Saudi Arabia

Iran’s IRGC had earlier said they targeted radar systems in locations including Al-Kharj, home to Prince Sultan base.

At least two people have been killed after a projectile fell on a residential location in Saudi Arabia‘s Al-Kharj city, Saudi authorities reported, as Iranian counterattacks on Gulf nations hosting US military assets entered a second week.

The Saudi civil defence said in a post on X on Sunday, without mentioning Iran, that an unspecified “military projectile” had hit a residential area in Al-Kharj, killing two foreign nationals – one Indian and one Bangladeshi – and injuring 12 people.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had said earlier that it had targeted radar systems in locations including Al-Kharj governorate, which is home to the Prince Sultan airbase used by United States forces, and has come under repeated attack over the past week in the US and Israeli war against Iran.

Reporting from Doha, Al Jazeera’s Laura Khan said the projectile had landed on a residential site belonging to a maintenance and cleaning company.

“This is getting very volatile and dangerous for people across the Gulf,” she said. “It’s really important to emphasise that over 200 nationalities live and work across the Gulf nations. Many of these could be labourers.”

On Sunday, the Saudi Defence Ministry reported intercepting 15 drones, including an attempted attack in the diplomatic quarter of the capital Riyadh.

Kuwait, meanwhile, said an attack hit fuel tanks at its international airport, and Bahrain reported a water desalination plant had been damaged.

Sunday’s attacks came after Israeli warplanes hit five oil facilities around the Iranian capital, killing several people, according to a state oil executive, and blanketing the city in acrid smoke.

A spokesperson for the IRGC said Iran would retaliate if US-Israel attacks on its energy infrastructure did not let up.

“If you can tolerate oil at more than $200 per barrel, continue this game,” said the spokesperson.

As the war extended into its ninth day, the IRGC said it had enough supplies to continue drone and missile attacks across the Middle East for up to six months.

Ahmed Aboul Gheit, secretary-general of the Arab League, said Iran’s attacks on several member states were “reckless”, urging Tehran to reverse what he called a “massive strategic mistake”.

Iran’s Health Ministry said Sunday that at least 1,200 civilians had been killed and around 10,000 wounded since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28.

The United States-Israeli war on Iran could leave consumers and businesses worldwide facing weeks or months of higher fuel prices even if the conflict, which is now in its eighth day, ends quickly, as suppliers grapple with damaged facilities, disrupted logistics, and elevated risks to shipping.

The outlook poses a global economic threat and a political vulnerability for US President Donald Trump leading into the midterm elections, with voters sensitive to energy bills and unfavourable to foreign entanglements.

Global oil prices have surged by more than 25 percent since the start of the war, driving up fuel prices for consumers worldwide.

The national average petrol price reached $3.41 per gallon ($0.9 a litre) on Saturday, according to the American Automobile Association (AAA), rising by $0.43 over the past week. Goldman Sachs warned oil prices could climb above $100 per barrel if shipping disruptions continue.

The US crude oil settled at just below $91 per barrel on Friday – its largest weekly gain on record in data dating back to 1983, indicating prices could continue to rise.

“The market is shifting from pricing pure geopolitical risk to grappling with tangible operational disruption, as refinery shutdowns and export constraints begin to impair crude processing and regional supply flows,” JP Morgan analysts said earlier this week, according to the Reuters news agency.

The conflict has already led to the suspension of about a fifth of global crude and natural gas supply, as Tehran targets ships in the vital Strait of Hormuz between its shores and Oman, and attacks energy infrastructure across the region.

A nearly complete shutdown of the strait means the region’s top oil producers – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Kuwait – have had to suspend shipments of as much as 140 million barrels of oil – equal to about 1.4 days of global demand – to global refiners.

More than 80 percent of global trade moves by sea, according to the World Bank, meaning disruptions in the waterway could increase freight costs and delay deliveries of goods.

Storages in the Gulf filling

As a result, oil and gas storage at facilities in the Gulf is rapidly filling, forcing oilfields in Iraq and Kuwait to cut oil production, with the UAE likely to cut next, analysts, traders and sources told Reuters.

“At some point soon, everyone will also shut in if vessels do not come,” a ⁠source with a state oil company in the region, who asked not to be named, told Reuters.

Oilfields forced to shut in across the Middle East as a result of the shipping disruptions could take a while to return to normal, said Amir Zaman, head of the Americas commercial team at Rystad Energy.

“The conflict could be ended, but it could take days or weeks or months, depending on the types of fields, age of the field, the type of shut-in that they’ve had to do before you can get production back up to what it once was,” he said.

Iranian forces, meanwhile, are targeting regional energy infrastructure, including refineries and terminals, forcing them to shut down too, with some of those operations badly damaged by attacks and in need of repairs.

Qatar declared force majeure on its huge volumes of gas exports on Wednesday after Iranian drone attacks, and it may take at least a month to return to normal production ‌levels, sources told Reuters. Qatar supplies 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG).

Saudi Aramco’s mammoth Ras Tanura refinery and crude export terminal, meanwhile, has also closed due to attacks, with no details on damage.

Economists warn that the situation could create a combination of higher prices and slower growth.

Islamabad, Pakistan – The reverberations of a war in which US-Israel attacks have killed more than a thousand people in Iran, including the country’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, and Iranian missiles and drones have fallen on Israel in retaliation, are being felt deeply in Pakistan.

Six Gulf countries have also come under Iranian missile and drone attacks, putting Pakistan in a tough position.

The country shares a 900-kilometre (559 miles) border with Iran in its southwest, and millions of its workers are residents in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations.

Since September last year, Islamabad has also reinforced its decades-long ties with Riyadh by signing a formal mutual defence agreement that commits each side to treat aggression against the other as aggression against both.

As Iranian drones and ballistic missiles continue to target Gulf states, the question being asked with increasing urgency in Pakistan is what Islamabad will do next if it finds itself pulled into the war.

Islamabad’s answer so far has been to work the phones furiously, engaging regional leaders, including Iran and Saudi Arabia.

When US-Israeli strikes killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, Pakistan condemned the attacks as “unwarranted”. Within hours, it also condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Gulf states as “blatant violations of sovereignty”.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, who was attending an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Riyadh when the conflict began last week, launched what he later described as “shuttle communication” between Tehran and Riyadh.

Speaking in the Senate on March 3, and at a news conference later the same day, Dar disclosed that he had personally reminded Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of Pakistan’s defence obligations to Saudi Arabia.

“We have a defence pact with Saudi Arabia, and the whole world knows about it,” Dar said. “I told the Iranian leadership to take care of our pact with Saudi Arabia.”

Araghchi, he said, asked for guarantees that Saudi soil would not be used to attack Iran. Dar said he obtained those assurances from Riyadh and credited the back-channel exchange with limiting the scale of Iranian strikes on the kingdom.

On March 5, Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, said his country welcomed Saudi Arabia’s pledge not to allow its airspace or territory to be used during the ongoing war with the US and Israel.

“We appreciate what we have repeatedly heard from Saudi Arabia – that it does not allow its airspace, waters, or territory to be used against the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said in an interview.

But only a day later, during early hours of March 6, Saudi Arabia’s defence ministry confirmed it intercepted three ballistic missiles targeting the kingdom’s Prince Sultan Air Base. And hours later, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir was in Riyadh, meeting Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, where they “discussed Iranian attacks on the Kingdom and the measures needed to halt them within the framework” of their mutual defence pact, the Saudi minister said in a post on X.

As the war escalates, analysts say that Pakistan’s tightrope walk between two close partners could become harder and harder.

A defence pact under pressure

The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, signed on September 17, 2025, in Riyadh by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif alongside army chief Asim Munir, was the most significant formal defence commitment Pakistan had entered into in decades.

Its central clause states that any aggression against either country shall be considered aggression against both. The wording was modelled on collective defence principles similar to NATO’s Article 5, though analysts have cautioned against interpreting it as an automatic trigger for military intervention.

The agreement followed Israel’s September 2025 strikes on Hamas officials in Doha, an event that shook confidence in US security guarantees across the six Gulf Cooperation Council states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Nuclear-armed Pakistan has maintained a military relationship with Saudi Arabia for decades, according to which an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Pakistani troops remain stationed in the kingdom.

Now the pact is being tested under conditions neither side anticipated.

Umer Karim, an associate fellow at the Riyadh-based King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, called Pakistan’s current predicament the outcome of a miscalculation.

Islamabad, he argued, likely never expected to find itself caught between Tehran and Riyadh, particularly after the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.

“Pakistani leaders were always careful not to take an official plunge vis-a-vis Saudi defence. It was done for the first time by the current army chief, and though the potential dividends are big, so are the costs,” Karim told Al Jazeera.

“Perhaps this is the last time the Saudis will test Pakistan, and if Pakistan doesn’t fulfil its commitments now, the relationship will be irreversibly damaged,” he added.

In 2015, it declined a direct Saudi request to join the military coalition fighting in Yemen, following a parliamentary resolution that the country must remain neutral.

Aziz Alghashian, senior non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum in Riyadh, pointed to that episode. “The limitation of the Saudi-Pakistan treaty is clear. Treaties are only as strong as the political calculations and political will behind them,” Alghashian told Al Jazeera.

But Ilhan Niaz, a professor of history at Islamabad’s Quaid-e-Azam University, said that if Saudi Arabia feels sufficiently threatened by Iran to formally request Pakistani military assistance, “Pakistan will come to Saudi Arabia’s aid.”

“To do otherwise would undermine Pakistan’s credibility,” he told Al Jazeera.

The Iran constraint

The complicating factor for Pakistan is that it cannot afford to treat Iran simply as an adversary if Riyadh calls for military assistance.

The two countries share a long and porous border, maintain significant trade ties, and have recently stepped up diplomatic engagement. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Islamabad in August 2025, and the two governments maintain a range of formal and backchannel contacts.

Niaz acknowledged that Tehran has also been “a difficult neighbour”, pointing to the January 2024 exchange of cross-border strikes initiated by Iran as evidence of the relationship’s unpredictability.

Even so, he said Pakistan had “vital national interests” in ensuring Iran’s stability and territorial integrity.

“The collapse of Iran into civil war, its fragmentation into warring states, and the extension of Israeli influence to Pakistan’s western borders are all developments that greatly, and rightly, worry Islamabad,” he said.

The domestic fallout from the US-Israel strikes and Iran’s response has already been immediate.

The army was deployed and a three-day curfew imposed in Gilgit-Baltistan after at least 23 people were killed in protests across Pakistan following Khamenei’s assassination. The protests were driven largely by Pakistan’s Shia community, estimated to make up between 15 and 20 percent of the 250 million population, which has historically mobilised around developments involving Iran.

Pakistan’s violent sectarian history adds another layer of risk.

The Zainabiyoun Brigade, a Pakistan-origin Shia militia trained, funded and commanded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has recruited thousands of fighters from Pakistan over the past decade. While many fought in Syria against ISIL (ISIS), many Syrians activists accuse them of committing sectarian violence.

Two years ago, Pakistan’s northwestern Kurram district, the Zainabiyoun’s primary recruitment ground, saw more than 130 people killed in sectarian clashes in the final weeks of 2024 alone.

Pakistan formally banned the group in 2024, but many believe the designation has done little to dismantle its networks.

Analysts warn that fighters hardened in Syria’s civil war could, if Iran’s conflict with Pakistan’s Gulf partners deepens, shift from a defensive to an offensive posture on Pakistani soil.

“Iran has significant influence over Shia organisations in Pakistan,” Islamabad-based security analyst Amir Rana, executive director of the Pak Institute of Peace Studies, told Al Jazeera. “And then you have Balochistan, which is already a highly volatile area. If there is any confrontation, the fallout for Pakistan would be severe.”

Pakistan’s Balochistan province borders Iran, and has been ground-zero for a decades-long separatist movement. “That reality cannot be ignored,” Muhammad Khatibi, a political analyst based in Tehran, said, pointing out that geography itself constrains Islamabad’s choices.

“Any perception that Islamabad is siding militarily against Tehran could inflame domestic sectarian divisions in ways that a full-scale regional war would make very difficult to contain,” Khatibi told Al Jazeera.

What are Pakistan’s options?

Analysts say direct offensive military action against Iran, such as deploying combat aircraft or conducting strikes on Iranian territory, is not a realistic option for Pakistan, given its domestic constraints.

Rana describes Islamabad’s current posture as an attempt to placate both sides.

“Iran’s primary threat is through air strikes using drones and missiles, and that is an area where Pakistan can help and provide assistance to Saudi Arabia. But that would mean Pakistan becoming a party to the war, and that is a major question mark,” he said.

He added that the most viable option for Pakistan could be to provide covert operational support to Saudi Arabia while maintaining diplomatic engagement with Iran.

Alghashian also agreed; he identified air defence cooperation as the most concrete role Pakistan could play — it would be both “militarily meaningful and politically defensible”

“They could help create more air defence capacity,” he said. “This is tangible, it is defensive, and it is in Pakistan’s interest that Saudi Arabia becomes more stable and prosperous.”

Karim, however, warned that the window for Pakistan’s balancing act may be closing faster than Islamabad realises.

“As the situation reaches a tipping point and as Saudi energy installations and infrastructure are hit, it is only a matter of time that Saudi Arabia will ask Pakistan to contribute towards its defence,” he said.

He added that if Pakistan deploys air defence assets to Saudi Arabia, doing so could leave its own air defences dangerously exposed, while deeper involvement could carry political costs at home.

For now, Islamabad’s strongest card remains diplomacy, using its access to both Riyadh and Tehran and the trust it has accumulated. Khatibi said Pakistan should protect that position “at all costs”.

“Pakistan’s most realistic positioning is as a mediator and leveraging its relationships with both sides. It is highly unlikely that Pakistan deploys forces into an anti-Iran coalition. The risks would outweigh the benefits,” he said.

The stakes for Pakistan

The scenario least favourable to Islamabad would be a collective Gulf Cooperation Council decision to enter the war directly, and the warning signs are mounting.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have both declared that Iranian attacks “crossed a red line”.

A joint statement issued on March 1 by the United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE said they “reaffirm the right to self-defense in the face of these attacks.”

For Pakistan, such an escalation could carry serious consequences.

Economically, with millions of Pakistani workers living and earning their wages in Gulf states, remittances from the region provide crucial foreign exchange for an economy still recovering from a balance of payments crisis.

Khatibi said any prolonged regional war that disrupts Gulf economies would directly affect Pakistan’s financial position.

“Energy prices could also spike, adding further strain,” he said, noting Pakistan’s heavy dependence on Gulf states for its energy needs.

Pakistan is also simultaneously managing its own military confrontation with the Afghan Taliban which began two days before the US-Israel strikes.

Karim warned that deeper involvement in the regional conflict could trigger internal instability.

“Sectarian conflict,” he said, “can reignite, taking the country back to the bloody 1990s. The government already has lean political legitimacy, and such an occurrence will make it even more unpopular.”

Alghashian also highlighted Pakistan’s reluctance to be drawn into the conflict.

“Saudi Arabia does not want to be in this war and is getting dragged into it. Pakistan will also certainly not want to be dragged into somebody else’s war that they didn’t want to be dragged into. It just wouldn’t make any sense,” he says.

But Niaz said that if the crisis eventually forces Islamabad to choose, the calculus may become unavoidable.

“If Tehran forces Pakistan to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the choice would unquestionably be in favour of the Saudis.”

The Gulf states have spent years trying to broker peace between Iran and the West: Qatar brokered nuclear talks, Oman provided back-channel diplomacy, and Saudi Arabia maintained direct dialogue with Iran through 2024 and into 2025. Iran attacked them anyway. The idea that the Gulf states have a responsibility, a moral one, to protect Iran from the consequences of its actions because of good neighbourliness is now grotesque in context. Iran did not return good neighbourliness. Iran returned ballistic missiles.

Iran’s position is based on three propositions. First, that Iran acted in lawful self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter; that host countries relinquished territorial sovereignty by allowing US military bases on their territory; and that the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314 justifies the attack on those bases as lawful military objectives. Each of these propositions is legally flawed, factually skewed, and tactically wrong. Collectively, they add up to a legal argument that, if accepted, would ensure that the Gulf is permanently destabilised, the basic principles of international law are destroyed, and, in a curious twist, the very security threats that Iran is reacting to are reinforced.

The self-defence claim does not meet the required legal threshold

The UN Charter, in Article 51, permits the use of force only in self-defence against an “armed attack”, and this term is not defined by reference to the state invoking it. The International Court of Justice, in cases such as Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (1986) and Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) (2003), has interpreted the requirement of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the UN Charter restrictively. The Court distinguished between the most grave forms of the use of force, which qualify as armed attacks triggering the right of self-defence, and less grave uses of force that do not. Accordingly, not every use of force, such as minor incidents or limited military activities, amounts to an armed attack. In this light, the mere presence of foreign military bases in Gulf states, maintained for decades under defence agreements with host governments, would not in itself constitute an armed attack against Iran.

Necessity and proportionality are also part of customary international law, requiring that self-defence be necessary and proportional. Iran has not demonstrated either. Targeting the territory of other sovereign Arab states in response to the policy decisions of the United States is neither necessary, since diplomatic and United Nations avenues are still available, nor proportional, since it imposes military consequences on states that are not a party to any conflict with Iran.

Critically, Article 51 also has a mandatory procedural element, in that any state employing self-defence is immediately required to notify the Security Council. Iran has consistently evaded this requirement in each of its escalatory actions. While this may seem to be a minor element, it is in fact the means by which the international community is able to verify and check self-defence claims. A state that evades this requirement is not employing Article 51. It is exploiting the language of Article 51.

Iran’s reading of Resolution 3314 is a fundamental distortion

The provision of Article 3(f) of the Annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974) states that an act of aggression includes the “action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State”. Iran could rely on this provision to hold the Gulf states that host United States military bases liable for any act of aggression committed from their territories against Iran. Nevertheless, the mere presence of military bases is not sufficient to hold them to be lawful military objectives; this will depend on their actual contribution to military activities against Iran based on the rules of international humanitarian law.

Thus, such an Iranian reading would be wrong on three distinct legal grounds.

First, Resolution 3314 is definitional in nature. The resolution was adopted to assist the Security Council in determining when aggression has taken place, not to confer upon states the unilateral power to punish states deemed to have committed aggression through the use of force. The resolution itself, in Article 2, asserts the power of the Security Council to make the determination of what constitutes aggression. The self-application of Article 3(f) of the resolution is therefore bypassed altogether.

Second, Article 3(f) speaks of the active launching of an attack, not the passive hosting of a military base. The legal distinction is fundamental. A state, in signing a defence treaty with another and hosting the latter’s troops on its soil, is engaging in a measure of sovereignty. A state, actively launching, coordinating, or enabling military strikes against a third party, is engaged in a different matter altogether. Iran has not credibly shown this latter case. The presence of US troops or bases in the Gulf has been a fact for decades, and this has not constituted armed aggression against Iran under any legal standard.

Third, even if Article 3(f) were applicable, the appropriate course would be to bring the matter to the Security Council, not to launch unilateral military strikes. General Assembly resolutions do not override the Charter. Iran cannot rely upon a non-binding resolution defining terms to override the Chapter VII requirements for the use of force or the clear criteria of Article 51.

Sovereignty cannot be dictated by a neighbour’s strategic preferences

Iran, in invoking the principle of good neighbourliness, asks the Arab Gulf states to deny the United States basing rights. Good neighbourliness is a two-way principle, and it does not allow for interference in the internal affairs of other states, certainly not interference in the decisions of other states simply because they are deemed inconvenient to the interfering state. All UN states possess the inherent right to conclude defence treaties with whomever they choose, and this is so regardless of the opinion of their neighbours.

The asymmetry of Iran’s position is striking and self-disqualifying. Iran itself has active military relationships with Russia and China. Iran arms, finances, trains, and supports the activities of non-state military actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force operates openly in various states, and this has been extensively documented in United Nations Panels of Experts reports, as well as other international monitoring reports. According to the standards that Iran applies to the Gulf states, any state that hosts the activities of the IRGC, the transfer of Iranian arms, or the coordination of Iranian proxies on its soil would be engaging in aggression against third parties. Iran will not accept this principle when it is applied to itself. A legal principle that is unacceptable to the party to whom it would be applied is not a legal principle at all; it is a political tool.

A doctrine that defeats Iran’s own strategic interests

From the perspective of international relations theory, Iran’s position follows the logic of offensive realism, which seeks to remove the external balancing architecture of regional neighbours by claiming it to be hostile in nature. However, this approach is empirically self-defeating.

Under balance of threat theory, states react to offensive capability, geographic proximity, and aggressive intentions. Iran’s doctrine, in asserting the right to strike any state that hosts forces it perceives as a threat, drives each and every threat variable to maximum levels for each and every state in the region. The obvious consequence, evident in the data, is that the states in the region and external powers are becoming more, rather than less, securely integrated. The Fifth Fleet’s permanent base in Bahrain, the UAE’s negotiations over F-35s, Saudi Arabia’s deployments of THAADs, and Qatar’s expansion of the Al Udeid base are reactions to Iran’s escalation, not causes of it.

From the perspective of constructivism, the legitimacy of a legal argument is also partly based on the normative credibility of the state that presents the argument. The record of Iran’s compliance with IAEA regulations, including the enrichment of uranium to a purity level of 60 percent or more in 2023–2024, interference with inspections, the removal of monitoring cameras, and the overall violation of the non-proliferation regime, has undermined the credibility of the state significantly. A state that is itself a violator of the legal regime cannot claim the role of a law-abiding state seeking protection under the norms of the legal regime.

Iran’s legal rationale was always theoretically wrong. What has occurred since February 28, 2026, has made Iran’s actions morally and politically wrong. Iran did not simply target US military assets. The reality of the situation is now documented and undeniable. Ballistic missiles and drones were launched against Gulf states in the opening days of the conflict. This marked the first time one actor had simultaneously attacked all six GCC states. Iran escalated its attacks in deliberate stages. Day 1: Iranian missiles were fired against military bases. Day 2: Iranian missiles were fired against civilian infrastructure and airports. Day 3: Iranian missiles were fired against the energy sector. Days 3 and 4: The US Embassy in Riyadh was attacked by Iran. International airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait were attacked by Iranian missiles, resulting in the suspension of flights throughout the region. Videos from Bahrain documented an Iranian Shahed drone attacking an apartment building. This is not self-defence. This is the collective punishment of sovereign nations that went to extraordinary lengths to avoid the conflict.

The rationale provided by Iran falls flat when one considers the actions Iran itself took. Its doctrine held that only targets involved in the preparation or launch of an attack against Iran were legitimate targets. Civilian airports are not military bases. Hotels in Palm Jumeirah are not military command centres. An apartment complex in Manama is not a weapons storage facility. By Iran’s own stated legal rationale, none of these targets was legitimate, yet they were attacked. This was not a legal doctrine at all; it was a pretext for coercion, and the conduct of war revealed this to be the case.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.