nuclear

Rare Video Appears To Show A Soviet Su-7 Jet Dropping A Nuclear Bomb

Videos and other imagery bearing witness to the awesome destructive power of nuclear detonations remain some of the most enduring legacies of the Cold War. But of the more than 2,000 nuclear weapons tests that have been carried out since 1945, only very, very few have involved a live weapon dropped from a fighter-bomber.

A nuclear strike performed by the Su-7 thumbnail

A nuclear strike performed by the Su-7




At least one such test took place in the Soviet Union, however. On his X account, Sam Wise, an aviation analyst at Janes, brought our attention to footage that purportedly shows that test, or at least portions of it.

It’s a shame about the poor condition of the footage because this is some extremely rare and compelling footage of a nuclear armed Su-7. Special mention to the extraordinary lean forward when the brakes are applied!https://t.co/tlrOnnAAdN

— Sam Wise Aviation (@samwiseaviation) April 21, 2026

The test in question was especially notable in that it involved a free-fall tactical nuclear bomb that was delivered by a crewed fighter-bomber, specifically a Su-7 Fitter attack jet, in an end-to-end test.

Of those 2,000-plus nuclear tests, only a small fraction involved bombs dropped from aircraft of any kind — roughly 200 to 250 according to records compiled by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Those tests almost always involved bombers, aircraft with multiple engines, several crew members, and, often, dedicated to delivering nuclear weapons.

The bomb is moved on its trolley toward the Su-7. YouTube screencap

The vast majority of nuclear tests were conducted underground, at sea, or on land. In the latter case, the devices were typically detonated from an elevated position, either atop a tower or suspended from a balloon. This better replicated the conditions of a typical nuclear detonation, with the weapon engineered to explode in an air burst above the ground, for maximum effect.

A screencap shows the mushroom cloud after the nuclear bomb codenamed “Ivan” was dropped by a Tu-95 bomber over Novaya Zemlya in October 1961. This was the largest device of its kind ever detonated, at around 50 megatons. ROSATOM

One reason for the relative scarcity of air-dropped nuclear bomb tests was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which pushed testing underground.

At the same time, dropping a live nuclear weapon from a crewed aircraft brings additional risks for relatively little benefit.

At the beginning of the nuclear age, air-dropped tests were useful to prove that bombs could be delivered, but they were inefficient in terms of scientific measurement and riskier to conduct from a safety point of view. Dropping a nuclear device from an aircraft adds variables (altitude, speed, trajectory) that complicate measurements. If something goes wrong, you risk losing a plane, or worse, an accidental detonation or contamination spread.

The bomb attached to its pylon under the Su-7. YouTube screencap

Based on the available information, it appears that the U.S. military never tested a live tactical nuclear bomb dropped by a tactical combat jet, despite the very many platforms, both Air Force and Navy, that were cleared to carry them operationally.

It should be noted that the U.S. Air Force did detonate one tactical nuclear weapon after launch from a fighter. However, this involved an air-to-air rocket, the nuclear-tipped Genie, which was fired on this occasion from an F-89 interceptor, in 1957’s Operation Plumbbob John.

Project Genie : Air-to-air rocket nuclear testing thumbnail

Project Genie : Air-to-air rocket nuclear testing




France does appear to have conducted a live test of an air-dropped tactical nuclear bomb, with an AN52 dropped from a Jaguar attack jet in August 1972, to help prove that weapon for service.

Returning to the Soviet Union, on August 27, 1962, pilot Lt. Col. A. I. Shein took off in a single-seat Su-7B, with a live 244N nuclear bomb carried on the centerline station below the fuselage. He then headed for the Semipalatinsk test site on the Soviet steppe. Also known as “The Polygon,” the Semipalatinsk range was the main test site for Soviet nuclear weapons. It is in the Abai region, in what is now Kazakhstan.

Final inspection of the bomb after it was loaded on the Su-7. YouTube screencap

Shein put the jet into a climb at an angle of around 45 degrees. This was an ‘over-the-shoulder’ toss maneuver, typical for fighter-bombers of this era. This involved the attacking aircraft pulling upward before releasing its bomb to compensate for the weapon’s gravity drop in flight. The result would put the weapon on the target, without the aircraft having to pass over it. Instead, the jet would complete a half roll and (hopefully) avoid the blast effects so it could escape. The launch maneuver sequence, as shown in the video, is apparently simulated, or at the least, heavily edited.

Briefing for the pilot before the sortie. YouTube screencap

Shein later recalled:

“I take off, the excitement subsides, I enter the combat course, and make an approach. Everything is normal, I make an approach for a combat release, bring the aircraft into a nose-up attitude, and monitor the G-forces. After four seconds, I hear a signal, then a second, a short third, and I press the ‘release’ trigger. The green light goes out, indicating the release has been completed. The bomb’s release is felt by the shaking of the aircraft. I continue the nose-up attitude. For control, I note the release angle; it is almost constant and equal to 44–50 degrees. After passing the top point, I then descend at a 50-60 degree angle, perform a half-roll, increase engine speed and, consequently, aircraft speed, descend to the lowest possible altitude, and try to get as far and as quickly as possible from the target.”

This method required a bomb computer to calculate the release point. For the U.S. Air Force, this was the Low Altitude Bombing System, or LABS, while the Su-7 was fitted with the equivalent PBK-1 device, a separate box that was added to the left side of the instrument panel. In this context, PBK denoted Pritsel dliya Bombometaniya s Kabrirovaniya, or toss-bombing sight.

A video shows a U.S. Air Force B-47 bomber flying the LABS maneuver:

Boeing B-47 Stratojet (Low Altitude Bombing System) LABS Maneuver thumbnail

Boeing B-47 Stratojet (Low Altitude Bombing System) LABS Maneuver




After release from the Su-7, the bomb exploded at an altitude of around 800 feet, at the coordinates of 50.4°N and 77.8°E. The detonation had a yield of 11 kilotons.

The bomb detonation as seen in the video. YouTube screencap
Craters and target markings are still visible in satellite imagery of the Semipalatinsk range. Google Earth

As for the Su-7, this was the Soviet Union’s first-generation supersonic attack jet. It was rapidly equipping fighter-bomber regiments, and nuclear strike would become one of its most important duties.

The streamlined 244N was the first mass-produced Soviet tactical nuclear bomb specifically intended for carriage by supersonic jets.

A photo showing the earlier, non-streamlined RDS-4 tactical free-fall bomb:

RDS-4 “Tatyana” was a Soviet atomic bomb that was first tested with a yield of 27 kilotons at Semipalatinsk Test Site, on August 23, 1953. The Soviet Union’s first mass-produced tactical nuclear weapon. pic.twitter.com/c7xdODw0tZ

— NUKES (@atomicarchive) August 24, 2023

At this point, it should be noted that there is a possibility that the video shows not the 244N, but an IAB-500, a so-called ‘imitation bomb’ that replicated the shape, dimensions, weight and flight characteristics of the nuclear device. Filled with a mixture of liquid petroleum and white phosphorus, it also produced a large fireball that subsequently turned into a mushroom cloud.

With that in mind, the video could at least show portions of an IAB-500 test, although the location and the original voiceover point squarely to the 1962 Semipalatinsk test. The apparent installation of a camera pod below the Su-7’s wing, to record the detonation, also suggests a nuclear test rather than training.

Regardless, the 244N was successfully tested and was put into operational service in several variants, including with different yields up to a maximum of 30 kilotons. Most of these bombs were deployed by Soviet units stationed close to what would have been the front line in the event of a confrontation with NATO: in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.

Starting in 1967, Western intelligence began to note training activities involving nuclear weapons at Soviet airbases in East Germany, including Su-7s taking part in LABS-type maneuvers.

In one of its reports from 1967, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) noted that its staff identified Su-7s from Grossenhain Air Base performing at least four LABS practice delivery runs on October 7 of that year.

“The aircraft passed over the airfield at approximately 2,000 feet, pulled up into vertical climb to 3,500 feet, pitched over, flew inverted for several seconds, then rolled over again departing to the west.”

Two days later, the USMLM reported “A very active program of local navigational, touch-and-go landings, LABS maneuvers, and possible range activity flown by Grossenhain-based Fitter and [two-seat Su-7] Moujik” aircraft.

Air-dropped tactical nuclear weapons still play a significant role in Russia’s military strategy, as evidenced by recent moves to station tactical devices in Belarus. Many Russian combat aircraft have variants capable of carrying nuclear bombs, and most Russian air-launched missiles weighing over around 1,000 pounds have the option of a nuclear warhead.

Russia really wants West to see they’re doing a tac nuke exercise. After several exercise videos they put the head of the 12 GUMO in front of a Belarusian Su-25 (possibly at Lida air base) loaded with what is said to be “training nuclear ammunition.” https://t.co/h9rHp2qvGv pic.twitter.com/sTzAqSNd9f

— Hans Kristensen (also on Bluesky) (@nukestrat) June 13, 2024

Starting in the 1960s, the 244N was superseded by a modernized development of the same weapon, the 10-kiloton RN-24, as well as the one-kiloton RN-28. These were carried, among others, by the MiG-21 and Su-7.

These bombs were followed in the 1980s followed by the RN-40 and RN-41, carried by the MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-27.

To this day, the IAB-500 also remains in use to train combat jet pilots in nuclear bomb delivery. Alongside it, although much less known, and barely ever seen, are tactical nuclear bombs, the descendants of the 244N that was proven in a unique test back in 1962.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Thomas is a defense writer and editor with over 20 years of experience covering military aerospace topics and conflicts. He’s written a number of books, edited many more, and has contributed to many of the world’s leading aviation publications. Before joining The War Zone in 2020, he was the editor of AirForces Monthly.




Source link

Global nuclear leaders gather in Busan for AI-era energy

Visitors look at a South Korea-developed innovative small modular reactor model during this year’s International Nuclear Energy Expo at the BEXCO exhibition center in Busan, South Korea, 22 April 2026. Photo by YONHAP / EPA

April 22 (Asia Today) — Global nuclear industry leaders gathered in Busan on Tuesday, highlighting the growing role of nuclear power in meeting surging electricity demand driven by artificial intelligence and data centers.

The Korea Atomic Industrial Forum opened its annual conference at BEXCO, bringing together policymakers, industry leaders and researchers under the theme “Nuclear energy for the AI era.”

This year’s event is being held alongside the Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference, which returned to South Korea for the first time in 14 years, and the Busan International Nuclear Industry Exhibition. Organizers expect around 19,000 participants.

The event features representatives from 19 countries and 156 companies, making it the largest exhibition of its kind to date.

Participants emphasized that rapid growth in AI technologies is fundamentally reshaping global energy demand. Electricity consumption by data centers is projected to reach 1,300 terawatt-hours by 2035, while AI-related power demand is expected to grow at an annual rate exceeding 120% through 2028.

To meet this demand, major technology companies have significantly increased investments in nuclear energy, with total spending surpassing $30 billion over the past 18 months.

Government policy is also shifting. The United States has set a target to expand nuclear capacity to 400 gigawatts by 2050 – roughly four times current levels – while about 15 new nuclear reactors are expected to come online globally in 2026.

Keynote speakers included Mesut Ozman of Fermi Nuclear, who is leading an 11-gigawatt nuclear project in Texas, and Tomas Ehler of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, along with other senior officials and industry executives.

The conference also includes sessions focused on Southeast Asia, where countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam are exploring nuclear energy adoption.

Discussions are covering a wide range of issues, including reactor lifetime extensions, carbon neutrality, artificial intelligence, energy security, small modular reactors and radioactive waste management.

South Korean companies are also expanding their global footprint. Hyundai Engineering & Construction is participating as an engineering, procurement and construction partner in negotiations for four AP1000 reactor projects, while Doosan Enerbility is supplying key components such as reactor vessels and steam generators.

The Czech Republic is also pursuing an expanded nuclear strategy, aiming to increase the share of nuclear power in its energy mix to as much as 50% to 60% through new projects at Dukovany and Temelin.

As energy demand accelerates in the AI era, industry leaders said nuclear power is increasingly being viewed as a reliable and scalable solution to ensure energy security and meet climate goals.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260422010007146

Source link

Czech Republic deepens nuclear partnership with Korea

An old chapel stands in a field in front of cooling towers operating at the Dukovany nuclear power plant operated by CEZ AS, near the village of Dukovany, Czech Republic. Photo by MARTIN DIVISEK / EPA

April 22 (Asia Today) — The Czech Republic said its nuclear power project with South Korea is progressing on schedule, signaling potential expansion of cooperation that could extend to additional reactor construction and broader entry into the European market.

Petr Závodský, head of the Czech project company EDU II, said the Dukovany nuclear project has entered a key design phase just 10 months after the contract was signed with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power.

“We received the first large-scale engineering package, including the conceptual design, last week,” Závodský said at a conference in Busan. “This marks a major contractual milestone, and site investigations have already been completed.”

He added that the next step is to submit licensing documents to Czech nuclear regulators within a year.

Tomas Ehler said the Czech government selected Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power based on its proven ability to complete projects on time and within budget.

“In nuclear projects, the most important factor is execution capability,” Ehler said. “The Korean proposal was evaluated as the best across all criteria.”

He emphasized that nuclear construction involves complex risks and requires close coordination between partners to identify and manage challenges early.

Officials also addressed concerns over a dispute involving France, saying the issue has effectively been resolved after being dismissed by Czech courts. They added that approval procedures with the European Commission for expanded reactor plans are ongoing and expected to be finalized by early 2027.

The Czech government reaffirmed its strategy to increase nuclear power’s share in its energy mix from about 30% currently to 50%-60% in the coming years.

A final decision on constructing additional reactors at the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant is expected next year, with progress on the Dukovany project serving as a key benchmark.

Ehler said that if both projects move forward with Korean participation, significant synergies could be achieved.

Závodský stressed that the partnership goes beyond a typical supplier relationship.

“The Czech Republic cannot build nuclear plants without Korean companies, and Korean firms cannot carry out the project without Czech partners,” he said. “This is a joint project, not just a client-supplier arrangement.”

Officials added that the cooperation could expand beyond the Czech Republic to other European countries, including Slovakia and Poland.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260422010007168

Source link

South Korea, Vietnam discuss nuclear, supply chain cooperation

President of Vietnam and General Secretary of the Communist Party To Lam (2-R) and his wife Ngo Phuong Ly (R), South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (2-L) and his wife Kim Hea Kyung (L) pose for a group photo at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, 22 April 2026. President Lee is on a state visit to Vietnam from 21 to 24 April 2026. Photo by LUONG THAI LINH / EPA

April 22 (Asia Today) — South Korean President Lee Jae-myung held summit talks with Vietnam’s top leader on Tuesday to strengthen cooperation in nuclear energy, infrastructure and supply chains, as both countries seek to navigate rising global uncertainties.

Lee met with To Lam in Hanoi during a state visit, where the two sides discussed expanding strategic cooperation across key sectors, including energy security and critical minerals.

The talks come as prolonged conflict in the Middle East heightens concerns over global energy supply disruptions, prompting both countries to pursue more resilient and diversified supply chains.

South Korea and Vietnam, each among the other’s top three trading partners, agreed to deepen cooperation not only in trade and investment but also in nuclear power, infrastructure, defense and other strategic industries.

The two countries have set a goal of increasing bilateral trade from $94.6 billion in 2025 to $150 billion by 2030.

Lee is expected to express support for South Korean companies seeking to participate in major Vietnamese infrastructure projects, including a new urban development project valued at about 1.1 trillion won ($740 million) and a new airport project estimated at 102.7 billion won ($69 million).

The leaders are also expected to discuss expanding cooperation in science and technology, climate response, artificial intelligence semiconductors and cultural industries, as well as boosting people-to-people exchanges such as tourism.

Ahead of the summit, Lee said relations between the two countries had reached a “comprehensive strategic partnership” following the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties in 2022.

“Through this visit, we aim to further develop our highest-level cooperation into a more future-oriented and strategic partnership,” Lee said during a meeting with Korean residents in Vietnam.

Lee also paid tribute at the mausoleum of Ho Chi Minh before the summit and is scheduled to attend a state banquet hosted by the Vietnamese leadership.

On Wednesday, Lee is expected to meet Vietnam’s prime minister and National Assembly chair, and attend a business forum with executives from major South Korean conglomerates, including Lee Jae-yong, Chey Tae-won and Koo Kwang-mo.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260422010007161

Source link

What is uranium enrichment and how quickly could Iran build a nuclear bomb? | US-Israel war on Iran News

United States President Donald Trump has claimed that a new nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which the US withdrew from in 2018 during his first term.

On Tuesday, Trump extended the two-week ceasefire with Iran a day before it was set to expire, with hopes for a second round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Key among the US demands is that Iran stop all enrichment of uranium.

Iran has always insisted its nuclear programme is for civilian use only, such as for power generation, which requires uranium enrichment of between 3 percent and 5 percent. To build nuclear weapons, uranium needs to be enriched to 90 percent.

In this explainer, we visualise what uranium is, how it is enriched and how long it could take Iran to make a nuclear weapon.

What is uranium, and which countries have it?

Uranium is a dense metal used as a fuel in nuclear reactors and weapons. It is naturally radioactive and usually found in low concentrations in rocks, soil and even seawater. About 90 percent of the world’s uranium is produced in just five countries: Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia, Australia and Uzbekistan. Reserves of uranium have also been found in other countries.

Uranium is extracted either by digging it out of the ground or, more commonly, through a chemical process that dissolves uranium from within the rock.

INTERACTIVE - update_Where is uranium found map nuclear-1776865649

Before it can be used as nuclear fuel, uranium is processed through several different forms, including:

  • Yellowcake: Mined ore is crushed and treated with chemicals to form a coarse powder known as yellowcake, which, irrespective of its name, is usually dark green or charcoal in colour, depending on how hot it has been treated.
  • Uranium tetrafluoride: Yellowcake is then treated with hydrogen fluoride gas, which turns it into emerald-green crystals known as uranium tetrafluoride or green salt.
  • Uranium hexafluoride: Green salt is further fluorinated to create a solid white crystal known as uranium hexafluoride. When heated slightly, this crystal turns into a gas, making it ready for enrichment.
  • Uranium dioxide: The gas is spun in a centrifuge machine, which chemically converts it into a fine, black powder.
  • Fuel pellets: The black powder is pressed to form black ceramic pellets, which can then be used in a nuclear reactor.

INTERACTIVE How uranium turns into fuel nuclear reactor-1776853142

How is uranium enriched?

Natural uranium exists in three forms, called isotopes. They are the same element, with the same number of protons but different numbers of neutrons.

Most naturally occurring uranium (99.3 percent) is U-238 – the heaviest and least radioactive – while about 0.7 percent is U-235 and trace amounts (0.005 percent) are U-234.

To generate energy, scientists separate the lighter, more radioactive U-235 from the slightly heavier U-238 in a process called uranium enrichment. U-235 can sustain a nuclear chain reaction while U-238 cannot.

To enrich uranium, it must first be converted into a gas, known as uranium hexafluoride (UF₆). This gas is fed into a series of fast-spinning cylinders called centrifuges. These cylinders spin at extremely high speeds (often more than 1,000 revolutions per second). The spinning force pushes the heavier U-238 to the outer walls, while the lighter U-235 stays in the centre and is collected.

A single centrifuge provides only a tiny amount of separation. To reach higher concentrations – or “enrichment” – the process is repeated through a series of centrifuges, called a cascade, until the desired concentration of U-235 is achieved.

INTERACTIVE - How does uranium enrichment work centrifuge_updated-1776865507

What are the different levels of uranium enrichment?

The higher the U‑235 percentage, the more highly enriched the uranium is.

Small amounts (3-5 percent) are enough to fuel nuclear power reactors, while weapons require much higher enrichment levels (about 90 percent).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers anything below 20 percent to be low-enriched uranium (LEU), while anything above 20 percent is considered highly-enriched uranium (HEU).

Low enriched – less than 20 percent

  • Commercial grade – 3-5 percent: This is the standard fuel for the vast majority of the world’s nuclear power plants
  • Small modular reactors – 5-19.9 percent: Used in more modern reactors and advanced research reactors

Highly enriched – More than 20 percent

  • Research grade – 20-85 percent: Used in specialised research reactors to produce medical isotopes or to test materials
  • Weapons grade – above 90 percent: This is the level required for most nuclear weapons
  • Naval grade – 93-97 percent: Used in the nuclear reactors that power submarines and aircraft carriers

Depleted uranium, which contains less than 0.3 percent U‑235, is the leftover product after enrichment. It can be used for radiation shielding or as projectiles in armour‑piercing weapons.

How long does it take to enrich uranium?

The effort it takes to enrich uranium is not linear, meaning it is much more difficult to go from 0.7 percent natural uranium to 20 percent LEU than it is to go from 20 percent to 90 percent HEU. Once uranium reaches 60 percent enrichment, it becomes much quicker to reach 90 percent weapons grade.

The effort it takes to enrich uranium is measured in separative work units (SWU).

According to the IAEA, Iran is believed to have about 440kg (970lbs) of uranium enriched to 60 percent – enough to theoretically build 10 or 11 low-technology atomic bombs if refined to 90 percent.

fordo
The then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspecting the Natanz nuclear plant in central Iran, March 2007 [Handout/Iran President’s Office via EPA]

Ted Postol, professor emeritus of science, technology and international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), told Al Jazeera that before the US attack on Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow, the country had at least 10 cascades of 174 IR-6 centrifuges in operation – meaning 1,740 IR-6 centrifuges.

The IR-6 is one of Iran’s most advanced centrifuge models. The country also has tens of thousands of older centrifuges.

Little is known about the conditions of these centrifuges or the stocks of uranium hexafluoride, which are still believed to be buried underground.

Postol has calculated that Iran’s cascade of centrifuges could produce 900 to 1,000 SWUs annually.

“Getting from natural uranium to 60 percent enrichment, which Iran has already achieved, takes roughly five years, and about 5,000 SWUs using Iran’s cascades.”

“If I want to go from 60 to 90 percent, I only need 500 SWUs. So, instead of five years, [by] starting with the 60 percent here, this might take me four or five weeks. Because I am already very enriched,” Postol said.

Using an analogy of a clock, Postol explained: “Let’s say it takes seven minutes to get 33 percent enrichment, and then eight minutes to get to 50 percent enrichment. It only takes me one minute to get to total [90 percent] enrichment.”

INTERACTIVE - How long does it take to enrich uranium_updated-1776865509

How easy would it be for Iran to build a nuclear weapon?

Postol said Iran’s stockpile is held underground, meaning a military strike would not necessarily eliminate the nuclear threat.

A single centrifuge cascade capable of enriching weapons-grade uranium could take up “no more floor space than a studio apartment, making it easily hidden in a small laboratory”, he said, estimating the area at 60sq metres (600sq feet).

“A single Prius Compact Hybrid car can produce enough electric power to run four or more of these cascades at a time,” Postol added, meaning “Iran can covertly convert its 60 percent uranium into weapons-grade uranium metal”.

“What they have done is put themselves in a position where anybody who thinks about attacking them with nuclear weapons has to know that they could be sitting in those tunnels after such an attack, refining [and] enriching the final step they need to build atomic weapons and converting it to metal, and building a nuclear weapon, and that they have the means to deliver it,” Postol said.

“They would have all of the technical equipment they need to build the atomic weapons. And they have the missiles, which are also in the tunnels and can be manufactured in addition to what they already have. And the atomic weapon would not need to be tested, because uranium weapons do not need to be tested before they’re used.”

What does the NPT say about enrichment?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), established in 1968, is a landmark international agreement aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran is a signatory to this pact.

The treaty supports the right of all signatories to access nuclear technology and enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, including energy, medical or industrial purposes, with precise safeguards to ensure it is not diverted to make weapons.

Under the NPT, nuclear-weapon states agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist non-nuclear-weapon states in developing them. Non-nuclear-weapon states also agree not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons.

Despite this, most nuclear powers are currently modernising their arsenals rather than dismantling them.

Most of the countries are signatories, except five: India, Pakistan, Israel, South Sudan and North Korea.

INTERACTIVE - Nuclear weapons NPT members-1776853134

What agreements has Iran made about its nuclear programme in the past?

In 2015, under the Obama administration, Iran struck a deal with six world powers — China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US — plus the European Union, known as the JCPOA.

Under the pact, Tehran agreed to scale down its nuclear programme, capping enrichment to 3.67 percent, in exchange for relief from sanctions.

“The Iranians agreed to it, and they were following the treaty. There was no problem with the treaty at all, absolutely no problem,” Postol said.

“They were allowed to have 6,000 centrifuges, which, if they had natural uranium, they could probably build a bomb within a year if they were secretly using these centrifuges, but that was all under inspection. They were just simply going to enrich to 3.67 percent, which is for a power reactor. They’re allowed to do that by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

But in 2018, Trump pulled out of the deal, calling it “one-sided” and reimposing sanctions on Iran. Iran responded by eventually resuming enrichment at Fordow.

After the US killed Iran’s General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, Tehran stated it would no longer follow the set uranium enrichment limits.

Former President Joe Biden made attempts to revive the deal, but it never came to fruition due to disagreements over whether sanctions should be lifted first or Iran should rejoin the JCPOA first.

Trump has repeatedly said Iran should not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons. It has been one of Washington’s red lines during talks with Iranian officials over the past year, and was also the central justification that Washington used when it bombed Iranian nuclear facilities during the 12-day US-Israel war on Iran last year.

In the current negotiations, Iran has said it is willing to “downblend” its 60 percent enriched uranium to about 20 percent – the threshold for low-enriched uranium. The process of downblending involves mixing stocks with depleted uranium to achieve a lower percentage of enriched U-235 overall.

“From the point of view of showing goodwill, I think it’s good, it shows that the Iranians are thinking of ways to address what the Americans claim are their concerns,” Postol said.

INTERACTIVE - TImeline of Iran nuclear programme JCPOA-1776853136

Which countries have nuclear weapons?

Nine countries possessed roughly 12,187 nuclear warheads as of early 2026, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Approximately two-thirds are owned by two nations – Russia (4,400) and the US (3,700), excluding their retired nuclear arsenals.

Some 9,745 of the total existing nuclear weapons are military stockpiles for missiles, submarines and aircraft. The rest have been retired. Of the military stockpile, 3,912 are currently deployed on missiles or at bomber bases, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Of these, some 2,100 are on US, Russian, British and French warheads, ready for use at short notice.

While Russia and the US have dismantled thousands of warheads, several countries are thought to be increasing their stockpiles, notably China.

The only country to have voluntarily relinquished nuclear weapons is South Africa. In 1989, the government halted its nuclear weapons programme and began dismantling its six nuclear weapons the following year.

Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, with a stockpile of at least 90. It has consistently neither confirmed nor denied this, and despite numerous treaties, it faces little international pressure for transparency.

INTERACTIVE - which countries have nuclear weapons-1776853140

Source link

The Second Nuclear Age: Why the World is Betting on the Atom Again

Data centres, climate targets and energy security – three forces pushing nuclear power back to the forefront of the global agenda. But behind the technological shift lies a human dimension: the story of nuclear host communities, where quality of life has long defied the familiar fears.

Three Forces Behind the Renaissance

The AI Data Centre Surge   Climate Commitments Energy Security
Data centres already consume ~2% of global electricity and the figure is set to multiply as AI model training becomes industrial. Only nuclear can deliver baseload power at scale, 24/7, regardless of weather At COP28, 20+ nations pledged to triple nuclear capacity by 2050. Nuclear emits less CO₂ per kWh over its full lifecycle than solar panels – and far less than any fossil fuel alternative The crises of 2021-2022 exposed the vulnerability of single-source energy systems. Now, the 2026 Middle East conflict has delivered an even starker lesson: severe disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz has triggered what the IEA has described as “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market” – worse than the oil shocks of the 1970s. The crisis has made one argument impossible to ignore: energy that is generated at home cannot be blockaded.

In 2024, Microsoft signed a deal to restart a unit at Three Mile Island – the very plant in Pennsylvania whose partial meltdown in 1979 shaped public anxiety about nuclear for decades. The reasoning was simple: the data centres powering AI require enormous quantities of electricity, continuous and ideally carbon-free. A nuclear plant delivers all three. That deal has since become something of a symbol for a much broader shift playing out across dozens of countries.

The industry already calls it a renaissance – not the first in nuclear’s history, but arguably the most structurally grounded. Three things are happening at once: explosive electricity demand from the digital economy, binding climate targets set by governments, and a growing reckoning with the limits of intermittent renewables. Wind and solar are essential to decarbonisation – but they cannot guarantee baseload supply in all weather, at all hours. Nuclear can.

“We need a source that delivers around the clock, every day of the year – sun or no sun, wind or no wind.” That, roughly, is how energy executives frame the problem when they look at what AI actually needs from the grid.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN UNLIKELY ALLY FOR NUCLEAR

Data centres already account for about 2% of global electricity consumption, and that figure could rise dramatically by 2030 as training and running large language models becomes routine. Google, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft are all in the market for long-term clean power contracts – and nuclear plants are almost the only sellers that can offer both the scale and the certainty those contracts require.

One example already up and running: the Kalinin Data Centre, built directly on the site of the Kalinin nuclear power plant in Russia. It draws up to 80 MW of guaranteed power straight from the plant’s substations – giving it some of the lowest electricity costs in central Russia – and operates to Tier III reliability standards. It has been included in Russia’s national Digital Economy programme. This is not a concept for the future: a nuclear plant is already powering real digital infrastructure today.

In the United States, after decades of stagnation, the first licensing procedures in a generation have begun for new reactors, including small modular reactors – SMRs – that promise lower capital costs and shorter build times. In the United Kingdom, Hinkley Point C is under construction. France has announced six new EPR-2 reactors. Canada has approved a major refurbishment of the Pickering station. These are not isolated decisions. They represent a change of direction that is now systemic.

THE CLIMATE CASE: THE NUMBERS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

Nuclear energy produces less carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour over its full lifecycle than a solar panel, and many times less than a gas turbine. For governments that have committed to climate neutrality by 2050, this is becoming a decisive argument – particularly given that large-scale battery storage, the main alternative for backing up renewables, carries its own considerable environmental costs.

It is no coincidence that at COP28 in Dubai, more than 20 nations signed a declaration committing to triple nuclear capacity by 2050. The list includes the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and South Korea. After years on the political margins, nuclear is back in the official climate conversation.

  87%     +$9K     €59B   >$2B
of residents in 24 Russian nuclear cities report satisfaction with their quality of life   average household income between US counties near nuclear plants vs. neighbouring counties   projected average annual household income generated by EU nuclear industry, 2025–2050   annual economic impact of Palo Verde nuclear plant in Arizona, the largest in the US
Nuclear cities sociological survey, Russia Good Energy Collective / Carnegie Mellon, 2022 Deloitte / NuclearEurope, 2025   APS – Arizona Public Service  

NUCLEAR CITIES: THE LIFE THAT RARELY MAKES THE NEWS

In the middle of the technology and climate debate, it is easy to miss a different dimension entirely – the human one. Nuclear energy does not exist in the abstract: it lives in specific towns and regions, alongside real communities. And the data on quality of life in those places tell a story that sits rather awkwardly alongside the image embedded in popular culture.

Research from multiple countries consistently finds that cities and regions hosting nuclear facilities tend to have higher household incomes, better infrastructure, stable employment, and often stronger demographic indicators than comparable areas without nuclear presence. A nuclear plant is not simply a generator. It is an anchor employer, a leading taxpayer, and a structural pillar of the local economy for decades at a stretch.

EVIDENCE FROM AROUND THE WORLD

CANADA – Bruce Power (Ontario)

Bruce Power is the largest employer in Ontario’s Bruce County. Ipsos polling found that 93% of local residents consider the company a “good neighbour” and 96% are confident the plant operates safely. That level of sustained public support sits alongside major refurbishment programmes that will go on creating thousands of regional jobs for years ahead.

HUNGARY – Paks

Paks is a small town on the Danube, 100 kilometres south of Budapest. According to Hungary’s Central Statistical Office (KSH), it ranks among the country’s leaders in per capita income – GDP per capita and purchasing power run roughly 1.5 to 2 times the national average. Male life expectancy in Paks is around 75-76 years, against 73 nationally; female life expectancy is 81-82, against 79 across Hungary. 

FINLAND – Eurajoki (Olkiluoto NPP)

The Finnish municipality of Eurajoki, home to the Olkiluoto plant, has a population of around 9,000 and is one of the most financially secure municipalities in the region. In 2022, the plant’s operator TVO paid €20 million in property tax, out of the municipality’s total tax revenue of €57 million. Local authorities describe Eurajoki as debt-free. It also maintains a stable population, which is a genuinely rare achievement for small Finnish communities. 

RUSSIA – Udomlya (Kalinin NPP, Tver Region)

The Kalinin nuclear power plant is the largest electricity producer in central Russia, located 3 kilometres from the town of Udomlya. The plant generates 82% of all electricity produced in the Tver Region and 14% of the output of the entire Central Federal District. It is also a major regional employer: together with contractor organisations, the station accounts for around 30% of all jobs among the working-age population of the Udomlya municipal district. The plant supplies the town with heat and hot water, and the construction of the station marked the beginning of rapid development across the entire surrounding area.

UNITED STATES – Palo Verde (Arizona)

Palo Verde is the largest nuclear plant in the United States and generates more than $2 billion in annual economic impact for Arizona. The station directly employs 2,500 people, with a further 5,800 jobs supported in related industries. It is Arizona’s largest private taxpayer – a contribution that matters directly to the funding of local schools and public infrastructure. 

SWEDEN – Forsmark

A Novus survey from spring 2023 found that at least 86% of residents in Östhammar municipality – where Forsmark is located – support the construction of a permanent spent fuel repository. Nine in ten local residents believe the presence of operator SKB has a positive impact on regional development. 

UNITED KINGDOM – Hinkley Point C (Somerset)

Britain’s largest infrastructure project will employ up to 15,000 workers at peak construction. More than 1,500 apprentices have already been trained, 500 more than originally planned. Three Skills Centres of Excellence in Somerset have put over 8,000 people through training in welding, electrical and mechanical trades. The effects on the regional labour market will be felt for a long time. 

CANADA – Pickering (Ontario)

The Pickering refurbishment is expected to create around 30,500 jobs during construction and sustain 6,700 permanent positions during operation. The project received government approval in November 2025, with construction due to begin in 2027. 

FRANCE – Nuclear host regions

Analysis by France’s national statistics agency INSEE indicates that nuclear plants generate economic clusters that sustain employment and population in smaller municipalities across the country. 

THE PROXIMITY PARADOX: WHY NUCLEAR COMMUNITIES SUPPORT NUCLEAR ENERGY

Sociologists have long noted a pattern that tends to surprise outsiders: the further people live from a nuclear plant, the more they fear it. The closer they live, the more they trust it. A Nuclear Energy Institute study found that 89% of residents within ten miles of a reactor view nuclear energy favourably. Surveys across nuclear host cities in Russia show that 78% of residents feel proud of the industry’s achievements, and more than two-thirds rate its contribution to their city’s development positively. Across 24 such cities, 87% of residents report satisfaction with their quality of life – in some, the figure exceeds 90%.

This is not a coincidence, and it has nothing to do with messaging campaigns. It is the product of lived experience. When a nuclear plant is the largest employer in the area, the main source of local tax revenue, and the sponsor of community sports clubs and healthcare facilities, people’s relationship with it is shaped not by what they read in the news, but by the texture of their daily lives.

The Proximity Paradox: Trust Rises Near the Plant

  The closer people live to a reactor, the more they support it Sociologists have long documented a consistent pattern: public support for nuclear energy is significantly higher among people who live close to a plant. Daily life near a facility creates a different picture than the one shaped by media coverage from a distance. The effect holds across countries, cultures and decades of polling.       Within 10 miles of a reactor (US, Nuclear Energy Inst.) Bruce Power region (Canada, Ipsos) Forsmark area (Sweden, Novus 2023) Nuclear cities, Russia (satisfied with life)     89%   96%    86%  87%

CONCLUSION: AN OLD SOURCE OF ENERGY FOR NEW CHALLENGES

The nuclear renaissance that gathered momentum through the mid-2020s is neither nostalgia nor ideology. It is a practical response to several problems that landed at roughly the same time: exponential growth in electricity demand from the digital economy; climate targets that cannot realistically be met without firm, low-carbon baseload generation; and hard lessons from successive energy crises about the fragility of systems built around a single source or a single supplier.

Against that backdrop, the accumulated experience of nuclear communities around the world: from Eurajoki in Finland to Paks in Hungary, from the shores of Lake Ontario to the Arizona desert, makes for a substantial body of evidence. Living near a nuclear plant is not a losing proposition for a community. More often than not, it has been the foundation of lasting prosperity, decent public services, and demographic stability that many non-nuclear towns can only envy. That, too, belongs in the conversation about what the future of energy actually looks like.

This analysis draws on data from: Deloitte / NuclearEurope (2025); Good Energy Collective / Carnegie Mellon University (2022); Ipsos Canada; Novus / SKB (Sweden, 2023); KSH — Hungarian Central Statistical Office; TVO (Finland); APS — Arizona Public Service; EDF Energy (United Kingdom); Government of Ontario; INSEE (France); Nuclear Energy Institute (United States); IEA; sociological surveys of nuclear host cities in Russia; Rosenergoatom

Source link

What was the Iran nuclear deal Trump dumped in search of ‘better’ terms? | US-Israel war on Iran News

United States President Donald Trump has said a nuclear agreement currently being negotiated with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which he withdrew from in 2018 during his first term in office.

The original 2015 accord took roughly two years of negotiations to reach and involved hundreds of specialists across technical and legal fields, including multiple US experts. Under it, Iran agreed to restrict the enrichment of uranium and to subject itself to inspections in exchange for the relaxation of sanctions.

Recommended Stories

list of 3 itemsend of list

But Trump took the US out of that pact, calling it the “worst deal ever”. Before the initial US-Israeli strikes on Iran at the end of February, the US had made new demands – including additional restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear programme, the restriction of its ballistic missiles programme and an end to its support for regional armed groups, primarily in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

Trump’s latest remarks come amid growing uncertainty about whether a second round of talks will proceed in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, as a two-week ceasefire between the US-Israel and Iran approaches the end in just a day.

So, what was the JCPOA, and how did it compare to Trump’s new demands?

What was the JCPOA?

On July 14, 2015, Iran reached an agreement with the European Union and six major powers – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the US, and Germany – under which these states would roll back international economic sanctions and allow Iran greater participation in the global economy.

In return, Tehran committed to limiting activities that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon.

These included reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium by about 98 percent, to less than 300kg (660lb), and capping uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent – far below weapons-grade of 90 percent, but high enough for civilian purposes such as power generation.

Before the JCPOA, Iran operated roughly 20,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges. Under the deal, that number was cut to a maximum of 6,104, and only older-generation machines confined to two facilities, which were subject to international monitoring.

Centrifuges are machines which spin to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope – enrichment – in uranium, a key step towards potential bomb-making.

The deal also redesigned Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor to prevent plutonium production and introduced one of the most intrusive inspection regimes ever implemented by the global nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In exchange, Iran received relief from international sanctions which had severely damaged its economy. Billions of dollars in frozen assets were released, and restrictions on oil exports and banking were eased.

The deal came to halt when Trump formally withdrew Washington from the nuclear deal in 2018, a move widely criticised domestically and by foreign allies, and despite the IAEA saying Iran had complied with the agreement up to that point.

“The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East. That is why we must put an end to Iran’s continued aggression and nuclear ambitions. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement,” he said in October 2017.

He reimposed crippling economic sanctions on Tehran as part of his “maximum pressure” tactic. These targeted Iran’s oil exports, as well as its shipping sector, banking system and other key industries.

The goal was to force Iran back to the negotiating table to agree to a new deal, which also included a discussion about Tehran’s missile capabilities, further curbs on enrichment and more scrutiny of its nuclear programme.

What has happened to Iran’s nuclear programme since the JCPOA?

During the JCPOA period, Iran’s nuclear programme was tightly constrained and heavily monitored. The IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran was complying with the deal’s terms, including one year after Trump announced the US’s withdrawal from the agreement.

Starting in mid-2019, however, Iran began incrementally breaching the deal’s limits, exceeding caps on uranium stockpiles and enrichment levels.

In November 2024, Iran said it would activate “new and advanced” centrifuges. The IAEA confirmed that Tehran had informed the nuclear watchdog that it planned to install more than 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium.

In December 2024, the IAEA said Iran was rapidly enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, moving closer to the 90 percent threshold needed for weapons-grade material. Most recently, in 2025, the IAEA estimated that Iran had 440kg (970lb) of 60-percent enriched uranium.

What are Trump’s latest demands for Iran’s nuclear programme?

The US and its ally, Israel, are pushing Iran to agree to zero uranium enrichment and have accused Iran of working towards building a nuclear weapon, while providing no evidence for their claims.

They also want Iran’s estimated 440kg stock of 60pc enriched uranium to be removed from Iran. While that is below weapons-grade, it is the point at which it becomes much faster to achieve the 90 percent enrichment needed for atomic weapons production.

Iran has insisted its enrichment effort is for civilian purposes only. It is a signatory to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In March 2025, Tulsi Gabbard, the US director of national intelligence, testified to Congress that the US “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon”.

On Sunday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a strongly worded statement, said Trump had no right to ⁠⁠”deprive” Iran of its nuclear ⁠⁠rights.

INTERACTIVE- NPT
(Al Jazeera)

What else is Trump asking for?

Restrictions on ballistic missiles

Before the US-Israel war on Iran began, Tehran had always insisted negotiations should be exclusively focused on Iran’s nuclear programme.

US and Israeli demands, however, extended beyond that. Just before the war began, Washington and Israel demanded severe restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

Analysts say this demand was at least partly triggered by the fact that several Iranian missiles had breached Israel’s much-vaunted “Iron Dome” defence system during the 12-day war between the two countries in June last year. While Israel suffered only a handful of casualties, it is understood to have been alarmed.

For his part, Trump has repeatedly warned, without evidence, about the dangers of Iran’s long-range missiles, claiming Iran is producing them “in very high numbers” and they could “overwhelm the Iron Dome”.

Iran has said its right to maintain missile capabilities is non-negotiable. The JCPOA did not put any limits on the development of ballistic missiles.

However, a United Nations resolution made when adopting the nuclear agreement in July 2015 did stipulate that Iran could not “undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”.

Ending support for proxy groups

The US and Israel have also demanded that Iran stop supporting its non-state allies across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and a number of groups in Iraq. Together, these groups are referred to as Iran’s “axis of resistance”.

In May last year, Trump said Tehran “must stop sponsoring terror, halt its bloody proxy wars, and permanently and verifiably cease pursuit of nuclear weapons”, during a GCC meeting in Riyadh.

Three days before the war on Iran began in February, during his State of the Union address to Congress, Trump accused Iran and “its murderous proxies” of spreading “nothing but terrorism and death and hate”.

Iran has refused to enter a dialogue about limiting its support for these armed groups.

Can Trump really get a new deal that is ‘much better’ than the JCPOA?

According to Andreas Kreig, associate professor of Security Studies at King’s College, London, Trump is more likely to secure a new deal that closely resembles the JCPOA, with “some form of restrictions on enrichment, possibly with a sunset clause, and international supervision”.

“Iran might get access to frozen assets and lifted sanctions much quicker than under the JCPOA, as it will not agree to a long drawn-out, gradual lifting of sanctions,” Krieg pointed out.

However, he warned that the political landscape in Tehran has hardened. “Iran now is a far more hardline and less pragmatic player that will play hardball at every junction. Trump cannot count on any goodwill in Tehran,” he said.

“The IRGC is now firmly in charge… with likely new powerful and tested levers such as the Strait of Hormuz,” he said, referring to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which operates as a parallel elite military force to the army and has a great deal of political and economic power in Iran. It is a constitutionally recognised part of the Iranian military and answers directly to the supreme leader.

Overall, Krieg stressed, the US-Israel war on Iran “leaves the world worse off than had Trump stuck to the JCPOA”, even if a new compromise is eventually reached.

Moreover, since the revocation of the JCPOA, the US and Israel have waged two wars on Iran, including the current one. The 12-day war in June last year included attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites and killed more than 1,000 people.

Attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have continued since the latest war began on February 28, including on the Natanz enrichment facility, Isfahan nuclear complex, Arak heavy water reactor, and the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Iran nuclear facilities

Nevertheless, King’s College’s Krieg said there is still room for a negotiated outcome if Tehran and Washington scale back their demands.

“Both sides can compromise on enrichment thresholds, and on temporary moratoriums on enrichments. But Iran will not surrender its sovereignty to enrich altogether, and the Trump administration will have to meet them halfway,” he said.

“While the Iranians will commit on paper not to develop a nuclear weapon, they will want to keep R&D [research and development] in this space alive.”

Economic incentives will be central, he added. “Equally, Iran would want to get immediate access to capital and liquidity. Here, the Trump administration is already willing to compromise.”

Source link

North Korea fires missiles, signaling broader nuclear delivery push

A test-fire of strategic cruise missiles and anti-warship missiles from the destroyer Choe Hyon in North Korea, 12 April 2026 (issued 14 April 2026). File. Photo by KCNA / EPA

April 19 (Asia Today) — North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles on Saturday, just 11 days after its previous test, in what analysts describe as an effort to expand and demonstrate its nuclear delivery capabilities.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said the missiles were fired around 6:10 a.m. from the Sinpo area on the country’s east coast and flew about 140 kilometers over the East Sea.

The launch site, near a key submarine facility, has raised the possibility that the weapons could be linked to submarine-launched ballistic missile development, though officials said further analysis is needed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff said it is assessing the missiles’ specifications and whether they were launched from land or underwater.

Sinpo is home to North Korea’s main submarine shipyard, where vessels such as the “Kim Gun-ok Hero” submarine have previously been unveiled.

Recent satellite imagery cited by the North Korea-focused outlet 38 North indicated that another submarine had been moved to dry dock, suggesting possible preparations for additional testing.

Yang Wook, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said the relatively short flight distance raises questions about whether a full submarine-based launch was conducted.

“Given the 140-kilometer range, it is unclear whether this was a full SLBM test, but the location suggests it could be part of efforts to verify repeated launch capability,” he said.

If confirmed as an underwater launch, the test would mark North Korea’s latest step in diversifying its nuclear delivery systems, following demonstrations involving land-based missiles and sea-based platforms in recent weeks.

Under its latest defense development plan, North Korea has been expanding a range of strategic capabilities, including short-range ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles and solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile engines.

Analysts say the timing may also reflect broader geopolitical considerations. With the United States focused on conflict in the Middle East, North Korea could be seeking to exploit a perceived security gap while reinforcing its deterrence posture.

Some experts also suggest the launch may be intended to strengthen Pyongyang’s bargaining position ahead of potential diplomatic engagement tied to an expected visit by President Donald Trump to China next month.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260420010005867

Source link

Pakistan expecting ‘major breakthrough’ tied to Iran’s nuclear programme | US-Israel war on Iran

NewsFeed

A source has told Al Jazeera that Pakistan is expecting a breakthrough tied to Iran’s nuclear programme as Islamabad helps negotiate an end the US-Israeli war on Iran. Pakistani military and government officials met with Iranian and Saudi leaders on Wednesday.

Source link