News Analysis

Gulf countries have stepped up diplomacy with Iran in a bid to de-escalate tensions across the Middle East, amid fears of renewed US strikes on Tehran and intensifying hostilities between Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

The three nations that signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement in August – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye – and diplomats from Qatar met with high-ranking Iranian officials on Monday in an effort to prevent the resumption of all-out war.

Underscoring the high stakes, the meeting in Tehran was attended by Saudi Minister of Defence Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, just days after Iran-aligned Houthi fighters struck Saudi airports, ports and oil facilities.

Meanwhile, during a diplomatic visit to the United Kingdom’s University of Cambridge on Monday, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi called for a regional security framework, including a “non-aggression pact”, between the Gulf countries and Iran under which the United States would no longer be the primary provider of security.

While Gulf countries appear determined to avoid another round of conflict – which has already restricted passage through the Strait of Hormuz, disrupted global oil and gas supplies and wreaked havoc on energy facilities and infrastructure in Gulf states – questions remain over whether a regional agreement is possible and where it would leave relations between the US and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Regional security or de-escalation?

On Friday, US President Donald Trump repeated warnings that Washington may carry out another military operation against Iran as rising fuel prices weigh on the US midterm elections scheduled for November 3. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said Iran would respond more forcefully to any renewed US military action, stoking fears of an even wider escalation.

While this week’s talks in Tehran mark the first high-level ‌contact between Iran and the Mecca mutual defence pact nations since the US-Israel war on Iran began on February 28, reports suggest they have stopped short of landing an agreement.

Reuters reported that Qatari mediators ⁠presented ⁠Iran with a draft deal on Sunday, which Tehran was expected to respond to by the end of the week. On Wednesday, the news agency quoted Iranian officials as saying Qatar had put ‌forward ideas that were unacceptable and that Tehran would ⁠show ⁠no flexibility regarding the nuclear ‌issue.

Khaled Batarfi, a Saudi political analyst and academic, said the visit to Tehran indicated that Saudi Arabia was willing to give Iran a “last warning” and “submit to the region’s concerns”, but that Iran has so far refused.

“The gap is [wide] and what makes it worse is that there is no trust,” Batarfi told Al Jazeera.

Observers say diverging views are unlikely to turn the current diplomatic efforts into a lasting infrastructure. “It’s really hard to see a regional security framework coming out in the coming months or even years,” Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, an associate fellow at Chatham House in London, told Al Jazeera.

“What we are seeing is more small groups, flexible groups of countries that are taking the lead in trying to reach either bilateral or multilateral solutions,” the analyst said. “A regional security framework would need the same vision for the region, which is not necessarily shared… among the GCC countries themselves.”

Challenges ahead

Hamidreza Azizi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye share concerns that a prolonged confrontation between Iran and the US could further destabilise the region.

“The main obstacle remains the fundamental disagreement between Tehran and Washington over the sequence of commitments,” Azizi told Al Jazeera. “The US wants Iranian concessions, particularly on the nuclear issue, while Tehran insists that its conditions for ending the war must be met first.”

“Regional mediation could help bridge this gap, possibly through an interim arrangement, but the willingness of regional actors to facilitate an agreement does not necessarily mean that the two principal parties are prepared to make the necessary compromises,” he added.

As for a new security order, Azizi said regional countries do not share a common understanding of what it should look like and what role the US – which has so far been the GCC’s main security partner – would have left to play.

Iran has long advocated for a regional security architecture that would reduce or eliminate the US military presence. “Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, however, remain deeply integrated into the US security system, and there is little indication that they intend to abandon it,” Azizi said.

“The recent war has certainly raised questions about the reliability of American security guarantees, but this has encouraged these countries to diversify their security partnerships rather than fundamentally redefine their strategic alignments.”

Gaza City — Mohammed al-Jamal, 60, tries to secure the nylon sheets of his family’s worn-out tent as a storm approaches his displacement camp on a beach in western Gaza City.

He and his sons pull at the tarpaulin, trying to fasten it firmly to the ground for protection from rain and wind coming in from the sea.

This will be the fourth winter that displaced Palestinians in Gaza have faced without adequate shelter. Many still live in tents and makeshift structures that offer little protection against the impending winter weather when temperatures can drop to 7C (below 45F) but can feel much colder due to strong coastal winds and rain.

The family cannot afford to fix their damaged tent with a replacement tarpaulin costing between 120 and 150 shekels ($37-$47) in local markets.

All al-Jamal can do is patch up the damaged shelter and hope it holds through the coming storm.

“We are trying to prepare as much as we can to protect ourselves from the water and the wind,” he said. “We follow the weather reports, and whenever there is a warning of a storm, we start preparing. But once the storm comes, everything gets torn apart, and we have to start all over again. It is continuous suffering throughout the winter.”

Mass displacement

Al-Jamal, originally from Gaza City’s Shujayea neighbourhood, has been displaced several times since Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza began in October 2023.

About 30 members of his extended family live in these difficult living conditions.

“We are just trying to adapt to what we have. This is what is available to us. We need everything,” he said.

When it rains, water enters the tent and floods their living space, risking damage to their meagre belongings.

When temperatures drop, tents offer little protection for the displaced, with al-Jamal and his family having no choice but to put on more layers of clothing.

“We are out in the open. We are living in the street, not in houses that protect us,” he said.

Al-Jamal said he had repeatedly heard promises that shelter materials and caravans would be allowed into Gaza, but none had arrived for his family, and he had not seen any of them enter.

He described these announcements as “false promises and lies” that had left displaced families waiting for help that never came.

“Our demand is to have our lives back the way they were before,” he said.

Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza has killed more than 74,500 Palestinians and destroyed or damaged more than 80 percent of buildings. With homes and infrastructure in Gaza destroyed, about 1.5 million of Gaza’s 2.3 million people are living in tents or makeshift shelters.

Many of the displaced have been forced to move from city to city when Israeli assaults begin on their homes or camps.

At least 294,250 families in Gaza need winter shelter assistance, according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), but with current supplies, only 52,000 families, roughly 18 percent of those in need, have access to partial humanitarian assistance.

More than 65 percent of displaced households were living in tents or makeshift shelters, according to a Shelter Cluster survey, with more than half of those shelters in poor or very poor condition.

Israel’s siege on Gaza has also affected supplies reaching the enclave, with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) saying on October 5 that at least 500 truckloads of shelter materials were awaiting entry or procurement.

At the current pace, NRC said, it could take more than seven months for those supplies to enter Gaza. The materials include tents, tarpaulins, ropes and other items needed to repair shelters.

Winter around the corner

For families already living in torn tents, the shortage leaves few options beyond repeatedly repairing the same shelters.

Khitam Salman, 39, originally from Beit Lahiya in northern Gaza, has been displaced multiple times over the past two years.

Now living near the beach, she is trying to prepare for winter with tents that have already suffered repeated damage.

“Every time there is a storm, we put up the tarpaulins and tie them down, only to have to do it all over again,” she said. “With every low-pressure system, it is the same.”

Khitam said one of the family’s tents had collapsed four times while they were sleeping inside and was torn, allowing sand to enter and offering little protection from rain and wind.

She is trying to cover the family’s tents and the space where they store their belongings, but the costs are beyond their means.

“We need a tarpaulin for this tent, another for the other one, and one for the room where we keep our belongings,” she said. “But we don’t have the means. We have done what we can.”

Her husband works in the health sector, but she said he receives his salary only once every three months, and it is not enough to cover the family’s needs.

“The tents are not suitable for living in any more,” she said. “They are torn, and sand gets inside. It is exhausting.”

Last winter, after their tent collapsed and their belongings were soaked, Salman said she became so overwhelmed that she walked away and sat by the sea for hours.

“I was so frustrated,” she recalled. “The tent had fallen, everything was flooded, and all our belongings were wet.”

“I’m worried about this winter … that the whole nightmare will repeat itself all over again.”

Damaged roads, drainage and sewage systems also increase the risk that rainwater will mix with wastewater and swamp the camps.

Husni Muhanna, spokesperson for Gaza Municipality, said more than 85 percent of the city’s infrastructure had been damaged and its rainwater drainage system was operating at about 20 percent of its previous capacity.

Rubble, damaged drainage networks and shortages of heavy machinery, fuel and maintenance materials are hampering preparations for winter, Muhanna said.

The municipality has begun emergency cleaning and maintenance work, but its efforts remain constrained by a lack of resources.

Flood risks beyond tents

Yosra Mesleh, 45, was displaced from her home in Gaza City’s Nassr neighbourhood when her home was destroyed and is preparing for her second winter living in a tent.

Preparing for winter means thinking about what to do when water enters their tents and soaks bedding and belongings. When this happens, they often have nowhere dry to sit, cook or eat.

“When it rained last winter, the water came inside and reached the bedding. Everything got wet,” she said. “It was difficult to find somewhere to sit while we waited for everything to dry.”

In summer, the heat and humidity inside the tent were unbearable, she said, with water shortages compounding their dire living situation.

“The place where we are living is not healthy or safe. It is not suitable for summer or winter,” she said.

Her husband has been out of work since the beginning of the war, while her son is struggling to cover his own expenses.

“We need tents and tarpaulins. We need cooking utensils and a proper place to prepare food. We also need a regular supply of gas,” she said.

Without cooking gas, she worries about how the family will prepare meals when rain keeps them inside.

She remembers life before the war, when life was hard but they had an apartment and her husband ran a tea and coffee shop. They have since lost their home and their only source of income.

“We are not asking for towers or anything extravagant,” she said. “We are asking for tarpaulins and tents, for a dignified life.”

As Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva celebrated his election victory on Sunday in Sao Paulo, he placed his hand on the head of a man standing beside him and beaming in a green and yellow Brazilian football jersey.

Lula thanked him for his role in the campaign, calling him “our general”.

Andre Janones, a 42-year-old Brazilian congressman who had spent the final weeks of the presidential run-off building a mass online movement to get Lula re-elected, then embraced the president.

“He played an exponential role in this campaign in lifting the morale of our troops every day, morning, noon and night,” Lula told thousands of supporters who packed Paulista Avenue, the city’s main artery.

Just three weeks earlier, the president seemed to be in trouble. He had finished behind his right-wing rival Flavio Bolsonaro after the first round of voting, his campaign struggling to keep up with the right’s powerful social media operation.

Janones, who had also helped coordinate Lula’s digital operation in his run-off against Jair Bolsonaro in 2022, was convinced Lula’s campaign needed a change – and that he could help turn things around.

He posted a video declaring, “We are going to win this election. Lula will be re-elected president of Brazil.”

His plan centred on a WhatsApp channel he had launched months earlier.

Called Exercito do Lula, or “Lula’s Army”, it had about 60,000 followers after the first round.

By election day, Lula’s Army had grown to almost 11 million subscribers, with Janones widely credited with helping Lula stage his comeback.

How Andre Janones built Lula’s WhatsApp army

Janones is a lawyer and congressman who grew up in a working-class family in Minas Gerais. He made a name for himself through his social media commentary during Brazil’s 2018 truckers’ strike and was elected to Congress that year.

In 2022, he dropped his own presidential bid to endorse Lula, joining his run-off campaign.

“At the time, he became widely known for employing tactics similar to those used by Bolsonarism, despite operating on the left,” said Viktor Chagas, a professor at Fluminense Federal University who studies digital politics and online campaigning.

Janones coined the term “cultural Janonism” to describe his approach, which relied on urgent messages, memes and calls for supporters to take action, as well as what Chagas described as the occasional use of negative campaigning and “content of questionable origin”.

But the scale of Lula’s Army in 2026 was unprecedented, Chagas said.

In the video declaring that Lula would win, Janones urged supporters to enlist as “soldiers” by posting saluting emojis and joining his WhatsApp channel, where he assigned them what he called “missions”.

The tasks were simple, from recruiting three friends to sharing campaign videos to promoting hashtags.

They came in a relentless stream of messages from Janones himself, often written in capital letters. Supporters couldn’t reply, but they could forward the messages or react with emojis, often doing so in the tens of thousands.

Chagas described the strategy as a form of “electoral gamification”, with Janones setting targets for supporters to reach together.

For Andre Pagliarini, an assistant professor of history and international studies at Louisiana State University and the author of a book on Lula, the appeal of Janones’s approach was giving people something they could actually do to help Lula win.

“It became an organising platform that grew exponentially because it spoke to a desire that many Lula supporters evidently had to do something tangible to defeat Flavio Bolsonaro,” he said.

How Lula’s campaign changed its message

But the path to victory wasn’t just about mobilising supporters online.

Pagliarini credited the campaign for also finding a more effective way to tell the story of the president’s working-class past.

“The campaign’s mistake in the first round was to present this history as a finished monument, worthy of admiration but distant from the lives of the people it was meant to represent,” he wrote.

After Bolsonaro mocked the president for having nine fingers during the final televised debate, for example, Lula responded by recalling how he lost a finger at 17 while working a night shift at a factory. He then linked his experience to workers injured as a result of employers’ negligence.

“Unlike Flavio, he reminded voters, he knew the world of work because he had lived in it,” said Pagliarini.

After the debate, Janones spread the message online, promoting the hashtag #SomosTodos9Dedos, or “We Are All Nine Fingers”. Supporters shared the slogan, with some posting photographs of their own amputated fingers in solidarity.

Janones had also publicly called for simpler, less polished campaign videos that showed a more relatable side of Lula, drinking coffee, visiting people’s homes and talking to ordinary Brazilians. Around the same time, the campaign started posting more informal, selfie-style videos.

“Lula was looser in his political communication, less mediated,” Pagliarini said.

Did Lula’s WhatsApp army help him win?

It is difficult to establish whether Janones’s digital army actually delivered votes.

“I am not sure there is a way to empirically connect the group to the outcome,” Pagliarini said.

But he believes Janones helped turn the campaign around.

“Janones himself became a kind of character in the campaign, a cheerleading strategist who seemed confident in a plan that had been missing throughout much of the race,” wrote Pagliarini.

Chagas agreed that it was “difficult to imagine the outcome we achieved without Lula’s Army”, adding that the channel brought together left-wing supporters who had previously been scattered across fragmented online communities, and gave them a way to work together.

The challenge now is keeping that momentum going, Chagas said, pointing to the far right’s use of “permanent campaigning”, maintaining the engagement of supporters between elections.

On election night, at least, Janones kept his soldiers busy.

“EVERYONE TO PAULISTA TO CELEBRATE,” he wrote, urging them to gather on Sao Paulo’s Paulista Avenue. “NOW.”

Later, he asked them not to go to sleep, adding that he’d let them go once he got back from the celebrations.

“Then we’ll discuss a few days off for you,” he joked in a message that drew more than 225,000 reactions.

When Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva scored his surprise election victory on Sunday, winning an unprecedented fourth term in office, his supporters were euphoric.

The joy they felt over Lula’s victory has echoed across large parts of the Global South – and could restore some hope to the grouping that has sought to give emerging countries a greater stake on the world stage, the BRICS alliance.

At a time when United States President Donald Trump is seeking to reassert US power and has cast BRICS as a threat to US interests, Lula’s victory in Brazil offers the alliance a measure of political reassurance, experts say.

A win by his rival, Flavio Bolsonaro, could have threatened Brazil’s commitment to the bloc, given his links to Trump and calls to reconsider the country’s role in BRICS.

Instead, Lula’s return gives the grouping one fewer reason to fear a retreat from within – as it continues to help forge a more multipolar future for a world dominated by the US.

As Esmat Zaidan, professor of public policy at Qatar’s Hamad Bin Khalifa University, told Al Jazeera, “The victory of Lula is important to BRICS’ political continuation in the current climate as it seeks to increase the bloc’s role and make it stronger in global governance.”

A spared fracture

It was clear to analysts that Lula’s win would safeguard the continuation of the BRICS alliance, while under Bolsonaro, its future may have floundered.

Lula himself was one of the architects of the bloc when it was founded nearly two decades ago, and has sought to advance its role on the global stage.

According to Zaidan, Bolsonaro’s desire to reconsider Brazil’s participation in BRICS and instead pursue closer alignment with Washington would have weakened the bloc’s political cohesion and potentially slowed cooperation on trade and financial reform.

Bolsonaro had reportedly also promised the US Trade Representative that Brazil’s Pix instant payment system would stay out of non-Western payment schemes, as the US seeks to safeguard global dominance of the dollar, said Imran Khalid, a geostrategic analyst and senior fellow at Foreign Policy in Focus.

“BRICS makes decisions by consensus, so one unwilling founding member can slow everything down from the inside. That was the real risk, more than Brazil walking out,” Khalid told Al Jazeera.

Still, Zaidan cautioned that continuity of the alliance does not amount to total unity within.

“The member countries of BRICS have distinctly different economic interests and geopolitical goals,” he said. “Therefore, while Lula’s victory makes it easier for the BRICS bloc to continue working towards a common agenda, his election did not eliminate these distinct differences.”

Guy Burton, a geopolitical and policy analyst, agreed that the bloc’s differences will remain unchanged with Brazil’s election result.

“BRICS matters because it represents a large share of the world’s population, economy and trade. But it has never really acted as a political unit. Its members are too different,” he said.

“The bloc now includes Iran and the UAE, which sit on opposite sides of the current war. That tells you how limited its cohesion is,” Burton added.

More multipolarity, but not a counterweight to Washington

The apparent relief in the Global South to Lula’s win reflects a broader concern among many emerging economies about their exposure to decisions made in Washington, “particularly regarding trade, tariffs and international economic relations,” said Zaidan.

“For these countries, the issue is not necessarily opposition to the US. It is about having greater room to make independent decisions and avoiding excessive dependence on any single global power,” he said.

Khalid pointed to China and Russia’s support for Lula, with Xi Jinping backing him against outside interference, and the Kremlin praising his work for the BRICS alliance.

“Most of these countries do not want a fight with the United States; they want the freedom to say no to Washington without being punished for it,” he explained.

“A strong Brazil inside BRICS helps protect that freedom.”

Lula has long advocated for a more multipolar international system, in which emerging economies have a stronger voice when it comes to shaping international rules and institutions, added Zaidan.

Burton said even countries and regions beyond the Global South are looking to lessen their reliance on  Washington, including Europe, which is building its own security against Russia and in support of Ukraine.

“So states, whether in the Western camp or not, have accepted that they must pursue their own interests. That means working with whoever they can. We are moving into a genuinely multipolar world,” he said.

Still, BRICS’ diversity and its member states’ varied interests have meant it has never been a coherent counterweight to the West, experts said.

Many in the alliance maintain strong economic and security relationships with the US, said Zaidan.

“I would see Lula’s victory as strengthening the case for strategic autonomy rather than confrontation with Washington,” said the professor.

“BRICS is potentially more effective when it expands the choices available to its members, rather than defining itself simply through opposition to the United States.”

Burton agreed, pointing to Brazil’s changing ties with Trump over the years.

“Russia and China are the obvious US rivals. But India under Modi long had a close relationship with Washington, and with Trump in particular, even if that has weakened recently,” he said.

“Brazil, too, was close to Trump under Jair Bolsonaro, Flavio Bolsonaro’s father, when he was in office.”

Challenging dollar dependence

Among the BRICS’ many ambitions is to promote trade in local currencies rather than the US dollar – and Lula’s victory could provide the political foundation to build on these efforts, said Zaidan, given that Brazil is one of the largest trading economies in the bloc.

Khalid said that after the alliance scrapped the idea of a common BRICS currency at its most recent summit in New Delhi in September, its ambition for trade in local currencies has become far more viable.

“If the [BRICS’ New Development Bank] moves towards its goal of 30 percent of lending in member currencies, and Brazil and China settle more trade in reais and yuan as they agreed in 2023, reliance on the dollar falls step by step, without an open confrontation,” he explained.

But Zaidan said that political will alone is not enough.

“Countries also need reliable payment infrastructure, sufficient currency liquidity, appropriate financial regulations, and businesses willing to use these arrangements,” he said.

For now the dollar reigns supreme in foreign exchange transactions, and there may be no tipping point for another decade or so, Burton said.

Ultimately, though, Lula’s victory could help BRICS move from political discussions towards more practical financial cooperation, while reducing dollar dependence will be “gradual, uneven and driven as much by economic feasibility as by geopolitical ambition”, said Zaidan.

How Washington reacts to this is another variable; Trump’s government sits at the contradiction of wanting to remain the world’s superpower, while also retreating to a more protectionist America-first role, said Burton.

“Developments such as Lula’s re-election will only sharpen the pressures already building in the Global North,” said the expert.

Almost 45 percent of Israelis had cast a ballot by mid-afternoon, but questions have been raised about possible voter suppression in Arab towns.

Almost 45 percent of Israeli voters had cast a ballot by mid-afternoon on Tuesday, according to Israel’s Central Elections Committee, marking the highest election turnout by 2pm (12:00 GMT) in 50 years.

The figure was 6 percent higher than at the same time in the last elections in 2022.

Mitchell Barak, a pollster and former aide to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, told Al Jazeera that voter turnout “is really high and that’s good”.

“I think … it will probably pass its historic peak in ‘73 – when Israel was also involved in a huge war – so draw what conclusion from that you will,” he added.

The election is largely seen as a referendum on Netanyahu’s handling of the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks and the wars that followed, the most intense period of combat for Israel since the 1973 surprise military campaign by Egypt and Syria.

“Those numbers are going to help the incumbent parties,” Barak said, “as the 3.25 percent threshold a party needs to get into the Knesset remains, the number of votes you need to meet that threshold increases dramatically.”

Israeli officials noted that several polling stations had faced exceptionally long lines, which were attributed to high voter turnout despite rainy and blustery weather in parts of the country, and a flood warning in some areas.

Arab vote

In a message more than five hours after polls opened, Netanyahu urged supporters to vote, saying turnout was high among his opponents on the left and among Palestinian citizens of Israel, about a fifth of the population.

“We need it to be high too. You all need to stream to the polls,” he said. “This is a fateful moment.”

Netanyahu had repeatedly warned supporters of the prospect of high turnout among Palestinian citizens in Israel ahead of the vote, seeking to mobilise his base under the slogan “the right or Palestine”.

Those voters were casting ballots in “unprecedented” numbers, Palestinian candidate Ahmed Tibi said.

Netanyahu and his main rival Gadi Eisenkot have ruled out partnering with Arab parties, citing a lack of shared values, although some possible scenarios envision them propping up a minority government to ensure Netanyahu is removed from office.

Meanwhile, an Israeli rights group has filed a complaint with the country’s election commission warning that widespread delays could be suppressing the vote among Israeli Palestinians.

Though delays could be a result of high voter turnout, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) said in its complaint to the Central Elections Committee that delays had been reported in at least 18 communities. It asked the committee to investigate “whether these delays are deliberate.”

The ACRI also reported “a large presence” of police and National Guard officers at a polling station in the Negev Desert, raising concerns that officers were using crowd control as a pretext to prevent people from entering to vote.

Developments in the Gulf since the beginning of this year have raised fundamental questions about the security of the region in general and Qatar in particular. How can Qatar and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states become effective, independent military powers that do not rely on external security guarantees to ensure their safety?

The question for Qatar is how it can build, over the next five years, a national defence capability that would enable it to protect the state and its vital interests even in the absence of Gulf or regional support, or if the United States provides only limited assistance. The aim is to explore whether Qatar can achieve what might be described as defence autonomy, rather than isolation. In other words, Qatar should remain open to alliances and partnerships without making its security dependent on the decisions of another state.

Qatar is a small country in terms of geography and population, but it enjoys numerous advantages. It has highly valuable critical infrastructure, a sensitive geographical location and an economy that depends heavily on the uninterrupted flow of energy exports, trade and shipping to almost every part of the world. At the same time, it possesses substantial financial resources, extensive international relationships, a major military base hosting US forces, advanced air defence capabilities and a network of political relationships that give it influence beyond its physical size.

These advantages, however, do not amount to “strategic autonomy”. In a major crisis such as the one the region has been experiencing for several months, Qatar’s protection remains heavily dependent on the US. Nor does reliance on the collective capabilities of the GCC provide sufficient assurance that its member states would be able, or willing, to take risks in defence of another member.

Against this backdrop, Qatar’s policy objective over the next five years should be to design and build an independent national strategy based on the capacity to prevent threats, withstand attacks and maintain continuity. The goal should be to achieve defence autonomy, rather than to build an army capable of confronting a major regional power on its own.

Such a strategy would rest on six pillars:

• Air and missile defence
• Early warning capabilities and information sovereignty
• Protection of critical infrastructure
• Air and naval power
• Cybersecurity and electronic warfare
• Restructuring security and military policy around the principle of multiple security guarantees rather than dependence on a single guarantor

Defence autonomy

Qatar does not need to exhaust its resources building the capabilities required to fight an all-out war alone against a major regional power, regardless of which power that might be. Such an ambition would be unrealistic for a country with limited territory and population.

A more realistic objective is to achieve a degree of defence autonomy appropriate for a small state such as Qatar. This means being able to perform a number of essential tasks without waiting for assistance from others.

These include, but are not limited to:

• Detecting threats and identifying their nature before they reach Qatari territory
• Delaying or absorbing an initial strike
• Protecting the country’s leadership and strategic centres
• Maintaining energy and water supplies, electricity, communications, ports and airports
• Keeping political and economic activities functioning during a crisis
• Imposing sufficiently high costs on an aggressor to force it to reconsider its calculations
• Withstanding a prolonged crisis without making the state’s continued functioning conditional on the arrival of external forces

To carry out these tasks effectively, the strategy should focus on the following priorities:

First: Building an integrated Qatari air defence shield

This is the most important gap that needs to be addressed. Possessing advanced fighter aircraft and air defence systems is not enough to make Qatar militarily autonomous. What is needed is an integrated national air and missile defence system.

The objective by 2031 should not be to possess the best defence system, but one that continues to function even in the absence of US forces or any other external security guarantor.

Such a system should include:

• A multilayered Qatari radar network
• Integration of civilian and military radar systems
• A unified national command and control centre
• Integration of short, medium and long-range air defences
• Expanded counter-drone capabilities
• Stronger electronic warfare capabilities and equipment
• Low-cost interception systems for small targets
• Enhanced mobile protection for radar installations and command centres
• Large national stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts

Second: An air force designed for independence

Qatar currently possesses an advanced air fleet. But the independence of an air force cannot be measured by the number of aircraft it operates. The crucial question is whether the Qatari air force can sustain operations for several consecutive weeks if external supply lines are disrupted.

For the answer to be yes, Qatar must develop the capacity to continue air operations even without direct US or other foreign support, albeit at a reduced level.

This requires policymakers and those responsible for developing the national defence strategy to focus on the following priorities over the next five years:

• Increasing ammunition stockpiles, whether through domestic production or imports
• Expanding domestic defence manufacturing capabilities and strengthening maintenance capacity
• Training more Qatari personnel to carry out a range of functions, including maintenance
• Building up dispersed ammunition stockpiles rather than concentrating them in a single location
• Increasing stocks of drones and other unmanned aircraft
• Developing ground and aerial refuelling capabilities and strengthening logistical support

Third: The sea as a second line of defence

For Qatar, a peninsula surrounded by water on three sides, protecting its maritime domain is not merely a military concern. It is also an economic necessity of the highest importance.

Liquefied natural gas, oil exports and imports all depend on the security of the surrounding waters. Qatar should therefore develop a naval force suited to its needs, equipped with advanced technology and capabilities.

The objective is not to build a large fleet, but to make attacks on Qatar’s maritime infrastructure both difficult and costly.

This requires a focus on several important priorities:

• Continuously improving and expanding maritime surveillance capabilities to protect Qatar’s waters and offshore installations
• Strengthening and developing capabilities to counter maritime drones
• Enhancing the protection of ports and securing shipping routes

Fourth: A national resilience programme

The most serious vulnerability of a country with limited territory and population lies in its infrastructure. A successful attack on a small number of critical facilities could have severe and far-reaching consequences for the entire country.

Given the importance of this threat, the national defence strategy should include the establishment of what might be called a “national resilience and protection programme”.

Such a programme would aim to protect critical infrastructure, including gas and energy facilities, water desalination plants, power stations, telecommunications centres and towers, civilian and military airports, ports and fuel networks, hospitals, government institutions and data centres.

One aspect of this protection is ensuring that every sector has adequate backup capacity. If a major desalination plant were to stop operating for any reason, for example, an alternative source of supply should be available to prevent a water supply problem from escalating into a national crisis. The same principle should apply to every other sector.

Fifth: Qatar must know what is happening around it before the US does

Military independence begins with information. Qatar therefore needs to develop its own national capabilities in the following areas:

• Space-based reconnaissance
• Unmanned aerial vehicles
• Radar systems
• Electronic intelligence
• Artificial intelligence-driven data analysis

This does not mean that Qatar needs to launch large satellites for every mission. Instead, it should work towards building an integrated system combining commercial and military satellites, international partnerships and national capabilities for collecting and analysing data.

The underlying principle is that Qatar should not depend on an external party to inform it of a threat approaching its territory.

Qatar will undoubtedly continue to need intelligence from the US, France, the United Kingdom and other countries. Nevertheless, it must possess the independent capacity to produce its own national intelligence picture, assess the nature of threats and determine how to prepare for them at an early stage, before requesting assistance from allies or partners.

Sixth: Diversifying security guarantees

The events of this year have demonstrated to all GCC states the importance of diversifying their alliances and security guarantees rather than relying on a single external power, particularly the US.

That power could become involved in future international crises, decide for one reason or another to limit its direct involvement in regional crises, or even reduce its military presence.

This makes it necessary to adopt a forward-looking approach based on diversifying alliances and making the security of the Gulf a matter of global interest requiring international cooperation.

In this context, GCC states could benefit from partnerships with South Korea, Turkiye and certain European powers, as well as regional powers such as Pakistan and China in specific fields, without hastily abandoning cooperation with the US.

The objective is to reduce the risks associated with dependence on a single supplier or ally. Such diversification does not mean building an alliance against the US.

Achieving defence and political autonomy for Qatar by 2031 does not mean isolating the country from its partners or dispensing with existing alliances. Rather, it means developing national capabilities that can ensure the protection of the state and its vital interests under all circumstances.

This strategic objective requires the development of an integrated air defence system, stronger intelligence and cyber capabilities, and better protection of critical infrastructure. It also requires improving the effectiveness of Qatar’s air and naval forces to ensure resilience and allow state institutions to continue functioning during a crisis.

Defence autonomy also requires diversifying international partnerships and establishing multiple security guarantees to reduce dependence on any single external power.

The foundation of this strategy is a transition from dependence on external protection towards the ability to deter threats, withstand crises and make independent national decisions at the appropriate time, while remaining open to international cooperation and partnerships.

A version of this piece in Arabic was originally published by Al Jazeera Arabic here.

As the threat of a new war with the United States looms, the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, a hardline political faction also known as the Paydari Front, has asked the Iranian parliament and the Supreme National Security Council to initiate a withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This move has been interpreted as a call for Iran to develop nuclear weapons, with the Paydari Front saying these military endeavours should happen “as quickly as possible”.

It is the latest bold and defiant message by Iran’s hardliners against Washington, after the US and Israel launched a war on Iran on February 28 on the pretext that Tehran was trying to develop nuclear weapons.

The war has seen the Strait of Hormuz largely closed to shipping, massive damage to Iranian and Arab infrastructure in missile and air strikes, and huge disruptions to global energy supplies.

The past eight months have also marked an ongoing existential power struggle between moderates and centrists, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, who generally favour talks with the US, and hardliners in the Paydari Front who do not.

Ultimately, the moderate camp wants a swift end to the conflict to save Iran’s crumbling economy. Hardliners believe Washington only understands the language of force, so the war should continue until the US capitulates to Iran’s demands.

The domestic rivalry can be seen in the public squares of major Iranian cities, where for the past 200 days supporters of the hardline faction have rallied at night.

Initially, these gatherings were a way for people to express public support for the government and protest the unprovoked US war on Iran. Over time, they have evolved into highly organised political rallies where activists can publicly express their strong opposition to moderates’ efforts to end the war through diplomatic channels.

The hardliners’ slogans include “No compromise, no surrender – the fight against America” and “Negotiating with the enemy is a betrayal of the homeland”.

They also protested against President Pezeshkian’s return to Tehran from the UN General Assembly in September, where he condemned the US war but also extolled the virtues of diplomacy. The pickets were viewed as a way for their “anti-negotiation” message to be heard by the president.

This bloc has considerable power beyond these activist circles. Hardliners have a strong presence in Tehran’s municipal government, the parliament, among religious preachers and eulogists, and academia and the media.

Amirhossein Sabeti, a member of parliament aligned with the Paydari Front, said in a statement that negotiations with the US will not begin unless Washington’s siege on Iran’s southern ports or sanctions end.

“The enemy’s objective of destroying Iran has not changed. It is simply waiting for the right moment to launch another surprise attack. Those who thought negotiations could prevent war, or that the United States would lift sanctions through negotiations, did not understand how the world works and were deluding themselves,” he said. “The only language the world understands is the language of power.”

The political faction to which Sabeti belongs has filed a motion in the Iranian parliament to impeach Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, following his visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly. Iran’s parliament is also considering a law to criminalise interviews with foreign media outlets, which would be another win for hardliners.

But as the impeachment motion against Iran’s foreign minister moves through parliament, the political camp supporting the government continues to advocate for a diplomatic solution to the current conflict.

Davood Heshmati, a journalist considered close to Pezeshkian, said there are signs that US forces have foregone the grand ambition of overthrowing the Iranian government and have instead opted for more modest aims, which makes a diplomatic solution more likely.

“There are several ways to achieve those other goals, one of which is war. But, in any case, to prevent a war, all alternatives to military action must first be tested. Negotiations and a diplomatic agreement are among those alternatives, and they should always take precedence over war,” Heshmati told Al Jazeera.

“Those who say the Strait of Hormuz must not be reopened are people who believe the war must not end. From the perspective of Iran’s anti-negotiation camp, the war between Iran and the United States has no end. What they do not explain is what outcome they expect from this war. They seem to believe that, after several rounds of fighting, the United States will simply walk away from the conflict. But that idea does not appear to be consistent with the logic of what we are witnessing.”

He indicated that for any war to end, there needs to be an understanding with the US that respects Iran’s territorial integrity.

“Those in Iran who support negotiations argue that a balance of power does not necessarily have to be achieved through war, although, given everything that has happened along the diplomatic path, the distrust that exists is understandable,” he said.

Political analyst Negar Mortazavi argues that hardline groups are a powerful domestic force, but they currently have limited influence over Iran’s foreign policy.

“Iran’s hardliners are not a marginal political force. They are a well-organised and deeply entrenched part of [Iran’s] political establishment. Their strength lies in their ability to mobilise supporters, shape political discourse, pressure the government, and raise the political cost of diplomacy,” she said.

“But political influence should not be confused with ultimate decision-making authority. Decisions about war, peace, and negotiations are made at the highest levels of Iran’s leadership and national security establishment.”

Hardliners can continue to confront negotiators, threaten impeachments against those who propose talks with the US, and try to obstruct diplomatic endeavours, she said. But they cannot prevent an agreement being reached if it is backed by the country’s main powerholders, including Supreme Leader Mujtaba Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council.

“The [hardliners] are powerful enough to complicate diplomacy, but not necessarily powerful enough to stop it. [They] are a highly visible and vocal political force, but they are not calling the shots,” Mortazavi told Al Jazeera.

“Throughout the war, Tehran has kept the door open to diplomacy, and the decision at the highest levels of leadership has been to pursue negotiations with the United States and seek an agreement. The hardliners have been unable to stop that. The real test of their power is that they could not stop the JCPOA [nuclear agreement] under [former President Barack] Obama, and they could not stop the more recent MoU [memorandum of understanding] with Trump. Ultimately, the decisions were made above their heads.”

Street rallies and television programmes opposing a peaceful solution to the US-Israeli war against Iran will continue. But the delay in scheduling the foreign minister’s impeachment hearing, alongside continued diplomatic engagement with mediators to end the war, suggests that the moderates are still a force to be reckoned with.

Tehran, Iran – Ministers and senior security officials from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye – the three nations that signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement – are in Tehran to discuss regional security issues amid threats of new US strikes on Iran.

Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, Pakistani military chief Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin met Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and will discuss tensions with security chief Mohsen Rezaei.

The meetings are among the highest-profile dialogues held in Tehran in recent months. While there is still little information on what might be discussed, the meetings come amid a flurry of diplomatic activity to deal with a new escalation between the United States and Iran.

But analysts broadly believe the visit to Tehran by the three signatories of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, a regional defence alliance, will be enough to prevent a new outbreak in violence between the US and Iran.

“The Mecca pact’s 11th-hour visit to Tehran is an attempt to tip the balance in favour of those willing to compromise before the guns start blazing again,” said Ali Vaez, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at the International Crisis Group.

“But unless they arrive with a credible formula to bridge the US-Iran divide, they may find themselves with little more than goodwill in a race against the clock.”

The talks are expected to address the waves of missile and drone attacks carried out by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who are allied with Tehran, on Saudi Arabia, which supports Yemen’s internationally recognised government.

“I believe that parties to the Mecca agreement lack options of military engagement with the Houthis, but Riyadh is certainly asserting greater pressure for more, and its expectation of its partners has grown in parallel with the offensive from Yemen,” Ayesha Siddiqa, a senior research fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

But despite the collective security arrangement in the Mecca defence pact, Saudi Arabia’s allies Turkiye and Pakistan cannot “afford to commit troops on the ground” in Yemen, said Siddiqa.

The latest diplomatic push is likely linked to visits by Pakistani army chief Asim Munir to Saudi Arabia and Iran last week, Siddiqa said, and coincides with Islamabad’s restrictions on overland border trade with Tehran amid the US blockade on Iran.

Iranian authorities have said they favoured “security originating from within the region” as they prepared for the meetings.

Umer Karim, who researches Saudi foreign policy and its implications for regional security, said the Tehran meetings are unlikely to reduce the risk of a renewed war between Iran and the US, which would likely lead to more regional turmoil.

“Therefore, these talks perhaps are more concerned about the security of Saudi Arabia and involve an attempt by Turkiye and Pakistan to compel Iran to reach a compromise,” he told Al Jazeera.

US President Donald Trump is said to be considering new attacks to break the diplomatic deadlock with Iran, which has refused to agree to any peace agreement with Washington unless several of its demands are met.

The US and regional powers want international shipping and transit through the Strait of Hormuz to resume without impediments or attacks. Washington also wants to rein in Tehran’s nuclear programme and bring in international inspectors to assess Iran’s highly enriched uranium. Israel says it wants to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

Tehran wants to lift the US naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports, which has halted crude oil exports and disrupted most trade, and return to a memorandum of understanding agreed between the two countries in June.

The US has refused this, with President Trump saying he is left with a choice to “finish the job” by launching major strikes on Iran’s civilian infrastructure. This could prompt Iran to lash out at its neighbours, as it did earlier in the war with strikes on US bases in Arab states and infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the US Department of State issued an October 21 order for nonemergency US government employees and their family ⁠members to leave Saudi Arabia for their safety’s sake, given the Houthi threat.

As talks involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye continue in Iran, analysts say these Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signatories will likely try to minimise the impact on Saudi Arabia if war does break out again.

“However, since little has changed from an Iranian strategic calculus and the actors involved don’t have the kind of leverage needed to affect Iran’s strategic thinking, these negotiations are going to yield little,” Karim said.

The Farsh Al-Hawa area in the city of Hebron in the occupied West Bank is unrecognisable after Israeli forces demolished a three-story building and industrial facilities there. Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also holds the West Bank portfolio in the Ministry of Defence, said he ordered their destruction.

It all started on Friday, when two Palestinians attacked an Israeli military checkpoint in Farsh Al-Hawa, killing two soldiers and injuring others.

Since then, Hebron, the West Bank’s economic capital, has been attacked and put under lockdown by Israeli forces.

Israel has announced a sweeping military assault in the city, targeting the neighbourhood of the gunmen, who were killed on Friday. Israeli forces have already forcibly displaced more than 2,000 Palestinians. City officials say almost half of the displaced are babies and children under 18, along with 81 pregnant women and 204 elderly.

Fahd Ahmaro was forced to leave his home, along with his family. He told Al Jazeera that he planned to stay but felt compelled to seek shelter outside his neighbourhood because the women and children were terrified.

“We left with nothing but the clothes on our backs. Our savings, belongings and documents are all in the house,” he said. “I tried to go back after I got my family out safely, but I couldn’t. It’s not safe any more.”

Palestinian authorities in Hebron have declared a state of emergency and created a crisis group, bringing together government agencies, the private sector and civil society, to respond after thousands of people in the city were forced to flee their homes.

Riyadh Khamis, who serves on the committee, told Al Jazeera that philanthropists who could not bear the thought of fellow Palestinians staying in temporary shelters opened their homes to the displaced.

“Hebron is known for its social solidarity and generosity. Our city was the first to provide aid during the COVID lockdown and during the genocide,” Khamis told Al Jazeera. “Today, our neighbours needed help so we all rallied.”

Real estate developer Mohamed Al-Rujoob is one of the philanthropists who sprang to action at the start of the assault on the city.

Al-Rujoob, who owns several apartments in Dura, a town close to Hebron, announced that the properties would be made available for displaced families, prompting other owners to do the same. He now hosts three extended families in his apartments, including 30 children.

“We must preserve people’s dignity. Today, we host these good people. Tomorrow, who knows? It might be us who need shelter. We’re all under the same occupation and we’re all vulnerable,” he said.

The Israeli army says Hebron is on lockdown, which affects nearly 1 million Palestinians who live in the city and the rest of the district.

Restrictions on movement have had a severe impact on the West Bank’s largest district. Schools have moved to online classes, while Hebron’s universities have made similar arrangements for their 18,000 students until the Israeli operation ends.

The measures are essential for Palestinian students who are stuck in their homes and neighbourhoods, including the besieged Fawwar refugee camp in Hebron, home to nearly 8,000 Palestinians. Israeli soldiers closed the camp’s entrance gate on Saturday, barring residents from entering or leaving, even on foot.

Abdel Fattah Al-Ttitti, a school teacher who lives in the camp and works in a Hebron school, said “we are locked in”.

“If, God forbid, somebody needs medical attention, we may be able to get them to the clinic in Masafer Yatta, but that clinic is poorly equipped. If there’s a medical emergency, they can’t help,” Al-Ttitti told Al Jazeera.

He is glad that schools announced online classes. “Until this campaign is over, there’s no other way,” he said.

Many in Hebron believe that Israel’s military campaign in the city has a political dimension, with Israelis heading to the polls on Tuesday for a general election.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition is vying for every right-wing vote. Violence against Palestinians has proved an expedient campaign tactic for politicians such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Minister of Settlement Affairs, Orit Strook.

Both right-wing ministers have homes in illegal settlements in the Hebron area and support the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the occupied West Bank and Gaza, which they refer to as “encouraging voluntary migration”.

When Altayeb Alhadi was just six years old, his father died after a well collapsed in his village in White Nile state, south-central Sudan. Two months later, and his mother also died, leaving the five children in the family as orphans. As the eldest of the siblings, it was Altayeb’s responsibility to find work and help the family survive.

At 14, he travelled hundreds of kilometres from his home in Galli village to seek work in the north, where gold mines dot the landscape, so he could feed his siblings and keep them in school.

“We warned him about the dangers, but he was ambitious. Some relatives were already working in the area although they had found jobs in restaurants and other services rather than underground extraction,” Ayateb’s uncle Alhadi Hamid told Al Jazeera.

The boy initially worked in transport and other jobs, but when he heard lucrative stories from miners in the area, he began to search for gold in the surrounding mountains.

Altayeb died in an air strike attributed to the Egyptian military at a gold-mining site near Jabal Al-Aigdat in Sudan’s Red Sea region on October 10, which killed at least 72 miners, a few months after he began working at the site.

“It was less than 30 minutes since we separated, and he said he was going to the mine. We suddenly heard a loud sound of bombardment, and we ran. It was too chaotic with people running in all directions and many attacks taking place within a few minutes,” a fellow miner told Al Jazeera, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“We found Altayeb with his hand and leg [blown off] and a severe injury to his abdomen [which] was open. We tried to help him and took him to a safer place near a mountain. We were terrified. He died within hours. … We couldn’t believe how quickly things could happen.”

Altayeb worked alongside about 15 young men and children, using basic tools to extract gold from the rocks. The miners worked night and day, taking the material they gathered to nearby mills for processing.

Proceeds from any gold found were shared, but earnings depended on the amount of gold recovered and individual agreements. On productive days, the group could earn more than $100, the miner said.

“We used to dig for two to three weeks until we found a gram or less. If the gold percentage in the well wasn’t good, we would change locations. When we found a gram or less, we sold it and shared the profit, which was about $100,” Altayeb’s former colleague said.

For young people supporting relatives, even irregular earnings in these dangerous gold mines can seem preferable to unemployment.

Altayeb told his siblings 10 days before his death that he would soon return home, his sister Rogaia Alhadi told local media.

Friends told the family that Altayeb visited them at a restaurant near the mining site on the morning of the attack, his uncle said. They shared a cup of tea before heading towards the mine for the final time. Minutes later, the air strike hit the area.

Authorities in Egypt have accused Sudanese miners of crossing its border and reportedly linked some to gold smuggling, drugs and human trafficking. The Sudanese side did not respond to these allegations.

Since a civil war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group broke out in 2023, the economy has tanked and forced thousands with no other source of income to find work in the artisanal gold mines of northern Sudan.

This can vary from independent prospecting to working in investor-owned pits for a share of the proceeds. Earnings depend on the amount of gold found, equipment and fuel costs, and profit percentages agreed with financiers.

Although some miners strike gold, they still face an array of dangers, ranging from collapsing shafts and unstable ground to air strikes. Limited medical care makes mining, particularly in remote areas, especially hazardous.

Living conditions are also extremely hard. Mohamed Awadalkarim, who was a miner in River Nile state for 10 years, said workers often shelter in makeshift huts made from burlap sacks and plastic sheeting. Their diet consists mainly of lentils and sorghum porridge.

But for families without reliable incomes, mining offers a possible source of immediate earnings. Miners may spend hours searching for gold and not find enough to cover their expenses. Others share proceeds with investors or equipment owners, leaving them with limited money left.

Artisanal and small-scale mining accounted for 53.71 tonnes, or about 83 per cent, of Sudan’s declared gold production in 2024, but this was just in areas under government control, according to research by the Chatham House think tank. About one million people were involved in artisanal mining across Sudan’s 18 states, generating $1bn annually for the country.

Artisanal mines, while generally viewed as being outside the main war-funding networks, have still been exposed to violence.

On June 16, several people were reportedly killed and injured in attacks on mining sites near the Egyptian border, according to local sources and miners.

The repeated air strikes near Sudan’s border with Egypt have raised concerns about civilian protection, territorial sovereignty and accountability.

Egyptian authorities have accused Sudanese prospectors of crossing the border to mine near a concession managed by an Egyptian company, but there is little independent evidence to back these claims.

Sudanese military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan reportedly ordered a fact-finding committee involving prosecutors, judicial representatives and security agencies to investigate the attack. Findings from an inquiry into a similar incident announced in June have not been made public.

Altayeb paid the highest price in this regional conflict and the hunt for gold, which provides huge profits for some and meagre incomes for many.

Altayeb’s siblings are now living with their extended family, including uncles, aunts and cousins. People who know them are trying to help his brothers and sisters and are carrying out community initiatives in Galli to keep his memory alive.

“We will raise the children and care for them as he would have wanted. He was young, caring and brave, and he will always be remembered,” Altayeb said.

Authorities warn of ‘destructive winds’ and urge residents to shelter as the storm passes the island’s northeast.

Typhoon Champi has struck Taiwan, killing one person and injuring at least 350 others, as authorities warned of “destructive winds” and instructed people to stay indoors.

The storm swept past the island’s northeast on Friday, toppling trees, shutting shops and schools, cutting power to thousands of households, and forcing more than 4,300 people to evacuate from their homes.

Champi is heading towards China and Japan, forcing the cancellation of hundreds of flights in the region.

“From tonight through tomorrow morning conditions will be very windy and stormy everywhere,” Central Weather Administration (CWA) forecaster Lin Ping-yu said in a briefing. “Please try to stay indoors.”

Champi was briefly a super typhoon with winds of nearly 300 kilometres per hour (186 miles per hour) but has since weakened. The US Joint Typhoon Warning Center reported maximum winds of 185km/h (115mph).

Worse is still expected to come on Saturday. Champi could drop up to 900mm (35 inches) of rain between Thursday and Saturday, with the northeast hit hardest, the CWA said. More than 400mm fell in Yilan County on Friday.

CWA forecaster Lu Kuo-chen said the typhoon could slow near the island’s northeastern tip, prolonging its impact.

About 8,400 households in Japan’s Okinawa islands were without power on Friday afternoon, according to the Okinawa Electric Power Company. Champi is forecast to hover near Okinawa and then China’s eastern coast before turning northeast towards mainland Japan.

Champi is the latest storm in a Pacific season supercharged by El Nino.

The United Nations said on Wednesday that El Nino, a natural cycle that warms the tropical Pacific, is heading off the charts.

“The current El Nino event could be unprecedented in strength. Literally off the monitoring charts that we have used for the past four decades,” said Celeste Saulo, secretary-general of the World Meteorological Organization.

It is expected to peak in December, with its impact lasting into 2027 and beyond.

Qatar, Turkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia signed a deal on Wednesday to deepen their defence industry cooperation, reflecting a broader effort by countries in the region to widen their network of security partners amid the prolonged US-Israel war with Iran.

The four countries signed the memorandum of understanding in Doha, building on existing military projects through joint production, technology transfers and more closely integrated supply chains.

The initiative comes as the failure of the United States and Iran to reach a concrete peace agreement pushes countries in the region to diversify their defence partnerships and look beyond what experts described as an overreliance on Washington for their security. But they stress that closer cooperation does not mean abandoning long-standing alliances. Instead, the ambition is to gain greater control over their own security while strengthening pre-existing partnerships.

Arda Mevlutoglu, a defence industry analyst and managing director of Mergen Analytical Strategies, told Al Jazeera that the implications could extend well beyond the four participants.

“We may be witnessing the emergence of an interconnected network of defence and security arrangements extending from the Gulf to South and Southeast Asia, rather than a single formal alliance,” he said.

What would the agreement do?

In a statement, the Qatari Defence Ministry said the “Badr” Memorandum of Understanding “aims to foster cooperation in the field of defence manufacturing, enhance defence capabilities among the four countries, and promote collaboration in technical defence training, as well as in research and development areas, thereby contributing to the creation of solutions and industries worthy of the evolution of modern defences”.

Experts say that under the agreement, each country will bring its own resources or set of skills to the table. “Turkiye contributes technological expertise, systems integration and a mature defence industry; Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capacity, skilled workforces and sizeable domestic markets; and Qatar provides investment potential and demand,” said Mevlutoglu.

Together, the four nations could “establish integrated supply chains, allowing these countries to jointly develop, manufacture and sustain defence systems”, he told Al Jazeera.

Such arrangements could give buyers a larger role in producing and supporting their own equipment, while providing manufacturers with longer-term orders and investment. Albert Vidal, a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told Al Jazeera that Pakistan and Indonesia were both willing to purchase Turkish weapons and locate part of their production at home.

This could bring down costs for Turkish companies and bring jobs to Pakistan and Indonesia, while Qatar brings “financial depth”, he said.

Building on existing partnerships

Turkiye, home to one of the world’s most advanced defence sectors, already has military manufacturing ties with Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia separately. Qatar and Turkiye, for instance, signed a bilateral defence industry memorandum in October 2025.

But Vidal says that the new agreement, bringing together all four nations, points to a strategic calculation alongside an industrial one. Closer relationships could give more countries a stake in each other’s security. He pointed to Qatar’s investment in the Turkish defence industry over more than a decade and Ankara’s deployment of forces to Doha during the 2017 diplomatic crisis.

Pakistan’s existing naval manufacturing project with Turkiye, meanwhile, shows how weapons purchases can support domestic manufacturing. Of the four ships announced under the project, two are to be built in Istanbul and two at Karachi Shipyard.

Indonesia and Turkiye, meanwhile, are jointly building a tank.

“The rationale is to streamline these distinct defence export and joint production agreements under a more structured and resilient networked hub, rather than reinvent the wheel with each new defence agreement,” Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told Al Jazeera.

Less dependence on Washington?

The US-Israeli war with Iran and recent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia have heightened regional security concerns, analysts say, while reported US weapons shortages may be adding urgency to efforts to strengthen pre-existing partners and bolster domestic arms-building capacity.

“Diversification is a major driver, particularly as recent conflicts have exposed vulnerabilities associated with dependence on foreign suppliers, technology restrictions and supply chain disruptions,” Mevlutoglu said.

But he cautioned against interpreting the memorandum as a break with Washington. “Qatar is unlikely to abandon its strategic relationship with Washington, while Turkiye seeks greater technological independence within NATO, not autonomy from it,” he said.

According to Bader Mousa Al-Saif, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme and an assistant professor at Kuwait University, the initiative reflects Gulf countries increasingly looking towards the Global South and fellow Muslim countries.

It also complements a separate effort to formalise military cooperation across the region, analysts say. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement in August, establishing a mutual defence commitment. Ankara submitted the agreement to parliament for ratification on Wednesday, although deploying Turkish troops abroad would require separate parliamentary approval.

The Doha memorandum concerns industrial cooperation rather than a mutual defence pledge, but Mevlutoglu sees a connection between the two initiatives. “While Mecca focuses on collective deterrence and military cooperation, Doha could provide the industrial and technological foundations for such partnerships,” he said.

Lander says dozens remain in Israeli custody after being detained while helping Palestinian farmers harvest olives.

United States Democratic congressional candidate Brad Lander says he has been released from Israeli military custody with a warning after being detained alongside dozens of volunteers helping Palestinian farmers harvest olives in the occupied West Bank on Wednesday.

But several dozen others, including rabbis and international volunteers, remain in detention, according to Lander, who called them to be released immediately.

“I’ve been released from IDF custody with a ‘warning,’ apparently because of my public profile,” Lander wrote on X. “I told them I wasn’t even a congressmember yet, just a nominee.”

Lander, a former New York City comptroller and mayoral candidate, was among approximately 80 volunteers detained by Israeli soldiers and police near the village of Nahalin, outside Bethlehem, according to the Israeli organisation Rabbis for Human Rights.

The group, which included American, Israeli, Palestinian, British and Canadian volunteers, had been accompanying Palestinian farmers for about two hours when Israeli forces arrived and informed them that they were in a closed military zone.

The volunteers were then taken to a police station, according to Rabbis for Human Rights.

The Israeli government has not responded to a request for comment.

France and the United Kingdom have both moved to deploy military assets to Saudi Arabia, deepening their defence ties with the kingdom as its conflict with the Houthis, an armed group also known as Ansar Allah (Arabic for Supporters of God), in Yemen escalates.

Paris last week said it had begun sending assets to Saudi Arabia as part of a previously announced agreement, after President Emmanuel Macron committed to deploying troops and air defence systems to help protect the Red Sea port city of Yanbu, which has come under attack from the Iran-backed Houthis.

The UK, for its part, on Tuesday announced plans to deploy fighter jets to help shield Saudi Arabia from Houthi attacks.

Both countries stressed that their support would be defensive.

Analysts say the European moves serve several geopolitical purposes: protecting Saudi oil exports that are important to European energy markets, shoring up their strategic alliance in the Gulf amid US reluctance to offer direct military assistance to Saudi Arabia, and strengthening deterrence against future Houthi attacks.

But the deployments also carry significant risks, many analysts say, potentially drawing the two European states more directly into the protracted Saudi-Houthi conflict.

“If insufficiently deterred, the Houthis may decide that the moment is ripe to test the resolve and resilience of Saudi Arabia’s defensive posture, and attempt to draw Saudi Arabia’s allies even further into the Yemen-Saudi confrontation,” Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow for Middle East Security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told Al Jazeera.

‘Support during crisis’

The British and French military support measures come as Saudi Arabia faces a sustained Houthi missile and drone campaign against it, including targeting energy and transport infrastructure.

Houthi attacks targeting Saudi airports in Riyadh and Abha this month have killed 19 people and injured more than 300 others, according to the Saudi-led coalition spokesman Turki al-Maliki.

Addressing the UK’s stepped-up military support for Saudi Arabia, UK Defence Secretary Wes Streeting called recent Houthi attacks in Saudi Arabia “absolutely despicable”, specifically condemning the group’s targeting of Riyadh airport.

The UK Ministry of Defence said it would deploy Typhoon fighter jets to fly “defensive counter air missions” in Saudi Arabia, send UK military advisers to work with Saudi staff officers and provide an A400M transport aircraft to help move defence material within the kingdom.

French support for Saudi Arabia would include soldiers, radars and defence systems, Macron has said, without detailing the scale of the support.

Urban Coningham, a research fellow at RUSI, noted differences in the British and French roles, with the French mainly limited to protecting Saudi export infrastructure. The British, by contrast, will conduct “defensive patrols where they would shoot down incoming missiles or drones” in Saudi Arabia, as well as provide air-to-air refuelling support for Saudi bombers and jets heading into Yemeni airspace, he said.

Camille Lons, policy fellow and deputy head of the Paris office at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said France is limited in what it can provide to Saudi Arabia, particularly given the demands on European defences amid the war in Ukraine. Still, Paris sees its assistance as a way to “show support [for Saudi Arabia] in times of crisis, and a way to deepen the defence partnership”, Lons told Al Jazeera.

‘Freeing up’ Saudi aircraft

Saudi Arabia will welcome the European deployments, as it has struggled to translate some of its security partnerships into high-level military support.

In September, US President Donald Trump rejected multiple Saudi requests to participate in strikes on the Houthis, agreeing only to provide intelligence and targeting support, the news agency Reuters cited informed sources saying.

Turkiye and Pakistan have committed to “collective deterrence measures”, including potential troop deployments, under the newly signed Mecca defence pact with Saudi Arabia, but the agreement has yet to be ratified in Turkiye.

Egypt’s parliament has also postponed a vote that would authorise its armed forces to support Saudi Arabia.

Nawaf Obaid, a senior fellow at King’s College War Studies Department, called the UK and French deployments “militarily valuable and politically significant”, saying they could help shield the kingdom’s sprawling territory from persistent Houthi air attacks while giving Riyadh more room to focus its own assets on offensive operations.

“The British Typhoons can reinforce Saudi air defences and, crucially, free up Saudi Eurofighters for offensive operations,” Obaid told Al Jazeera. “France’s contribution is particularly important for protecting Yanbu.”

Saudi Arabia “does not need foreign assistance to conduct air strikes”, Obaid added, noting that the kingdom has its own powerful combat aircraft fleet. “What it needs is additional defensive coverage across its enormous territory, particularly for critical energy infrastructure.”

Ozcelik said the recent British move was “not insignificant”, but its deterrent impact was not immediately clear.

“The question remains whether the UK air missions will move the dial in deterring sustained Houthi attacks while Saudi air defences and interceptor stockpiles are stretched,” said Ozcelik. “The difference between deterrence and interdiction is an important one.”

‘Dragged into protracted conflict’

What also remains to be seen is whether the UK and France will maintain a purely defensive posture – and whether the Houthis will recognise that distinction at all.

Coningham said the Houthis could interpret European military involvement, especially the UK’s air-to-air support for Saudi bombers and jets, as “offensive” rather than defensive, leading the group to view those countries as belligerents and their forces as targets.

As a result, Coningham said, the Houthis could strike at British forces stationed in the region – whether in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, such as Cyprus – or reverse their position on allowing free transit to non-Saudi vessels, including European ships, in the Bab al-Mandeb strait – a key maritime route in the world.

Another potential flashpoint would be a Houthi attack in Saudi Arabia that kills British or French personnel, analysts noted.

“Whether it’s a direct attack planned by the Houthis or collateral damage, if the British or French have any casualties … then there becomes a pointed debate in those countries as to whether they should then retaliate,” said Coningham.

Ozcelik said the UK could face pressure to play a more offensive role in the event of a “mass civilian casualty event” caused by the Houthis or “debilitating attacks on Saudi’s energy infrastructure”, although London would likely view such a scenario as a “last resort”.

“Neither the Mecca signatories nor the UK are inclined to get dragged into deeper and likely protracted conflict inside Yemen,” said Ozcelik.

Both candidates for the Brazilian presidency have called for the disqualification of their rivals over allegations of social media interference, ramping up political drama ahead of the close-fought October 25 runoff election.

Brazil’s right-wing presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro has requested the annulment of the candidacy of his rival, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, over what he called unlawful propaganda.

Lawyers for Bolsonaro filed a request with the Superior Electoral Court on Tuesday, alleging Lula’s “abuse of power” in the mass dissemination of government postings during the campaign period via WhatsApp.

Bolsonaro’s camp claimed the Brazilian government sent mass messages to millions of Brazilians via the messaging service, promoting social programmes, benefits and government initiatives in the midst of the presidential race, Brazilian media reported.

The request to the electoral court seeks to declare Lula and Social Communications Minister Sidonio Palmeira ineligible to hold public office for a period of eight years.

‘Algorithmic manipulation’

In the other camp, Lula’s campaign said on Tuesday that it would request the disqualification of Bolsonaro on Wednesday over alleged election interference by WhatsApp parent company, the tech giant Meta.

Lula’s petition, which has yet to be officially filed, alleges “algorithmic manipulation” by Meta aimed at harming Lula’s chances of winning, a campaign source told AFP.

The electoral court had given Meta 24 hours on Monday to prove it was complying with an order to treat both campaigns equally, threatening a daily fine of around $200,000 if it didn’t.

The order came after Lula’s campaign alleged that Meta, which owns Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram, was suppressing his online content to boost Bolsonaro.

“We have completed the implementation of the measures to comply with the Superior Electoral Court’s decision,” the company said on Tuesday.

Lula and Bolsonaro are locked in a heated presidential race after the right-wing candidate, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, won the initial round of voting earlier this month with 47 percent of the vote to the incumbent’s 45 percent.

Polls show a very close race ahead of Sunday’s runoff round.

The lawsuit argues Trump bypassed Congress and misused a century-old law to impose sweeping tariffs on Canadian imports.

A US food importer is suing US President Donald Trump over his 50 percent tariffs on Canadian goods, arguing he lacks the legal authority to impose sweeping tariffs without congressional approval.

Gellert Global Group, a New Jersey-based company that imports Canadian cheese, filed the lawsuit on Tuesday in the US Court of International Trade in New York.

The company says the tariffs are driving up its costs and disrupting its relationships with suppliers on both sides of the border. Between September 16 and October 11, Gellert had paid more than $520,000 in duties, according to the complaint.

“Gellert Global Group has spent generations building trusted relationships with suppliers, customers and partners across the food industry,” said Thomas Gellert, the company’s co-chief executive officer, in a press release. “These tariffs disrupt those relationships overnight and create costs and uncertainty that ripple through the entire supply chain.”

The lawsuit challenges Trump’s decision to use a Depression-era law to impose tariffs on a wide range of Canadian products, including dairy products, furniture, clothing and wine.

Trump first imposed the 50 percent tariffs over the summer, accusing Canada of discriminating against American-made cars, alcohol and dairy products. He expanded the measures in September, adding more products in response to Canadian retaliatory tariffs.

The lawsuit argues that the law doesn’t apply to the Canadian policies the Trump administration says are discriminatory, since two of them “arose in response to the president’s own tariffs, while the third involves Canadian dairy policy governed by the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)”.

It also questions why Canadian cheese is being taxed over disputes involving alcohol and cars.

“No president should have the power to pull a dormant statute off the shelf and use it to impose sweeping tariffs or import bans without the limits Congress required,” said Sara Albrecht, chairman and CEO of the Liberty Justice Center, a nonprofit legal organisation that filed the suit on Gellert’s behalf.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment, according to the Reuters news agency.

At the centre of the case is Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which allows the president to impose tariffs of up to 50 percent on imports from countries found to discriminate against American businesses.

The provision had never been used until Trump invoked it this year.

The lawsuit argues that newer laws passed by Congress since then, such as Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, require investigations, public comment and other safeguards that Gellert says the Trump administration has bypassed, and that these override Section 338.

“The administration cannot skip those protections by reaching for a 1930 statute that no president had ever used to impose a tariff,” said Jeffrey Schwab, the Liberty Justice Center’s senior counsel and director of litigation.

In addition, the lawsuit says that even if Trump is allowed to use the older law, he hasn’t met its requirements, including waiting 30 days before tariffs can be collected on new products added to the list.

The administration only waited seven days to start collecting tariffs on cheese in September, according to the lawsuit.

Gellert is asking the court to declare the tariffs illegal, stop them from being collected, and order refunds with interest for importers who have been impacted.

The lawsuit marks the fourth major legal challenge to Trump’s tariffs.

In February, the US Supreme Court struck down most of the tariffs he imposed in 2025, and a trade court later ruled against a temporary 10 percent global tariff. A separate challenge to tariffs imposed over alleged forced labour in international trade is still pending.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has unveiled an updated national security doctrine and displayed a map of rival regional alignments, signalling a security approach that prioritises preemptive military action, the expansion of buffer zones, and the pursuit of new regional partnerships.

The document was developed with the assistance of Israel’s National Security Council and published by the Prime Minister’s Office on Sunday, just nine days before Israel’s parliamentary elections that could spell the end of Netanyahu’s time in office. It outlines a formal policy of preventing perceived threats through military action rather than containment – a policy that has already been seen in action over the past few years, as Israel pursues multiple wars and attacks on its neighbours.

Electoral survival strategy

The timing of the map’s release carries particular political significance, with Netanyahu fighting to retain power amid criticism of his conduct in power, the ongoing corruption trial he faces and his handling of the October 7, 2023, attacks, as well as the wars that followed.

As the October 27 election day draws closer, Netanyahu is attempting to bolster his credentials as Israel’s ‘Mr Security’, hoping to get the votes of Israelis who may not like some of his other policies or behaviour, but still view him as the most likely leader to defend the country.

Netanyahu, who did get the endorsement of US President Donald Trump on Sunday, said during the briefing that Israel could face the possibility of a far less supportive administration in Washington in two years, after the end of the Trump presidency.

“In two years, a president… who is extremely hostile to Israel could come to power [in the United States],” Netanyahu warned.

He therefore argued that Israel must “expand our network of alliances and develop capabilities that make us a valuable asset” to other countries as a way of protecting itself if US policy towards it changed.

The comments, according to analysts, suggest that Netanyahu is seeking to portray his leadership as essential to navigating both Israel’s regional military challenges and its diplomatic isolation, all while keeping a fearful electorate reassured.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, explained that the strategic presentation centred on competing regional blocs and buffer zones.

That framework “incubates and nurtures existential fears, which would lead Israeli voters to feel the need for a decisive leader”, Hage Ali noted.

In his assessment, Netanyahu stands to benefit from the Israeli public’s fear of regional threats by presenting himself as a familiar leader capable of managing them, making him “the devil you know”, as the analyst put it, to voters reluctant to embrace political change at a sensitive time.

Netanyahu’s political opponents have been quick to push back against that narrative.

Gadi Eisenkot, one of the prime minister’s main challengers in the upcoming election, said that the published doctrine was “two hollow pages, full of slogans that have nothing to do with a security concept”.

Another, former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, described the document as “superficial”.

Expanding security zones

The map displayed during Netanyahu’s briefing was originally published in May by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation. It divides the Middle East and parts of Africa into competing blocs, highlighting the region’s complex network of alliances and rivalries.

Those networks include states, unrecognised entities and non-state actors.

The map identifies an Israel-United Arab Emirates alignment, described as the “Hexagon Alliance”, alongside a separate grouping of Egypt, Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – the latter three of which signed the Mecca mutual defence pact in August – labelled the “Sunni Diamond Alliance”. It also depicts Iran and its regional allies as a separate axis.

The map serves to illustrate the issues outlined in the published security doctrine, presenting a region where Israel faces multiple threats, the alliance that Israel is seeking to cultivate across the wider region, and the perceived need for “buffer zones” – the occupation of territory in other countries.

Israel’s existing illegal occupation of territory in Gaza and southern Lebanon illustrates the potential consequences of expanding the buffer zone approach.

Hage Ali warned that continuing to pursue an approach built around expanding military control could lead to “more conflict and more ethnic cleansing” under the guise of security buffers.

Embracing regional factions

A striking element of the map displayed by Netanyahu is its explicit designation of non-state actors as friendly entities.

The map highlights territories controlled by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Khalifa Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army within an alignment deemed cooperative to Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Israel views these actors as pragmatic partners or at least cooperative entities in a broader strategic grid, Hage Ali explained. However, the public association of these groups with Israel threatens to damage their domestic standing across the Arab world.

That reflects Netanyahu’s immediate priorities, where “what Israelis think matters more than the reputation of your allies and the viability of these alliances”, Hage Ali added.

The portrayal of the Middle East as a region divided into competing alliances also carries risks for Netanyahu’s broader diplomatic ambitions.

Earlier this year, Netanyahu proposed a “hexagon of alliances”, envisaging cooperation between Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and unnamed Arab, African and Asian partners, against what he described as “radical” regional alliances.

The proposed grouping has not been established as a formal alliance, and commentators in Israel and the international press have described the project as a branding exercise rather than a binding military pact, noting that countries like India prioritise non-alignment and pragmatic trade over ideologically rigid blocs.

For Tehran and its regional partners, the map also offers potent political leverage.

Hage Ali emphasised that the visual layout “will certainly help their propaganda machine”, providing Hezbollah and other Iranian allies with evidence to reinforce the narrative that Israel seeks to expand and dominate the region.

Tehran, Iran – Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is due to meet with senior Iranian officials in Tehran to discuss the war with the United States and efforts to end it.

Lavrov landed in the Iranian capital on Monday afternoon on his first visit to Iran since February 2025. Moscow said the trip was part of efforts to ease months of tension, since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28. The Russian minister is scheduled to hold talks with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi later on Monday.

On Sunday, Lavrov was in Bahrain, which was heavily targeted by Iran during the war, to participate in a strategic dialogue session between Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

He was urged by GCC members to use Moscow’s influence with Tehran to press for “serious dialogue” and restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which has been severely disrupted by attacks on commercial vessels.

GCC chief Jasem Al-Budaiwi said member states had faced more than 7,000 Iranian missiles and drones since the start of the war.

In the council’s closing statement, the six Arab countries said they wanted Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, as well as its support for regional armed groups, to be included in future talks to end the war.

Nikita Smagin, an analyst and researcher on Iran and Russia’s role in the Middle East, said Lavrov’s trip reflects Moscow’s efforts to maintain working relations with all countries in the region.

He said Lavrov also wants to maintain Russia’s status as a mediator, despite the impact of the Ukraine war on its global reputation.

“The timing of visits to the Gulf monarchies and Iran, taking place almost simultaneously, is a deliberate signal: Moscow wants to show that it approaches relations with all these countries on broadly equal terms and is equally interested in cooperation with each of them,” Smagin said.

How does Russia fit in?

Lavrov told GCC ministers in Manama that the region was once again teetering on the brink of a full-scale war and Russia wanted to establish a regional architecture for “collective security”.

He said this could include combining initiatives from countries in the region, along with those put forward by Russia and China, with the aim of restoring maritime traffic and achieving lasting peace. The Russian foreign minister urged other regional states such as Iraq and Jordan, which have also been hit by Iranian strikes, to participate.

Lavrov expressed support for the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Iran and the US in June, which later collapsed, as a framework for reducing tension.

Iran has said it wants a return to that agreement, and for Washington to honour a finalised bilateral deal between Iran and Oman to manage territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. This has been opposed by the US, which has established its own route in the waterway for shipping.

Intelligence reports cited by US media said that Russia and China are providing military support to Iran in the form of satellite imagery for targeting purposes and components for weapons.

But US President Donald Trump contradicted those reports last week, saying Moscow and Beijing would have “too much to lose” if they helped Iran.

Washington has also issued sanctions waivers for Russia in a bid to lower fuel prices driven up by the war against Iran.

Mixed intentions

Russia’s position on the Iran war is somewhat unusual, said Smagin. It has a partial interest in the conflict continuing, as higher oil prices and the severe restrictions on Iranian oil reaching China all benefit Moscow.

“Russia and Iran have been competing primarily for the Chinese market, so China is now effectively forced to buy Russian oil at higher prices because Iranian supplies are largely unavailable,” he said.

Smagin added that Russia does not want the conflict to escalate further, as the consequences could be unpredictable, but its leverage over either Iran or the US to influence the course of the conflict remains limited.

Russia will continue to expand relations with Tehran, Smagin said, including through Caspian Sea trade, and limited military cooperation with Iran.

“These efforts appear to be aimed less at generating economic returns than at expanding Russia’s political influence over Iran and the course of events,” he said.

Military strikes by Iran and the US to wrest control of the waterway have continued, with the US midterm elections approaching on November 3 .

In comments to the media, Trump threatened to “soon finish the job” with Iran, to which Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi replied: “We have unfinished jobs too.”

Protests are sweeping France as anger over conditions in schools meets frustration with high living costs and a government accused of doing little to address problems facing people.

About 550,000 people demonstrated nationwide on Saturday, according to the Interior Ministry. Most marched peacefully, while a small minority attacked buildings, looted shops and clashed with police, who fired tear gas and charged protesters.

Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu said 1,200 people were arrested and 150 police officers were injured. Behind the confrontations lies a political crisis, fuelled by anger at deteriorating services and overstretched household budgets, and compounded by a sense that France’s political institutions offer little hope of change.

Here is how school blockades became a nationwide movement – and what that means for President Emmanuel Macron.

How have the protests spread, what are protesters demanding?

The movement began last month in high schools in Paris’ working-class northern suburbs, where students protested against teacher shortages and poor facilities. School blockades and demonstrations later spread to cities including Bordeaux, Rennes, Nantes, Lyon, Lille and Marseille.

Saturday brought together students and trade unions, alongside supporters of the “yellow vest” movement that emerged in 2018 to challenge rising living costs and economic inequality.

Emile Chabal, a professor of contemporary history at the University of Edinburgh, told Al Jazeera the demonstrations were “the logical outcome of a series of protests” stretching back to the yellow vests.

That movement was driven by financial pressures and resentment at “the French presidential system”, he told Al Jazeera, alluding to a structure which often leads to the election of a centrist candidate, such as President Emmanuel Macron.

Saturday combined those longstanding grievances with students’ anger at deteriorating state schools. The yellow vests had demanded better public services.

Bringing students’ grievances together with wider social demands, therefore, represented “the worst possible outcome for the French government”, Chabal said.

Students’ immediate demands concern conditions in France’s lycees (public high schools), which generally educate pupils aged 15 to 18. They want smaller classes, enough teachers, better buildings and less exhausting timetables. Their complaints also reflect broader concerns about whether the state can provide the education and opportunities young people need.

But for workers, including school staff, the dispute also concerns wages and the resources available to deliver public services.

The school protests coincided with a nationwide public sector strike against the government’s budget plans. Bringing all these concerns together under one umbrella represented “the worst possible outcome for the French government”, Chabal said.

It comes as the proposed 2027 budget includes a 54 billion euro ($60.8bn) package of cost-cutting and tax measures, which the government says is necessary to reduce France’s deficit. The proposals include freezing the pay scale used to calculate civil servants’ basic salaries, which unions say would be the fourth consecutive annual freeze.

Donatella della Porta, a sociologist and political scientist, said students were inspiring wider mobilisation around inequality, cuts to public investment and democratic rights, with demands for social welfare spending rather than militarisation.

“They do not want to fight wars; they want a different future,” she told Al Jazeera.

She also linked the movement to young people’s mobilisation over Gaza, with Palestinian flags appearing at demonstrations across several European countries.

How has the government responded?

The government has focused its immediate response on public order, with President Macron saying those responsible for violence would be “prosecuted and punished”.

His comments came as a fire largely destroyed the historic town hall in the city of Limoges, while public buildings and shops were attacked elsewhere.

But those involved in violence represent only a small minority of the much larger mobilisation. Jean-Luc Melenchon, leader of the left-wing France Unbowed party, has accused the government of repressing school students and allowing the confrontation to intensify.

His argument reflects a wider political dispute about whether the government treats the protests chiefly as a security problem or addresses the grievances that have brought different groups together.

Experts say France’s problems extend beyond disagreement over individual budget measures and reflect deeper discontent. Emile Chabal, from the University of Edinburgh, said political paralysis since the 2024 parliamentary elections, which left no bloc with an outright majority, had created “an environment in which no political party or movement is able to channel social discontent”.

That fragmentation makes it difficult to build a durable agreement on spending, taxation or public services. It also leaves protesters questioning whether changing governments produces meaningful changes in policy.

The protests are also “a tough blow for Macron”, Chabal said, whose promises of youthful energy and a reformed, dynamic France have been undermined by “his inability to articulate his political project and his deeply unempathetic persona”.

Chabal added that the unrest included violence sometimes seen on the fringes of French demonstrations, with direct-action tactics associated with the yellow vests. Targets included shops and, more unusually, public buildings. He described the destruction of Limoges’ town hall as particularly significant because of its place in France’s civic history.

Other researchers emphasise the role of policing. Guya Accornero, a specialist in social movements at Lisbon’s University Institute, said previous confrontations had created lasting tensions between protesters and police.

During the current protests, a 15-year-old lost a hand to a police stun grenade, while a 14-year-old suffered a shattered jaw after being struck by a tear gas canister fired at close range, according to Human Rights Watch. The organisation condemned excessive force against children, saying the demonstrations had been overwhelmingly peaceful.

“Young people have been violently repressed also when using non-disruptive tactics,” she told Al Jazeera.

Who could benefit politically?

There is no clear answer from the experts who spoke to Al Jazeera. Paul Smith, an associate professor in French history and politics at the University of Nottingham, believes far-right leader Marine Le Pen stands to gain.

“I see only one beneficiary and that’s Le Pen,” he told Al Jazeera, suggesting the unrest could also damage Melenchon’s presidential prospects.

Chabal cautioned against assuming a far-right gain, but he said fear of disorder had historically benefited conservative or centrist parties in France, including after the 1968 protests.

Le Pen has not entirely dismissed the protesters’ grievances, describing them on X on Saturday as “legitimate social demands”, while claiming they had been “held hostage by the far left”.

The far-right may seek to reap the rewards of public discontent, but experts say it is more likely to channel that anger towards immigration and the scapegoating of migrants, rather than blaming the structures of neoliberalism and capitalism for the protesters’ woes, as Melenchon has suggested.

With a presidential election due in April 2027, candidates face competing pressures, demonstrating that they can restore order while convincing voters they will address the conditions behind the mobilisation.

The challenge, Chabal said, is how to create change in “an environment in which no political party or movement is able to channel social discontent”.