strategy

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

Israel’s balancing act that allowed it to reap America’s unconditional and, often, blind support, while slowly benefiting from China’s growing economic influence and political prestige, is already floundering.

Thanks to the heated cold war between the US and Chinese economic superpowers, the Israeli strategy of playing both sides is unlikely to pay dividends in the long run.

Soon enough, Tel Aviv might find itself having to make a stark choice between Washington and Beijing.  When US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited Israel on May 13, two items topped his agenda: Israel’s imminent illegal annexation of Palestinian land and the growing Israeli-Chinese economic ties.

Pompeo communicated his country’s stand on both issues, reflecting Washington’s long-standing policies regarding Palestine and China. In the case of Palestine, as with the rest of the Middle East, Washington seems to adhere to Tel Aviv’s agenda, often to the letter.  China is a different story.

READ: China rejects Israel’s planned annexation of West Bank

Two significant historical examples come to mind: one, is Israel’s attempt to sell China Israeli-made Phalcon airborne radar system, which relied heavily on American technology in the 1990s; a similar event transpired in 2005, this time concerning Israel’s Harpy anti-radar missile. On both occasions, Israel succumbed to American pressure and canceled both deals.

For the Chinese, Israel matters for two different reasons. One, Israel is a strategic stop in China’s Belt and Road initiative, China’s most significant economic project to date, ultimately aimed at turning Beijing into a center of global trade and financial activities. Two, China is hoping to fight the US on its own political turf in the Middle East – partly in response to the American ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, which was initiated by the Barack Obama administration.

But the world – in terms of political and economic balances of power – after the coronavirus pandemic is likely to prove a different one when compared with previous years. China’s rise has been in the making for many years and the US political retreat and declining global outreach has been quite evident for some time. The isolationist policies of the Donald Trump Administration, coupled with Washington’s many China-related tantrums in recent years, are all indicators of the vastly changing political realities of a once-unipolar world.

“I will not miss the opportunity to annex the West Bank”- Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

A few years ago, Beijing had the time, patience, and resources to play a long-drawn geopolitical game in order for it to challenge the US’s global influence, whether in South America, Africa, or Israel.

The visit by China’s Vice President, Wang Qishan, to Israel in 2018, to “boost business ties”, was part of this Chinese strategy. That visit followed the signing, one year earlier, of the China-Israel Innovative Comprehensive Partnership. As of 2018, China-Israel trade has jumped to $14 billion and has grown exponentially ever since.

China would have been happy to carry on with that strategy for many years to come. Israel, too, would have played along, considering the lucrative financial returns from its China partnership.

READ: Israel ties to China may risk our ability to work with Tel Aviv

Indeed, despite Washington’s warnings against and, at times, explicit demands on Israel to refrain from giving Chinese companies access to fifth-generation infrastructure (5G) projects in the country, Israel labored to make China feel welcomed.

However, the global response to the coronavirus pandemic is likely to change this, as it has already accelerated the cold war between the US and China, pushing the latter to adopt a more aggressive form of diplomacy and pour massive sums into other countries’ economies to help them in their desperate fight against the COVID-19 disease.

The Chinese strategy is predicated on two main pillars: fortifying existing ties and solidarity with China’s allies or potential allies anywhere in the world, while pushing back against China’s foes, especially those who are participating in Washington’s anti-Beijing campaign.

The latter phenomenon is known as ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’. The ‘wolf warriors’ are Chinese diplomats who have, for months, pushed back with unprecedented ferocity against what they perceive to be US and Western propaganda.

READ: China’s ambassador to Israel found dead in Tel Aviv home

“We never pick a fight or bully others,” China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, told reporters in Beijing on May 24, while explaining China’s novel approach to diplomacy. “We will push back against any deliberate insult, resolutely defend our national honor and dignity, and we will refute all groundless slander with facts,” the top Chinese official said firmly.

China’s new aggressive diplomacy, especially if it continues to define the country’s approach to foreign policy in the coming years, is unlikely to permit Israel to maintain its balancing act for much longer.

China’s ambassador to Israel, Du Wei, who was entrusted with implementing Beijing’s soft-diplomacy with Tel Aviv, died in his home only a few days following Pompeo’s visit to the country. Although Wei’s death was not – at least publicly – perceived to be the result of foul play, his absence, especially in the age of coronavirus and ‘wolf warriors’, might signal a shift in China’s approach to its economic and political interests in Israel.

On May 26, under American pressure, the Israeli Finance Ministry denied China a massive $1.5 billion desalination plant contract, awarding it to an Israeli company, instead.

This is the first time that the US has used its political and economic sway over Israel to curb Chinese influence in the country. China must be anxiously watching events unfold,   to see if US pressure on Israel will continue to undermine Beijing’s long-term strategy.

Deal of the century, embassy relocation, and the Golan Heights – Israel surely can’t believe their luck? – Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

The world’s quickly shifting balance of power and the US-Chinese unmistakable fight for dominance is likely to, eventually, force countries like Israel to make a choice, of wholly joining the American or the Chinese sphere of influence. It is all reminiscent of the American-Soviet Cold War, where much of the globe was divided into zones of influence operated by proxy from Washington or Moscow.

Balancing acts in politics only work if all parties are willing to play or, at least, tolerate the game. While this form of politics suited Israel’s interests in the past and was played, quite successfully for years by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s balancing act is, possibly, over.

Between Washington’s precise demands to Israel to keep Beijing at bay, and the latter’s aggressive ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, Israel is facing a stark choice: remaining loyal to a fading superpower or diving into the uncharted waters of an emerging one.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

One of the memorable moments of Venezuela’s crazy January ‘26 was ExxonMobil Chairman Darren Woods sitting across from President Trump, telling him Venezuela was “uninvestable.” His company is owed billions from Chávez-era expropriations, spent years in arbitration tribunals, and had watched its assets nationalised without fair compensation. Four months later, ExxonMobil’s technical teams were on the ground in Venezuela, evaluating assets including the Cerro Negro project. Woods was telling investors he felt positive about the opportunities.

The arc from expropriated creditor to ¿partner? is not happening by accident. In April 2026, the IMF and World Bank resumed dealings with Venezuela for the first time since 2019, opening the path to a formal economic assessment and potentially unlocking $4.9 billion in frozen special drawing rights. In May, the Delcy administration announced a “comprehensive restructuring of its sovereign debt” and PDVSA obligations, appointing Centerview Partners as financial adviser and pledging a macroeconomic framework by June. This did not include a request for a macroeconomic programme established by the Fund, which distanced itself from Venezuela’s announcement shortly after. According to Reuters, Venezuela’s total liabilities could be above $150 billion.

On June 2, Venezuela added Hogan Lovells as legal counsel for the restructuring under a dual mandate that also covers strategic lobbying for the Venezuelan embassy in Washington. The account is led by Norm Coleman, a former Republican senator with deep political connections in the capital. Neither selection has been free of political entanglement. Former Trump official Mauricio Claver-Carone, earmarked by The Washington Post as Venezuela’s unofficial viceroy, has vouched for Centerview. His business partner, Jessica Bedoya, was on the same chartered flight to Caracas as two Centerview executives on February 12, weeks before the firm finalized its contract (Centerview denied Bedoya played any role in their assignment).

Some of the companies that spent a decade winning arbitration awards against Venezuela may now be considering turning those claims into something more useful: an operating agreement, a new oil deal. Whether the game is actually changing, and the extent to which Delcy’s technical cadres can manage the process her government is trying to kickstart, are two of the huge questions for Venezuela’s “transition” observers.

Without the IMF as an anchor, the most aggressive litigants will extract preferential recoveries while others are left with worthless paper.

The shape of how Venezuela got here is also visible in a Delaware courthouse. In December, a judge signed the order transferring Citgo to Amber Energy, an affiliate of Wall Street hedge fund Elliott Management, for 5.9 billion dollars. The gavel came down, but the sale did not close. CITGO is now in legal and political limbo.

The transaction requires approval from OFAC, which has repeatedly extended the freeze on CITGO-related transactions. The State Department is now the main barrier blocking the sale, while Treasury, Commerce, and Energy favour letting it proceed. Ten days ago, OFAC issued General License 5W, extending the freeze on CITGO share transfers to June 19. A World Bank delegation visited Caracas last month. Everything suggests Delcy Rodríguez now feels compelled to show she can find a way to pay them back. That she has a plan.

In the meantime, Amber Energy is pressing daily for access to CITGO’s financial and operational details even though it is not formally in control, while CITGO itself cannot make major investment decisions or hire key personnel. A company valued at $13 billion is being run in slow motion, waiting for Washington to decide what Venezuela’s most valuable foreign asset is actually worth, to whom, and under what terms.

None of this happened overnight. The process was set in motion by Hugo Chávez when he went on a nationalisation spree that expropriated the assets of ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Crystallex, and dozens of other foreign companies across the oil, mining, and manufacturing sectors. Those companies didn’t go home quietly. They went to arbitration. And they won.

The restructuring announcement tries to change the terms of the conversation. Venezuela is no longer being asked whether it will engage with its creditors. It has begun doing so. Centerview Partners is on the ground. A macroeconomic framework is due soon. The creditor committee, which includes GMO, Greylock Capital, Fidelity, and T. Rowe Price has been ready to negotiate since January.

ConocoPhillips has been explicit: recovering the billions owed from past expropriations takes priority over any new drilling.

An IMF programme, if it materialises, could signal credibility. It would serve as the anchor for the entire restructuring process. IMF conditionality establishes a debt sustainability framework that defines how much Venezuela can actually pay, which in turn defines what creditors can realistically expect. It also catalyses coordination. Rather than pursuing individual enforcement actions against Venezuelan assets, creditors have an incentive to wait for an orderly process. Without that anchor, the most aggressive litigants will extract preferential recoveries while others are left with worthless paper.

Delcy Rodríguez announced the restructuring without first securing that anchor. She has stated there are “no plans” to contract an IMF loan. The IMF, for its part, says it is willing to support a programme but requires clarity on economic data and external debt that Caracas has not yet provided. Very soon, we will find out whether Venezuela is building toward an IMF-anchored process or trying to engineer one without it.

Several of the companies owed the largest arbitration awards are well positioned to operate Venezuelan assets: ExxonMobil at Cerro Negro, ConocoPhillips at its former Petrozuata and Hamaca projects. ConocoPhillips has been explicit: recovering the billions owed from past expropriations takes priority over any new drilling. A negotiated settlement that converts arbitration claims into operational stakes, with revenue streams tied to production, would give creditors a return and Venezuela a rebuilt industry. The OFAC licensing architecture already enables this. Since January 2026, OFAC has issued or updated more than eight general licenses expanding authorised activity in Venezuela’s energy and financial sectors. Washington has built the tools, such as General License 58. The question is whether Venezuela can use them. 

What this push does not resolve is the harder question: whether Venezuela has the institutional capacity to negotiate on its own terms rather than simply accept whatever is offered. Woods’s shift from “uninvestable” to “positive” in four months signals appetite, not commitment. ExxonMobil wants its assets back or a return on its claims. So does ConocoPhillips. So does every creditor in the queue. The question is whether Venezuela can show up to this negotiation as a party with a strategy, not just a debtor with a problem.

The path forward requires exactly what fifteen years of chavismo didn’t build: legal capacity, a coherent negotiating strategy, and the institutional infrastructure to distinguish between claims that should be settled, claims that should be contested, and claims that might be converted into something more useful than a judgment. The latter could amount to an oil agreement like the one Chevron got in the early 2020s. Venezuela’s reformed Hydrocarbons Law allows international arbitration to resolve disputes in the oil and gas sector. So does the new Mining Law for gold and strategic minerals.

The framework now exists in writing. Whether Venezuela can implement it coherently, and whether it can hold up against the inevitable tension between Venezuelan law as established in the new statutes and US jurisdiction as required by OFAC licenses, are the open questions that will determine whether this moment becomes the start of something durable or another lost opportunity.

None of that sounds like glamorous policymaking. It doesn’t play well in a speech. But the alternative, continuing to treat international arbitration as someone else’s problem, has a documented price tag. It is measured in refineries.

Hawkish voices in Israel have accused Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of holding back on bombing Beirut, to appease the Trump Administration and ensure his own political survival. Nida Ibrahim explains.

May 29 (Asia Today) — Leaders of South Korea’s rival political parties urged voters to cast ballots Friday, the first day of early voting for the June 3 local elections, but their strategies showed different approaches.

Chung Chung-rae, leader of the Democratic Party, and Han Byung-do, the party’s floor leader, both voted on the first day of early voting. People Power Party leader Chang Dong-hyeok and floor leader Song Eon-seok divided their roles, with Chang choosing to vote on Election Day and Song planning to vote early.

Chung began his schedule Friday by casting an early ballot at the Seongsan 2-dong Community Service Center in Mapo District, Seoul. After voting, he attended a meeting of the party’s central election committee in Seoul and urged voters to participate.

“Voting is stronger than bullets,” Chung said. “Power does not come from the barrel of a gun. It comes from the polling place.”

Han also visited an early voting station before heading to campaign events in Namwon, North Jeolla Province.

“Early voting will be held for two days starting today,” Han said. “Please exercise your precious vote for the future of South Korea.”

The major opposition People Power Party took a different approach. Chang plans to vote on Election Day, while Song is scheduled to cast an early ballot Saturday.

The move is seen as a strategy to appeal both to the party’s hard-line conservative base and more moderate conservative voters. Chang and Song have also divided campaign duties during the election period, focusing on separate schedules.

Chang campaigned Friday in Sejong and western Gyeonggi Province.

“The atmosphere is changing as we lead this election, but if we lose by even one vote, there is no future for South Korea,” Chang said. “Everything depends on your one vote. Please do not leave yourself with regret by failing to go to the polling place.”

Song said he plans to vote early Saturday in Gimcheon, North Gyeongsang Province, his electoral district.

At a news conference at the National Assembly earlier Friday, Song acknowledged that some political figures have argued against early voting.

“It is true that there are some movements in political circles saying people should not vote early, but I will not say that is our party,” Song said. “There is a big difference between holding voting over three days and holding it for only one day.”

“In reality, the number of votes cast during the two days of early voting and on Election Day is close to half and half,” he said. “I think voters should vote over the three days, including early voting, according to their circumstances and schedules.”

Park Sung-hoon, chief spokesperson for the People Power Party, said both early voting and Election Day voting are important exercises of political rights.

“To strategically encourage both early voting and Election Day voting, we decided that the floor leader would vote early and the party leader would participate in Election Day voting, taking his schedule into account,” Park said.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260529010008858

The Lakers informed employees Wednesday there would be a round of layoffs as the organization continues restructuring under new ownership, according to multiple people.

Those familiar with the situation but unable to speak publicly confirmed to The Times that at least 15 people across multiple departments, including communications, marketing and sales, would be laid off.

Since Dodgers owner Mark Walter took over as the majority owner of the Lakers in a record-setting $10-billion deal that was finalized in October, the franchise has gradually overhauled both business and basketball operations.

The team hired a new assistant general manager this week, bringing Rohan Ramadas in from the New Orleans Pelicans to oversee strategy and data systems. The front office, led by president of basketball operations and general manager Rob Pelinka, will hire another assistant general manager focused on scouting and player development.

The Lakers functioned as a family business for more than 45 years under the ownership of the late Jerry Buss and his children. They blossomed into one of the premier sports teams in the world, but the ownership change brought swift business changes.

Former Dodgers executive vice president and chief marketing officer Lon Rosen became the Lakers’ president of business operations and created two positions to boost revenue and oversee business strategy.

Michael Spetner, who also most recently worked for the Dodgers, was hired as chief strategy and growth officer while Ryan Kantor, a former business executive with the Clippers, joined as the vice president of global partnerships.

Times staff writer Broderick Turner contributed to this report.

May 15 (Asia Today) — SK Group will merge its annual strategy meeting with the Icheon Forum, its knowledge management platform, industry officials said Friday.

The group plans to hold the New Icheon Forum from June 11-13 at the SKMS Research Institute in Icheon, Gyeonggi Province.

The event combines SK’s management strategy meeting, usually held in June, with the Icheon Forum, which has been held in August. The company plans to hold the New Icheon Forum every June.

The move is aimed at strengthening execution by bringing strategic discussions into a single forum.

This year’s forum is expected to focus on accelerating artificial intelligence.

SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won and chief executives from major affiliates including SK Innovation, SK Telecom and SK hynix are expected to attend.

Participants plan to discuss specific measures for each affiliate to secure leadership in the AI industry and strategies to create groupwide synergy.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260515010004232

NEW YORK — Democratic leaders, desperate to compete in red states where their party brand is toxic, are embracing something new this midterm season: not backing Democrats.

In states like Nebraska and Alaska, Democratic officials are, in some cases, looking past their own party’s candidates while subtly encouraging — or even openly promoting — independent candidates they hope can outperform the Democratic label. The Democratic National Committee and some of its allies in Washington are quietly supporting the new strategy.

Meanwhile, some of the independent candidates are chatting in a group text about their approach as they plot a path that could shake up Congress, which is consumed by partisan gridlock.

Nebraska Democrats this week chose a nominee for U.S. Senate, Cindy Burbank, who said a major campaign priority was to ensure a Democrat wouldn’t be on the fall ballot to pull support from independent Dan Osborn. Shortly after polls closed, Burbank reiterated her plan to drop out in the coming weeks during a private conversation with a party official, according to state Democratic chair Jane Kleeb.

Democratic leaders believe Osborn, who came within 7 percentage points of winning a Senate seat in 2024, has the best chance to defeat Republican Sen. Pete Ricketts.

Democrats’ pivot toward independents is part of an intentional strategy in some places — and something closer to a wink and a nod in others — that covers a handful of high-profile Senate and House and even statehouse contests. Independent Senate candidates are also running in states like Idaho, South Dakota and Montana, where Democratic leadership has so far been unwilling to fully embrace the independents, although many view them as the Democrats’ best chance to stop Republicans this fall.

“For some states, and Nebraska is one of them, where Democrats are 32% of the electorate, this is a long-term strategy for us,” said Kleeb, who also serves as a vice chair to the Democratic National Committee.

Kleeb said her state party is backing independents in at least four state legislative seats in addition to the U.S. Senate: “We have to build a coalition with independents in order to win elections so we can do good work for the people. Period.”

Some of the Democratic Party’s national political machine appears to be on board.

The Democrats’ fundraising site, ActBlue, serves some of the independent candidates, as do popular Democratic-allied website builders. At the same time, some of the party’s campaign committees in Washington quietly provide logistical support in some cases, while avoiding public criticism of the independent candidates even in some races where there is a Democratic nominee.

“The Democratic Party’s brand is awful right now,” said Democratic strategist Josh Schwerin. “The combination of the brand problem and the existential nature of the threat that our country is facing requires us to have a big tent and look for candidates who can win.”

There are risks for the Democratic Party

Some Democratic donors, strategists and party leaders from other states have privately pushed back, insisting Democrats should not look past their own nominees for short-term political gain. They want Democratic officials, in Washington and on the ground in red states, to work harder to make the Democratic brand more attractive — even if it takes several more years to be competitive.

“What’s the independent going to do for the Democratic Party if they win?” asked Democratic strategist Mike Ceraso, who sees the shift toward independents as an attempt to disguise Democrats in some cases. “We’re the party of truth and honesty and integrity, but we’re playing these stupid political games?”

And there is no guarantee that the independent candidates, if elected, would support all of the Democrats’ policy priorities or even Democratic leadership in Congress.

In Idaho, independent Senate candidate Todd Achilles, an Army veteran and former Democratic state legislator, said he won’t be caucusing with either party if elected. He explained his politics as “straight down the middle,” and said he believes in individual liberties.

“Idahoans should be able to live how they want,” he said. But the Democratic Party was a bad fit because it “has given up on little red states like Idaho.”

On his list of problems with Democrats is that the party made a big mistake by initially running Joe Biden again for president in 2024. But he also said “the shine is coming off” Trump, whom Idaho voters backed by 36 points in 2024.

Achilles said he and other military veterans running for Senate as independents chat in the text chain and are “very much on the same page.” He says the group wants to see “guardrails,” including term and age limits and campaign finance reform.

“The priority is to get Congress functioning again,” he said. “We gotta break the grip of the two-party system.”

‘I’ll never vote for a Democrat’

In South Dakota, Navy and Air Force veteran Brian Bengs has launched an independent bid to defeat Republican incumbent Sen. Mike Rounds, who’s seeking a third term this fall.

Bengs ran as a Democrat against Senate Majority Leader John Thune four years ago and lost by 43 points.

A lifelong independent, he said he got turned down by the party this time when he sought to run with its organizational support but without the label. Still, he insists he can win without the party’s formal backing.

One key lesson from his 2022 campaign, he says, was how hard it was to break through with the Democratic Party label.

Voters would immediately ask, “What are you?” he recalled.

“When you say, ‘I’m a lifelong independent running as a Democrat,’” Bengs said, the response was quick. “‘I’ll never vote for a Democrat.’ And that was it,” he said.

“So that takeaway soured me on running again in any party system, because it was just a soul-sucking experience.”

In Alaska, some Democrats believe that commercial fisherman Bill Hill, a retired school superintendent, may represent their best hope in defeating first-term Republican Rep. Nick Begich for the state’s only House seat.

Hill, a lifelong independent, raised more than $780,000 in the first three months of the year, besting Democrat Matt Schultz, a pastor, who raised $578,000 from last October through March.

The state Democratic Party declined to endorse Schultz at its recent convention, which Hill also attended. The House Democrats’ campaign committee in Washington has also declined so far to promote Schultz’s candidacy. Hill, meanwhile, is racking up local union endorsements.

Hill’s message to voters, he said, is the same for Republicans, Democrats and independents: “You need to be pragmatic about who you choose to support in this election cycle, because at the end of the day, we need a change in the House seat in Alaska.”

A spokeswoman for the National Republican Senatorial Committee criticized independents like Osborn, Bengs, Achilles and Seth Bodnar, who is running in Montana, as “fake Independents who would push liberal Democratic policies in the Senate.”

Currently, there are two independents in the Senate: Maine Sen. Angus King and Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders. Both caucus with Democrats.

In an interview, Hill said he’s unlikely to caucus with Republicans in Washington if elected, but he’s not committing to joining Democrats either. He was reluctant to criticize the Democratic Party or Trump.

Hill acknowledged the challenge of running for Congress as an independent, but said there are benefits, too.

“There’s freedom,” he said. “I can truly represent the working people of Alaska.”

Peoples and Catalini write for the Associated Press.

The White House’s newly released strategy for tackling the nation’s drug and addiction crisis calls for a number of ambitious public health approaches that some experts say are laudable but will be hampered by the administration’s own actions.

The sweeping 195-page National Drug Control Strategy, published May 4, advocates for making access to treatment easier than getting drugs, preventing young people from developing addictions in the first place, increasing support for people in recovery, and reducing overdose deaths.

Those broad goals are widely supported by public health researchers, addiction treatment clinicians, and recovery advocates.

But accomplishing such goals will be difficult in the face of the administration’s mass layoffs of federal employees, cancellation of research and community grants, attacks on organizations and practices that serve people who use drugs, and cuts to Medicaid, the state-federal health insurance program for low-income people that is the largest payer for addiction and mental healthcare nationwide.

Many components of the National Drug Control Strategy are “things that we would agree with and that we fully support,” said Libby Jones, who leads overdose prevention efforts at the Global Health Advocacy Incubator, a public health advocacy group.

But there are “disconnects in what the strategy says is important and then what they’re actually going to fund,” she said of the Trump administration. “Those inconsistencies feel particularly loud in this strategy.”

The White House’s National Drug Control Strategy, released every two years, is a touchstone document meant to lay out the federal government’s coordinated approach to what in recent decades has been one of the country’s defining problems.

Since 2000, more than 1.1 million people have died of drug overdoses. Although deaths have decreased recently, the numbers remain elevated compared with earlier decades, and research suggests overdose death rates among Black Americans and Native Americans are disproportionately high.

The strategy document published this week is the first of President Trump’s current term. In keeping with the administration’s approach to addiction issues, it places heavy emphasis on law enforcement efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs. The document repeatedly refers to the ongoing “war” against “foreign terrorist organizations” — the Trump administration’s term for drug cartels — and touts increased enforcement at U.S. borders.

It also outlines plans to implement artificial intelligence technologies to screen for illicit drugs brought into the country and wastewater testing to detect illegal drug use nationwide.

The second half of the strategy focuses on reducing the demand for drugs through public health prevention efforts, addiction treatment, and support for people in recovery. It promotes the role of religion in recovery and calls for the widespread use of overdose reversal medications, such as naloxone.

In a news release, the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy called the document a “roadmap” that will “continue dismantling the drug supply and defeating the scourge of illicit drugs in our country.”

The Trump administration did not respond to requests for comment about how the strategy aligns with its other actions.

In December, Trump signed a reauthorization of the SUPPORT Act, which continues several grants related to treatment and recovery and the requirement for Medicaid to cover all FDA-approved medications for opioid use disorder. In January, he announced the Great American Recovery Initiative, including a $100-million investment to address homelessness, opioid addiction, and public safety.

However, few details have been provided about the initiative, and in January, about a month after the SUPPORT Act passed, billions of dollars in addiction-related grants were abruptly terminated and reinstated within a frantic 24-hour period.

That “whiplash” left “a sense of instability and uncertainty in the field,” said Yngvild Olsen, a national adviser with the Manatt Health consultancy. She led substance use treatment policy at the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, or SAMHSA, under the Biden administration and left about six months into Trump’s second term.

That insecurity was exacerbated by the president’s 2027 budget request, which proposes cuts to several addiction and mental health programs and the consolidation of key federal agencies working on those matters. Jones’ group and nearly 100 others in the field have signed a letter asking Congress to reject the proposals, as it did with similar requests last year.

The national drug strategy adds new, potentially contradictory information to this confusing landscape.

Increasing Access to Treatment

One of the most significant public health goals in the strategy, mentioned at least half a dozen times, is to make it easier to get treatment than it is to buy illegal drugs.

National data underscores the necessity: More than 80% of Americans who need substance use treatment don’t receive it.

The administration’s actions on health insurance may make it difficult to improve that statistic.

Medicaid is the main source of healthcare coverage for adults with opioid use disorder. When implemented, the Medicaid work requirements in Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act are projected to strip that coverage from about 1.6 million people with substance use disorders.

The last time Medicaid rolls were purged — after COVID-era protections expired — many people who had been receiving medication treatment for opioid addiction stopped it and fewer people started treatment, according to a study published last year.

Olsen, who is also an addiction medicine doctor, said she loves the strategy’s emphasis on making treatment readily available to anyone who wants it. But she said that’s “hard to really imagine when now people may have to pay for it themselves because they may be losing their Medicaid insurance coverage.”

One analysis estimated the upcoming Medicaid changes could lead 156,000 people to lose access to medications for opioid use disorder and result in more than 1,000 additional fatal overdoses per year.

People with private insurance may be affected too.

The Trump administration has refused to enforce Biden-era regulations aimed at bolstering mental health parity, the idea that insurers must cover mental illness and addiction treatment comparably to physical treatments. And recently, the administration said it would redo those regulations altogether, raising fears that addiction treatment could become increasingly unaffordable.

The administration did not respond to specific questions about how it reconciles its actions on Medicaid and parity with the goal of increasing treatment.

Prioritizing Prevention

The strategy highlights preventing addictions before they begin as one of the keys to reducing demand for drugs. It calls for “promoting a drug-free America as the social norm” and implementing school and community-based programs that are backed by science.

“Investing in primary prevention, before drug use starts, saves lives and resources,” it says, citing several studies about the cost-effectiveness of such programs.

Yet, the president’s budget proposes cuts to these types of programs, and federal layoffs have decimated the agencies that would implement such work.

The White House’s most recent budget request proposes cutting roughly $220 million from SAMHSA’s Center for Substance Abuse Prevention and nearly $40 million from the Drug-Free Communities program.

Since the new administration started, SAMHSA has lost about half of its staff, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is down about a quarter.

“It’s not clear to me that they’re really going to be able to have the funds or the people to be able to carry that out,” Olsen said of the strategy’s prevention goals.

Another wrinkle appears in the strategy’s discussion of marijuana. The document points to marijuana use as one of the drivers of increasing drug use disorders and reports that “convergent evidence from multiple sources” suggests cannabis use increases the risk of psychosis. It calls for developing new tools to treat marijuana withdrawal and addiction.

However, just two weeks ago, the White House moved to reclassify medical marijuana to a lower tier of scheduled substances and is moving to hold a hearing to do the same for marijuana broadly.

“The administration, on the one hand, is moving in a direction of liberalizing access to cannabis,” Jones said, “but at the same time, in the strategy, it talks about the dangers of doing so.”

“There’s a disconnect there that just makes you question: Which one do you believe?” she added.

The administration did not respond to specific questions about its marijuana policies.

Stopping Overdose Deaths

One of the more surprising elements of the National Drug Control Strategy comes in the last paragraph of the final chapter. It focuses on public drug-checking programs, which often involve using test strips to help people who use drugs determine whether there are more-dangerous substances, such as fentanyl or xylazine, in the batch they bought. That helps them determine whether or how to safely use those drugs.

“Rapid test strips and similar technologies that detect fentanyl and other drugs are an important tool that should be legal,” the strategy document says.

However, SAMHSA announced in a recent letter that it would no longer pay for test strips, as part of the Trump administration’s “clear shift away from harm reduction and practices that facilitate illicit drug use.”

The administration has similarly attacked harm reduction programs in an executive order and its budget requests. It did not respond to specific questions about how this position interacts with the drug control strategy.

Regina LaBelle, a Georgetown University professor who served as acting director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy during the Biden administration, wrote about the contradiction in a blog post: “It is the height of rhetoric over reality to champion a tool while simultaneously cutting off the funding used to acquire it.”

KFF Health News is a national newsroom that produces in-depth journalism about health issues and is one of the core operating programs at KFF—an independent source of health policy research, polling, and journalism.

WASHINGTON — When Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin was questioned by senators during his confirmation hearing about his vision for implementing President Trump’s mass deportation agenda, he said his goal was to keep his department off the front pages of the news.

To some degree, he has. Gone are the social media video clips of now-retired Border Patrol commander Greg Bovino clashing with protesters. Mullin’s predecessor, Kristi Noem, made her first trip as secretary to New York City to make arrests with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In contrast, Mullin went to North Carolina to review hurricane recovery efforts.

The Republican administration appears to be recalibrating its approach to a centerpiece policy that helped bring Trump back to the White House, moving in many ways away from aggressive, public-facing tactics toward a quieter approach to enforcement. Despite that shift, the administration insists it is not backing down from its lofty deportation goals.

“Clearly they’ve stepped back from the, for want of a better word, the Bovinoist tactics of before,” said Mark Krikorian, the president of the Center for Immigration Studies, which advocates for immigration restrictions. “But it’s not clear this means they’re actually stepping back from immigration.”

The Trump administration launched a series of immigration enforcement operations last year in mostly Democratic-led cities, which drove up arrests in large-scale sweeps. The crackdown sparked clashes between protesters and enforcement officers and led to the shooting deaths in Minneapolis of two U.S. citizens.

Since then, the president’s hard-line anti-immigration agenda has lost popularity with voters and there have been no new high-profile city-based operations launched, raising questions about the administration’s strategy.

“We’re still enforcing immigration laws. We’re still deporting illegals that shouldn’t be here. We’re still going after the worst of the worst — but we’re doing it in a more quiet way,” Mullin said in an interview April 16 with CNBC.

Immigration arrests have dropped, but deportation goals remain

ICE arrests have fallen in recent months, and the number of people in immigration detention has dropped from a high of roughly 72,000 in January to 58,000 this week, according to data obtained by The Associated Press.

But in a sign of its continued determination, ICE in budget documents says it plans to remove 1 million people this fiscal year and the next compared with roughly 442,000 people last year. The agency also has plenty of money to carry out its mission, with Congress granting the Department of Homeland Security more than $170 billion for Trump’s immigration agenda last year.

The administration aims to have enough space to detain roughly 100,000 people this fiscal year, which would more than double the average daily number held in ICE detention last year. The administration has already expanded its detention capacity with the purchase of 11 warehouses across the country.

“They are working on really building a juggernaut of a system,” said Doris Meissner, who headed the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, a predecessor to ICE, during President Bill Clinton’s Democratic administration and is now a senior fellow at the Migration Policy Institute.

White House spokesperson Abigail Jackson said there had been no change to Trump’s strategy.

“President Trump’s highest priority has always been the deportation of illegal alien criminals who endanger American communities,” Jackson said.

ICE did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

Stripping away legal protections to ramp up deportations

Advocates for immigrants are bracing for the Trump administration to turn its attention more intently to stripping away protections for migrants with temporary legal status to remain in the U.S. while their cases are being adjudicated.

In one example of this, the number of green cards approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services dropped by half over the course of a year under the Trump administration, according to an analysis by the Cato Institute, which supports immigration into the U.S. Humanitarian visas for refugees or people who qualified for asylum saw the biggest declines.

USCIS spokesman Zach Kahler said the drop was due to increased vetting of applicants by the administration.

The Trump administration has also pushed to strip Temporary Protected Status from hundreds of thousands of people, with a key case weighing whether it’s overstepped its power to do so being heard at the Supreme Court this week.

Advocates see it as a way to send a chilling message to immigrant communities and make more people vulnerable to deportation. It also enables the department to operate without the public spectacle of workplace raids or home arrests.

ICE has also focused over the past year on creating agreements with jurisdictions around the country that allow local and state law enforcement to carry out an expanding array of immigration enforcement tasks, ranging from checking the immigration status of people in their jails to incorporating immigration checks during routine traffic stops.

These agreements, known as 287g, have grown from 135 in 20 states before Trump took office to more than 1,400 in 41 states and territories now.

Some states, most noticeably Florida and Texas, have mandated various forms of cooperation between local law enforcement and ICE.

Meissner, from MPI, said Trump’s border czar, Tom Homan, is likely to prioritize further discussions about how cities and states can cooperate with ICE.

“At the end of the day, some of this may very well succeed in increasing the numbers,” Meissner said.

Calls to enforce work restrictions

Conservatives who want more deportations say the only way to truly crack down on illegal immigration is to make it so difficult for the migrants to work that they’ll leave on their own.

The Trump administration has already taken steps to make life harder for people in the country illegally including limiting who can live in public housing by immigration status, sharing Medicaid information with ICE and requiring people in the country illegally to register with the federal government.

Krikorian, of the Center for Immigration Studies, said the Social Security Administration could send out letters alerting employers when an employee’s name doesn’t match their Social Security number. Authorities could repeatedly and consistently carry out audits of I-9 forms, which companies are supposed to fill out and submit to the federal government showing that new hires are legally able to work. And they could require banks to collect citizenship information on customers.

Whatever the strategy going forward, the administration is facing heavy pressure not to back away from its goals.

“The numbers are too low,” said Mike Howell, part of the Mass Deportation Coalition, which launched a playbook for how the administration can actually get to a million deportations a year by using tactics such as worksite enforcement.

“The deportation numbers are just too low,” Howell said, “and they need to be much higher, and they can be much higher.”

Santana writes for the Associated Press. AP writers Lisa Mascaro and Will Weissert contributed to this report.

April 29 (Asia Today) — China expressed opposition Wednesday to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” initiative, calling it an attempt to promote bloc confrontation.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian made the remarks at a regular briefing in response to reports that Takaichi may present a revised Indo-Pacific strategy during a visit to Vietnam this weekend.

“Exchanges between countries should not target a third party or harm the interests of a third party,” Lin said. “Japan uses the slogan of being ‘free and open,’ but in reality it is stirring up confrontation between camps and creating a small, exclusive group.”

Lin said such actions run counter to the shared desire of regional countries and the international community for peace, development and cooperation.

“They will be difficult to win support,” he said.

According to Japan’s Foreign Ministry, Takaichi is scheduled to visit Hanoi on Friday and meet with To Lam, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and Prime Minister Le Minh Hung.

Diplomatic sources in Beijing said the talks are expected to focus on strengthening the two countries’ comprehensive strategic partnership, including in economic security fields such as energy, critical minerals and science and technology.

Takaichi is also expected to deliver a speech outlining Japan’s foreign policy direction, including its Indo-Pacific strategy, around the time of the meetings.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260429010009593

WASHINGTON — Polls show that record numbers of Americans think the country is on the wrong track. Anxious voters find no shortage of corroboration. Seeming proof of national decline is everywhere–the savings-and-loan bailout, an imperial Congress, overpaid executives at the top of underperforming companies, record murder rates in cities, declining school quality, an intractable drug epidemic, spiraling health-care costs and a flat economy riddled with deep pockets of regional recession. We haven’t felt good about ourselves, our country or our future since the Gulf War.

President George Bush’s decline in the polls mirrors this trend. As long as voters were concerned about foreign policy, his high standing compensated for lower ratings on domestic affairs. The Cold War’s end has changed the issue mix of presidential races forever.

The recession is an immediate problem, but that will decline in importance when the growth most economists predict resumes this spring. But the recession masks a deeper fear that our post-Cold War inheritance is a declining standard of living, with high-paying jobs and prosperity flowing overseas. That fear will not recede quickly.

With the recession ending by spring, campaign planners will be tempted to heave sighs of relief and run a status-quo candidacy against the uncertainties of a switch to the Democrats. That would be a serious mistake.

For Bush will never have more fertile ground to lay out a new GOP agenda that addresses the deep fear voters have about the future of America. He can capitalize on the public’s thirst for certainty by laying out a set of ambitious goals–in government, in jobs, in schools and in social progress.

He can start with government. A recent Gallup poll shows 20% blame Bush for the economy’s condition, but 54% blame Congress. Support for term limits and a Trumanesque campaign to fix what’s wrong with Congress will not only pay political dividends, but give him a governing coalition for a second term. Beginning with this week’s State of the Union, Bush should challenge Congress to pass his economic recovery program within 100 days and return it to him for signature. He should also push legislation on health-care reform, education and crime by similarly challenging Congress. To dramatize the push for excellence, he might consider national middle-class merit scholarships for college.

Nor should he give up on trade, despite the Japan trip. Presidential involvement in a few trade confrontations will make his claim to fight for American jobs more credible. Where unfair trading practices are found, executive action on import relief should be swift.

By establishing his vision for the post-Cold War future, contrasting his own activism with Democratic and congressional obstruction, showing that he thinks free trade should benefit us as well as our partners and fighting hard for the middle class–in essence charting a course the country thinks takes us in the right direction and gets us off the wrong track–he’ll win not only reelection but a mandate.

It’s also important to understand this is not the 1984 reelection. Compression of the primary calendar means there are fewer days between the first Iowa caucuses, Feb. 10, and Super Tuesday, March 10, and the Democratic winner-take-all rules could give a front-runner enough momentum to be the apparent nominee by April. There is little prospect for a protracted Democratic primary battle like 1984’s between Gary Hart and Walter F. Mondale.

Because the Democrats won’t be tearing each other apart as long, Bush should engage the Democrats early. But he needs to shore up his own vulnerabilities before he begins to contrast with the Democratic nominee. He needs to sharpen his middle-class message, starting with the economy and people’s fears about the future.

This should be done well before the summer Democratic convention, when the Democratic ticket will have a solid week of national television coverage to engage in Bush-bashing.

It’s also critical to understand this is not 1988. The Democratic nominee will also have learned a lesson from Michael S. Dukakis–define your candidacy before your opponent gets a chance to define it negatively for you. It’s highly unlikely the ’92 Democratic nominee will be kept on the defensive for months as was Dukakis.

This year’s presidential election takes place in politically uncharted territory. It is the first contest of the post-Cold War era, probably the last election with a World War II veteran running for President. World events, from Eastern Europe’s velvet revolutions of 1989 to last summer’s failed Soviet coup, have irrevocably reshaped America’s political landscape.

Foreign policy and defense no longer matter much to voters. Communism’s death also buried anti-communism as an issue. With few external threats, Americans see old relationships through a new prism. They supported the post-war alliance with Japan for mutual security; without the Cold War, that same relationship looks one-sided.

To win reelection, it’s critical to understand what this dramatic shift means. The old rules are gone–now is the time for a new political order in American campaigns. For four decades, we’ve elected presidents against a Cold War backdrop. Now that we’ve won the Cold War, we need a new presidential agenda that’s relevant for the ‘90s.

This is a very similar situation to the one that surrounded Red Bull’s former head of strategy, Will Courtenay, who is now McLaren’s sporting director.

It emerged at the 2024 Singapore Grand Prix that Courtenay had signed to join McLaren when his contract ended, and Red Bull emphasised that he would not be allowed to leave before 2026.

They did not specify exactly when in 2026, and BBC Sport has been told that negotiations were held that led to him starting work at McLaren on 1 January this year.

Despite that, for the entirety of last year, Courtenay stayed in his previous role, even though Red Bull were fighting McLaren for the drivers’ championship.

For now, the same thing will happen with Lambiase – he will continue in his role as Red Bull’s head of racing and race engineer to Verstappen for the foreseeable future.

However, just because Red Bull’s statement announcing his departure said he would not be joining McLaren until 2028 does not necessarily mean that will be the case.

McLaren’s statement said Lambiase would join “no later than 2028”. That means they will be hoping to come to an agreement with Red Bull that shortens that timeframe.

It’s worth pointing out, meanwhile, that McLaren have emphasised that Lambiase is joining to provide support for team principal Andrea Stella, not ultimately replace him.

Stella has until now been fulfilling the role to which Lambiase has been appointed, that of chief racing officer, in addition to that of team principal.

Stella said last week: “Zak (Brown, the chief executive officer of McLaren Racing) and I have built a flat team structure, in which it is essential to ensure all leaders are properly empowered, but at the same time, we must guarantee there is always the necessary level of long-term support.

“It goes without saying that, with this approach, the dual role I currently hold could not be sustainable in the long run.”

McLaren have indirectly – but very clearly – rejected what are said to be inaccurate reports that Stella is on his way to Ferrari.

Stella said in a statement issued by McLaren on Friday: “Some of the recent rumours, including those regarding astronomical salaries and mythical pre-contracts, have made me smile.

“It almost seems as though the ‘silly season’, which usually begins before summer, has arrived early!

“I’m quite used to this sort of thing by now and I take with a smile. It almost looks as if some envious pastry chef has tried to spoil the preparation of a good dessert at the McLaren patisserie. However, we do know very well how to distinguish the good ingredients from the poisoned biscuits.”