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Published on
13/05/2026 – 15:46 GMT+2

Europe’s reliance on American liquefied natural gas is set to increase further next year as the EU continues efforts to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports, according to new analysis published by the IEEFA on Wednesday.

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The report estimates that the US could supply close to two-thirds of Europe’s LNG imports in 2026, reinforcing Washington’s dominant position in the continent’s gas market after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Iran war reshaped global energy flows.

According to IEEFA, the US already accounted for 57% of Europe’s LNG imports in 2025, a sharp increase compared with pre-war levels.

The organisation warned that the share could continue rising over the coming years if current import trends persist and additional long-term supply contracts enter into force.

The findings come as most European governments seek to fully eliminate Russian gas imports by 2027 under the European Commission’s REPowerEU strategy.

Since 2022, EU member states have rapidly expanded LNG purchases, particularly from the US, to compensate for declining Russian pipeline deliveries.

The IEEFA stated that the shift had improved Europe’s short-term energy security but also created a growing concentration risk.

The think tank argued that replacing dependence on Russian gas with heavy reliance on another single alternative supplier could expose Europe to future political and market instability.

Lower demand but higher imports and investment

The report noted that LNG imports from the US generally come at a higher cost than pipeline gas because of liquefaction, shipping and regasification expenses.

The IEEFA estimates that EU countries spent roughly €117 billion on US LNG imports between early 2022 and mid-2025.

Several European policymakers and regulators have previously warned against excessive dependence on imported LNG.

Earlier this year, European Commission Executive Vice President Teresa Ribera said the bloc should avoid replacing one energy dependency with another and accelerate investment in renewable power and electrification instead.

The European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators has also raised concerns about supply concentration risks linked to the growing role of US LNG in the European market.

The increase in LNG imports also comes despite a broader decline in European gas consumption in recent years.

High prices following the energy crisis, industrial weakness, energy-saving measures and faster deployment of renewable energy have all contributed to lower demand.

The IEEFA data shows Europe’s LNG imports declined in 2024 as gas consumption fell to its lowest level in more than a decade. However, imports rebounded in 2025 amid colder weather conditions and efforts by governments to replenish storage sites.

At the same time, several EU countries continue expanding LNG import infrastructure.

Germany, which previously relied heavily on Russian pipeline gas, has rapidly developed floating LNG terminals and emerged as one of the largest buyers of US LNG in Europe.

Analysts have also questioned whether Europe risks building excess LNG import capacity as long-term gas demand is expected to weaken further during the energy transition in the coming years.

SACRAMENTO  — As Xavier Becerra rose to the top echelons of power in Washington and Sacramento over the last two decades, his trusted advisor Sean McCluskie joined him at every step.

The son of a Scottish immigrant, McCluskie had a reputation as a political street fighter and his gruff style complemented Becerra’s more measured, cerebral approach.

Now Becerra is under attack in California’s wide-open governor’s race after McCluskie, 57, pleaded guilty in December to stealing more than $200,000 from Becerra’s campaign account.

The charges were part of a broader scandal that implicated or brushed up against some of Sacramento’s most influential Democratic political advisors, a scheme prosecutors allege included payments, bank fraud and an FBI sting operation that swept McCluskie’s incriminating private conversations and texts into evidence.

Rivals in the California governor’s race have seized on the case to question whether Becerra, one of the front-runners in the contest to succeed outgoing Gov. Gavin Newsom, is fit for office and could be swept up in the case.

“We can’t have someone who is running as a Democrat who could run into legal difficulties,” said candidate Tom Steyer, who is close to Becerra in the polls.

Becerra has not been accused of wrongdoing, and prosecutors’ court filings describe him as a victim. He told The Times that he cooperated with investigators, including appearing before the grand jury.

“Sean was as close as any staffer that I’ve ever had,” Becerra said in an interview last week, describing how McCluskie moved across the country twice to work for him.

He added that he’s “racked” his brain to understand the case involving McCluskie and his longtime political consultant, Dana Williamson, both of whom he described as “very highly accomplished people.”

Williamson, who also served as Gov. Gavin Newsom’s chief of staff, was indicted in November. She had refused to cooperate with federal investigators and pleaded not guilty, but recently discussed a plea deal with prosecutors. A court hearing is set for Thursday, according to court filings.

An agreement could unearth more details about the case in the coming weeks, a possibility not lost on the Democrats and Republicans running for governor.

Former Orange County Rep. Katie Porter, one of the Democrats who has watched Becerra’s rapid ascent in the race, said in a CNN interview Monday that California can’t risk having Becerra in the race with the specter of the ongoing criminal case.

She acknowledged that “I do not have the facts” about the case, but said if Becerra were to finish in the top two in the June 2 primary and then be indicted by the Trump administration’s Department of Justice, a Republican ultimately could win the governor’s race in November.

“Secretary Becerra cannot and has not guaranteed or promised the people of California that he will not be named as a co-conspirator and indicted,” she said.

Other candidates, and reporters, have questioned whether Becerra had a blind spot in trusting McCluskie.

Appearing on Fox40 News last year, Becerra likened the criminal case to being “married for 20 years” and “all of a sudden you find out that your spouse has been cheating.”

According to prosecutors, McCluskie, Williamson, and another consultant skimmed $225,000 from one of Becerra’s dormant campaign accounts and funneled it to McCluskie through various entities.

McCluskie, who declined to speak to The Times, sought the money because he’d taken a pay cut after joining Becerra in Washington when Becerra became Health and Human Services secretary in 2021, according to prosecutors.

And unlike Becerra, he didn’t move full-time to D.C., and was splitting his time between the nation’s capital and California, where his family lived.

On a phone call recorded by the FBI in 2024, McCluskie talked about the scheme and told a consultant, “This money you guys are giving me is helping me fly back and forth to D.C. and live there half part time.”

Becerra, in an interview, said McCluskie never mentioned his money problems. The pair worked together when Becerra served in Congress and as California attorney general.

After President Biden appointed Becerra to lead Health and Human Services, the pair discussed the move back to D.C.

“Even before we went to HHS, we had talked about whether we wanted to do this,” Becerra said. “We both agreed, ‘Yeah, you know, it’s going to be a sacrifice. We’re going to have to make changes.’”

Former Becerra staffers told The Times that Becerra and McCluskie were such a close team that they have a hard time imagining Becerra working in government without McCluskie.

Another former staffer, Amanda Renteria, said the two men bonded over their humble immigrant backgrounds. McCluskie’s family came from Scotland and Italy; Becerra’s relatives came from Mexico.

McCluskie relished going to battle for those less fortunate, she said.

“When Becerra became A.G., [people questioned] whether or not he had the style that could really take on Trump. If you were to meet Sean, you’d be like, Oh yeah, Sean is totally ready for a fight, he’s ready to take him on.

“That was sort of a difference with Becerra. Becerra had that fight in him. Sean wore it a little bit more,” said Renteria, a political strategist.

Becerra has faced repeated questions about his financial judgment after the criminal case revealed that he agreed to pay up to $10,000 a month to Williamson and another consultant to oversee one of his dormant campaign accounts.

The consultants charged him the fee as part of the scheme to divert money to McCluskie, prosecutors allege.

At the time, Becerra, a Biden Cabinet member, was barred from involving himself in campaign matters.

Becerra defended the payments during an interview with Fox40 last year, stating, “I was told that’s the rate I would have to pay to get someone who could manage that and make sure that I don’t have to worry about [violating any federal rules].”

Campaign finance records show Becerra had never paid such a high fee for his other accounts.

Becerra told The Times that his longtime attorney Stephen Kaufman, whom he was also paying to oversee the account, didn’t flag the payments. “I would have expected him to raise issues if he thought there was something wrong,” Becerra said.

Kaufman didn’t respond to questions about the account.

Los Angeles-based political consultant Eric Hacopian told The Times that the fees are “certainly high.”

“It’s obviously something he should’ve noticed. Either he was not paying attention, or was too trusting of these people,” said Hacopian, who isn’t involved in the governor’s race. “At the end of the day, he’s the primary victim.”

At a debate last week, rival candidate Antonio Villaraigosa pounced on the payments made by Becerra, saying that the politician “has to be under suspicion because it doesn’t pass the smell.”

Danni Wang, a spokesperson for Steyer, said in a statement, “So, which is it — did Becerra know about the illegal payments and participate in the campaign’s corruption, or was he a totally incompetent manager oblivious to what was going on underneath his nose?”

Renteria, the former Becerra staffer, said the allegations against McCluskie and others are particularly surprising given Becerra’s reputation as a “straight A student.”

“Part of it broke my heart,” she said.

Jonathan Underland, a Becerra spokesperson, said Becerra “has always been consistent and clear: Every action he took was in accordance with the law.”

“What he didn’t know — and what the FBI’s own investigation goes out of its way to clarify — is that his staff cooked up a scheme designed to deceive him.”

Becerra, in an interview, repeatedly said that he relied on McCluskie. It was McCluskie, he said, who advised him to make the payments. “I trusted him to handle the accounts,” he said.

He also said he was unaware of some of the details laid out by prosecutors.

Prosecutors said Williamson and others created a “no show” job for McCluskie’s wife, Kerry MacKay, to do work for the consultants.

MacKay never was paid, however, and the money went to an account controlled by McCluskie. MacKay, who didn’t respond to requests for comment, was not charged.

McCluskie’s plea agreement states that he told Becerra about his wife’s job with the consultants, though he didn’t tell the politician that his wife wouldn’t actually be doing any work.

Becerra, in an interview, said he didn’t recall McCluskie informing him about his wife’s work.

McCluskie’s sentencing is scheduled for June 4, two days after the primary.

Published on
13/05/2026 – 14:02 GMT+2

EU lawmakers have reached a provisional deal to make the EU-US trade agreement suspendable in the event of a market disruption caused by a surge in US imports, Euronews has learned from two sources close to the talks.

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Intense negotiations have been underway between EU governments and the European Parliament over the implementation of the deal, which would cut EU tariffs on US goods to zero, under pressure from the Trump administration.

The US has suggested it will double tariffs on European cars if an agreement to swiftly implement the deal is not approved by the European Parliament by 4 July

MEPs have been pushing for tougher conditions since the agreement was clinched last summer between Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, arguing that it must not become a vehicle for extortion of the EU.

The deal sees tariffs tripling on EU goods entering America, although the duties are not stackable, while US industrial goods are reduced to zero. Members of the European Parliament have been delaying a vote to implement the accord, arguing that it needed to be rebalanced and include clauses to protect the EU’s interests.

In recent days, a provisional compromise was found on a safeguard mechanism allowing the EU to reimpose tariffs on US industrial goods if a surge in imports disrupts the European market. The details of the wording of the clause are still under discussion.

Negotiators also agreed in principle to include a “sunset clause” that would automatically terminate the deal unless renewed. Parliament initially sought an expiry date of March 2028, though the final timeline remains under negotiation, the sources said.

‘Sunrise’ clause sparks tensions

However, talks remain at a standstill over a proposed “sunrise clause” defining when the agreement would begin to apply. The EU Parliament wants the implementation date to start only once Washington complies with the 15% tariff cap, while the Commission opposes the condition and wants it done immediately, one source said.

The sunrise clause was introduced by MEPs after a US Supreme Court ruling in February declared the 2025 US tariffs illegal, prompting Washington to introduce new duties on EU goods that now average above the agreed ceiling, therefore in violation of the deal.

The European Commission is also pushing to remove references to the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, seen as the EU’s trade bazooka that could curtail US access to the European single market in unprecedented ways.

The Commission is also pushing back against provisions allowing the suspension of the deal if Trump were to threaten the bloc’s territorial integrity again, one of the source said.

Following Trump’s threats earlier this year to target EU countries refusing to support a US acquisition of Greenland, MEPs also added provisions allowing the suspension of the deal in the event of threats to the EU’s territorial integrity.

The Anti-Coercion Instrument is one of the EU’s strongest market defence tools, designed to counter economic pressure from third countries through measures including restrictions on licenses and intellectual property rights. Its use was repeatedly discussed at the height of transatlantic trade tensions last year, but never approved.

EU negotiators are aiming to finalise the agreement by June ahead of a plenary vote in the European Parliament the same month, in time for the 4 July deadline set by Trump.

Published on
12/05/2026 – 19:47 GMT+2

An EU committee made up of experts from member states voted on Tuesday to ban imports of Brazilian meat starting 3 September due to the use of antimicrobials to stimulate animal growth.

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The decision to remove Brazil from the list of countries that comply with EU food safety standards comes as the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement between the EU and Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay provisionally entered into force on 1 May.

The deal, which liberalises trade of agri-product between both sides of the Atlantic, remains fiercely opposed by EU farmers, who fear that different production standards on both sides of the Atlantic will create unfair competition from Latin American imports.

“The fact that the Union is able to enforce the rules is essential for trust, a level playing field, and good relations with our trading partners,” an EU diplomat told Euronews.

An official with knowledge of the file said that the vote was unanimous and makes Brazil the first country removed from the list of states complying with EU restrictions on antimicrobial use in animals.

The list of third countries which comply with EU requirements, and therefore can export food-producing animals to the EU, will be formally adopted in the coming days.

The European Commission has consistently said EU food safety rules would continue to apply to agricultural products imported from Latin America after the deal enters into force.

Commission’s spokesperson Eva Hrncirova confirmed to Euronews that from 3 September Brazil will no longer be able export to the EU commodities such as bovine, equine, poultry, eggs, aquaculture, honey and casings.

“Trade agreements do not change our rules,” Hrncirova said, adding: “The Commission establishes the Union’s mandatory sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and both our farmers and exporters from third countries have to comply with them.”

Brussels has also negotiated safeguards aimed at protecting EU farmers, including mechanisms to monitor potential market disruption from a surge in imports from Mercosur countries. Quotas were also introduced for sensitive products, including poultry and meat.

Once compliance with the safety rules is demonstrated by Brazil, the EU will be able to resume the imports, and Brazil will be able to benefit from the same tariff relief as the other Mercosur countries.

Photo by Rodrigo Abd for The Associated Press, May 2019 

The window international operators had waited years opened overnight in Venezuela. The interim government has signed new hydrocarbon and mining laws. US officials have been in and out of Caracas. The government of Delcy Rodríguez has landed several new deals in a matter of months. Everything is happening so fast that elements that seemed obvious when Nicolás Maduro was in charge are suddenly overlooked or underdiscussed.

For the last thirteen years I have worked in indigenous communities in the Venezuelan Amazon, in border towns along the Colombian border, and in barrios in and around Caracas. The Venezuelan towns and territories are not the ones the companies coming back will remember.

Almost eight million people left Venezuela during the crisis, one of the largest displacement events in history. The oil-dependent towns of Zulia, Anzoátegui, and Monagas were not spared, nor were mining communities in Bolívar and Amazonas. In some places, a large share of the working-age population is simply gone. What remains is older, poorer, and more dependent on informal survival than the country they left.

Institutions have followed. Hospitals in oilfield regions operate, where they operate at all, at drastically reduced capacity. Schools have hemorrhaged teachers. Local government in many areas has ceased to perform basic functions. Chronic blackouts compound everything. Formal PDVSA employment, the organizing principle of community life in these regions, collapsed along with the company. In many places there are no longer legitimate interlocutors left to negotiate with as the local civic infrastructure that companies elsewhere take for granted has been hollowed alongside everything else.

Once the rigs come back, however, these towns will not stay hollow. They will hastily be filled with returnees, prospectors, informal traders, and internal migrants chasing rumored hiring. The Mining Arc has already shown what this looks like: since 2016, gold has pulled in shifting populations of miners, intermediaries, and military protection chains, with towns like Tumeremo and El Callao expanding and contracting to the rhythm of the frontier economy.

A criminalized operating environment

In most resource markets, companies enter with a clear distinction between the formal environment and the informal risks around it. That distinction broke down in Venezuela a long time ago.

Research by Insight Crime and the International Crisis Group has documented how, over a decade, the line between State oversight and participation in illicit extraction dissolved. Individuals linked to the military and the ruling party benefited from illegal mining, using it as political currency and to cement alliances with Colombia’s ELN and FARC dissident factions. Gold mining was estimated to generate more than $2.2 billion last year, much of it through channels that evaded oversight. In the oil sector, criminal groups have been documented siphoning roughly 30% of fuel in some regions.

“There is deep political skepticism in the communities. Many do not believe that this time will actually bring lasting reforms,” a senior humanitarian told me.

The Rodríguez-led interim government intends to change this, and the foreign policy pressure behind the new laws is real. But the continuity problem deserves precision. The recent turnover at the top of the security apparatus—Defense, military intelligence, the presidential guard—was a selective reshuffle within the chavista system, not an outsider takeover or institutional rupture. The personnel and chains of command sitting inside this supposedly new architecture are not new. Informal structures built over a decade do not dissolve with a reshuffle among the same political elite.

Informal actors are not parallel to the formal system, but intertwined with it, which presents a complex practical consequence to the investors. Companies entering these zones will negotiate, in practice, with all of them at once: the local political boss, the garrison commander asking for vacuna, the colectivo that controls the access road, the gestor who can speed a permit, the sindicato, the guerrilla commander. The single regulator is a fiction.

What communities remember

These are not communities without prior experience of extraction. Many have decades of it, enough to have formed hard views about what operators promise, what they deliver, and what gets left behind. Those views were then tested against a decade of watching investment withdraw, oil spills go unaddressed, and industry jobs disappear.

The environmental record is severe and specific. Aging pipelines and wells around Lake Maracaibo, once the engine of the Venezuelan oil industry, have left slicks visible from the air, fishing communities along its shores watching their catch collapse, and a persistent green bloom of algae fed by untreated sewage and hydrocarbon residue. In mining regions, studies have found that up to 90% of Indigenous women in the Orinoco Mining Arc carry dangerously high mercury levels. These are not abstract concerns. They are the lived experience of the population any operator will meet.

The damage is also in the memory of being told it would be different. Communities have seen “openings” before. A senior humanitarian, who has spent years working on community engagement throughout the country, put it to me while I was writing this piece: “There is deep political skepticism in the communities. Many do not believe that this time will actually bring lasting reforms, and that hardens their initial positions. Even well-intentioned and hopeful promises can be met with radical distrust.”

Sanctions, fiscal terms, and reservoirs can be modeled from afar. The social landscape of a specific Zulia oilfield town or a Bolívar Indigenous territory cannot.

For an operator arriving with standard community-engagement  language, the problem is not that the offer isn’t understood. Other versions of it have been heard before, and the probability it fails to hold is being priced in.

Skepticism in Venezuela also comes pre-supplied with vocabulary. Almost three decades of State rhetoric have framed foreign extractive capital as imperial extraction (saqueo, entrega). People do not have to believe the framing to use it. Many will reach for it because it is the only available vocabulary for criticizing a returning company. The corporate language that lands well in a boardroom across an ocean arrives into a discursive space that has been filled for a generation.

None of which prepares an operator for the deepest mismatch. Where the State has withdrawn from basic services, foreign companies will not be received as purely economic actors. They will be received as potential substitutes for the State and expected to provide what the hospital, the school, the utility, and the municipality no longer do. A company arriving to play a bounded role (taxes, permits, a defined social investment envelope) may find the limits it has drawn around itself are not recognized on the other side of the gate. Conflict may rise not because the company has done something wrong, but because the role it is willing to play is smaller than the role it is being asked to fill. And past experience tells people that the only leverage they have, when promises don’t hold, is disruption.

The carpentry problem

In their 1984 book El caso Venezuela: una ilusión de armonía, Moisés Naím and Ramón Piñango argued that Venezuela had lived for decades in an unsustainable harmony, oil revenue papering over political frustrations. Today there is no harmony and there is no illusion. The arbiters are weaker than they have ever been. The redistributive cushion is gone.

In a 2024 retrospective, Naím and Piñango named a specific mode of failure: the neglect of what they called, in a deliberate understatement, la carpintería, the carpentry. The unglamorous work of implementation, where plans either succeed or quietly fall apart. Small, dismissed flaws in execution had repeatedly proved fatal. When everything was a priority, nothing was.

This is where the current opening risks repeating the failure, transposed from public policy to private investment. A former senior executive at a major international oil company recently told me that the industry’s preference for offshore projects in Venezuela is shaped to a meaningful extent by a desire to avoid the social dynamics on land, not only by reservoir quality. Sanctions, fiscal terms, and reservoirs can be modeled from afar. The social landscape of a specific Zulia oilfield town or a Bolívar Indigenous territory cannot, and the speed of the opening is pulling capital past the groundwork that determines whether a project actually runs.

The contracts will be signed in Caracas and approved in Houston or London. They will fail or hold somewhere else: at the gate of a refinery in Anzoátegui and on the road into a mining town, in front of a hospital that hasn’t run a power generator in a year. The plans are moving faster than the country they describe. That is the carpentry. That is where the projects will come apart: not on the page, but among neighbors more changed, more skeptical, and more demanding than the plan assumed.