News Analysis

As renewed fighting spreads across northern Ethiopia, the government has accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing armed opposition groups, raising fears that the conflict could draw in regional powers.

Over the weekend, Ethiopian army chief Birhanu Jula attributed his country’s unrest to those he called Ethiopia’s “historical and contemporary adversaries”.

Birhanu accused Eritrea of being the go-between linking these external powers – including Sudan and Egypt, which he explicitly named – with armed groups inside Ethiopia.

Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt have all rejected the accusations. Speaking to Al Jazeera, Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nader Zaki said that Egypt’s foreign policy was founded on “full respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of states, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries”.

Zaki added that Egypt “is fully committed to the rules of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and rejects any practices that would undermine regional security and stability”.

Major-General Samir Farag, the former head of the Egyptian Armed Forces’ Morale Affairs Department, also told Al Jazeera that the accusations against Egypt were false. “It has not been Egypt’s policy to interfere in the internal affairs of any state in the region,” he said.

Sudan’s military also dismissed the accusations as “baseless” and levelled its own charge of destabilising behaviour at Ethiopia, accusing it of supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces since 2023. Ethiopia has denied those allegations.

Troubled relations

Ethiopia’s relations with the countries it has accused have already been strained by other disputes that predate the latest fighting.

Relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa have remained tense as a longstanding dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remains unresolved. Competition between the two has increasingly extended to regional security, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Sudan’s relations with Ethiopia are similarly troubled. Since the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war, Khartoum has accused Addis Ababa of providing training, supplies and the use of Ethiopian territory to the RSF.

Eritrea had fought alongside Ethiopia against rebel groups in the latter’s Tigray region during a war between 2020 and 2022, but relations between the two neighbours have since soured, with Eritrea alarmed by Ethiopia’s attempts to gain access to the Red Sea.

Against that background, some analysts and Ethiopian opposition figures say that Addis Ababa is pointing the finger at foreign conspiracies in a bid to rally support behind its national army.

Mohamed Selim, deputy chair of the Egyptian parliament’s African Affairs Committee, told Al Jazeera that he believes the accusations were an attempt to shift attention from Ethiopia’s domestic problems by creating an external enemy and seeking to unify the internal front.

Amani al-Tawil, director of the Africa Programme at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, similarly described the accusations as “an understandable attempt to escape from internal crises”.

She questioned why Egypt would choose this moment to intervene militarily in Ethiopia, given the two have been in dispute over GERD since 2011.

Al-Tawil said the breadth of the new opposition alliance in Ethiopia – seven groups representing disparate ethnic groups and regions announced the coalition last week – presented a challenge to Addis Ababa.

Spillover concerns

The renewed fighting in Ethiopia has spread across Tigray and into neighbouring Amhara and Afar.

Mohammed Hussein, the chairman of the Prosperity Party Afar Region Branch Office – the ruling party in Ethiopia’s Afar region – told Al Jazeera that the three regions together have a population of more than 38 million, according to his estimate, and include areas near the borders with Djibouti and Eritrea, raising fears of a regional war.

Ammar Arki, a writer focusing on Horn of Africa affairs, told Al Jazeera that Ethiopia had, at various stages, blamed Sudan, Egypt and Eritrea for contributing to instability inside Ethiopia.

He said the latest accusations could be interpreted as an attempt to redirect some domestic attention towards an external threat and build support around the federal government.

But Arki warned that the longer Addis Ababa continued to explain its internal crisis in terms of an “external conspiracy”, particularly if neighbouring states responded in the same way, the greater the risk that Ethiopia’s conflict could move beyond Ethiopia’s borders and become regional.

Indirect talks between the United States and Iran aimed at ending the seven-month-long war continue – most recently via Qatar as mediator on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York – but the two sides still disagree about the agenda.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi left New York on Tuesday after telling state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) that he expects an official response to Tehran’s proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by the end of the day. The proposal, which Iran said would see the strait reopened within seven days, was first passed to the US via Qatari mediators last week.

United States President Donald Trump was reported to have rejected that offer, under which Tehran would reopen the strait in return for Washington lifting its naval blockade, waiving sanctions, releasing an estimated $12bn in frozen Iranian assets and enforcing a wider regional ceasefire that includes Lebanon.

Under Iran’s proposal, wider peace talks, including discussions of its nuclear programme, would begin only then

Despite Trump’s public rejection, Araghchi says he has not yet received a formal response from Washington. Meanwhile, US media reports that Trump may well be willing to relax sanctions and unfreeze Iranian assets have been strongly denied by the US president.

Instead, US officials say, the US wants a deal that resolves all outstanding issues, particularly Tehran’s nuclear programme, in one go, rather than pursuing a gradual, step-by-step approach.

Here’s what we know about the talks:

Qatari mediators met Araghchi in New York on Monday to discuss how to advance Tehran’s proposal for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and then progressing to wider peace talks.

In a post on Telegram, Araghchi insisted that the talks focused solely on the Strait of Hormuz. He denied that the US had formally rejected the Iranian proposal.

“Despite what the US president said, I said that we were waiting for the official US response through the mediators … They [Qatar] had ideas, and we discussed them. They are going to raise this issue with the American side again, and then the final response from the American side will be conveyed to us through the Qatari mediator,” Araghchi said late on Monday.

Araghchi also said negotiations had become more “serious”, but cautioned that Tehran’s position has not changed.

“I state firmly that there has been no change in Iran’s position. Our conditions for opening the strait are clear. Our position on other issues is also clear. At present, there has been no discussion at all about flexibility,” he added.

Tehran’s proposal includes elements of the Islamabad memorandum of understanding (MoU), which was signed by both the US and Iran on June 17.

Is Trump willing to accept some Iranian demands?

A US official told The Associated Press news agency last week that Trump is not willing to make a final peace deal with Iran until the issue of its nuclear programme is addressed. According to the official, who has not been named, the US president would be willing, however, to grant Iran sanctions relief and release some frozen funds if progress is made on the nuclear file.

Then, on Monday, US-based news outlet Axios also reported that Trump had offered Iran sanctions relief in return for concessions on its nuclear programme. The report also cited US officials, one of whom told Axios that the indirect talks had been “positive and constructive”, adding that Tehran had indicated it was “flexible” on nuclear issues.

Trump, however, angrily denounced the story as a “hoax” in a post on Truth Social, the social media platform he owns. He said the story was “not true” and demanded Axios remove the article.

Iran has been heavily sanctioned for decades. The restrictions have severely affected Iranians’ quality of life, including their access to essential medicines and healthcare.

In August, the US announced yet more sweeping economic sanctions on Iran and countries that trade with it as it sought to apply more economic pressure to isolate the country from the global economy during the diplomatic deadlock in their war.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the campaign as the “economic asphyxiation” of Iran.

It is difficult to quantify exactly how many Iranians have been killed by what Tehran views as “economic warfare”. However, a study published last year by the highly regarded medical journal The Lancet Global Health concluded that more than 564,250 people worldwide die annually as a result of US sanctions.

What does the US want?

In late February, just before the US launched its first strikes on Iran, the two sides were already holding talks hosted by Oman, which included the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme.

But before those talks could conclude, the US and Israel launched strikes, triggering the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas is shipped in peacetime, by Iran. The closure of the strait has since become the primary point of contention between the two sides, when it had not been an issue before the war began. The strait is currently subject to blockades by both sides.

Throughout the war, Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to strike a deal with Tehran. However, serious differences between the two sides will need to be resolved first, including the order in which issues are addressed for the purpose of peace talks.

Iran wants to establish its control of the Strait of Hormuz, have sanctions lifted and assets unfrozen, as well as ensure an end to US-Israeli strikes before it will go back to negotiating other issues, such as its nuclear programme. This was the order of events laid out in the MoU agreed between Iran and the US in June, but which quickly fell apart.

The US, however, wants everything to be on the table at the same time – it does not want to agree to anything relating to these Iranian demands before it addresses the other issues.

Scott Lucas, professor of US politics and international relations at University College Dublin, told Al Jazeera that Washington effectively wants Iran to surrender.

“The Strait of Hormuz has become a fundamental issue. The question here is, will both sides give? The memorandum of understanding clearly gave Iran a role in the management of the strait,” Lucas said.

“When the Trump administration pulled away from negotiating on the basis of the memorandum, they effectively went back to the idea of Iran having to completely allow passage through the Strait of Hormuz with no guarantees over it, in terms of not only what it means for Iran financially, but [also] in terms of Iranian security. The Iranian government is not going to agree to that, so we’re stuck in this limbo right now,” he added.

“Are the Trump folks going to come back to the talks on the basis of the memorandum of understanding or something that is a revised version of it, or are they going to try and break the government with economic warfare until at least after the US elections in November? That’s where we are right now.”

What does Iran want?

After half a century of bitter enmity with Washington, Iran wants to consolidate what it sees as the strategic gains it has made during a war it did not start. This specifically includes its newly established ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, sending global energy markets into a tailspin and placing additional pressure on the Trump administration.

Since US-Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28, Hormuz has dominated talks aimed at ending the war and emerged as Tehran’s greatest point of leverage. Prior to the conflict, Iran did not exert control over the waterway and all commercial shipping passed through freely.

For this reason, Iran will not move on to wider peace talks until it has leveraged its control of the strait to get its demands met. “Our discussion is clear. Right now, it is only about the Strait of Hormuz,” Araghchi said late on Monday.

“The opening of the Strait of Hormuz is also subject to the fulfilment of a series of conditions that we announced to the other side.”

Ali Salehian, director of the Center for Intellectual Diplomacy at the Governance and Policy Think Tank in Iran, told Al Jazeera that Tehran does not believe Washington will honour any future deal as it did not honour what was agreed under the Pakistan-brokered June MoU.

“For Iran, the bottom line of every negotiation with Trump, considering all of his misbehaving and [military] targeting of Iran during negotiations, is the Islamabad MoU,” Salehian said.

“Tehran thinks that if the US doesn’t fulfil its commitments based on the MoU, there is no guarantee that any kind of future deal would be sustainable.”

What is likely to happen next?

It does not look likely that the diplomatic standoff will be eased anytime soon, analysts say.

Both the US and Iran have indicated throughout the war that they would prefer a diplomatic settlement to a continuation of the war. However, Trump has continued to threaten Iran with more strikes if it does not agree to a deal, and Araghchi told US news outlet NBC on Sunday that Tehran is also prepared to resume fighting, even though it has not abandoned diplomacy.

“We are fully prepared for the time for the war to be resumed, and I repeat, we stand firm in the face of any new aggression, even if it comes to a doomsday war,” he said.

Trump said last week that he expects a deal will be reached, but not until after the US midterms on November 3.

“For the moment, the Trump administration is going to try to make the Iranian government capitulate through economic warfare,” Lucas said.

However, a deep sense of distrust remains between the two sides. Senior Iranian officials believe Trump will restart the war after the midterms on a far greater scale and that Israel would also participate.

If that theory proves true, Tehran may well prefer the fighting to resume before November’s elections, as it would allow Iran to impose a greater cost on Trump.

“The reaction of the Iranians to that might be to actually trigger the war themselves, early, right before the midterm elections in order to maximise the pain that [it] will impose on the US president,” Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the US-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told Al Jazeera earlier this month.

Tehran, Iran – Iranians are stocking up on food and medicines as fears grow that the country will face dire shortages as the United States tightens an embargo on the country.

The Iranian government had managed to keep household staples flowing during the early months of the war. But a US naval blockade and pivot to draconian sanctions have led to fears that imports will be limited.

More recently, the US announced a ban on Iranian airlines worldwide and is pressing other countries to cut trade ties with Iran in a bid to isolate the country.

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly last week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned Washington for its blockade on his country, saying it will prevent food and medicine from reaching the Iranian people.

On Saturday, US President Donald Trump rejected Iran’s offer for a seven-day truce that would see it reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for economic relief and other conditions.

As the war enters its eighth month and hopes for a diplomatic solution dim, Al Jazeera looks at how some Iranians are faring under a US embargo.

Consumers

Tehran’s stores remain stocked, but shoppers are keeping an eye on shop shelves. Their anxiety has deepened since a flurry of social media posts urging people to ensure they have several days of food before a possible new round of fighting with the US.

At one shopping centre, Ali, 51, was loading a trolley packed with rice, flour, pasta, pulses, cooking oil and canned food.

He is stocking up because he is convinced that Iran’s adversary is seeking to “starve” the people to push them to turn on their government.

“This is not a war in the traditional sense. It targets the people to put pressure on the authorities,” he said.

With flights to some nearby countries suspended, imports of certain medicines and mobile phone headsets are hard to find. The prices of those still available in shops have been pushed up.

Haj Pasandideh, a 71-year-old grocer, said he believed warehouses were well-stocked with basic goods at the moment. But the problem lies in the daily price increases due to Iran’s weakening rial, prompting him to bulk-buy goods before the expected hikes.

He sometimes caps cooking oil at one bottle per sale to ensure as many customers can purchase the goods as possible.

Exporters crushed

Farmers are also on edge due to the embargo, unable to ship out their produce and forced to sell to local markets.

The war has worsened the economic situation, even after years of sanctions that have pushed the country from being a regional exporter of agricultural and food products to being one of the region’s main importers.

Mehran, an apple grower, told Al Jazeera that due to the difficulties of exporting, he had sold only a third of this year’s harvest, all of it inside Iran.

Some neighbouring countries have halted trade with Iran in recent months, he said, while trucks now spend days at crossings they once cleared in a day, causing fruit to spoil before it reaches buyers.

“The blockade has not only closed the sea and air but also the land routes but in an undeclared manner,” he said.

Pharmaceutical shortages

The war has also deepened an already-dire shortage of medications. Some pharmacies Al Jazeera visited in southern Tehran had run out of infant formula and dozens of other types of medications.

Although officials have assured Iranians that substitute products were available, pharmacy staff expressed concern about the increasing number of customers searching for infant formula in vain.

“Imported medicines are disappearing fast, and lately people have been coming in to buy certain items before they need them for fear they will run out in future,” Mahsa, a 23-year-old pharmacy assistant, told Al Jazeera.

She said the health authorities had introduced “smart systems” to track the quantity and type of medication each person buys.

Breaking the blockade

The prospect of a prolonged siege and deteriorating economic conditions have driven some Iranians to call for a military solution.

On Tehran’s main thoroughfare, several people told Al Jazeera that another round of fighting with the US was unavoidable. Some urged the government to break the blockade by force before it is tightened further.

Mohsen, a 23-year-old economics student, believes Washington’s goal is to strangle the Iranian economy and the cost will ultimately be felt by Iranian citizens.

Iran possesses many strong cards that it must use to break the air and sea blockade before they develop into a land blockade that would completely choke Tehran, he said.

Alireza Taghavinia, an Iranian international relations expert, told Al Jazeera that the gap between Washington and Tehran was too wide to be bridged. “The siege imposed by force will only be lifted by force,” he said.

In a worst-case scenario, falling living standards could bring protesters onto the streets, he added.

“The enemy is counting on stirring up chaos inside Iran because it believes no military strike will achieve its objectives without internal unrest,” he said.

Tehran, Iran – Hours after US President Donald Trump rejected a diplomatic solution put forward by Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, explosions were heard in the waterway, according to Iranian media.

Reports of blasts near southern Iran’s Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz suggested that multiple antiship missiles and drones were fired at vessels transiting the waterway against Tehran’s wishes.

While Iranian authorities did not confirm any attacks in the Strait of Hormuz that day, shipping continues to be attacked in the waters, including an Indian cargo ship last week, which killed a sailor.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains that the strait is closed to any ship that does not coordinate with Iranian authorities. On Sunday afternoon, it released video of what it said was a second US underwater drone seized this month.

Tehran has issued instructions to shipping companies transiting the Strait of Hormuz to use a temporary route approved by Iranian authorities and pay relevant fees. But it has also said the strait will not fully reopen until the US blockade on Iranian ports ends.

Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority announced on Saturday that it would blacklist any shipping charterer company which orders crews to use routes it considers to be unauthorised.

It also published what it described as an apology from an unnamed shipowner blaming commercial pressure from its charterer for trying to pass through the strait.

Washington still insists that its warships are successfully guiding oil tankers out of the strait via a different route. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright told Fox News on Sunday that the “running average” of crude oil in transit was nearly 13 million barrels per day.

A September 19 operational update by US Central Command claimed that its forces had helped move more than one billion barrels of crude out of the Gulf over roughly two months.

The US military also says its forces have redirected 122 commercial vessels to enforce the naval blockade of Iran’s ports, halting all Iranian crude exports.

Tehran has claimed that the US is providing false information regarding Strait of Hormuz traffic to project control over the key waterway. Shipping has been severely disrupted since the US and Israel started their war on Iran on February 28.

Andreas Krieg, associate professor at King’s College London, said Iran’s strategy of launching maritime attacks has spread the economic costs of the conflict beyond its borders.

While Iran has suffered economically from war damages, the US naval blockade and sanctions, it would be a mistake “to assume that reaching that threshold produces submission”.

“The next Iranian move is therefore likely to be an attempt to increase the pain experienced by the Gulf rather than simply absorb further American pressure,” Krieg said.

“That could mean more aggressive vessel interdictions in Hormuz, attacks on energy infrastructure, greater Houthi pressure around Bab al-Mandeb and pressure from Iranian-aligned groups against alternative Saudi export routes. We are already seeing how pressure on Hormuz, the Red Sea and Saudi infrastructure can interact.”

More escalation on the way

At the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Iran projected a message of defiance while also proposing to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within a week if its seven conditions were met.

They included lifting the blockade on Iran, the release of frozen Iranian funds and an end to attacks on all fronts, including Israel’s assault on Lebanon. The demands mostly amounted to a return to the June memorandum of understanding between the US and Israel.

Tehran has added that reopening the strait must be undertaken through a bilateral arrangement already finalised with Oman, the only other country with territorial waters in Hormuz.

US President Donald Trump told reporters he rejected the offer, but Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Sunday they were adamant about the conditions and would await an official response through mediators, such as Pakistan, Qatar and Oman.

Abolfazl Shekarchi, chief spokesman of the Iranian armed forces, warned that if the US further intervenes in the Strait of Hormuz, “it will get slapped”.

“The Americans have no way out other than withdrawing from the West Asia region. The sooner they leave, the fewer losses they will incur and the region will certainly become safe after that,” he said.

Iranian army spokesman Mohammad Akraminia  said conditions were deteriorating so badly for the US that it might launch another “military aggression” on Iran.

Krieg said that as the US moves to isolate Iran via sanctions, Tehran, unable to respond with mutual financial measures against Washington, will be forced to rely on continued coercion in the Strait of Hormuz.

“The most likely level remains controlled attrition rather than an immediate return to the massive air campaign of the opening months,” Krieg said.

“Over the coming weeks, I would expect further attacks or attempted attacks on tankers, US-enabled shipping and regional infrastructure, followed by limited US strikes against IRGC maritime assets, coastal missile positions, drones or vessels involved in those operations. That tit-for-tat cycle has already re-emerged around Hormuz.”

The red carpet was rolled out, and a trade truce was extended. Yet, beneath the pomp and pageantry of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit with US leader Donald Trump on Thursday, Washington and Beijing remain locked in a much deeper strategic rivalry.

Xi arrived in Washington, DC on Wednesday evening for talks on Thursday, and Trump was there to meet him personally on the tarmac.

The meeting was the first state visit by a Chinese leader to the US in 11 years. But it is also the third time in less than a year that the two men have met face to face, as the two powers remain uneasily gridlocked in competition over AI, rare-earth metals, the question of Taiwan, and the Iran war.

Overhanging it all is the paused, but simmering, trade war between their two nations.

Almost as soon as Trump began his second term in the White House in January 2025, up went tariffs on Chinese goods as he accused China of facilitating the flow of fentanyl, a deadly drug, to the US. Beijing responded with its own levies, then restricted exports of valuable rare-earth metals which are crucial for the development and manufacture of everything high-tech, from smartphones to fighter jets. At one point, tariffs were heading towards 150 percent before being paused to allow time for talks.

Finally, the two leaders called a truce on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea on October 30, and they met once more, in May, when Trump travelled to Beijing.

As Xi landed in Washington on Wednesday this week, the Trump administration announced that the two countries had agreed to extend an October 2025 truce which had offered some respite from the punishing tariffs, produced an agreement from China to buy more soyabeans from the US and delayed the ban on rare-earth exports from China until January 10. The prospect of a much-longed-for trade deal appeared to be in the air when US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox News he had met Chinese ‌Vice Premier He Lifeng before Xi’s visit to “see if we could ⁠do a bigger deal as opposed to just a series ⁠of smaller things”.

But analysts have, for the most part, shot down such hopes. Beyond tariffs, they say, the simmering conflict between the two powers now encompasses new US sanctions on buyers of Russian oil – namely China – and sweeping investment and research restrictions, never mind the intensifying race for dominance in artificial intelligence.

“The two-month extension isn’t a bridge to a grand bargain – it’s a temporary sandbag holding back a structural flood,” Beijing-based Einar Tangen, a senior fellow at the Center for International Governance Innovation, told Al Jazeera.

Theatrics or continued thaw in tensions?

In fact, the truce is little more than “transactional theatre” – an attempt at good optics before the upcoming US midterm elections – Tangen said.

Trump’s deeply unpopular war on Iran has already inflicted severe damage to his chances in that vote. Democrats are leading in the polls amid concerns about the rising cost of energy, triggered by the war which the US started. Trump ultimately needs wins on other issues.

The current truce with China serves a purpose, therefore, but is fragile enough to be undone the moment political utility shifts for Trump, Tangen said.

“Success in January won’t be measured by what is solved, but by whether the knot is left tight enough to hold, but not kill,” said Tangen.

Phillippe Le Corre, professor of international relations and Asian studies at France’s ESSEC Business School, said the length of the truce extension indicates clearly that a more permanent deal remains out of grasp.

“The extensions are getting shorter and shorter, which means they haven’t found a common ground on many issues,” Le Corre told Al Jazeera.

“The two-month extension is a terrible outcome for the US. Nothing is resolved, and many Damocles’ swords are still hanging over Washington’s head,” he added.

Trump’s entire China policy, Le Corre argued, is in fact short-sighted. “That is bringing the world a lot of uncertainty,” he said.

Some analysts are more hopeful, but not much. Sun Chenghao, a fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing, described the extension of the trade truce as a “useful interim step”. It shows that both sides want to preserve the recent easing of tensions, which is meaningful progress, he said.

“From China’s perspective, a sustainable agreement needs reciprocal benefits and greater policy predictability,” Sun told Al Jazeera. “Additional purchases cannot indefinitely compensate for uncertainty over tariffs, technology restrictions and market access.”

The extension’s value, however, will depend on whether it produces “concrete commitments” from Beijing and Washington, Sun added.

A game of ‘economic chicken’

There is motivation to get a deal done, analysts say. Any escalation in the US-China trade war will be costly for both sides.

But there is some way to go. A Congressional Research Service report in July 2026 noted that Chinese goods exported to the US still face tariffs of 36.5 percent, while US goods entering China are taxed at 31 percent.

Any higher, and they will raise import and manufacturing costs in the US, squeeze margins and increase pressure on consumer prices, said Sun. They would also hurt US farmers and industrial exporters, he added, just as the US faces pressure from the rising costs of its war on Iran, which have pushed it into a record national debt of $40 trillion two years earlier than expected.

“Washington is playing a high-stakes game of economic chicken with a $40 trillion debt load, an inflationary sword of Damocles, zero fiscal cushion to absorb a truce collapse and a dependence [on] Chinese industrial and manufacturing inputs,” Tangen said.

US consumers and the economy in general will find it tough to survive yet another inflationary shock from renewed tariffs “at a time when the federal budget already operates like a high-wire Ponzi scheme”.

Then there is the AI race, which no one can afford to lose. According to Jon Bateman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a partial “decoupling” of US and Chinese technology ecosystems is under way. US policymakers have pushed to become less dependent on Chinese tech and “to secure America’s technological future in the context of a rising China”, Bateman writes.

But that will not help if there is a collapse in valuations of companies in the AI sector, which currently drive global stock markets. An AI valuation collapse, Tangen warned, “could trigger a financial tsunami that makes 2008 look tame – making technological decoupling meaningless as the world is plunged into a depression”.

Despite the trade war and Trump’s tariffs, China’s trade with other countries has risen sharply, with the country registering a $1.2 trillion global trade surplus last year. But an escalation of the trade war with the US would nevertheless spell increased pressure on export orders, employment in exposed industries and business confidence, said Sun.

Beijing does hold one crucial ace card – it is sitting on 60 percent of the world’s known deposits of rare-earth minerals, said Le Corre. It processes 90 percent of them, too. These are the metals that all countries need supplies of for semiconductors, technological components and the manufacture of weapons, to name but a few. Last year, China began to make use of that leverage by restricting exports of five of the 12 rare-earth metals it mines in April. Then, in October, it prepared to restrict seven more – until the trade truce happened. Plans for the export restrictions are not shelved, however, merely on hold.

“[China] understood this over the past year and they are certainly not going to give up on this,” said Le Corre.

“Washington is hostile, but it is hooked,” Tangen said. “You cannot threaten China with secondary sanctions on energy while desperately needing its rare-earths to fuel your military-industrial base.”

A drawn-out path to durability

The path to a lasting US-China trade deal will be long and rocky. First, any new tariff reductions will need more coverage and duration, said Sun.

For a deal to last, it would also require “more predictable licensing and actual deliveries of rare earths and critical minerals; restraint in expanding technology restrictions; and market access reflected in regulatory approvals and completed transactions”, he said.

A durable agreement also needs regular consultations and a process for resolving complaints. If all this can be hammered out then, just maybe, there might be a chance, Sun said.

Tangen and Le Corre were less optimistic, however. “The US view of China as an existential threat has to change before there can be solutions,” said Tangen.

Le Corre, meanwhile, said that while China is a long-term planner, “durable is a word that can hardly be associated with Trump.”

The existing trade truce also risks breaking down if there are new unilateral tariffs, broader technology or mineral restrictions, or disputes over whether commitments have been fulfilled, said Sun.

Tensions over Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory, but for which the US approved an $11.1bn arms sale in December last year, could also trigger a breakdown in trade relations, the analysts said.

“Taiwan remains the ultimate low-probability, catastrophic-impact tail risk – where a single round of arms sales can snap a multibillion-dollar trade truce in an instant,” Tangen noted.

Islamabad, Pakistan — The motorway linking Pakistan’s capital with Peshawar, about 180km (110 miles) to the northwest, has been closed to all traffic until further notice, according to a police notification.

So have the highway towards Dera Ismail Khan, the Hazara motorway and the Grand Trunk Road at Attock.

Each carries traffic between Islamabad and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the province governed by the party of jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan, whose supporters plan to march on the capital on Sunday, September 27, demanding his release.

The motorway from Lahore, about 375km (235 miles) to the southeast, remains open.

Inside Islamabad, workers have welded shipping containers together and filled them with gravel and sand so they cannot be pushed aside. Several schools and colleges have been told to shut so police brought in from Punjab and Sindh can be housed there.

Police expect the march to draw between 20,000 and 25,000 people, according to local media reports.

While two of the country’s main opposition parties announced marches on the capital this month, only Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has faced measures on this scale.

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a religious party, also set out for Islamabad last week to protest against rising fuel prices. On Monday, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif telephoned its leader, Hafiz Naeemur Rehman, and by Tuesday afternoon JI had postponed its march, pending a meeting between the two men.

PTI leaders have received no such call.

Instead, Khan’s three sisters, all over the age of 65, have been detained in Lahore and at least six of the party’s legislators in Islamabad, all under a 1960 public order law that allows preventive detention without charge.

PTI says the true figure of those arrested is higher, and that one lawmaker taken from the parliament lodges has not been traced since.

Khan has been in prison since August 2023 and remains Pakistan’s most prominent opposition figure. But his party enters the final stretch before the protest weakened, with no major demonstration outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since November 2024, by its own account.

Yet, say analysts, the Pakistani government appears to be treating the protest march as a far bigger threat than a regular political event would warrant.

“While this is undoubtedly a difficult moment for PTI, it is equally exposing the government’s own frustration,” Habib Akram, a Lahore-based political analyst, told Al Jazeera.

“In fact, the government’s conduct suggests something more. It isn’t just afraid of this protest; it has turned this protest into a matter of its own survival.”

A capital behind containers

More than 2,000 containers have been placed across Islamabad and at Attock Bridge, the main crossing between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, according to media reports, with 19,000 police officers on their way from Punjab and Sindh, and thousands more deployed at Attock.

Dawn, the country’s leading English-language newspaper, said in an editorial that the government appeared to be preparing “not for a political event but an invasion”.

Talal Chaudhry, the junior interior minister, rejected the suggestion that the government was shutting down the capital itself.

“Normal life in Islamabad is continuing. Hospitals, offices and essential services are functioning. The containers and security arrangements are precautionary measures, not a shutdown,” he told Al Jazeera.

Rana Ihsaan Afzal, a coordinator to the prime minister and a government spokesperson, was more candid.

“In trying to counter the rhetoric PTI has adopted, we do have to take certain measures, and yes, those measures carry their own consequences too, but we have to look at the bigger picture,” he told Al Jazeera.

It is all being mounted during one of the deadliest weeks for Pakistan’s security forces this year.

An attack on a police compound in Kohat, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, killed more than 20 people on September 18, and six soldiers were killed in a gunfight in nearby Hangu two days later.

Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi set those losses against the march in Lahore on Monday.

“The situation in KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] over the past 10 days is before everyone. There was a suicide attack on a mosque, and two or three other attacks. Our captain was killed, our soldiers were killed, our policemen were killed, and these people are preparing to storm a city,” he said.

The government’s case

Government ministers have seized on a remark by Junaid Akbar, PTI’s chief in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who said protesters would turn Islamabad into Somnath, a Hindu temple in India sacked by Mehmood of Ghazni, an 11th-century invader, to try to paint the upcoming protest as a major law and order threat.

“Peaceful people do not leave their homes carrying nail-studded sticks,” Information Minister Attaullah Tarar said in Kohat on Monday.

But the PTI’s Sohail Afridi, the chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who will lead the September 27 march, answered Tarar in Peshawar on Monday.

“We will go there on nothing but two hands and two feet. There will be nothing else in our hands,” he said.

In a September 18 judgement, the Islamabad High Court ruled that no party could block roads into the capital, and barred provincial governments from using state resources for the march.

Days later came the arrests of Imran Khan’s sisters. Aleema Khan was detained in Lahore on Sunday, and her sisters, Uzma Khan and Noreen Niazi, were taken in a predawn raid on their homes the next day, according to a family statement on September 22.

The Lahore High Court has reserved its decision on whether a petition challenging Aleema’s detention is admissible, after the family’s lawyer argued that the order was issued after the arrest.

Chaudhry said the sisters faced several cases, had led confrontational protests in the past, and were being held as a preventive measure.

PTI says the arrests reach far wider, listing five members of the National Assembly, a senator, provincial legislators and more than 1,500 workers.

“We were peaceful, we are peaceful, and we will remain peaceful. We are being punished for being peaceful,” Gohar Ali Khan, the PTI chairman, said in Peshawar on Monday, noting that four women from Khan’s family, including his wife Bushra Bibi, are now in jail.

‘Long march’ vs ‘permanent plan of action’

But Interior Minister Naqvi suggested that the government is bracing for a confrontation.

“I think this time we will draw up a permanent plan of action. We will not go halfway,” Naqvi said in Lahore on Monday, adding that the matter would be settled “once and for all”.

What he ruled out was a long sit-in of the kind PTI has staged before.

“This time, it will not happen that they come, and the country is shut down for 10 or 20 days. That possibility does not exist,” he said.

Afridi has signalled that he has exactly that in mind.

“The long march is not a T20, it will be a Test match,” he said on Monday, a reference to cricket’s five-day format.

If Naqvi’s comments sound ominous, they also carry a history with them.

On May 9, 2023, after Imran Khan was briefly arrested, his supporters attacked military installations across the country, including burning down a senior commander’s official residence in Lahore. That led to a major crackdown on the PTI’s supporters and leaders, with hundreds placed under arrest for days, and party leaders pressured to leave the group.

Then, on November 26, 2024, a PTI march on Islamabad ended in an overnight crackdown by security forces, in which the party says at least 12 of its supporters were killed. The government denies that, and says four security personnel died — even though Al Jazeera met families of some of the PTI supporters killed.

A contested mandate

PTI was stripped of its electoral symbol before the February 2024 general election, forcing its candidates to run as independents.

They still won 93 seats, more than any other party, but could not form a coalition, and the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz took power with other major parties.

A Commonwealth observer group, in its report on the polls released a year later, found that decisions by key institutions had “consistently limited the ability of one particular party” to contest the vote, in a reference to the PTI.

While the Election Commission of Pakistan rejected allegations of rigging, two and a half years on, the popularity scale remains tilted in favour of PTI.

Bilal Gilani, executive director of the pollster Gallup Pakistan, said its unpublished Public Opinion Pulse surveys showed a landscape broadly similar to 2024.

“PTI continues to lead nationally, but faces strong competition from PML-N in Punjab and PPP in Sindh,” he told Al Jazeera, adding that Khan remained the country’s most popular leader.

For Akram, that unresolved argument — over the lack of legitimacy of the 2024 election in the eyes of Pakistanis — is what keeps the pressure on.

“You can hold as much power as you want, but that question never fully goes away. It continues to haunt you, and it continues to be a source of anxiety for the government,” Akram said.

The ‘hard state’

In March 2025, army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, who now also serves as Pakistan’s chief of defence forces, told a parliamentary security committee that the country must stop acting as a “soft state”.

“How long will we continue to sacrifice countless lives in a manner of a soft state?” he asked, according to state broadcaster PTV.

For Ahmed Ijaz, an Islamabad-based political analyst, the response to the September 27 march is a response to that thinking, rather than the PTI’s strength.

“Behind that confidence lies the thinking of a hard state, one that has decided no one will be granted an unconditional right to protest going forward,” he said.

Akram, however, said that a different factor might also be worrying the government and the military behind it.

The war in the Middle East has pushed petrol to 393.75 rupees ($1.42) a litre ($5.37 per gallon), up about 51 rupees ($0.18) since the start of September. That is what Jamaat-e-Islami was marching against, and it has warned that it will resume its march in October if the prime minister offers no relief.

Akram said the government’s real worry is multiple issues of antigovernment anger — price rises and Imran Khan’s continued incarceration — coming together.

“That merging could then pull other groups out onto the streets too, and that is precisely what worries the government,” he said.

Excluding Ra’am and the Joint List leaves Palestinian citizens in Israel without major Knesset representation options.

Israel’s Central Elections Committee has voted to bar both main Arab electoral lists from next month’s election, putting the political representation of Palestinian citizens of Israel before the Supreme Court weeks before voters go to the polls.

The committee voted on Wednesday to disqualify the United Arab List, or Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, and the Joint List, an alliance of the Arab-led Hadash, Ta’al and Balad parties. It also voted separately to bar Hadash legislator Ofer Cassif and Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh. The election is scheduled for October 27.

The bans are not final. Decisions against individual candidates require Supreme Court approval, while lists can appeal their exclusion. Adalah, the legal centre representing the parties and candidates, says it will challenge the votes when the court hears the cases next week.

Ra’am called its exclusion “political and unacceptable”, saying the decision was intended to prevent it from influencing the balance of power and changing the government.

The Joint List said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir were trying to discourage Arab citizens from voting “because they fear our ability to bring down the government of genocide and racism”. Its leader, Yousef Jabareen, questioned how the committee could bar parties representing more than 1.25 million voters.

Abu Shehadeh told Al Jazeera that his exclusion was an attempt to silence criticism of government policy and said the decisions would be challenged in court and through public protest. Rejecting the allegation that he supports violence, he told The Times of Israel: “I have never called for violence or terrorism. I oppose armed struggle.”

The petitions invoke Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset, which allows a list or candidate to be excluded for denying Israel’s existence as a “Jewish and democratic state”, inciting racism or supporting armed struggle against Israel by an enemy state or an organisation designated as terrorist.

Netanyahu’s Likud party sought to disqualify the Joint List and Cassif, and was among the groups that filed against Ra’am. Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit party also sought to bar Abu Shehadeh. Adalah disputes the allegations. It says the case against Ra’am presents no evidence that the party supports armed struggle, while the Joint List petition relies heavily on old material, including bills proposed in previous Knessets.

Abu Shehadeh’s case has drawn a different response. Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara found no legal basis to exclude the other targeted parties and candidates but said an article he published on October 8, 2023, which she said may constitute support for armed struggle, warranted serious examination. The committee voted 31-4 to bar him. Adalah says the article contains no such call.

The push to bar Abu Shehadeh drew support from parties outside Netanyahu’s coalition. According to The Times of Israel, opposition parties voted to disqualify him, as did Supreme Court Justice Noam Sohlberg, who chairs the elections committee. The vote broke with decades of precedent in which committee chairs abstained from disqualification votes. Abu Shehadeh’s exclusion still requires approval from the full Supreme Court.

Why the Arab vote matters

Ra’am joined the coalition government formed by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid in 2021, helping end Netanyahu’s 12 consecutive years in office in 2021, although Abbas had previously discussed cooperation with Netanyahu as well. Now Likud itself has filed petitions against Arab representation, while Ben-Gvir’s party has pursued separate exclusions.

A Channel 12 poll published on Tuesday projected seven seats for the Joint List and five for Ra’am, against 50 for Netanyahu’s current coalition bloc. The 12 projected Arab seats would not automatically back Netanyahu’s opponents, as mainstream opposition parties remain divided over whether to govern with Arab support. But removing both lists would change the possible routes to the 61-seat majority needed to form a government.

The Supreme Court has overturned previous committee bans on Arab lists and candidates, including Balad’s exclusion in 2022. It must now decide whether the evidence meets the legal threshold for barring the two principal lists seeking to represent Palestinian citizens of Israel. The ruling will determine who can appear on the October ballot.

Tehran, Iran – Travel is becoming increasingly difficult for Iranian civilians as United States sanctions shut domestic airlines out of much of the world’s airspace and international carriers continue to avoid the country.

The US Department of the Treasury designated 27 airlines on September 8, covering the remaining Iranian carriers that had not previously been sanctioned by Washington. Major names like Iran Air and Mahan are among those already heavily sanctioned, but have continued limited operations.

Recent designations have also targeted individuals and entities linked to aviation support and procurement in the United Arab Emirates, Turkiye, China, India, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and elsewhere.

Airports and companies that provide Iranian-operated aeroplanes with fuel, landing services, or ticket sales risk secondary US sanctions that could cut them off from the US financial system, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on Monday. It is the latest attempt to squeeze Iran and force it to make concessions amid the US-Israel war on Iran.

Wednesday marked the expiry of a short wind-down period allowing countries to stop servicing Iranian carriers, leading to the cancellation of all but a handful of Iranian flights to Turkiye, UAE and China.

Aviation authorities in several neighbouring countries that had continued to allow Iranian airlines to use their airspace and airport services would no longer be providing them, including Oman, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. In Iraq, Baghdad Airport was declared off-limits to Iranian carriers, but flights to Najaf Airport were still operating on Wednesday.

Many flights between Iran and major transit hubs in Turkiye and the UAE had already been suspended because of the war and sanctions. International airlines have also largely stopped flying to Iran, with Turkish Airlines suspending flights until at least March 2027, and Qatar Airways, Emirates, and Lufthansa’s operations also suspended.

‘A new level’ of sanctions

Iran-based aviation and transit expert Mohammadreza Ebrahimpour said years of US sanctions had already forced Iranian airlines to rely on third countries and work with smaller firms to get fuel or services. Obtaining spare parts needed to keep Iran’s ageing aircraft flying has also become increasingly difficult.

But the decision by aviation authorities in neighbouring countries to formally refuse services to Iranian airlines constituted “a new level of sanctions in action” that could have longer-lasting consequences, he told Al Jazeera.

Ebrahimpour said the US had also effectively prohibited international airlines from flying through Iranian airspace by suspending authorisations for some US-origin aircraft to fly to Iran and limiting US-linked overflight payments.

“This is a big blow because payments for overflights were one of the most lucrative parts of [Iran’s] aviation industry, which could act as a support for developing infrastructure and the overall industry,” Ebrahimpour said, adding that Iran earned more than $300m a year from this.

Beyond the effect on civilian passengers and the import of some goods, the measures could put tens of thousands of jobs at risk across the aviation sector and related industries, including tourism and hospitality.

Ebrahimpour pointed out that the International Civil Aviation Agency and other organisations have failed to offer any tangible protection to Iran’s aviation industry during years of sanctions. Iranian authorities, he said, would likely consider China and Russia among the few countries potentially able to provide assistance.

The two countries have rejected US sanctions against Iran, although some of their more globally connected financial networks and companies have, at times, distanced themselves from Iran to avoid secondary sanctions.

Under pressure from all fronts

The flight cancellations have pushed thousands of travellers towards land crossings, particularly those with Turkiye and Armenia, where onward international flights remain available for Iranians. Heavy congestion has been reported in recent days at the Bazargan and Razi border crossings with Turkiye and along land routes to the Armenian capital Yerevan.

But everyday passenger travel overland into Azerbaijan remains restricted, with Azerbaijan’s government citing internal security and COVID-19 restrictions. As a result, Iranians cannot cross overland into Azerbaijan to catch a flight there.

The Shalamcheh and Chazabeh border crossings with Iraq were also temporarily closed earlier this month, leaving travellers stranded, before reopening to passengers on September 13.

For thousands of Iranians attempting to travel, the flight suspensions mean significantly longer journeys. Some members of the Iranian diaspora have expressed concern online that the lingering effects of war and sanctions could potentially prevent them from visiting parents and other family members in Iran.

Bus tickets from Iran to Turkiye have reportedly sold for quadruple their normal price on the black market amid surging demand.

Some of the people making the journey are young Iranians who are attempting to take international language tests that are not allowed to be administered inside Iran due to sanctions. The tests are often a prerequisite for anyone planning to study, work, or settle abroad.

Iranian academics have also expressed concern about growing isolation from the international academic community. Numerous universities across the globe, including in Norway, Australia, Singapore, Estonia and elsewhere, have in recent weeks rejected postgraduate and research applications from Iranians as a result of US education sanctions.

At the same time, many of Iran’s roughly 90 million people are currently unable to afford international travel – or even domestic flights – as the country’s economic conditions worsen.

The Trump administration has portrayed the war and sanctions as measures directed at the Iranian authorities.

The US Treasury has said its aviation restrictions are intended to disrupt the use of Iranian commercial aviation for weapons procurement and transportation, including activities linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But the designation of entire airlines under “Operation Economic Outcast”, after nearly seven months of war, has also had sweeping consequences for affected civilians.

Iran’s international aviation network was already badly damaged prior to the latest package of sanctions. Aviation analytics company Cirium reported that international capacity in August 2026 was 49 percent lower than in August 2025, despite a modest recovery from July.

The latest flight cancellations are also expected to further disrupt imports by air at a time when the US naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports in the Strait of Hormuz has constrained maritime trade routes, while war and sanctions have caused disruptions and delays to road and rail cargo routes.

Some of Iran’s medical imports enter the country by air, raising concerns that the latest aviation restrictions could place more pressure on an already struggling healthcare sector. A domestic pharmaceutical company executive told Al Jazeera earlier this month that the cost of some imported supplies, some of which arrived by air, had risen as much as 10-fold as a result of sanctions, wider economic pressure, and war damage.

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Wednesday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian accused the Trump administration of “bullying”.

“They have tested Iran’s resilience, and now they know full well that Iran cannot be forced to surrender through war,” Pezeshkian said.

Millions of voters went to polls in Morocco on Wednesday to determine the makeup of the House of Representatives, the parliament’s lower house.

Twenty-seven political parties are competing for 395 seats in the country’s 12th legislative election since independence in 1956.

Almost 16 million people are able to vote, with 55 percent residing in urban areas and 45 percent in rural regions, seeing a mix of concerns among voters.

Economic frustrations

While King Mohammed VI will maintain most executive powers, the new government will manage many public affairs for the coming years.

Once the votes are counted, the king will appoint the head of government from the leading party, but they will still need the support of 198 deputies – an absolute majority – to gain parliamentary confidence.

The election comes at a time of mounting challenges for the country, with the economic situation creating discontent and frustration, Mohammed Masbah, head of the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, told Al Jazeera.

“The upcoming elections will have special importance because they come in a context tied to a social and economic crisis, especially high prices and the cost of living on one hand,” Masbah told Al Jazeera.

“On the other hand, there is a state of frustration among broad segments of society, especially the youth. The Gen Z protests last year, as well as the attempt to cross towards Ceuta a few weeks ago, demonstrate this crisis.”

The introduction of a new financial system designed to support candidates aged 35 could encourage more youth participation. But the nearly six million Moroccans residing overseas, many of them younger citizens, will have to appoint a proxy in Morocco to cast their vote.

There is also an upcoming key milestone for the country with the 2030 World Cup, which requires huge investments. What will remain in the minds of most voters is the state of the economy and inflation, which have impacted the living standards of many Moroccans.

“I believe the upcoming elections will produce a government majority whose primary function will be to address these imbalances, especially the economic ones related to the high cost of living in Morocco,” Masbah said.

“Regarding the issues that were raised and discussed by the majority of political parties, whether represented in the government or the opposition, they are the issue of employment and high prices.”

Two of the main parties competing in the election, the National Rally of Independents and the Authenticity and Modernity Party, have put these issues at the front of their campaigns in what has been a heated election.

“Of course, this is the main topic, but in the public debate, we also noticed conflicts, especially between the top two parties currently running the government,” Masbah said. “We noticed mudslinging and accusations of squandering funds and stealing candidates, which may increase voter alienation from voting today.”

Despite the tense conditions, Morocco’s Public Prosecution has recorded a significant drop in election-related complaints compared with the 2021 vote.

But legal amendments that criminalise digital offences for the first time – including the dissemination of fake news and false allegations intended to defame candidates or voters – have been introduced. The digital space became the primary arena for violations this year, accounting for 22 complaints.

Masbah said that despite a mood of frustration in Morocco over the government’s inability to manage key economic and social issues, turnout is expected to remain steady, as it has been over the past 20 years, due to structural factors.

“Electoral and voting behaviour in Morocco is not primarily linked to electoral programmes and promises [of parties], as much as it is linked to the stable bloc formed by Moroccan deserts and villages, which relies primarily on a network of notables who have influence and the ability to win voters’ voices through utilitarian voting,” Masbah said.

“I expect that if there is a decline in the voting rate – and this is likely – it will not be catastrophic or a sharp decline, given the consideration I mentioned earlier, which is the focus on notables and traditional elites in winning over voters.”

At the colloquium established shortly after the second world war to prevent future wars, United States President Donald Trump did just the inverse: He platformed his unceasing threats against Iran, suggesting almost casually on Tuesday that he could “annihilate” the country he has waged war against since February 28.

But behind closed doors on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), a flurry of diplomatic activity concerning the ongoing US-Iran war has also been unfolding, as world leaders gather in New York.

The US and Iran held indirect talks for three hours on Tuesday. US special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, with Trump calling it a “very good” and “very productive” meeting. Trump also met Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders that day, with senior officials from the region mulling a Qatari proposal for a common security framework involving Iran and the Gulf states.

Meanwhile, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in New York early on Wednesday – the first time a leader whose country is at war with the US has set foot on US soil to address the gathering. And Chinese President Xi Jinping will skirt New York to instead meet Trump one-on-one in Washington, DC – his first state visit to the US in just less than a decade. Xi lands on Wednesday evening.

All these separate diplomatic initiatives, analysts tell Al Jazeera, are parts of a push to bring Iran and the US back to the negotiating table. According to Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Tehran, Tohid Asadi, Araghchi’s meeting with Witkoff and Kushner was to convey Tehran’s latest set of conditions to end the war, following the collapse of the June 60-day memorandum of understanding (MoU) finalised in Islamabad, Pakistan.

But analysts say expecting an actual deal to emerge this week from the diplomatic meetings in the US would be unrealistic. Multiple actors and mediators in the conflict are testing possible off-ramps, but core disagreements between Washington and Tehran remain unresolved.

“I am sceptical that a breakthrough deal can emerge this week, but a series of understandings can build confidence for renewed diplomacy,” Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, told Al Jazeera.

Too early for a breakthrough

Vakil is hesitant to call the current moment ripe for a diplomatic breakthrough – it is far too early, and there is a history of negotiations failing, she said.

“Both sides have been negotiating for over two years and on two occasions, that ended with military conflict and these negotiations continue amid persistent military threats,” she said.

Iran has long pointed to its previous rounds of diplomatic talks with the US – in 2025 and again this year – as evidence that Washington can veer from negotiations to military action. It has cited the 12-day war last June, and the current conflict, which began with joint US-Israeli strikes on Tehran at a time Washington and Tehran were engaged in Oman-mediated dialogue.

Adel Abdel Ghafar, a senior fellow focusing on the Middle East at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said that there appears to be “genuine” movement towards reigniting negotiations – but also “a fair amount of posturing”. He referenced Trump’s praise for Tuesday’s indirect Iran-US talks and his pugnacious UNGA speech the same day.

A breakthrough hinges on whether Iran’s diplomats in New York can actually deliver, he said.

“Araghchi and Pezeshkian can negotiate, but any deal will need the consent of the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] and the hardliners in charge of the war back home,” Abdel Ghafar told Al Jazeera.

There are specific indicators to watch for another round of US-Iran contact, the analysts said.

“The signs to watch for are another confirmed round of US-Iran talks, agreement on sequencing or reciprocal steps, and language from both sides becoming more specific about implementation rather than simply repeating maximalist demands,” said Vakil.

Abdel Ghafar added that, against the backdrop of UNGA, signs could include Araghchi or Pezeshkian meeting directly with US officials, in addition to supportive statements from more hardline elements of the Iranian administration back home.

The appearance of such indicators could lead to a stronger push for such talks when Trump meets Xi, as well as an easing of fighting between the Iran-backed Houthi group and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, which has escalated in recent weeks, the analyst added.

The limits of Gulf and Chinese diplomacy

The analysts agreed that the Gulf states remain crucial in brokering a return to talks because they have channels to both warring sides, as well as a very strong interest in preventing further escalation, having absorbed the cost of the fighting since February. Qatar, Oman and other Gulf states have been involved in mediation efforts throughout the conflict.

“Qatar and Oman, in particular, can help translate broad political messages into workable arrangements on issues such as Hormuz and regional security,” said Vakil.

China, meanwhile, has less capacity or interest to mediate, she argued.

Beijing, however, could use its economic and political leverage with Tehran “to encourage compromise and give Iran greater confidence that any agreement will not leave it completely isolated”, said Vakil.

Abdel Ghafar pointed out that China remains Iran’s main customer for its oil, explaining why Beijing has pushed for a return to the June interim deal and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

“Still, I think neither can impose a settlement – it ultimately comes down to Washington and Tehran,” he said.

Hostilities and Hormuz

The tit-for-tat rhetoric has resulted in continued deadlock in the conflict, with each side unwilling to relinquish to the other’s demands and appear to admit defeat.

On Tuesday, following Trump’s remarks on annihilating Iran, Iran’s military warned that it is ready to respond with “crushing” attacks more severe than earlier in the war.

“The main challenge is finding a formula that both governments can present domestically as a negotiated compromise rather than capitulation,” said Vakil.

The Strait of Hormuz remains a key obstacle.

“It’s Iran’s strongest card and the thing Washington most wants back, with oil prices high and midterms approaching,” said Abdel Ghafar.

“Tehran will be reluctant to give it up without firm guarantees in return.”

Still, he warned that even if Washington and Tehran de-escalate, that does not automatically extend to the Red Sea.

The wider landscape of regional instability and conflict has created new conditions for Yemen’s unresolved war to flare up once again. The Bab al-Mandeb, now under effective Houthi control, has gained greater significance amid Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for global oil and gas supplies.

“Calm in Hormuz won’t necessarily mean calm in Bab al-Mandab,” said Abdel Ghafar.

The Houthis are attempting to push into the Kahboub Mountains after seizing much of Yemen’s Red Sea coast in a lightning offensive this month – an advance that experts say could dramatically shift the balance of power in the country’s war if successful.

The renewed fighting in recent months with forces aligned with Yemen’s Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government has brought an end to the relative calm that had largely held since 2022. In recent days, the conflict has moved into the rugged highlands overlooking the approaches to Bab al-Mandeb, one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

The strait connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and its importance is only growing as shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted by the Houthis’ main ally: Iran.

Experts said taking the high ground would help the Houthis defend the newly captured coastline and make it far harder for government forces to push them back. While the mountains may not necessarily be used as a launchpad for attacks on ships, controlling them would provide defensive depth and cover for Houthi positions closer to the coast, making missile and drone operations in the Red Sea easier to sustain and harder to disrupt.

The Houthis have said they do not intend to target United States shipping and attacks would be limited to vessels linked to Saudi Arabia. But the group has repeatedly attacked ships in the Red Sea in previous years, including vessels with no clear connection to its stated targets.

The Houthi advance has taken on added urgency after The New York Times reported that US President Donald Trump came close to ordering air attacks against the Houthis on Sunday, only to call them off at the last minute. Britain, meanwhile, said it will support Saudi Arabia with defensive refuelling.

Why is Kahboub strategically important?

Kahboub, a mountainous region spanning parts of the Lahj and Taiz governorates in southern Yemen, derives much of its strategic importance from its proximity to Bab al-Mandeb. Some of its heights lie about 40km (25 miles) from the waterway, providing commanding views across a stretch of the Red Sea, through which a significant share of global maritime trade and millions of barrels of oil pass each day.

While that vantage point has considerable military value, experts said the mountains are unlikely to serve directly as a launchpad for attacks in the Red Sea. Their more immediate importance for the Houthis lies in securing the territory the group has already captured.

“The mountains are the natural wall that protects the Houthis’ rear on the coast. Controlling them would cut the coast off from the government-held south and place direct pressure on Lahj and, in the longer term, Aden,” Faozi Al-Goidi, a visiting fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, told Al Jazeera.

Securing their rear would help the Houthis prevent government forces from attacking their coastal positions from behind or severing the routes connecting their newly captured territory. Until the high ground is secured, Houthi forces stationed along the Red Sea remain vulnerable to attacks from government-held areas to the south and east.

Capturing the elevated positions, therefore, would make Kahboub less important as a potential launchpad for maritime attacks than as a defensive shield for the Houthis’ military gains along the coast.

Ewa K Strzelecka, a visiting senior fellow at the London School of Economics, told Al Jazeera that controlling the coastline, Mayyun Island and the neighbouring highlands would give the Houthis “strategic resilience”.

“Holding the coastline, Mayyun and the adjacent highlands together would give the Houthis a much deeper and more defensible position around one of the world’s principal maritime chokepoints,” she said.

Those positions would allow the Houthis to move fighters, weapons and supplies along the coast with less risk of their routes being severed from behind.

“From the high ground, the Houthis could monitor movements along the coast, around Mayyun Island and towards the chokepoint while protecting missile, drone and potentially unmanned-boat infrastructure positioned farther inland,” Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

The battle is already proving slower than the Houthis’ rapid advance across the coastal plains. Footage circulated on X by the Taiz Military Axis Command’s media centre appears to show intense fighting between forces aligned with the Yemeni government, local fighters and the Houthis on mountain fronts. The footage could not be independently verified by Al Jazeera.

“This is not an easy battle,” said Mohammed al-Basha, an analyst and a former spokesperson for Yemen’s embassy in Washington. “The fighting is taking place across some of Yemen’s most unforgiving terrain where control of a single hilltop or mountain peak can come at a heavy cost.”

Could the Houthis isolate Taiz by controlling Kahboub?

Control of Kahboub could also place greater pressure on Taiz, a symbolically and strategically important city, as the Taiz governorate forms a bridge between the Houthi-held north and the government-held south and the Red Sea coast. Whoever controls it gains the upper hand in the movement of weapons and supplies between the interior and the southern port city of Aden. Losing it, therefore, could deal a serious blow to the government.

Murad Al-Arefi, an editor at the Sana’a Center, told Al Jazeera that taking Kahboub would “increase pressure on the southern and western approaches to Taiz” although he cautioned that it should not yet be seen as evidence of a broader attempt to encircle the city.

The immediate threat to the Taiz-Aden connection is less direct because Kahboub does not itself sit across the route.  “What matters is whether the Houthis can subsequently push farther east through Al-Wazi’iyah and towards the Al-Turbah-Lahj axis, which would place much greater pressure on the southern approaches to Taiz and potentially weaken its connection with Aden,” Strzelecka said.

A further advance, therefore, could leave government forces defending several mountain fronts simultaneously while relying on fewer secure routes to move troops, weapons and supplies, leaving Taiz increasingly exposed. One of Yemen’s largest population centres, Taiz became an important centre of resistance to the Houthis after they seized Sanaa in 2014, and was besieged by the rebel group for years. A major Houthi breakthrough there, therefore, would carry symbolic significance far beyond the territory captured.

What could it mean for Red Sea shipping?

Officially, the Houthis have said their current restrictions in Bab al-Mandeb would apply only to Saudi-linked shipping.

But during its previous Red Sea campaign, the group struck or endangered ships with no clear connection to Israel – their purported target during Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza – raising questions about how narrowly any new restrictions would be applied. Seizing the Kahboub Mountains would further strengthen the Houthis’ position by helping them secure the coastline overlooking Bab al-Mandeb and making it harder for their opponents to push them back.

Simon Mabon, a professor of international relations at Lancaster University, told Al Jazeera that the offensive showed the Houthis using their momentum to capture more territory, weaken their opponents and “dominate Yemen further”.

“This is the Houthis trying to seize more ground and diminish the capacity of their enemies while increasing their strategic ability to close Bab al-Mandeb,” Mabon said.

Repeated blasts at military sites expose the risks facing Syria as it rebuilds its army and consolidates weapons after years of war.

A series of explosions at weapons and ammunition sites across Syria this month have exposed the difficulties facing the country’s military in storing and moving munitions, as the armed forces rebuild after more than a decade of war.

The latest blasts injured at least four people in the early hours of Monday morning at an arms depot in al-Eis, south of Aleppo.

On Friday, a blast in Ayyash, west of Deir Az Zor, killed 11 soldiers. Another on September 9 killed 14 defence ministry personnel in Sarmada, Idlib. Also in Idlib, five people were killed when a vehicle carrying ammunition exploded in the town of Binnish on September 1 .

According to a tally by the Reuters news agency, at least 16 similar explosions have hit arms storage facilities since the fall of long-time President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 after an opposition offensive.

Some have been attributed to poor storage conditions. The Syrian Defence Ministry said it is investigating the causes behind the recurrent explosions to prevent future incidents.

Long-time neglect

Security analysts are divided on the root causes, with some pointing to a lack of professional infrastructure and others highlighting the potential for foreign interference – although there is as yet no hard evidence for that.

Omer Ozkizilcik, a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programmes, explained to Al Jazeera that the Syrian military is undergoing a period of huge change. It is reorganising from what it was under al-Assad, consolidating weapons from different sources and integrating various forces. All of that could be putting pressure on Syria’s storage infrastructure, which was already creaking after the long war and international isolation.

“The explosions could have happened due to neglect, Ozkizilcik said. “The Syrian army is receiving much more military aid than ever before. It gained control over the stockpiles of the former regime and the formerly US-backed [Syrian Democratic Forces]. The increase in quantity coupled with the need to protect weapons from potential Israeli airstrikes may have pushed the Syrian army to store weapons in inadequate places.”

Ozkizilcik emphasised that Syria’s military is still in a transitional phase. The former army was dissolved after the fall of the al-Assad regime and fighters from armed opposition groups were integrated into a new military structure. Damascus has also been working to integrate territory and forces previously controlled by the Kurdish-led SDF.

“The Syrian army has yet to become a professional army,” Ozkizilcik added. “These explosions are not the first that happen in Syria. Before the fall of al-Assad, similar things happened many times in Syria. [but] I don’t think these explosions will affect Syria’s military capabilities in any visible way. It’s merely a loss of some stockpiles that can be replenished.”

Weapons and ammunition, by their nature, need to be handled extremely carefully and stored properly. Storing large quantities of ageing ammunition for years in poor conditions, such as high temperatures or humidity, can accelerate their deterioration and lead to them becoming unstable.

“The current warehouse infrastructure suffers from severe ageing; most of it dates back decades and does not meet international safe storage standards,” said security expert Ismat al-Absi. “Storing ageing munitions in open or semi-closed environments without controlled cooling and humidity systems creates what we call a thermal runaway chain reaction.”

Possibility of sabotage

The repeated explosions have led to some fears of sabotage, particularly in light of repeated Israeli attacks against Syria since the fall of al-Assad, many of which have targeted the military, including the August strikes on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in Idlib.

Ozkizilcik noted that there was “no public information about possible sabotage” being behind the weapons depot explosions, and no evidence of any direct Israeli links. But the repeated explosions, coupled with Israel’s attacks in Syria and past intelligence operations against groups like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, mean it cannot be totally ruled out.

“Considering that the Israeli media recently wrote about the growing military capabilities of Syria, suspicions grow,” he said.

Al-Absi told Al Jazeera that the wide geographic scope of the explosions nevertheless meant that deliberate interference should be investigated.

“The main loopholes that [could have allowed sabotage operations] are the absence of smart surveillance, relying on traditional human guarding instead of remote sensors and thermal movement detection; weak securing of transport lines and administrative fragmentation,” al-Absi said. “The weakness of security discipline during the restructuring phase of the military institution has made some sites vulnerable to penetration or internal manipulation.”

Tehran, Iran – Amid dire fuel shortages and mounting economic challenges, the Iranian government is seeking cost-saving measures for government workers and other citizens to deal with the crisis.

On Saturday, the government set office attendance hours for 8am to 1pm from September 23 to the end of the current Iranian year (late March 2027), with the remaining contractual hours to be completed remotely.

Agencies must also designate one day a week when employees and managers travel to work by public transport. In recent days, government ministers have released videos showing themselves using the metro to commute to work as part of the campaign.

Metro and bus rapid transit (BRT) systems will also be free of charge until mid-November in a bid to encourage commuters to leave their cars at home. Worn-out government vehicles will also be replaced with electric, gas-powered or hybrid alternatives, although this is expected to take years to implement.

The reopening of universities is expected to be staggered and partial, with some lessons shifted online by authorities.

Government-linked offices are required to switch off heating and turn off lights after working hours, while schools, universities, healthcare facilities and operational services are to follow separate arrangements to be announced later.

President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a directive on September 12 instructing government agencies to facilitate remote work for suitable employees to save on petrol, electricity and natural gas costs for the state.

“We have begun consumption savings with the government,” Pezeshkian said earlier this month. This is seen as effectively framing remote work and other measures for government workers as in line with other energy-saving measures that the government has asked of the rest of the population.

Resource-rich Iran has dealt with energy crises before, rooted in mismanagement and dated infrastructure, when similar cost-saving measures were implemented. But the added pressure of war with the United States and Israel has forced the government to think of creative solutions to energy shortfalls.

In early September, the cash-strapped government raised the price of fuel for the third tier of quotas for a second time in less than a year, meaning that people will pay double for any petrol use beyond 110 litres (29 gallons) per month. Imported vehicles and some other categories of cars are also limited to the most expensive tier of fuel.

For the first five months of the current Iranian year, which ended on August 22, average daily petrol production was 122 million litres while consumption was at 132 milion litres, highlighting a shortfall in supply versus demand. In the first half of the sixth month, the gap between production and consumption was around the same, at a 10 million litre shortfall.

The US naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports in place since July has halted fuel imports that previously helped balance the gap. The blockade has also stopped Iran from exporting its oil via supertankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, affecting its foreign currency income. Crude stored on open waters beyond the blockade line is still being gradually sold to China.

Oil and gas facilities, petrochemical companies and major fuel depots were also bombed by the US and Israel, impacting production and distribution. Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in early September that “a significant portion of production capacity has now been restored, and the process is continuing”.

As rampant inflation continues to squeeze most Iranians, data released this week by the Statistical Center of Iran also highlighted the damage the war with the US has dealt to the economy.

Iran experienced a massive 10.1 percent year-on-year fall in real gross domestic product (GDP) and a 26.4 percent fall in oil and gas extraction between late March and late June 2026, the centre’s data showed.

Including oil, industries and mining were down 14.7 percent, while construction was down by 6.4 percent, services overall by 4.8 percent, and transport, storage and communications by 17 percent.

The government has not released any information on how many workers are estimated to be affected by the remote work directive, or how it expected efficiency to be impacted.

But after decades of mismanagement, corruption and inefficiency among government-linked organisations, some Iranians believe it highlights a wider issue of state inefficiency.

“My unpopular opinion is that if 85-90 percent of government sector personnel are fired and 70 percent of ministries closed down, absolutely no problem will occur in the country,” a user named Mohsen wrote on X.

Zabihollah Salmani, a deputy head of the Administrative and Employment Organisation of Iran, told reporters during a press conference in August that more than 2.43 million were on its payroll.

If council, fire brigades, social security and non-government organisation workers were included, this would bring the number to more than four million people. The average monthly pay for government personnel at the end of the previous Iranian year in late March 2026 was around 240 million rials ($104 at the current exchange rate).

Asked by reporters how many of these employees could potentially be taken off the payroll without hurting output, Salmani said, “We do not yet have these figures.” He added that agencies were being asked to submit that information.

About 1,075,000 people are on the payroll of the Education Ministry, including teachers and trainee staff, while 600,000 employees work under the Ministry of Health and its affiliated networks, according to official figures.

Amir-Hossein, a young man working at a research centre linked with the government-funded University of Tehran, said that since the start of the month, he had been assigned two days of remote work. Working hours were set for 7am-1pm before, but are to be shifted to 8am-1pm starting from Wednesday, per the government.

His work can be done on his laptop, but might require some coordination on the phone or short commutes to other centres, he said. Overall, the remote work lifestyle has been beneficial.

“Sometimes I get more work done than I would have at the office,” he told Al Jazeera, asking not to use his full name due to security reasons.

As Amir-Hossein regularly uses online ride-hailing services to commute to and from his job, working from home has been financially beneficial for him.

An Iran-based economist who spoke to Al Jazeera on background said the government measures are essentially crisis control at best, and not a long-term solution to the problem.

PM Anthony Albanese asks Apple CEO Tim Cook to back Canberra’s online safety laws to ‘keep Australians safe’.

The Australian government is seeking support from global tech giants as it works to strengthen the country’s online safety laws and artificial intelligence (AI) regulations.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who met Apple CEO Tim Cook at the tech company’s headquarters in Cupertino, California, on Saturday, said that “Australia can’t do it alone” when it came to protecting children from the dangers of the internet.

“We spoke about what we’re doing to protect children from online harm and the work ahead,” Albanese wrote on social media.

“We’re putting stronger rules in place to keep Australians safe online,” he said. “And now, big tech companies like Apple are stepping up too.”

Albanese, who is also in the United States for the United Nations General Assembly, used his trip to call for stronger AI regulation after dire safety warnings from industry leaders.

Australia will introduce new standards for AI by the end of the year, he said.

In a video posted to his X account, Albanese said his Labor government is “making sure technology works for Australians”, and not the other way around.

In a post on X, Cook also said he shared with Albanese new “strong and intuitive controls to help keep kids safe online”.

New Australian legislation unveiled this month would place a “duty of care” requirement on the firms behind popular platforms, such as Facebook, TikTok and Instagram, and allow users to turn off their algorithms.

The draft laws will be introduced to parliament later this year after consultation with social media companies, industry bodies and civil society groups.

The opposition Liberal-National Coalition opposes the bill “in its current form”, according to a statement published on September 10, saying that it “contains inadequate safeguards for free speech and journalism, and leaves too much power in the hands of the Communications Minister”.

Australia implemented legislation barring children under 16 from social media platforms last year as part of a world-first crackdown designed to protect children from online bullying and “predatory algorithms”.

However, data last month found that Australians under 16 continued using social media apps such as Instagram and TikTok despite the ban.

Fidan highlights Turkiye’s readiness to assist Saudi Arabia militarily, as Houthi attacks escalate in Yemen.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has said that Saudi Arabia may have unmet military needs from the attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels and that Turkiye would consider how to support the kingdom as part of a trilateral defence pact.

Speaking to Turkish broadcaster NTV on Friday, Fidan said it was unacceptable for Saudi Arabia to be dragged into the US-Iran war, adding that Riyadh had no desire to join the conflict.

He added that proposals had been conveyed to all sides in an effort to end the fighting, without further elaborating.

The Iran-backed Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia continue trading attacks in an escalating war in Yemen, as the Houthis press gains that have brought large stretches of the Red Sea coast, including the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, under their control.

Pakistan has made a similar pledge to defend Saudi Arabia under the defence pact.

Lieutenant-General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, a spokesperson for Pakistan’s military, told Arab News on Thursday that Islamabad would defend Saudi Arabia “to any extent”, including “physically”, though he did not say whether Riyadh had asked for more Pakistani troops.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office has said no military response is currently under discussion under the pact, adding that Islamabad would act “when time comes”.

The trilateral agreement, known as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, was signed on August 7 in Mecca by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

The three countries formally named the arrangement the Mecca Defence Alliance on August 31, after officials meeting in Istanbul agreed to set up a secretariat in Riyadh, to be headed initially by a Pakistani secretary-general.

Its founding principle is that an armed attack against any one of the three states will be treated as an attack against all three.

Fidan said at the time the alliance was built on “respecting the sovereignty of other states, territorial integrity and not intervening in internal affairs”, and remained open to other countries joining.

Analysts have questioned how much substance lies behind the pact so far, noting it lacks the integrated command structure and standing forces that underpin NATO.

Its institutional shape, including how the mutual defence clause would actually be triggered, remains unclear.

The trilateral pact was struck as Gulf states grow increasingly concerned about being pulled into the wider US-Iran war, which has continued for more than six months since Washington and Israel first struck Iran in February.

Deir el-Balah, Gaza – A handful of electronic components, a few wires and a basic programmable circuit board are enough to bring a group of curious children around a table in central Gaza to learn about robotics.

Students at The Next Gen Team: Rising Robotics Engineer Project in Deir el-Balah learn how to integrate sensors into alarm systems, study robotics, understand how motors and drive units work, as well as get firsthand experience with programming.

The children’s research could save lives in the future. The robotics and early warning systems they are working on could make way for bigger developments such as early detection of gas leaks and fires or help rescue workers access hard-to-reach areas, such as victims trapped under rubble.

Today’s lesson will also teach students the sciences of the future and help them keep pace with technological advancements happening outside Gaza’s borders.

Before the war, students had access to schools, universities, incubators and training programmes to pursue an interest in technology.

With much of that infrastructure now destroyed or damaged during Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, there are few places and tools for students to work with.

But their interest in robotics and will to learn are helping them maintain their skills and ambitions for the future, something they hope will be of benefit when the bombs stop falling on Gaza.

Hamza al-Atrash, 16, is a student taking part in the “Next Gen” project and learning how electronic components can be used to develop robots and early-warning systems. To do this, he is using an Arduino controller – a programmable circuit board which connects sensors – and some other electronics.

Students work with what they have, but a shortage of equipment and electricity outages make studying a challenge.

“We have capabilities and aspirations that we want to develop, and we try to take advantage of every available opportunity for learning and training,” Hamza tells Al Jazeera.

Hamza hopes the skills that he and his cohort learn in class will benefit his community and provide new opportunities for young people in Gaza.

“The lack of devices and equipment doesn’t mean we’ll stop. It pushes us to look for solutions and make the most of the simple tools we have,” he said.

The challenges facing these students are part of a wider disruption to Gaza’s technology and innovation sector.

Before the war, Gaza had several incubators that supported technology projects and startups. Bahaa al-Masri, head of the training team for the Early Warning Systems and Robotics Project, said it provided a rare bit of hope for children and young adults in the besieged enclave.

“These incubators provided an environment for training and development. They helped innovators and entrepreneurs turn their ideas and projects into prototypes and ventures,” he told Al Jazeera.

The war severely damaged this ecosystem: training spaces were lost, equipment difficult to find, and students and innovators left with limited opportunities to experiment and develop their ideas.

Although challenges remain, the trainers are continuing their mission of educating budding tech experts in Gaza.

“We have a generation of students who possess genuine passion and talent in technology and digital systems,” he told Al Jazeera. “They need the environment and tools to develop these abilities and turn their ideas into projects that can serve their community and their future.”

Education pays the price

The near-collapse of Gaza’s technology sector has coincided with the widespread destruction of the education system, with schools, universities and research facilities repeatedly targeted by Israel during the war.

Preliminary estimates from the Government Media Office in Gaza put direct losses to the education sector at approximately $4bn. Seventeen higher education institutions have been completely or partially destroyed since October 2023, preventing about 620,000 high school students and 90,000 university students from continuing their education.

Approximately 20,228 students and 830 teachers and educational staff have also been killed, along with 194 scientists, academics and researchers.

For students seeking to enter technical fields, the loss of such educational facilities and teachers means fewer opportunities to gain practical experience and hone their skills.

Before the war, the IT industry was one of the promising sectors of Gaza’s economy and a rare source of foreign income, said Ahmad Abu Qamar, an economic affairs specialist and board member of the Palestinian Economists Syndicate.

It was also an opportunity for employment for thousands of university graduates entering a job market with high unemployment, with roughly 80 percent of its economic activities directed towards foreign markets.

Abu Qamar estimates that the IT sector now runs at less than 25 percent of pre-war levels, while more than 70 percent of IT companies in Gaza have completely or partially halted operations.

But even if a company’s offices or equipment survived the war on Gaza, damage to digital infrastructure has also made it difficult for companies to continue functioning.

Prices of some technical equipment – including computers, mobile devices, servers, routers, fibre-optic lines, and cabling – used in the industry have increased by more than 600 percent due to the difficulties of importing devices during Israel’s ongoing siege on the enclave.

According to his estimates, about 30,000 IT professionals have lost their jobs since the war began. General unemployment is at nearly 80 percent and poverty at more than 90 percent in the enclave.

Brain drain

A severe shortage of vital IT equipment – such as storage devices, routers, and laptops – has been compounded by the destruction of supporting internet and electricity infrastructure, including primary and secondary networks, according to technology and digital economy expert Abdullah Altahrawi with the UCAS Technology Incubator. This makes the task of rebuilding Gaza’s IT sector an even bigger challenge than before the war, particularly with Israel’s more crippling siege on Gaza.

“The repercussions have extended to dealings with foreign markets, including the purchase of servers and electronic services, the management of digital accounts, the use of cards and e-commerce,” Altahrawi said.

Before the war, Gaza’s five main incubators provided training, mentoring, workspaces and support for tech startups. Perhaps most crucially, it also gave students a place to develop their skills, connect with foreign markets, and find job opportunities.

Just two incubators – the UCAS Technology Incubator, affiliated with the University College of Applied Sciences, and the Ma’an Center for Innovation and Entrepreneurship Incubator, have resumed operations since the October 2025 ceasefire. But their capacity has not managed to exceed 20 percent of pre-2023 levels.

Due to the damage caused by three years of Israeli bombing and a shortage of real estate, just 1 percent of technology companies now have offices, while only 10 percent of business incubators have an operational office space.

Companies looking to rebuild and universities ready to teach a new cohort of tech students have also been hit by a brain drain in the sector, severely hindering development and innovation.

“More than 80 percent of highly skilled and experienced professionals in the technology and digital fields have left the Gaza Strip,” Altahrawi said. “Gaza’s future is inseparable from its ability to restore and develop its technology sector.”

Tehran, Iran – Hossein, a 32-year-old marketing specialist based in Tehran, has been thinking of replacing his 13-year-old Iranian-made car with a newer model.

Even though he earns about four-and-a-half times the minimum wage after a recent pay rise – his salary is now close to 900 million rials (about $390 at the current exchange rate) – imported vehicles are not even remotely affordable for him.

Even finding a locally made car might be out of his budget, with an economic crisis gripping the country since the United States and Israel launched a surprise war on Iran on February 28 and later enacted a crippling siege and sanctions on the country.

“I’m losing hope of ever being able to buy a new domestic production car too, unless the country opens up and becomes a bit more normal again,” Hossein, who asked to keep his full name confidential for security reasons, told Al Jazeera.

His old manual Peugeot 206 model, an originally French-made car but now produced domestically after foreign counterparts left Iran due to sanctions, can fetch up to 10 billion rials ($4,350) if he sells it towards making a new purchase. However, his replacement options are limited.

Upgrading to a slightly improved Peugeot 207 with an automatic gearbox could cost him 28 billion rials ($12,170) now. This means that, after selling his car, he would need more than 20 months of his entire salary.

A domestic sedan Shahin model costs more than 31 billion rials ($13,480), and a crossover Reera is priced at more than 43 billion rials ($18,700).

With these options, he would need to save about 24 months and 37 months of his whole salary, respectively, and that is if prices remain stable and he does not spend a rial on anything else. But the reality of the fast-rising living costs and lagging incomes in Iran means he can barely put aside any money, let alone afford a new car.

Domestic car prices have mostly risen 40 to 80 percent since the start of the war, while some vehicles sell for more than 130 percent of their September 2025 costs.

The costs of maintaining the vehicles are also rising much faster than people’s salaries. Domestically produced tyres, motor oil, brake pads and clutch kits have at least doubled since last year, with some car parts having more than tripled in price.

Domestic vehicles have generally low safety standards, meaning that they contribute to staggering road accident deaths. At least 1,609 Iranians have been killed so far on intercity roads in the current month of Shahrivar of the solar Hijri calendar, which ends on September 22. More than 20,000 people lose their lives on the roads every year. In comparison, fewer people in the whole of the European Union, nearly five times Iran’s population, died on roads last year.

Iran’s fuel-guzzling cars also contribute to smoke-congested city streets, degrade vehicles faster and increase fuel costs, just as petrol prices have risen for users.

How did we get here?

Experts say, due to a combination of protected state-linked businesses, privileged access, economic isolation and a curtailing of imports, Iranian households have no choice but to pay exorbitant prices – compared with their salaries – to buy low-quality cars.

The damage from the war, including the extensive bombing of multiple steel giants by Israel and the US, has only added insult to injury. The naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports has prevented goods coming in from popular neighbouring markets like the United Arab Emirates.

Under such circumstances, domestic vehicle manufacturers have little incentive to improve.

End customers are also beset by government charges, currency and financing costs, margins levied by murky intermediaries – and in numerous documented cases, industry corruption.

“People are forced to buy expensive low-quality cars whose real prices should be a quarter of global prices, and this is a direct harm done to them,” Mohammad Rashidi, a member of the presiding board of Iran’s parliament, told local media on Saturday. “The traces of a mafia system are visible throughout the process.”

His claims echo those of other officials and state-linked media, who have openly described the industry as resembling an organised crime operation.

According to the latest figures released by state media, about 233,000 cars were manufactured or assembled in Iran in the first five months of 2026, compared with 366,000 the year before. Only about 25,000 vehicles were imported in that period.

Only a handful of state-linked companies or intermediaries are allowed to import vehicles, with duties plus value-added tax increasing final prices up to 200 percent.

The government and parliament have discussed lowering import tariffs this year, with no agreement announced so far.

The premiums are more visible for high-end cars, with a 2026 Toyota Land Cruiser VXR going for approximately 660 billion rials ($287,000) in Iran at the moment, while the same model is available for about $86,000 in the UAE. The same story applies to most other models, at different rates depending on the rarity of the vehicle and the availability of parts.

The price of a mid-range Chinese-designed SUV sold as Exeed VX in international markets is listed at about $32,000 in China, while it is priced at about $42,000 in the UAE. The same car, assembled from imported parts by a state-linked company in Iran under a different name, currently costs Iranian customers the equivalent of $53,000.

The bizarre situation was on full display during a three-day “international” car exhibition in Tehran last week that mostly featured Chinese-manufactured vehicles. These remain available in Iran despite the US sanctions, since Tehran exports almost all of its oil to China and barters this for goods, including cars.

Some domestic manufacturers and importers were absent, either because they had no products to offer or because they had angry customers who registered months ago to get vehicles they never received. Spare parts for some of the vehicles on display are currently either not available in the Iranian market or cost several times their price in international markets.

Even the cheapest vehicles offered at the exhibition were completely unaffordable to the average Iranian. It would take a worker on the minimum wage with standard allowances 50 years to buy an XPENG G9, a Chinese-made electric SUV priced at 120 billion rials ($52,150), on his or her salary, without spending a rial on food, housing or clothing.

Still, there were huge queues outside the exhibition centre each of the three days.

“It was sad because most people just came to take pictures with the cars they knew they could never afford,” a young man who attended the exhibition told Al Jazeera. “The doors of the cars were locked too.”

United States President Donald Trump claims the US has reached a deal with Denmark granting it “permanent control” over Greenland’s security “and all other needs”.

The announcement comes more than a year after the US president threatened to seize the self-governing Arctic territory, which is part of Denmark. Those threats roiled the NATO security alliance that Washington and Copenhagen are part of.

According to Denmark, the deal is expected to be signed during next week’s United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. Copenhagen has stressed that it retains sovereignty over Greenland, and this deal will still need to be ratified in the Danish and Greenland parliaments.

Here’s what we know about the deal and what it could mean for the US and Greenland:

What’s in the deal?

The official text has yet to be released. But according to Trump, the deal gives the US permanent control over Greenland’s security and “all other needs”, at no cost to the US.

The deal bars US adversaries from establishing a military presence or making “sensitive investments” in Greenland without US approval, said Trump.

A US Department of State official cited by the BBC said the deal will mean non-NATO states won’t be able to set up bases in Greenland and will be barred from “making investments in Greenland that could threaten the United States”.

The official said that means China and Russia won’t be able to build bases or send troops to Greenland, and that those states would be blocked from investing “in sensitive sectors”.

However, Mikkel Olesen, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, told Al Jazeera that it is unlikely to be a major concession because “the Danes and Greenlanders never wished for Russia or China to have bases in Greenland.”

However, it is unclear whether other countries could similarly be labelled “adversaries” to the US in the future, subjecting them to these restrictions.

Trump called the deal an “‘Infinite Life’ Agreement”, meaning “it never ends”.

The State Department official also said the agreement gives the US the right to build more military sites on the island without Greenland or Denmark approving. According to the official, the deal would remain in force even if Greenland were to become an independent state in the future.

There was no specific mention of potential US mining rights in Greenland, which has a rich deposit of rare-earth minerals, including zinc, iron, uranium and graphite, that are likely to interest Trump. These minerals are highly sought after and are used in the manufacture of hundreds of technological products, from smartphones to fighter jets.

However, some observers think this could be what Trump means by his mention of “sensitive investments”.

The US president has sought to expand the US’s global access to rare-earth metals, especially as China, a global leader in the technology, AI and renewables industries with 60 percent of the world’s known deposits of these minerals in its territory, restricts their exports.

What have Greenland and Denmark said?

Greenland and Denmark acknowledged the deal on Friday, but neither gave specific details about its terms. They said the agreement would be announced next week.

Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said it “recognises Greenland’s interests” and is “to the benefit of us all”.

Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said it is “great for NATO and Europe”, as it “strengthens our common security in the Arctic and the North Atlantic Area”.

Olesen stressed that details of the deal remain unclear and that available information should be taken “with a grain of salt” as most of it has so far come from the US side.

Does the deal give the US ownership of Greenland?

No, it does not meet Trump’s previously stated objective of “ownership”.

Denmark’s Frederiksen said the agreement “recognises the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom and the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination”.

Olesen said the deal could be positive for Greenland and Denmark as it “has the potential to end the crisis” caused by Trump’s insistence on acquiring Greenland last year, without sacrificing sovereignty.

Trump’s earlier threats to seize control of Greenland were met with high resistance on the island of 56,000 people. A January 2025 poll found that 85 percent of Greenlanders opposed becoming part of the US.

What military rights does the US already have in Greenland?

A substantial number. Under a 1951 treaty, the US has broad overflight and basing rights on the island.

In addition to giving the US the right to build bases and maintain personnel, the treaty also stipulates that the US can “control landings, takeoffs, anchorages, moorings, movements, and operation of ships, aircraft, and waterborne craft”.

As part of the treaty, the US currently operates a Space Force base in a remote part of northwestern Greenland – the Pituffik Space Base. It has more than 100 personnel stationed there.

What would actually change under this new agreement?

That largely remains to be seen. Trump said the US will “immediately” begin building up a large military presence on Greenland. However, the US already had the right to build bases and send personnel there under the 1951 treaty.

Imran Bayoumi, a former Pentagon official, told the Reuters news agency that it would be new if the US could now build bases unilaterally, but “it seems that Washington could have achieved a lot of these ⁠objectives through diplomacy and dialogue without straining the broader US-NATO relationship.”

Trump has also said the US will support Greenlanders with “development and construction”, without elaborating.

Richard Weitz, a fellow at the NATO Defense College, told Al Jazeera the deal “defuses perhaps one of the most severe sources of internal tension” within NATO.

While Trump “backed down and settled for less” than he sought with respect to Greenland, he still “got pretty much everything he wanted, except formal annexation”, added Weitz.

US judges affirm migrants must have opportunities to voice safety concerns before deportation to unfamiliar nations.

A US federal appeals court has rejected the Trump administration’s policy of rapidly deporting migrants to countries other than their own – a ruling that could next go before the Supreme Court.

On Friday, a three-judge panel of the 1st US Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston largely upheld a February decision that found the Department of Homeland Security’s so-called third-country removal policy unlawful.

The case stems from a class-action lawsuit testing what due process migrants are owed before being sent to nations with which they have no ties.

Writing for the panel, US Circuit Judge Seth Aframe said migrants must be given a “meaningful” chance to raise safety concerns before removal, rejecting the Trump administration’s narrower reading of the law.

The court did overturn part of the ruling on procedural grounds, concerning whether officials must first try deporting migrants to countries they have ties to.

Trina Realmuto, a lawyer for the plaintiffs at the National Immigration Litigation Alliance, said the decision confirmed that “due process and the protections Congress enacted against persecution and torture cannot be circumvented by putting someone on a plane to a country that was never part of their removal proceedings”.

The DHS did not immediately comment. The Trump administration is expected to appeal the ruling.

Under Trump, the US has struck agreements allowing it to send more than 25,000 migrants to at least 29 third countries, most often Mexico, according to Third Country Deportation Watch, a tracker run by the rights groups Refugees International and Human Rights First.

The policy, adopted in March 2025, allowed removals with only minimal notice if officials had diplomatic assurances against persecution.

The controversial programme has reached the Supreme Court twice.

In 2025, the justices cleared the way for eight men, including nationals of Cuba, Myanmar and Vietnam, to be deported to South Sudan, a country the US State Department advises against visiting because of “crime, kidnapping, and armed conflict”.

The DHS called the removals “a win”, while rights groups said they flouted basic protections.

The Trump administration’s immigration agenda has faced a string of setbacks this month.

A federal judge blocked planned caps on student and journalist visas, calling the government’s justification “exceptionally weak”, while a coalition of 22 states and Washington, DC, sued to stop a separate rule that would let officials deny green cards to immigrants who lawfully use public benefits.