US says its forces ‘successfully’ completed a wave of strikes against Iranian targets, accusing the IRGC of attempted attacks on shipping and US service members.
Published On 2 Sep 20262 Sep 2026
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Foreign, defence ministers and military chiefs from three countries to meet for first time since signing Mecca pact.
By Al Jazeera Staff, AFP and Reuters
Published On 30 Aug 202630 Aug 2026
Top officials from Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan will gather in Istanbul on Monday for their first meeting since signing the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement earlier this month.
Turkish officials said on Sunday that the meeting will be attended by foreign ministers, defence ministers, and chiefs of staff from the three nations.
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According to AFP, the Istanbul meeting will formally establish a “political and defence strategic committee” comprised of such national representatives.
Turkish Foreign Ministry sources, quoted by Reuters news agency, said the agenda will cover international security issues, as well as discussions on improving military cooperation and capabilities.
The Mecca agreement forms a collective security pact similar to NATO, under which an attack on one member could be considered an attack on all. The alliance was established following the United States-Israel war on Iran.
Turkiye possesses the second-largest military in NATO, Pakistan is the only nuclear-armed Muslim country, and Saudi Arabia is the world’s leading oil exporter.
In an August interview with Al Jazeera, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Egypt could potentially join the pact.
Bangladesh has also stated it is actively considering joining the agreement. The potential expansion is being closely monitored by India, whose Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, told reporters that New Delhi would take all necessary steps to safeguard its national security.
Six months into the war on Iran, the largest US oil companies have posted their biggest profits since 2022, selling less oil at far higher prices. But the conflict is also putting their longstanding Gulf investments at risk, exposing the industry’s uneasy balance between wartime gains and mounting geopolitical vulnerability for investors worldwide.
Since the war began on February 28, Brent crude has risen about 22 percent, from $72 to $88 a barrel.
The Strait of Hormuz – through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas was shipped before the war – remains largely closed to commercial traffic, though Iran and Oman agreed last week on a temporary maritime route. Iran says the strait will not fully reopen until the United States fulfils its commitments under a lapsed interim peace deal, leaving longer-term security and management arrangements unresolved.
In the absence of a lasting resolution, the disruption is likely to continue supporting higher energy prices and creating windfalls for producers, despite placing energy companies’ regional assets and future projects at greater risk.
Rahul Choudhary, vice president of Upstream Research at Rystad Energy, an independent energy research company, said the conflict has already reduced the amount of oil and gas US energy firms are drawing from the Gulf region.
“Overall we expect US companies’ share of gas supplies [from the region] to fall by around 40 percent this year compared to last year [and] the share of oil supplies to drop by 30-35 percent,” he told Al Jazeera.
While higher commodity prices have helped offset the immediate financial impact, Choudhary said prolonged disruption is likely to delay major projects and weigh on the future growth plans of US oil and gas companies with a presence in the region.
The surge in the oil price since early March, when Iran first closed the Strait of Hormuz, has delivered a windfall for oil companies, but gains have been tempered by challenges in the Gulf.
Chevron has limited exposure to Arab Gulf supply disruptions, with the region accounting for just 5 percent of its total global output. The group reported its highest quarterly profit in six years of $12bn in adjusted earnings on July 31.
ExxonMobil, by contrast, has been far more exposed to disruption in the Middle East, with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian attacks on US-linked infrastructure in the region affecting its operations in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which together account for 20 percent of its global equity upstream supply, according to Choudhary.
“We already saw in H1 [the first half of] 2026, the company’s upstream earnings dropped by around $1.3bn compared to H1 2025, due to lower upstream volumes from the Middle East. However, the shortfall was covered well by higher commodity prices,” Choudhary said.
The contrast highlights a broader divide between those US energy companies which have benefitted from tighter global supply – and the corresponding rise in the oil price – and those with assets, partnerships or operations in the Gulf at greater risk of disruption caused by recent attacks on energy facilities.
The Gulf’s energy sector is dominated by state-owned giants such as Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and QatarEnergy.
Although these national oil and gas companies retain control over the region’s reserves and core infrastructure, US energy firms have carved out strategic positions across the region.
US companies generate revenue through stakes in production assets, joint ventures, production agreements, refining and petrochemical projects, as well as through long-term contracts to provide equipment, engineering and operational expertise.
ExxonMobil has some of the largest US commercial interests in the Gulf.
The company has been a major partner in Qatar’s LNG sector for decades, holding stakes in several QatarEnergy LNG joint ventures linked to the expansion of the North Field. The field is the Qatari section of the North Field-South Pars structure, the world’s largest natural gas field, which Qatar shares with Iran, where it is known as South Pars. ExxonMobil also holds an interest in the UAE’s Upper Zakum offshore oilfield alongside ADNOC.
Similarly, ConocoPhillips joined the North Field East (NFE) and North Field South (NFS) expansion projects with QatarEnergy in 2022 to increase export capacity at Ras Laffan.
The US group, Occidental Petroleum, has become one of the largest foreign producers in Oman, operating the Mukhaizna heavy oilfield, the country’s biggest producing oilfield. It also holds interests in UAE gas and pipeline projects.
Chevron maintains a smaller but strategically important Gulf footprint. Through Saudi Arabian Chevron, the company operates oil assets in the Saudi-Kuwait Partitioned Zone, including the Wafra field. In July, it said it was exploring potential routes to move Iraqi crude to Mediterranean export terminals, which could reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a US-registered independent conflict monitor, Iran and Iran-backed groups in the region have carried out at least 172 attacks on nonmilitary infrastructure across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries since the US and Israel launched their war on February 28.
Energy infrastructure has been hit hardest, with oil and gas facilities, along with power plants and desalination plants, accounting for nearly half (48 percent) of all strikes on nonmilitary targets.
The UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain have suffered the highest number of successful strikes, with the majority aimed at oil and gas facilities.
Among the sites that have been struck are Kuwait’s Mina Abdullah and Mina al-Ahmadi refineries, the Bahrain Petroleum Company oil refinery, and ADNOC’s al-Ruwais Industrial City and the Habshan gas complex.
There have also been several strikes on Saudi Aramco facilities, most recently a drone strike on July 27 on the Abqaiq processing complex, one of the most critical nodes in Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure, processing more than seven million barrels of oil per day.
Nasser Khdour, Middle East assistant research manager at ACLED, said: “Oil and gas facilities, power plants and water desalination plants are likely to remain key targets for Iran because disruption to these sectors can increase economic pressure on Gulf states, while disruption to global energy supplies increases prices and pressure on the US during periods of escalation.”
In March, a drone attack close to the Saudi Aramco-ExxonMobil SAMREF refinery in Yanbu disrupted oil loading at the city’s Red Sea port. While the attack had only minimal operational impact, it highlighted the vulnerability of US-linked energy assets in the region.
Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, the world’s largest LNG export hub, which hosts major joint ventures between QatarEnergy, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, also came under repeated attack in March, at one point forcing the plant to halt production entirely. In June, an explosion as a result of a “technical malfunction” on Qatar’s Barzan gas project, where ExxonMobil holds a stake, killed at least 13 people.
“In terms of gas assets being impacted, major blows have been [dealt to] companies [that are] part of LNG projects in Qatar: ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips,” Choudhary said.
He added that ExxonMobil’s share of LNG supply from Qatar is expected to fall significantly this year to about four million tonnes compared with 13 million tonnes last year, while ConocoPhillips has also experienced reduced volumes to one million tonnes this year compared with 2.5 million tonnes last year.
The attacks on Qatar’s LNG infrastructure could have longer-term consequences. Damage to LNG trains at Ras Laffan could take years to repair, according to QatarEnergy, while delays to Qatar’s North Field expansion projects could push back planned supply growth.
“The attack on LNG trains 4 and 6 at Rasgas damaged roughly 13 million tonnes of capacity, which will take anywhere between three to five years to come back online with a total repair cost estimate of around $3bn,” said Choudhary.
He added that the second most impacted gas project has been the Shah gas project in the UAE, in which Occidental Petroleum has a 40-percent stake and where drone attacks in March caused a fire at the gas plant that halted operations.
The conflict has also affected ExxonMobil’s oil interests in the UAE, Choudhary said. Production from Upper Zakum, where ExxonMobil has a 28 percent stake, was reduced between March and May when export routes were disrupted, limiting the ability to move offshore crude.
Beyond the UAE, the most significant impact on US companies’ oilfield operations played out in Iraq. A drone attack hit the Sarsang oilfield in March, followed by an explosion at one of its storage facilities in April, together causing damage to the field.
Looking ahead, Choudhary said higher prices could support cash flows, but prolonged conflict risks could threaten future growth. ExxonMobil’s $10bn Upper Zakum and Qatar LNG expansions could face delays, while ConocoPhillips remains exposed through investments in higher-risk markets, including its planned 42-percent stake in BP’s Kirkuk operations in Iraq.
“For companies like Chevron and Occidental Petroleum, whose presence are in less volatile countries like Israel and Oman respectively, the impact of escalations will not be as severe, as we have not seen significant disruption in these countries,” said Choudhary.
Oilfield service giants, including US firms SLB (formerly Schlumberger), Halliburton and Baker Hughes, provide drilling technologies, equipment and operational expertise across the Gulf, supporting Saudi Aramco, ADNOC and QatarEnergy.
For oilfield service companies, the outlook is mixed, according to Chinmayi Teggi, energy research analyst at Rystad Energy, a research group. While higher oil prices and energy security concerns could lift demand over time, near-term margins remain under pressure from higher logistical costs, supply-chain disruptions and delayed projects.
“For the Big Three (SLB, Baker Hughes and Halliburton), the conflict continues to weigh on regional revenues,” Teggi told Al Jazeera, adding that second-quarter Middle East revenues were down 8-10 percent compared with the previous year across the three companies, while higher oil prices meant revenues were higher in other geographies.
However, a recovery in suspended operations and production could help drive growth into 2027.
For US companies, therefore, the Gulf remains both an opportunity and a risk.
“The impact on US companies will depend on the extent of exposure and countries in which these companies are present,” Choudhary said.
Their investments have secured US access to some of the world’s most important oil and LNG projects, but the conflict has exposed the risk of operating in a region where energy infrastructure has become increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical conflict.
US President Donald Trump has repeatedly warned Iran against restricting access to the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the waterway must remain open to global commerce.
But for companies with billions of dollars invested across the Gulf, the challenge isn’t just about keeping shipments moving – it is ensuring the infrastructure remains secure, they say.
The Iran war is settling into attrition, with no regime collapse and Gulf economies facing growing uncertainty
Analysts broadly agree the United States and Israel’s war on Iran will not see regime collapse in Tehran or a definite victory for Washington, but rather a dragged-out affair of stagnation and attrition.
The hope among the US leadership at the start of the war, which began after surprise Israeli and US attacks on February 28, was that mounting economic and military pressure on Iran would force a structural shift in Tehran. Six months on, it is clear this vision will not come about, and instead many are preparing for a protracted war and managed fallout.
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Oil-dependent economies are still absorbing supply shocks after traffic in the Strait of Hormuz slowed to a trickle of pre-war levels following Iran’s attacks on shipping and a US blockade on Iranian ports.
The US military is still entrenched in a region that remains its most militarised in years. Although the war’s intensity has lessened since a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed by Washington and Tehran in June, there is no sign it will conclude, leading to continued uncertainty about the future.
Existing tensions, such as those between the Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia in Yemen, look only set to increase as the war drags on. The influence of rival powers, such as those of India and China, remains stalled rather than stopped, with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative having already established itself within the Middle East and North Africa. All in all, the region remains in flux where formal alliances with outside powers no longer guarantee safety.
The defence agreement between Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia recently signed in Mecca will likely be the first of many such military pacts agreed in the region.
“The war has just accelerated trends, but hasn’t really started anything that wasn’t already under way. The Gulf countries were already diversifying their economies,” Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, told Al Jazeera. “Many were already looking at broadening their defence partnerships beyond existing US security guarantees, as well as increasing their own defence capability.”
Israel, for its part, is still pursuing its regional project of “paramountcy”, HA Hellyer of the Royal United Services Institute said, despite its failure to bring Iran to its knees this year.
“There is no chance of the government in Tehran falling in the next six months,” Hellyer told Al Jazeera. “If everything were to theoretically stay the same … with just increased economic pressure, that could eventually cause a ripple effect that could lead to state collapse in Iran. But we’re talking years, not months, and everything is not likely to stay the same.”
![A photograph taken from the southern Lebanese city of Tyre shows smoke rising from the site of a string of Israeli airstrikes that targeted the area of al-Mansouri on August 25, 2026. [Kawnat Haju/AFP]](https://i0.wp.com/www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/AFP__20260825__C6G72NK__v3__HighRes__LebanonIsraelUsIranWar-1787675105.jpg?w=640&ssl=1)
The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on regional cities have hindered Gulf states’ plans to use oil revenues as an engine to diversify their economies and build on their reputations as a safe haven to encourage investors.
Shipments of oil, derivative products and liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been repeatedly and severely disrupted since the US and Israel launched their attacks on Iran in February.
Transit through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which saw attacks on shipping by the Houthis during Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, became even more hazardous in July, when the Iran-allied Houthis declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia.
“The price of oil has increased broadly in line with the Gulf states’ difficulties in exporting it,” John Sfakianakis, chief economist at the Gulf Research Center, told Al Jazeera. “Is this going to go for six months? Is it going to go on for longer?”
Exacerbating the Gulf states’ difficulties is that, although the price of oil has risen, so has inflation. In addition to the economic difficulties the war has created, there is also growing pressure for Gulf states to invest more in defence.
For now, the majority of the states caught in the middle will look at ways of living with the turmoil and managing the consequences.
Trump says all mines have been cleared from Strait of Hormuz’s international waters and that Tehran received warnings that ships laying new mines will be ‘destroyed’.
Published On 26 Aug 202626 Aug 2026
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NOT ONE but three new theme parks have been given the go-ahead to open in Europe, which they claim could even rival Disney.
A deal between France and Saudi Arabia for three theme parks near Paris has been announced.
The project is expected to cost €6bn (£5.13bn) overall and will include a manga-themed park, inspired by the popular Japanese franchise Dragon Ball Z.
Little details have been revealed about the theme parks, but local media has reported that it could be built on the site of the former Mirapolis park in Val-d’Oise, which has been closed for 35 years.
The opening dates for the parks are not known yet, but they will be built near Cergy-Pontoise and expected to take years to construct.
French President Emmanuel Macron said that the development would be “extraordinary” and would create a “new global destination”.
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He also said: “Nothing like this has been seen since Disneyland Paris.”
The project is thought to have transpired from a conversation between Macron and bin Salman about their love for Japanese comics.
It is expected to create around 22,000 jobs.
Despite no details being revealed about the new theme parks yet, it is believed that the Dragon Ball Z theme park could be based around the park of the same theme currently being built by Qiddiya in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Riyadh theme park is set to have seven zones including Turtle House, Capsule Corporation and Beerus’s Planet.
There is also set to be a 70-metre high rollercoaster running through the park.
Overall, the Riyadh theme park is expected to have 30 themed attractions, five of which are set to be next generation rides.
Guests will be able to stay in themed hotels as well, and there will be a number of restaurants at the park.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announces new sanctions on Tehran to sever financial support for the regime, urging US allies to support the measures.
Published On 25 Aug 202625 Aug 2026
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Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, (MBS), is on the second day of his two-day state visit to France, where he’s meeting President Emmanuel Macron.
In this explainer, we outline what they are expected to discuss and examine how their latest meetings build on an already evolving relationship.
MBS’s visit to Paris began on Sunday evening alongside President Macron at the closing ceremony of the Esports World Cup. It was the first time the Esports tournament, which includes competitions ranging from video games to chess, had been held outside Saudi Arabia.
On Monday, Macron and Bin Salman are expected to sign several agreements on health, transport and energy.
French media reported that a deal to build a Dragon Ball-themed amusement park, backed by a Saudi investment fund and inspired by the iconic Japanese manga series, could be signed.
Valerie Pecresse, President of the Regional Council of Île-de-France in Greater Paris, told French broadcaster TF1 that the regional government had been working on the project for 18 months.
“There is a very important meeting at the Elysee today that may result in the signing of this agreement. We are waiting for the signature,” she said, describing the project as “on the scale of Disneyland”.
Bin Salman and Macron are also holding bilateral discussions on regional security and their economic ties.
That is expected to include discussions about energy routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, such as new pipelines, capacity upgrades and alternative port networks.
France is a major buyer of Saudi oil and mineral products.
Since the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran on February 28, shipping has been severely disrupted in the Strait of Hormuz – the vital waterway on which oil exporters in the Gulf are heavily reliant and where 20 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas supplies are shipped from during peacetime. The disruption sent oil prices soaring.
Before the war, a barrel of Brent crude – the global benchmark – cost about $66. Over the course of the conflict, prices have climbed above $100 – hitting a high of $119 early on in the war.
On Monday, Brent was trading around $93 a barrel.
Bin Salman and Macron are also expected to discuss the war in Iran, the bloodshed in Palestine, as well as developments in Syria and Lebanon, where Israel occupies around one-fifth of its territory.
Other expected topics on Monday’s agenda include global events that Saudi Arabia is set to host in the coming years, including Expo 2030, focusing on sustainability and urban innovation, and the 2034 football World Cup.
The two countries have a fairly equal trading balance.
In 2024, France exported $4.5bn worth of goods to Saudi Arabia and imported $4.6bn worth, according to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), an online platform that compiles and visualises international trade statistics.
Refined petroleum accounted for 72 percent of Saudi Arabia’s exports to France in 2024. Besides refined petroleum, Saudi Arabia exported crude petroleum and other mineral products to France. It also exported small amounts of machinery, chemicals and cars.
France’s exports to Saudi Arabia in 2024 were more diverse, including airliners, helicopters, gas turbines, pharmaceutical products and perfume, among other products.
Sunday’s visit marked the third time MBS has visited France after trips in 2022 and 2023.
In December 2024, Macron visited Riyadh, where the two countries founded the Saudi-French Strategic Partnership Council, which formalised and upgraded political and economic ties between Saudi Arabia and France.
The current visit is also MBS’s first international trip since the August 7 signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, known as the Mecca pact – the mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan.
Signed by the prince, Turkiye’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, the agreement commits all three states to treat an armed attack on any one of them as an attack on all three.
Analysts say the pact shows that Saudi Arabia is taking steps to diversify its security partnerships beyond Washington.
Omani and Iranian foreign ministers hold a call as Washington prepares economic sanctions amid ongoing shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
Published On 22 Aug 202622 Aug 2026
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has called for an end to the months-long war with the United States, stating that Tehran holds a position of strength as diplomatic talks remain stalled.
“It is better that we bring the war to an end now as we are in a position of power and dignity,” Pezeshkian said in a meeting with doctors on Friday. “The whole world acknowledges our victory and emphasises that America has attacked our schools, hospitals and infrastructure in violation of all regulations and is hated around the world.”
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Pezeshkian – whose authority as president is ultimately subordinate to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei – also defended the June memorandum of understanding agreed with Washington against hardline domestic critics in parliament, who accused his administration of giving concessions to the US.
“They cannot find even a single clause in this agreement that indicates capitulation. All the commitments concern the other side,” he said.
However, days after the memorandum of understanding expired, Iran’s military leadership has warned that the country remains ready to strike back against any new threats.
“With preparedness across land, sea, air, air defence and cyberspace, Iran’s armed forces will respond to the enemy’s new threats with crushing, punishing and devastating responses,” Major-General Ali Abdollahi, chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, was quoted as saying by Iranian media.
Meanwhile, Omani and Iranian foreign ministers discussed in a phone call on Friday ways to create suitable conditions for resuming dialogue and negotiations, as well as developments affecting navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, according to Oman’s state news agency.
Tehran continues to keep the key waterway partially shut while Washington persists with a naval counterblockade. Reports in US media indicate the US navy has been organising and protecting secret convoys of tankers through the southern sector of the strait, enabling between five and 10 million barrels a day of oil to be exported.
In Washington, President Donald Trump expressed scepticism over Tehran’s willingness to negotiate, telling reporters when asked if US military options with Iran were limited: “It just means that we’re seeing what happens.”
“We have total control of that entire region having to do with the Strait of Hormuz, and that means well into it, the land areas. So, they would love to make a deal, but they’re not ready to make the right deal, in my opinion,” Trump added.
He has also warned of economic consequences against any country that provides “any type of lifeline to Iran”.
The comments came as US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that Washington would “collapse” the Iranian government with a sanctions campaign.
Bessent will hold a news conference at the Department of the Treasury on Monday, where he is expected to outline planned sanctions against Iran, marking a shift by the Trump administration towards economic rather than military pressure as the war nears the six-month mark.
Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already condemned the US plan, accusing Washington of “economic terrorism” and stating that “the instigators of these sanctions are deserving of trial and punishment”.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lin Jian also criticised the US measures, stating that “sanctions and pressure will not help resolve the issue” and urging all parties to “take responsible measures and resolve the problem through political and diplomatic means”.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says Washington will impose its ‘toughest sanctions in history’ to ‘collapse’ Iran’s government, warning of consequences for countries that maintain economic ties with Tehran.
Published On 21 Aug 202621 Aug 2026
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The Red Sea does not recognise political borders as maps draw them. Instead, it binds every country on its shores to a shared fate with its neighbours across the water. When the western shore of this sea is shaken, the eastern shore does not remain untouched. This is a hard geopolitical reality that Saudi Arabia has understood well through decades of dealing with crises in the Horn of Africa and Yemen as a direct extension of its own domestic security.
It is through this deep understanding of geography as a shared destiny that the agreement establishing the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council, signed in Riyadh on August 17, 2026, should be read. It is the institutional expression of a firmly held Saudi conviction: that the stability of a unified Sudan is indispensable to the stability of the kingdom itself, and that Sudan’s collapse or fragmentation would inevitably become a Saudi national security crisis.
Long before strategic considerations and geopolitical crises came to the fore, Saudis viewed Sudanese people with great respect and as among those to whom they felt closest. Since the earliest times, Hijazis have shared cultural and linguistic traits with people on the other side of the Red Sea, particularly Sudanese people.
Throughout modern history, relations between the two countries have not been marked by serious crises. Indeed, they have been distinguished by a unique historical fact: the relationship has never witnessed a political crisis between the two states or their peoples, and there has always been mutual appreciation between them. This exceptional relationship, rooted in religious, cultural and social ties, has made the two countries a rare model of intra-Arab relations that has withstood all regional storms.
Saudi Arabia has stood by Sudanese people through every ordeal, including Nile floods and natural disasters, as well as the country’s crises and civil wars. This has created a fabric of human ties that goes beyond narrow political interests. It was this unique historical legacy that made Saudi mediation welcome to both sides when the war broke out, with the Jeddah platform working to ease the conflict and address the humanitarian crisis.
Saudi Arabia’s current position towards Sudan, then, is not merely the product of cold strategic or political calculations. It is the natural extension of a relationship that lived in people’s hearts before it was translated into institutions and agreements.
This relationship culminated in the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council, whose founding agreement was signed in Riyadh on August 17, 2026, by the two countries’ foreign ministers, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and Mohieddin Salem. Sources say it is not merely a conventional diplomatic framework, but a comprehensive institutional platform intended to oversee 10 major strategic areas. These reflect the depth of the partnership between the two countries and their desire to move from political and humanitarian support towards a long-term strategic, economic and investment partnership.
The 10 areas covered by the council include Sudan’s reconstruction; agriculture and food security; livestock; gold and mining; the Red Sea and ports; energy and electricity; finance and banking; industry and food processing; communications and digital transformation; and tourism, real estate and services.
Taken together, these areas constitute an integrated roadmap for turning bilateral relations into a genuine development partnership, drawing on Saudi Arabia’s investment and technological capabilities and Sudan’s enormous natural and human resources.
According to the Sudanese foreign minister, the council’s priorities centre on security, defence and the economy, with the Red Sea added as an area of strategic cooperation because of its importance to both countries. This is why Sudan joined the maritime defence alliance established by Saudi Arabia on July 30, 2026. This reflects a shared understanding that security and stability are the essential preconditions for any economic development, and that Red Sea security is a shared responsibility that cannot be separated from the stability of the states along its shores.
For more than a decade and a half, the Arab region has witnessed a wave of systematic projects of fragmentation targeting pivotal states such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia. Countries that once played an active role in the regional order have been turned into open arenas of conflict managed by regional and international actors through local proxies. With its enormous resources and vital location connecting the Arab world with the African interior, Sudan has always been an ideal target for such a project of division.
When Saudi Arabia acts to support a path that preserves the unity of the Sudanese state and its national institutions, it objectively contributes to thwarting one link in this scheme targeting the Arab world as a whole. Every Arab state protected from fragmentation represents another defeat for this project, while every state that succumbs to it represents a victory that encourages its repetition. From this perspective, Sudanese stability is a collective Arab battle, and Saudi Arabia finds itself in the position of a state capable of leading that battle in defence of a collective Arab project that cannot afford to lose another link.
Sudan occupies a unique position that makes it one of the region’s most important strategic keys: it is an Arab state that borders both the Red Sea and the Nile, connects the Horn of Africa with the Sahara, the Sahel and the Arab hinterland, and borders seven African and Arab countries.
This location makes Sudan a natural bridge between the Arab world and Africa, a vital maritime gateway on the Red Sea and a strategic water nexus on the Nile.
If a state in such a position fragments, it opens a geopolitical rupture whose effects extend from the Nile Basin to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and from the African Sahel to the Arabian Peninsula. The recent experience of Yemen has clearly demonstrated how the collapse of a state on the Red Sea can transform a vital maritime chokepoint such as Bab al-Mandeb from a safe commercial passage into an arena of direct threats to global shipping.
Saudi Arabia, which has paid a heavy price in both security and economic terms as a result of the war in Yemen, has realised that the security of waterways cannot be safeguarded merely by guarding the passages themselves, but by ensuring the stability of the states whose coastlines surround them.
In classical and contemporary strategic thought, the security of any major state is measured not only at its immediate borders, but also through its “strategic depth”: the wider geographical sphere that absorbs shocks before they reach the core. This idea, whose roots can be traced to strategic thinkers such as Nicholas Spykman and Walter Lippmann, holds that a state exists within a geopolitical environment that either acts as a buffer and absorbs crises, or transmits and amplifies them.
Given Saudi Arabia’s position as a pivotal regional power, it cannot content itself with securing its immediate borders while crises rage throughout its strategic surroundings. From this perspective, Sudan is not merely a neighbour across the sea, but one of the most important components of Saudi strategic depth. Its stability means stability along the kingdom’s western maritime frontier, control over flows of irregular migration and smuggling, and keeping at bay the spectre of a security vacuum that could be exploited by armed groups and extremist organisations.
When Riyadh invests in Sudan’s reconstruction and development through permanent institutional frameworks such as the Coordination Council, it is building a wall of stability around its strategic depth. It has understood that genuine security cannot be bought with walls alone, but is built through the prosperity of its neighbours.
The security of major waterways is not simply the product of military protection of the passage itself, but of the strength and stability of the states along its shores. A Red Sea bordered or surrounded by fragile or collapsed states, or states penetrated by irregular forces, is an insecure Red Sea regardless of the military capabilities of the major powers along its shores.
From this lesson, a more mature Saudi vision has emerged: it is not enough for the kingdom to be strong on the eastern shore. The states along the western shore and the Red Sea’s southern approaches, including Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, must also be strong, cohesive and capable of exercising full sovereignty over their coastlines. By placing the “Red Sea” alongside security and defence among its areas of focus, the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council puts this philosophy into practice: strengthening Sudan’s ability to control its coastline is a direct Saudi investment in the security of the Red Sea as a whole.
The Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council is an expression of a broader political philosophy embraced by Riyadh: genuine regional power does not grow stronger by isolating itself behind borders, but by assuming responsibility for the stability of its surroundings. At a time when projects of fragmentation are proliferating, supporting Sudan’s unity, strengthening Saudi strategic depth and safeguarding Red Sea security are three sides of the same coin.
When Saudi Arabia safeguards the unity of its neighbour, it safeguards the integrity of its own strategic project. When it protects the stability of the Sudanese coast, it protects the stability of its own. This is the dialectic of shared geography: neither neighbour can be secure without the other, and neither shore can be stable without the one opposite it.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
