Ukraine

Ukraine hits Russia’s Afipsky oil refinery and gas plant in latest attacks targeting energy infrastructure.

A fire broke out at the Afipsky oil refinery in Russia’s Krasnodar region following a drone attack, local authorities have said.

At least two people were killed and two others were injured due to falling drone debris at the Afipsky railway station, Governor Veniamin Kondratyev said on Tuesday.

Ukraine has been targeting Russia’s oil refineries and ⁠other infrastructure, attempting to undermine ⁠Moscow’s war efforts and reduce financial revenue.

Ukraine’s General Staff said its forces struck facilities at Afipsky.

It said its forces also hit a gas processing plant in Russia’s Astrakhan region overnight.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence said its forces had struck a cargo vessel carrying goods for the Ukrainian army in the port of Pivdennyi near Odesa, as well as port infrastructure facilities used for unloading military cargo.

The ministry said Russian air defences shot down 148 Ukrainian drones overnight.

Ukraine has ramped up attacks on Russian energy infrastructure in recent months, escalating a fuel crisis in the country.

Amid the continuing attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on Monday that would allow the state to take temporary control of critical infrastructure found to be inadequately protected from attack.

The attacks come after a meeting in Kyiv where Ukraine’s allies pledged to continue supporting the country during the ongoing war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the assembled leaders in an evening address that he wanted to “raise production” of drones and missiles to wage “more attacks” on Russia, matching its strikes on Ukraine.

The meeting was attended by 30 leaders of the so-called Coalition of the Willing, including British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, who called for negotiations with Russia, and French President Emmanuel Macron, who participated remotely and predicted that “NATO countries will be targeted and the provocations will multiply”.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb was also in attendance, urging Ukraine’s allies to help expand its ability ⁠to strike deeply inside Russia.

The Kremlin said on Tuesday that Burnham and Stubb belonged to the “party of war”.

Owing to his illness, 26-year-old Sasha from Orenburg, a city in Russia close to the Kazakhstan border, has a Category V military ID, which under normal circumstances makes him ineligible for service.

But not during wartime.

Just before partial mobilisation was declared in 2022, he considered leaving for Kazakhstan. But while awaiting the bus, he struck up a conversation with his soon-to-be girlfriend.

As they turned back together, they decided against making the drastic move.

Over the past year, however, they have grown increasingly anxious.

“Since mid-2025, my girlfriend and I have been experiencing a severe decline in mental health. We see psychiatrists and take antidepressants,” Sasha told Al Jazeera.

He requested to be identified only by his first name to protect his anonymity.

“I don’t go outside unless it’s urgent and try never to be alone. I carry pepper spray for protection against aggression if it happens, like in Penza.”

Since June, there have been reports of attempted press-ganging in Penza, 625km (388 miles) southeast of Moscow.

Recent footage shared on social media has shown individuals dressed in plainclothes trying to force fighting-age men into vehicles to take them to the recruitment centre, while weeping women try to intervene – echoing similar scenes in Ukraine.

Potential recruits have also been reportedly summoned to police stations under bureaucratic pretexts, then beaten or threatened – for example, by having illicit drugs planted on them – into signing a military contract.

Local authorities deny the reports, claiming only men attempting to dodge the draft, who have already been mobilised, are being approached. They have also accused residents who have shared footage of the roundups of spreading disinformation.

Although the Penza roundups have received attention lately, local authorities throughout Russia have been accused of coercive methods for some time.

“In October 2022, a friend was stopped at night by military police,” said Sasha. “They identified themselves as civilians and didn’t show identification. They demanded a passport or military ID, and that he accompany them. My friend ran away.”

According to Mikhail Liberov, from the Conscientious Objectors Movement, military recruiters select the “right targets who, for one reason or another, are vulnerable to seduction, deception, blackmail, or are simply unaware of their actions”.

He said this group includes drug addicts, alcoholics, mentally unwell people, those with large debts and migrants “who don’t speak Russian or barely know what’s actually written, and are also afraid of deportation”.

Men above 35 years of age are also approached, and some are “willing to risk their lives and the lives of others for big money and the chance to become ‘heroes’.

“Then comes the threat of prison: A man arrested for petty hooliganism might be intimidated by the idea that, say, ‘We’ll plant drugs on you and put you in prison for 12 years,’ and many agree to sign contracts.”

Oleg Ignatov, senior Russia analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the recent roundups in Penza are likely isolated instances of local authorities trying to fill their recruitment quotas, rather than a systemic, nationwide effort.

‘Mobilisation will still happen’

These renewed recruitment incidents come amid rumours of a mobilisation effort and an expected Russian offensive this winter that will likely involve ramped-up attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

“I’ve already accepted that mobilisation will still happen, unless something happens that forces (Russian President Vladimir) Putin to end the war in Ukraine,” said Liberov, who believes Russia will ready troops within a year.

“Human rights activists are already working on the assumption that mobilisation will take place this fall,” he said.

In September 2022, Putin signed a decree allowing for partial mobilisation. Fearing deployment, thousands of men fled to neighbouring countries. But that mobilisation effort effectively ended two months later.

Russia has since been able to replenish its ranks by enlisting prisoners, as well as promising generous payouts.

However, the recruitment pool is dwindling.

According to the independent Russian news site IStories, the number of people voluntarily signing military contracts halved by late 2025. Those who enlist are disproportionately from underprivileged corners of society.

“The protracted war with Ukraine, the large number of dead soldiers, and the degradation of the Russian economy demotivate people from participating in such an adventure in the name of Putin,” said Liberov.

Official casualties are not made public in Russia.

The Washington, DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies puts the number of deaths among Russian forces since the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 at nearly 450,000.

Meanwhile, the 2022 mobilisation decree remains in effect, and the Russian offensive in Ukraine is lagging. The war is now being felt at home as Ukrainian drones strike deep into Russian territory.

“I only live once. I’m not going to sacrifice it for someone else’s wishes and will fight to the bitter end,” said Sasha. “Human life is priceless, and you have to cling to it until the end.”

Vladimir from Ulan-Ude, who has previously served as a conscript and is thus eligible for mobilisation, said he has a “generally negative attitude” about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“I am preparing for a possible draft. In the event of an escalation, I will insist on the alternative civil service,” said the 35-year-old, who requested to withhold his surname over fears of reprisal. “I wouldn’t want to leave the country.”

According to the Russian constitution, alternative civilian service can be applied for when “convictions or religious beliefs contradict military service”.

Conscripts can serve either for 21 months at an organisation “subordinate to the bodies of the executive branch”, often taking jobs as nurses, cleaners or postal workers, or for 18 months at a defence manufacturing plant. According to the Ministry of Defence, about 2,000 people apply for alternative civilian service each year, with approximately half receiving approval.

Earlier this summer, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed the Kremlin was secretly preparing for a mass mobilisation – a claim backed by reports in Russian independent media.

In June, lawmaker Andrey Gurulev of the governing United Russia party wrote on Telegram that “there’s now active talk, both behind the scenes and in high places, about the need for a new large-scale mobilisation.”

But expanding the army is expensive while budgets are under strain, and a huge influx of recruits still leaves a shortage of experienced officers and trained specialists.

“I would say that Russia’s problems right now are less about the quantity, but more about the quality of contractors,” said Crisis Group’s Ignatov.

“Russians need more skilled soldiers who can operate drones, who can operate modern warfare systems. And here they have more problems than the Ukrainians.

“But if this war continues, of course, we can assume that (mobilisation) could happen.”

Aug. 24 (UPI) — On his first visit to Ukraine as British Prime Minister Andy Burnham promised Monday to share Anglo-French long-range cruise missile technology with Kyiv in its fight with Russia, saying Britain would stand with Ukraine until there was “a just and lasting peace.”

Burnham said European defense contractor MBDA would be authorized to declassify blueprints for the parts of the Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles that are made by Britain to help Ukraine build its own version of the weapon that Britain has for the past three years been giving to Kyiv.

The Storm Shadow enables Ukrainian forces to hit targets 150 miles inside Russia.

Burnham said Britain would join forces with France to build production plants in Ukraine following a similar pledge of help by President Emmanuel Macron, who also told Zelensky at the weekend that France would supply Kyiv with more anti-missile interceptors in the wake of a series of deadly ballistic missile strikes.

“On Ukraine’s 35th anniversary of independence, the Ukrainian people should be in no doubt: the U.K. is behind you today and for as long as it takes. I am proud of the contribution our country has made to Ukraine and I want the Ukrainian people to hear it directly from me that our support will not waver. After all, Ukraine’s security is our security,” Burnham said in a statement issued Sunday night.

“The friendship between our two countries will long outlast Russia’s illegal war. In both the fight and in the rebuilding to come, we will stand with Ukraine and deliver opportunities for people across both our countries. Russia should be in no doubt of our resolve. We will not back down until there is a just and lasting peace,” said Burnham.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov likened the missile plan to pouring gasoline on relations with Russia and warned Britain over “participating in this war” on Ukraine’s side, saying that the Russian military was actively collecting data to uncover and destroy any missile production sites.

“Britain is methodically and regularly adding fuel to the fire and methodically and regularly plotting to prevent any progress in the peace process,” said Peskov.

Burnham’s high-profile, public backing for Zelensky came as he faces challenges both from nightly Russian ballistic missile strikes and to his authority, amid calls for elections which have been suspended for more than four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

As well joining Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for Independence Day celebrations in Kyiv, Burnham was also scheduled to chair a meeting of the U.K.-France-led Coalition of the Willing for talks on providing more help to Ukraine.

Established in 2025, the focus of the 34 country plus Ukraine partnership is to provide security guarantees in the event a cease-fire agreement is reached, including providing a multinational force to support and monitor it from day 1, though not necessarily in the format of a traditional peace-keeping force.

The stand by Burnham, coincided with a similar pledge from from Brussels, backed up by a multi-billion dollar package of fresh European Union military aid.

“On Ukraine’s Independence Day, we show our unfaltering support. Today, we approved $7.1 billion for the air and missile defense systems, missiles, ammunition and radars that Ukraine urgently needs. Europe stands with you today, tomorrow, and for as long as it takes,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a post on X.

The package is in addition to $18.7 billion already approved by the 27-country bloc, $9.7 billion of which has already been provided to Kyiv.

Aug. 23 (UPI) — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Saturday rejected calls for wartime elections, saying the move would “destroy the country.”

Under martial law, elections have been suspended since Russia invaded the country in 2022.

Last week, ousted Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov called on the president, whose five-year term ended in 2024, to allow Ukrainians to vote again.

Responding to Fedorov for the first time, Zelenky said such a move would split the country.

“I believe that if we want to destroy the country, then during such a war we can move in the selection of elections,” Zelensky told reporters on Saturday.

“I believe that during such a war, elections in general are big risks,” the president added. “Elections right now are a tsunami for the state that will split Ukraine.”

Zelensky said he would consider fresh elections under “specific conditions,” the Guardian reported.

Those conditions include the “participation of the military, in frontline territories, abroad, where millions of our citizens have gone, fleeing the war,” the president said.

Fedorov’s removal as defense minister in July sparked protests across Ukraine. On Tuesday, he said democracy was not a “peacetime luxury.”

“Democracy cannot be held hostage by Russia,” Fedorov said. “We are fighting precisely because we want to remain a free European state.

“Therefore, we must find a legal, safe, and realistic mechanism that will allow Ukraine to restore a full democratic process even amidst a prolonged war.”

Responding to Zelensky’s comments on Sunday, Fedorov told the BBC, “Democracy should not be the hostage of Putin.”

Zelensky last discussed open elections in December, after U.S. President Donald Trump accused him of using the war as an excuse to stay in power.

Back then, the Ukrainian president said he would hold elections so long as he could secure help from the United States and other allies to keep citizens safe when they go out to vote.

In early August, a Pentagon official stood in front of reporters and conceded something the department almost never says out loud: the world’s best-funded military cannot out-produce a country under invasion. Travis Metz, deputy director of the Defense Innovation Unit, put a number on it. Ukraine will manufacture six to seven million small first-person-view attack drones this year — roughly 500,000 a month, built in garages, repurposed furniture factories and basements within range of Russian glide bombs. The Pentagon’s own flagship drone program, a $1.1 billion initiative branded Drone Dominance, will have ordered fewer than 200,000 drones, cumulatively, by February 2027. Metz’s response was not defensive. It was aspirational: “I see no reason why we shouldn’t… be the world champions of this as well.” The gap he was describing is not a technology gap. It is a speed gap, and speed is the one metric wartime industry cannot fake.

The instinct is to read this as a story about Ukrainian ingenuity, and it is one. But it is also the epilogue to a specific American failure. In 2023 the Pentagon launched Replicator, a program to field “multiple thousands” of autonomous systems within 24 months to counter China. By its August 2025 deadline it had delivered “hundreds,” not thousands, after burning through roughly $1 billion — undone by drones that were unfinished at selection, software that could not command large numbers of different systems at once, and a Switchblade loitering munition priced above $100,000 a unit. Washington’s answer was not to slow down and fix the model; it was to bring in the Department of Government Efficiency to override procurement rules and reclassify small drones as disposable supplies rather than regulated weapons systems. Meanwhile, Russia’s own Shahed and decoy drone output is reportedly climbing toward several hundred, and by some Ukrainian estimates up to a thousand, units a day. The war that forced Ukraine to mass-produce cheap drones is the same war exposing how slowly America still moves.

Why the gap isn’t about money

Start with unit economics, because they explain most of the gap. A Ukrainian FPV drone can be built for as little as $300 to $500 — an airframe, a camera, a battery and a warhead, assembled by hand and flown once. The Pentagon’s comparable systems have historically cost orders of magnitude more, not because the components are better but because they were designed inside an acquisition culture built for exquisite, low-volume platforms like fighter jets, where every part is sourced, tested and certified over years. Layer onto that a July 2026 rule requiring a “wholly domestic” supply chain — no Chinese-made motors, no Chinese battery packs — and the honest tension becomes visible: the policy meant to make American drone production more secure is, in the near term, also what makes it slower and more expensive to scale. Metz’s own explanation was blunt: it is “much harder to get from zero to 200,000” than to expand an existing line. Ukraine skipped that problem by never centralizing production in the first place — thousands of small, dispersed workshops that are individually replaceable and collectively enormous.

The deeper obstacle is not money but structure. Replicator had no dedicated budget line, was bounced between the Defense Innovation Unit and a newly created Defense Autonomous Warfare Group under Special Operations Command, and repeatedly selected systems that existed as concepts rather than finished products, in a rush to hit an artificial 24-month deadline. Congress, by its own research service’s account, has struggled to get basic cost and capability data out of the program. This is what forced DOGE’s intervention: not a shortage of appropriated dollars, but a procurement system engineered for careful, low-volume exquisiteness trying to behave like a wartime factory floor, and failing at both.

The strongest objection to treating this as a straightforward American failure is that the comparison is not apples to apples. Ukraine’s FPVs are disposable, short-range and built for a static front line; American planners are chasing autonomy, jamming resistance and long-range swarm coordination for a Pacific theatre defined by vast distances rather than trench lines, and that ambition costs more and takes longer to get right. That is a fair distinction — but it does not rescue the record. Years and a billion dollars into that more ambitious bet, the Pentagon still lacks software able to command mixed fleets of different drones, while Ukrainian manufacturers are already fielding AI-assisted terminal guidance on sub-$500 airframes, refined through thousands of real combat sorties a month. The ambition gap did not produce a capability lead. It produced the same failure as the cost gap: exquisite requirements colliding with a timeline the requirements were never built to meet.

Which is why the Pentagon’s actual fix looks nothing like a bigger budget. Six Ukrainian manufacturers, including F-Drones and General Cherry, are now required to form joint ventures with American companies — near Toledo, Ohio, and in New Hampshire — as a condition of future Pentagon orders. Washington is not just buying drones. It is importing the production model, and with it the tacit admission that the expertise now runs the other way.

Three ways this goes

What happens next depends on whether the joint-venture model actually transplants Ukraine’s manufacturing tempo onto US soil, or just its branding.

Base case (roughly 50 percent probability). The Ohio and New Hampshire joint ventures scale gradually. By 2027–28, US-based output climbs into the low hundreds of thousands annually — a real improvement, but still an order of magnitude below Ukraine’s current pace, held back by the domestic-sourcing rule’s cost premium. The program becomes a credible proof of concept for a future Indo-Pacific contingency rather than a fix for any current shortfall, and “Drone Dominance” quietly redefines success downward to match what it can actually deliver.

Downside case. The DOGE-driven bypass of standard testing repeats Replicator’s failure mode at greater scale: units purchased without adequate vetting turn out unreliable in the field, a GAO or inspector-general report documents it, and Congress reimposes the very procurement safeguards that were just stripped away. Combined with a Chinese-component ban that keeps unit costs well above Ukrainian levels, US output stalls again, and the gap that Metz conceded in August widens rather than closes by the time it next matters.

Upside case. The joint-venture model works as intended — not just as a purchasing arrangement but as a transplant of Ukrainian manufacturing culture, its dispersed micro-factories, rapid iteration and tolerance for combat-tested imperfection, into the American industrial base. That model, proven on drones, becomes the template for how Washington arms the next partner already fighting a war, whether Taiwan or a Baltic state: not a slow pipeline of finished stockpiles shipped from the continental United States, but manufacturing capability transplanted onto the partner’s own soil, and now, in this instance, onto America’s.

The takeaway

So: what does the mismatch reveal? Not that Ukraine builds better drones — the Pentagon never disputed that its own designs, on paper, are more capable. It reveals that capability on paper is not the same as capability in time, and that the American defense-industrial base, even backed by an executive order, a billion-dollar program and a DOGE override of its own rules, still cannot mobilize at wartime tempo on its own. The fix Washington has actually reached for is not more money. It is outsourcing the missing ingredient — speed — to the one partner that has been forced to master it under fire. That is the real admission, and it may be the more durable one: the next time the United States arms a country fighting a live war, it may look less like supplying an ally and more like apprenticing to one.

Watch for: whether the Ohio and New Hampshire joint-venture lines are shipping US-assembled drones at anything close to Ukrainian unit costs by the next Gauntlet test cycle at Fort Carson. If the “wholly domestic” sourcing rule keeps American-made units several multiples more expensive than their Ukrainian counterparts, the joint ventures will have transferred the branding of Ukraine’s drone war without transferring its speed.