row Arthur Clark and Gloucester fly-half Charlie Atkinson all made their England debuts.
Immanuel Feyi-Waboso also returned after his two-match ban as Borthwick made 12 changes to the England side who beat the Pumas in San Juan in their second Test.
Earlier at Audi Field, the USA’s women survived a late charge to beat Fiji 31-24.
