Saudi Arabia

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have captured Mocha port and now threaten to control the main waterway of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. They have also attacked several cities in Saudi Arabia, wounding about 70 people, including women and children.

The repeated attacks against Saudi energy, civil, and defence facilities, combined with the maritime blockage by Iran and its Yemeni partner the Houthis, directly raise the question of the Mecca Pact’s operationalisation between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia can activate the mutual defence agreement. If that happens, what could a Pakistani and Turkish intervention look like?

The answer to this question necessitates some crucial background first.

The US – the main security partner of the Gulf states – has signalled for a while now that it expects regional countries to take primary responsibility for their own defence and deterrence, with US help remaining critical but limited.

That posture is already visible on the ground. Since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, the US has not been able to provide comprehensive defence for its regional partners. On several occasions, it has even failed to stop attacks on its own bases in the Gulf.

With US presence receding and Washington emphasising regional burden-sharing, Gulf states have had to look into a new defence architecture. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed their first mutual defence agreement, which expanded in August this year to include Turkiye and became the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

The three countries have since established a joint secretariat, with its headquarters in Riyadh, with Pakistan taking the chairmanship for an initial three-year term.

The pact remains in a gestation period. It does not publicly identify the thresholds or scenarios under which a member would move to direct military intervention. Its organisational and institutional structure, including rules of engagement, mechanisms of consultation, and collective defence and deterrence, are yet to be formally developed.

Now, back to the question of how the pact will be operational if a member state is attacked.

Earlier this week, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that an unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia, or a spillover of the Yemen conflict into the kingdom, would make the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement operational, adding that “there should be no doubt in this.”

Asif, however, did not share specific details on what shape that operationalisation would take. Last month, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified that the Mecca Pact would work the same way as NATO: If a member state is attacked, it must actively request and define the specific type of help it needs.

NATO’s Article 4 allows for a member to call alliance consultations and exchange of information. Article 5 requires mutual assistance from allies, but it leaves each state to decide the nature of that assistance.

In 2012, after Syria shot down a Turkish warplane, Ankara invoked Article 4 for consultation and requested specific defence assistance. Instead of demanding direct military intervention, the Turkish government explicitly asked for Patriot missile defence batteries. NATO approved the request and deployed the systems to protect Turkish airspace.

In this context, if the Mecca Pact is to be operationalised, it would have to be Saudi Arabia that defines the type of military assistance and involvement that it needs. If, for example, Riyadh makes an actual request for Pakistani direct military intervention, beyond materiel and intelligence support, Islamabad would be obliged to comply. But the request, and the scale of the response, would still likely need to be defined and agreed in a consultation meeting.

For now, none of this has been tested as Riyadh has not invoked the pact with either Pakistan or Turkiye.

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts have intensified, with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud talking to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Islamabad has also publicly urged Iran to rein in the Houthis from attacking Saudi Arabia and threatening the Bab al-Mandeb, and has reminded Tehran of Pakistan’s commitment to Riyadh’s defence through the pact. Ankara would likely play its own part in diplomatically restraining the Houthis and Iran.

If diplomacy fails and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or the Bab al-Mandeb continue, Turkiye and Pakistan would likely expand the air and technological support they already provide. Islamabad already has an air squadron of about 16 JF-17 Thunder multirole aircraft, defence systems, and thousands of troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.

But a direct military operation by Pakistani forces inside Yemen remains unlikely at the moment. Given the disastrous and lasting impacts of its participation in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union on behalf of the US, Pakistan would be far more wary of joining a war against Iran and its allies, for fear of spillover into its western border provinces’ economy, domestic security, sectarian balance, and societal harmony. Pakistani leaders would find it hard to build domestic consensus for direct attacks on the Houthis or a fight with Iran.

The likely scenario is that Pakistan would increase joint diplomatic pressure on Iran to restrain the Houthis, further augment its support for Saudi defence, and push for a multinational naval coalition to secure the Bab al-Mandeb. Adopting this restraint would still keep the essence of the Mecca Pact intact, while putting more weight behind regional de-escalation.

The new security architecture that agreements like the Mecca Pact are setting up will take years to mature. Until the mechanisms and rules of collective response develop, Pakistan’s existing bilateral defence relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners will continue to focus on defence needs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Israeli troops opened fire Saturday at a group of Palestinians who did not appear to be posing a threat in the occupied West Bank, wounding one man, according to video obtained by The Associated Press.

The video, shot by an eyewitness, showed the man falling to the ground near the Palestinian village of Faqqua, north of the West Bank.

At least 14 shots in total were fired during the duration of the video. They continued as several men rushed to move the injured man to safety before setting him down and tying a tourniquet around his leg in an apparent attempt to stop the bleeding.

Mahmoud Shahin, a resident of the village, said the Palestinians had rushed to the area after receiving reports that Israeli settlers had arrived there with a flock of sheep. He said Israeli soldiers then came and began firing in the air and toward the Palestinians.

He added that the wounded man was undergoing surgery at a hospital in Jenin.

Israel’s military said the video was authentic and confirmed its forces had fired toward the Palestinians, wounding one man, and said commanders would review the incident.

Under the ultranationalist government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, settler violence in the West Bank has surged. The international community largely considers Israeli settlements to be illegal and obstacles to peace.

Over 700,000 Israelis now live in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, areas captured by Israel in the 1967 Mideast war and claimed by the Palestinians as parts of a future state.

Tehran, Iran – Iranian authorities and state media have praised the Houthis’ capture of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which some see as giving Tehran more leverage against the United States.

The Houthis, a political and armed group dominated by Zaidi Shia Muslims, have been fighting against the Western-backed Yemeni government since capturing the capital, Sanaa, in 2014.

The Houthis captured a series of Red Sea coastal cities and islands this week, essentially giving them control over the vital Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The Iran-allied group’s recent victories have been praised in Iran, and are viewed by some as part of Tehran’s wider war against the US, ongoing since February 28.

“The victories of Yemen’s Ansar Allah in the western coast is a narrative of a divine triumph and the fruit of years of steadfastness in the most difficult of battlefields,” Hossein Mohebbi, spokesman of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), wrote on X on Saturday.

Amid the Houthis’ recent battlefield wins against the fragmented Saudi-backed forces, senior Iranian officials have cheered their Yemeni allies on.

The Houthis’ capture of the port city of Mocha on Friday delivered a huge blow for the Yemeni government, which now has no direct access to the Red Sea.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iranian parliament speaker and chief negotiator with Washington, reposted a comment made by slain Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2024, saying the “resistance” of the Houthis will inevitably lead to victory.

“The brave Yemeni people will certainly triumph, by permission of God Almighty,” Ghalibaf added on Thursday, in Arabic.

Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said the government is happy with the Houthi advances, and urged leaders in the region to pursue “the rationality of liberation from dependency [from the US and the West], and unity under the banner of Islam”.

The “grand victory” of the Houthis once again proved that “security is not a commodity that can be bought,” added Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

How could this benefit Iran?

The Houthis began to attack several vessels in the Red Sea they claimed were linked to Israel in 2023, as part of their stated aim to pressure Israel to end the genocidal war on Gaza.

This prompted bombing campaigns by the US, United Kingdom and Israel against Houthi positions in Sanaa, Hodeidah and other areas.

Saudi Arabia, which joined the war against the Houthis in 2015, has largely stayed out of the current eruption in fighting in Yemen.

After their recent victories, the Yemeni group can now exercise more control over the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The Houthis’ control of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and multiple islands – including the island of Mayun, also known as Perim, sitting about 3km (1.9 miles) off Yemen’s mainland – provides the group with close-range access to the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

A video published on Friday showed a Houthi commander telling soldiers they will no longer need missiles and drones to threaten shipping in the crucial waterway. They could simply position artillery along the coast and fire in all directions at ships, he said.

The Houthis have not declared the strait closed, but the group’s military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, said on Friday that “maritime navigation is safe for all companies except for Saudi vessels.”

Likewise, Iran’s partial control of the Strait of Hormuz on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula has been a key tool of leverage for Tehran in the war against the US.

The prospect of closing down the strait could potentially be used by Tehran in future negotiations over ending the war with the US.

Iranian officials are expected to meet regional Arab representatives on Monday for talks over how to facilitate shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran maintains remains closed.

They have said they favour a collective regional approach on passage through the strategic waterway.

Iran claims it has reached an understanding with Oman, which also has territorial waters in the strait.

The US, which has continued its naval blockade of Iran’s ports and intensified sanctions on Tehran, reportedly opposes the agreement.

Authorities in Tehran have signalled there will be no talks with Washington under the current circumstances.

“As long as the American side does not accept all of Iran’s conditions, dialogue and negotiation are of no use,” Ebrahim Azizi, head of the hardline Iranian parliament’s national security commission, wrote on X on Saturday.

‘Lord of the straits’

At the start of the working week in Iran on Saturday, hardline and IRGC-linked newspapers and media outlets celebrated the recent Houthi advances.

Keyhan, whose editor-in-chief was appointed by Ali Khamenei, called the advances “the miracle of resistance” and said they had “put the US and Israel in a bind”.

The Quds newspaper, published by the influential Astan-e Quds Razavi in Mashhad, called Iran and the Houthis “the lord of the straits”.

But even though Tehran has repeatedly threatened that Bab al-Mandeb could be further disrupted if the war continues, Iran’s diplomatic apparatus did not immediately link the Houthi advances with the current fight against the US.

As has often been the case, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that the Houthis make their decisions independent of Tehran, with their own interests at heart, including ending Saudi Arabia’s blockade on Yemen.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry also called for an end to the Saudi siege on Houthi-controlled areas, an immediate return to negotiations between the group and Riyadh, and respect for Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The ministry also pushed back on the idea that the Houthis act merely as a proxy for Tehran.

“What is happening now in Yemen is the result of the Yemenis losing patience,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told state television on Friday night.

“It is not fair to ignore the fact that they were under a cruel blockade for years, and concluded that the United Nations and regional mechanisms could not resolve the issues.”

JEDDAH: The first Syrian Industries Exhibition recently concluded in Jeddah, bringing together more than 160 Syrian companies and factories, and attracting business figures, importers and distributors seeking commercial and investment opportunities in the Saudi market.

Held over four days at the Jeddah Center for Exhibitions and Events under the patronage of the Jeddah Chamber, the expo focused on business-to-business opportunities in supply, distribution, investment and partnerships.

The event facilitated meetings between Syrian manufacturers and Saudi businesses to establish partnerships, sign supply and distribution contracts, and conclude memoranda of understanding to support the entry of Syrian products into the Saudi market.

Agreements covered four main sectors: food, textile, chemical and engineering industries. The expo also highlighted investment incentives, facilities and regulatory procedures for establishing joint ventures between the two countries.

A knowledge program featured seminars and panel discussions on legal procedures, trade incentives, partnership mechanisms, and the shift from traditional trade to industrial investment and joint production.

Pavilions showcased food, textile, engineering and chemical industries, along with agriculture, tourism, culture and labor, highlighting opportunities for economic cooperation between Saudi and Syrian businesses.

The expo provided a platform to strengthen economic and trade ties, explore investment opportunities and build partnerships supporting economic development and shared interests.

CAIRO: An Iraqi military commander was dismissed early on Saturday ‌after ‌investigations confirmed the ‌latest drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia originated from Iraq, according to ‌a statement ‌by Iraq’s ‌prime ‌minister’s office.

The commander led operations ‌in Maysan province in southern Iraq, according to the statement.

The rapid Houthi advance down Yemen’s Red Sea coast this week is an astonishing military victory, but not quite the game-changer it is being portrayed as.

The group has been able to threaten the vitally important shipping route, but they have been doing so since 2023. This new victory consolidates that control, proving that Yemen’s government is not currently in a position to defeat them.

The prior Houthi control over the northern section of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the major port city of Hodeidah, has allowed the Iran-allied rebel group, for years, to first attack shipping linked to Israel and the United States – and then, in recent months, Saudi Arabian-linked vessels.

That control also damaged the global economy. Long before the US war with Iran and the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a tool to throttle international trade, Houthi attacks around Yemen had turned Bab al-Mandeb into a similar weapon, and led to bombing campaigns against the Houthis by the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

Houthi officials themselves have emphasised this, with one leading official, Abdulqader al-Murtada, saying earlier this week that the group did “not need control over Bab al-Mandeb, for the blockade [on Saudi ships] is already in place”. Al-Murtada could point Saudi ships that have avoided Bab al-Mandeb since the Houthis began attacking them in July, even before their latest progress.

However, the Houthi lightning advance makes it even easier for the group to disrupt shipping. They now have access to the Red Sea’s narrow entry point and several islands in it, allowing them to use shorter-range weapons and more easily reach vessels they want to attack and board, as well as potentially using sea mines to further restrict shipping.

Not going away

The increase in the Houthi ability to target shipping – even with the caveats outlined above – does have an impact on market sentiment. Oil prices have increased as traders price in the ability for Iran and its allies to disrupt shipping in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, the two maritime chokepoints of the southern Arabian Peninsula.

However, the consequences of this advance are not limited to the increased ability of the Houthis to attack shipping, but to the increasing reality that the Houthi problem on the Red Sea is not going away.

For months, after Saudi Arabia backed a Yemeni government campaign against southern Yemeni separatist forces earlier this year, the mood had shifted in the country’s anti-Houthi camp.

The perception was that the Yemeni government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council, had finally gotten its act together. President Rashad al-Alimi repeatedly spoke of a unified military chain of command, allowing the military to overcome the divisions blamed for its inability to defeat the Houthis.

Yemeni and Saudi officials had hinted at an anti-Houthi campaign all year. The Red Sea coastline was a possible location: the largely flat geography suited the government, allowing Saudi Arabia to effectively use its air power; much of the population is not made up of the Houthis’ traditional support base; and prior Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping meant that there would likely be international buy-in for such a campaign.

The seizure of the Red Sea coastline has broken all of those narratives.

The momentum the Yemeni government thought it had, even at the start of this week when it claimed advances in al-Jawf, to the east of the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa, is now gone.

After months of projecting unity, Yemen’s anti-Houthi camp is once again turning on itself, trading accusations of blame for the defeat.

Saudi dilemma

The message the Houthis have for Saudi Arabia is clear: ‘Your partners in Yemen can’t defeat us.’

Therefore, the potential Houthi argument is that Saudi Arabia has to make a deal with them and agree to their terms, including Riyadh funding public sector salaries, access to income from Yemen’s oil and gas reserves, and no restrictions on flights and shipping to Houthi-controlled ports.

The Houthis have an incentive to lock in their gains and raise the cost of escalation before Saudi-backed Yemeni forces can reorganise.

Their attacks on Saudi Arabia, escalating in the past week, have been damaging, and the group is promising more if Riyadh increases its military support for the Yemeni government.

The risk of any such intervention is clearly there for Saudi Arabia. But so is the risk of inaction. The Houthis have repeatedly demanded more concessions when they were in positions of strength.

With the Yemen war unresolved, the Houthis may decide to escalate again in the future, even if a deal is agreed now.

And so, policymakers in Riyadh could determine that it makes more sense to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem head-on now, rather than allow it to fester into the future.

NEW YORK CITY: Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the UN warned the Security Council on Thursday that “the international community cannot call for de-escalation” in Yemen “while at the same time allowing the continued flow of support that enables this (Houthi) militia to continue its hostile and criminal conduct.”

The warning from Abdulaziz Alwasil came during an emergency council session to discuss Houthi attacks against the Kingdom this week. It was requested by the UK, the penholder on Yemen, and Bahrain.

He said the latest strikes on Saudi cities, which began on Tuesday, were not an isolated episode but “an extension of a systematic, hostile approach pursued by this militia since its coup against the legitimate Yemeni government in 2014,” and part of a pattern that has also targeted commercial shipping and threatened freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.

He said a press statement by the council on Aug. 7 condemning Houthi missile strikes on the Kingdom since July 13, and attacks against commercial vessels since July 22, had gone unheeded, and the militia had answered the international warnings with further escalation.

Alwasil said Saudi Arabia had backed nearly every major effort to end the Yemen war — including the Gulf Initiative, the transitional period, the National Dialogue Conference, the Geneva, Kuwait and Stockholm talks, a 2021 initiative and the UN-brokered truce in 2022 — but the Houthis had repeatedly met those efforts with renewed violence.

“My country affirms its legitimate right to defend itself, its citizens and residents, and to safeguard our national resources,” he said, adding that Riyadh “will not hesitate to take all measures necessary to deter Houthi attacks and to protect our security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

He called on the council to enforce Resolutions 2216, which imposed an arms embargo and sanctions on the Houthis, and 2722, which demanded an immediate halt to Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, and to send “a clear and firm message” that leaves no room for misinterpretation that attacks on the Kingdom must stop.

Yemen’s ambassador, Abdullah Alsaadi, affirmed Sanaa’s “full solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its leadership, government and people,” and its “absolute rejection of the use of any part of the Yemeni territory as a platform for launching missiles and drones, or for threatening the security of the Kingdom or any neighboring country.”

He said the attacks amounted to the “hijacking” of Yemen’s own sovereign decisions over war and peace, carried out by a militia that operates outside of state institutions and was “militarily and technically supported by the Iranian terrorist regime.”

Saudi Arabia had shown “a great degree of restraint,” Alsaadi said, and been “the principal partner of the Yemeni people and state” in supporting institutions, salaries and services throughout the war. But he cautioned that “restraint should not be misconstrued as weakness.”

The security of Yemen and of Saudi Arabia “cannot be separated from one another,” he added, as he called for full enforcement of the arms embargo on the Houthis, and accountability for those who finance and arm the group.

The renewed escalation in Yemen is no longer simply a Yemeni battlefield development. For Saudi Arabia, it is becoming a direct test of national security, economic resilience and the kingdom’s ability to prevent the wider regional war from spilling further across its borders.

The latest Houthi attacks have demonstrated this clearly. Missiles and drones have hit civilian and economic sites in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran, injuring dozens of civilians and causing fires and temporary disruption at energy facilities. The attacks came as fighting intensified in Yemen and around the western coast, while the Houthis continued to threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

Saudi Arabia therefore faces two interconnected threats: Attacks on its territory and attempts to disrupt the maritime routes on which regional and international trade depends.

This creates a difficult strategic equation for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has spent the past several years trying to move away from direct military involvement in Yemen and towards diplomacy, de-escalation and support for a political settlement. A return to an open-ended war would contradict that strategy and impose unnecessary political and economic costs.

But restraint cannot mean accepting repeated attacks on Saudi territory.

A different security environment

The security challenge today differs considerably from the first years of the Yemen war.

Saudi Arabia has strengthened its air and missile defences, improved coordination between its military and security institutions and accumulated considerable experience in countering drones and ballistic missiles. It is therefore much better prepared to defend its territory than it was a decade ago.

Yet the Houthi threat has also evolved.

The group possesses a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and increasingly sophisticated drones. Even when most incoming weapons are intercepted, relatively inexpensive systems can impose disproportionate defensive costs and create uncertainty around airports, industrial facilities, border communities and energy infrastructure.

This means Saudi security cannot depend on interception alone. No air defence system can guarantee a perfect shield indefinitely.

The strategic objective must therefore be deterrence: Convincing the Houthis that attacks on Saudi territory will impose costs greater than any political or military benefit they expect to obtain.

This does not necessarily require returning to the large-scale military campaign of previous years. Riyadh has more options today. These include intelligence operations, strengthening Yemeni government forces, improving border security, disrupting missile and drone supply networks and, where necessary, conducting proportionate operations against facilities directly involved in attacks on Saudi Arabia.

The distinction is important. Saudi Arabia does not need to choose between doing nothing and returning to a full-scale war.

The economic front

The economic consequences are equally important.

Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest energy exporters, which makes attacks on its oil infrastructure internationally significant even when physical damage is limited. The latest attacks affected energy facilities and contributed to renewed concern in already nervous global oil markets.

There is an apparent paradox here: Regional instability can push oil prices higher and temporarily increase Saudi oil revenues. But higher prices caused by war should not be confused with economic benefit.

Saudi Arabia’s economic strategy under Vision 2030 depends increasingly on stability, investment, tourism, logistics, technology and the development of major projects outside the oil sector. Persistent missile and drone attacks can raise insurance and transport costs and affect perceptions of regional risk even if the kingdom’s underlying economy remains strong.

The greater strategic concern is maritime security.

Saudi Arabia occupies a strategic position between two of the world’s most important energy corridors: The Strait of Hormuz to the east and Bab al-Mandeb to the west. Disruption of both routes represents a serious challenge not only for Saudi Arabia but for the global economy.

This is why the Red Sea dimension of the Yemen conflict is particularly important. Bab al-Mandeb connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. A sustained Houthi ability to threaten shipping there would increase freight and insurance costs and potentially divert vessels around Africa.

Saudi Arabia, however, possesses an important strategic advantage: Its energy infrastructure is not completely dependent on the Gulf. The kingdom can transport significant quantities of oil through its East-West pipeline to terminals on the Red Sea. This provides an alternative to Hormuz and gives Riyadh greater strategic flexibility.

That advantage does not, however, eliminate Saudi Arabia’s exposure to insecurity elsewhere in the Red Sea, including around Bab al-Mandeb.

Protecting Bab al-Mandeb should therefore be understood not simply as a Saudi or Yemeni interest but as an international economic and security requirement.

Avoiding the Houthi trap

The greatest danger for Riyadh may be political rather than purely military.

The Houthis could benefit from drawing Saudi Arabia back into an extensive war. It would allow them to portray the conflict once again as a confrontation between Yemen and an external power rather than a struggle among Yemenis over the future of their state.

Saudi Arabia should avoid this trap.

Confronting the Houthis must remain fundamentally a Yemeni responsibility. The internationally recognised Yemeni government and its forces should carry the principal burden of confronting Houthi expansion on the ground, while Saudi Arabia provides political, economic, intelligence and defensive support.

This is particularly important on the western coast. If the Houthis consolidate their military position around strategic areas overlooking the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, the consequences will extend far beyond Yemen.

The objective should not be to retake Sanaa through another large-scale air campaign or restart an indefinite regional war. It should be to prevent the Houthis from using military force to change the regional balance, threaten neighbouring states or threaten international maritime arteries.

Diplomacy backed by deterrence

Saudi policy is therefore likely to operate on several tracks simultaneously.

First, Riyadh will continue strengthening its air and missile defences and protecting critical infrastructure. Second, it can increase support for Yemeni government forces while avoiding unnecessary direct involvement in ground combat. Third, it will seek broader regional and international cooperation to secure the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

At the same time, diplomatic channels should remain open.

Saudi Arabia has repeatedly demonstrated its preference for a negotiated settlement in Yemen. But negotiations are sustainable only when both sides believe that escalation carries unacceptable costs.

Diplomacy, therefore, must be backed by credible military power.

Saudi Arabia has strong incentives to prevent Yemen from becoming another permanent front in the wider regional confrontation. The kingdom’s economic transformation requires stability, while its geopolitical interests require secure borders, uninterrupted energy exports and freedom of navigation.

But the same logic that encourages restraint also places limits on it.

If attacks on Saudi cities, civilians and energy infrastructure continue, Riyadh will increasingly regard the issue not as intervention in the Yemeni civil war but as the defence of Saudi territory.

That distinction will shape what comes next.

Saudi Arabia does not need another prolonged Yemen war. Nor does Yemen. But avoiding one requires restoring deterrence while preserving the possibility of a political settlement.

The most effective Saudi strategy, therefore, is neither unlimited escalation nor passive restraint. It is calibrated pressure: Defend the kingdom, strengthen legitimate Yemeni institutions, protect the Red Sea, keep diplomatic channels open and make clear that attacks on Saudi territory will carry consequences.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Sanaa, Yemen – The United Nations-recognised Yemeni government and the Houthi group have been using warplanes, missiles, drones and other weapons as they engage in intense fighting on multiple fronts in the country’s north, west and central regions.

At least 194 people have been killed and 880 others wounded in the past two weeks of fighting in parts of Taiz, the western coast, al-Jawf, Marib and Dhalea, according to aid agencies.

Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), have intensified attacks on the coastal district of al-Makha (Mocha) located on the western coast, among others, to gain a foothold in the Red Sea – a vital shipping lane.

On the other hand, government forces have been battling to expand in Taiz and boost their control of Marib, an oil-producing region in the north.

Fighting has also been raging in the al-Jawf governorate bordering Saudi Arabia and Dhalea, which connects the Houthi-controlled north to the country’s south under the internationally recognised government.

Experts say gains or losses on any of these strategically important fronts could have significant consequences for either side.

Taiz and western coast fronts

“The hills and mountainous areas of Taiz and the western coast are key targets for the Houthis, who have repeatedly attempted to advance there,” Yazeed al-Jeddawy, the research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said.

“The Houthis are trying to seize commanding terrains, cut supply routes between the coastal Mocha district and Taiz, and prevent government troops on the western coast from linking up with the Taiz Military Axis,” said al-Jeddawy.

In Taiz and along the western coast, al-Jeddawy says, the immediate contest is over the heights and roads connecting Taiz to al-Makha.

Situated roughly 60km (37 miles) from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, al-Makha enjoys a highly strategic position on the Red Sea. For a month now, the Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks on the city, causing massive damage to its port facilities and killing and injuring several civilians.

Recently, the group has also attempted to extend its ground operations towards al-Makha city.

“The Houthis seem intent on tightening their hold around [al-Makha] and moving closer to the Dhubab–Bab al-Mandeb area. A substantial advance would strengthen their position near the southern entrance to the Red Sea and give them greater leverage over international shipping,” he added.

Fuad Mussed, a Yemeni political analyst and author, told Al Jazeera that the strategic importance of the western coast and Taiz fronts stems from their proximity to Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

“The Houthis seek to move closer to this vital waterway to threaten maritime traffic. Such a move aims to keep the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb under the influence of Iran and use them as leverage against regional and international powers. This is a strategy Tehran has been pursuing for years,” Mussed said.

Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a global oil chokepoint, to use it as leverage in the war against the United States. It has also warned that its allies could shut shipping via Bab al-Mandeb. Iran also attacked Saudi Arabia’s pipeline used to export oil from the Red Sea.

In July, the Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi vessels transiting through the Red Sea – an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

Marib and al-Jawf fronts

Over the past few weeks, pro-government forces have attacked Houthi-held territories in Marib and al-Jawf, facing further retaliation from the Houthis.

Saddam al-Huraibi, a Yemeni political commentator, said the Marib front is fateful for both sides.

“Marib is a government stronghold in north Yemen. So, a Houthi expansion in Marib would threaten government presence and weaken its leverage in the north. That is why pro-government troops are ready to fight tooth and nail on this front line,” al-Huraibi told Al Jazeera.

For the Houthis, the takeover of Marib will deepen the group’s authority and step towards controlling the oil and gas infrastructure. The Iran-backed group captured vast swaths of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, but Marib has remained in government hands since.

“Dominating Marib’s oil and gas resources has been a Houthi goal for over a decade. Without facing a crushing defeat in Marib, they would keep fighting to achieve that goal,” al-Huraibi said.

Adjacent to Marib, al-Jawf is also a hub of tense fighting between the Houthis and government forces. A government gain there would lay the groundwork for further advances, while a strong Houthi defence could undermine government forces’ morale and prompt them to retreat.

“Government-aligned forces have lately focused much of their offensive effort on al-Jawf. Government gains in al-Jawf would ease the threat to Marib while requiring the Houthis to defend a much broader area,” al-Huraibi said.

Al-Jeddawy said government gains could open routes towards the north – Saada, Amran or Houthi positions north of Marib.

The Houthis have carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia, including energy facilities in the country’s south. They have also accused Saudi Arabia of launching multiple attacks in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces in support of government forces.

The Dhalea front

Fighting on the Dhalea front, a strategic gateway between Houthi-held territory and the southern governorates, has intensified in recent weeks.

Fighting there did not fully stop during the relative calm, which began in April 2022 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

A Houthi advance there could open a route for their fighters to reach other southern territories. On the other hand, a Houthi setback would encourage government forces to push towards Ibb, controlled by the group.

“[Houthi] advances in Dhalea could expose the southern hinterland, while [government advances] could threaten Houthi positions and supply routes towards Ibb, al-Bayda and, farther north, Sanaa,” al-Jeddawy noted.

With the escalating fighting, the Houthis face pressure on several fronts, but the group has been readying for a range of scenarios, Khaled Ghorab, a pro-Houthi general, said.

“The [Houthi] Yemeni armed forces were never caught off guard by the prospect of escalation; rather, they worked to build and develop their own military capabilities based on tactical combat plans designed to counter a comprehensive, sustained attack launched simultaneously from land, sea and air,” he said.

Ghorab noted that this state of readiness enables the Houthi forces to carry out a direct response to sources of the threat – whether deep within enemy territory or at sea – targeting military bases or aircraft carriers as far as the Horn of Africa.

While the warring parties compete to seize strategic positions on several front lines, the latest escalation is also closely related to the wider regional confrontation.

“Iran has an interest in keeping Yemen and the Red Sea active as sources of leverage, while parts of the government camp believe the Houthis are under growing strain and that this is an opportunity to weaken them,” al-Jeddawy, the Sanaa-based researcher, said.

“The escalation still reflects domestic military and political aims, but its timing and direction cannot be separated from the regional war,” he told Al Jazeera.

The war in Yemen is threatening to open a new front as the Iran-allied Houthi rebels are trying to advance along the Red Sea coast, through the mountain chains of Taiz province, edging closer to strategic ground that overlooks one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries.

For the internationally recognised Yemeni government, this is an offensive with global consequences.

In Wednesday’s interview with Al Jazeera, Yemen’s Ambassador to Qatar, Rajeh Badi, a former government spokesman, said that his government and its armed forces had not violated any truce since 2021.

The Houthis, he argued, are “the aggressors”. “What we are seeing now is a surprise Houthi offensive to seize strategic ground along the Red Sea, in order to allow Iran, through its Houthi proxy, to tighten its grip on maritime routes,” Badi said.

He added that the Houthis, who have advanced on al-Makha (Mocha) and al-Waziyah, and over large stretches of the mountain chain overlooking the Red Sea in Taiz province, “want commanding positions to launch more effective strikes on ships and disrupt navigation in the Red Sea”.

Badi said the Yemeni government responded by opening fronts in al-Jawf, Marib and al-Bayda, and that the consequences could extend far beyond Yemen.

“We are now facing a real threat that does not stop at Yemen’s borders,” he said. “It threatens the entire region and the world. If the Houthis manage to choke maritime traffic in the Red Sea, we will be looking at another Hormuz in these waters – with potentially even greater impact.”

The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb “represent a vital artery for global shipping, for both energy and food supplies”, he added.

A chokepoint that belongs to the world

Bab al-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. To the north, the Red Sea leads to the Suez Canal, while farther east, beyond the Arabian Sea, lies another critical chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz. This geography is what gives Yemen’s conflict consequences far beyond its borders, as Saudi Arabia is already being drawn into the confrontation.

The Houthis have targeted Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea.

Major-General Turki al-Maliki, spokesman of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis on Wednesday attacked Saudi cities of Khamis Mushait, Abha, and Jizan with ballistic missiles and drones. He did not elaborate on any casualties as a result of the attacks.

Badi, who has spoken to the media for the first time since taking up his post, said those attacks are designed to change the nature of the war.

“By targeting Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south, and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea, the Houthis are trying to drag Saudi Arabia into their war. Their calculation is simple: they want to rebrand this conflict as a Saudi-Yemeni war,” he said.

The ambassador assessed that “every time their militias suffer heavy losses inside Yemen at the hands of the Yemeni armed forces, they respond by firing missiles and drones at civilian sites in Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to inflame Yemeni public opinion and convince the outside world that Yemen is at war with Saudi Arabia”.

The conflict, he said, is fundamentally about Yemen’s state and its future. The Yemeni people are fighting to “reclaim their state, their republic, their dignity and their stability”.

Iran’s hidden hand

Behind Yemen’s fragmented front lines, a larger regional confrontation looms, and its architect, according to Badi, is Iran.

The official said that Tehran’s relationship with the Houthis is now impossible to hide. “Iranian officials openly boast about it, and Houthi leaders proudly talk about their ‘strategic’ ties with Tehran,” he said.

The Houthis are “one of Iran’s key regional arms – just like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Many of Tehran’s other proxies have come under pressure,” he added.

“Former Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi used to say that if Iran gains control over Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, it will not need a nuclear weapon – its grip over these two chokepoints would be more powerful than any nuclear arsenal. Events have proved him right,” Badi recalled.

‘We have exhausted all peaceful avenues’

For Yemen’s government, the alternative to another war was supposed to be diplomacy.

Badi urged the world “to stand with us so we can rid ourselves of this scourge – a threat that no longer targets Yemenis alone”.

“We have exhausted all peaceful avenues. For more than 13 years, we have been engaging in dialogue rounds and signing agreements, whether inside Yemen or after the Houthis seized the capital, Sanaa,” he said.

Badi added that the Houthi rebels have effectively “buried peaceful options. Peace is simply not part of this movement’s culture or mindset. That is what ultimately forced us to take up arms”.

“The world must understand this difficult equation,” the ambassador concluded, that the Houthis are “an armed proxy, an extension of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthis do not represent us”.

Yemen’s more than a decade-long civil war has flared up once again after the Houthi rebel group launched an offensive in several locations against Saudi Arabian-backed government forces. The conflict has already spilled over beyond the country’s borders with the Houthis launching an attack on southern Saudi Arabia, targeting oil facilities and wounding dozens of people this week.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a United Nations-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

So who is involved in this conflict? Here’s a look at the main actors:

The Houthis

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), are an armed group controlling most parts of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, and some of the western and northern areas close to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to international prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, forcing it to step down and causing a crippling humanitarian crisis.

The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The two warring sides have also repeatedly tried to hold peace talks.

Seen as part of a regional alliance known as the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, the Shia Zaidi group nevertheless has its own base, its own interests – and its own ambitions.

The Houthis have demonstrated their missile and drone capabilities during the Yemen war in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, targeting oil installations and vital infrastructure. They have also proven resilient, defying more than 10 years of bombing by the Saudi-led coalition, as well as US and British strikes in recent years.

The group has gained international prominence for its attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea since the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza in October 2023.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh entered the Yemen war when it led a military coalition against the Houthis in March 2015, seeking to restore the government of then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Back then, Saudi Arabia and Iran were at the peak of a regional competition, both deeply distrusting each other. An Iran-supported group expanding control at the kingdom’s southern border was unacceptable, hence the military action.

This was before a China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 marked the beginning of a more practical and less confrontational relationship.

Presidential Leadership Council

The PLC was established in 2022 when the former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, formally transferred his powers to the new eight-member body.

It represents the internationally recognised government of Yemen, with a mandate to manage the country’s political, security and military affairs, and to steer negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire. It is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the late president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Its membership is drawn from a mix of northern and southern politicians and military-linked leaders in a bid to unite major anti-Houthi forces under one roof.

The PLC is backed by Saudi Arabia and the alliance that Riyadh leads.

Islah party

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, better known as Islah, is a Sunni Islamist movement with historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a faction within the recognised PLC-led government but has long had an independent identity. Its major stronghold has long been Marib, the country’s sole gas-producing region with one of its largest oilfields.

National Resistance Forces

The National Resistance Forces is a government-aligned military faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The force has maintained ties to Saudi Arabia and, like the Islah party, is part of the PLC. It aims for a unified Yemen, positioning itself as a counterweight to both the Houthis and southern secessionists.

Yemen’s Houthi group has carried out attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh saying that dozens of people have been wounded, as fighting between the Iran-aligned group and pro-Saudi forces in Yemen sharply escalates.

The Houthis on Tuesday said they targeted Saudi energy sites belonging to oil giant Aramco in southern areas, with the group’s military spokesperson calling it “a broad operation”.

Saudi authorities confirmed attacks on several facilities and installations related to the energy sector in the south of the country, vowing a firm response. Riyadh also accused the Houthis of wounding at least 73 people in the attacks.

The conflict between the Yemeni armed group and Saudi Arabia is unfolding as the Houthis are currently fighting Yemen’s Riyadh-backed internationally recognised government, which announced that it was launching counteroffensives against Houthi-held positions across several provinces on Monday.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a UN-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

The escalation also comes as the strategic importance of Yemen’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait grows amid Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key passageway for global oil and gas supplies.

The Houthis have sought to advance towards the vital Red Sea shipping route, while government forces say their campaign ultimately aims to retake the Houthi-held capital, Sanaa.

So what do we know about the latest fighting, and what comes next?

How did the fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis unfold?

The Houthis on Monday said Saudi Arabia launched multiple attacks on Houthi-held areas.

The group said Saudi attacks using aircraft and cruise missiles struck al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces.

Moreover, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out an air strike on a prison in al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf, killing seven people and injuring seven others. Riyadh did not immediately comment on the attacks.

At the same time, the Houthis claimed to have shot down Saudi reconnaissance drones over al-Jawf and al-Bayda.

Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Major-General Turki al-Malki, the Saudi spokesman for the Riyadh-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis carried out attacks on the Saudi cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, injuring at least 73 people, among them women and children.

According to a statement from Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry, the strikes also triggered fires at multiple oil installations and utility sites across the kingdom’s southern provinces.

Southern Saudi Arabia is home to key oil infrastructure, including the Jazan refinery, one of the kingdom’s largest, with the capacity to process 400,000 barrels of crude per day.

Shortly after, the Houthis announced that they had targeted Saudi energy infrastructure operated by oil giant Aramco in the south using drones and ballistic missiles.

The group’s military spokesman, Yahya Saree, said the attacks were retaliation for recent Saudi attacks on Houthi-controlled areas across Yemen.

Why is this escalation taking place now?

A key focus of the fighting is the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi shipping in July. The Houthis have also pushed towards government-held areas near al-Makha (Mocha) and territory bordering the Bab al-Mandeb Strait amid reinforcements and counteroffensives from government forces.

The strait’s strategic importance has increased dramatically because Iran’s restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz have forced Saudi Arabia to rely more heavily on its Red Sea export route. Between March and mid-July, Saudi seaborne crude exports through Bab al-Mandeb were eight times higher than during the same period in 2025.

In 2024, about 4.1 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait daily on average – about 5 percent of the global total.

Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the strait holds importance “when we look at the Houthis’ broader strategy”.

“The move towards the western coast is not only about gaining territory on the ground. It also has a maritime dimension,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The Houthis have already linked their military campaign to the Red Sea and the shipping routes around Bab al-Mandeb. So gaining more control over the … western coast could give them greater depth and allow them to sustain pressure on maritime traffic in the Red Sea. In that sense, the ground offensive and their maritime campaign are closely connected.”

The latest escalation also follows fighting that resumed in July after an Iranian aircraft attempted to land in Sanaa without Saudi authorisation, followed by strikes on Sanaa airport and Houthi retaliation.

What is happening between government forces and the Houthis?

On Sunday, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its warplanes had struck Houthi positions in Hodeidah, Marib and al-Jawf, as fighting spread across several fronts.

On Monday, government-aligned forces stepped up their counteroffensive. They announced a ground push towards the al-Labanat mountains in al-Jawf, while also reporting rocket attacks on Yatma and “intensive battles” with Houthi fighters in the province. Government forces also claimed advances towards Dhi Na’im district in al-Bayda.

The Houthis said they had repelled the advance towards al-Labanat and inflicted casualties on government-aligned forces. Houthi official Mohammed al-Farah also claimed the group fired ballistic missiles at reinforcements in al-Jawf.

By late Monday, government-aligned forces reported carrying out further air attacks against Houthi positions west of Taiz.

Al Jazeera could not independently verify the battlefield claims by the Houthis or the Yemeni government.

Rashad al-Alimi, who heads Yemen’s Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, meanwhile said on Monday that government forces had made significant gains against the Houthis, pointing to advances in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Taiz and Hodeidah.

“Our armed forces will continue to carry out their constitutional duty until state institutions are restored and their authority extends over the entire territory of Yemen,” al-Alimi said in a statement.

Yemen’s deputy defence minister, Major-General Samir al-Sabri, said in comments aired on state television that the government had resolved to “retake Sanaa”.

Majid al-Nuzaili, a spokesperson for government-aligned forces, said the goal of the offensive was to “liberate Yemen from the grip” of the Houthis “and restore Sanaa as a capital for all Yemenis”.

What is the humanitarian situation on the ground?

The World Health Organization said on Monday that at least 728 people have been killed or wounded in Yemen since August 23, with the majority in Taiz and along the western coast.

It said an estimated 21,000 people, roughly 3,000 families, have been displaced from Taiz alone since Thursday.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the casualty count is expected to rise.

“These casualties are said to be in the hundreds from both sides, especially as we have reports of air strikes being conducted in the governorate of al-Jawf,” he said.

The Crisis Group’s Nagi said the world was witnessing “significant deterioration in what is already a catastrophic situation”.

“We saw in the past few days a lot of displacement from areas where there has been fighting between the two sides, especially in Taiz,” he noted.

“Those are the direct impacts, but there are also indirect ones. The economic situation is likely to get worse, which will put even more pressure on the humanitarian situation. Ultimately, I think it will depend on how long this round of fighting lasts. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the humanitarian impact will be.”

What’s next?

Analyst Hisham al-Omeisy said the fighting in the war-torn country was no longer simply a domestic one.

“We are way beyond the concept [of it] being domestic. It all started with the Houthis pushing to control Bab al-Mandeb and the western coast, to control the chokehold on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, with the Iranians controlling the Strait of Hormuz,” al-Omeisy, a senior Yemen adviser at the European Institute of Peace, told Al Jazeera.

“This is definitely not domestic, especially when the Houthis have started attacking Saudi Arabia as well for the better part of the last month, and now escalating since today [Tuesday].”

Domestically, the Crisis Group’s Nagi said it was “unclear” what the outcome of this round of fighting will be, describing the situation on the ground as “very fluid”.

“But what we are seeing is that the government seems to be in a stronger position than at any time before, and it sees this round of fighting as an opportunity to consolidate its position and gain more territory from the Houthis,” he added, while warning that this did not mean the Houthis were weak.

“It’s true that the Houthis are fighting in Taiz, and they were the ones who launched the offensive against government forces there and made some gains. But on other fronts, in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and elsewhere, government forces have advanced and gained several key areas, while the Houthis have been on the defensive.”

On whether there will be a winner in this conflict, al-Omeisy said that in the long term, he expects a negotiated settlement.

“Look at the history of Yemen … we always inevitably reach some sort of a deal, so it’s not going to be a winner-takes-all,” he said.

“I don’t imagine there’s going to be a push to regain the capital [Sanaa], for instance. It’s going to be a bloodbath if they [government-aligned forces] do that.”

“There’s going to be a humbling of the Houthi forces. There’s going to be losses. But eventually, you will need a political deal,” al-Omeisy added.

According to Saudi political analyst Khaled Batarfi, the Houthi strikes will trigger a response but not a prolonged war.

“This is an escalation, of course,” Batarfi told Al Jazeera. In past attacks, Saudi Arabia tried “to not get engaged in a civil war, keep its distance and not to respond to attacks. But now this is too much [of an escalation],” he said.

“The coalition will have a say on that. This is a civil war inside Yemen, and it affects us as one of the parties. And so any response … in the same way [will be] an eye for an eye. But I don’t see a prolonged war – not with Iran and not with the Houthis.”