Myanmar

Mathias Licharz calls for the ‘unconditional’ release of ousted politicians, including former leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has summoned the head of mission at the German embassy in the country over a Facebook video calling for authorities to “unconditionally release” ousted politicians such as former leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The ministry said in a statement on Tuesday that Mathias Licharz in the video “appeared to fuel opposition to the host country and its Government, thereby inciting internal unrest”.

Licharz met Deputy Foreign Minister Ko Ko Kyaw, was “warned against the video” and handed an aide-memoire, the ministry said.

“The Deputy Minister strongly warned against recurrence of such act and informed him that any similar conduct would be treated with utmost seriousness and would take appropriate actions,” the ministry said.

Licharz posted the video on Sunday, standing outside the former Yangon residence of Win Myint, the figurehead president of Aung San Suu Kyi‘s government that was removed in a 2021 coup.

The German diplomat said in his message, marking Win Myint’s 75th birthday, that the United Nations still regards him as the “legitimate president” of Myanmar.

In the video, he called for authorities to “unconditionally release all those who are arbitrarily detained, including Win Myint and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi” – using the affectionate term by which Aung San Suu Kyi‘s supporters refer to her.

Germany’s embassy in Myanmar did not immediately comment.

Win Myint’s downfall

Win Myint was jailed in the February 2021 military coup, ending Myanmar’s decade-long democratic experiment.

Since then, pro-democracy rebels rose up and long-simmering ethnic minority rebellions challenging central rule boiled over.

Authorities said in April he had been pardoned of his post-coup convictions – charges that supporters and analysts say were confected to oust the government.

However, Licharz said in his video message his efforts to meet Win Myint had been unfruitful.

“There is only one conclusion,” he said. “U Wint Myint is not a free man. He’s not allowed to meet with whom he would like to meet, and he’s not allowed to communicate independently,” he added, using a male honorific.

The military leadership behind the coup organised elections, installing a nominally civilian government this year, although analysts regard it as a fig leaf for ongoing military rule.

“Should the Charge d’Affaires choose to recognize U Win Myint as President and wish to discontinue his service in Myanmar, the Ministry would have no objection,” the Foreign Ministry statement said on Tuesday.

Aung San Suu Kyi remains detained but was moved to house arrest in the capital Naypyidaw this year, authorities say, where access to the 81-year-old Nobel Peace Prize laureate remains tightly controlled.

On October 8, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim received Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing in Putrajaya with a guard of honour and an official luncheon, in the military chief’s first visit since the 2021 coup. Nine days earlier, Malaysia sent 1,476 Myanmar nationals back by sea in the first phase of a plan to return 5,000 people.

Kuala Lumpur calls this pragmatic diplomacy. In reality, it lends a middle power’s credibility to the Trump administration’s retreat from international accountability, weakening the laws and institutions smaller states rely on most.

Domestic pressures

Since May, a surge of online hate speech and misinformation has targeted the Rohingya, Malaysia’s largest refugee community. By late July, at least nine Rohingya community schools had closed or faced closure orders, and more than 100 Rohingya told UNHCR that residents of their Penang village had driven them out.

The hostility ignores the facts: Malaysia’s police chief says Rohingya account for 0.02 percent of crime. Yet research by INITIATE.MY and the Center for the Study of Organized Hate found AI-generated content amplifying anti-Rohingya disinformation across Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Bangladesh, casting refugees as a threat and legitimising vigilante violence.

Electoral politics plays a part. After heavy losses in three state elections, and with a general election due by February 2028, Anwar’s coalition may see a hard line on Rohingya returns as a show of control, though voter disillusionment and right-wing rivals make any electoral gains uncertain.

Impunity goes mainstream

Malaysia is not acting alone. Mongolia hosted Vladimir Putin in 2024 despite an ICC arrest warrant, and Hungary welcomed Benjamin Netanyahu in 2025 despite another. Kuala Lumpur denies this is recognition, yet Anwar says Malaysia will work towards Myanmar’s full reintegration into ASEAN, and Min Aung Hlaing wants a seat at the bloc’s November summit in Manila. Each welcome makes the next easier and tells leaders accused of atrocities, from Netanyahu to Min Aung Hlaing, that diplomatic rehabilitation is possible without accountability.

ASEAN has tried this before. In April 2021, Min Aung Hlaing agreed to the Five-Point Consensus, then ignored it: The violence continued, the ASEAN special envoy never met Aung San Suu Kyi, and inclusive dialogue never began. The bloc’s one real lever was excluding military leaders from its summits. Myanmar Specialist, Arkar Hein, said “Welcoming him back with nothing asked in return rewards that defiance and tells Naypyidaw that time and a staged election can achieve what
compromise would otherwise require. Each handshake abroad also makes the regime less willing to offer its opponents real concessions, and convinces them that only the battlefield will decide Myanmar’s future.”

A question of consistency

Malaysia has spent decades building its credibility as a regional peacemaker, a hard-won reputation it now puts at risk. It has facilitated the Bangsamoro peace process since 2001, helping negotiate a landmark peace agreement in the southern Philippines, and has facilitated talks in southern Thailand since 2013. In November 2024, Anwar welcomed the ICC’s arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his former defence minister, saying they “should be arrested even if they are visiting other countries”. That same month, the ICC prosecutor sought an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing for alleged crimes against humanity targeting the Rohingya, and an Argentinian court has since issued its own.

The Gambia’s genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice centres on the 2016-17 operations Min Aung Hlaing commanded, which killed thousands of Rohingya, included mass rapes and burned hundreds of villages, driving more than 700,000 people into Bangladesh. UN investigators called for him to face genocide charges. Malaysia is not a party to the Rome Statute and has no legal duty to arrest him. But its credibility as a peacemaker and on Palestine rests on applying one standard to everyone.

Returns without safeguards

The returns rest on assurances no independent body can verify. UNHCR says it was not involved in the returns and had no access to verify that they were voluntary, and that safe conditions do not exist. Those returned reportedly included 27 children. Though not a party to the Refugee Convention, Malaysia is bound by the customary principle of non-refoulement, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar has warned of substantial risks.

Naypyidaw says no Rohingya are involved because it does not recognise them as citizens, but other returnees also risk arbitrary detention, prosecution and forced recruitment. The military does not even control Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army holds more than 90 percent of the territory. On September 28, a day before returns began, a military air attack reportedly killed at least 50 civilians there, following more than a dozen other mass killings by the military earlier this year.

Nor can the military-backed government deliver the peace that safe return requires. Its election saw no voting in 67 of 330 townships, and when Min Aung Hlaing offered peace talks in April, the National Unity Government (NUG) and major ethnic armed groups refused. Without a ceasefire and an inclusive political process, assurances of safe return ring hollow.

Malaysia’s frustration is nonetheless legitimate. It has hosted refugees for decades with little international support, and resettlement has shrunk since the Trump administration suspended United States refugee admissions in January 2025. But failed burden-sharing cannot justify returns without safeguards.

Pressure on the court

The ICC exists so that victims of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity can find justice when their own states fail them. That mission now faces unprecedented pressure. On October 9, hours after former ICC judge Navi Pillay won the Nobel Peace Prize, the Trump administration sanctioned the court itself. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Venezuela have announced their withdrawal.

Yet middle powers can push back. Seventy-nine ICC members, including Canada, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, backed the court after the first US sanctions in February 2025, and in May Hungary’s new government reversed its predecessor’s withdrawal. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines surrendered former President Rodrigo Duterte to The Hague, and on October 8 judges found him fit to stand trial for crimes against humanity, with proceedings due to begin on November 30.

Middle powers should say no

Middle powers like Malaysia, and blocs such as ASEAN and the European Union, cannot stop US sanctions, but they need not follow the Trump administration’s lead. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney told the World Economic Forum in January, middle powers “must act together, because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu”.

Malaysia and its neighbours should lead by saying no: No to efforts to weaken the court, no to treating Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency as a clean slate, and no to Rohingya returns into an active conflict. Malaysia should back efforts to hold him accountable if ICC judges issue a warrant, and reconsider acceding to the Rome Statute, a move it abandoned in 2019.

Saying no does not mean disengaging. Kuala Lumpur should tie Myanmar’s reintegration into ASEAN to real progress on the Five-Point Consensus, starting with an end to violence and inclusive dialogue involving the NUG and ethnic armed organisations. At home, it should pause returns until an independent body confirms they are safe and voluntary, and hold accountable those who evict, threaten or attack refugees.

Malaysia should not carry this burden alone. ASEAN partners, members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and donors should fund refugee registration, education and integration, and resettlement countries should restore their commitments. Governments should also hold tech platforms accountable for amplifying anti-refugee disinformation and require swift action against incitement.

For years, Malaysia has offered refuge to the Rohingya and others fleeing Myanmar when few countries would. That record gives it the standing, and the responsibility, to defend the system of international justice it has long championed.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Muslim governments backed the genocide case against Myanmar. They must now show that their commitment to the Rohingya goes beyond words.

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has made Muslim solidarity central to how it presents itself. Nine years ago, Myanmar’s military massacred Rohingya civilians and drove hundreds of thousands from their homes. The persecution has not ended: the Rohingya remain stateless, face continuing violence and risk death while fleeing by sea. Throughout those years, the OIC has held summits and passed resolutions. Yet it has failed to protect them.

When I founded the Burma Human Rights Network 14 years ago, I believed that if we gathered evidence carefully and put it before institutions with the power to act, they would act. We have gathered testimony from survivors of massacres. We have documented the systematic destruction of Rohingya villages, the denial of their citizenship and the deliberate starvation of a people. Yet despite all this documentation, the situation facing the Rohingya has mostly grown worse. The International Court of Justice is expected to rule later this year on whether Myanmar’s actions constituted genocide.

I have sometimes asked myself whether a ruling could help stop the atrocities. The Rohingya survivors who gave evidence in The Hague relived the worst moments of their lives before international judges because they trusted that their testimony would matter. Many of them are still in Bangladesh, still in limbo, dependent on food assistance worth as little as $7 per person per month. One in every seven Rohingya who attempted sea crossings last year was reported dead or missing. They are unprotected, and governments that could do more have not done so.

People often ask me why we continue. I have never had a satisfying answer. What I know is that without a record of these atrocities, it becomes easier to deny they happened. I continue because, after hearing these accounts and seeing the evidence, I do not know how to walk away from it.

We have published evidence that governments did not want to confront, and we have called the atrocities what they are: genocide. If the court finds that Myanmar committed genocide, it would be the first time in the International Court of Justice’s 80-year history that a state has been held responsible for the crime.

I now address the OIC foreign ministers who will gather in Baghdad on October 17. The OIC backed this case, and your governments supported the effort to hold Myanmar accountable for its treatment of the Rohingya. Many Rohingya, along with many of us who work with them, took those commitments seriously. When the ruling arrives, I expect statements welcoming it and renewed promises of accountability. But another communiqué will not protect anyone. OIC governments should refuse to forcibly return Rohingya to Myanmar, protect Rohingya who reach their territory, sustain support for refugees in Bangladesh and agree on diplomatic and economic measures against those responsible for their persecution. These are choices your governments can make.

The way Rohingya are treated across the region is hard to reconcile with those commitments. Some governments that speak about the Rohingya in international meetings do not offer the same protection to those who arrive at their borders. A government cannot demand accountability from Myanmar and at the same time send people back into danger.

Bangladesh hosts 1.2 million Rohingya and has faced years of pressure to send them back. The OIC must also challenge abuses against the Rohingya by governments outside its membership. In 2025, according to testimony documented by Amnesty International, Indian authorities forced at least 40 Rohingya from a naval vessel into the Andaman Sea, leaving them to swim towards Myanmar. If the OIC says nothing when governments expose Rohingya to that kind of danger, those governments have little reason to change course.

To the Rohingya community organisations that kept working, the journalists who reported despite restrictions on access, those who helped survivors bring their testimony to international forums, and the advocates who stayed with this issue when official attention moved elsewhere, I can only say this: you did work that governments with armies and treasuries should never have left to you. The evidence you preserved is now part of the record.

The 57 governments meeting in Baghdad have repeatedly pledged solidarity with the Rohingya and supported efforts to hold Myanmar accountable for genocide. But solidarity means little if it does not translate into action. A judgment from The Hague will not protect the Rohingya by itself. What those governments do after it will show whether their support for this case has consequences beyond the courtroom.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.