nuclear

Romania’s military detonated part of the Danube riverbed to redirect water towards the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant after prolonged drought and extreme heat pushed the river to record-low levels.

Hungary says a heatwave is forcing the shutdown of its largest nuclear power plant for the first time in 44 years. Scorching temperatures and drought have caused record-low water levels in the Danube river, disrupting reactor cooling systems.

China fields the largest and most sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal in Asia, supported by what the U.S. Department of Defense has described as “the world’s most active and diverse missile development program.” In the first of this series, TWZ provides an overview of the country’s intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs), representing the leading edge of Beijing’s nuclear deterrent forces.

China has rapidly expanded and modernized the arsenal of its People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), fielding a growing number of ballistic missiles capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear warheads. The backbone of the force now consists of road-mobile, solid-fuel medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range missiles. However, legacy liquid-fueled systems such as the Dong Feng-5 (CSS-4) remain in service, and a new silo-building program will change the balance yet again.

The expansion shows no signs of slowing. According to one report, by the start of this decade, the number of Chinese ballistic missile brigades had grown by more than 35 percent in just three years, with most new formations operating medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) alongside ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).

Perhaps most dramatically, China has embarked on a rapid expansion of its ICBM silos. In 2021, open-source researchers observed the construction of several hundred new missile silos. These are located near Yumen (120 silos), Hami (110 silos), and Ordos (around 90), and they raise big questions about how many ICBMs China aims to deploy. The analysts responsible for locating the new solos described it as “the most significant expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal ever,” but its full significance remains to be seen.

Leaving some of the new silos empty might be an option, revisiting the ‘shell game’ that was planned for the U.S. Peacekeeper ICBM in the late 1970s. However, the U.S. State Department has said that the U.S. intelligence community believes every silo will have a missile ‘loaded.’ You can read our previous assessment of this development here.

At the same time, Beijing is improving the survivability and effectiveness of its strategic arsenal through the deployment of multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids, while advancing new sea- and air-based nuclear delivery systems. These include the Type 096 ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and its JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), as well as the nuclear-capable H-20 stealth bomber currently under development, further strengthening China’s emergence as a fully fledged nuclear triad power.

As for the nuclear warheads that arm the ICBMs and SLBMs discussed below, the numbers available are a closely guarded secret. However, the Pentagon has estimated that China had surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels.

DF-5 (CSS-4)

Range: 12,000+ kilometers

With the DF-4, a ‘limited-range ICBM,’ having been retired from service around 2023, the DF-5, China’s first true ICBM, is now the oldest in the inventory.

On account of its size, the two-stage, liquid-fueled DF-5 was always intended for silo deployment.

Although tested as early as 1971, the missile wasn’t successfully flown over longer ranges until 1980. It appears that China had particular challenges getting the powerful new engines to work, and other new developments over the DF-4 included using nitrogen tetroxide as an oxidizer and steering via gimballed engines and vernier engines rather than jet vanes.

As tensions with the Soviet Union increased, China accelerated the program, placing the missiles in experimental silos by December 1980, a month after the handover of the first DF-5.

As early as 1983, work began on the improved DF-5A, known in the West as the CSS-4 Mod 2, four units of which were reportedly operational by 1992. Deployed DF-5 units were gradually replaced with the DF-5A. The DF-5 and DF-5A both featured a multi-megaton warhead.

In 2015, the further-improved DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 2) variant was unveiled. In a first for China, this version is understood to differ from its predecessors in carrying multiple warheads, reportedly four re-entry vehicles per missile. The delay in fielding a missile with nuclear-armed multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) may seem surprising, but reflects the major technological challenges, which saw China lag behind the Soviet Union (later Russia) and the United States for many years.

At the same time, it appears that, instead of attempting to boost penetrative power against enemy defenses by adopting MIRVs, China instead focused more on rapid launch sequences and hardened silos for its ICBMs.

It should be noted that the DF-5 also served as the basis for China’s important Long March 2 series of space launch vehicles and its successors.

The latest version of the missile is the DF-5C (CSS-4 Mod 4). This features an enlarged final stage section, which the Pentagon has suggested carries a multi-megaton-sized warhead. This would indicate a counter-value rather than a counter-force system, i.e., expected to target enemy population centers and economic assets, rather than its military capabilities like missile silos and command bases.

The DF-5 and its improved variants remain in service as China’s last liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. According to Western estimates, there are 20 known DF-5 silos, although China is building additional silos which may well also be used to house these weapons, as well as more modern missiles.

DF-31 and DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 Mod 2)

Range: DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) 7,000+ km; DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) 11,000+ km

With Sino-Soviet relations hitting a low in the early 1970s, China launched the development of a solid-fuel ICBM (and a submarine-launched counterpart) as part of a major overhaul of its strategic forces.

Initial work on what became the DF-31 began in 1974, but the program made little progress until 1978. Successful tests of a new solid-fuel motor in 1983 spurred these efforts and led Beijing to scrap work on a new liquid-fuel ICBM. In 1984, an official directive called for a shift from liquid to solid propellants, as well as a focus on tactical rather than strategic missile systems.

Solid-fueled missiles, when combined with mobile launchers, can leave cover and launch far more quickly, eliminating the lengthy fueling process required while the missile is erected. As a result, they are significantly less vulnerable to preemptive strikes. The shorter launch timeline also drastically improves the ability to respond to a crisis.

From 1985, China embarked on its ‘second-generation strategic missile’ program, spearheaded by the DF-31 and the submarine-launched JL-2.

In 1999, the three-stage DF-31 was publicly unveiled for the first time during a parade. However, the missile didn’t enter service until 2006, reportedly due to difficulties related to the guidance systems.

As a mobile solid-fuel ICBM, the closest match to the DF-31 is perhaps Russia’s Topol. The U.S. Minuteman III is similar in terms of size and configuration but is exclusively silo-based and has significantly better performance.

The DF-31 is an important part of Beijing’s strategic force. Most significantly, perhaps, it reflects a shift from a Chinese ICBM force dominated by heavy, liquid-fuel missiles to one fielding a larger number of smaller, mobile solid-fuel missiles.

As well as the original DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1), of which around eight launchers are understood to be deployed, China operates around 24 launchers armed with the DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2). The DF-31A reportedly first flew in 1999 and has a longer range thanks to a lighter guidance system and other improvements. Both types carry a single warhead.

There is also a silo-based version of the missile, which Beijing is now presumed to have installed in many of the silos in its missile fields. This is designated as the DF-31BJ, but few details about it are known.

DF-31AG (CSS-10 Mod 3)

Range: unknown

In 2017, China publicly displayed a new variant of the DF-31, the DF-31AG. Mounted on a new transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), the new missile system has a distinctly unique appearance and likely has certain different capabilities, perhaps including multiple warheads. Based on commercial satellite imagery, it appears that China is converting at least some of its existing DF-31A brigades to this new variant.

Compared to the tractor-trailer configuration of the MEL used on the DF-31/DF-31A, that for the DF-31AG is highly mobile and much more suitable for off-road operations, suggesting a different employment concept. Around 30 launchers are understood to be deployed.

DF-41 (CSS-20)

Range: 12,000+ km

While the DF-31 series marked a step change for China’s strategic forces, these ‘second-generation strategic missiles’ were just a part of the process of modernizing the deterrent.

By 1986, China was working on an even more ambitious three-stage solid-fuel missile, the DF-41. This was intended to fully replace the liquid-fuel DF-5 by no later than 2010, although this goal was not achieved.

Like the DF-31, the new ICBM would be mobile, and, in parallel with its development, China made efforts to make portions of its highway network more suitable for handling the heavy mobile launchers.

The DF-41 was revealed to the public during a parade in 2019. At the time, it was announced that two brigades were already equipped with this system.

In contrast to the DF-31, the DF-41 is thought to be equipped with multiple warheads, although sources disagree on how many. Published figures range from three to 10 MIRVs, although it’s probable that a range of different numbers and yields can be accommodated. One Pentagon assessment said that “the system is likely intended to carry no more than three warheads per missile and has improved range and accuracy over DF-31 class ICBMs.”

In addition to the road-mobile version, the U.S. Department of Defense has assessed that both silo-based and rail-based variants are under development. Potentially, the newly built silos could accommodate other ICBMs, like the DF-31 and DF-5, but the more modern DF-41 appears a more likely candidate.

Looking at the road-mobile type only, a total of 18 launchers for the DF-41 are understood to be deployed.

DF-61

Range: unknown

The latest Chinese ICBM to have been revealed is the DF-61, shown publicly for the first time during the parade celebrating the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II, in September 2025. There have been suggestions that the missile could be the launcher for one or more intercontinental-range nuclear-armed HGVs. (It is unclear what happened to the ‘missing’ DF-51 designation, which only ever appears to have been used speculatively).

U.S. intelligence considers that there is a Chinese counterpart to Russia’s Avangard, namely, an intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which may be carried atop the DF-61. Designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, it would seriously complicate an adversary’s ability to provide precise warning. It is likely the same gliding re-entry vehicle that China tested in 2021 as a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) capable of defeating U.S. missile defences.

Chinese officials have hinted at such a capability in the past. In 2024, then-Principal Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Dr. Vipin Narang, described a ‘strategic hypersonic glide missile that can carry nuclear warheads’ in Beijing’s arsenal. Such a missile would provide a long-range, strategic complement to the theater-range, conventionally armed DF-17 hypersonic boost glide vehicle.

JL-2 (CSS-N-14)

Range: 7,000 km

Soon after embarking on its nuclear program, China began looking at launching a ballistic missile from a nuclear-powered submarine. The ambition was long delayed, since the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) did not commission its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) until 1984. The goal was further thwarted when it deprioritized its SSBN program, and only a single Type 092 class boat was ever fielded.

Ultimately, China did not possess a true sea-based deterrent until the mid-2010s. The PLAN deployed its first Type 094 Jin class SSBN in 2007 and commissioned its sixth example in 2021.

Each Jin class submarine carries 12 JL-2 (CSS-N-14) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are derived from the DF-31 ICBM. The three-stage solid-fuel missile was reportedly tested for the first time in 2004. British and U.S. intelligence reports on the status of the JL-2 were generally circumspect, and they only started to list the missile as operational around 2015.

The limited range of the JL-2 means that the Type 094 submarines would need to operate in areas north and east of Hawaii if China wanted to strike targets on the U.S. east coast. This puts a serious dent in the credibility of China’s sea-based deterrent, and this is exacerbated by the fact that only a portion of what is already a small SSBN force will be on patrol at any given time.

Most Western sources consider that the JL-2 is armed with a single warhead, although there have been rumors of a multiple-warhead configuration with three to eight MIRVs.

JL-3

Range: 10,000 km (estimated)

China is developing a follow-on to the JL-2, the JL-3, which would allow it to target portions of the continental United States from its own territorial waters. This missile is expected to be deployed on the new Type 096 submarine, which China likely began constructing in the early 2020s. These new SSBNs are expected to enter service in the 2030s and will provide China with a much more credible sea-based deterrent. The Pentagon has also reported that some of the older Type 094 submarines may have been equipped to carry the JL-3 as well as the older JL-2.

The JL-3 is presumed to be a three-stage, solid-fuel weapon carrying multiple warheads.

“Over the next decade, the PRC [People’s Republic of China] probably will continue to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly,” the Pentagon had noted in the unclassified version of an annual report on Chinese military developments that it sent to Congress in December 2024.

“The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its ‘strategic deterrence’ capabilities,” the report added.

The development of new ICBMs and SLBMs is an important part of this, and one that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces. However, these weapons are just one part of the picture. China is busy working on fielding a larger and more diverse missile force, both nuclear and conventional. China’s bewildering array of intermediate-, medium-, and short-range ballistic missiles will be discussed in a forthcoming article.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing to eliminate a foundational safety principle that has for 50 years minimized the radiation people in the United States are exposed to and that has been adopted around the world.

Currently, facilities such as nuclear plants, hospitals or academic institutions that use radioactive materials must ensure radiation exposures are kept “as low as reasonably achievable” — the ALARA principle. The NRC proposal would abandon that philosophy while keeping a separate standard on maximum radiation exposure.

The two standards have worked together in radiation safety. Dose limits set the maximum amount of radiation the public and radiation workers can be exposed to, while ALARA kept radiation exposure as low as practical under those limits. Research shows radiation exposure increases a person’s chance of getting cancer, a risk that increases as the dose increases.

The dose limits are not changing. But the NRC, which regulates civilian nuclear energy technologies and radioactive materials, now wants to replace ALARA with a “graded approach” that includes several actions facilities must take depending on the potential dose of radiation to workers. More rigorous radiation protection measures would be required when approaching dose limits to ensure they aren’t exceeded.

This comes as President Trump attempts to quadruple domestic nuclear energy production because of surging electricity demand amid a data center and artificial intelligence boom. Reforming the NRC is one way Trump is trying to speed up nuclear reactor development. He instructed the federal agency in an executive order last year to “adopt science-based radiation limits.”

The Energy Department, which oversees national energy policies, has already stopped using ALARA. The NRC expects to finalize its radiation protection regulations in the coming months.

NRC Chairman Ho Nieh said the commission is not lowering the bar on safety.

“We’re just removing the ambiguity,” he said in a call with reporters. “But the standard for exposure to workers and the public, those are not changing. We’re just putting in place greater clarification.”

Nieh doesn’t expect major changes within the nation’s existing fleet of large, traditional reactors. But companies designing and building new, smaller reactors could move faster with a clearer picture of the radiation protection requirements, he said.

Could radiation doses creep higher?

The NRC said radiation exposure limits are set well below levels associated with health effects, and it expects remaining standards and industry practices to keep radiation doses far below the limits. There’s incentive to do so — it’s more expensive and time-consuming to work in areas with higher radiation because access must be restricted and more surveys are required.

The nuclear industry’s trade association agrees with the NRC.

“We will always continue to look at what can we do to reduce the dose to workers, and maintain our doses to the off-site public as low as possible,” said Doug True, chief nuclear officer at the Nuclear Energy Institute. “It’s not like we’re just going to throw open the doors and let everything run up to the limits.”

ALARA created a “moving target” for regulation, said Justin Friedman, a nuclear energy consultant who previously spent three decades at the U.S. Department of State. Getting rid of the rule would allow NRC scientists to make more rational decisions about appropriate levels of manageable risk, he added.

Some experts question cutting ALARA

Edwin Lyman, director of nuclear power safety at the Union of Concerned Scientists, cautions that some parts of the NRC proposal could raise permissible radiation doses in certain cases, while still staying below the cap. Lyman highlighted a proposed revision to radionuclide emissions standards, in particular.

Radiation exposure to the general public is limited to 100 millirem per year. A typical dose of radiation from a chest X-ray is 10 millirem.

The NRC wants to increase its radionuclide emissions standards from a conservative, 10 millirem per year dose to 25 millirem per year, based on a hypothetical person living in a house at the property line for a nuclear plant.

The NRC says actual doses to the public would remain far lower because, in reality, people live farther from nuclear sites and benefit from dispersion in air and water.

The NRC should improve, rather than eliminate, ALARA, Lyman said, to protect the public and workers. ALARA has become a political target because some people mistakenly believe radiation exposures have to be as low as possible no matter the cost, Lyman said. In reality, it allows trade-offs.

Katy Huff, a former U.S. assistant secretary for nuclear energy, said in some cases, the requirement may be challenging to regulate. Additional clarity would improve the regulatory environment without harming the public, added Huff, a professor and department chair at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

However, Huff said, she thought the NRC was going to clarify what “reasonably” means in ALARA without scrapping it. She said she’s open to being convinced the graded approach will be just as effective.

One expert sees a mixed bag

The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, chartered by Congress to provide independent scientific guidance, has not formally weighed in yet. Council President Kathryn Higley said she likes some things in the 180-page document but thinks others are problematic.

The NRC should look at the whole picture for managing risk, she said. For instance, if a worker at a nuclear power plant were to enter an area where airborne radioactive materials are present, in keeping with ALARA, they might wear full personal protective equipment with respirators, said Higley, professor emeritus at Oregon State University. That makes them move slower, potentially subjecting them to heat stress that could hurt them more than a low dose of radioactivity, she said.

A concern with the proposal, Higley said, is that it maintains the current occupational dose limit for adult radiation workers at 5 rem, or 5,000 millirem, per year. With ALARA in place, the average dose to workers has been well below that cap.

The International Commission on Radiological Protection recommends an occupational dose of 2 rem per year on average. The NRC previously found it wasn’t justified to match that, because workers were exposed to less than that and changing regulations is costly.

Higley said the U.S. may need to align with the international community if ALARA is going away.

McDermott writes for the Associated Press.

United States President Donald Trump agreed to a 30-year nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia on Wednesday that would see Washington transfer nuclear technology to the Gulf kingdom.

This has drawn concerns that if the deal comes to fruition, it could spark a nuclear arms race across the Middle East amid reports that Riyadh would be able to enrich its own uranium, a necessary step in acquiring nuclear weapons.

US officials have stressed the proposed deal would serve civilian nuclear purposes, although exact details of the agreement have not been made public.

It has now been tabled in the US Congress for a review, but is expected to survive resistance from Democrats.

Here’s why some are concerned about the agreement:

Could this spur a nuclear arms race in the region?

Analysts have raised concerns about whether the proposed deal could lead to Saudi Arabia seeking to develop military-grade uranium, which the US Energy Department has not yet confirmed.

Some analysts have warned this could open the door to spurring an arms race with other regional powers.

Saudi Arabia has long voiced its intention to use nuclear energy for power generation, but in 2018, de facto leader Mohammad bin Salman told CBS that Riyadh would “without a doubt” develop a nuclear weapon if Iran did the same.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted on Thursday that the deal would not lead to nuclear proliferation, as US contractors would handle the project, allowing Washington to monitor it. US nuclear reactor designer Westinghouse is believed to be a major contractor.

Former Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Liberman said in a post on X on Wednesday that Israel must oppose the deal with “all our might.”

“We must all understand that Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme will end in nuclear weapons and lead to a mad arms race across the entire Middle East,” he posted.

Israel, which developed a nuclear arsenal in the 1960s, has long sought to stop Arab countries and other regional countries from gaining their own nuclear weapons.

Is there a risk of nuclear reactors being attacked in strikes?

Some others have also raised concerns over possible nuclear leaks amid the tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, for example, has seen some of its outer facilities hit in the US and Israel’s war on Iran. Iran too has hit the perimeter of the United Arab Emirates’ Barakah nuclear power plant in a drone strike.

None of these strikes hit the nuclear plants’ reactors, but analysts say allowing more such facilities in the Middle East when tensions are so high is a mistake.

Damage to a reactor’s core could release highly radioactive gases, causing immediate catastrophic damage within a 20- to 30-kilometre (12- to 18-mile) radius.

Nuclear accidents at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear plant in 2011 and Chornobyl in Ukraine in the former Soviet Union in 1986 are cautionary stories.

Could Saudi Arabia have access to sensitive material?

That’s unclear for now.

Highly enriched uranium and spent nuclear reactor fuel are key components of nuclear bombs.

According to US media, the agreement includes a clause providing for a “black box” uranium enrichment facility that would be situated in Saudi Arabia but run by US companies.

A joint study by the two countries, set to last two years, will determine whether such a facility is needed, or if Saudi Arabia should import commercial-grade low-enriched uranium.

“That’s really the concern,” Matthew Kroenig, a fellow with the Atlantic Council, told Al Jazeera, saying there’s been no such arrangement anywhere else in the world.

“What does the US really mean by a ‘black box’? So will the US bring its engineers there full time, forever? Realistically, the Saudis will be involved, they will learn the tech, and they could kick out the US in the future,” Kroenig said.

Washington could be seeking to model Moscow’s agreement with Turkiye and Egypt, where Russian contractors manage active nuclear power plants, including the needed uranium and the highly radioactive spent fuel from the reactors.

The difference, Kroenig pointed out, is that Russia does not enrich the uranium in those cases.

On the other hand, the UAE, which runs a civilian nuclear programme that has been held up as a gold standard for non-proliferation, imports all of its low-enriched uranium from France, the United Kingdom and Russia among other countries.

Kroenig suggested that the US could be using the two-year study as a negotiating tactic, noting that the same claims of impact studies have been used to stall South Korea’s requests to enrich its own uranium.

“The deal doesn’t immediately speak about uranium enrichment, so my hope is that this is a negotiating tactic and that after two years the US will say ‘oh no, this doesn’t make sense right now’”, he said.

Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, told CBS News in 2018 that his own nation was not planning to acquire a nuclear weapon, but that “without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible”.

Earlier US media reports suggested the deal could allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium in the future – which can be used as fuel for power plants, but also potentially to make nuclear bombs. However, Trump’s remarks appear to deny this.

Rosemary Kelanic, the director of the Middle East programme at the US-based Defense Priorities think tank, said it would be “quite shocking” if the US were to allow Saudi Arabia uranium enrichment facilities.

“The US has never done that before. We have never helped another country enrich on their own soil,” she said, adding that this was because “if you can produce your own nuclear fuel, you become a much bigger risk” for building nuclear weapons.

The agreement will now be sent to the US Congress for review.

Some lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle are expected to oppose the deal, though Trump’s Republican Party controls both the upper and lower chambers and opponents of the deal do not appear to have the votes needed to block it.

July 23 (UPI) — President Donald Trump said on social media Thursday that Saudi Arabia must sign the Abraham Accords as part of its nuclear deal with the United States.

Trump added that the nuclear deal will be approved but Saudi Arabia’s entry into the Abraham Accords is a required condition.

“The Civil Nuclear Deal (There will be no enrichment of material!) being made between the United States Department of Energy and Saudi Arabia, which pertains only to non-military use such as the ones that Iran and UAE (and others) already have, will be approved, but it is totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the very respected and successful Abraham Accords,” Trump wrote. “The United States is not opposed to Civil (Non-Enriched) Nuclear Facilities.”

Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the agreement on Wednesday. The Department of Energy says U.S. companies will benefit from the deal with involvement in establishing nuclear facilities in Saudi Arabia to the tune of billions of dollars.

The nuclear deal is to last 30 years and will involve the United States supporting Saudi nuclear development.

The Abraham Accords are meant to normalize relations between Israel and Arab nations in the Middle East, including the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia’s entry into the Abraham Accords would be a step toward a diplomatic relationship with Israel.

Saudi Arabia has called for progress toward Palestinian statehood, a sticking point that has drawn Israel’s criticism of the nuclear deal with the United States.

Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have also voiced skepticism over the nuclear deal, fearing that it may ultimately lead to the enrichment of uranium and plutonium for the development of nuclear weapons.

“This agreement will set off a nuclear race in the region, further disincentivizing Iran from limiting its own program,” Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., posted on social media.

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration has agreed to work with Saudi Arabia to develop a civilian nuclear program, a watershed moment following a years-long effort to curb the proliferation of nuclear technology in the Middle East.

The announcement comes as President Trump has vowed to continue executing a war against Iran over its own nuclear ambitions. On Wednesday, the president warned he would target a bridge or power plant for every commercial vessel Iran fires upon in the Strait of Hormuz, after earlier this week threatening to strike a new facility Tehran is reportedly building to conceal its continued nuclear work.

The Saudi deal stoked surprise and immediate concern across Washington, where lawmakers are expected to have a vote on the matter, as well as in Israel, itself a nuclear power that has long feared an atomic arms race could grip the region.

A Saudi nuclear program has long been tied to the standoff over Iran’s nuclear work, which successive U.S. administrations have said extends beyond civilian purposes. After Iran struck a nuclear deal with world powers in 2015, Saudi Arabia vowed to match whatever nuclear capabilities Tehran was allowed to keep.

In the decade since, U.S. officials had tried to keep Saudi Arabia from developing its own program, fearing it would fuel nuclear competition across the Middle East. But it became a consistent and central point of negotiation between the two allies.

Both the Trump and Biden administrations ultimately offered to support a limited, monitored program as part of a broader deal to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, hoping that a diplomatic breakthrough would mitigate the risks of an arms race.

But the agreement secured this week left skeptics in Washington and the region unclear what the United States had secured in return.

The deal comes after Trump told reporters this week that the goal of resuming war with Iran was to prevent them from ever obtaining nuclear weapons, a challenge that has vexed the international community since the outset of the century.

U.S. presidents have long sought to prevent Middle Eastern countries from acquiring technologies that could be used to build weapons of mass destruction. The 2003 invasion of Iraq over false claims about Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs prompted Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi to abandon his nuclear work. Over the next two decades, the United States and Israel also targeted Syria’s nuclear and chemical weapons programs under Bashar al-Assad.

But Iran’s slow march to nuclear weapons capability, enriching uranium near to weapons-grade with no clear civilian or scientific ends, has prompted other countries in the region to question whether they, too, might need similar capabilities to counterbalance a historic foe. Israel, which views the Islamic Republic and its nuclear program as existential threats, is widely believed to possess its own nuclear weapons.

Hours after the nuclear deal was reported by the Wall Street Journal, the White House was silent on the details and Trump administration officials were left scrambling when asked by lawmakers and reporters for answers.

While traveling in Manila, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters he was aware of the news reports, but deferred to the White House to provide more public information.

When pressed about the risks of such a deal, Rubio said he would not “opine directly on the agreement,” but said the United States “is not going to reach any agreement with any country in the world that leads to the risk of proliferation.”

The White House confirmed the deal Wednesday afternoon.

Back in Washington, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz told members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that he has not yet seen the agreement with Saudi Arabia.

The deal, which would last 30 years and involve American firms developing the program, is expected to be submitted for review to Congress. Lawmakers will consider the deal as they grow increasingly uneasy about the Trump administration’s handling of an expanding Iran war, which Trump and Israel launched, arguing for the need to wipe out Tehran’s capabilities to build nuclear weapons.

As the war enters its fifth month, Trump has continued to defend the military efforts and has dismissed the idea that war is unpopular among Americans as they feel the economic effects.

“Americans aren’t against the war,” Trump told reporters on Wednesday. “Americans don’t want high gasoline prices but they’re not against the war.”

Trump’s remarks were made as he traveled to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware to attend a dignified transfer of U.S. service members killed in the war. Asked what he would say to the families who lost their loved ones, Trump said he’d tell them they’re loved.

“All I’m going to say is, we love you. We love your child, and that’s what they are to them. They’re their children. There’s no games, no nothing,” Trump said. “That’s their child, and all you can do is throw out your heart.”

Earlier in the day, Trump said the United States will destroy a bridge or power plant in Iran each time it shoots at a ship in the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial waterway for the global energy supply.

Trump’s threat to target bridges and power plants would mark yet another escalation that could affect civilians in the region.

Hasan Ghashghavi, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, denied Trump’s claim on Tuesday that Iran was requesting negotiations, saying in a statement on X that it was “in no way consistent with the facts.”

“It seems that Trump, in order to extricate himself from the quagmire he’s trapped in, should seek better paths,” he wrote. “Repetitive lies no longer even bring about short-term market relief.”

Times staff writer Nabih Bulos in Beirut contributed to this report.

After U.S. strikes on Iran’s largest nuclear facilities last year, both President Trump and the White House were adamant that the Middle East nation’s nuclear program had been destroyed.

“Monumental Damage was done to all Nuclear sites in Iran, as shown by satellite images. Obliteration is an accurate term!” Trump wrote on social media.

“Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Have Been Obliterated — and Suggestions Otherwise are Fake News,” the White House wrote in a press release.

A year later, the U.S. and Iran are five months into a war Trump said would be over in weeks. Iran has gained leverage by seizing control of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital energy corridor, and the U.S. has been forced to the negotiating table as global gas prices have spiked — including again this week after a ceasefire agreement collapsed.

And Trump — facing mounting criticism that he has pushed the U.S. into another “forever war” despite campaigning on doing exactly the opposite — is leaning back into the notion that Iran presents an unacceptable nuclear threat and strikes are needed, namely at another Iranian nuclear facility known as Pickaxe Mountain.

“Pickaxe is a possible target for a nice big fat shot right near the front door,” the president recently said on “The Hugh Hewitt Show.” “We’re going to take out Pickaxe Mountain. Tell the Iranians to be ready.”

Pickaxe, a heavily fortified facility deep underground that would be difficult to penetrate even with powerful “bunker buster” bombs, was not targeted during last year’s 12 Day War between Iran and the U.S. and Israel, nor in the full-scale war of the last five months.

However, it is less than two miles from Natanz, one of Iran’s primary nuclear enrichment facilities, which was struck both last year and this year. On Monday, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israeli intelligence believes Iran moved thousands of uranium-enrichment centrifuges into Pickaxe last fall — bolstering its ability to reconstitute a nuclear program that threatens the U.S. and regional allies.

Trump’s sudden focus on Pickaxe as a suspected hub of Iranian nuclear activity, which comes as his administration is trying to justify its continued entanglement in its unpopular war there, is an acknowledgment that two prior military campaigns and years of attempted diplomacy by his administration have failed to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Few experts ever bought into the Trump administration’s claims that Iran’s nuclear program had been completely destroyed, and even Trump and his closest allies have walked some of those comments back — including in discussions about Iran’s ability to retrieve and repurpose enriched material buried at Natanz and other targeted sites.

Some experts have cited construction activity around Pickaxe as evidence Iran is continuing to develop the facility in violation of recent agreements with the U.S., but have said the exact nature of the work isn’t known. They’ve also wondered if the Trump administration intends to use the work there to lay the groundwork for a broader, boots-on-the-ground war effort that would be unpopular in the U.S. but necessary to truly accomplish Trump’s stated goal of ending Iran’s nuclear program for good.

The Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based think tank, said last week that it wasn’t clear “if Iran still plans on installing a large-scale assembly facility” at Pickaxe Mountain “given the destruction of Iran’s centrifuge program,” but “if Iran starts to rebuild its centrifuge manufacturing capability, it could plan to install a smaller centrifuge assembly facility in Pickaxe Mountain able to serve a nuclear weapons program.”

The space under the mountain, the institute said, may be “large enough to also hold a centrifuge enrichment plant capable of producing weapon-grade uranium” and is “likely large enough to also hold certain nuclear weaponization activities such as making weapon-grade uranium metal and shaping it into nuclear weapon components.”

Retired Army Gen. Joseph Votel, the former head of U.S. Central Command, told The Times that Iran has had a substantial amount of time to relocate equipment since the bombings of last year and has “demonstrated that they are savvy on these kinds of things,” and the U.S. “should be serious about it and try to confirm the intelligence.”

And “if there have been centrifuges that have been moved there and are underground and spinning and developing nuclear bomb grade materials,” he said, “we should be very, very concerned about that.”

Benjamin Radd, a political scientist and senior fellow at the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, said it is true that Iran is continuing its enrichment program in clandestine ways that present an ongoing threat and that “the war is not going the way the president wanted.” He also said Iran’s activity around Pickaxe helps Trump justify the war — and its possible expansion.

Radd said Iran has used the war to block independent inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency and reconstituted some of its nuclear capabilities in the process, including as talks with the U.S. shifted from its nuclear program to the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump and the U.S., meanwhile, have “vacillated” between trying to “manage” the Iranian nuclear program by reining in enrichment, to trying to “neutralize” the program with targeted attacks on its nuclear infrastructure. Radd said that “even though his rhetoric is there,” Trump hasn’t had “the resolve or the ability or the mandate” to move to fully eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, because that would require “much more forceful intervention” than the American public is willing to accept, such as U.S. troops on the ground in Iran.

He said he wonders now if the president’s talk about Pickaxe is part of a shift in that direction — or at least threatening it — after Trump and his advisors realized that the current cycle of war, negotiations and then more war is giving Iran the time it needs to reconstitute its nuclear program.

“I’m wondering if that is just a threat, or if it’s a genuine option that the president is actually considering,” Radd said.

Under Senate questioning Tuesday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth declined to say whether American bombs were capable of destroying whatever is under Pickaxe Mountain.

July 19 (UPI) — The United Nations’ nuclear energy agency said Sunday it’s investigating Iran’s allegation that the U.S. military struck a nuclear power plant under construction as part of renewed fighting after the deaths of two U.S. service members.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said it reached out to the Iranian government about the reported attacks on the Darkhovin Power Plant in southern Iran on Sunday morning. Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization said U.S. forces hit the site, which was under construction.

“The facility is in the very early stages of construction and contained no nuclear material when last visited by the IAEA,” the agency said in a post on X.

“While the reported attack is not believed to pose any radiological risk, [IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi] reiterates call for military restraint in the vicinity of all nuclear-related sites.”

Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization first began work on the Darkhovin Power Plant in 2022, but construction didn’t officially start until March 2026, CNN reported, citing the World Nuclear Association.

The United States ordered fresh airstrikes on Iranian targets Saturday after two U.S. service members were killed in Iranian attacks Friday in Jordan. A third service member was missing.

The U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan, warned U.S. citizens to avoid traveling to the international airport or seaport in Aqaba, and all military bases in Jordan. Jordan’s military said Sunday afternoon it intercepted three Iranian missiles, and a third landed in a remote area.

Aqaba is situated on Jordan’s southern coast, within a few miles of the border with Israel. The Israeli military warned of potential spillover of Iranian attacks into Israel, The Times of Israel reported Sunday morning.

“There may be spillover into Israeli territory as a result of the fire,” the military said.

The United Kingdom’s surprising decision to buy a dozen conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) F-35A fighters has taken another turn. According to a U.K. Royal Air Force official, “We did not buy those aircraft for their dual [nuclear] capability, we bought them for our conversion unit. At the same time, we stated we would get back into the [nuclear] role supporting NATO. The two are separate functions.”

The official, Air Vice-Marshal Jim Beck, the Royal Air Force’s Director Capability and Programs, was speaking today at the Global Air & Space Chiefs’ Conference in London. Their words were reported by Gareth Jennings, aviation desk editor at Janes.

As you can read about here, the United Kingdom announced in June last year that it would buy 12 F-35As alongside the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B models it already uses.

At that point, the U.K. Ministry of Defense specifically highlighted the F-35A’s ability to join the NATO nuclear mission, which would see the jets armed with U.S.-owned B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs. The F-35B, with its smaller weapons bays, is not able to carry these weapons.

B61-12 test drop by an F-35A

“The U.K. will purchase 12 new F-35A fighter jets and join NATO’s dual-capable aircraft nuclear mission in a major boost for national security,” the U.K. Ministry of Defense announced. The ministry described this as the “biggest strengthening of the U.K.’s nuclear posture in a generation, complementing the U.K.’s existing sea-borne deterrent.”

Earlier in June 2025, the Strategic Defense Review, published by the U.K. Ministry of Defense, had suggested that the future Lightning Force could comprise a mix of F-35As and F-35Bs.

At the same time, however, the Royal Air Force had noted that the F-35As would be assigned to a training unit and would primarily be used in that role.

As the F-35A is cheaper to operate, it is considered a better option to use for training sorties, including keeping pilots current on the F-35B. The ministry said buying the 12 jets will bring a savings of 25 percent per aircraft over the F-35B.

“Day-to-day, the F-35As will be used in a training role on 207 Squadron, the Operational Conversion Unit (OCU),” the Royal Air Force said. “As the F-35A carries more fuel than the F-35B variant, it can stay airborne for longer, extending the available training time in each sortie for student pilots. As F-35As also require fewer maintenance hours, there will be increased aircraft availability on the OCU. These factors combined will improve pilot training and reduce the amount of time for pilots to reach the frontline squadrons.”

The tradeoff is that the F-35A can’t be used to train for STOVL missions, but this part of the F-35B profile can be trained in the simulator, while an F-35A training unit frees up more F-35Bs to deploy aboard the two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.

Now, the words of the Royal Air Force official today cast doubt on whether the F-35As will actually take on the nuclear strike role, something that was specifically highlighted in the U.K. Defense Investment Plan published last month.

As well as today’s underscoring of the priority of the training mission, it should be noted that the new F-35As will be based at RAF Marham, in eastern England, and it’s unclear whether the airfield retains the underground weapons vaults for nuclear bombs. Some reports suggest the vaults that existed there in the Cold War have been dismantled or even filled in completely. In the past, we speculated that the jets might have to make use of nearby RAF Lakenheath, where there is evidence that the United States has brought nuclear bombs back to the United Kingdom, for its own use.

At the same time, as we have explained in the past, while the nuclear-sharing program provides access to U.S.-owned weapons, it still requires the United States and NATO to approve their use.

U.K.-operated nuclear-capable F-35As would not offer the same sovereign capability as the Royal Navy’s ballistic missile submarines, around which the British nuclear deterrent is based.

Then there is the issue of how much training, and other resources, would have to be assigned to the nuclear mission to ensure that it could actually be executed. Certainly, this would be nothing like the Cold War era, when a handful of jets stood fully armed, round the clock, on each assigned RAF base, with their crews waiting for the alert to sound.

The reality would likely involve the unit switching to focusing on the nuclear mission in times of crisis. This raises a question about how long this would take, and to what degree it would provide a real deterrent, bearing in mind the need to spin it up to be combat-ready.

These are all questions we have asked before in relation to the U.K. F-35A’s proposed nuclear role.

Now, the Royal Air Force itself is dialing back expectations in this regard.

Ultimately, the best chance of the Royal Air Force having a meaningful dual-role nuclear mission would be to buy more F-35As. As it stands, the 12 F-35As are part of the core buy, not additional to it.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense has long said that it still expects to procure 138 F-35s over the lifetime of the program. So far, 48 F-35Bs have been delivered, and the government is committed to buying 15 more F-35Bs and the 12 F-35As for delivery by 2033.

The lack of numbers has seen the United Kingdom rely on U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs to make up the required aircraft numbers during carrier cruises.

The F-35A argument would become much more compelling, and more cost-effective, if it were to be bought in larger numbers.

The F-35A is more capable in general, with superior range and payload, and it can maneuver at 9G, while the F-35B is cleared for 7.5G.

One unresolved issue as far as the British are concerned is the F-35A’s refueling receptacle, which is incompatible with their fleet of Voyager tankers. Modifications could provide the British F-35A with a probe, but would likely only make sense on the back of a bigger buy.

While many senior Royal Air Force officers might favor getting more F-35As, the jet is now also competing with the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), at the center of which is the Tempest crewed stealth fighter, as well as emerging drone programs.

In the meantime, the British are struggling to find money for more basic elements of the F-35B, which still critically lacks a standoff strike capability. A report late last year found that a history of “cost-cutting” throughout the U.K. F-35 program “has caused significant problems in its use,” which have affected the jet’s “capability, availability to fly, and value for money.”

The U.K. Ministry of Defense also needs to spend more than $83 billion over the next four years to fund its  nuclear-powered submarine programs, which include a true sovereign  nuclear capability of the kind that the F-35A is unable to provide.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

US President Donald Trump is threatening to attack a heavily-fortified underground nuclear facility in Iran known as ‘Pickaxe Mountain’. It followed a third night of US strikes and a demand the US be paid 20% of the value of all cargo passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

China’s successful submarine-launched ballistic missile test into the southern Pacific this week was more than a routine military exercise. It provided Beijing with a rare opportunity to validate one of the most sensitive aspects of its nuclear deterrent its ability to command, communicate with and potentially deploy nuclear-armed submarines while remaining undetected.

The test, carried out on Monday, involved a ballistic missile launched from a strategic nuclear-powered submarine and has drawn close scrutiny from regional governments and defence analysts. While Chinese officials described it as a standard military drill conducted in accordance with international law, experts say it marks another step in China’s effort to build a more credible and survivable nuclear force.

Why submarine missile tests matter

Unlike land-based nuclear missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are designed to ensure a country can retaliate even if its territory comes under nuclear attack. This “second-strike capability” forms one of the central pillars of nuclear deterrence.

Analysts say the test was not solely about assessing missile performance. It also allowed Chinese military leaders to evaluate the complex command-and-control systems needed to operate nuclear submarines while they remain hidden beneath the ocean.

Maintaining secure communications with submarines without revealing their position is among the most technically demanding aspects of any nuclear arsenal.

Collin Koh, a security expert at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said Beijing would likely have been evaluating communications, operational procedures and submarine performance alongside the missile itself.

A key part of China’s nuclear modernization

Regional defence experts believe the missile was launched from one of China’s Type-094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), although Beijing has not officially identified the vessel.

China has steadily expanded its nuclear capabilities over the past decade, developing what military planners describe as a complete “nuclear triad”—the ability to launch nuclear weapons from land, sea and air.

The submarine component is viewed as increasingly important because it offers a survivable retaliatory force if China’s land-based missile sites were destroyed during a conflict.

According to previous U.S. defence assessments, China has already begun near-continuous deterrence patrols using its SSBN fleet, joining the United States, Russia, Britain and France in maintaining an at-sea nuclear capability.

Challenges remain

Despite the progress, experts note that China’s submarine force still faces significant operational hurdles.

To threaten the continental United States with its most advanced JL-3 submarine-launched missile, Chinese submarines would likely need to leave the relative protection of the South China Sea and enter the wider Pacific Ocean, where they could be tracked by U.S. and allied anti-submarine forces.

Military analysts say American and allied navies closely monitor Chinese submarines using surveillance aircraft, underwater sensor networks and naval patrols.

China is also developing a quieter next-generation ballistic missile submarine that could improve its ability to operate undetected.

Regional reaction

The launch prompted criticism from several regional governments.

The United States said China had provided only limited advance notification before the launch and expressed concern over Beijing’s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal. Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan also voiced concern following the test.

China rejected the criticism, insisting the exercise complied with international law and was intended solely to safeguard national security and strategic stability.

Beijing has repeatedly argued that its nuclear modernization remains defensive and consistent with its longstanding policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons.

Analysis: A signal beyond the missile

The importance of this test extends beyond the missile itself. It demonstrates Beijing’s growing confidence in the sea-based leg of its nuclear deterrent, an area traditionally dominated by the United States and Russia.

The exercise also reflects China’s broader military modernization strategy under President Xi Jinping, which prioritizes survivable nuclear forces capable of guaranteeing retaliation under any scenario. Even if operational challenges remain—particularly the ability of Chinese submarines to evade increasingly sophisticated Western tracking systems—the test suggests China is moving closer to a fully credible second-strike capability.

Strategically, the launch sends multiple messages. Domestically, it showcases advances in China’s military technology. Regionally, it reinforces Beijing’s determination to protect its security interests. Internationally, it signals that China’s nuclear forces are becoming more sophisticated, mobile and resilient, adding another layer of complexity to strategic competition with the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

With information from Reuters.

Iranian officials say US strikes across Bushehr province damaged civilian infrastructure, including areas near the Bushehr nuclear power plant, airports, logistical facilities and fishing wharfs where several fishing boats caught fire. The US says strikes were aimed at military targets.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) says low availability of unnamed “legacy” aircraft has created hurdles for flight testing of the new AGM-181A Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) nuclear-armed cruise missile. The B-52 is the only platform known to be involved in this effort. The fleet of these bombers is highly in demand, underscored by heavy use in strikes on Iran earlier this year, and has also recently suffered a tragic loss. U.S. Air Force officials have previously highlighted how the relatively small number of B-52s in service and the heavy demands placed on them create challenges when it comes to modernizing the aircraft themselves.

GAO, a Congressional watchdog, provided new details about flight testing plans and other aspects of the LRSO program in an annual report published last week. The AGM-181A has been in active development since 2020, when the Air Force chose Raytheon to be the prime contractor.

“LRSO reported unfavorable cost and schedule changes over the past year,” GAO reported. “For example, flight testing challenges, largely due to the poor readiness rates of legacy aircraft supporting LRSO testing, resulted in a 4-month delay to its initial capability.”

The Air Force is now aiming to reach initial operational capability with the AGM-181 in November 2030.

GAO says that there have been nine LRSO test flights since October 2024. That is when developmental testing of the missile began. Six of those flight tests, along with seven ground test events, occurred last year. In a report dated December 2022, the Pentagon had previously disclosed nine more test flights as part of earlier phases of the program. Whether additional test flights occurred between December 2022 and October 2024 is unclear.

“Since our last assessment, program officials realigned the test schedule, leaving less time to complete the 27 remaining test flights before operational testing starts in September 2027,” the report GAO put out last week also notes. “However, they noted that some re-testing can still be accommodated.”

As noted, the B-52 is the only aircraft known to be involved in LRSO flight testing, and certainly meets the definition of a “legacy” platform. The last of these bombers rolled off Boeing’s production line in 1962, though the remaining examples have been upgraded repeatedly since then. The sighting last year of a B-52 carrying a pair of AGM-181s, or relevant test articles, on a pylon under its right wing offered the first public glimpse of the missile. Spotters have caught these bombers supporting LRSO tests on several other occasions since then.

The Air Force currently has 75 B-52H bombers in service, in total. The entire fleet is never available at any one time for taskings of any kind, due to routine maintenance and other factors. The mission-capable rate for the bombers has been hovering between 50 and 55 percent in recent years.

In addition, only one of the bombers is explicitly set aside to support test and evaluation efforts. B-52s from operational units are also used to support research and development and test and evaluation work on a more ad hoc basis. This is on top of the heavy operational demands put on the fleet, both for conventional combat operations and as a key component of the air leg of America’s nuclear deterrent triad. As mentioned, B-52s were heavily utilized just earlier this year for conventional strikes on Iran, adding to these strains.

Last month, the Air Force also lost one of its B-52s in a fatal crash at Edwards Air Force Base in California, which tragically killed all eight individuals onboard at the time. The aircraft in question was headed out on a flight test in support of a critical radar modernization program for the bombers when it went down, as you can read more about here.

The radar modernization effort is part of a slew of major upgrades for the B-52 fleet, which also includes all-new engines, improved communication suites, and more. The upgrades are so substantial that the bombers’ designations will change from B-52H to B-52J in the process. They are also in line to see their arsenals grow, including with the addition of the LRSO. The future B-52Js are set to continue serving through at least 2050.

B-52 Future Stratofortress: The Upgrades That Will Transform The B-52H Into The B-52J

Other aspects of the B-52 modernization plan have also been beset by cost growth and delays. Air Force officials have said this has been compounded by the total size of the fleet and operational demands placed on it.

“The challenge with B-52 that I think everybody forgets, it’s such a small fleet that has such a tremendous requirement in terms of readiness,” Air Force Gen. Dale White, the service’s Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems, told TWZ and others at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in February. “You’ve got to have a certain number on the ramp. That’s a requirement.”

The question becomes “how do you get these through the depot while at the same time meeting the operational requirements?” Gen. White further explained at that time. “That choreography, I think, is going to be tough.”

It’s worth pointing out here that both the war with Iran and the crash at Edwards came after the cutoff date for GAO’s report, and further impacts on the LRSO flight test schedule would not have been recorded therein. There has also been a broader surge in demand across the U.S. military for flight test assets. This is being driven by the needs of modernization efforts for several aircraft beyond the B-52, including the F-22 Raptor, as well as next-generation developments, like the F-47 sixth-generation fighter.

Going back to LRSO, GAO’s latest assessment also highlights other challenges that the program has been facing that are unrelated to flight testing.

“Program officials stated that 12 of 14 software releases are delivered, with the final delivery planned for March 2026. According to program officials, nuclear certification of LRSO software continues to be a risk that they expect to fully address by November 2026. As we reported last year, the program risks delays if additional LRSO software development is needed to satisfy this certification requirement,” per the report. “LRSO cybersecurity testing continues with some delays reported during the past year. Program officials stated these delays did not bring about any cost or schedule changes, with the final cybersecurity assessment still planned for September 2027.”

“The missile’s technology maturity has advanced since our last assessment, with only two out of the six critical technologies still approaching maturity. They are both expected to be fully mature in fiscal year 2026, about 5 years after development start. DOE [Department of Energy] also identified critical technologies for the warhead, of which 80 percent are considered mature, more than double the percentage reported last year,” the report adds. “However, DOE may not mature all the remaining warhead technologies until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2026. As we previously reported, both the missile and warhead started development with immature technologies, requiring parallel technology and design maturity efforts. This method falls short of the best practice to start with mature technologies and would have minimized the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays associated with concurrency during system development.”

There is also cost growth, as well as cost discrepancies.

“Program costs increased by $347 million after Air Force leadership directed a 1-year extension to LRSO production due to near-term budget constraints,” according to GAO.

“As we previously reported, Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials continue to work together to resolve a $1.9 billion difference between their production cost estimates for future LRSO production,” the report also says. “While a fully updated estimate is not expected until later in 2026, program officials now agree that OSD’s higher cost estimate provides an appropriate basis for the program’s fiscal year 2027 budget request and future year procurement funding needs.”

Buoyed in part by the successful flight testing it has conducted to date, GAO says the Air Force remains confident that it can meet its goal of starting low-rate initial production of the LRSO next year. Hitting that milestone will be key to staying on schedule to start fielding the missiles in 2030.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

July 6 (Asia Today) — North Korea is using tacit support from China and Russia to harden its status as a nuclear-armed state, raising pressure on South Korea to rebuild the kind of international sanctions coordination that brought Pyongyang back to negotiations in 2018 and 2019, analysts said Monday.

North Korea has repeatedly stressed the “constant expansion and strengthening” of its nuclear forces and the “thorough exercise” of its status as a nuclear-armed state, signaling that it has no intention of returning to talks premised on denuclearization.

Diplomatic observers in Seoul say North Korea is taking advantage of a turbulent international environment to consolidate its nuclear status.

Russia, which has become a close partner of North Korea since the war in Ukraine, vetoed the renewal of the U.N. panel monitoring sanctions on North Korea in March 2024. At the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in May, Russia also opposed including language on North Korea’s nuclear program in a consensus document, according to the report.

China, which has long maintained a formal position supporting denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, did not mention the issue during a North Korea-China summit in June.

The North Korean nuclear issue has become even more difficult to resolve as U.S. attention remains focused on the Middle East and the U.N. Security Council has become increasingly ineffective, analysts said.

Experts say South Korea should pursue denuclearization by maintaining sanctions on North Korea, strengthening its military capabilities in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear buildup and securing diplomatic means to apply pressure through China and Russia.

Kim Tae-woo, former president of the Korea Institute for National Unification, said South Korea must acquire capabilities that can offset North Korea’s growing nuclear threat.

“As North Korea’s nuclear threat grows, South Korea must secure corresponding capabilities to neutralize that threat,” Kim said. “Only when North Korea recognizes that an intensifying arms race will be harmful to both Koreas can nuclear arms control negotiations begin.”

Kim said South Korea should quickly move forward with security consultations under the Korea-U.S. joint fact sheet. He said Seoul should pursue the construction of nuclear-powered submarines, secure what he called “nuclear latent capability” and push for stronger U.S. extended deterrence.

Analysts also said Seoul should wage a more active diplomatic campaign toward China and Russia, which retain significant influence over North Korea.

They said South Korea should work to recreate the diplomatic environment of 2016 and 2017, when the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a series of strong sanctions resolutions in response to North Korea’s nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile launches.

Experts say those sanctions were the key factor that pushed North Korea into inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea denuclearization talks in 2018 and 2019.

A former senior South Korean diplomat, who requested anonymity, said sanctions remain one of the few long-term sources of leverage over North Korea.

“Every area of North Korea except its nuclear program remains backward because of sanctions,” the former official said. “As long as sanctions are not abandoned in the long term, I believe there is still hope for North Korea’s denuclearization.”

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260707010002164

June 26 (Asia Today) — Former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said Friday that North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs have made the pursuit of nuclear disarmament increasingly difficult, but Japan must not abandon its goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Speaking at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in Tokyo, Kishida said East Asia is facing its most severe security environment since the end of World War II.

“Japan must strengthen its defense capabilities and further reinforce the Japan-U.S. alliance,” Kishida said. “At the same time, we must not give up the ideal of pursuing a world without nuclear weapons.”

Kishida, a lawmaker whose constituency is in Hiroshima, made nuclear disarmament a major diplomatic priority during his tenure as prime minister.

He cited Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, instability in the Middle East and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs as evidence that the international security situation surrounding nuclear weapons is “undeniably severe.”

Kishida said stronger national security and nuclear disarmament should not be viewed as mutually exclusive goals.

“Reality and ideals are not incompatible,” he said. “The issue is not choosing one or the other, but determining how to bring reality closer to the ideal.”

Kishida recalled becoming the first Japanese prime minister to attend a review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2022.

At the conference, he presented the Hiroshima Action Plan, a series of practical steps intended to advance nuclear disarmament while acknowledging the international security environment.

The plan calls for maintaining the record of non-use of nuclear weapons, increasing transparency surrounding nuclear forces, continuing reductions in global nuclear stockpiles, strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

“We must narrow the gap between reality and the ideal one step at a time,” Kishida said.

Ukraine warning for East Asia

Kishida linked the war in Ukraine to security concerns in East Asia.

He recalled his unannounced visit to Kyiv in March 2023, when he met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and expressed Japan’s solidarity with Ukraine.

Kishida said he delivered the message that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”

Russia’s invasion demonstrated that security in Europe and the Atlantic cannot be separated from security in the Indo-Pacific, he said.

East Asia faces overlapping concerns including North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, China’s growing military power and tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

Kishida said Japan’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific seeks to improve regional connectivity, promote prosperity, reject coercion and intimidation and uphold freedom and the rule of law.

Kishida stresses U.S. alliance and international rules

Addressing U.S. foreign policy under President Donald Trump, Kishida said “America First” should be regarded as a structural trend rather than a temporary development.

He said countries such as Japan, which have limited natural resources and relatively constrained domestic markets, depend on international law, multilateralism, free trade and the rule of law.

Kishida emphasized the importance of maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance while preserving an international system governed by widely accepted rules.

Dialogue with China remains necessary

Kishida also called for continued dialogue with China despite security concerns and political tensions between Tokyo and Beijing.

China is Japan’s largest trading partner, while Japan remains one of China’s major economic partners, he said.

“That is precisely why dialogue is important,” Kishida said.

He recalled meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping twice during international gatherings while serving as prime minister. Kishida also held talks with Chinese Premier Li Qiang during meetings connected to Southeast Asian nations and a trilateral summit involving Japan, China and South Korea.

“It is regrettable that fewer people are now willing to engage in dialogue between Japan and China,” Kishida said.

He called for communication not only between governments but also through business, people-to-people exchanges, sports and culture.

Stable relations between Japan and China would serve both countries’ national interests and contribute to regional peace and stability, he said.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260626010009412

EXPLAINER

Iran and the US clash over nuclear inspections and Hormuz as negotiators push for a final deal within 60 days.

Iran and the United States have offered conflicting accounts of key issues as negotiators work towards a final agreement within a 60-day window. Differences remain over nuclear oversight and the implementation of any deal, underscoring the challenges facing both sides.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Iran would not be allowed to charge tolls in the Strait of Hormuz under a final agreement, stressing that the strategic waterway must remain open to international shipping.

Meanwhile, Iran rejected US claims that it had agreed to allow nuclear inspectors back into the country after President Donald Trump said Tehran had accepted the “highest level” of monitoring. The conflicting statements highlight the gaps that negotiators are still trying to bridge.

Here is what has happened:

In Iran

• Iran’s military shifts to ‘offensive doctrine’: General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan, head of Iran’s Army Strategic Studies and Research Center, said Tehran has moved away from a purely defensive posture and now includes preemptive operations in its military strategy. Quoted by the semi-official Fars news agency, Pourdastan said Iran could “severely surprise the enemy” if national interests required it and added that much of the country’s military capability has yet to be used.
• Iran says no IAEA inspections planned: Tohid Asadi, reporting from the Strait of Hormuz, says the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei has denied reports of a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi and said there are currently no plans for visits or inspections by the UN nuclear watchdog. Baghaei said Iran’s dealings with the IAEA would be governed by existing procedures, its safeguards obligations, parliamentary legislation and decisions by the Supreme National Security Council. Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA after US and Israeli strikes on its nuclear facilities in June 2025, and while diplomacy continues under a 60-day framework, Tehran says it has not granted permission for inspectors to return.

War diplomacy:

• ‘No way’ US and Iran can finalise deal in 60 days, analyst says: Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, told Al Jazeera there is “no way” Washington and Tehran can complete a final agreement within the 60-day timeframe repeatedly cited by President Donald Trump. “I think we’re talking about at least into the next calendar year,” he said, adding that he would not be surprised if both sides simply “run out the clock” by continuing negotiations and keeping the Strait of Hormuz open without reaching a final deal before the end of Trump’s presidency.
• Qatar says LNG production could return to normal within weeks: Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani told the Financial Times that Qatar is preparing to restore normal liquefied natural gas (LNG) production after the interim US-Iran deal. Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG producer, halted output in March following an Iranian drone attack on the Ras Laffan facility. Sheikh Mohammed said most production could resume within weeks, except at the damaged site, adding that QatarEnergy would only lift its force majeure declaration once it is satisfied that all safety and operational concerns have been addressed.

In the Gulf:

• Rubio ‘trying to sell the deal’ with Iran on Gulf tour: Alan Fisher, reporting from Washington, DC, said US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is visiting the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain, three Gulf countries seen as having been among the most affected by the war with Iran. Rubio, who also serves as Trump’s national security adviser, is expected to reassure regional allies that US security commitments remain intact. He will also address the Gulf Cooperation Council in Bahrain, where he is “really trying to sell the deal”, amid concerns over Washington’s response to Iranian attacks.

In the US

• US Senate approves resolution to curb Trump’s war powers on Iran: The Senate voted 50-48 to pass a measure requiring congressional approval for further US military action against Iran, marking the first time a war powers resolution on the conflict has cleared both chambers of Congress. Four Republicans – Bill Cassidy, Lisa Murkowski, Susan Collins and Rand Paul – joined nearly all Democrats in backing the measure, while Pennsylvania Democrat John Fetterman voted against it. The resolution is expected to face a veto from President Trump.

In Israel

• US ‘very naive’ on Iran, Ben-Gvir says: Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir said the US would be “very naive” if it believed Iran would abandon its nuclear programme, and hinted that Israel may act independently against Tehran. “It is Israel’s responsibility to confront this Iranian threat and act against it alone,” he told Israel’s Channel 7, adding that “no circumstances” could force Israel to act “according to the dictates of a friend, even if that friend is truly great”. His remarks come amid reported tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv over Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and ongoing US-Iran negotiations. Last week, US Vice President JD Vance publicly criticised Israeli cabinet ministers for “attacking” Washington, calling the US Israel’s “only powerful ally” left in the world.

In Lebanon

• UN says ceasefire ‘largely holding’ in southern Lebanon: The United Nations said the ceasefire in southern Lebanon appears to be “largely holding”, although peacekeepers continue to observe Israeli military ground and air activity. UN spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said UNIFIL troops witnessed “heavy” machine-gun fire and three tank rounds fired by Israeli forces near Biyyada on Monday, while drones were also seen “apparently to monitor UNIFIL peacekeepers”. The incident came a day after peacekeepers reported the first day without exchanges of fire since fighting escalated on March 2. The UN urged all sides to “adhere fully to the ceasefire and refrain from any escalation, particularly during this delicate period of ongoing negotiations”.

Several key issues remain as sticking points in US-Iran talks, including maritime security and nuclear oversight.

SEOUL, June 23 (UPI) — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for accelerating the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear forces, citing increasingly hostile military cooperation between Seoul and Washington and an unstable global security environment, state media reported Monday.

Kim led a plenary meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea from Saturday through Monday to review progress on national goals for the first half of the year and outline priorities for the remainder of 2026, according to the official Korean Central News Agency.

The meeting reaffirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to strengthening and expanding its nuclear forces, describing them as “the core of the military sovereignty of the country” and the foundation of its war deterrent.

“To thoroughly exercise the position of a nuclear weapons state is the most correct and unique way to actively and confidently cope with the unpredictable international military and political situation,” KCNA said.

North Korea passed a law declaring itself a nuclear-armed state in 2022. Kim later amended the country’s constitution to enshrine the permanent growth of its nuclear arsenal, calling the status “irreversible.”

The remarks come weeks after Kim toured a newly inaugurated nuclear fuel production facility and vowed to continue expanding the country’s fissile material at an “exponential rate.”

In an address to the meeting, Kim said it was necessary to bolster North Korea’s defense capabilities in response to an increasingly volatile international environment.

“Wars, bloodshed and political and economic instabilities are becoming a daily occurrence in the world due to the gangster-like and unlimited geopolitical greed and misuse of strength,” Kim said, according to KCNA.

The North Korean leader criticized the U.S.-South Korea military alliance, citing regular joint military exercises and Seoul’s pursuit of a nuclear-powered submarine.

Kim also singled out the allies’ Nuclear Consultative Group, which met in Seoul earlier this month, calling it a “nuclear war body” and accusing Washington and Seoul of developing plans for a nuclear strike against North Korea.

He further accused Japan of transforming itself into a “war state” and warned that military buildups in Northeast Asia were heightening regional tensions.

In addition to expanding the country’s nuclear program, Kim outlined broader military modernization goals, including construction of a 10,000-ton strategic guided missile cruiser, expansion of munitions production and the development of new naval facilities. He also called for completing ongoing efforts to harden the border with South Korea.

The remarks come as North Korea continues extensive fortification work near the Military Demarcation Line inside the DMZ, including the installation of barbed-wire fencing and preparations for mine-laying operations.

South Korea’s Defense Ministry on Monday called the activity a violation of the armistice agreement that ended fighting in the 1950-53 Korean War.

North Korea has revised its constitution to remove all references to reunification with South Korea, formalizing Kim’s push to redefine inter-Korean ties as relations between two separate states.

“In particular, it is essential to thoroughly adhere to the principle of struggle against the enemy set forth by our party which defined the ROK as the most hostile state,” Kim said, using the official acronym for South Korea.

The remarks underlined Pyongyang’s continued rejection of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s outreach efforts since taking office last year.

Last week, Lee said he discussed North Korea with U.S. President Donald Trump during the Group of Seven summit in France, arguing that sanctions had failed to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear development and suggesting a more phased approach.

Trump met Kim three times during his first term and has repeatedly said he would be open to meeting the North Korean leader again since returning to office.

“President Trump said it was time to pay attention to the North Korea issue again,” Lee said.

June 19 (UPI) — Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, or KHNP, said Thursday that its CEO Kim Hoe-chun has traveled to the Czech Republic to review progress on the construction of two nuclear reactors in the European country.

The state-backed utility noted that Kim took part in a meeting of the Dukovany Steering Committee in Prague alongside South Korea’s Minister of Trade, Industry and Resources Kim Jung-kwan and Czech Deputy Prime Minister Karel Havlicek.

Kim’s visit is timed with the first anniversary of the signing of an $18 billion contract to build two 1,000-megawatt reactors in Dukovany, located around 120 miles southeast of the Czech capital.

Groundbreaking is targeted for 2029, with commercial completion expected by 2037. The South Korean consortium includes such industrial partners as Daewoo E&C and Doosan Enerbility.

The two sides also discussed ways to strengthen bilateral nuclear cooperation, while companies from the two countries signed an engineering support agreement related to the project, according to KHNP.

Kim also toured the manufacturing facilities of Doosan Skoda Power in Plzen, situated roughly 55 miles west of Prague. The Czech turbine manufacturer owned by the Doosan Group is expected to play a key role in the Dukovany program.

“The Dukovany project is a monumental endeavor that symbolizes the strategic partnership between South Korea and the Czech Republic,” Kim said in a statement.

“We will work closely with the Czech government, the project owner, local communities, and Czech companies to make this project a model for the safest and most successful nuclear power plant construction in the world,” he added.