strategic

Drones of an unknown origin were reportedly sighted over the remote joint U.S.-U.K. Diego Garcia installation located deep in the Indian Ocean. As we have frequently reported, this island base has long been a highly strategic operating location for the U.S. military. Beyond its large airfield that has been an epicenter of bomber operations over the decades, it plays many roles for the Pentagon. These include hosting Space Force operations, serving as a key port for U.S. Navy vessels, including nuclear submarines, and its lagoon provides shelter for a Sealift Command Prepositioning Ship Squadron.

The installation was targeted by Iranian ballistic missiles during the Epic Fury operation, but the threat posed by drones is even more plausible for the island outpost, especially at this extremely tense time as the standoff between the U.S. and Iran grinds on.

The issue of reported drones over Diego Garcia highlights a plausible threat of sea-launched drones that TWZ has been drawing attention to for years now. It also again raises concerns about the danger to critical infrastructure and aircraft parked in the open at Diego Garcia and many other U.S. installations. This is another issue TWZ has been highlighting for years.

“We are aware of reported sightings of drones (UAS) over Diego Garcia,” the U.K. Defense Ministry (MoD) told us Monday morning. “We are unable to provide any details about a situation which may affect the security or operation of the joint U.K.-U.S. base on Diego Garcia.”

“The U.S. and U.K. Commanding Officers on Diego Garcia consider and implement appropriate measures to ensure the security and safety of the base and the safety of the personnel on the island,” MoD added.

U.S. officials were less forthcoming.

“As a matter of operational security, we do not discuss specific force protection measures or security procedures at U.S. military installations,” an official from U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) told us on Friday. “We remain vigilant in protecting U.S. personnel and facilities.”

Neither MoD nor PACOM would say what kinds of drones were sighted, when they were sighted, who was operating them or what, if any, defensive measures were taken as a result. Both military organizations were responding to our questions about an Aug. 7 posting on the Air Force amn/nco/snco Facebook page, an unofficial social media channel that posts about service topics.

“Inbox: ‘Diego Garcia. Drones spotted near fuel farm. Base on 0700 to 1900 curfew until further notice’ Note: message us if you have further information, thanks,” the post read.

On Sunday, the page published a second post on the topic titled “Diego Garcia Curfew reportedly due to Drone Threats.” The post displayed what the page purported to be an official listing of curfew times for various locations around the installation.

We cannot independently confirm the accuracy of these posts and have reached out to MoD and PACOM for details. MoD did not specify who reported the drone sightings over Diego Garcia, so we have asked for clarification. Making this an even more unusual event, Diego Garcia is essentially a closed island with no significant general population or tourists around to be operating drones on a recreational basis. So seeing one or more over the base would certainly raise alarms.

Though Diego Garcia is about 1,000 miles from Sri Lanka, the nearest large landmass, its remote location does not rule out the possibility of drone incursions by an adversary.

During the run-up to the launch of the Epic Fury operation against Iran, the FBI sent out an alert warning about the possibility of an Iranian drone attack on targets in California using uncrewed aircraft launched from ships off the coast. Though the alert was based on raw, unverified intelligence, and was sent out of an abundance of caution rather than any fears of an imminent action, the overall threat of drone attacks from ships is very real. You can read our feature about this very real threat vector and its relation to that questionable intelligence release here.

Generally speaking, there are long-standing concerns that Iran and/or other actors operating on its behalf could seek to launch asymmetric attacks on targets in the United States, as well as elsewhere outside of the Middle East, in retaliation for large-scale strikes or even in an unprovoked manner. The risks of Iranians deciding to take such action have historically been seen as especially high in any scenario where there might be an existential threat to the regime in Tehran.

There were enough concerns about an Iranian attack on Diego Garcia that F-16s were deployed there in February, before the war erupted, for protection primarily against one-way attack drones and cruise missiles. F-15Es were first deployed to Diego Garcia for this same purpose last year, in what appeared to be a first of its kind force protection change. As noted earlier, Iran clearly sees the installation as a top target, as it has long been something of a refuge for U.S. forces to fallback from the Middle East from, if need be. Iran subsequently launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles at Diego Garcia during Epic Fury; however, neither struck the base.

The threat from drones launched by ships is not just limited to Iran. Russia is suspected of sending drones over key European military installations from vessels.

Long-range one-way attack drones with endurance measured in many hundreds of miles, if not more than a thousand miles, are increasingly a staple in military arsenals globally, and have also been proliferating to non-state actors. Yet the drone threat isn’t just limited to these kinds of weapons for remote locales like islands. Ukraine has carried out devastating attacks on Russian radars and other targets on Crimea and elsewhere using short-range aerial drones launched by uncrewed surface vessels (USVs). This same capability set is proliferating around the globe, allowing for the USV to work as a relatively low-cost delivery system for highly precise and relatively inexpensive short-range drones that can then execute near-field attacks. The U.S. and others are also developing similar capabilities for its submarines and future uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), which could even more easily sneak into close proximity to targets ashore before launching their deadly drone munitions.

The following video shows a Ukrainian USV launching drones against Russian targets:

Esther Kim Varet has gotten a lot of questions recently from “depressed” liberals wondering whom they should vote for in November to represent them in the redrawn 40th Congressional District, which covers a large swath of inland Orange County and portions of San Bernardino and Riverside counties.

The Democratic art gallery owner placed third in last month’s closely watched primary for the seat, behind Republican incumbent Reps. Ken Calvert of Corona and Young Kim of Anaheim Hills. Calvert and Kim were pushed into the same district by last year’s Proposition 50 and will be the only two candidates facing off for the seat in November.

Kim Varet said her supporters have “obviously put a lot of thought into” which of the incumbents to support, but they have had a hard time swallowing the idea of voting for either. So she tells them why, “if we’re playing a kind of longer game,” they should vote for Kim.

She says Calvert is favored to win, so supporting Kim will “force both sides to spend more on this race” and reduce Republican spending on other races where Democrats still have a shot at beating a GOP incumbent. She says Calvert is “much more senior” than Kim, so ousting him would be “more significant.” And Calvert, as chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, has funded Trump’s war in Iran and would be “morally the better target.”

In last month’s primary, Kim Varet and other Democratic candidates collectively won 42.9% of the district vote, compared with Calvert’s 34.9% and Kim’s 20.6%. If enough of those Democratic voters coalesced behind Kim, they could end Calvert’s 33-year run in Congress.

Whether they will, however, is unclear. Such “orphaned” voters — those left without a candidate of their party in a general election — are historically just as likely to abstain from voting or to vote based on far less strategic considerations. Californians created that dilemma more than a decade ago when they approved the top-two primary system that puts all candidates on the same ballot and only allows the top-two finishers to advance to the general election, regardless of their party affiliation.

Paul Mitchell, a Democratic redistricting expert who devised California’s new congressional map under Proposition 50, said the backers of California’s primary system sold it years ago as a moderating force, where those orphaned voters would be encouraged to select the least partisan general election candidate.

But in reality, Mitchell said, “it doesn’t work that way.”

Voter decisions

Mitchell said intraparty matchups in the past have shown 35% of orphaned voters or more simply abstain from voting in that race.

A recent analysis Mitchell conducted of races, including for seats in the state Legislature, showed such undervoting among orphaned voters in every intraparty race for a state Senate seat in 2024 — one clear example being the competitive and costly battle between two Democrats, Laura Richardson and Michelle Chambers, in South Los Angeles.

Many others vote based on “tertiary things,” he said, such as a candidate’s race or gender, or whether they seem local or a Washington insider.

“Traditionally, it isn’t so much about somebody being more moderate,” he said, in part because voters can’t always discern moderation among candidates of an opposing party. “Republicans might be able to tell the difference between a moderate Republican and a conservative Republican, but Democrats can’t tell the difference.”

Incumbency can also be a drag on a candidate if orphaned voters dislike their track record, even if their opponent is even further from those voters politically. As one example, Mitchell pointed to rural, more conservative parts of the state going for Kevin de León over Sen. Dianne Feinstein when he challenged her in 2018, despite his running to her left.

“You’re like, how in the hell did these rural counties vote for Kevin de León? And it was because there were a lot of Republicans who, if they were going to vote in the U.S. Senate race, just wanted to vote against Feinstein,” Mitchell said.

Katelyn Stauffer, an associate politics professor at University of Georgia who has studied voter behavior in top-two races in California, said people “like to make decisions that are easy,” and “for most people, the ultimate cue is, does this person share my party?”

When party doesn’t differentiate candidates, voters tend to rely on other “simple cues or heuristics,” Stauffer said.

For example, based on her research, she said, women regardless of party and Democrats regardless of gender are more likely to vote for a woman in such scenarios.

Candidate messaging

Candidates could consider moderating their message to attract orphaned voters, though that can be perilous.

In a statement to The Times, Calvert accused Kim of trying to woo orphaned voters with a more bipartisan message, as evidence she is untrustworthy.

“Young Kim has bragged to some voters that she’s a moderate who censured President Trump. She’s then claimed to others that she [is] a 100% Trump Republican. It’s obvious Young Kim will say anything to try and hold on to her job, which is why voters from every party just can’t trust her,” Calvert said.

He said he has “been a consistent conservative in Congress for many years and that’s not going to change.” He also claimed to be “one of the most effective members of Congress,” saying he has secured funding to reduce traffic congestion, fight fires and improve water infrastructure in his district — things “voters from all parties want.”

Chris Pack, a spokesman for Kim, denied that Kim is changing her tune depending on her audience, and dismissed Calvert’s claims of serving his constituents well, calling him a “do-nothing dinosaur” who has failed to improve his constituents’ lives for decades.

“The truth is he’s had more than enough time to deliver for the people of California, and he hasn’t,” Pack said.

Similar intraparty battles are playing out in other congressional races between Democrats.

In the 4th Congressional District, which stretches through the Napa and Sacramento valleys, Republican voters could help decide between incumbent Rep. Mike Thompson (D-St. Helena) and his challenger from the left, venture capitalist Eric Jones.

Thompson — who has been in Congress since 1999 and sits on the powerful Ways and Means Committee — won 41% of the vote in the primary, while Jones won 22.2%. A slate of six Republican candidates collectively won 36.1%.

Jones, who backs progressive measures to expand Medicare and cut working-class taxes, said he hopes voters of all stripes look beyond political labels and see that he is the only candidate in the race who will take on big utilities, healthcare lobbyists and other big-business interests who fund Thompson’s campaigns.

“I want voters to realize that there’s a real choice in front of them,” he said.

Thompson said he is focused on doing his job, introducing himself to voters in the new parts of his district, reconfigured under Proposition 50, and “figuring out how I can work with them” to address their concerns. He said there is “a lot of commonality” among voters of all parties who want “good roads, clean air, water, strong [agriculture], safe communities,” and that he’s been endorsed by local Republicans and Democrats alike.

Thompson also rejected Jones’ criticism of his fundraising, saying he has “done a lot of good work that’s not necessarily in the interests” of those who have contributed to his campaign. He also said fundraising is necessary in a race against a wealthy opponent like Jones, who donated millions of dollars to his own campaign.

In the 7th Congressional District, Republican voters will help decide between incumbent Rep. Doris Matsui (D-Sacramento) — who has been in Congress since replacing her late husband there in 2005 — and her challenger from the left, progressive Sacramento City Councilmember Mai Vang.

Vang won 31.2% of the primary vote. Matsui won 29.1%. Two Republican candidates together won 37%.

In a statement to The Times, Matsui said November’s general election “will be a significantly different race because there will be many more voters that didn’t vote in the primary,” and that she will “work harder to court voters by meeting them where they are and informing them how I’ve delivered on my promises,” including on healthcare, public safety and jobs.

Vang did not respond to a request for comment but has previously accused Matsui of not delivering on her promises for decades.

“After 20 years, families are living paycheck to paycheck, people of my generation are no closer to owning a home, and you still can’t afford a doctor visit,” Vang said last month.

Party involvement

Political parties have traditionally shunned meddling in races where they lack a candidate of their own, experts said. They sometimes endorse in races where two members of their own party are facing off against each other, but not always.

Nick Poche, a Republican National Committee spokesperson, said his organization is largely focused on three races in which Republicans are either looking to hold or win seats from Democrats: the 13th Congressional District, where Republican Kevin Lincoln is challenging Rep. Adam Gray (D-Merced); the 22nd Congressional District, where Rep. David Valadao (R-Hanford) is trying to fend off Democrat Randy Villegas; and the 48th Congressional District, where Republican Jim Desmond is facing off against Democrat Marni von Wilpert for the seat of retiring Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Bonsall).

He called the Democrats in those races “radical socialists and emblematic of California’s far-left failures,” and said his party would be campaigning against them. But he declined to speak to the Calvert-Kim race, or the races in which two Democrats are facing off.

The California Republican Party did not respond to a request for comment.

Rusty Hicks, chair of the California Democratic Party, said his party is focused on “fulfilling the promise of Proposition 50” to flip five seats to help his party win control of the House, and is also focused on three competitive races: those for Valadao’s and Issa’s seats, and one in the 6th Congressional District, where Democrat Richard Pan is taking on Republican-turned-independent Rep. Kevin Kiley of Rocklin.

Hicks said the party will not endorse Calvert or Kim, whom he called “two rotten choices,” but has endorsed incumbents Matsui and Thompson in their races against fellow Democrats because they have “been leading” on issues of affordability and access to healthcare and “are best positioned to be reelected.”

Jones scoffed at his party endorsing his opponent. “Are we really excited that the Democratic machine keeps trying to choose our electeds for us?” he said.

July 31 (Asia Today) — South Korea will launch a strategic investment fund worth more than 20 trillion won, or about $13.6 billion, next year to provide long-term capital to artificial intelligence, semiconductor and other industries considered vital to national security and economic growth.

The government said Friday that it would establish a separate strategic investment account within the Korea Investment Corporation rather than create an independent sovereign wealth fund.

Deputy Prime Minister and Finance and Economy Minister Koo Yun-cheol announced the plan during an emergency economic meeting and a meeting of economic ministers at the Government Complex Seoul.

The new account will use KIC’s international investment network and asset-management expertise while expanding the corporation’s mandate beyond its traditional role of investing public foreign-exchange assets overseas.

The government plans to submit a revision to the Korea Investment Corporation Act to the National Assembly in August and complete the legislation before the end of the year.

The fund is expected to begin operating in 2027.

Government shares to provide initial capital

The fund will begin with more than 20 trillion won in assets.

The government plans to contribute more than 16 trillion won, or about $10.9 billion, in shares it holds in public financial institutions, including the Korea Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Korea.

It will also contribute about 4 trillion won, or $2.7 billion, in private-company shares received as payment for inheritance and gift taxes.

The government is considering accepting private donations intended to increase national wealth as another source of capital.

The fund will target artificial intelligence, semiconductors and other advanced strategic industries as well as data centers, critical infrastructure and overseas companies important to South Korea’s supply chains.

Unlike conventional policy financing, which often relies on loans, guarantees or subsidized credit, the fund will primarily make direct equity investments.

The government said the approach would allow it to remain invested in promising companies for longer periods and share in their growth.

The fund will also be able to exercise shareholder voting rights to promote corporate value, protect critical technologies and help companies defend themselves against hostile takeovers.

Fund to serve as an anchor investor

The government wants the strategic account to serve as an anchor investor capable of attracting global institutional investors to South Korean projects.

By committing public capital first, the fund could reduce perceived risk and encourage foreign sovereign funds, pension funds and private investors to participate.

The government also plans to connect the new account with existing policy funds.

Venture and growth funds usually must sell their holdings and return capital to investors within four to eight years.

Under a proposed relay-investment system, the strategic fund could purchase stakes in promising companies when those shorter-term policy funds reach maturity or begin liquidation.

The arrangement is intended to prevent companies with long development cycles from losing financial support before they become commercially established.

The model could be particularly important for semiconductor fabrication, artificial intelligence infrastructure, biotechnology and other sectors requiring large investments over many years.

Separate governance structure planned

The government said it would create governance safeguards intended to protect the fund’s investment independence.

KIC’s board structure would be divided between its existing foreign-reserve investment account and the new strategic account.

A dedicated investment committee and advisory committee would be established for strategic investments.

An operating committee would set broad policy and investment priorities but would not intervene in individual investment decisions, the government said.

The separation is intended to prevent short-term political considerations from determining which companies receive investments.

The plan also represents a change from an earlier proposal to establish a completely separate sovereign wealth fund.

The government instead decided to expand KIC’s mandate and use its existing personnel, investment systems and global relationships.

Long-term capital for industrial strategy

South Korea has introduced several public financing programs to support advanced industries, including funds targeting chips, artificial intelligence, batteries and biotechnology.

The new strategic account differs because it is designed to hold equity investments for extended periods rather than provide loans or exit investments according to fixed fund schedules.

The government expects the fund to support major national projects involving semiconductors, physical artificial intelligence and data centers while helping South Korean companies secure critical overseas supply chains.

It also hopes investment returns will gradually expand the fund’s assets and reduce its dependence on additional government contributions.

The success of the plan will depend on whether the government can maintain commercial investment discipline while pursuing broader industrial and national-security objectives.

It will also require clear rules governing voting rights, corporate intervention, investment losses and potential conflicts between financial returns and government policy.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260731010011712

The Houthi declaration that they intend to block Saudi shipping and vessels bound for Saudi ports in the Red Sea is not another act of revolutionary theatre. It is Iran’s latest attempt to test Saudi Arabia’s strategic patience through one of its most capable regional proxies. That is a dangerous gamble because Riyadh has spent nearly a decade avoiding the wider regional war that Tehran increasingly appears determined to provoke.

Saudi restraint has never reflected military weakness. It has been a deliberate strategic choice intended to preserve regional stability while enabling the kingdom to focus on its historic economic transformation. Unable to compete with Saudi Arabia’s regional trajectory through conventional means, Iran has increasingly turned to proxy warfare, maritime coercion, and economic intimidation.

The Houthis have become the principal instrument of that strategy.

By threatening shipping in both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, Tehran seeks to pressure Saudi Arabia from its eastern and western maritime gateways while raising the cost of regional stability. The objective is not military victory but economic disruption: undermining investor confidence, threatening energy exports, and projecting instability onto the Middle East’s largest economy.

That strategy carries consequences far beyond the region. Saudi Arabia remains the world’s largest crude oil exporter, OPEC’s leading producer, and the only country with sufficient spare production capacity to stabilise global energy markets during periods of crisis – as it did during the first phase of the Iran war through its 7 million barrels per day East West Pipeline. Sustained disruption of Saudi exports would ripple through international shipping, insurance markets, inflation, and the global economy.

Iran tried to prepare for the present escalation by attempting to restore the Tehran-Sana’a air bridge. The flights were never simply about reconnecting two capitals. They would have provided a direct logistical corridor through which operational planning advisers, missile specialists, drone technicians, and intelligence officers could rotate into Houthi-controlled territory. Such an air corridor would have allowed Tehran to transfer not only equipment but also operational expertise and command capability.

This explains why the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) strike on Sana’a International Airport carried significance beyond denying a specific aircraft permission to land. The objective was to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent logistical architecture capable of sustaining a more sophisticated proxy campaign against Saudi Arabia’s maritime and economic interests.

It is clear Tehran’s calculations increasingly rely on outdated assumptions about Saudi military capability. The Saudi-led Joint Forces Command (JFC) bears little resemblance to the force that first entered Yemen a decade ago. Years of hard learnt lessons from past mistakes and operational experience have transformed it into an integrated coalition built around persistent intelligence, fused command-and-control, precision strikes, air missile defence, and cyber operations.

Rather than functioning as separate military combatant commands, these capabilities now operate as a single decision-making architecture capable of compressing the time between intelligence collection and operational execution.

That transformation extends beyond the Saudi armed forces alone. The Saudi-led JFC now includes more than 650,000 personnel drawn from Saudi Arabia and allied Yemeni, Pakistani, Sudanese, and limited but symbolic GCC formations operating within a unified operational framework. Its principal advantage lies not simply in numbers but in its ability to synchronise military effects across multiple domains while maintaining operational tempo and centralised escalation control.

The JFC maturity became unmistakable during RSAF’s campaign that restored control over southern Yemen in less than a week in January. Built upon an advanced command and control (C2) fused architecture that supports persistent intelligence, electronic warfare, precision targeting, and synchronised manoeuvre, has demonstrated a level of operational sequencing and command integration unseen in earlier phases of the war.

The same C2 maturity was evident during Iran’s coordinated missile and drone attacks launched from Iranian territory and allied formations in Iraq, when RSAF executed synchronised precision strikes across multiple theatres while maintaining centralised escalation control.

The broader consequences extended beyond the battlefield. Saudi operational performance helped create the conditions under which Pakistan was able to broker an unofficial ceasefire between the Saudis and Iranians while reinforcing a new deterrence equation in which further direct Iranian military pressure carried significantly greater operational and political risk. Tehran’s subsequent caution reflected not diplomacy alone but recognition that the kingdom had entered a fundamentally different stage of military maturity.

None of this means the Houthis cannot impose costs. Their missiles, drones, maritime attacks, and psychological operations remain capable of generating disruption disproportionate to their size. But disruption is fundamentally different from sustaining a prolonged confrontation against an opponent possessing overwhelming advantages in intelligence, air power, maritime control, and operational endurance.

Every escalation therefore increases the likelihood of a comprehensive Saudi response. Such a campaign would not simply target missile launchers or drone facilities. It would seek to dismantle the command-and-control networks, logistics infrastructure, communications systems, intelligence apparatus, and operational support that enable Houthi military operations.

This is why the current trajectory is so dangerous.

Saudi Arabia has consistently demonstrated that it prefers stability to confrontation because its overriding strategic priority remains economic transformation and long-term national development. But no state can indefinitely tolerate an Iranian-backed proxy threatening its economy, energy infrastructure, and maritime lifelines.

Ultimately, the Houthis are not testing Saudi military capability. Years of operational adaptation have already answered that question. They are testing Saudi Arabia’s strategic patience.

History suggests that even the greatest strategic patience has limits. If Tehran continues using the Houthis as an instrument of coercion against the kingdom, Riyadh may conclude that the costs of restraint have exceeded the costs of decisive action. If that moment arrives, the campaign that follows will bear little resemblance to the Yemen war of a decade ago. It will reflect years of coalition integration through an elaborate C6ISR architecture to be strategically prepared for such a war. Iran, and the Houthis, may then regret testing the limits of Saudi Arabia’s strategic patience.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The Asia Pacific’s geopolitical balance is under change. While the U.S. remains the main architect of the plan, it is Australia that is becoming the executor of the strategy in the Oceania region. Through the signing of multiple defense agreements with the small island states, Canberra is transforming itself from a middle power to a regional security player in the South Pacific region. 

Australia, being the most trusted ally of the United States and a member of the two most important defense cooperations, i.e., AUKUS and QUAD, makes it suitable to provide security to its neighbors. By signing the bilateral agreements in the defense domain, Australia, particularly, and the United States, generally, want to counter China’s rising military presence in the Pacific region. The defense deals signed with Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji collectively demonstrate that work on a broader security plan is under process. Instead of deploying American military bases directly in these states, Washington is relying on Canberra to expand its security footprint in the South Pacific region.  

The recent signing of the Australia-Fiji agreement named “Ocean of Peace Alliance” on July 6, 2026, is the latest in the series. This agreement marks Fiji’s first mutual defense treaty and Australia’s fourth, following treaties with the United States, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea.   Secondly, the announcement of the Pukpuk Treaty entering into force between Australia and Papua New Guinea by PM Anthony Albanese and PM Honourable James Marape MP on July 8, 2026, also showcases a mutual defense commitment. Thirdly, the signing of the Nakamal Agreement between Australia and Vanuatu in June 2026 prevented China from creating military bases in the country.

In addition to this, the new PM of the Solomon Islands, Matthew Wale, has also shown interest in reducing the country’s dependence on China. He stated that the Solomon Islands-China pact, signed in 2022, needs to be revised, which would allow China to deploy its military and police personnel. By signaling on revising the agreement, it clearly demarcates that the Solomon Islands do not want to allow their land to be used for Chinese military bases. This statement proved a silver lining for Australia’s hegemonic designs in the region, as it was fearful that the Solomon Islands would be a foothold for China in the Pacific.

The momentum and process of acquiring a broader Pacific security strategy are extending, as New Zealand PM Christopher Luxon has also shown interest in joining the recently signed Ocean of Peace Alliance. This also marks Australia’s victory in that these Pacific states are gradually turning away from China and moving towards Western allies. This also shows defense cooperation, military exercises, information sharing, and maritime cooperation. In such a case, when there is an attack on any ally in these domains, then others will come to aid and rescue.

Also, the opening of the US Embassy in the Solomon Islands back in 2023 and the agreement between another QUAD member, i.e., Japan, and the Solomon Islands also strengthen Australia’s position in the Pacific region.

Now, the bigger question here is why this change in geopolitical balance is happening and why the regional players are taking the lead despite having the hegemon, i.e., the United States. Rising interference of China by expanding its naval capabilities has drawn concerns of the states in the Oceania region. The recent firing of a long-range ballistic missile in the South Pacific region on the same day that Australia and Fiji signed the treaty sends a clear message that China will not remain quiet on these expanding relations. Although Chinese state media have stated that this firing was just a mere test using dummy warheads. But the concerns of the government officials of the Pacific countries and their rising apprehensions have clearly shown that concerns for Australia and its allies are increasing against China. This fear has enabled them to move towards a securitization strategy and maximize their security capabilities.

Along with benefits, there are various risks for Australia and partnering nations as well by entering into these defense deals. The original plan of keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open for trade for all is gradually turning into a hub of militarization. Therefore, strategic competition between China and Australia will increase more than ever before, compelling Canberra to engage in more economic and defense treaties in the broader Indo-Pacific region to maintain its central position. Additionally, small island states are also in turmoil as they are caught between China and the Western bloc.

Thus, it is clear that the US is expanding its network in the South Pacific region by making Australia a regional security player. This also sends a signal to China that its growing capabilities and tactics will not go unanswered. Moreover, Pacific Island countries are also diversifying their options by signing defense agreements and are not predominantly relying on China. These agreements also reduce the possibility of Beijing having a military presence in the Oceania region. Therefore, whether Australia’s expanding defense network succeeds or not depends on mutual trust. By not compromising the sovereignty of these states, Canberra can only become the regional security provider on its own terms.       

July 6 (Asia Today) — China launched a strategic missile into international waters in the Pacific on Monday, prompting concern from Japan and other regional powers as a U.S. nuclear and missile expert said the weapon was likely a JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy said on social media that one strategic nuclear submarine successfully fired a submarine-launched strategic missile carrying a dummy warhead toward the Pacific at 12:01 p.m. local time.

The Chinese military said the missile landed accurately in the target sea area but did not disclose the missile type or the exact impact location.

Wang Xuemeng, a spokesperson for the Chinese navy, said the launch was part of annual military training and that relevant countries were notified in advance.

“The launch complied with international law and international practice,” Wang said. “It was not aimed at any specific country or target.”

China also launched an intercontinental ballistic missile into international waters in the Pacific in September 2024. That test was China’s first ICBM launch toward the Pacific since a Dongfeng-5 launch in 1980. Based on photos later released, analysts assessed the 2024 missile as likely a Dongfeng-31AG, a road-mobile missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland.

Monday’s launch was China’s first Pacific-oriented strategic missile test in about one year and 10 months.

The Japanese government expressed serious concern over the launch. China notified Japan of the plan in advance and designated areas near Shionomisaki, south of Wakayama Prefecture, as possible falling zones for space debris, Japanese media reported. Japan asked China to reconsider so the launch would not threaten Japanese safety.

The Japanese government said some of the projected debris zones included Japan’s exclusive economic zone, but the missile appeared to have landed outside the zone. It also said there were no confirmed reports that the missile passed over Japanese territory or the exclusive economic zone or that aircraft or ships were damaged.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara, the Japanese government’s top spokesperson, said China’s military activities are a serious concern because of Beijing’s lack of transparency.

“China’s military trends lack transparency and have become a grave concern for Japan and the international community,” Kihara said.

China’s Foreign Ministry rejected international criticism, saying the launch was a routine military training activity conducted under safety standards and professional procedures.

“We hope relevant countries will not overinterpret the matter,” the ministry said.

In the United States, analysts said the missile used in the test may have been China’s newest submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-3.

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, told The New York Times that the Chinese military most likely tested the JL-3.

The JL-3 is China’s third-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is believed to have a range of more than 10,000 kilometers, or about 6,200 miles, putting most of the world, including the U.S. mainland, within reach.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles are considered a key part of nuclear deterrence because they are harder to detect than land-based missiles once deployed at sea. China publicly displayed the JL-3 during a military parade in Beijing in September 2025.

Lewis said the test signals that China’s nuclear force modernization has entered a new stage.

“Historically, China has conducted fewer ICBM tests than other countries,” Lewis said. “The reason was political, but the political dynamics have changed, and they seem to be adopting an approach of testing more frequently.”

Lewis said China may conduct more frequent tests of long-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the future.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260706010002183

Russian forces have claimed capture of Kostiantynivka in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region after roughly a nine-month battle. The city sits within Ukraine’s “fortress belt,” a defensive network of cities forming Donbas’s main defensive line. Ukrainian officials denied the city fell.

Satellite imagery reveals Russian progress in building protective shelters for its military aircraft, which now extends to long-range bombers, an unprecedented development for the Russian Aerospace Forces. The imagery reveals extensive work underway at Russia’s Engels Air Base, one of the country’s most important long-range aviation hubs, marking a significant shift after decades of leaving these high-value aircraft exposed on the flight line. The base has long been a key target for Ukraine, due to its central role in the cruise missile campaign waged by Russia against that country.

A satellite image taken on June 20, 2026, obtained by TWZ from Planet Labs, shows the extent of construction work on shelters at Engels Air Base in the Saratov region in the southeast of the country. Unlike previous protective shelters, which are sized for tactical aircraft, those at Engels are much larger, in keeping with the dimensions of the Tu-95MS Bear-H and Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers that are stationed there.

Based on the available imagery, no fewer than 17 separate protective shelters appear to be under construction at the base, which is located around 300 miles from the nearest Ukrainian border.

Engels, also known as Engels-2, is one of the most important airfields of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation Branch. It is home to the 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, which is responsible for Russia’s only squadron of Tu-160s, plus another squadron of Tu-95MS bombers.

Both those types have been widely employed in the conflict in Ukraine and especially in the standoff strikes that have targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, among other objectives, civilian and military, across the country.

Between 2012 and 2017, Engels Air Base was reconstructed. In parallel to the main runway, which is around 11,500 feet long and 230 feet wide, a new runway of the same length and a width of 200 feet was built. Later, the parking area for aircraft was entirely reconstructed.

Reportedly, work on bomber-sized protected shelters began in April 2025, some months ahead of Operation Spiderweb, the large-scale Ukrainian drone strike against mainly bomber bases across Russia last summer, and which you can read about in our coverage here.

Soon after, a model of a Blackjack-sized aircraft shelter was shown to Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov, as seen below.

Engels was not among the airbases targeted in Operation Spiderweb, but the potential vulnerability of the aircraft there was already clear.

As we wrote about at the time, Engels came under attack by long-range Ukrainian drones in March 2025, with a weapons storage area at the base apparently the primary target.

In January of 2025, we reported on a huge fire close to Engels Air Base, caused by what Russian officials described as a “massive” Ukrainian drone attack. The strike was on the strategically important fuel storage tank farm for Engels, and the fire raged for several days after.

Russia’s Rosreserv fuel depot in Engels continued to burn today after a Ukrainian drone attack last night, with multiple additional storage tanks igniting throughout the day.

Within the last hour, the regional governor of Saratov declared a state of emergency. pic.twitter.com/EzhoQTgqK0

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) January 8, 2025

Earlier in the conflict, Engels was also attacked three times in the month of December 2022 alone. On at least one of those occasions, Russia stated that the airbase was attacked by Soviet-made jet-powered uncrewed aerial vehicles modified by Ukraine to carry explosives.

Attacks such as these have repeatedly underscored the ability of relatively slow and low-flying Ukrainian drones to fly deep into Russian territory and strike strategic military targets. Meanwhile, Operation Spiderweb presented a new dilemma — short-range drones launched covertly, in mass, from locations much closer to airbases.

Amid continued questions about the efficiency of local air defense capabilities, Russia has embarked on various initiatives to try to protect its aircraft on the ground at their bases.

From the start of the conflict, Russian airbases have dispersed their aircraft for protection, although this is not so straightforward for bombers, with their more intensive demands on space, crews, maintenance facilities, weapons, and others. One of the runways at Engels has been used as a dispersed parking area for years now.

Russia has also taken further precautions at its airbases. To begin with, they installed blast walls between active aircraft. This was an attempt to contain any damage to one aircraft in an attack, designed to prevent both fire and shrapnel from spreading.

More recently, construction work at multiple bases has been adding many dozens of new hardened aircraft shelters to better shield aircraft from drone attacks and other indirect fire. At the start of this effort, however, the shelters were sized to accommodate smaller tactical jets, and the bombers were not provided with the same kinds of protection. This may also have been a reflection of the specific vulnerability of airfields closer to Ukraine and to the U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles, which began to be used against Russian airbases in late 2024.

Instead, bomber bases were provided with discarded aircraft to serve as decoys. More unusual measures included placing vehicle tires on the upper surfaces of aircraft and painting aircraft silhouettes on concrete airfield surfaces. The tires, specifically, were intended to confuse image-matching seekers on Ukrainian-operated standoff weapons. TWZ was first to spot the strange coverings atop a couple of bombers at Engels in August 2023.

Now, imagery from Engels confirms that the shelters are being extended to Russia’s bombers, too. This marks a significant change in Russian bomber operations, with these aircraft previously having been left essentially unprotected on their airfields, including undergoing maintenance in the open.

At this stage, it’s not clear what level of protection the bomber shelters might offer. The most robust tactical aircraft shelters are understood to utilize steel frames with prefabricated concrete elements on top, which may not survive a direct hit by a large cruise missile, but could defend against many types of drone and cluster munitions strikes.

Another shelter type, this time using curved sections of sheet metal, has also appeared at some Russian tactical airbases, but likely serves as little more than a drone screen against near-field attacks by smaller FPV and ‘bomber’ drones.

Even if the bomber shelters are on the more fragile side, they could provide some degree of protection, especially against smaller drones, as well as shielding operations — and even the presence of bombers — from observers, complicating targeting.

As well as bearing the brunt of long-range cruise missile strikes against Ukraine, Russia’s bombers are a far more precious asset than tactical jets, the most important of which remain in series production.

In contrast, the Tu-95MS (and the Tu-22M3 Backfire-C) have been out of production for decades, while efforts to restart Tu-160 production have moved only very slowly so far.

At the same time, these aircraft are a key element of the country’s strategic military posture, forming one arm of Russia’s nuclear-delivery forces.

The need to provide adequate protection to aircraft — especially for the U.S. military — is something that TWZ has addressed before. Aircraft shelters with varying degrees of hardening are now very much back on the agenda globally, in response to evolving drone and missile threats. There is a growing debate within America’s armed forces and Congress about the value of building new defensive infrastructure for its aircraft, as well as investments in new active air and missile defense and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Except for a few forward deployment locations, the United States does not invest in robust shelters for its combat aircraft, including its bombers. The risks of this situation, including at home in the continental U.S., were highlighted across the media when Barksdale AFB was swarmed recently by drones, with the base’s prized B-52 bombers left largely defenseless on the apron.

Consistent Ukrainian drone (and also cruise missile) attacks have made it clear that Russia’s bomber bases are among the most prized targets for Kyiv. Ukraine’s ability to strike facilities of this kind by various means has now driven the expansion of the program to build protective shelters to Engels Air Base, something that is unprecedented for Russia, even going back to the Cold War. The construction marks a new doctrine of force protection for the Russian bomber fleet, which has suffered losses that are very hard to replace. With Moscow now coming under mass air attack in broad daylight, it appears the threat from long-range strikes is now growing at what is clearly an alarming rate for Russia.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The top strategist for Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass’ reelection bid has left her campaign, just as she is gearing up for a bruising showdown against City Councilmember Nithya Raman in the Nov. 3 runoff.

Douglas Herman, who has worked with Bass since 2021, told The Times on Wednesday that he stepped down from the campaign earlier in the day. He is being replaced by Julie Chávez Rodriguez, who was campaign manager for the Biden and Harris presidential campaigns in 2024, a Bass spokesperson said.

Chávez Rodriguez has spent the past few months running Unidos Con Karen Bass 2026, an independent expenditure campaign that focused on Latino voter turnout during the primary.

Herman, asked about his departure, said he left due to “strategic differences” regarding the direction of the reelection campaign. He did not provide details.

The Bass spokesperson, Alex Stack, declined to discuss Herman’s exit.

“Going into the general election, our campaign is proud to announce that Julie Chávez Rodriguez will be leading the team,” he said in a statement.

The granddaughter of César Chávez, co-founder of the United Farm Workers union, Chávez Rodriguez worked in both the Obama and the Biden administrations. She ran Joe Biden’s 2024 campaign until he dropped out and then ran Kamala Harris’ campaign, losing to President Trump. While working for Harris, she courted Latinos and working-class voters in battleground states.

Herman was a combative messenger for Bass, issuing broadsides against her rivals as she fought for a second four-year term. He had been advising her since her first run for mayor, when she defeated real estate developer Rick Caruso by about 10 percentage points. He also helped her fend off a recall attempt while in office.

Bass was the top vote getter in the June 2 primary election, securing 34% of the vote, compared to 29% for Raman and about 26% for reality TV personality Spencer Pratt. With a majority of voters registering disapproval of her performance, she faces a tough runoff campaign.

Raman, first elected in 2020, is expected to be a formidable opponent, drawing on her support from younger voters, entertainment industry workers and activists in the YIMBY movement, which seeks to tear down regulatory barriers to housing construction.

Authors: Dr Soumyodeep Deb & Aung Kyaw*

Myanmar’s president Min Aung Hlaing is currently on a 5-day state visit to India on the invitation of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. This is his first foreign visit after the recent election where he was elected as the new president of Myanmar. However, the elections that brought him to power were not democratic in nature. Therefore, “Min Aung Hlaing is not Myanmar’s legitimate president,” as noted by Mercy Chriesty Barends, a member of the Indonesian Parliament and chairperson of the ASEAN Parliamentarian on Human Rights. He oversaw a campaign of widespread crimes against his own people after masterminding a bloody coup that toppled a democratically elected government. As a result, APHR has asked India to condemn Min Aung’s government as undemocratic and illegal. Thus, the question of why India, which claims to be the largest democracy in the world, is dealing with an undemocratic administration that is accused of violating its own citizens’ human rights emerges.

The idea of democracy and human right violation had been India’s central position during the 1988 military coup in Myanmar. The Indian government had cut ties with the then military junta. India’s idealistic position had sidetracked India-Myanmar relations and led China to occupy the strategic sphere in India’s immediate neighborhood. Chinese investment and trade with Myanmar grew exponentially with the junta purchasing military hardware worth $1 billion from Beijing in 1989 one of the largest weapons deals in Myanmar’s history. This had led China to exert its influence on Myanmar. For Beijing the geo-strategic location of Myanmar having access to the Indian Ocean was of strategic interest. Enhancement of Chinese influence in Myanmar had a security implication for India as China used Myanmar to train major northeastern Indian insurgent groups like NSCN, ULFA etc. Thus, India’s rupturing of relationship with Myanmar after 1989 on idealistic grounds led China to exploit major gain at India’s immediate neighborhood.

This had led India to recalibrate its strategy towards Myanmar post the 2021 coup when India took a more pragmatic stand. The Indian ministry of external affairs had categorically pointed that any development in Myanmar has implications for India so India’s policy must serve its strategic interest. Therefore, we have seen India engaging both the military junta and the ethnic armed groups trying to balance its ties with both the parties. Since the coup India has been providing steady military assistant to the junta in form of military hardware and spares. It has also engaged the various ethnic armed groups by sending officials across the border and by inviting some of the groups to New Delhi for a conference. This makes it very evident that rather than maintaining the moral superiority of democracy, India is striving to further its strategic interests. The support to the rebel groups like the Arakan Army (AA) which controls a major part of strategic Rakhine state. After seizing control of majority of the state the Arakan Army pushed the initiative to have dialogue with the military junta. The AA had always held the ambition of having greater strategic autonomy in the Rakhine state. Thus, India’s engagement with the AA by sending government officials over to Myanmar signals that it wants to have strategic relation with the AA as that would enhance its influence and uphold India’s economic and trade ambitions. 

For India, the geographical location of Myanmar holds a great strategic significance. It shares a 1,693 kms of border and is seen as India’s gateway to the ASEAN. This had led India to invest heavily on major infrastructure projects in Myanmar. The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Corridor and Sittwe Port are two of India’s largest projects in Rakhine and Chin state of Myanmar. This project is seen to give India’s landlocked northeastern states access to Myanmar’s Sittwe port. This project is also seen as a counter to China’s Kyaukphyu Port at the Rakhine state. This has made the relation with Arakan Army of geo-strategic importance. The other major project that India is working on is to physically connect itself ASEAN via the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. This project would give India land access to the two ASEAN states which can further be expanded to other nations like Vietnam. Although the projects are currently stalled due to the civil war, India is working with both the ethnic armed groups and the government to safeguard and fast-track the projects.

Thus, the recent visit of Min Aung Hlaing to India shows that India has chosen pragmatism over idealism. New Delhi has kept itself away from the nature of democracy in Myanmar and is trying to engage based on strategic interest. During the press briefing the Indian foreign sectary had pointed that India’s engagement with Myanmar is not based on Myanmar’s internal political arrangement. India does not want to disengage based on internal political dynamics as history has shown that other powers which has no interest in democracy would eventually take the advantage. This statement although has not mentioned China but was directed towards it. Therefore, the visit led to the signing of various agreements and MOUs between both the states. Myanmar has also reiterated that it won’t allow its territory to be used against anti-India activities. The recent advancement by the Myanmar Army is further leading it to consolidate its power and capture grounds. With the new conscript law, it can funnel additional troops to keep its advancement. Further being supported by Russia, China and India the firepower of the junta is superior to the rebel forces. This has also led India to recalibrate its Myanmar policy by engaging the current powerful junta and strategic rebel forces like the AA in Rakhine state.

Therefore, it can be argued that the growing India-China competition has made India move its Myanmar strategy towards pragmatism from idealism. Unlike in 1988 when India lost its strategic foothold to China in Myanmar due to its idealistic stand, the situation has now altered as the competition grows. But as a democracy, India must tread carefully on this fine line and bring up important issues of human rights and democracy in Myanmar.

Bio: Aung Kyaw is a recent graduate from Lingnan University majoring in Global Development and Sustainability and minor in Sociology. His research interests are politics of southeast asia, peace and conflict studies, social development, social issues in southeast asia. kyawkyawaung@ln.hk

For decades, satellites have provided critical data for military activities in active and non-active combat zones. One of the most significant integration of space-based technologies emerged in missile defense systems during the Cold War. Satellite constellations provided critical data on the launch sites and trajectories of ballistic missiles. The US Defense Support Program (DSP) was the first program to launch satellite constellations to detect heat signatures of Soviet ICBMs with infrared sensors. The Soviet Union launched the first generation of early warning systems under OKO satellite constellations against US missile threats. These systems of satellite constellations allowed both the US and the USSR to maintain a close watch over each other’s strategic capabilities and allowed for much needed early warning that upheld mutual deterrence between the two powers.

Fast forward to the current era, today’s missile defense systems have shown a very limited success rate against hypersonic missiles. The tracking and interception capabilities of current missile defense systems have remained effectively limited due to speed, maneuverability, and depressed flight of hypersonic missiles. Traditional missile defense systems have been outmaneuvered by hypersonic missiles, which increases the threat level due to their capability to reach and hit targets with a high success rate. Modern hypersonic missiles can still be detected with infrared sensing during their boost phase, but Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) are extremely difficult to track and intercept primarily due to their maneuverability. The radar-evading capabilities of HGVs affect the strategic calculus by shrinking detection and reaction time duration during crises and conflicts.

As a remedy, the US has introduced the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors (HBTSS) to counter the threat of HGVs and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs). The HBTSS will be a major component of the US Golden Dome missile defense project. It is a layered network of command-and-control systems, interceptors, and space-based sensors to build an advanced layer of missile defense system. What makes HBTSS different from traditional missile defense systems is the satellite constellation, which provides real-time tracking data of missiles. Traditional defense systems like Space Based Infrared System (SBIR) could detect the launch of missiles, but HBTSS can detect, track, and possibly predict the target of the missile.

Because HGVs present a unique challenge due to low flight path and maneuverability and often operate under the coverage of conventional radars, which make it difficult for traditional defense systems to detect. HBTSS relies on space-based sensors, which can detect and track continuously from space. Theoretically, it can be called a space-based missile defense system reflecting the growing strategic importance of space in the military domain. It relies on an interconnected satellite network that can work as a kill web across the globe against the threat of hypersonic missiles.

HBTSS is an emerging strategic shift as it starts a new era of space weaponization with a layer of satellites for enhanced detection and tracking. A reliable space-based tracking system bolsters a state’s capabilities to deal with the threat of hypersonic missiles with improved early warning and missile tracking systems, and reduces the threat of surprise attacks from an adversary. Although missile forces hold great impact on deterrence stability, the induction of HTBSS will question the effectiveness of missiles during crises and conflicts if a more advance missile defense system is introduced. This will provide a wider view from space with more accuracy and precision, and increase the vulnerability of missile forces of states.

Because ground-based nuclear forces are considered vulnerable, many countries have developed second-strike capabilities, particularly at sea, to preserve deterrence even after absorbing an initial attack. But the development of HBTSS undermines the survivability of a state’s missile forces with an enhanced detection and tracking system. Even though the United States and Russia continue to maintain certain crisis management and risk reduction mechanisms, including hotlines and military deconfliction channels, the suspension of New START has weakened the broader framework of strategic stability. While in conflict-prone regions like South Asia, India and Pakistan possess a more limited and less institutionalized set of confidence-building measures (CBMs), making crisis management in South Asia particularly challenging due to emerging technologies.

The peaceful use of outer space depends on the intent and actions of major powers. Sometimes measures taken for self-defense can also prompt a proportionate reaction in the form of countermeasures. The strategic impact of HBTSS on the missile forces may lead to more advance, fast, and lethal missiles for survivability. The development of HBTSS will not end the arms race, it will intensify the arms race with countermeasures.

PM Nikol Pashinyan, who deepened ties with US, faces challenge from pro-Russia parties in upcoming parliamentary polls.

Armenia has signed a strategic partnership agreement bolstering ties with the United States, as Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan faces a challenge from pro-Russia parties in the country’s upcoming election in June.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan also signed a framework on critical minerals and cooperation on a transit corridor in the Armenian capital of Yerevan on Tuesday.

“This agreement marks the biggest step to date on making this historic route a reality, on advancing peace, and on increasing prosperity in Armenia and frankly in the region,” Rubio said at a signing ceremony at the Yerevan airport.

The 43-km (27-mile) corridor, dubbed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), would traverse southern Armenia and provide Azerbaijan with a direct route to the exclave of Nakhchivan and into Turkiye, a close ally of Baku.

Pashinyan has sought closer ties with the US and Europe, drawing the ire of longtime ally Russia. Moscow has said that it could raise the price of gas Armenia receives from Russia if it continues to pursue greater integration with Western countries.

Armenia had historically been a close security and economic partner of Russia, but Yerevan started to turn towards the West for alliances after the 2023 conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.

Russia, which is fighting its own war in Ukraine, did not intervene militarily when Azerbaijan launched a major military offensive Nagorno-Karabakh, which had a large Armenian population and had been de facto independent since the 1990s.

Last year, the US and Armenia held joint military drills for the first time.

“I wish to reaffirm that the comprehensive strategic relations between our two nations are stronger than ever,” Mirzoyan said of relations with the US on Tuesday.

The administration of US President Donald Trump, for its part, has cast its relationship with Yerevan in largely economic terms and sought concessions in areas such as critical minerals.

“We are laying the groundwork for the sort of economic engagement that allows Armenians to make money and find prosperity and Americans to do the same and to do it together, which is one of the strongest ways to bind nations with one another,” Rubio said on Tuesday.

A US State Department framework for the transportation corridor, part of a peace agreement signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan last August, also grants the US a 74 percent share in the “TRIPP Development Company”, with an explicit pledge to benefit US companies.