Israel is building roads and military outposts across southern Lebanon, with satellite imagery showing a network spanning nearly 90km, fuelling concerns over a prolonged Israeli military presence in the region. Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr reports from Baraachit.
IRGC says underground military complexes allow missile production to continue even under heavy bombardment.
Published On 7 Nov 20267 Nov 2026
Iran is building underground military complexes able to sustain weapons production and storage even under heavy bombardment, according to the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
IRGC spokesperson Hossein Mohebbi made a series of announcements on Saturday about the military’s capabilities during a news conference in Tehran, Iranian media reported.
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Among the achievements listed were an “underground missile city” set to be unveiled, the semi-official Tasnim news agency reported.
Mohebbi said the IRGC had rapidly transferred its missile and drone production lines from the surface to underground facilities. This allows Iran to continue producing missiles while its adversaries assumed its stockpiles were dwindling, he explained.
The spokesperson also outlined advances in stealth technology. He maintained that such improvements had allowed Iran’s missiles and drones to pierce air defence systems and accurately strike targets during previous rounds of fighting with the United States and Israel.
“Today, every weapon used by the IRGC Aerospace Force is manufactured using homegrown knowledge and expertise. Moreover, our products are not even derived from reverse-engineering captured enemy war material,” Iran’s IRNA news agency quoted Mohebbi as saying.
A recent report by US newspaper, The Wall Street Journal, shows that Iran caused billions of dollars in damage to US bases throughout the Middle East during previous rounds of fighting.
Meanwhile, a separate report by the Reuters news agency found that Iran had successfully targeted Gulf infrastructure on at least 135 occasions during the same period, causing billions of dollars in damage and lost revenues.
Mohebbi also warned on Saturday that restrictions on the range of Iranian missiles had been lifted. The warning follows a statement from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who said that there would be “no geographical limits” to Iran’s response if it were attacked again by the US and Israel.
The US-Israeli war on Iran was launched on February 28, prompting Tehran to close the Strait of Hormuz and triggering a global energy crisis. Mediation efforts have stepped up recently, as regional countries hope to bring the war to an end.
On Friday, President Donald Trump said the US military launched limited strikes on Iran’s Qeshm Island, while also claiming Washington had made “a lot of progress” in talks with Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly warned that it will target Gulf energy infrastructure if the fighting resumes. Such attacks would likely push energy prices even higher.
Meanwhile, Washington has also imposed additional sanctions on Iran as it seeks to force Tehran to concede to its demands. The restrictions have further strained the country’s economy, forcing Iran to adopt new trade routes.
On Saturday, US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced it was establishing a new task force that will support ongoing US efforts to prevent Iran from using land routes to transport advanced weapons and other materials.
The US has also imposed a naval blockade on Iran to prevent it from exporting oil.
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operates an increasingly diverse fleet of helicopters spanning everything from basic pilot training and battlefield transport to airborne early warning, anti-submarine warfare, and dedicated attack missions.
The force reflects decades of development, often beginning with helicopters acquired from France and later produced under license, before transitioning to increasingly indigenous designs. The result is a mix of older aircraft that have undergone extensive modernization and newer platforms designed around the requirements of China’s expanding military, including its growing carrier and amphibious assault fleets.
A Z-10 attack helicopter. Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images
The Z-8 family, originally derived from the Cold War-era French Super Frelon, is a particularly good example of this evolution. It has spawned a wide range of specialized variants, including search and rescue, transport, electronic warfare, and airborne command post helicopters. Meanwhile, the Z-20 — frequently alluded to as a Sikorsky S-70/H-60 clone — has emerged as a modern medium-lift platform with land-based, naval, and assault variants, while the Z-10 and newer Z-21 represent China’s growing emphasis on dedicated attack helicopters.
A PLAN Z-8C conducts an aerial assault demonstration at the Zhuhai Air Show in Zhuhai, south China’s Guangdong province, in 2024. CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images
This guide examines the principal helicopter types operated by the PLA, their development, and the roles they are expected to perform.
At the same time, it should be noted that, as it now stands, the PLA remains heavily reliant on foreign-sourced helicopters for a wide variety of applications.
Russian-built helicopters give the PLA a mix of transport and specialized naval capabilities. The Mi-17/171 Hip family supports troop and cargo movement, search and rescue, special operations, and select high-altitude or mission-specific roles. At sea, the Ka-28 Helix provides anti-submarine warfare, while the Ka-31’s radar supports airborne fleet surveillance. These aircraft remain in service where their established capabilities continue to meet operational needs. However, they are increasingly supplemented by Chinese designs, including certain designs that have been tailored to provide direct replacements.
The most advanced Hip helicopter operated by the PLA is the Mi-171Sh used for combat search and rescue. It features extensive self-protection equipment and armament. Photo by Sun Lin/VCG via Getty Images
Utility, Training, and Light Helicopters
HC-120
The HC-120 is a light utility helicopter derived from the EC120, a design co-developed by China, France, and Singapore during the 1990s. The type entered service with PLA Army Aviation in 2005, providing a modern platform for primary helicopter training and replacing the aging SA316 Alouette III in that role.
The HC-120 is powered by a single Turbomeca Arrius 2F turboshaft engine. Its introduction represented an important step in modernizing the Army Aviation training fleet, giving pilots experience with a more contemporary helicopter before transitioning to larger operational types.
An HC-120 in the colors of the Army Aviation Training School. via Chinese internet
Z-11
The Z-11 is a light utility helicopter developed by Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation (CHAIC) and the 602 Research Institute. The design is based on the French AS350BA Écureuil, examples of which were acquired for Army Aviation.
Deliveries of the Z-11 to Army Aviation began in 1998. The helicopter is powered by a single WZ-8D turboshaft engine and is primarily used for training, liaison, and other light utility duties.
A scout and armed reconnaissance derivative, designated as the Z-11WB, was developed with a nose-mounted electro-optical (EO) turret and external weapon pylons capable of carrying rockets, missiles, and gun pods. Its operational status remains unclear, although it provided the basis for the unarmed Z-11A training helicopter used by the Army Aviation Academy.
A demonstrator for the Z-11WB scout and armed reconnaissance helicopter. via Chinese internet
The Z-8 Family: From French Origins To A Modern Helicopter Lineage
Z-8J
The Z-8 was developed from the French SA321Ja Super Frelon, 13 examples of which China purchased during the late 1970s. Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation subsequently developed an indigenous version during the 1980s.
Powered by three WZ-6 turboshaft engines, the original Z-8 became the foundation for a broad family of helicopters serving the PLA Navy (PLAN), Army Aviation, and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
The Z-8J is the naval transport variant, with a boat-like hull. For anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions, the helicopter can be equipped with a surface-search radar, a French HS-12 dipping sonar, and Whitehead A244S or ET52 torpedoes.
Several specialized derivatives were developed from the Z-8J:
Z-8S: A naval search and rescue (SAR) version with upgraded avionics, a searchlight, a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) turret, and a rescue hoist. Most Z-8Js have reportedly been upgraded to this configuration.
Z-8JH: A medical evacuation and SAR variant.
The Z-8J and Z-8JH have both been used aboard Chinese aircraft carriers, providing transport and support capabilities for embarked naval forces.
A Z-8JH on the PLAN replenishment ship Kekexilihu at Qingdao Port, Shandong Province of China, in 2023. Photo by Fu Tian/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images
Z-8C
The Z-8C represents a substantially improved successor to the original naval Z-8J series. The helicopter was first reported in 2016 and incorporates a number of changes intended to improve its performance and operational versatility.
The most visible differences include a redesigned nose with a chin-mounted weather radar, a FLIR turret, and a pilot night-vision system (PNVS) mounted above the cockpit. A searchlight is also fitted, while the longer engine compartment accommodates the WZ-6C turboshaft engine.
The Z-8C is operated by the PLA Marine Corps, while the Z-8CJ serves as a training variant with the Naval Aviation University.
The helicopter has become a principal transport platform for the Type 075 amphibious assault ship, supporting the movement of troops and equipment between ships and shore.
Z-8C helicopters conduct aerial display training for the upcoming Airshow China in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province of China, in 2024. Photo by Chen Xiao/VCG via Getty Images
Z-8K/KA
The PLAAF introduced the Z-8K in 2007 as a dedicated search-and-rescue helicopter. The related Z-8KA is configured for combat search and rescue (CSAR), including the recovery of personnel from hostile or contested environments.
Both versions feature a FLIR turret, searchlight, radar-warning receiver (RWR), chaff and flare dispensers, and a rescue hoist. Some aircraft are also equipped with small terrain-following radars beneath the nose to support low-level operations.
Selected helicopters have received satellite communications (SATCOM) antennas on top of the tail boom, improving their communications capabilities over longer distances.
A further derivative, the Z-8KH, was developed for the PLAAF garrison stationed in Hong Kong. This version is distinguished by chaff and flare dispensers integrated into its flotation equipment.
A Z-8KA helicopter during the 2022 Changchun Air Show at Changchun Dafangshen Airport, Jilin Province of China. Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images
Z-8B
The Z-8B entered service with PLA Army Aviation in 2011 as an improved transport helicopter. It shares several characteristics with the Z-8KH but lacks the latter’s flotation equipment.
The Z-8B incorporates a glass cockpit and has become a major component of the Army Aviation transport fleet. Some aircraft have subsequently had flotation equipment reinstalled, reflecting the type’s continuing evolution.
An optional auxiliary fuel tank can be installed inside the cabin to extend its range. Other upgrades have included SATCOM antennas on the tail boom and, on some aircraft, WZ-6C engines, an EO turret, and a terrain-following radar beneath the nose.
A specialized operations variant has also been identified. These helicopters incorporate RWR, laser-warning receivers (LWR), and missile-approach warning system (MAWS) sensors, alongside flare dispensers and ceramic armor protection.
A still from a CCTV video shows a Z-8B equipped with RWR, LWR, and MAWS sensors, as well as countermeasures dispensers. via Chinese internet
Z-8G
Lacking the boat-like hull of the Z-8B, the Z-8G is expected to replace that type in Army Aviation service. The helicopter was evaluated from 2014 and was specifically optimized for operations at high altitudes, including in Tibet.
Unlike earlier Z-8 variants, the initial Z-8G configuration uses imported Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6B-67A turboshaft engines. Its redesigned nose is longer and more aerodynamically efficient, while the glass cockpit and terrain-following radar support operations in demanding environments.
The helicopter also incorporates SATCOM and BeiDou/GPS antennas to improve communications and navigation during long-range missions.
Some Z-8Gs have been equipped for special operations, with combinations of MAWS, RWR, and LWR sensors mounted on the rear fuselage and sponsons, together with chaff and flare dispensers. Armor plates beneath the cockpit windows provide additional protection, and some aircraft carry a 12.7mm machine gun inside a cabin doorway.
Several specialized variants have also been identified:
Another electronic warfare configuration reportedly uses rectangular plate antenna arrays mounted on both sides of the rear fuselage.
An airborne command-post variant featuring a retractable synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) surveillance system inside the rear fuselage, alongside additional electronic-support-measures (ESM) antennas.
Some Z-8Gs may also have adopted the indigenous WZ-6C engine.
A Z-8G at Airshow China at Zhuhai in 2024. Photo by Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images
Z-8L
The Z-8L is a wide-body development of the Z-8G that first flew in 2017. Its most prominent feature is a pair of large sponsons mounted along the sides of the fuselage, providing additional space for fuel tanks and other equipment.
The wider fuselage also increases internal volume, allowing the helicopter to carry more cargo and equipment. Relocating the internal fuel tanks beneath the cabin floor has further increased usable cabin space.
Some aircraft have been observed with RWR and MAWS sensors on both sides of the forward fuselage, a roof-mounted FLIR turret, and a terrain-following radar beneath the nose. Additional defensive equipment, including LWR and RWR sensors and chaff/flare dispensers, can be installed on the sponsons.
A SATCOM antenna is mounted on top of the tail boom. The original PT6B-67A engines are reportedly being replaced by the more powerful indigenous WZ-7 turboshaft.
The Z-8L provides the Army with a larger and more capable transport helicopter suited to demanding operating environments and specialized missions.
A Z-8L (nearest camera) alongside a Z-20 during the 2022 Airshow China in Zhuhai, Guangdong province of China. Photo by Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
Z-8D
The Z-8D is a shipborne derivative of the Z-8L that first appeared in 2023. It combines the wide-body configuration with an extensive self-defense suite intended to improve survivability during operations over water.
The helicopter features RWR, LWR, and MAWS sensors, along with chaff and flare dispensers. Four inflatable flotation units provide emergency protection in the event of a forced landing at sea.
Power is supplied by either WZ-6C or the newer WZ-7 turboshaft engines. Engine air particle separators (EAPS) are installed ahead of the engine inlets to reduce the risk of damage from airborne debris.
The Z-8D is expected to operate from China’s Type 075 amphibious assault ships and the larger Type 076 amphibious assault ship.
One of the first clear images of a PLAN Naval Aviation Z-8D. via Chinese internet
The Z-18 Series: Naval Utility, Early Warning, and ASW Helicopters
Z-18Y
Named White Heron, the Z-18Y was developed by the 602 Research Institute and Changhe as a new medium-lift shipborne transport helicopter. It is derived from the AC313 but incorporates a redesigned fuselage and a number of changes intended to improve its naval suitability.
The helicopter uses imported PT6B-67A turboshaft engines and provides greater internal volume and payload capacity than the earlier Z-8. Improved performance in hot-and-high conditions is another important feature.
The Z-18Y incorporates a nose-mounted weather radar and an FLIR/TV turret, along with additional communication and navigation antennas beneath the fuselage. A SATCOM antenna is installed on top of the tail boom.
Folding main and tail rotor blades allow the helicopter to be stored more efficiently aboard ships. The Z-18Y is primarily used for carrier onboard delivery (COD) missions, transporting personnel and supplies between ships and shore.
It has also provided the basis for several specialized naval derivatives.
A Z-18Y operating from a Type 075 class assault ship. PLA
Z-18J
Named Bat, the Z-18J is an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) helicopter developed from the Z-18Y.
Its principal feature is a retractable radar antenna housed within a redesigned rear fuselage. The long-range, multimode AESA radar is lowered vertically during operation, providing 360-degree coverage around the helicopter.
The Z-18J also incorporates a nose-mounted FLIR turret and additional MAWS and RWR antennas distributed around the nose and rear fuselage. Chaff and flare dispensers are installed in the flotation equipment.
The helicopter has been used aboard Chinese aircraft carriers as an interim airborne early-warning platform and has also been observed operating from Type 075 amphibious assault ships.
A rescue hoist is installed on the starboard side of the forward fuselage, allowing the aircraft to perform secondary SAR duties.
An improved Z-18A features a redesigned engine and gearbox compartment and three indigenous WZ-6C engines. Some Z-18Js and Z-18As have also received SATCOM antennas to improve long-range communications.
A Z-18J together with two J-15 fighters onboard the Liaoning. via Chinese internet
Z-18F
Named Sea Eagle, the Z-18F is an ASW and anti-ship warfare helicopter developed from the Z-18Y. It first appeared in 2014 and represents a substantial improvement over the earlier Z-8-based naval ASW helicopters.
The helicopter incorporates a large surface-search radar beneath the nose, while its FLIR/TV turret has been relocated to the starboard side of the fuselage. A dipping sonar provides an additional means of detecting submarines, while MAWS and RWR antennas are installed on the forward and rear fuselage.
Additional communications and navigation antennas are mounted beneath the fuselage. Four external pylons can carry torpedoes or anti-ship missiles (AShMs), including the YJ-9. A dispenser near the rear loading ramp allows the helicopter to deploy sonobuoys.
The Z-18F operates aboard Chinese aircraft carriers and the Type 075 amphibious assault ship.
Several improved derivatives have since appeared:
Z-18FA: Incorporates a redesigned engine and gearbox compartment and three domestic WZ-6C turboshaft engines.
Z-18FG: Features a new chin-mounted search radar and small side pylons for lightweight ASW torpedoes or AShMs.
Z-18FB: A further improved version reportedly powered by three WZ-7 turboshaft engines, replacing the Canadian PT6B-67A.
These developments point to a continuing effort to improve the Z-18’s performance and extend the operational life of the broader family.
A Z-18F assigned to the aircraft carrier Liaoning. via Chinese internet
The Z-9 Family
Z-9A/B
The Z-9 originated from the French AS365 Dauphin family, with China acquiring aircraft and subsequently producing them under license through Harbin Aircraft Industry Group (HAIG) during the 1990s.
The Z-9A became a principal utility helicopter for Army Aviation and was also used for pilot training. The improved Z-9B incorporated a greater proportion of indigenous components, helping establish the foundation for China’s broader Z-9 development program, which also took it in a maritime direction.
The helicopter has since become one of China’s most widely used light utility platforms and has also been widely exported in the Z-9E series.
Cambodian soldiers stand in front of Z-9s during a handover ceremony at a Royal Cambodian Air Force base in Phnom Penh, in 2013. KHEM SOVANNARA/AFP via Getty Images KHEM SOVANNARA
Z-9C
The Z-9C is China’s indigenous naval derivative of the French AS565 Panther, examples of which were imported during the late 1980s.
The helicopter incorporates a domestically developed surface-search radar and dipping sonar, allowing it to conduct ASW missions. It can carry up to two Yu-7K torpedoes and is equipped with inflatable flotation bags for emergency landings on water.
Some Z-9Cs have been converted to SAR duties, receiving a searchlight, an EO turret, and a rescue hoist.
The type has also been used for anti-piracy patrols off the Somali coast. In this role, some aircraft have carried a 12.7mm gun pod and a 57mm rocket launcher.
A downgraded training version was developed for the Naval Aviation Academy.
Z-9 sits aboard the Type 052D destroyer Zhanjiang at Ngong Shuen Chau Naval Base on Stonecutters Island in Hong Kong on July 6, 2025. Photo by AFP
Z-9D
The Z-9D is an improved derivative of the Z-9C, incorporating a greater emphasis on anti-surface warfare.
The helicopter features stub wings capable of carrying up to four AShMs for use against smaller surface targets. A new fire-control radar is housed in a larger nose cone, while the weapon-control officer is positioned in the rear cabin.
RWR antennas are installed on both sides of the nose and near the tail rotor. The Z-9D has been observed operating from Type 056 and Type 056A frigates.
Some aircraft have also received an EO turret beneath the fuselage, expanding their surveillance and targeting capabilities.
A Z-9D carrying a YJ-9 anti-ship missile. via Chinese internet
Z-9F
The Z-9F is an improved ASW helicopter based on the Z-9D. It was first observed in 2017 and is expected to replace the older Z-9C.
The helicopter incorporates a new dipping sonar, a glass cockpit, and an improved surface-search radar. A BeiDou antenna is mounted on top of the cabin.
The Z-9F retains the ability to carry up to two ASW torpedoes beneath its stub wings, providing a more modern platform for shipborne submarine-hunting missions.
Z-9S
The Z-9S is a naval search-and-rescue helicopter developed for operations aboard Chinese aircraft carriers.
It features a nose-mounted EO turret, a searchlight, and a rescue hoist installed on the starboard side. The helicopter is also used for training by the Naval Aviation University.
A small number of SAR-configured Z-9S helicopters are also operated by Army Aviation.
A Z-9S conducts exercises onboard a Type 055 destroyer. via Chinese internet
Z-9WA/WZ
The Z-9WA is a night-attack development of the Z-9W, incorporating more powerful engines and improved avionics for operations in low-light conditions.
The helicopter features stub wings capable of carrying up to eight KD-8 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or PL-90 air-to-air missiles (AAMs). A nose-mounted low-light TV/IR turret supports night operations, while RWR antennas are installed on both sides of the fuselage.
Additional features include cockpit armor, flare dispensers, a datalink, and a redesigned cockpit compatible with night-vision goggles (NVGs).
Z-9WZ. via Chinese internet
The improved Z-9WZ incorporates a laser designator, allowing it to employ the newer KD-9 ATGM, as well as FN-6 AAMs. It is also powered by WZ-8H engines.
Most Z-9WAs are believed to have been upgraded to the WZ standard.
The PLAAF operates some Z-9WA/WZ helicopters in the SAR role. A similar derivative, the Z-9ZH, is used by the PLAAF garrison stationed in Hong Kong.
Dedicated Attack and Scout Helicopters
Z-10
The Z-10 represents China’s first dedicated modern attack helicopter. Developed by the 602 Research Institute, CHAIC, and HAIG, the program also received early input from Russia’s Kamov design bureau.
The helicopter features a conventional tandem-seat gunship configuration, with the gunner seated in front and the pilot behind. A five-blade composite main rotor and distinctive scissor-type tail rotor distinguish the design.
The Z-10 is powered by WZ-9 turboshaft engines and entered service in 2010, following its first flight in 2003.
A Z-10K at the Shek Kong Barracks in Hong Kong, China. Photo by Zhang Xiangyi/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images
Its primary armament consists of up to eight KD-9 or KD-10 laser-guided ATGMs, supplemented by a chin-mounted 23mm chain gun. The helicopter can also carry up to eight PL-90 AAMs.
The nose-mounted PNVS and target acquisition and designation system (TADS)-equivalent housing incorporates FLIR, a TV camera, a laser rangefinder, and a laser designator. RWR antennas are installed on both sides of the forward and aft fuselage, while LWR sensors are mounted on the pylon tips.
The initial prototypes were powered by the Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6C-76C engine. Series-production aircraft instead adopted the less powerful WZ-9, resulting in reductions to armor protection, sensor size, and weapon load compared with the original configuration.
Several variants and upgrades have since emerged:
Z-10H: Retains the original PNVS/TADS configuration while using WZ-9 engines.
Z-10K: A dedicated version for PLAAF airborne units, featuring a new 23mm gun and 19-tube rocket launchers. Some aircraft have SATCOM antennas on top of the tail boom.
Z-10A: The definitive production configuration, distinguished by upward-facing engine exhaust nozzles.
Later upgrades: Some Z-10 and Z-10K aircraft have received additional ceramic armor, MAWS sensors on the nose, and SATCOM antennas for long-range communications.
The helicopter has also gained newer long-range, IIR/CCD-guided ATGMs. These weapons require an additional datalink antenna mounted in front of the PNVS.
Later developments include the introduction of millimeter-wave (MMW) radar-guided fire-and-forget missiles, potentially allowing the Z-10 to operate alongside the Z-19 in coordinated attack missions.
The export-oriented Z-10ME incorporates further improvements, including a mast-mounted MMW radar.
Z-19
The Z-19 is a scout and attack helicopter developed by HAIG using the H425 as its basis. It was intended to replace the Z-9WA while complementing the larger Z-10.
The helicopter features a narrow fuselage and tandem cockpit, with the pilot seated in front and the gunner behind. A nose-mounted EO turret incorporates FLIR, a TV camera, and a laser rangefinder, while RWR antennas provide warning of hostile radar emissions.
The Z-19 uses the same WZ-8C engines, transmission, and rotor systems as the H425, helping accelerate its development.
A Z-19 without the mast-mounted MMW radar. via Chinese internet
When fitted with a mast-mounted MMW radar, the Z-19 provides additional target-detection capabilities. The helicopter’s armament is broadly similar to that of the Z-9WA, including KD-9 and KD-10 ATGMs, PL-90 AAMs, rocket launchers, and gun pods.
Later upgrades include MAWS sensors on the nose and tail, along with LWR sensors on the stub wings.
The Z-19 has also been integrated with newer long-range IIR/CCD/laser-guided ATGMs, including the KF-9, KF-10, and KF-11. These weapons require an additional datalink antenna mounted on the nose.
Z-21
The Z-21 is a new heavy attack helicopter first identified in 2024. Developed by the 602 Research Institute, Changhe, and Hafei, it appears to be a substantially larger and more heavily protected gunship than the Z-10.
The helicopter is believed to use the WZ-10 turboshaft engines and rotor systems developed for the Z-20. It features a conventional tandem-seat configuration, with a gunner in the front and a pilot behind.
One of the first photos of the Z-21. via Chinese internet
Large cheek fairings on either side of the fuselage incorporate MAWS, LWR, ESM, and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment. The nose features a new PNVS above a TADS, while an MMW search radar is mounted above the main rotor mast.
Laser-powered directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) are installed on the wingtips. Additional defensive equipment includes chaff and flare dispensers on the cheek fairings and tail boom.
A BeiDou antenna is mounted on the tail boom, while at least one prototype has been observed with upward-facing engine exhausts.
Z-21. via Chinese internet
The Z-21 is expected to feature a 30mm chain gun beneath the forward fuselage. Each stub wing incorporates three weapon stations capable of carrying the newer KF-series long-range ATGMs, PL-90 AAMs, and other emerging weapons.
Compared with the Z-20, the Z-21 is expected to offer improved high-altitude performance, greater armor protection, and a heavier payload, making it better suited to demanding attack missions.
The Z-20 Family: China’s New Medium Helicopter
Z-20
The Z-20 is China’s new medium-lift general-purpose helicopter, developed by the 602 Research Institute, Harbin, and Changhe since the late 1990s.
The design is heavily influenced by the Sikorsky S-70 Black Hawk, examples of which China acquired for the PLA during the 1980s. However, the Z-20 incorporates a number of indigenous systems and is intended to replace the Mi-17 series in Army Aviation service.
The helicopter features a five-blade main rotor, a glass cockpit, and armor protection around the cockpit. A PNVS is mounted beneath the chin, while RWR antennas are installed on both sides of the forward and rear fuselage.
Additional equipment includes LWR sensors on both sides of the nose, SATCOM, ECM antennas on top of the fuselage, and a nose-mounted weather radar and terrain-following radar.
A Z-20 during the 7th China Helicopter Exposition in Tianjin Municipality, China, in 2025. Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images
The Z-20 is powered by two WZ-10 turboshaft engines and can carry up to 13 fully equipped soldiers. An optional fuel tank can be installed in the cargo compartment to extend its range.
Stub wings can be fitted to carry rocket launchers, gun pods, and external fuel tanks.
The Z-20 first flew in 2013 and entered service with PLA Army Aviation by 2019.
Several aircraft have been observed with upward-facing engine exhausts. A SAR variant incorporates an EO turret and searchlight beneath the forward fuselage, together with a rescue hoist above the cabin door.
Z-20K/KS/KT
The Z-20 has also spawned a number of specialized variants for the PLAAF.
The Z-20K, identified in 2022, is a transport helicopter intended for airborne assault units.
The PLAAF operates the Z-20KS subvariant in the SAR role. This model features an EO turret and searchlight beneath the forward fuselage, while optional stub wings allow it to carry rocket launchers and gun pods.
An improved assault variant, the Z-20KT, incorporates a larger SATCOM antenna on top of the tail boom. Its folding tail section indicates that the helicopter is designed to facilitate aerial transport, allowing rapid deployment over long distances.
A Z-20K at the Shek Kong Barracks in Hong Kong, China, in 2026. Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images
Z-20T
The Z-20T is a specialized assault helicopter broadly comparable in concept to the MH-60L Direct Action Penetrator used by the U.S. Army.
The helicopter features large stub wings capable of carrying KD-9 and KD-10 ATGMs, KF-9A ATGMs, PL-90 AAMs, ECM pods, and external fuel tanks.
LWR sensors have been relocated to the wingtips, while a TADS has replaced the weather radar in the nose. Additional armor plates provide increased protection for the crew and critical systems.
Later examples have also been observed with upward-facing engine exhausts.
Z-20F
The Z-20F is a shipborne ASW helicopter developed to provide the PLAN with a modern equivalent to the MH-60R Seahawk. It first flew in 2018.
The helicopter incorporates folding rotor blades and a folding tail boom to facilitate shipboard storage. An emergency flotation system is fitted, while the rear landing gear has been relocated forward to the rear end of the fuselage.
The redesigned nose features an EO/laser-ranging turret, with a surface-search radar antenna mounted beneath the chin. A SATCOM antenna is installed on top of the tail boom.
Additional ESM antennas are distributed around the nose and rear fuselage. A 25-round sonobuoy launcher is mounted on the port side, while a dipping sonar and rescue hoist provide additional ASW and SAR capabilities.
The Z-20F can carry up to four YJ-9 AShMs beneath its stub wings, alongside lightweight ASW torpedoes on rear fuselage pylons.
The helicopter is expected to replace the older Z-9C on Type 054 frigates and Type 052 and Type 055 destroyers. It has also been observed aboard the aircraft carrier Fujian and Type 075 amphibious assault ships.
A Z-20F on the deck of the carrier Fujian carrying a pair of YJ-9 anti-ship missiles under one stub wing. via Chinese internet
Z-20J
The Z-20J is a shipborne transport and assault variant designed for the PLAN.
Its stub wings can carry up to eight KD-9 ATGMs or four YJ-9 AShMs, as well as rocket launchers, external fuel tanks, and gun pods.
MAWS sensors are installed on both sides of the chin and along the rear fuselage, providing additional protection during operations over water.
The Z-20J expands the range of missions that can be performed from Chinese surface combatants and amphibious assault ships, complementing the ASW-focused Z-20F.
Z-20J. via Chinese internet
Conclusion
Despite often being overshadowed by the PLA’s latest combat aircraft, missiles, and other high-profile weapons programs, helicopters remain an indispensable part of China’s military modernization. They provide critical capabilities, from moving troops and supplies across difficult terrain to supporting amphibious operations, special forces, search and rescue, and naval warfare.
More importantly, the steady development of indigenous helicopter designs reflects China’s determination to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers and build a more capable, self-sufficient rotary-wing force. These aircraft may attract less attention than the PLA’s newest fighters, but their growing sophistication and expanding roles make them an essential part of the force’s ability to operate across a wide range of contingencies.
Iran has stepped up diplomatic efforts amid suggestions by United States President Donald Trump that the US could resume full-scale strikes on the Islamic republic.
The US news website Axios quoted a US official saying that US Central Command (CENTCOM) was preparing for the resumption of major military operations in Iran, and that it was just waiting on orders from Washington. On Thursday, Trump told reporters the US may have to “destroy” the rest of Iran, adding that people will “know soon enough” if he acts.
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Tehran’s intensified diplomatic push comes after Iran downed two US reconnaissance drones near Qeshm island in the Strait of Hormuz, which the US struck earlier this week. Iran says it will retaliate if the US resumes larger strikes.
What diplomatic efforts is Iran engaging in?
On Thursday, Iran offered the US a new nuclear and peace proposal via Qatari mediators, to be discussed only after Washington meets Tehran’s seven demands, a senior Iranian official told Reuters. The US is examining the proposal, Reuters reported.
Iran has made meeting its seven demands a condition for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and restarting peace talks, including on its nuclear programme. The demands include the lifting of sanctions on Iran, the unfreezing of Iranian assets and the end to the US naval blockade of its ports in and around the Strait of Hormuz, among other things.
It has also stepped up ties with Russia, with its top security official, Mohsen Rezaei, travelling to Moscow for talks on Thursday. During that visit, Rezaei said: “On the issue of diplomacy, we have announced seven conditions to the Americans. As long as they do not execute our seven conditions, we will neither open the Strait of Hormuz nor have negotiations.”
Meanwhile, the US has insisted a deal on Iran’s nuclear capacity must be part of any ceasefire agreement before wider peace talks can restart.
How is Iran deepening ties with Russia?
On Thursday, Rezaei met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin to deliver a message from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Iranian state media did not elaborate on the contents of the message.
Rezaei called it “an extremely important exchange” according to remarks reported by the Iranian embassy, but also did not give further details.
However, The Financial Times reported that Russia previously agreed to supply Iran with 90 helicopter-mounted launchers for precision-guided missiles, despite needing its own weapons for the Ukraine war. The newspaper cited a Russian defence manufacturer’s production schedule for 2024 and 2025, which it has examined, showing an order for helicopter-mounted launchers being assigned a code used to refer to Iran in Russian defence documents.
Relations between Russia and Iran have deepened since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and during the US-Israeli war on Iran that saw the two countries become the most heavily sanctioned in the world. Iran has provided Shahed drones, which Russia has modified and used heavily against Ukraine.
In return, Russia has also reportedly helped Iran develop supersonic cruise missiles, sold it Verba shoulder-launched anti-air missiles and shared information with Tehran potentially relevant to nuclear weapons.
“It is indicative of Russia’s willingness to continue supplying Iran despite its own wartime demands and with far less concern about Western objections than in the past,” Nicole Grajewski, a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the FT.
In early October, Putin said Russia was prepared to take part in mediation to bring an end to the war.
Images released by the Kremlin showed its foreign affairs adviser Yuri Ushakov and chief of the Russian military intelligence, Igor Kostyukov, attending a meeting with Iran’s security chief alongside Putin.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets Iranian security council chief Mohsen Rezaei in Moscow, Russia, on November 5, 2026 [File: Pool via Reuters]
The meeting also strengthened Iran’s economic ties with Russia.
“During the meeting with Mr Vladimir Putin, discussions were held regarding the construction of gas pipelines from Russia to Iran,” said Rezaei, Iranian state TV reported.
He said the gas pipelines would address Iran’s gas shortages and facilitate the sale of Russian energy to neighbouring countries.
Tehran said Iran’s natural gas refineries had been hit during the most intense phase of US-Israeli strikes on Iran earlier this year, which lasted 40 days.
Separately, Russia’s Foreign Ministry advised citizens against travel to Iran “In light of the remaining risks of a new escalation around Iran”.
How is Iran negotiating with regional leaders?
During the most intense fighting of the war, Iran struck bases in Gulf countries hosting US military assets, as well as civil and energy facilities and infrastructure.
Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that any state helping the US to target the Islamic republic will be a “legitimate target” should US attacks resume.
On Thursday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held phone calls with several Gulf leaders, including the foreign minister of the UAE, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
They discussed regional developments as well as diplomatic efforts for stability in the region, according to Araghchi’s Telegram channel.
Araghchi spoke with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud about efforts to improve security and stability in the region, according to the Saudi foreign ministry.
Araghchi also discussed de-escalation efforts with the foreign ministers of Kuwait and Turkiye.
In a separate call, Araghchi talked with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani about coordinating to reduce tensions, the Qatari foreign ministry said.
Sheikh Mohammed stressed support for efforts to secure freedom of maritime navigation.
In a statement, Oman’s foreign ministry said the safety of passage through the Strait of Hormuz was a main topic of discussions, in a call between Araghchi and Oman’s foreign minister.
Iran continues to tightly control shipping lanes through the strait, where several ships have been damaged in recent days. It has granted exemptions to shipping restrictions to Iraq and Qatar, in the Gulf region, as well as to India and China.
What is Trump saying?
Despite his Republican Party suffering a drubbing in this week’s US midterm elections – largely because of public anger over the war on Iran and the resulting rise in energy prices – US President Donald Trump has refused to rule out further strikes on Iran.
On Thursday, Trump told reporters at the Oval Office that he may have to “destroy the rest” of Iran.
Former Iranian diplomat Hadi Afghahi told Al Jazeera that Tehran can ease the path to a settlement if the US also shows flexibility. He argued that Trump “really does not want to go to war, because war again will cost him more”. However, the US president’s next move is unpredictable, observers say.
Afghahi cautioned that Trump “is still surrounded by a group of hawks”, including the energy and treasury secretaries.
Trump has shown willingness to engage in diplomacy, however. Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani discussed diplomatic efforts to ease regional tensions in a phone call with Trump on Friday, according to the Qatari Emiri Diwan.
The leaders reviewed international diplomatic efforts, including the Doha-led mediation efforts to support negotiations in recent weeks, in a bid to reach “a comprehensive agreement that puts an end to the crisis”, the Diwan said in a statement.
Iranian officials said Iran has the capacity to strike further than the Gulf using weapons manufactured in Iran.
On Thursday, a spokesman for the Supreme Advisor to the Commander of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said: “In the event of a new aggression, any country or force that helps America attack Iran can be a legitimate target of the Islamic Republic.”
Iran’s state media outlet Tasnim News reported: “Our missile bases have a suitable range to target the Zionist regime and American bases,” adding “Iran’s response to the possible new aggression of the enemies will not be geographically limited.”
Iran has also previously warned that cables, data centres and artificial intelligence (AI) facilities across the Gulf region could be attacked if war with the US erupts again.
What strikes have there been in recent days?
In the run-up to the midterm elections, the US said it had conducted “defensive strikes” on Iran’s Qeshm island and Bandar Lengeh in the Strait of Hormuz.
Meanwhile, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps navy says at least seven tankers have caught fire after sailing into mines while attempting to transit through the Strait of Hormuz using “unauthorised routes” near Oman this week.
Two oil tankers caught fire and were brought to a stop after hitting mines on Friday, the IRGC said. They had been trying to cross the waterway “with the support of the aggressor and terrorist American military”, the IRGC added.
Control over the Strait of Hormuz has been a main stumbling block in negotiations to end the Iran war since it began in February.
Tehran has sought to limit traffic through the strategic waterway, which normally carries about one-fifth of global oil supplies.
The US has also imposed a blockade on Iranian ports and escorted tankers through the strait.
Maritime organisations have not confirmed the latest incidents.
Call comes as Iraq’s foreign minister urges armed groups not to join any Iranian retaliation, warning it would be disastrous for Iraq.
Published On 6 Nov 20266 Nov 2026
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has told the United States that Baghdad will not let its territory be used to attack neighbouring countries, as his foreign minister warned that a new war on Iran would be a “disaster” for Iraq.
Al-Zaidi spoke to US President Donald Trump over the phone on Thursday, according to his office, as diplomatic efforts intensify to avert renewed US attacks on Iran.
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The two men “discussed the evolving situation in the region, security developments, and prospects for the next phase”, al-Zaidi’s office said.
The prime minister reaffirmed Iraq’s call “for respect for the sovereignty of states and for Iraqi territory not to be used as a launching point for attacks against neighbouring countries”, it added.
He also stressed the need for diplomacy and dialogue to safeguard the region’s security and stability, it said.
Iraq, which neighbours Iran, has struggled to maintain a balancing act between US and Iranian interests since Trump launched the war on Iran in February.
Since taking office in May, al-Zaidi has prioritised the disarmament of all fighter groups in the country, including several powerful pro-Iran groups that have launched attacks in support of Iran across the region during the war.
Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein told Dijlah TV on Thursday that the potential of renewed US military attacks against Iran is “not a secret” and warned Iraqi armed groups against joining in any Iranian retaliation.
“Pushing Iraqi society into the war will lead to a disaster,” he said. “We are not prepared for war. Neither Iraqi society nor the armed forces are prepared for war.”
Hussein said Iraq had been turned into a battlefield after the US struck Iran, with the country coming under attack from both the US and Iran, as well as from armed groups inside Iraq.
“We are not part of any axis, and we do not want to let the Iraqi arena be turned into a battlefield,” he said. “We have good relations with the US and with our neighbour Iran… We need a clear policy that we are not a part of the war, and we do not want to be a part of the war.”
Since the war began, Iraq has lost more than $60bn in oil revenues, as about 90 percent of its oil exports normally pass through the Strait of Hormuz and were largely cut off when Tehran closed the waterway.
Oil accounts for about 90 percent of Iraq’s federal budget.
Since then, Iraq has been one of the few countries that have been granted exemption by Iran to pass freely through the Strait of Hormuz.
Article 1 of a bill approving the pact was adopted by the Turkish parliament on Wednesday.
But afterwards, Deputy Parliament Speaker Celal Adan adjourned the session until Thursday afternoon, the Anadolu news agency reported.
After parliament returned to session, lawmakers continued to debate the other articles in the pact.
The agreement ultimately passed with 279 votes in favour and 119 against, with 398 of the chamber’s 592 lawmakers taking part in the vote.
The pact contains 16 articles, according to a document submitted to the Turkish parliament, seen by the Reuters news agency.
In Article 1 of the accord, the signatories shall use “all necessary means” to eliminate threats to one another’s territorial integrity. Article 1 can be invoked in case of an attack on any member state.
Once the first article is invoked, the document lays out provisions for what follows.
“In the event one of the parties is subjected to an armed attack or military aggression by another country or group of countries, the parties shall immediately provide assistance to the party under attack, utilising the full range of mutual assistance measures available to them,” says Article 2 of the pact.
This key clause mirrors Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the document that established the NATO military alliance. NATO’s Article 5 establishes that an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all.
Given that Turkiye is a member of both NATO and the Mecca pact, critics have raised questions about whether the country’s government might face a conflict of interest in allocating its military resources.
Turkish officials, however, have dismissed such concerns as unfounded.
Other articles in the Mecca pact concern a mutual agreement to increase defence industry cooperation and military coordination, with the aim of deterring threats.
Those articles, in part, commit member states to conducting joint training, pursuing technological innovation and sharing logistics and intelligence resources.
The draft approved by Turkish lawmakers commits member countries to the pact for 10 years, after which point they may withdraw.
It also leaves open the possibility of other countries joining, with the approval of the pact’s existing members. Syria’s government has already expressed interest.
Despite Thursday’s parliamentary ratification, it is not a foregone conclusion that Turkish troops would be deployed to Saudi Arabia amid the Houthi attacks.
Experts say any Turkish troop deployment would also require other legislative processes.
Turkiye’s Defence Minister Yasar Guler said in October that the scope of potential support for Saudi Arabia would be determined after ratification.
“We absolutely do not foresee entering into any conflict with the Houthis,” Turkish media reported Guler as saying. Instead, Turkish support “would be to strengthen deterrence”.
Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Yemen had abated somewhat following a 2022 ceasefire. But the Houthis have escalated their attacks on Saudi Arabia in recent months, notably launching a series of deadly strikes on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh.
The region also remains embroiled in the US-Israel war on Iran, which has contributed to cross-border tensions.
On Thursday, Saudi Arabia announced it had intercepted a drone in the region of Medina. Riyadh has accused the Houthis several times of targeting Mecca and Medina, two holy cities in Islam, an accusation the Iran-backed group systematically rejects.
The New York Times and Wall Street Journal have suggested that US forces piloted the drones that targeted the ELN. (MDAA)
Caracas, November 4, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Donald Trump administration is negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Venezuela that would lay the groundwork for a potential long-term US military presence in the country, according to US officials cited by the New York Times.
According to the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, negotiations over the military pact are being led by the State Department under Secretary of State Marco Rubio. However, details regarding the number of troops and ground missions would be left for future discussions.
According to US officials, SOFA accords “provide a clear and predictable legal framework for US forces to work on mutually agreed activities with our security partners, such as ship visits, training, exercises, and humanitarian assistance.”
The US currently has SOFA agreements in place with several Latin American countries, including Paraguay, Ecuador, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago, to “address shared threats such as drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.” Washington likewise operates multiple bases in the hemisphere and recently launched the “Shield of the Americas” initiative alongside regional allies with the declared purpose of tackling transnational crime and illegal immigration.
The New York Times sources did not clarify whether Washington intends to establish military bases in Venezuela or deploy US troops at existing Venezuelan bases. One official said only that the issue remains “far in the future” in the discussions, citing Venezuela’s “poor infrastructure” and the lack of interaction between the Venezuelan and US militaries in recent decades.
The newspaper warned that the military cooperation talks could be both “significant” and “risky.” Article 13 of Venezuela’s Constitution prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases or facilities serving the military purposes of other countries.
The story comes on the heels of a reported attack involving drones and helicopters against a camp belonging to Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) on Friday in Apure State, close to the two countries’ shared border.
According to the New York Times, the operation counted on US intelligence assistance, with military personnel helping identify the camp, which was claimed to be a “hub” for drug trafficking.
The death toll, initially reported at 19 by local NGO Fundaredes, has risen to 23. Fundaredes’ Apure coordinator Juan García said that interviews conducted with survivors and victims’ relatives indicated that the strike also killed civilians not associated with the guerrilla group.
The Times stated that it was “not clear who piloted the drones” which are typically operated by US forces. The Wall Street Journal claimed US military drones executed the attack with “cooperation” from the Venezuelan government. For its part, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government and the Venezuelan armed forces have yet to issue any public comment on the mission targeting the ELN.
The ELN is the longest active guerrilla group in Colombia, having sustained a decades-long insurgency against the Colombian state. The organization maintained an arms-length relationship with the Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro governments, operating across the vast and porous southwestern border uncontrolled by both nations and at times cooperating with Venezuelan authorities against Colombian paramilitaries and dissident FARC elements.
Since the January 3 bombing and kidnapping of Maduro, senior US military brass have visited the Caribbean country.
In June 2026, US forces carried out an airstrike on Venezuelan territory that neutralized Héctor “Niño” Guerrero, an alleged leader of the criminal organization Tren de Aragua. The operation involved CIA intelligence work, with US authorities thanking Venezuelan counterparts for cooperation. Likewise, following the June 24 double earthquake, the US Southern Command deployed around 2,000 troops in Venezuelan territory, temporarily taking control of the country’s main airport.
In May, the US military held “rapid response” military drills, flying Osprey MV-22B aircraft over Caracas and landing at the US Embassy. The exercise drew fierce protests from Venezuelan social movements.
US President Donald Trump said Tuesday that he had reached an agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end Washington’s annual military assistance to Israel, estimated at approximately $3.8 billion, by the end of 2026.
The announcement reportedly surprised Israel’s security establishment, where senior officials said they had not received advance notice or detailed information about the decision and its potential implications.
Israel’s public broadcaster Kan 11 quoted a senior security official as saying the announcement had caught the defense establishment off guard despite ongoing consultations with Washington.
“We did not expect this announcement—certainly not today,” the official said.
“There is a constant dialogue with the Americans, yet it is fair to say that we were taken by surprise,” the official added, noting that the relevant authorities would assess the implications once further details became available.
Speaking in an interview with Fox News, Trump said he and Netanyahu had agreed several months earlier to discontinue the annual financial transfers, which he estimated at approximately $4 billion.
Trump said the two sides had agreed to stop the payments, adding that Israel no longer required the assistance because of its economic prosperity.
“We will no longer pay Israel,” Trump said, while emphasizing that Washington would remain prepared to provide support if necessary.
“Of course, we will help them if they need it,” he added.
The reported agreement raises questions about the future of US military assistance to Israel, particularly because the existing ten-year memorandum of understanding governing American security aid remains in effect until 2028.
Under the agreement, Israel receives approximately $3.8 billion annually in US military assistance.
In addition to this regular funding, Washington has provided Israel with billions of dollars in supplementary military assistance in recent years amid the war in Gaza and Israeli military confrontations involving Lebanon and Iran.
The report did not clarify how the proposed termination would be implemented under the existing agreement or whether the necessary legislative and administrative measures had been initiated.
While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu has openly discussed weaning his country off direct U.S. assistance in favor of more cooperation on weapons development, the Trump announcement still caught many there by surprise. It also raises a lot of questions about Congressional authorization and the impact on future sales of advanced arms from U.S. manufacturers, many of which are planned, that still have to be answered.
“As far as paying Israel, Bibi Netanyahu and I have made a deal that – we give Israel $4 billion a year – and we made a deal months ago that we’re stopping,” Trump told Fox & Friends Tuesday morning during his message to American voters going to the polls for the midterm election. “And they’re fine with it because you know they have become a very successful country. They don’t need it, and we won’t be paying anymore to Israel, so it’s just a wasted thing because we’ve already agreed that by the end of this year we won’t be paying Israel.”
“Now we’ll help Israel if they need it,” the American leader added. “You know they’ve been a great ally, and we’ve been the greatest of all allies to many many countries.”
BREAKING: President Trump says the U.S. will end roughly $4 billion in annual aid to Israel by the end of the year, revealing that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to the decision.
Trump did not elaborate on what specific expenditures he was referring to, and we’ve reached out to the White House for more details. However, the president was almost certainly talking about the ongoing decade-long Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Israel.
The MoU calls for providing $3.8 billion in annual aid and it is drawing to a close. Set to run through 2028, the vast majority of that funding is for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to purchase weaponry mostly from American manufacturers.
U.S. military aid to Israel by the year. (Congressional Research Service)
“In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid, covering [Fiscal Year] 2019 to [Fiscal Year] 2028,” according to a 2025 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report. “Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional appropriation—$38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations) to Israel.”
The MoU is merely a promise and not legally binding. Congress has to approve any funding requests.
“The new framework, reflecting the strategic vision of Israel’s Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, is designed to strengthen the IDF’s qualitative military edge through expanded joint investment in research, development, and co-production, deepen the U.S.-Israel partnership demonstrated during Operation Roaring Lion, and gradually transition from aid to a completely reciprocal partnership,” MoD explained.
Netanyahu has been warning Israel for months that it would have to face reduced assistance from the U.S.
“If you think we will continue receiving what I secured twice — tens of billions of dollars in American aid for the defense budget — you’d better prepare yourselves and get used to the idea that this will not continue,” he told Israeli media last month, according to Bloomberg News. “That is because America has changed, not because Israel has changed. It will end. It is only a matter of time.”
Netanyahu added that Israel has two more years with Trump, but must prepare for a less favorable Washington after he leaves power.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has told Israel for months it will have to rely less on U.S. military aid. (Photo by Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images) Alexi Rosenfeld
In January, the Israeli leader said he wanted to reduce Israel’s reliance on American aid. He told The Economist that he was not seeking the full renewal of the MoU, which has to be renegotiated by 2028.
“I want to taper off the military aid within the next 10 years,” Netanyahu told the publication. Asked if he meant “to taper it off to zero,” Netanyahu said “yes.”
“We want to be as independent as possible,” the Israeli leader proffered. Referring to his meeting with the the American president in Florida in late December, Netanyahu added: “In my visit to President Trump, I said we very deeply appreciate the military aid that America has given us over the years, but here too we’ve come of age, and we’ve developed incredible capacities.”
For Israel, the MoU “now matters less for the money it provides than for what it signifies: a gauge of the depth and durability of U.S. support,” the Crisis Group think tank argued in August. “To be sure, FMF has enabled Israel to build up its military power without fully bearing the cost, and phasing out this assistance would impose real burdens. Israel would have to pay for critical U.S. weapons from its own budget.”
However, with its annual GDP now exceeding $700 billion and defense spending above $40 billion, “Israel has found increasing difficulty in arguing that it requires an additional $3.3 billion each year for military purchases,” Crisis Group posited. “Netanyahu has asked the finance ministry to allocate billions of dollars in additional funding for the defense budget over the next decade, a large portion of which would be earmarked to procure U.S. fighter jets, on the assumption that Israel will no longer receive the funds necessary for these purchases from Washington.”
Israeli Air Force F-15 Baz fighters. (Amit Agronov)
Since the attack by Hamas, U.S. money from the MoU has made up a smaller percentage of the Israeli MoD’s overall budget as the country has increased its own defense spending. Those funds have also been bolstered by several large tranches of U.S. supplemental aid to procure bombs and other weapons.
“For most of the last 15 years, the $3.3 billion Israel receives annually in FMF made up roughly 20% of Israel’s defense budget, which was itself 5-6% of Israel’s GDP in the same period,” the Israel Policy Forum (IPF) explained in May. “Both Israeli defense spending and the share coming from U.S. aid slowly declined amid major economic growth throughout the 2010s, and then spiked in 2023 following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and ensuing wars.”
IPF stated that after the Hamas incursion, “Israel sharply increased defense spending (both within the regular budget framework and in extraordinary expenditures) to 8-9% of GDP, and the U.S. gave Israel several large supplemental security assistance packages between late 2023 and early 2026 in addition to the MOU-directed security aid.”
“The net result, taking into account both much higher Israeli spending and large amounts of American aid, is that in 2024 U.S. assistance briefly accounted for more than one third of Israel’s defense budget,” IPF noted. “In 2025 this figure dropped to close to 10%, with Israel spending an estimated NIS 168 billion ($52 billion) on defense in that year.”
Until recently, “Israel had been given a partial exemption” on the requirement that FMF funds be allocated for American products,” the Crisis Group noted. This allowed Israel to “invest a portion of the money in its own defense industry, Crisis Group explained. “This carveout, in turn, has made Israeli firms more competitive in the arms export market.”
A top Israeli MoD official told The Times of Israel (ToI) last month that his country wants to flip the switch to add value to the American defense industry by using its experience developing weapons as it fights seemingly constant wars. The continual threats from regional actors and terror groups allow Israel to serve as a testing ground for U.S. defense technologies, Aviram Hasson, director of the Defense Ministry’s mission to the US and Canada, explained.
“Hasson pointed to engineering breakthroughs and intellectual property emerging through development of Israel’s active-defense systems, saying every US government request for technology arising from the long-range anti-ballistic missile Arrow 3 program has been fulfilled,” the publication noted.
“It is clear on both sides of the ocean that this cooperation is a strategic need of both powers, not only of Israel,” Hasson told ToI.
U.S. Has Paid Far More Than $4B A Year For Israel’s Defense
Beyond direct financial aid, the U.S. has expended a great deal of resources defending Israel over the past several years. This has included defending against multiple Iranian missile barrages on Israel on top of participating directly in two wars. In addition, there were the constant drone and missile battles in the Red Sea with the Houthis, who began attacking shipping there in response to Israel’s war in Gaza. Part of the U.S. operation against the Houthis was also providing a layer of protection against long-range missile and drone launches at Israel by the rebel group.
During the course of all these events, the U.S. deployed a very large number of its available warships, aircraft, and air defenses, as well as thousands of personnel, to the Middle East at great expense, both in dollars and the toll on troops and equipment.
ISMAILIA, EGYPT – MARCH 14: An U.S. aircraft carrier transits the Suez Canal in the city of Ismailia, Egypt, which connects the Mediterranean and Red Seas, on March 14, 2026. (Photo by Stringer/Anadolu via Getty Images) Anadolu
Just this year alone, 23 U.S. troops have died and nearly 900 have been injured since the launch of Epic Fury in February. Dozens of aircraft have been destroyed and U.S. bases in the region have been partially destroyed and will take billions to repair.
All told, the U.S. has spent nearly $50 billion just on the most current conflict with Iran, far exceeding the $4 billion Israel gets per year in annual direct aid. Then there is the opportunity cost of the massive wear and tear on the force and the U.S. military’s overall capacity to fight in the near and medium term due to all these engagements.
All that being said, it can be argued that the U.S. had major interests in participating in these conflicts beyond just the defense of Israel. It is rarely just that simple. The Iran nuclear program, for instance, has impacts much farther than the Middle East and Israel. Still, the U.S. has poured unprecedented resources into Israel’s defense and these investments far eclipse the $4B being discussed today.
Surprise In Israel
Many Israeli government officials were caught completely off guard by the Trump announcement, according to Politico.
“Officials in the Finance Ministry say they were surprised by U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement that military aid to Israel would cease by the end of the year, ” the publication reported.
“No formal document was submitted from the Prime Minister’s Office regarding the end of aid,” Politico added. “The ministry was aware of the intention to end it, but was surprised by the intention to do so immediately.”
Officials in the Defense Ministry and the military were also reportedly surprised by the announcement, according to the Post.
“We did not expect this announcement, certainly not today,” a senior defense official told Israeli media.
“There is ongoing dialogue with the Americans, and we can say that we were surprised. We will study the implications of the decision, which has yet to reach professional officials,” the official is quoted as saying.
Trump’s off-hand remark about U.S. aid to Israel ending “by the end of this year” triggers global “political and financial earthquake.”
Israel’s Finance Ministry was “entirely unaware” of the supposed plan, which Trump casually revealed earlier this morning to “Fox & Friends.” pic.twitter.com/IYh5SuifcD
As for Netanyahu, he has yet to weigh in on Trump’s statement. However, one of his main rivals in the closely fought Israeli parliamentary election that could unseat him has commented.
“The fact that Israel’s defense establishment is learning of a shift in our strategic relationship through the media, at the same time as the Israeli public, shows just how dangerous Benjamin Netanyahu’s conduct is,” Gadi Eisenkot said in a statement. “He can no longer be trusted and must be replaced.”
In his comments to Fox & Friends, Trump conceded that the midterm election played a role in his decision.
The annual assistance to Israel is a “bad talking point” for Democrats, including Michigan Democratic Senate nominee Abdul El-Sayed, the president proclaimed.
“The left uses the $4 billion payment … as a signal of unfairness. And we can’t allow that to happen,” Trump stated. “I don’t like that. … It’s almost too easy to target
There are many unknowns surrounding Trump’s statement about diminishing U.S. support for Israel.
The MoU, if that is what he is talking about, still has two years left, and almost $8 billion worth of anticipated funding, the vast majority earmarked for procurement of U.S. arms.
As we noted at the top of this piece, the MoU itself isn’t legally binding but the aid is authorized by law and appropriated by Congress each year. Ending it early would mean Congress either not appropriating the money or changing the law.
Will Congress agree to cut the deal off by December? What about the U.S. defense industry? It is unclear at the moment how, or if, this move would affect American defense contractors selling arms to Israel. These companies depend in large measure on predictability and taking this agreement off the table two years early could be problematic.
It is not exactly clear at this point which U.S. arms makers will be hit the hardest by Trump’s announcement. There are billions of dollars in contracts for the future procurement of aircraft, munitions and other equipment to companies like Boeing for F-15Is and KC-46As, Lockheed Martin for F-35Is and AM General for Joint Light Tactical Vehicles. While Israel has bumped up its defense budget, it is not really known at this point how it will cover these costs without that lost U.S. aid.
US President Donald Trump says he plans to stop the annual $3.8bn military aid package to Israel by the end of the year. US funding to Israel has become a contentious topic. What else do we know?
Amid growing concerns about renewed attacks on Iran following Tuesday’s midterm elections in the United States, US forces have struck Iran’s Qeshm Island in what officials have reportedly described as a defensive measure.
In the first attack since June on Qeshm Island, which serves as the primary platform for Iran’s “asymmetric” naval power, according to analysts, the US strikes come as both sides continue to adopt military and diplomatic postures.
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Mediation efforts led by Qatar are continuing in a bid to avert a return to all-out war, which began on February 28 when the US and Israel launched strikes across Iran, triggering the closure of the critical Strait of Hormuz, surging oil and gas prices and massive damage to military, civil and energy facilities around the Gulf.
Here’s what we know:
What happened in the attack on Qeshm Island?
Several explosions were heard on Qeshm Island late on Monday, as US media reported that the US military had carried out what officials called “defensive strikes” in the Strait of Hormuz.
The blasts came in rapid succession, according to Iran’s state-owned IRNA news agency. Witnesses told the agency they saw two planes flying over the island, located off Iran’s southern coast along the waterway.
According to The Wall Street Journal, which quoted an unnamed official, the strikes on Monday night appeared limited and were not a resumption of a major operation.
The Associated Press news agency also quoted an unnamed US official as saying Washington had conducted the defensive strikes against “Iranians using surface-to-air missiles against US assets”.
The attack came after IRNA reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had destroyed a US MQ-9 drone east of the Strait of Hormuz.
The US first struck a critical desalination plant on Qeshm Island on March 7 – one week into the war. The strike, which Tehran branded a “flagrant crime” against civilians, cut off freshwater supplies to 30 surrounding villages.
A satellite view of Qeshm Island, Hormozgan Province, Iran, within the Strait of Hormuz region on January 17, 2026 [Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data 2026]
But isn’t diplomacy ongoing?
It is, but it is fragile, and mixed messages are coming from both sides.
Qatari mediators have been engaged in indirect talks with Iranian officials in recent days. They have passed messages between the two sides, but the talks appeared to come to an end on Monday with no news of a breakthrough.
An official briefed on the talks told the Reuters news agency that Iran’s delegation had departed from Doha on Sunday, but that a draft proposal was still being circulated, without elaborating on the content.
Qatari mediators travelled to Tehran on Monday night for talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi regarding a version of a draft US-Iran deal which has been under negotiation for the past eight days, an official told Reuters.
Araghchi told IRNA on Monday: “Consultations through mediators are very intensive. We have presented our conditions and proposals, and everything depends on the political rationality of Washington.”
Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei also told a news conference on Monday that the “ball” was in the US’s court as Iran’s demands were “clear and logical”.
He said the plan Iran submitted in September to end the war remained the focus of talks, but that the proposal could be shortened and implemented in “two days”, including reopening the Strait of Hormuz and returning to talks about Iran’s nuclear programme.
On Monday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian also said Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei had given the government “certain authorities” over talks with the US, local media reported.
The president added that Tehran would look to resolve the conflict through dialogue.
Khamenei’s apparent approval of diplomacy marks a change since the breakdown of the June memorandum of understanding, which allowed a brief ceasefire and peace negotiations, when the supreme leader said the US could not be trusted.
For the US side, Vice President JD Vance also told reporters on Monday that he was hopeful for a diplomatic solution – just hours before the strikes on Qeshm Island.
“The president and I both feel pretty good about the prospects for potentially coming to a negotiated settlement,” Vance said. “We’ve certainly made some progress. We’ll see if we can make some more.”
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reiterated on Tuesday that Iran’s response to any US “miscalculation”, such as launching strikes, would be unpredictable.
“The enemy seeks to force the Iranian nation into submission through threats and military action, but they are sorely mistaken; Iran will not submit,” he said.
What has Trump said about diplomacy?
Oil prices dropped by more than 7 percent on Monday. In response, Trump wrote on his Truth Social account that people believe the war with Iran will not resume as mediation efforts continue.
“Iran wants a settlement, as soon as possible. It could happen!” Trump wrote.
He told media at the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool in Washington, DC, that it looked like efforts were “coming together very nicely”.
“That’s why I guess the oil prices dropped. People found out about it.”
However, Trump also told the US media outlet Axios before his post on Truth Social that he was “in no rush” to decide whether to resume strikes on Iran.
“One way or the other, we will do something, but there is no rush. We crippled them financially. They have no money, no gasoline, and their people are getting very tired of it,” Trump told Axios in an interview.
What happens next?
The US midterm elections are being viewed as the inflexion point for Trump’s decision on what path he takes next.
The president has suggested several times that he could attack Iran following the vote and told the Right Side Broadcasting Network (RSBN) on Sunday that the conflict would end “very soon one way or the other”, adding that Tehran would either “make a deal, or we’ll just end it”.
Observers say the US will likely renew strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities if they do resume.
In particular, this could include Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain, a highly fortified site that contains two tunnel complexes buried deep underground, and which Trump told US outlet Newsmax last month could be a target. He said the US “may have to go there. We’ll take a shot at that one. We’ll knock it out fast.”
Al-Jawf has become a new focal point in the conflict between forces aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognised government and the Houthis, highlighting the strategic importance of the northern governorate.
A major counteroffensive has been launched by the Yemeni government army and forces loyal to it to capture the strategic heights east of the provincial capital, al-Hazm, from the Houthis.
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The operations are part of Operation Dawn of Yemen, launched by the government last month to reverse Houthi territorial gains and restore state control in the country.
Al-Hazm has become a central part of this operation, with the city a potential launchpad for government forces against the Houthis. They have controlled the capital Sanaa and most of northern Yemen since the war broke out in September 2014.
Strategic defence lines
During the 12 years of war in Yemen, control over al-Hazm has shifted several times, with the Houthis seizing the city in March 2020.
The governorate remains highly coveted due to its expansive border with Saudi Arabia and its direct geographic links to five pivotal governorates: Hadramout, Saada, Sanaa, Amran and oil-rich Marib and close to the capital, Sanaa.
Al-Jawf also acts as a vital defensive shield for Marib, controlled by government forces, preventing the Houthis from advancing into the eastern regions. It is also a gateway to major Houthi strongholds in northern Yemen.
Video screengrab is said to show Houthi fighters attacking Saudi-backed forces in Al-Jawf governorate, September 15, 2026 [Houthi Military Handout via Reuters]
Field Commander Colonel Rabie Al-Qurashi said government forces have been able to win complete control over the strategic Huwaishan mountain range, east of al-Hazm city. He said it is the first line of defence for the Houthis in the eastern axis and control over the rugged region would give government forces the ability to disrupt rebel supply routes.
“Government forces succeeded in breaking that defensive format with partial control over the Al-Alam front road,” Al-Qurashi said. “The government advance represents a beginning to tighten the noose on the Houthis in the upper al-Labanat camp,” which is regarded as a vital eastern gateway to Sanaa.
Ali Al-Dahab, a military and strategic affairs researcher, said there are immense tactical benefits from holding this elevated terrain.
“The recent advances of government forces in Al-Jawf are a military transformation that serves the course of future operations for their arrival to al-Hazm city,” Al-Dahab told Al Jazeera.
“The government forces’ recovery of a number of heights there provides a military and psychological morale advantage and confuses the Houthis’ decisions, in addition to granting government forces monitoring, movement, and observation of Houthi supply lines and securing their own lines.”
Military spokesman Majed Abdullah Al-Nuzaili said on X that recent military operations against Houthi positions in al-Jawf were “inflicting losses on the militia’s capabilities”.
Desert battleground dynamics
The government dominates the vast eastern desert district of Khabb wa ash Sha’af, representing 82 percent of the governorate’s total area. The Houthis control the provincial capital, al-Hazm, and 10 other districts.
Security and political affairs researcher Brigadier General Ahmed Al-Awadhi stressed the importance of “continuous but not rapid” government advances in the area.
“The advances of government forces in Al-Jawf cannot be ignored or their importance underestimated,” Al-Awadhi told Al Jazeera.
“Control over heights or mountain ranges in the desert Al-Jawf governorate represents points of military strength regardless of their proximity to or distance from the governorate capital.”
The government forces advances in al-Jawf highlight a historical vulnerability for the Houthis, having suffered repeated defeats in battles in desert and open areas, he added.
The developments coincide with the Presidential Council’s appointment of Major General Amin Ali Al-Akimi as governor and military commander of al-Jawf.
“[His] reappointment… comes within the context of restructuring the theatre of operations and unifying the front,” Ibrahim Jalal, a Yemen-focused analyst told Al Jazeera.
“Hailing from Dhu Hussein, a branch of the Daham Bakil tribe, Al-Akimi possesses tribal and military influence that could help mobilise tribes, overcome divisions and bolster momentum on the ground. However, translating this influence into sustainable gains remains contingent upon unifying command and control, coordinating operations across all battlefronts, securing military and logistical support and strengthening anti-corruption efforts to improve the efficient management of military resources.”
The Houthis say they have thwarted advances by government forces in al-Jawf and Marib.
Escalating nationwide hostilities
Fighting has continued in other parts of Yemen as Houthi-affiliated media reported air strikes on an oil company facility in the Bajil district of Hodeidah, which coincide with fierce fighting further south.
Government forces repelled Houthi attacks in al-Aqroudh and on the Tur al-Baha front in Lahij governorate. Intense fighting continues in Taiz governorate.
The siege of Taiz City continues to strain medical infrastructure, with deliveries of food and fuel severely restricted. Civilians remain at risk from sniper fire from surrounding hillsides, authorities have warned.
Governor Nabil Shamsan said that hospitals are working at only 20 percent capacity, with 120 health centres entirely shut due to the siege.
“We urge the international community to secure at least one safe route between Taiz and Aden to enable citizen movement and the smooth entry of services, essential materials and goods,” Shamsan appealed to Al Jazeera.
More than 300,000 people have fled their homes in western Yemen due to the escalating fighting, leaving civilians highly vulnerable.
JOANNE McNally has revealed the regimental methods used to remove banished players from The Celebrity Traitors castle.
Asked by Vogue Williams on their podcast My Therapist Ghosted Me, Joanne explained precisely what happens once they are asked to leave the round table.
Celebrity Traitors stars are subjected to a ‘military’ procedure when they are banished from the castleCredit: PAJoanne McNally has revealed the regimental methods used to remove banished players from The Celebrity Traitors castleCredit: BBC
“When you leave, what happens? You just left and go home?” asked Vogue.
“So you get off the podium, they rush you out the side door and you’re bundled into a van like Whitney Houston in the Bodyguard,” Joanne explained. “You have a little backpack there, it’s like an emergency backpack in the castle at all times so that if it’s the night that you do go you have your essentials.
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“And then you’re taken to a different hotel.”
Joanne – who was banished on the penultimate episode of the second season of The Celebrity Traitors, after the other players wrongfully accused her of conspiring against the Faithful – explained that she was then sent back to the castle the next day.
Joanne explained that she was then sent back to the castle the next dayCredit: BBCThe Celebrity Traitors came to a dramatic close on Friday nightCredit: BBC
“You actually have a full day’s work to do in the castle because you have to do all your B-shots and there was a video of me in the bath, so it’s all that stuff and your final interviews.
“I always wondered why in the castle if you needed to go to the bathroom or anything it’s this big kind of production.
“It’s because they have to make sure the castle is clear and there’s not people who’ve been banished the night before because they were in the castle doing all their extra last bits of work.
“So they were making sure no one crossed paths. It’s such a huge production and they run it so military!”
Meanwhile, co-star James Acaster has revealed the moment he “should have walked out” of the show before filming was halted.
Welfare staff checked on the comic before the Round Table vote but he crumbled as Faithful Michael Sheen finally rumbled him — forcing producers to step in.
James shared that he was “really scared” during the coffin mission and should have gotten out then.
He told Far Out Magazine: “I was lying there thinking, actually, I think I’m really scared of this. As soon as the soil was heaped on top, Bella did say, ‘Imagine if they can’t get us out.”
“I respect Jerry the most because Jerry just went, ‘I’m not doing this.’ Like, are you kidding me? And the rest of us were just like, ‘We want to win Traitors in our coffins, idiots.’
“We should have just done what – as soon as I heard Jerry got out, I should have said to Bella, ‘I’m getting out, forget it.’ If it’s a free-for-all now, we should all get out. They can’t stop us all. We could all do it.”
Tehran, Iran – Ongoing contacts through mediators have provided a potential diplomatic opening between Iran and the United States, even as both sides express readiness for renewed military escalation.
After two days of Qatari-mediated talks, Iranian authorities have signalled that a deal remains possible provided that their demands are tangibly implemented. At the same time, they have doubled down on a willingness to expand attacks or even launch preemptive strikes if they deem war is inevitable.
“We are prepared for all scenarios,” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Al Jazeera on Saturday. “We have upgraded our weaponry, addressed our vulnerabilities, and tested new arms. Our forces are at the highest level of readiness.”
His comments came as US President Donald Trump said on Saturday the talks were going “fine” but added that Iranian authorities were not “reliable”.
The Republican leader, who ordered attacks alongside Israel against Iran on February 28, has repeatedly raised prospects of once more hitting the country’s civilian infrastructure. In recent weeks, he has suggested that an attack could potentially take place after the November 3 midterm elections in the US.
“We still have to take care of, I would say, one or two sites, but we can do that in 10 minutes,” Trump told reporters at a Halloween party at his Mar-a-Lago Club in Florida about further bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Sequencing and timeline
The mediated talks in Tehran on Friday, and then in Qatar on Saturday, appear to have produced a new tangible result by shortening the period after which Iran’s proposal to partly reopen the Strait of Hormuz can be enforced.
Tehran had previously offered seven days, but that has now come down to two, Araghchi said in his interview with Al Jazeera.
Negar Mortazavi, a senior fellow with the Center for International Policy, said there are “indications” of US interest in a negotiated settlement, citing the continuing Qatar-mediated talks and US Vice President JD Vance’s recent outreach.
“However, Iran is seeking a series of concessions while the United States insists on progress on Iran’s nuclear programme before concessions are made,” she told Al Jazeera.
“Therefore the central difficulty is sequencing and leverage. Each side wants the other to act first.”
Araghchi’s two-day offer indicates some flexibility over sequencing that could also allow both sides to claim an initial diplomatic achievement without immediately resolving their fundamental disagreements, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group.
“However, the military statements show the limits of this opening. Iran appears increasingly determined to prevent a repetition of previous scenarios in which negotiations or temporary ceasefires were followed by renewed military conflict,” he wrote on social media. “From Tehran’s perspective, the objective is to make another attack so costly and unpredictable that Washington would have to reconsider the option altogether.”
As the talks were ongoing on Saturday, the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said he had a meeting earlier with top military commanders to demand “maximum deterrence” through preparedness for an immediate response “without geographical restriction” to any threat.
Targets would include “tangible and intangible” US and Israeli assets, Khamenei said. Iranian authorities have previously said if Iran’s civilian infrastructure is attacked again, seabed cables and infrastructure across the region could also become targets.
After Khamenei’s statement, commanders of the general staff of the armed forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the traditional army separately expressed readiness to launch missile, drone and other attacks in case of an escalation of conflict.
State media on Sunday also aired footage of missiles and drones being taken out of massive underground storage sites and deployed during the eight months of war so far.
The authorities also signalled that they expect more potential attacks from the US and Israel, including against Iran’s power grid.
Gholamreza Jalali, commander of the National Organization for Passive Defense, said during a speech on Sunday that they have identified 14 sectors most dependent on electricity that would need support if the war restarts, without naming any.
“Adopting preventive measures in the area of passive defence for the electricity grid is a fundamental principle that all authorities must follow up in their capacities,” he said, adding that officials were considering “network islanding” practices to create different segments that would not all be simultaneously affected by potential bombing.
‘Positive change in tone’
In and around the Strait of Hormuz, vessels continue to be attacked if they refuse to coordinate with the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, the entity set up by Iranian authorities to enforce control and sovereignty in the critical waterway.
At least four tankers were identified as being hit on Friday and Saturday, although not all attacks are reported by vessels and monitors. According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, a vessel carrying liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) was struck by three Iranian projectiles on Saturday about 40 nautical miles (74km) south of Iran’s Lavan Island, deep into the Gulf.
Transit in the strait and surrounding waterways will not return to normal unless the US takes steps towards Iran’s conditions, security chief Mohsen Rezaei told state television during an interview on Saturday night.
For the sequencing to work, he said Tehran wants the US to lift its naval blockade that has halted oil exports and the majority of Iran’s trade, which used to be facilitated through its southern ports. The US must also issue waivers for oil sanctions, unfreeze Iran’s assets abroad, stop fighting on all regional fronts, including Lebanon, and recognise a bilateral Iran-Oman arrangement for Hormuz.
Rezaei said he has yet to respond to a letter addressed to him by Vance, although he said the missive indicated a “change in tone” that he described as “positive”.
Mostafa Najafi, a Tehran-based political analyst said to be linked with Rezaei, said if the conditions are not met, the letter is likely to go unanswered and negotiations – including on Iran’s nuclear programme – will not enter a higher level.
“It is unclear how willing Washington is to accept these demands. It is clear that not recognising rights emphasised by Iran will lead to the failure of the negotiations,” he wrote on X.
The US has also doubled down on the effectiveness of its Operation Economic Outcast involving the blockade, sanctions and pressure on overland trade and aviation.
A report by the US Treasury to inform Trump’s decision-making, which was publicised by news outlet Axios, said no new oil had been loaded onto tankers at Iran’s terminals since August 25. It also showed overseas crude deliveries were down, while Iran’s year-on-year inflation neared 90 percent in September and the national currency continued to dwindle.
The report said Iran’s economy was “crippled” by the combined measures, but did not argue that it was close to collapsing.
Thousands have protested across Italy against rising living costs and increased military spending, demanding greater investment in healthcare and education. Demonstrations spread to 50 cities, with clashes reported between protesters and police.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard says four tankers have caught fire in the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC says the vessels struck naval mines while travelling along what Tehran describes as ‘unauthorised routes’.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits a drone exhibition showcasing the country’s latest military technology, calling for “absolute superiority” in drone capabilities and for measures to boost unmanned aircraft development.
Over the past week, Washington and Tehran have sent mixed signals about whether their eight-month war is heading back to full-scale strikes or towards a peace deal.
On Thursday, the head of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, briefed US President Donald Trump on options for renewed attacks on Iran, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported.
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The US and Israel have drawn up joint plans to attack Iran after the November 3 US midterm elections, The New York Times (NYT) reported last week.
Yet on the same day, The Washington Post reported that Vice President JD Vance had offered to meet Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in person to negotiate an end to the war.
On Friday, Qatari mediators returned to Tehran for talks coordinated with the US, an official told Reuters.
So is Washington heading back to war, or towards a deal? Here’s what we know:
Why are there conflicting reports?
Essentially, Washington is preparing for war while keeping a diplomatic channel open.
The WSJ reported that the US has boosted air defences and munitions in the region and moved some troops away from bases vulnerable to Iranian retaliation.
Ten US military cargo planes landed at the Ovda and Nevatim air bases in Israel’s Negev region on Thursday, with more sent to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported.
Democratic Senator Chris Murphy, who said he had been briefed on the plans, called them “insane” and warned of a devastating escalation.
Senator Chris Murphy in Washington, DC, United States [File: Kylie Cooper/Reuters]
Can diplomatic efforts hold off a return to strikes?
Diplomacy has not stopped.
Vance’s letter, delivered to Rezaei through Qatari mediators on Sunday, proposed direct talks led by Vance, with Iran’s nuclear programme on the table from the start, according to the NYT, in a bid to prevent a renewal of strikes.
Whether it might have any influence over what happens next is a matter for debate. Rouzbeh Parsi, an Iran analyst who is an affiliated researcher at Lund University’s Department of History and Human Rights Studies in Sweden, described Vance as the “voice of reason” on Iran within the Trump administration, saying his signals have been “the least volatile and unpredictable”.
But he also told Al Jazeera that Vance’s position has “never proven to be sturdy enough to actually sway Trump”.
“Thus, while the optics with Vance look better than anyone else in the Trump administration, I doubt that they [Iranian officials] give the outreach much credence until Vance proves able to actually deliver something on his own,” he said.
Furthermore, Nader Hashemi, a professor of Middle East politics at Georgetown University, told Al Jazeera that “Rezaei is just one voice among many” adding that the “reality is that decisions are made collectively inside the Islamic republic”.
Wolfgang Pusztai, a security and defence analyst and Austria’s former defence attache to Libya, has a different view, however, telling Al Jazeera, “There is no doubt that the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] currently calls the shots in Iran.”
In February, Iran’s then supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the initial attacks by Israel and the United States, and his son became the new supreme leader, but Pusztai says he “simply does not have the influence his father did”.
“Without the IRGC’s approval, there will be no agreement with Iran,” Pusztai said, adding it is safe to assume that when Rezaei makes a statement or endorses a proposal, “it reflects the position of the IRGC leadership” and that the US was “absolutely right to negotiate with him”.
Pusztai said it is unclear whether Rezaei is indeed ready to make a serious compromise, but under sustained US pressure, Rezaei, who holds a doctorate in economics, could come to see that “Iran’s interests and the regime’s survival can be better secured without nuclear weapons and through a less aggressive foreign policy”.
“He certainly knows that peak oil is approaching and that time is running out for Iran’s economic recovery through the use of its oil revenues,” he said.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said progress depends on Iran’s seven conditions being met – including the lifting of sanctions, ending the US naval blockade of Iranian ports, guarantees to an end to US-Israeli strikes, and the unfreezing of Iranian assets – adding that the “carrot-and-stick approach has no effect on Iran”, according to the semi-official Tasnim news agency.
Vance, meanwhile, told Fox News on Thursday that Trump would “never” let the conflict become “a forever war”.
Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran [File: AFP]
Which of all these signals matter most?
The diplomacy may say more than the threats.
Andreas Krieg, an associate professor of security studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that Vance’s offer of direct talks “suggests that the Americans do have second thoughts” and that they are less ready to strike than they publicly suggest.
But he warned that Cooper, whom he called “quite hawkish”, could give Trump false confidence “that there is a military way out of it, when in reality there isn’t a military way out of it”.
“This idea that there is a short and crisp military operation to solve this issue is obviously an illusion,” he said.
Paul Musgrave, an associate professor of government at Georgetown University in Qatar, told Al Jazeera the White House could be sending signals to coerce Tehran, but that “the better interpretation is the simplest one”.
He believes “the United States is getting ready to carry out substantial attacks relatively soon”. He said he does not expect Washington to accept what he called the unfavourable deal Tehran is offering “without another round of attacks”.
Pusztai said Trump’s main focus is now the midterms, making it “very unlikely that he will order another large-scale attack on Iran before the elections”.
“Starting in mid to late November, there could be a major wave of attacks aimed at advancing the American agenda,” he said, adding that the aim would be to weaken the IRGC enough to push it towards a deal on US terms.
Whatever the vote’s result, “in the short term it will not change much”, Musgrave said.
A strong Republican showing could encourage more aggressive tactics, while a Democratic win could push Trump to show his unilateral powers, including by attacking, he said.
A funeral for the bombing victims of Minab School in Iran, which killed 120 children during the first day of the United States-Israel war on the country [File: Amirhossein Khorgooei/ISNA/WANA via Reuters]
Hasn’t this all happened before?
It has. Iran was attacked by Israel or the US while talks were under way in both 2025 and 2026.
“We’ve seen this pattern of behaviour before from the United States,” Hashemi said, describing it as “talking diplomacy while preparing for war”.
On June 13, 2025, Israel launched major strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites, two days before a sixth round of US-Iran talks was due in Oman. The US joined on June 22, bombing Iran’s Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan nuclear sites.
This year, the US and Israel attacked on February 28, two days after talks in Geneva that mediator Oman said had made “significant progress”.
A day before the strikes, Oman’s foreign minister said Iran had agreed to reduce its nuclear stockpiles to “the lowest level possible”.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told Al Jazeera in September that Iran no longer trusts negotiations with Washington because attacks had come during previous rounds of talks.
Hashemi said he suspects “the same pattern is repeating itself”, with the US preparing “a massive bombing campaign in Iran, replete with war crimes like we haven’t seen before”, citing his reading of Murphy’s comments.
An explosion in Tel Aviv after Iran launched missiles into Israel, following the Israeli-US attacks on Iran, on February 28, 2026 [Gideon Markowicz/Reuters]
What is blocking a deal?
“The issue is mostly around sequencing and the lack of trust on the Iranian side that the Americans will actually follow through with their commitments,” Krieg said.
Tehran wants sanctions and the US naval blockade lifted quickly, fearing that a slow process gives Trump room to backtrack, he said.
Some IRGC hardliners do not necessarily see war as a bad thing if it tightens their grip on the Hormuz strait, he added, and “the Iranians have been prepping for this war for the last three weeks, so they are ready to fight”.
Krieg said he expects “nothing is going to happen until the 3rd of November [the date of the US midterm elections]”. After that, he said, the likelihood of war will “increase exponentially”.
Any new escalation would be worse than in February and March, he said, with Iran readier to strike critical infrastructure in Gulf countries.
He said the threat to the Gulf “will be unprecedented”.
Veteran Israeli actress Chelli Goldenberg was left shocked after she was caught ripping into Israel’s policies towards Palestinians on air. Goldenberg was a guest on Channel 13 and did not realise the segment was being broadcast live.
EUFOR confirms Chinook CH-47 helicopter crash in Bosnia, with four Italian nationals confirmed dead.
Published On 30 Oct 202630 Oct 2026
Four people belonging to the European Union Force in Bosnia (EUFOR) have been killed after an Italian military helicopter conducting a training operation crashed.
EUFOR said a CH-47 Chinook helicopter crashed during “routine training” in the Brcko region on Thursday, about 180km (110 miles) north of Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo.
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A total of 11 people were injured in the crash, EUFOR said, adding that all the injured are receiving treatment and are in stable condition.
The Italian government said in a statement that all those on board the military helicopter were its nationals.
The victims were two soldiers and two Red Cross volunteers, according to the Italian defence ministry.
“At this moment of immense grief, my thoughts go first and foremost to the families of our fallen, to whom I extend my personal condolences and those of the entire defence establishment,” Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto said.
The site of the helicopter crash in the Brcko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on October 29, 2026 [klix.ba/Handout via Reuters]
Wreckage
Bosnian media outlets published photos of the wreckage showing the helicopter overturned on the ground in a flat field.
A spokesman for Brcko hospital told the AFP news agency that there were 15 people on board at the time of the crash, which initially killed three people.
“Twelve people were transported to our hospital. Unfortunately, a fourth person succumbed to injuries in the hospital,” the spokesman said.
“EUFOR is conducting a full and thorough investigation of the incident and will release more information as it is verified, and when appropriate,” the force said in a statement.
EUFOR, which has between 1,000 and 1,500 personnel, has been deployed in Bosnia since 2004, when it replaced a NATO peacekeeping force that had been in the country since the Bosnian War ended in 1995. The mission oversees the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the three-year war.
Ethiopia has received 12 Russian Su-35 fighter jets and will acquire four S-400 air defence batteries, in a deal experts say strengthens Moscow’s foothold in the Horn of Africa while bolstering Addis Ababa’s military amid conflict at home and tensions with neighbouring Eritrea.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced the deal in Moscow during the two-day Russia-Africa Summit.
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“I value the friendly relations between Russia and Ethiopia,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a statement. “Russia and Ethiopia stand together in international affairs.”
Experts say the agreement builds on decades of military cooperation, offering Moscow arms revenue and diplomatic influence while allowing Ethiopia to strengthen its armed forces amid its ongoing conflict in Tigray.
Here is what we know:
What weapons is Ethiopia acquiring?
Abiy said Ethiopia had taken delivery of its first 12 Su-35s under an earlier agreement with Russia, with four S-400 batteries to follow, but did not say when the air defence systems would arrive.
The aircraft would expand an air force already equipped with Russian fighter jets. The S-400 systems would complement this existing fleet by helping the military defend itself against aerial threats, experts say.
“They would be best used against conventional air threats,” Benedict Manzin, a lead analyst on the Middle East and Africa at risk consultancy Sibylline, told Al Jazeera. “In a war with Eritrea, they could be used against Eritrea’s limited air force and drones.”
However, air defences do not provide protection against every kind of attack.
“As we have seen in Ukraine, conventional air defence systems can be overwhelmed by small, cheap drones,” he said.
Why does Russia want closer ties with Ethiopia?
The relationship predates the current competition for influence in Africa.
“Russia has been engaged in Ethiopia for decades, part of the legacy of the Cold War,” Manzin said.
The Soviet Union backed Ethiopia’s former communist government. Today’s cooperation builds on those foundations, with the two countries having signed military agreements intended to improve the Ethiopian armed forces’ capabilities through technology, knowledge and training, according to the Ethiopian News Agency.
Commercial interests also matter.
“Russia is also in the business of making money through arms sales,” Manzin said. “This is one of Russia’s primary exports to Africa.”
Weapons sales provide revenue while sustaining relationships with governments that require training, maintenance and replacement equipment. But the partnership extends beyond defence.
Abiy said his talks with Putin covered nuclear energy, health and trade, alongside bilateral and multilateral cooperation, while in a statement, Putin said bilateral trade exceeded $1.3bn in January-September, more than twice the figure for all of 2025.
He identified energy, agriculture, industry and education among potential areas for further cooperation.
Ethiopia’s size also makes it attractive to competing powers, with experts saying that because it is Africa’s second-most populous country, it offers a substantial market.
“Everyone engages a bit, and Ethiopia tries to maximise its gains,” Manzin said.
Does this mean Ethiopia is turning away from the West?
Manzin suggested Ethiopia is widening its options rather than committing exclusively to Moscow.
“African states are aware that they are a focus of geopolitical competition,” he said.
That competition gives governments room to seek weapons, investment and diplomatic backing from different partners. Ethiopia’s relationship with Russia coexists with a significant Chinese presence and continuing Western investment in the country.
“China has a huge presence in Ethiopia, and Russian arms have always been a huge factor,” Manzin said. Moscow is seeking to turn those established connections into broader influence as Western sanctions over its war in Ukraine constrain its international relationships.
Russia supplied 15 percent of African imports of major weapons in 2021–2025, behind the United States at 19 percent and China at 17 percent, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Could the weapons be used in Tigray?
In his statement, Abiy thanked Putin for ensuring the aircraft were delivered a year ahead of schedule and said the equipment would strengthen Ethiopia’s ability to “preemptively deter aggression”.
The delivery comes amid renewed fighting in Tigray, a separate rebellion in Amhara and concerns about a possible conflict with Eritrea.
“Ethiopia is buying a lot of aircraft,” Manzin said. “The timing comes as Ethiopia is going through conflict in Tigray, with speculation about war with Eritrea.”
He cautioned against assuming the latest battlefield developments directly prompted purchases negotiated earlier.
“Aircraft are helpful regardless, as they are using aircraft and the air force heavily during any suppression,” he said.
What’s the conflict about?
Fighting between Ethiopia’s federal army and Tigrayan forces intensified in late September, in effect unravelling the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement that ended a devastating two-year war.
Each side has blamed the other for renewed violence. Tensions grew following the formation of a seven-group alliance seeking to overthrow Abiy’s government and establish a transitional administration.
Government troops and allied forces entered Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, earlier in October after Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters withdrew.
Addis Ababa subsequently installed a six-month caretaker administration, but rebel commanders have promised to continue fighting.
Trade and security are expected to be on the agenda as delegations and leaders from dozens of African countries gather in Moscow for a two-day summit with Russia.
The third instalment of the Russia-Africa Summit will run through October 28–29 and will be chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the current African Union chair, Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye.
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Russia has boosted security and trade cooperation with African nations as it grapples with Western sanctions imposed in response to its war against Ukraine.
So who will be attending and what is at stake?
Here’s what we know.
What is the Russia-Africa Summit?
The Russia-Africa Summit is a two-day diplomatic and economic meeting being held in Moscow on Wednesday and Thursday.
Leaders and delegations from 48 African countries are meeting to discuss bilateral cooperation spanning politics, defence and technology.
This high-profile forum is the third of its kind. The first summit took place in October 2019 in Sochi, marking an unprecedented turn in Russian-African relations.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (C), Egyptian President Abdel Fattal el-Sisi (L) and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa (R) seen during the plenary at the Russia-Africa Summit on October 24, 2019 in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia [Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images]
What’s on the agenda for the summit?
The event’s official theme is Developing Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and “unlocking the potential of every African country”.
More than 40 sessions and about 100 speakers will cover trade, investment, technology transfer, food and energy security, healthcare, education and youth exchange.
There will also be a business programme, culminating in a plenary session.
Who is attending?
Representatives from 48 African countries will participate, as well as 22 heads of state, according to Kremlin presidential aide Yury Ushakov. Heads of state from 17 countries attended the last summit in 2023.
Fewer leaders came to the last two summits, compared with the first gathering in 2019, when 43 took part, a decline which Moscow blamed on Western pressure.
Russian President Putin is scheduled to meet with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
The guest list includes leaders closely tied to Russia’s growing security role in Africa, including Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traore and Niger’s Abdourahamane Tchiani.
Kenya’s William Ruto, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and Namibia’s Netumbo Nandi-Ndatiwah are also expected, as well as Sudan’s Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed al-Menfi, the chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya.
What is the relationship between Russia and Africa like?
Russia has gained far more influence in Africa through security than trade, according to a report by the African Security Analysis group (ASA), a security consultancy.
Russia’s security presence has risen significantly in the region. In 2023, Russian forces, mostly from the Wagner Group, operated in only a few African countries, but the ASA now counts Russian missions or troops in at least nine countries.
Trade between African countries and Russia has exceeded $28bn. It was estimated to be about $16.8bn in 2019, when the first summit was held. But trade is mainly concentrated in a few countries and overshadowed by that of China and the European Union.
Russia’s strongest ties to the continent are in energy, fertilisers, defence and nuclear power, where the state-owned firm Rosatom has signed a string of agreements.
Russia has been an essential supplier of fertilisers and wheat to many countries in the region.
In 2023, Russia exported 200,000 tonnes of grain to Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Eritrea and Zimbabwe.
Why does this summit matter?
This is the first summit since 2023, so it will be an indicator of how far the relationship has developed and where it is heading, analysts say.
A final declaration and a Russia-Africa Partnership Forum plan should be adopted by the end of the Summit to cover 2027-2029.
Analysts have said that meetings on the sidelines could be more important than the main event, as talks between African delegations and Russian defence officials can illustrate where Moscow plans to expand its military ties.
The recruitment of Africans to fight in Ukraine could also be a growing problem for Moscow, as it has already caused diplomatic concern in countries such as Kenya.
Amnesty International has used the run-up to the summit to raise the issue of Africans being recruited to fight with Russia.
In an open letter, the directors of Amnesty’s African section urged leaders attending the summit to demand that Moscow end what the group describes as deceptive and coercive recruitment of Africans to fight in its war in Ukraine.