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Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan has opened six overland transit routes for goods destined for Iran, formalising a road corridor through its territory as thousands of containers remain stranded at Karachi port because of the United States blockade of Iranian ports and ships trying to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Ministry of Commerce issued the Transit of Goods through Territory of Pakistan Order 2026 on April 25, bringing it into immediate effect. The order allows goods originating from third countries to be transported through Pakistan and delivered to Iran by road.

The announcement coincided with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Islamabad for talks with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir, the latest in a series of diplomatic engagements as Pakistan seeks to mediate an end to the two-month war between Washington and Tehran.

Federal Minister for Commerce Jam Kamal Khan described the initiative as “a significant step toward promoting regional trade and enhancing Pakistan’s role as a key trade corridor”.

Iran has not publicly commented on the move, and Al Jazeera’s query to the Iranian embassy in Islamabad went unanswered.

The notification does not extend to Indian-origin goods. A separate Commerce Ministry order issued in May 2025, following the India-Pakistan aerial war that month, bans the transit of goods from India through Pakistan by any mode and remains in force.

Routes and regulations

The six designated routes link Pakistan’s main ports, Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar, with two Iranian border crossings, Gabd and Taftan, passing through Balochistan via Turbat, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Quetta and Dalbandin.

The shortest route, the Gwadar-Gabd corridor, reduces travel time to the Iranian border to between two and three hours, compared with the 16 to 18 hours it takes from Karachi – Pakistan’s biggest port – to the Iranian border. The Gwadar-Gabd route could cut transport costs by 45 to 55 percent compared with costs from Karachi port, according to officials.

But for Iran, firms sending their goods to the country, and transporters, all routes into Iranian territory today are viable options, with the principal maritime passage they have traditionally used – the Strait of Hormuz – blockaded by the US Navy.

Corridor shaped by conflict

The current US-Iran war began on February 28, when US and Israeli forces launched attacks on Iran.

In the weeks that followed, Iran restricted commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and gas passes during peacetime, disrupting one of the most critical arteries of global trade.

Pakistan brokered a ceasefire on April 8 and hosted the first round of direct US-Iran talks on April 11, in Islamabad. The negotiations lasted nearly a day but ended without a deal. Two days later, Washington imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports, throttling Tehran’s maritime access.

A second round of talks has since stalled. US President Donald Trump cancelled a planned visit to Islamabad by special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner last weekend.

Iran has ruled out direct negotiations with Washington while the blockade remains in place, though Araghchi told Pakistani officials that Tehran would continue engaging with Islamabad’s mediation efforts “until a result is achieved”.

The transit order appears to be a direct economic response to that impasse.

More than 3,000 containers destined for Iran have been stuck at Karachi port for several days, with vessels unable to collect the cargo. War-risk insurance premiums have surged from about 0.12 percent of a vessel’s value before the conflict to roughly 5 percent, making shipping to the region too expensive for many operators.

Shifting regional dynamics

The corridor also signals a shift away from Afghanistan, whose relations with Pakistan have deteriorated sharply.

The two sides engaged in clashes in October 2025 and again in February and March this year, with skirmishes continuing along the northwestern and southwestern borders.

The Torkham and Chaman crossings have ceased to function as reliable commercial routes since tensions escalated, limiting Pakistan’s overland access to Central Asian markets.

“This is a paradigmatic shift. Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan Taliban, the de facto rulers in Kabul, have no reset switch,” Iftikhar Firdous, cofounder of The Khorasan Diary, told Al Jazeera.

“Kabul has been diversifying away from Pakistan towards Iran and Central Asia, but this move flips the equation. Pakistan can now bypass Afghanistan entirely for westbound trade. The impact on Kabul’s transit relevance and revenue is strategic, not immediate – but it is real.”

Firdous said the implications extend beyond bilateral ties.

“This corridor also reduces Pakistan’s reliance on longer maritime routes through the Gulf. Geopolitics, security, and infrastructure will ultimately determine which corridors dominate, but it places Pakistan as the main overland gateway for China-backed trade routes into West Asia and beyond,” he said.

Minhas Majeed Marwat, a Peshawar-based academic and geopolitical analyst, urged caution. “A cornered Afghanistan is a destabilised Afghanistan, and Pakistan knows better than most what that costs,” she wrote on X on April 27.

“The opportunity here is real. So is the risk. Security on the northwestern and southwestern borders remains the variable that could unravel everything. Pakistan is positioned well. It is not yet positioned safely. Those are different things.”

UN experts said Wednesday that reconstruction in the Gaza Strip cannot succeed without ending Israel’s occupation and ensuring rebuilding efforts are rooted in human rights and Palestinian self-determination, Anadolu reports.

“The occupation must end, and the dispossession and discrimination against Palestinians must stop if rebuilding is to have any real chance of success,” the experts said in a statement.

Citing the Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, they said more than 371,000 housing units have been destroyed or damaged, 1.9 million people displaced, and over 60% of the population remains homeless, with reconstruction needs estimated at more than $71 billion.

“The data confirms a pattern of structural discrimination that reconstruction efforts must urgently correct rather than reproduce,” they said, warning that women, persons with disabilities and older people face disproportionate hardship.

The experts said reconstruction must be inclusive, participatory, transparent and accountable, with Palestinians shaping decisions in line with their right to self-determination under international law.

READ: Former US official accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza, says Washington is complicit

They raised questions about governance of the process, saying the assessment does not address who would oversee reconstruction or whether the proposed “Board of Peace” by US President Donald Trump is consistent with international law.

The experts are also concerned that the assessment does not sufficiently embed human rights principles, warning that an emphasis on financial needs and infrastructure could reduce housing to mere shelter provision rather than ensuring dignity, security and long-term sustainability.

They said reconstruction could become “a race for profits” without safeguards protecting vulnerable groups.

“Reconstruction is not only about rebuilding structures – it is about restoring rights, dignity and equality,” they said.

They urged states and donors to place human rights at the center of Gaza’s reconstruction, warning failure to do so “risks entrenching injustice and prolonging the suffering of Palestinians for generations.”

READ: Israeli court extends detention of Gaza hospital director Abu Safiya ‘without charges’

Deliveries of the CH-53K King Stallion to the U.S. Marine Corps are starting to ramp up, with the planned 16-aircraft annual milestone now expected for Fiscal Year 2029. The Marine Corps also says that, for the future, they are open to developing a mine countermeasures version, something that would be able to replace the current MH-53E.

Updates on the latest developments within the Marine Corps’ CH-53K program were today provided by Col. Kate Fleeger, a program manager for the H-53 Helicopters Program, at the annual Modern Day Marine conference in Washington, D.C., at which TWZ is in attendance.

Fleeger confirmed that, while the legacy CH-53E and MH-53E are “both still healthy and viable” and critical components of the Marine Corps fleet, the focus is now very much on the CH-53K as the future of heavy lift.

Currently, four Marine Corps squadrons have CH-53Ks as part of their stable, and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461), which was the first fleet squadron, is fully outfitted with Kilos.

“We also have our training squadron, HMHT-302, which has received multiple CH-53Ks and will continue to be a dual type/model series training squadron throughout the transition from the Echo to the Kilo,” Fleeger explained. “We also have the CH-53K in our developmental test squadron, HX-21 at Patuxent River, and with our operational test squadron, VMX-1, in Yuma, Arizona.”

With the CH-53K “rocking and rolling across the board,” the 25th example off the Sikorsky production line in Stratford, Connecticut, was delivered earlier this week. Fleeger said that the service expects to add another eight aircraft for the rest of the year. This is part of a total Marine Corps program of record of 200 aircraft, a figure that has not changed. On top of this figure, Israel has procured 12 CH-53Ks, and Fleeger confirmed that the country is “in conversations” about the potential for additional aircraft.

As part of ongoing training work, HMH-461 has been putting the CH-53K through its paces “in every clime and place in CONUS,” Fleeger said. This has included taking the aircraft on detachments at the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) school in Yuma, and in exercises out of Twentynine Palms, California.

Fleeger said she is “extremely happy with how the aircraft is performing” with the operational fleet.

Meanwhile, the CH-53K is also still being tested, with the two units covering operational and developmental tests. “We are continuing to expand the envelope of the baseline aircraft that’s been delivered to the fleet, whether it’s expansion of the envelope with the existing equipment, or whether it’s modifications that allow for additional capability moving forward, and ultimately providing those modifications to fleet aircraft,” Fleeger explained.

Part of the recent mission expansion saw one CH-53K lifted by another example of the same type, to broaden options for the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel, or TRAP mission. The aircraft that was lifted had its gear boxes and engines removed, but this is common practice, Fleeger said. The purpose of the test was not only to set up and document the flight characteristics, but also the rigging procedures. In the test, the aircraft that provided the sling load weighed about 28,000 pounds, which is well below the 36,000 pounds maximum external load for the CH-53K.

“When you talk to the pilots that lift something like that, even something that heavy, there’s very little ‘feel’ in the cockpit that you have a significant load underneath,” she added.

One of the other elements of additional testing has involved aviation ground fuel delivery. This involved a CH-53K landing with fuel and then providing this fuel to a V-22 tiltrotor that landed next to it.

At the same time, the transition to the CH-53K has involved training pilots with four Containerized Flight Training Devices (CFTD) now delivered. “They are state-of-the-art, fully immersive environments that have some of the highest fidelity visual databases and digital acuity that you’ll see in flight simulation today,” Fleeger said.

“The pilots have every opportunity to see exactly what’s going to happen in the aircraft before they even get in the aircraft. The idea here is the first time a pilot sits in that cockpit on the flight line is kind of a non-event, because he’s basically seen everything he needs to see along the way.”

These new CFTDs consist of a mobile box with the “guts of the simulator inside.” As Fleeger explained, “Gone are the days of the big dome, fully motion-based simulators that we’ve had previously. The motion platform is no longer a big portion of what provides the training fidelity. The majority of that fidelity actually comes from the visual systems, the realism of the visual system, and the haptic cueing to the pilots.

Another training aid is the Advanced Aviation Training Device, or AATD, new for the H-53 community, but loosely based on some of the early developmental training systems that arrived with the V-22, with its interactive cockpit learning environment.

“This is a lower fidelity,” Fleeger said, “There’s just screens, computer monitors, if you will, that show the pilot the outside visuals. But the pilot also has a see-through virtual-reality goggle set that he puts on. It’s absolutely amazing technology that really allows you, with very little additional cost, to be able to get that immersive and simulated environment.”

The AATD is designed primarily as a familiarization training device or for refresher-level training. “You got a few minutes, you go spend some time in here,” Fleeger explained. “You brush up on some stuff. It can also be used for some of the more advanced activities, like tactics, techniques, and procedures development. You can get in there and try some things out before you get to the aircraft and do it in the real world.”

The AATD has been so successful at its current location in New River, close to the training squadron, that the Marines expect to expand throughout the rest of the fleet as it works through the CH-53K transition.

Concurrently, Fleeger says the service has been “very forward-leaning with our Marines in the maintenance shed and making sure that they have the training tools that they need in order to prepare for a state-of-the-art, very data-intensive, data-rich aircraft.”

Maintenance of the fleet benefits from a fully condition-based maintenance model, at least for some of the CH-53K’s components.

“We can look at the vibratory signatures, the temperature signatures on gearboxes, for example, and we can understand when that gearbox might be approaching the end of its life.” The result is that the fleet is increasingly able to manage the maintenance rather than having the maintenance manage them. They can decide when they want to change that gearbox, for example, depending on operational commitments, the amount of flight time they may have planned, the criticality of that flight time, the availability of spares, and so on.

All of this training, including shipboard evolutions, is building up toward the first operational deployment, with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, in Fiscal Year 2027. Last month, the CH-53K fleet hit 10,000 fleet flight hours, a big milestone considering there are currently only 25 aircraft in the fleet.

At this stage, there are 12 aircraft sitting on the production line in Stratford, in various phases of completion.

“The fact that there are 12 aircraft is a big improvement as we move forward in the ramp-up through low-rate initial production,” Fleeger explained.

Once Sikorsky hits the milestone of 16 production aircraft per year, this will trigger the start of the Marine Corps CH-53K transition from East Coast to West Coast, and thus across the entire heavy-lift fleet.

Fleeger said that the line will be “getting up there” toward full-rate production at the end of Fiscal Year 2028, with the milestone to be achieved in FY29.

“The East Coast squadrons will complete transition, and then the transition plan will move out to the West Coast, and we will start transitioning the West Coast squadrons there as well,” Fleeger added. The CH-53E is slated to be retired in 2032.

As for the Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon, it is slated to be withdrawn in 2027. Exactly what will happen with its primary airborne mine countermeasures mission, a general capability set that is increasingly in the spotlight, is unclear. Currently, the Navy is beefing its MH-60 Seahawk mine countermeasures capabilities to help offset the loss. Still, the unique heavy countermeasures sled-towing capability that will be gone when the MH-53E leaves the inventory is likely to be felt, as will the heaviest vertical lift capability organic to the U.S. Navy.

According to Fleeger, “there have not yet been conversations about the Navy procuring the CH-53K or producing a minesweeping variant.” However, she added that “we are certainly open to that in the future, should that need arise.”

Whether or not the CH-53K eventually adopts another new mission, the type is clearly keeping busy for the time being, as the Marine Corps looks forward to taking it on its first operational deployment next year.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

European leaders are seeking to clarify a little-used mutual defence clause in the European Union treaty as questions grow over Washington’s long-term commitment to NATO during a deepening rift with the United States.

NATO, founded in 1949, is a military alliance of North American and European countries built on the principle that an attack on one member is an attack on all. But years of tension between Washington under President Donald Trump and its European allies have pushed European governments to place greater emphasis on their own defence capabilities.

The shift has come as Trump has repeatedly criticised NATO members over their defence spending. He has also questioned the value of the alliance and clashed with European leaders over Ukraine and Iran while threatening to seize Greenland from NATO ally Denmark. The latest tensions escalated after the US and Israel began their war on Iran when Trump accused allies of failing to support Washington and dismissed NATO as a “paper tiger”.

Media reports have said that the Pentagon has also prepared a memo examining options to punish allies viewed as insufficiently supportive during the Iran war. Those options reportedly include exploring the suspension of Spain, which has been particularly critical of the war, from NATO and reviewing the US position on Britain’s claim to the Falkland Islands. NATO has no formal mechanism to expel a member, but the episode has cast doubt over the alliance’s unity and revived questions about Europe defending itself without Washington.

At the heart of Europe’s bid to look for alternative security arrangements beyond NATO is Article 42.7 of the European Union’s founding treaty.

What is Article 42.7?

Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union is the bloc’s mutual defence clause. It says that if an EU member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states are obliged to provide aid and assistance by all means in their power in line with the United Nations Charter.

By comparison, Article 5 in NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. It is supported by common planning and joint exercises and is underpinned by the military weight of the US.

Unlike NATO’s Article 5, however, the EU clause is not backed by an integrated military command structure, standing defence plans or a permanent force able to respond automatically and the US has no obligation to intervene.

That means it is often seen as less credible as a military guarantee in practice although it remains an important political commitment.

Who is calling for Europe to turn to Article 42.7?

Cyprus, which is an EU member but not a NATO member, has been especially eager to strengthen the clause after a drone struck a British airbase on the island during the Iran war last month. While such an incident may not have been enough to invoke NATO’s Article 5, it could raise questions about Article 42.7, particularly at a time of growing strain between the US and Europe.

Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides said leaders had agreed it was time to define how the provision would work in practice if it were triggered.

“We agreed last night that the [European] Commission will prepare a blueprint on how we respond in case a member state triggers Article 42.7,” he said on Friday at an EU summit.

French President Emmanuel Macron has also stressed that the clause should be treated as a binding commitment rather than a symbolic gesture. “On Article 42, paragraph 7, it’s not just words,” he said during a weekend visit to Greece. “For us, it is clear, and there is no room for interpretation or ambiguity.”

Antonio Costa, president of the European Council, said the bloc was drawing up a “handbook” for the use of the clause.

And EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said Europe must step up its defence efforts after Trump has “shaken the transatlantic relationship to its foundation”.

“Let me be clear: We want strong transatlantic ties. The US will remain Europe’s partner and ally. But Europe needs to adapt to the new realities. Europe is no longer Washington’s primary centre of gravity,” she said at a defence conference in Brussels.

“This shift has been ongoing for a while. It is structural, not temporary. It means that Europe must step up. No great power in history has outsourced its survival and survived.”

Has the article ever been invoked?

The clause has been used only once before when France invoked it after the 2015 Paris attacks claimed by ISIL (ISIS), in which 130 people were killed and hundreds wounded.

The attacks were the deadliest in France since World War II. After Article 47.2 was invoked, other EU states shared intelligence aimed at helping French authorities unravel the conspiracy that led to the attacks.

NATO’s Article 5 has also been invoked just once – after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US.

But NATO’s help to the US wasn’t limited to intelligence sharing. Allies contributed tens of thousands of soldiers to the US-led war in Afghanistan. The operations lasted two decades, and more than 46,000 Afghan civilians were killed alongside 2,461 US personnel and about 1,160 non-US coalition soldiers, according to Brown University’s Cost of War project.

Can countries be kicked out or leave NATO?

Europe’s debate over its defence comes amid a string of disputes inside NATO. The reports that US officials have considered punitive measures against allies have revived questions over the alliance’s future cohesion.

Pablo Calderon Martinez, head of politics and international relations at Northeastern University London and a specialist in European affairs, told Al Jazeera that Spain cannot legally be removed from NATO.

“There is no legal mechanism to remove a member. There is, however, a mechanism through which a member can withdraw itself from the organisation,” he said.

He added that some countries have long fallen short of NATO commitments but that does not provide grounds for expulsion. A more likely scenario, he said, would be the US choosing to leave.

Carne Ross, a former British diplomat and founder of Independent Diplomat, a nonprofit diplomatic advisory group, said the deeper issue is whether Europe and Washington still share common values.

“It is abundantly clear that we do not. Trump is anti-democratic. He tried to subvert democracy, challenged the 2020 election result and whipped up a violent crowd to storm the Capitol,” Ross said.

“What more evidence do we need that the values of Europe are not shared in Washington?”

Is Europe preparing for a future without the US?

European countries have pledged to sharply increase their defence budgets with many aiming to spend 5 percent of their gross domestic products each year on their militaries.

Trump cannot withdraw the US from NATO without congressional approval, but doubts over Washington’s commitment have already unsettled many European capitals.

That has created new urgency around strengthening Europe’s own defence capabilities and building a more credible European pillar inside, or alongside, NATO.

Ross said Europe’s major powers should begin planning seriously for greater self-reliance.

“The Europeans themselves, particularly the most powerful countries – Britain, France, Germany and Italy – need to be talking about how to defend themselves without the US,” he said.

Fifty-nine years of membership, ended with a statement on a Tuesday and an effective date of Friday. The United Arab Emirates announced it will exit OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1, citing national interests, its evolving energy profile, and a long-term strategic vision that no longer aligns with the organization’s direction. The Energy Minister did not consult Saudi Arabia before making the announcement. He did not raise the issue with any other member country. He simply said the time had come. 

The timing tells the whole story. OPEC was preparing to meet in Vienna on Wednesday when the news landed. The Iran war had already wiped out 7.88 million barrels per day of OPEC’s production in March alone, resulting in the biggest supply collapse for the producers’ group in recent decades, surpassing even the 2020 Covid shock and the 1970s oil crisis. The UAE had been absorbing Iranian drone and missile attacks for weeks. The Strait of Hormuz, through which the UAE ships its own oil, has been functionally closed or severely restricted since early March. And sitting across the OPEC table was Iran, the country that had been targeting UAE infrastructure repeatedly, and Russia, which had been a steadfast partner to Iran throughout the conflict.

Walking out was not an impulsive decision. It was the logical conclusion of a calculation that had been building for years.

Why Abu Dhabi Was Already Done With OPEC 

The UAE’s frustration with OPEC production quotas is not new. The quotas have capped UAE output at around 3.2 million barrels per day, while the country has the ambition and the capacity to produce closer to 5 million barrels per day by 2027, suggesting production could almost double without OPEC’s constraints. For a country that has invested heavily in expanding ADNOC’s capacity and has the infrastructure to back it up, being told by a cartel committee how much it can produce has become an increasingly poor trade. 

The UAE’s sovereign wealth fund is so large that its economy is now more significantly tied to global economic growth than to the global price of oil. That shift in economic identity matters enormously for understanding why OPEC membership has become structurally uncomfortable. OPEC exists to keep oil prices elevated through production discipline. The UAE increasingly benefits from a growing global economy that demands more energy, more investment, and more trade, all of which are better served by producing at full capacity and building relationships with the countries that need what Abu Dhabi has to sell. 

An energy industry source familiar with the decision said the UAE felt it was “the right time to leave” and that “this decision is good for consumers and good for the world,” adding that the UAE would gradually increase production to supply global markets once freedom of navigation is restored in the Strait of Hormuz. The framing is deliberate. The UAE is not positioning itself as a cartel defector but as a responsible producer responding to a global energy emergency, which is a considerably more defensible diplomatic position. 

The Saudi Rupture Running Underneath It All

The official UAE statement was carefully worded, full of appreciation for “brothers and friends within the group” and “the highest respect for the Saudis for leading OPEC.” None of that diplomatic courtesy changes the underlying reality, which is that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been on a collision course for some time and the OPEC exit is the most visible expression of that tension yet.

The two countries had joined a coalition to fight the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, but that coalition broke down into open recriminations in late December when Saudi Arabia bombed what it described as a weapons shipment bound for UAE-backed Yemeni separatists. That incident was the visible rupture of a relationship that had been quietly fraying for years over economic competition, differing visions for regional leadership, and diverging approaches to normalization, China, and the post-war order. Within OPEC, the two countries have clashed repeatedly over quota allocations, with the UAE consistently arguing it deserves a larger share based on its expanded capacity. 

The OPEC exit does not resolve any of those tensions. It sidesteps them entirely, which is probably the more elegant solution. By leaving, the UAE removes itself from a framework where Saudi Arabia holds dominant influence and gains the freedom to pursue its own production and partnership strategy without needing Riyadh’s agreement. That is a significant shift in the regional power dynamic, and it happened without a single confrontational statement.

What Remains of OPEC Now 

The UAE’s exit could prompt other members to follow suit, with analysts pointing to Kazakhstan as another significant producer that wants to grow beyond its current quota constraints. “If there is a time to leave, now is the time,” one Dubai-based energy consultant told CNN. 

The cartel’s power has always rested on a specific mechanism: spare production capacity held back from the market to stabilize prices. That spare capacity is concentrated almost entirely in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with the other nine member countries possessing little to none. Removing the UAE from that equation means OPEC’s effective spare capacity narrows considerably, and the burden of price stabilization falls almost entirely on Riyadh and Kuwait City. Saudi Arabia will hold an even greater share of the cartel’s remaining leverage, but leverage over a smaller and weaker institution is not the same as leverage over a healthy one.

OPEC has lost members before, but the UAE is a much larger producer than previous departures, and its absence may over time pose an existential risk to the cartel’s sustainability. The organization that has shaped global energy politics since 1960 is now facing its most significant structural test, and it is doing so while simultaneously dealing with a historic supply shock from the Iran war, a closed strait, and a global economy pricing in the possibility that the disruption is not temporary. 

The Geopolitical Implications

Freed from production quotas, the UAE’s most immediate strategic move is likely to deepen its relationship with the countries that need its oil most urgently, and China sits at the top of that list. More production could help the UAE improve ties with oil-importing partners such as China, and given the economic damage caused by the Iran war, the prospect of maximizing energy revenues now is undoubtedly attractive to Abu Dhabi. 

The UAE-US relationship also stands to benefit. With the UAE free to leverage its spare capacity in pursuit of its own strategic interests, the move will likely strengthen the UAE-US relationship, particularly in relation to managing the strategic petroleum reserve and responding to the ongoing Hormuz supply shock. Trump has been publicly critical of OPEC for years, accusing the cartel of exploiting American military protection to keep prices artificially high. An OPEC that is smaller and weaker, with a major member now operating independently and aligned with US interests, is a more congenial arrangement from Washington’s perspective. 

For the global energy market, the picture is more complicated. Once the Strait reopens fully and UAE production ramps up without quota constraints, additional supply should exert downward pressure on prices that have been elevated since February. Whether that actually happens depends on a sequence of events, including a durable Iran settlement and the restoration of free navigation through Hormuz, that are still very much in progress.

Our Take: A Geopolitical Move Dressed as an Energy Decision 

The UAE’s OPEC exit is not primarily an energy story. It is a geopolitical statement about where Abu Dhabi sees itself in the emerging regional order, and the answer is: outside the frameworks that no longer serve its interests, and free to build the bilateral relationships that do. The exit from OPEC follows the same strategic logic as the Abraham Accords, the Huawei contracts, the US base agreement, and the China infrastructure ties. The UAE has been running a multi-alignment strategy for years, positioning itself as indispensable to every major power simultaneously, and OPEC membership was becoming a constraint on that strategy rather than an asset.

What happens to OPEC matters for energy markets in the short term. What the UAE’s departure signals about the fracturing of Gulf institutional solidarity matters considerably more for the regional order that everyone in the Middle East is trying to rebuild in the aftermath of a war that nobody fully planned for and nobody has yet fully ended.

The deeper story is what the UAE’s exit reveals about the post-war Middle East taking shape right now. The institutions that governed the region’s energy politics, security arrangements, and diplomatic alignments for decades were built in a different world, one where the Cold War defined choices, where oil producers had unified interests, and where the US sat at the center of every meaningful regional framework. That world is gone. What the Iran war accelerated, and what the UAE’s OPEC exit makes structurally visible, is that the Gulf’s most capable states are no longer willing to subordinate their individual strategic interests to collective frameworks that were designed for a regional order that no longer exists. 

Abu Dhabi did not leave OPEC because of a quota dispute. It left because it has decided that in the world emerging from this war, the countries that move fastest, align most flexibly, and free themselves from inherited institutional constraints are the ones that will define what comes next. Whether that calculation proves correct depends on what the Islamabad talks produce, how quickly the Strait reopens, and whether the ceasefire holds long enough for the region to build something more durable than a pause. But the signal Abu Dhabi sent on Tuesday was unmistakable, and every government in the region heard it.

Caracas, April 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government signed new energy agreements with energy conglomerates British Petroleum (BP) and Eni in separate ceremonies at Miraflores Presidential Palace.

On Wednesday, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop the Cocuina-Manakin field, an offshore natural gas project shared between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago.

“The return of BP [to Venezuela] is a ⁠clear sign of the future we want to chart for Venezuela and for ​international energy relations,” she said during a live broadcast. “May we have cooperation grounded in a win-win approach and ​shared benefits.”

BP was represented by its Trinidad and Tobago director David Campbell. The Cocuina-Manakin field holds an estimated 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas, split 34-66 between Caracas and Port of Spain.

Following Wednesday’s agreement, the London-based multinational will additionally explore opportunities in the 7.3 Tcf Loran field, which is also part of a cross-border reserve shared with Trinidad. Both Cocuina and Loran are part of Venezuela’s Deltana Platform, a largely unexplored gas deposit on the country’s eastern maritime border.

Venezuela had suspended all energy projects involving Trinidad and Tobago over its neighbor’s support for the US military escalation in the Caribbean. Following January 3, the acting Rodríguez administration reengaged with Port of Spain, while extending overtures to BP and Shell in an effort to reopen the projects.

The BP agreement came on the heels of another high-profile ceremony at Miraflores on Tuesday that saw Rodríguez extend a “special welcome” to Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi and other executives. In what she called a “milestone in the relations” between Venezuela and the Italian corporation, Rodríguez announced that Eni is planning “one of the largest investments” in the Venezuelan oil sector. 

The contract establishes conditions to relaunch the exploration of the 425 square-kilometer Junín-5 block of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The Junín-5 is estimated to contain 35 billion barrels of extra-heavy oil in place, though only a fraction will be recoverable.

For his part, Descalzi indicated that the signed deal created conditions to “accelerate development” of Junín-5 activities and that the company would finalize its investment plan by the end of the year.

The Junín-5 block was assigned in the late 2000s to Petrojunín, a joint venture where Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA and Eni held 60 and 40 percent of shares, respectively. Crude extraction began in 2013 but did not hit the established targets, hovering around 10,000 barrels per day (bpd) by the end of the 2010s.

The BP and Eni agreements were crafted under Venezuela’s recently overhauled Hydrocarbon Law, which introduces a series of pro-business incentives while curtailing state control over the energy sector.

Under the new law, minority partners can directly manage oilfield operations and sales, whereas in the prior framework that was PDVSA’s exclusive prerogative. Additionally, private companies can have royalties, income tax, and other fiscal contributions slashed at the government’s discretion as well as bring eventual disputes to international arbitration bodies.

In March, Eni, alongside Spain’s Repsol, inked a contract to further development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project. The European companies each own 50 percent stakes in the venture and recently announced plans to increase output by roughly 10 percent in the short term.

Eni, which has around 30 percent of its shares owned by the Italian state, is also a minority stakeholder in Petrosucre, a joint venture that operates the Corocoro offshore oilfield. In 2025, the ventures with Eni participation produced an average of 64,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day.

Alongside BP, Eni, and Repsol, Chevron and Shell have likewise struck new deals in recent weeks under the favorable conditions of the hydrocarbon reform. Chevron increased its stake in the Petroindependencia joint venture, while its Petropiar project with PDVSA was assigned a new drilling block in the Orinoco Belt. For its part, Shell will take over light and medium crude projects in Eastern Venezuela and several offshore natural gas initiatives. The company had also expressed interest in the Loran field.

The acting Rodríguez administration has actively courted foreign investment into the South American country’s energy and mining sectors, with leaders openly acknowledging the incorporation of “suggestions” and “recommendations” from Western conglomerates into the recent reform.

Alongside multiple delegations of corporate executives, Rodríguez has also hosted Trump officials, including Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, ahead of the recent hydrocarbon and mining reforms.

Last week, newly appointed US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett stated that Washington’s goal is to “place the private sector at the center of Venezuela’s transformation” during a meeting with the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VENAMCHAM).

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has issued multiple licenses to facilitate the return of Western conglomerates to the Venezuelan energy and mining sectors.

The licenses mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments be made into accounts run by the US Treasury. Caracas and Washington recently announced the hiring of external auditors to oversee the flow of the US-controlled Venezuelan resources.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Note: The report was amended on Wednesday night to incorporate the BP agreement.

Hundreds of Iranians have rallied in Tehran to demand an end to US threats and the ongoing blockade of Iranian ports. The blockade is causing Iran’s already devalued currency to sink further.

Over the course of a nearly two-month old war with Israel, Hezbollah has been increasing its use of fiber-optic controlled first-person view (FPV) drones against Israeli troops and vehicles, something we were among the first to note. Now, it appears that Israel is resorting to the use of anti-drone netting on its vehicles to help protect them from the one-way attack drones. These attacks are occurring even amid an ongoing, though extremely fragile, ceasefire.

A video emerged Wednesday on social media showing an Israeli vehicle festooned with the netting, draped like a soccer goal from metal arms extending out and above. The idea, as we have reported in the past, is that drones will get caught up in the nylon or mesh metal nets and become disabled, or the nets will help keep the drones far enough from the occupants before exploding to keep them from being killed. The latter is a far more limited scenario and depends on the vehicle type and the warhead on the drone. Based on the video we are seeing, the level of protection netting can provide passengers in the open-top Israeli vehicle if a trapped drone’s warhead were to detonate is likely very little.

The video began to circulate amid growing controversy in Israel over what is perceived as the IDF’s inability to counter the Hezbollah FPV drone threat. The frustration reached a new level over the weekend, after an Israeli soldier was killed and six were wounded by a Hezbollah drone. A followup attack was launched while the IDF was medevacing the wounded, narrowly missing the helicopter.

You can see the drone narrowly miss the helicopter in the following video. 

“The attack laid bare a growing vulnerability: the Israel Defense Forces’ lack of preparedness for first-person view (FPV) drones in Lebanon, which have been an increasingly prominent weapon in Hezbollah’s arsenal during the current fighting,” the Times of Israel reported on Monday. “The Israel Defense Forces has reported dozens of drone-related injuries in recent weeks, though most were minor. Sunday’s attack marked the first fatal FPV drone strike on Israeli forces.”

“Yet the emergence of fiber optic-guided drones should not have come as a surprise,” the paper highlighted. The reason is what we noted in our previous story about this issue. The militant Lebanese group has used FPV drones against Israel since 2024 and they have been widely used by both sides in the Ukraine war for several years, as well as in other conflicts zones around the globe.

These strikes have become more prevalent the deeper Israel went into southern Lebanon. Videos of these recent attacks have been showing up on social media.

Hezbollah conducted more fiber-optic FPV strikes on Israeli vehicles in Lebanon, including two ‘Merkava’ Mk.4 tanks, a D9 Caterpillar armored bulldozer, and what appears to be a rare ‘Namer’ heavy IFV equipped with a turret mounting a 30 mm Bushmaster Mk 2 cannon.
1/ https://t.co/ms2nagNHrD pic.twitter.com/WDs6M3SpwW

— Roy🇨🇦 (@GrandpaRoy2) April 5, 2026

Moreover, Israeli Merkava tanks began sporting metal additions on top of vehicles meant to deflect top-down attacks from drones during the conflict in Gaza two years ago, which you can read more about here. Some of those tanks that have come under attack recently have been observed with them as well. So Israel has been working to deal with the evolving FPV drone threat, on some level, for some time and it is not alone in struggling with it. Most militaries in the world face the possibility of this same vexing threat with no clear blanket countermeasure to deal with it.

Israeli military officials acknowledge that the IDF still lacks an effective counter to fiber-optic-guided drones, the Times of Israel noted, for reasons we have frequently reported. Fiber optic cables mitigate the effect of electronic warfare efforts to jam radio signals as well as some of the limitations imposed by geographical features that can impede the line-of-sight radio connection between drone and operator.

“The IDF initially assessed that Hezbollah’s fiber optic drones could only operate over a few kilometers,” the outlet stated. “Later, the military discovered launches occurring from distances of up to 15 kilometers (nine miles).”

“The gap was underscored on April 11, when the Defense Ministry’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development issued a public call for solutions to the threat — nearly two years after such systems first surfaced in Ukraine, and weeks into the current conflict with Hezbollah,” according to the Times of Israel. “The Defense Ministry is seeking additional capabilities to address this threat. The purpose of this request is to identify innovative and mature technologies.”

⚡️🇮🇱🇱🇧Times of Israel: Sunday’s Hezbollah drone attack in Taybeh, which killed Sgt. Idan Fooks and wounded six others, has exposed the IDF’s lack of preparedness for first‑person view (FPV) drones, particularly those guided by fibre‑optic cables which are immune to electronic…

— War Monitor (@monitor11616) April 28, 2026

It’s unclear how widespread the use of netting is currently by the IDF in southern Lebanon.

“The issue of drones carrying fiber-optic cables is currently a threat without a clear solution,” a high-ranking IDF official, who just returned from Lebanon, told us. “What’s been shown in the video seems more like an experimental concept rather than something that is already operational in the field.”

“In practice, forces are using various improvised solutions—fishing nets, camouflage nets, even soccer nets, along with drills involving small-arms fire at drones,” he added. “However, I personally haven’t seen the specific net system mentioned being used on the ground yet.”

The official said someone from the IDF’s ground forces research and development team told him that the conclusion in the military is that “this solution is highly problematic. It allows the lower parts of the vehicle to remain exposed, areas that the net doesn’t cover. The likely next step for the adversary would be to detonate the drone at a distance from the net, causing shrapnel to disperse toward the forces.”

In a post on X Tuesday, Israeli military journalist Doron Kadosh said the issue of how to deal with Hezbollah FPV drones “took up significant volume in [Monday]’s discussion at the IDF’s senior command forum at Ramat David. The commander of the 282nd Artillery Brigade, which is currently fighting in Lebanon, Col. G., told the commanders: ‘The drone threat is a significant operational challenge that we’re dealing with. We need to think about how to organize better against this threat.’”

IDF combat unit commanders fighting in Lebanon “now express great frustration with the drone threat and the few tools the IDF has to counter them,” Kadosh added. “‘There’s not much you can do about it,’ says a commander currently fighting in Lebanon. The briefing the forces receive boils down to— ‘Stay alert, and if you spot a drone—shoot at it.’”

Some IDF units “have already begun developing independent responses to the threat—for example, nets deployed over positions, houses, and windows—so that the drone gets caught in the net and doesn’t hit its target,” Kadosh continued. “This is an improvised response; we’ve started deploying it with some of the forces, but it’s far from sufficient,” an officer currently fighting in Lebanon told the reporter. This would follow exactly what we saw in Ukraine, as both sides looked to improvised forms of protection from incoming drones, leading to rapid experimentation and many dead ends.

הבוקר אצל @efitriger:

איום רחפני הנפץ שמאתגר את כוחות צה״ל בדרום לבנון בשורת התקפות יומיומיות של חזבאללה:

הסוגיה תפסה נפח משמעותי גם בדיון פורום הפיקוד הבכיר של צה״ל אתמול ברמת דוד. מפקד חטיבת התותחנים 282 שנלחמת כעת בלבנון, אל״ם ע׳, אמר למפקדים: ״איום הרחפנים הוא אתגר מבצעי… pic.twitter.com/jiSGrSEBGH

— דורון קדוש | Doron Kadosh (@Doron_Kadosh) April 28, 2026

Despite the limitations, this netting has become fairly common in Ukraine, with both sides using netting over vehicles, buildings and miles and miles of roadway to provide safer corridors of travel.

About anti-FPV road net tunnels:

“Thousands of kilometers of equipped anti-drone corridors block the main logistical routes all the way to the forward positions
The goal is to ensure security up to a depth of 100 km from the contact line.”
6/ https://t.co/Avipifv6Fr pic.twitter.com/ES7gq20lln

— Roy🇨🇦 (@GrandpaRoy2) April 29, 2026

As we noted in our last piece on the growing FPV threat to Israeli forces, active protection systems (APS) on armored vehicles are being adapted to provide hard-kill counter-drone protection. These systems use sensors to detect incoming rocket-propelled grenades, missiles, and other projectiles, and fire projectiles to hit them before they strike the vehicle. Israel is a major pioneer in the APS space, with systems being deployed for decades, but just how soon it can upgrade existing systems, such as Iron Fist, for this application isn’t clear. Also, this doesn’t help many lighter vehicles that do not have APS capabilities. Still, it is one bright spot of hope of creating a defense against fiber optic FPVs, at least for lower volume attacks, although these are also very costly systems.

Iron Fist APS | Active Protection System for Armored Vehicles

Regardless, we are likely to see more Israeli vehicles equipped with nets and other forms of passive protection in the coming days, and likely more advanced countermeasures if the war grinds on for a prolonged period.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Chile’s military police force has cracked down on student protesters after hundreds demonstrated against the government’s proposals to limit access to free higher education. The proposal includes cutting a government scholarship programme and increasing student loans, as part of wider austerity measures.

Standoff in the Strait of Hormuz is pushing global oil prices above $120 per barrel, with average gas prices in the US hitting a four-year high.

US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Jay Clayton said in the statement: “As the indictment lays bare, the Sinaloa cartel, and other drug trafficking organisations like it, would not operate as freely or successfully without corrupt politicians and law enforcement officials on their payroll”.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney took office last year amid a flurry of aggressive actions by his country’s southern neighbour. A recently sworn-in United States president, Donald Trump, slapped tariffs on Canadian exports and threatened to make the US neighbour the 51st state.

The actions were particularly damning as Canada had deep trade and security ties with the US, not only sending nearly 80 percent of its exports to that market, but also often following lockstep on geopolitical policy and strategic moves.

All that was thrown aside when Trump took office, and Canada, under former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, was one of the first countries he slapped with tariffs.

After a year of dealing with a mercurial and unpredictable US president, experts applaud Carney as “standing strong and resolute”, not just in the face of Trump’s threats, but also against internal critics.

“The most notable aspect of the last year was both a bullet dodged and a savvy bit of statecraft to avoid a rush to do a deal on trade and invest with the US the way many other countries did,” said Brett House, a senior fellow at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy.

“Commitments from this president are absolutely worthless, and the biggest accomplishment of the first year has been standing strong and resolute in the face of internal critics,” House told Al Jazeera.

Indeed, Carney has used Trump’s attacks on allies and others to refocus Canada’s foreign policy and place in the world.

With the US no longer the anchor of a rules-based order, and with there now being a “deep rupture” caused by changes in Washington, “Carney has aimed to build at home and diversify abroad, as Ottawa’s dependence and long ties have now become a source of weakness,” said Vina Nadjibulla, the vice president of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

“And he’s doing this at a speed, scale and ambition that we haven’t seen in recent years” in Ottawa, Nadjibulla said.

‘Rupture’ in global order

Some of that stance was evident in January, when Carney, in a speech in Davos, said there was a “rupture” in the global rules-based order and that Middle Powers like Canada and others had to rise strategically to address geopolitical tensions.

But it was visible in his actions even before Davos, when he had reached out to countries that had historically been important trade partners but where relations had been frozen due to political tensions under his predecessor, Trudeau.

For instance, Carney invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the G7 meeting in Canada to initiate a reset of ties with New Delhi that had been in a deep freeze since Trudeau alleged in 2023 that India was involved in the killing of a Sikh separatist activist on Canadian soil.

Carney also recalibrated Canada’s relations with China, which had been tense since Canadian authorities arrested a key official of Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei as she was transitioning through the Vancouver international airport in December 2018. China retaliated against the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, which was carried out at the request of US authorities, by detaining two Canadians.

Carney has also deepened relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others, making sure to align on security and economic issues, and has drawn Canada closer to Europe, Nadjibulla pointed out.

Domestic push

In the lead-up to elections last year, Carney “positioned himself as a centrist, a moderate, and went to great lengths to distance himself from the image of Justin Trudeau,” said Sanjay Jeram, the chair of the political science department at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, Canada.

“He hasn’t shown much interest in discussing things outside the economy, international relations and trade, and even when asked, has avoided those questions and steered the conversation back to what he believes is his true purpose. Or that could be his political strategy, or a bit of both.”

Under that pragmatist persona, “Carney takes the world and the economy as it is, rather than what we hope it to be”, which allows him to be judged on pragmatist metrics, Jeram said, referring to criticisms that Carney is overlooking concerns related to political interference or human rights in his dealings with foreign partners.

“Canadians have bought that [stance] so far,” Jeram added.

Indeed, Carney’s approval ratings are up. According to a March Ipsos poll for Global News, 58 percent of Canadians approve of him, up 10 percent from a year before, while 33 percent do not.

While there has also been significant movement on paper to remove federal barriers to facilitate business and trade within the country, there have also been concerns about certain policy pushes. A major projects bill, for instance, is meant to fast-track big infrastructure projects, but critics are concerned that it undermines the importance of consultation, especially with the Indigenous communities whose land these projects could go through.

“Carney recognises we need more of infrastructure to be able to diversify trade,” the Asia Pacific Foundation’s Nadjibulla said.

As he settles into his second year, Carney’s main challenge will be to see if he can deliver on his first-year announcements.

One of his biggest challenges this year will be a successful conclusion of the review of the trade pact between the US, Canada and Mexico, known as the USMCA, which starts on July 1 and which has helped shield Canadian exports from US tariffs.

The “US has signalled that a successful review could hinge on Canada lining its external tariffs in line with US tariffs, but that’s at cross purposes with Canada’s efforts”, said the University of Toronto’s House, especially as Canada has lined up deals with China on electric cars and agriculture.

Nadjibulla added that “2026 will be harder, because it will be about implementation and delivery, especially against the US-Canada dynamics.”

After watching Manchester City slip to a 3-2 defeat by Brighton on Saturday, Arsenal fans started to believe they had a chance.

And Slegers’ team made sure to capitalise on the opportunity with seven unanswered goals against Leicester, improving their goal difference to 33 – six behind City.

Leah Williamson’s glancing header – the Gunners’ seventh against Leicester – also took their tally to 103 goals under Slegers. No WSL team has scored more since she was appointed – initially as interim boss – in October 2024.

“Clean sheet, seven goals scored, different scorers – it was a great night for us,” Slegers said to Sky Sports.

“You saw so many players playing the Arsenal way, we played attractive football and we were very brave in everything we did.”

What will also boost Arsenal’s belief is their squad’s strength in depth.

With the second leg of their Women’s Champions League semi-final against Lyon awaiting on Saturday, Slegers rested Williamson, Lotte Wubben-Moy, Mariona Caldentey, Caitlin Foord and Alessia Russo against the Foxes.

Their replacements did the job.

On her 100th WSL appearance, Maanum scored the opening goal and assisted two more, while Smilla Holmberg bagged her first two goals in an Arsenal shirt.

Stina Blackstenius has often had to play second fiddle to Russo, but the Swede, who scored the winning goal in last season’s Champions League final, showed her quality with two goals in the space of nine minutes.

“Everyone knows their role and brings their strengths. There are such high levels of communication and trust within the team, on the pitch, off the pitch,” Slegers added.

The U.S. Marine Corps is exploring the possibility of fielding a theater ballistic missile defense capability. A key driver in this discussion is the U.S. Army’s capacity to provide protection against ballistic threats in future conflicts, or lack thereof, something TWZ has highlighted repeatedly in the past. The latest conflict with Iran has underscored the serious threats that ballistic missiles pose even to high-end integrated air and missile defense networks, which would be magnified further in a fight against a near-peer adversary like China.

“We’re exploring theater ballistic missile defense. So we’re doing some studies, we’re running some simulations, to see if that’s a requirement for the service in the future,” Marine Lt. Col. Robert Barclay said during a panel discussion yesterday at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition, at which TWZ has been in attendance.

Barclay is currently the Marine Air Command and Control Systems (MACCS) Integration Branch Head within the Aviation Combat Element Division of the service’s Combat Development and Integration office. His portfolio includes service-wide air and missile defense requirements.

“We know our old sensor used to be able to do it, but it wasn’t really a requirement,” Barclay added. “What we need to determine is, is [defending against] a theater ballistic [missile] like an SRBM [short-range ballistic missile] or MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile], a requirement for the Marine Corps to do? I would argue that it probably is.”

“At the end of the day, I don’t think the Army’s going to have enough capacity with us where we’re operating to actually adjudicate on that threat,” he continued. “So, I think we need to take a hard look at that, and that’s what our intent [is] to do over the next year.”

To take a step back quickly, the Marine Corps’ main general-purpose ground-based anti-air weapon today is the Stinger short-range heat-seeking surface-to-air missile. The service currently fields Stinger in a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) configuration using shoulder-fired launchers, as well as integrated on the Humvee-based Avenger air defense vehicles. Stinger offers a point defense capability against fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, drones, and certain types of cruise missiles.

The Marines also hope to reach initial operational capability this year with a new Medium-Range Intercept Capability (MRIC), which is a service-specific variation of the Israeli Iron Dome system. MRIC uses a U.S.-made version of Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptor, called SkyHunter, and a trailer-based road-mobile launcher. Each launcher can accommodate up to 20 interceptors, which come preloaded in individual canisters, at a time. The system uses offboard sensors to spot and track targets and cue missiles to intercept them. The Corps’ existing AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radars (G/ATOR) have been presented as the primary sensor for MRIC.

“The primary target set for MRIC is cruise missiles and your higher-end Group 5-type of [anti-]air application, as well as rotary wing, fixed-wing type of aspects,” Marine Col. Andrew Konicki, the service’s Program Manager for Ground Based Air Defense and another panelist at Modern Day Marine yesterday, explained. MRIC “can go after Group 3, because it’s probably a mismatch in terms of ammunition versus what it’s going after. So it’s primarily focused on that growing threat, or that higher-end threat, so to speak, as part of that integrated air missile defense application and layer defense piece.”

Groups 3 and 5 here refer to different categories of uncrewed aerial systems. The U.S. military defines Group 5 as consisting of drones with maximum weights greater than 1,320 pounds, and that can fly above 18,000 feet. The MQ-9 Reaper is a commonly used example of a Group 5 uncrewed aircraft. Drones that fall under Group 3 have maximum weights anywhere between 56 and 1,320 pounds, can operate at altitudes between 3,500 and 18,000 feet, and reach top speeds of up to 250 knots. Group 3 is very broad, but notably includes Iran’s now-infamous Shahed 136 long-range kamikaze drone, and the growing number of variants and derivatives thereof.

Lt. Col. Robert Barclay’s mention of an unspecified previous Marine ballistic missile defense capability seems most likely to be a reference to the HAWK medium-range surface-to-air missile system. The service retired HAWK in the 1990s, but versions of the system remain in use elsewhere worldwide, including in Ukraine. HAWK has used an evolving mixture of radars for target acquisition and engagement since the system was first introduced in the 1950s, as you can read more about here. Improved HAWK interceptors have also been developed, including variants explicitly intended to offer a rudimentary anti-ballistic missile capability.

The video below shows HAWK systems in service in Ukraine.

Американський ЗРК HAWK (Яструб) захищає небо України!

Barclay did not elaborate on what level of ballistic missile defense capability the Marine Corps might look to pursue in the future. In the past year or so, there have been reports of Israel using Iron Dome against incoming Iranian ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. However, the system’s effectiveness against ballistic missiles of any kind, which it was never designed to intercept, and whether the Marines might be able to employ MRIC in this role, is unclear.

Today, the main tool for providing ground-based theater ballistic missile defense across all of America’s armed forces is the Army’s Patriot surface-to-air missile systems. The Army also operates the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which offers a higher-end ballistic missile defense capability over Patriot. Both Patriot and THAAD are only capable of intercepting incoming ballistic threats during their final terminal phase.

The PATRIOT Missile in Action

At the same time, as TWZ has highlighted several times in recent years, the Army’s Patriot force is heavily strained due to constant demands that it is simply not adequately resourced to meet. The THAAD force is even smaller and is in equally heavy demand.

The latest conflict with Iran has reignited discussions about the Army’s worryingly limited capacity to meet operational needs for ballistic missile defense, as well as protection against other aerial threats. Between February and April, Iranian forces launched repeated missile and drone attacks on key bases across the Middle East. They were successful in many instances in targeting high-value military assets, including aircraft parked on the ground and air and missile defense radars.

The general in charge of keeping the United States Marine Corps sustained in a fight dismisses the notion that China poses a near-peer threat to the U.S. It’s far more serious and will make the currently paused conflict with Iran pale by comparison should the two superpowers come to blows, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Sklenka, the USMC Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics. 

“There is no threat that looms larger than the People’s Republic of China,” Sklenka said during the 2026 Modern Day Marine Expo in Washington, D.C.. “Don’t listen to this garbage about them being a near peer. They’re a peer because they rival us in nearly every single measure of national influence.”

As the “lead strategist” and former Deputy Commander of U.S. IndoPacom, Sklenka said he “got to be pretty familiar with how General Secretary Xi was thinking and what his intentions are.”

The Chinese leader’s “vision is to upend the international structure [and] supplant us as the global leaders. And in many ways, it’s been Xi’s thinking, his vision, that has helped my own thinking about the demands of modern warfare, particularly when waged in the Pacific and particularly waged against a peer adversary, something that’s new to all of us.”

Epic Fury offers some sobering lessons, Sklenka noted. While the U.S. is able to pour forces into theater via uncontested skies and largely uncontested seas, Iran was still able to inflict a great deal of pain on America and its allies during the fighting. It still is economically through an ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A fight with China would be far worse, Sklenka cautioned.

“We’re about two months into combat operations with Epic Fury. We’ve got service members who have tragically been wounded and killed by Iran. They’ve launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles at our bases and our allies throughout the region – Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan – reinforcing the point that the bases that we have, they’re no longer administrative garrison sanctuaries. We really need to start looking at our bases as war fighting formations, just as critical of a war fighting formation as our divisions, wings and [Marine Expeditionary Units] MEUs.”

We’ll talk more about that later in this story.

You can see damage to U.S. bases in the Middle East in the following satellite images.

Iran has “illustrated how a mid-tier power can hold a significantly superior force at risk” Sklenka suggested. “As a learning organization, we ask ourselves, ‘how do we carry every lesson from this fight forward, and how do we ensure that we’re equally prepared to dominate the conflict with China?’”

“Think about the complexities and complications that we’re [facing] with Iran, and then ask yourself, ‘how are we going to respond and act when we’re going up against a nation that’s number two in national GDP?’” he added. “The fact is that Iran doesn’t have anywhere near China’s economic might. They don’t have their industrial base. They certainly don’t have their military modernization trajectory.”

“Over the last 10 to 15 years, the Chinese manufacturing base has been out-producing us” Sklenka posited. “Xi is on a wartime footing. There’s no doubt about that. It’s underpinned by an industrial base that’s out producing the world in ships and steel, precious minerals and satellites, munitions.”

China’s “shipbuilding capacity is reported to be 230 times the capacity that the United States has,” the general continued. “They more than doubled their nuclear powered submarine construction, their arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles is undergoing a rapid expansion.”

First made-in-China aircraft carrier, the Shandong, enters service

“Their nuclear stockpile is the fastest growing in the world. They’re pursuing innovative, intelligentized warfare tactics,” Sklenka pointed out. “They’re using artificial intelligence, drone swarms, exploring the cognitive and innovative domains to achieve their dominance. They’re building a military design to dominate the Pacific, and I believe ultimately beyond the Pacific.”

China’s intent, Sklenka added, “is clear. They want to regain that self-identified moniker of the Middle Kingdom, and they want to resume what they believe is their rightful place in the world. They’re not interested in sharing that position with us or with anybody else. General Secretary Xi’s view is that it’s their time, and this is the context. I bring that all up for our transformation.”

“None of us in uniform today have ever had to operate in a world where a legitimate peer simultaneously contests us in every single domain,” said Sklenka. “We are talking terrestrially and non-terrestrially, kinetically and non-kinetically. We’re going to have to fight to get to that fight, and we’re going to have to embrace these challenges and not operate under the auspices of how we did in the 80s and 90s. History is proven, and our current operations are confirmed, that the society that can project and sustain power and sustain their forces most effectively, ultimately, they prevail.”

Looking to the future, Sklenka echoed warnings that TWZ has made for years about the vulnerability of U.S. military installations, both home and abroad. No increases in magazine depth, additional weapons systems or advancements with AI and other new technologies will ultimately matter “if you can’t get off the installation in the first place,” he stated. “The ability to mobilize and deploy is underpinned by the readiness of our installations. It’s a concept that we’re just now really starting to wrestle with.”

“Our bases, posts and stations…are the front lines of decisive terrain. And I’m not just talking about those in the first island chain. This isn’t just [Marine Corps Installations Pacific] MCIPAC. Our CONUS installations are subject to non-kinetic attacks. Non kinetic-attacks, they’re going to be just as debilitating and just as strategically consequential as any kinetic attack that’s going to be out there. And they’re going to carry an air of non-attrition that’s designed to both confuse decision makers and sow chaos during the most critical phases of the fight, the beginning, the first shots of that next war.”

That first salvo, Sklenka said, is most likely not going to be delivered by a missile or bomber.

“They’re likely not going to be fired in the South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait,” he explained. “They’re going to be a cyber attack against a power grid on our base, a disinformation campaign targeting military families or a drone swarm coming off one of our installations.”

The localized drone attack concern is exactly what TWZ has long predicted and became a reality last year in Russia and Iran. Last June, Ukraine launched Operation Spider Web, an audacious near-field attack on Russian air bases, destroying a large number of strategic bombers with remotely operated drones set up in trucks placed near those installations.

Spider Web was followed about two weeks later by an operation Israel carried out, using drones pre-positioned inside Iran to attack the Islamic Republic’s air defenses.

You can see video of one attack during Operation Spider Web below.

Shortly before 22:00 BST on 7 May, Lavryovych sent Pochynok a message on Telegram saying: “Look, we won’t talk much on the phone. At that address, there’ll be a car, need to check if it’s there. If it is there then basically today we’ll do the job. We’ll have money. And this week, if we plan everything well today, tomorrow there may be another one, we’ll make more money.”

Caracas, April 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government signed new energy agreements with Italian conglomerate Eni in a ceremony at Miraflores Presidential Palace on Tuesday.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez extended a “special welcome” to Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi and other executives, who were joined by Oil Minister Paula Henao and state oil company PDVSA President Héctor Obregón.

“We are witnessing a very important moment, a milestone in the relations between Eni and Venezuela,” Rodríguez affirmed, adding that Eni is planning “one of the largest investments” in the Venezuelan oil sector. 

The contract establishes conditions to relaunch the exploration of the 425 square-kilometer Junín-5 block of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The Junín-5 is estimated to contain 35 billion barrels of extra-heavy oil in place, though only a fraction will be recoverable.

For his part, Descalzi described the top-level ceremony as a “great honor.” He indicated that the signed deal created conditions to “accelerate development” of Junín-5 activities and that the company would finalize its investment plan by the end of the year.

The Junín-5 block was assigned in the late 2000s to Petrojunín, a joint venture where PDVSA and Eni held 60 and 40 percent of shares, respectively. Crude extraction began in 2013 but did not hit the established targets, hovering around 10,000 barrels per day (bpd) by the end of the 2010s.

The revamped agreement was crafted under Venezuela’s recently overhauled Hydrocarbon Law, which introduces a series of pro-business incentives while curtailing state control over the energy sector.

Under the new law, minority partners can directly manage oilfield operations and sales, whereas in the prior framework that was PDVSA’s exclusive prerogative. Additionally, private companies can have royalties, income tax, and other fiscal contributions slashed at the government’s discretion as well as bring eventual disputes to international arbitration bodies.

In March, Eni, alongside Spain’s Repsol, inked a contract to further development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project. The European companies each own 50 percent stakes in the venture and recently announced plans to increase output by roughly 10 percent in the short term.

Eni, which has around 30 percent of its shares owned by the Italian state, is also a minority stakeholder in Petrosucre, a joint venture that operates the Corocoro offshore oilfield. In 2025, the ventures with Eni participation produced an average of 64,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day.

Alongside Eni and Repsol, Chevron and Shell have likewise struck new deals in recent weeks under the favorable conditions of the hydrocarbon reform. Chevron increased its stake in the Petroindependencia joint venture, while its Petropiar project with PDVSA was assigned a new drilling block in the Orinoco Belt. For its part, Shell will take over light and medium crude projects in Eastern Venezuela and several offshore natural gas initiatives.

The acting Rodríguez administration has actively courted foreign investment into the South American country’s energy and mining sectors, with leaders openly acknowledging the incorporation of “suggestions” and “recommendations” from Western conglomerates into the recent reform.

Alongside multiple delegations of corporate executives, Rodríguez has also hosted Trump officials, including Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, ahead of the recent hydrocarbon and mining reforms.

Last week, newly appointed US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett stated that Washington’s goal is to “place the private sector at the center of Venezuela’s transformation” during a meeting with the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VENAMCHAM).

On Monday, Barrett was a keynote speaker at a Venezuelan Oil Chamber (CPV) event and hailed US “innovative investment” as the key to “turn Venezuela into a global energy hub.”

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has issued multiple licenses to facilitate the return of Western conglomerates to the Venezuelan energy and mining sectors.

The licenses mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments be made into accounts run by the US Treasury. Caracas and Washington recently announced the hiring of external auditors to oversee the flow of the US-controlled Venezuelan resources.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

The decades-old football book craze will comprise 980 unique stickers, including 68 ‘special’ ones in a 112-page ​album.

For generations of ‌football fans, no World Cup would be complete without the thrill of opening ⁠a packet of ⁠Panini stickers and discovering Zico, Franz Beckenbauer, Diego Maradona or Lionel Messi staring back.

Since Italian company Panini’s first sticker collection at the 1970 World Cup ⁠in Mexico, trying, and usually failing, to complete the set has been an obsession for young fans around the globe, with playground swapping mandatory.

This year’s World Cup in ⁠the United States, Canada and Mexico will present the biggest challenge yet, though, and will require a considerable amount of pocket money.

With 48 nations heading for the tournament in June and July – the largest edition ever – 980 unique stickers, including 68 “special” ones, will be required to ‌fill the 112-page album that will be available from Thursday.

Individual packets of seven stickers retail at 1.25 pounds ($1.69) in the United Kingdom, meaning that even with impossibly perfect luck and no duplicates, 140 packets would be required, costing 175 pounds.

Statistically, however, more than 1,000 packets may be required to acquire every player in the album, meaning an outlay in the region of 1,000 pounds ($1,351).

Panini’s biggest-ever collection was launched at a ⁠special event at Wembley Stadium on Tuesday, with former England players ⁠David James, John Barnes and Gary Cahill reliving their sticker-hunting days.

“As someone who grew up collecting Panini stickers, swapping with friends in the playground and trying to complete the album every tournament, the album has always ⁠marked the real start of a World Cup for me!” former Chelsea defender Cahill said.

“Seeing myself in the collection during my ⁠playing days was a surreal and proud moment, and ⁠a reminder of how these stickers become part of the story of every World Cup.”

Panini say they will be hosting a live “swap shop” in May around the UK, giving collectors the chance to find their must-have players while a “Sticker ‌Box” will travel up and down the country, giving away sticker packets and albums.

When the dust has settled on the World Cup, it might also be prudent to store ‌duplicates ‌in the loft as there is a burgeoning market in vintage stickers.

In 2021, a 1979 Panini sticker of Maradona, then aged 19, sold for 470,000 pounds (about $556,000 at the time) at auction.

The United States Marine Corps on Tuesday gave us our first glimpse of its evolving plan for its ground forces to succeed in the battlefield of the future. Dubbed Ground Combat Element 2040 (GCE 2040), it calls for ensuring that Marines are not just equipped with the latest technology, but that they know how to use it, all while maintaining readiness as they integrate these new systems into their formations. While all the final details remain in flux, we are getting a general idea of some of the elements the plan will include.

A working concept of the plan was presented for the first time today during a panel at the Modern Day Marine Expo held in Washington, D.C. It builds on the vision of former Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger’s Marine Force Design 2030 initiative, according to one of the current Corps leaders working to implement GCE 2040.

“This is really an opportunity for us to describe the future of the ground combat element in the United States Marine Corps,” explained Maj. Gen. Jason Morris, the Corps’ Director of Operations, Compliance, Policies and Operations. We want to “make sure that we have a clear vision of the capabilities required to field the most lethal, survivable ground combat element in the world, and make sure that we’ve got a pathway over the next three fiscal year defense programs that we are keeping our eye on the horizon, staying adaptable and incorporating new technologies into our Marine divisions and those subordinate elements that are a part of it.”

In addition, the Marines are “also continuing to refine the force design vision, to make sure that we are ready to go for any crisis, contingency or conflict in the future,” Morris added.

To better explain the GCE 2040 concept, Morris played a video laying out some of what it entails.  The video, which has not been yet been shared online, and a document that will be published in coming weeks, focuses on how the Marine Corps approaches human-centric warfare of the future.

“GCE 2040 is about equipping the Marine, not the machine,” the video stated. “While looking ahead to integrate robotic and autonomous systems into our formations and operationalizing AI at the tactical edge through concepts like Project Dynamis [an integrated battle management system being developed by the Marines], the Marine Corps will enable combat formations to sense, make sense and act with greater speed and precision than any adversary.”

Under GCE 2040, Marines will “integrate advanced sensors and intelligence networks to find and fix the enemy across all domains” while “conducting expeditionary maneuver in contested spaces and sustaining a resilient force through all phases of the operation,” the video stated. In addition, Marines will employ “joint forceful fires and achieve the effects of mass while mitigating vulnerabilities striking adversary targets from land, air and sea,” and establish “persistent, survivable [command and control] networks that enable decision making at machine speed from the strategic level down to the squad.”

The objective “is to generate the tempo of decision and action that allows us to shape, seize and hold key maritime terrain, deter aggression and prevail decisively in any future conflict,” the video explained.

This broadly fits with the U.S. military’s push to create ever larger and faster kill webs, in order to break the enemy’s decision cycle.  

When we asked for more details, the Marines told us that the plan includes addressing the need for ground-based air defense down to the squad level. 

“The proliferation of inexpensive one-way attack drones is the most significant tactical threat we face,” the Marines told us. “While systems like the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) and Medium-Range Intercept Capability [MRIC] are critical for a layered defense at echelon we must continue to thicken the protective layer that cover Marines at all echelons.”

You can read more about the Marines’ emerging doctrine for devolving air defense down to the individual Marine in our story here.

In a broader context, including air defense and offensive capabilities, the Marines told us “We must increase investment in multi-domain lethality and targeting systems that enable the right weapon to engage the right target at the right time to maximize the efficient use of lethal means against the enemy… The modern battlefield demands that we develop and field dispersed, AI-enabled targeting systems to create a network of sensors across the entire GCE.” 

The plan also involves evolving how Marines view technology. Autonomous systems and AI are a central focus of the new plan. The Marines state that these are not just tools, but are members of the team and the Marines are being trained to consciously accept risk with hardware rather than troops. 

Both AI and large quantities of autonomous systems will be critical to enabling future kill webs as discussed above. The USMC also says interoperability, both with other U.S. military branches and allies will be more critical than ever to achieving its aims going forward.

“The fact is that the Marine Corps is focused on the human being, individual, sailor, how we recruit and develop them, and how we build them into lethal combat teams,” proffered Maj Gen. Farrell J Sullivan, Commanding General of the Second Marine Division. “That has always been the case, and that will always be the case in the Marine Corps going forward, but modernization matters, and although we’re doing well, we have a long way to go, and as long as I’m in command of Second Marine Division, I will not be satisfied with where we are”

The GCE 2040 concept, he added, draws on lessons learned from modern combat that has evolved over the past decade into one where unmanned systems – like large drones such as Shahed-136s and smaller, first-person view (FPV) types – have become a major threat in Ukraine, the Middle East and many other places around the world.

The following image shows a U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry AWACS destroyed in a combined Iranian missile and drone barrage during the now-paused war.

The following video shows an Iranian-backed militia using FPV drones to strike a Black Hawk helicopter and a critical air defense radar at an American base in Iraq.

The new plan envisions future combat particularly in the Pacific, where Marines would likely have to fight inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone and across wide swaths of ocean. In such a battle, they would face standoff weapons and non-kinetic effects like advanced electronic warfare far more damaging and disrupting than what U.S. forces have faced in the fight against Iran. A Pacific conflict would also strain logistics as like never before.

“When you envision the type of fight we’re preparing for, where we face a peer or near peer adversary in a high-end fight, where all domains are contested, and in some the adversary will have an advantage, that’s not the battlefield we have fought on, at least not since I’ve been in the Marine Corps,” Sullivan stated. “And we see, if you look back over the last 10 or so years, how that manifests itself in places like Ukraine. Again, I don’t want to have a bias towards that conflict and say that all the future will look exactly like that, because it won’t, but we would be criminal not to be paying attention to that.”

Clearly the USMC is painting in very broad strokes at this time as there is still a lot more work to do to hammer out the details of GCE 2040.  The Marines say they will provide more details in the next few weeks and we continue to cover this issue as they become available.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

The African island nation also expels French embassy personnel over acts linked to the destabilisation investigation.

Madagascar has detained a French serviceman over an alleged plot to destabilise the island and also declared an agent at the French embassy persona non grata over acts linked to the destabilisation investigation.

Deputy Prosecutor Nomenarinera Mihamintsoa Ramanantsoa said in a video statement released late on ⁠Tuesday that the former French national serviceman, Guy Baret, had been placed ⁠in pretrial detention at Tsiafahy maximum-security prison.

A Malagasy army officer, Colonel Patrick Rakotomamonjy, and other alleged accomplices were also implicated, he said.

According to Ramanantsoa, prosecutors have charged the suspects with spreading false information to disturb public order, plotting to sabotage infrastructure including power lines and ⁠thermal plants operated by state utility Jirama, harbouring wanted individuals, and criminal conspiracy. Authorities said the group had planned actions initially set for April 18.

Rakotomamonjy is awaiting ‌presentation ‌before an investigating judge. Two other suspects were placed under judicial supervision, with prosecutors saying they did not appear to be the masterminds of the conspiracy

Madagascar is a former French colony that retains close political links to France and has had a history of instability in recent decades.

The country’s military ruler, President Michael Randrianirina, seized power in October last year, after a wave of youth-led protests against his ‌predecessor, Andry Rajoelina.

France helped Rajoelina flee in October as protests over lack of water and energy escalated and ultimately forced him from power.

France said Wednesday that it had summoned the charge d’affaires of the Madagascan embassy in Paris “to vigorously protest” the expulsion of the diplomatic official.

“He was informed that France categorically rejected any accusation of destabilising the Refoundation regime of the Republic of Madagascar,” French Foreign Ministry spokesman Pascal Confavreux said, adding that the official had been summoned on Tuesday.

“Such accusations are not only unfounded, but also incomprehensible.”

The Madagascar Foreign Ministry said French Ambassador Arnaud Guillois had been summoned and informed ‌of the decision over the embassy agent. It did not identify the agent or specify the acts in question.

Tehran, Iran – Iran’s national currency has plunged to new lows as authorities mobilise to dampen the impact of the naval blockade enforced by the United States.

The Iranian rial shot above 1.81 million to the US dollar on the open market by early afternoon on Wednesday before partially recovering. The embattled currency changed hands for about 1.54 million earlier this week, and its rate was about 811,000 per US dollar a year ago.

The rial had remained relatively stable over the past two months after experiencing an earlier drop as US forces amassed in the lead-up to the US-Israeli war on Iran, which began at the end of February.

The latest freefall follows on from unchecked inflation, which has been increasingly plaguing the Iranian economy as a result of mismanagement and sanctions, and continues to ravage households. Washington now has three aircraft carriers in the region and is bringing in more troops and equipment as Israel expresses readiness to restart fighting, three weeks after a ceasefire began.

Iran’s authorities this week projected a hardened stance on negotiations with Washington, and pledged to fight the naval blockade of Iran’s southern waters, which the US Central Command insisted on Tuesday had “cut off economic trade going into and coming out of” the country.

Amid threats by US President Donald Trump, the Iranian government has also tried to empower its own border provinces to import essential goods by reducing red tape. It has also allocated $1bn from the sovereign wealth fund to buy food, and made a partial policy U-turn to restart offering a preferential subsidised exchange rate with the goal of reducing prices, despite concerns about corruption.

Non-oil trade takes hit

According to customs data released by state media, Iran’s non-oil trade has been negatively affected after commercial ties were disrupted or cut off as a result of the war, and critical infrastructure was bombed.

Iran’s customs authority put the total value of non-oil trade in the Iranian calendar year that ended on March 20 at close to $110bn, with $58bn going to imports. The figure was about 16 percent lower than the year before.

The volume of non-oil trade was valued at approximately $9bn for the 11th month of the calendar year ending on February 19, and $6.46bn in the final month, indicating a drop of about 29 percent in connection with the war, which started on February 28. The final month was also about 50 percent lower than the more than $13bn estimated value for last year’s corresponding month.

Part of the drop is linked with the fact that shipping has been significantly disrupted through the Strait of Hormuz as Iran and the US spar over control of the strategic waterway. The US and Israel also directed some of their thousands of strikes against ports, naval facilities, airports, and railway networks across the country.

Iran’s top steel and petrochemical producers were also extensively bombed, as were oil and gas facilities, power stations, and major industrial zones. The US and Israel have threatened to take Iran “back to the Stone Age” through systematic bombing of civilian infrastructure like power plants.

To manage the impact and preserve domestic supply, Iranian authorities have imposed temporary restrictions on exports of steel, petrochemicals, polymers and other chemicals.

Oil exports in the crosshairs

The US is using its military capabilities and economic chokeholds to drive down Iran’s oil exports, a goal that it has also pursued over recent years through sanctions.

Since mid-April, the US military has been deploying its soldiers to take over or inspect ships transiting through waterways near Iran, in addition to targeting what is known as a shadow fleet of tankers used by Iran to circumvent sanctions and ship its oil.

Warships and thousands of troops could still launch a ground invasion or destructive aerial attacks against Iran’s Kharg and other critical islands, and the Trump administration expects increased pressure on Iran’s oil sector due to hampered access to export routes and supertankers keeping the oil stored on the water.

The US Treasury has been blacklisting refineries in China, the biggest buyers of Iranian crude oil, and going after the banking and cryptocurrency channels alleged to be facilitating Tehran’s oil trade, and having links to the IRGC – which Washington considers a “terrorist” organisation.

“We will follow the money that Tehran is desperately attempting to move outside of the country and target all financial lifelines tied to the regime,” said US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on social media.

Chinese refineries buy roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil shipments, and imported a record 1.8 million barrels per day ⁠in March, according to Vortexa Analytics data cited by the Reuters news agency, which also said purchases were expected to slow due to worsening domestic refining and processing margins.

According to figures released by the General Administration of Customs of China, the volume of the country’s bilateral trade with Iran during the first quarter of 2026 stood at $1.55bn, down 50 percent year-on-year.

In March, the first month of the war, trade stood at $184m, which was nearly 80 percent lower than the year before and 64 percent lower than the month before. China’s imports from Iran and exports to the country were both considerably reduced as a result of the war.

The removal of the United Arab Emirates as a major trade partner and import market for Iran has also significantly affected the country’s economy, increasing its reliance on land neighbours like Turkiye and Iraq to the west and Pakistan to the east.

The UAE, a big part of the Trump-led Abraham Accords that saw multiple countries normalise relations with Israel, was heavily targeted by ballistic missiles and drones launched by Iran.

The UAE has closed down numerous Iranian institutions on its soil over the past two months, including financial facilitators, instructed Iranian citizens to leave, and has said it will take years to restore bilateral relations to previous levels.