minefield

As far as we know, the US invading forces that attacked the country on January 3 did not plant any mines on Venezuelan soil. But, figuratively speaking, they did, because every day, here and there, a situation erupts that is clearly a consequence of the bombing and the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Some of these explosions even appear far more precise than the military operation – a term its proponents insist on using to describe it, despite the fact that it left more than a hundred people dead and caused significant material damage. In the four months that have passed since that traumatic morning, the country has witnessed what appear to be controlled demolitions at the very foundations of Venezuela’s 21st-century anti-hegemonic policy: the return of the US embassy; visits by high-ranking officials (including the head of the CIA); reintegration into the International Monetary Fund; reforms to fundamental laws; and even actions that appear motivated by a desire for symbolic humiliation, such as the removal of uranium from a historic but decommissioned nuclear reactor located on the outskirts of Caracas or Donald Trump’s alleged intention to annex Venezuela as the 51st state.

Every “mine” that explodes deepens a wound that, strictly speaking, is far from healing because it was inflicted on Venezuelan pride and hurts, above all, the Chavista base, but also people from other political camps who share a strong sense of nationalism.

Managing this systematic destruction of icons has been one of the most demanding challenges for the acting government, especially in terms of responding to its own supporters and to real internal power brokers, both within the sphere of popular power and within the military and police forces.

Peace and continuity

One of the most surprising aspects of the political period marked by the events of January 3 is that the country – which was invaded, bombed, and had its president kidnapped – has managed to maintain internal peace. Even more astonishing is that Chavismo, subjected to such a decapitation operation, has remained in power and has swiftly reestablished diplomatic and even cordial relations with the aggressor power.

This strange phenomenon was immediately exploited by internal and external opponents of the Bolivarian Revolution to disseminate accusations of treason. Those accused have responded by arguing that this was not a voluntary compromise, but rather concessions that any rational person would make in a hostage situation and under the threat of even worse attacks and reprisals.

In an unusual move, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres weighed in on this debate, voicing his suspicion that there was internal collusion in the military operation against Maduro.

A significant portion of Chavismo understands the need to reject these hypotheses and agrees that national peace is well worth the sacrifice of some of the slogans that propelled this movement to rise and remain at the pinnacle of political power.

The conflict arises when it becomes clear that, for many revolutionary activists, these slogans embody fundamental principles and values.

The controversy surrounding this issue lies dormant beneath the surface, like a geological fault line that became active following the bombing. At times, it surfaces in the form of minor tremors, through the critical attitudes of figures associated with Chavismo. The ground also trembles from the doubts and unanswered questions in the daily lives of sectors affiliated with or sympathetic to the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

One of the voices that has been speaking out from the ranks of the organic intelligentsia is that of Luis Britto García, who has raised objections to the reforms of the Hydrocarbons and Mining Laws, which, in his view, will allow for the unfettered plundering of Venezuela’s abundant natural resources and enable any disputes to be settled by foreign courts. He also rejects the return of the IMF, given the role that this and other multilateral organizations have played in imposing economic policies that are fundamentally anti-popular.

Britto García is unwavering in his ideological and legal objections, but he is also extremely careful not to present himself as an internal opponent of the acting president. Drawing on his immense moral authority, he has taken on the role of being the public voice for many who lack the ability or opportunity to express their views.

Meanwhile, some who clearly do not wish to be named say they have chosen to contribute through their silence, as the timing is highly inappropriate for taking sides.

Others, however, have chosen to openly dissent. Prominent among them is journalist Mario Silva, who built his career as an opinion-maker on the provocative television show La Hojilla and was later elected to the 2017 National Constituent Assembly and the 2021–2025 National Assembly. With his opposition to the oil and mining reforms as well as amnesty policies for opposition figures who participated in insurrections and riots, Silva has stirred up controversy, particularly among segments of the grassroots Chavista movement that identify with his dramatic and incisive style, which was once strongly supported by Commander Hugo Chávez.

In the vacuous yet highly topical realm of social media influencers, “dissidents” have also emerged, such as Diego Omar Suárez, “Michelo,” an Argentine YouTuber and TikToker who moved to Venezuela in 2024 and had been a key figure in the online discourse on these and other social media platforms, supporting the government of Nicolás Maduro and, in the early weeks, that of Delcy Rodríguez. However, he changed his stance to speak out against treason and collusion with the US. (1)

The Pilgrimage strategy

These disruptions have further obstructed the path of the interim government, which is grappling with a very difficult economic situation; they have become additional “landmines” along the way, forcing the government to move forward with extreme caution while navigating these threats.

One of the strategies designed to maintain popular support and mobilization has been the Pilgrimage against the blockade and the unilateral coercive measures or sanctions imposed by the US and its allies.

The Pilgrimage sought to mobilize support from the Chavista parties, which in the days immediately following January 3 had taken to the streets demanding the return of the presidential couple. That demand was redirected toward calling for a Venezuela free of economic sanctions.

Beyond giving new momentum to the Chavista camp, the mobilization sought to broaden the government’s support base by prioritizing the elimination of the blockade and sanctions.

To achieve this new consensus, the acting president has capitalized on the groundwork laid by the Amnesty Law, the Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence, and other reconciliation initiatives, such as the one established for labor issues, which allowed her to get through May 1 by decreeing increases in bonuses without committing to meaningful wage hikes.

Fundamental in this regard has been the willingness of Chavismo to cede institutional spaces – such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ministry of Higher Education, several vice ministries, and several embassies – to figures from the moderate opposition. It is clear that the support obtained outside the Chavista camp has been the result of these prior concessions.

What about the opposition?

In this complex political landscape, the opposition forces appear, now more than ever, to be watching the game from the sidelines, standing around the table, while the pieces are moved by the acting government and the United States.

The moderate opposition, which participated in the 2025 parliamentary elections and entered the new National Assembly that began its term on January 5, has since January 3 wavered between capitalizing on the moment by supporting the so-called “reinstitutionalization” of the country and reverting to old obstructionist tactics that are largely ineffective given the overwhelming majority that Chavismo holds in the national legislature.

From the perspective of public opinion, everything seems to indicate that this opposition faction has failed to present itself to the country as a genuine option for change, with a platform capable of rallying the masses to follow its leaders.

At the other extreme is the faction led by María Corina Machado, clearly identified as the one that demanded (and continues to demand) most vehemently that the country be sanctioned, blockaded, and attacked militarily, based on the premise that she would automatically be called upon to head a de facto government resulting from the bombing and the kidnapping of the constitutional president.

Donald Trump’s surprising support for Delcy Rodríguez’s government has left Machado high and dry. Neither her obsequious submission to the US president nor her lobbying of the Western corporate elites has done her any good so far, as she remains relegated to the sidelines – a situation that must be particularly humiliating for her.

Under the current circumstances, Machado appears more a part of the internal US political diatribe than of the Venezuelan political scene. Following her failed efforts to secure Trump’s endorsement (to whom she gifted her Nobel Prize), she seems to be actively working with the Democrats and elements of the Deep State with the aim of inflicting a defeat on the Republican president in the midterm elections.

It seems her allegiances have shifted, creating a bizarre paradox: Venezuela’s radical opposition is betting against Trump, while Chavismo feels more secure if the president who ordered the brutal military aggression does not emerge too battered from the November contest.

It appears, then, that the “metaphorical landmines” planted by the US during its brief invasion are also exploding, one after another, on the grounds of the right and the far right.

(1) Editor’s note: this article was written before the May 16 handover of former minister and diplomatic envoy Alex Saab to US authorities.

Clodovaldo Hernández is a journalist and political analyst with experience in higher education. He won the National Journalism Prize (Opinion category) in 2002. He is the author of the books Reinventario (poetry and short stories) De genios y de figuras (journalistic profiles) and Esa larga, infinita distancia (novel).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelan editorial staff.

WASHINGTON — Reporters assigned to travel aboard Air Force Two were told to prepare for an early morning departure on Tuesday for Islamabad until an unexplained delay — followed by a detour by Vice President JD Vance to the White House — revealed clues that something was wrong.

Iranian diplomats had not yet responded to U.S. proposals intended to form the basis of a new round of talks. Some were questioning whether they would attend at all. Had he departed as planned, Vance risked a humiliation, spending hours flying to Pakistan only to be stood up on arrival.

A crisis meeting at the White House led President Trump to announce an indefinite extension to a ceasefire deadline that had been set as a pressure tactic. Now, unable to bring the Iranians to heel, that pressure was suddenly off.

It was an early lesson for Vance in the many ways high-stakes diplomacy can veer off-course.

“There are obvious risks for Vance,” said Chester Crocker, who served as an assistant secretary of State in the Reagan administration, “being associated with failure or with a dubious deal.”

Trump’s aides are clear on the stakes in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and an end to the war. Control of the Strait of Hormuz could determine global oil prices for years. Any final deal will shape whether Americans ultimately conclude the fight was worth it — and could sway the outcome of the midterm elections.

But for America’s lead negotiator, the stakes are also personal.

Vance, a diplomatic novice, has found himself at the helm of an effort rife with political risk that has stymied seasoned diplomats ahead of an anticipated run for president.

The potential payoff is substantial, placing Vance at the center of an international stage with the power to end a historically unpopular war.

But he also may be forced to attach his name to a nuclear deal that provides Tehran access to billions of dollars in sanctions relief, in exchange for limits on its nuclear work that will ultimately expire over time, under conditional monitoring access for international inspectors — an agreement with striking echoes to a 2015 nuclear deal negotiated by a Democratic administration that was disparaged by his party for over a decade.

Vance is negotiating not on his own terms, but on behalf of a mercurial president whose decisions will ultimately determine whether an agreement can be reached. And the Iranians know that Trump’s days in office are numbered, with Vance, a war skeptic, possibly in line to succeed him.

One U.S. official familiar with the negotiations said the vice president is “a pragmatist,” realistic about the prospects of a deal.

“What he has to gain is an image that he can operate effectively on the world stage on a fraught issue. Even if he will give credit to the president, he will be seen as capable of resolving really hard, security-related problems,” said Dennis Ross, a veteran diplomat on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict who served in the George H.W. Bush, Clinton and Obama administrations. “What he has to lose is that he was given the role and did not succeed.”

Failure could raise doubts about his statecraft. But even success at the negotiating table could result in an agreement that turns off Republican voters he may need in a 2028 presidential bid.

“Vance is put in an impossible position,” said Arne Westad, a professor of history at Yale.

“Any deal with the current Iranian regime will be seen as problematic by many Republicans,” Westad said. “If he fails to secure a deal, he will be attacked by those who want an end to the U.S. war — and be seen as ineffective by the president.”

Reputation ‘on the line’

Trump has publicly acknowledged that Vance, a Marine Corps veteran who has consistently opposed U.S. military engagements in the Middle East, had reservations over launching the Iran war in the first place. “He was, I would say, philosophically a little bit different than me,” the president told reporters in March. “I think he was maybe less enthusiastic.”

For that reason, according to Iranian state media reports, Vance was seen by Tehran as their preferred interlocutor in negotiations. Iranian officials expressed gratitude when, during fevered talks ahead of the initial announcement of a ceasefire, they learned that Steve Witkoff, the president’s roving negotiator, had recommended that the vice president be included in the delegation — an exceptional gesture that marked Washington’s highest-level engagement with the Islamic Republic in history.

Republican strategists said Vance’s participation is a demonstration that Trump trusts him, an essential trait for any future Republican presidential nominee and aspiring heir to the MAGA movement.

“It’s rare that a vice president has been put in the position of directly negotiating with a foreign adversary,” said Terry Nelson, a longtime Republican media strategist. “We are engaging a very senior political leader in negotiations with a country that has killed U.S. soldiers and sown chaos in the region. I do think it’s an indication of our resolution and seriousness.”

Whit Ayres, a veteran Republican pollster who has consulted Republican senators and governors for more than three decades, said the vice president’s appointment as lead negotiator “elevates Vance as Trump’s heir-apparent even more than before.”

“Whether that becomes a plus or a minus depends on the outcome of the negotiations,” Ayres added, “and Trump’s ultimate standing with the Republican electorate, both of which are unknowns.”

Talks are currently deadlocked over long-standing demands from Tehran that its leadership has held since the early 2000s, when previously undisclosed nuclear activities first triggered international alarm over Iran’s expanding program.

Iran has periodically accepted temporary limits on its nuclear work — pausing uranium enrichment during talks and, under the 2015 deal, committing to a prolonged cap on enrichment at levels beyond any clear civilian need. But it has always insisted on a “right to enrich” on its own soil, rejecting U.S. attempts to permanently end the program as a foreign attempt to thwart Iran’s scientific progress.

Returning from the first round of ceasefire negotiations, Vance dismissed that position, articulated to him in Islamabad by the speaker of Iran’s Parliament.

“He said, ‘We refuse to give up the right to enrichment,’” Vance said. “And I thought to myself, you know what, my wife has the right to skydive, but she doesn’t jump out of an airplane, because she and I have an agreement that she’s not going to do that, because I don’t want my wife jumping out of an airplane.”

Echoes of a broken deal

The 2015 deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — negotiated by veteran, nonpolitical U.S. diplomats and nuclear scientists over two years of near-constant negotiations — removed roughly 98% of Iran’s nuclear stockpile from the country, while keeping the country’s nuclear infrastructure largely in place, save for the decommissioning of a heavy-water plutonium reactor that could have provided Tehran with a second path to a nuclear bomb.

Under the agreement, Iran consented to limit its use of advanced centrifuges for 10 years, and to restrict uranium enrichment to below weapons-grade levels for 15 years. Inspectors from the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency were granted unprecedented access to monitor the program, though some of these enhanced inspection measures were set to expire after roughly two decades.

In exchange, Iran regained access to tens of billions of dollars of its frozen assets, and settled a long-standing legal dispute with Washington that led the Obama administration to transfer $400 million in cash to Tehran. The episode prompted scandal on the political right, which accused Democrats of fueling terrorism through the funding of Iran’s proxy militias.

Now, after just two weeks of negotiations, the Trump administration is already acknowledging that a final deal with Iran would rely on a familiar formula: temporary caps on Iran’s nuclear work in exchange for substantial sanctions relief. Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.

Iran comes to the talks with added leverage today, able and willing to disrupt the flow of 20% of the world’s energy through the Strait of Hormuz. And the United States is negotiating alone, without its former partners in the “P5+1” — Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and Germany — at its side.

Anna Kelly, principal deputy press secretary at the White House, told The Times that “after Democrats like Joe Biden and Barack Hussein Obama weakened our country on the world stage, President Trump has effectively restored American strength with the help of Vice President Vance, who is doing a great job leading the United States in negotiations with Iran.”

“The president and his entire national security team have an incredible track record in making good deals for our country, and the American people can rest assured that the United States will not enter any agreement that does not put our national security interests first,” Kelly said.

Matt Gorman, a longtime Republican strategist and chief communications officer at Targeted Victory, said the JCPOA was viewed particularly critically because it “was negotiated in peacetime.”

“Vance would essentially be ending a war, if successful, and that allows him to make a very different argument,” Gorman said.

The vice president is currently polling as the front-runner for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, ahead of Marco Rubio, who — despite serving as Trump’s secretary of State and national security advisor — is not directly involved in the Iran talks.

Vance’s role at the negotiating table could help position him as a peacemaker, Crocker noted, distinguishing him from advocates of the war entering the presidential primaries.

But Vance “has been tasked by a president incapable of staying on message, with limited stores of credibility with adversaries as well as allies and a disregard for the complexities of the issues,” said Barbara Bodine, former U.S. ambassador to Yemen. “His task? A credible end to the war without clear objectives.”

“At best, this will be a faux-gilded JCPOA 2.0. Victory will be declared to no applause. On the line is not just Vance’s own reputation, but a demerit in his run for the 2028 presidency,” Bodine added. “The Iran portfolio was no gift.”

What else you should be reading

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The L.A. Times Special: The Flores twins built a drug empire with El Chapo — then betrayed him

More to come,
Michael Wilner
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