Military

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has warned commercial vessels to only use routes through the Strait of Hormuz approved by Tehran, reopening a point of friction in fragile negotiations between the United States and Iran over the future of the strategic waterway.

The warning came after Oman announced a new shipping transit route through the strait on Wednesday, saying it had coordinated the route with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as maritime traffic slowly resumes following weeks of disruption.

The dispute remains one of the unresolved issues after a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed by the United States and Iran last week, which largely halted hostilities in the four-month US-Israel war on Iran and which launched a 60-day negotiation process aimed at reaching a broader peace agreement.

The MoU, which includes the reopening of the strait, followed months of severe disruption to shipping after Iran effectively closed it, and the US imposed a corresponding naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Both Washington and Tehran have declared the strait open to commercial shipping, but questions remain over whether Iran will seek greater control over vessel movements, whether it will impose transit or service fees on ships using the strait following the 60-day negotiating period, and whether disagreements over the waterway could derail efforts to reach a permanent agreement altogether.

Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important?

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most strategically significant waterways, with around one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies normally being shipped through the narrow passage linking the Gulf to the Arabian Sea.

Bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the south, the strait is only about 50km (31 miles) wide at its entrance and exit, narrowing to about 33km (21 miles) at its tightest point. Despite its width, it is deep enough to accommodate the world’s largest oil tankers.

According to the US Energy Information Administration, about 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products transited the strait each day in 2025, representing hundreds of billions of dollars in annual energy trade.

The route is used not only by Iran but also by Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It is also vital for global fertiliser exports, with roughly one-third of international fertiliser trade normally passing through the strait.

Because disruptions to shipping there rapidly push up global energy prices and destabilise US markets, control of the waterway has become one of Iran’s strongest sources of strategic leverage in its conflict with the US.

Why is Iran objecting to Oman’s new route?

The IRGC says Oman and the IMO announced the new shipping corridor without consulting Tehran. “Certain authorities have announced a new shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz without prior notification to or coordination with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The proposed route is unacceptable and poses serious safety risks,” the force said.

“The only authorised transit routes through the Strait of Hormuz are those designated by the Islamic Republic of Iran,” it said, adding that ships must maintain contact with the IRGC Navy while transiting the waterway.

Iran first issued its own map of acceptable routes through the strait in April, showing that ships should pass much closer to the Iranian coast than they had previously.

The IRGC’s warning came after a Liberian oil tanker passed through the strait on Thursday using a route much closer to Oman’s coastline.

Al Jazeera’s Resul Serdar, reporting from Tehran, said the IRGC appeared frustrated because the Omani route partially bypasses Iran’s direct control over shipping.

“The control of the Strait of Hormuz has been a huge leverage for Iran to put pressure on its adversaries and the global economy since the beginning of the war,” Serdar said.

Oman defended the corridor route it had announced, saying it was intended to restore safe navigation while complying with international law. Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi said Oman remained committed to ensuring freedom of navigation through the waterway and stressed that “future arrangements related to the strait do not involve imposing any transit fees”.

What does the US-Iran agreement say about the strait?

In the MoU signed last week, Iran agreed that it would “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa”.

While the agreement states that “the traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start”, it also acknowledges that demining operations will be required before normal shipping routes can fully resume, stating that “demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran will be instated within 30 days”. It also provides for discussions between Iran, Oman and other Gulf states on future arrangements for managing the waterway.

However, the memorandum does not specify what will happen after the initial 60-day period. Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, said the temporary rerouting of vessels had always been expected because of the mine-clearing operations outlined in the agreement.

“We always knew that if there was a deal, there would be several weeks of mine-clearing operations in the international shipping lane running through the middle of the Strait of Hormuz,” he said.

“During that period, vessels would have to transit through Iranian and Omani territorial waters instead.”

However, Vaez said the latest announcement by Iran was unexpected. “The important thing now is that the Iranians do not start taking fees or other tolls,” he said, “because that is not provided for in the memorandum of understanding.”

Asked whether the IRGC’s position differed from that of Iran’s government, Vaez said: “There is no distinction between the IRGC and the state. They are effectively one and the same. The IRGC is calling the shots.”

Can Iran charge ships fees?

International law generally protects the right of transit through international straits, including Hormuz, making it difficult for coastal states to impose unilateral transit fees on vessels simply passing through international shipping lanes, even where they are within territorial waters.

Last week, Iran announced it would waive planned fees through the strait for 60 days while talks with the US continue in Switzerland, suggesting charges may be introduced once the negotiating period expires.

Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has signalled that Tehran views the post-war arrangement as fundamentally different from the status quo that existed before the conflict.

“Hormuz will never return” to its prewar status, Ghalibaf said.

The suggestion that Iran could charge fees was dismissed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week. Speaking at the start of a regional tour in the United Arab Emirates, he said: “It’s an international waterway. No country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway.”

Rubio added that he believed “all the countries in this region would agree”.

Speaking in Manama, Bahrain, after meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – a bloc comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – on Thursday, Rubio also told reporters: “Iranians are saying one thing, but then something else is actually happening.

“It’s now obvious to us that … the Iranian system is going to produce all sorts of maximalist rhetoric. What we’re interested in is not their press conferences. What we’re interested in is whether or not ships are moving. If ships are moving as they should be moving, then that’s what we’re going to judge.

“If, on the other hand, this rhetoric is backed up by actual ships being threatened and ships are not moving, then that’s a violation of the agreement, and we’re going to have a problem with it.”

Rubio claimed there is no regional support for Iranian transit fees, saying, “There is zero support among Gulf countries for any sort of toll or fees charged for the use of international waters … that isn’t going to happen.”

His comments came after UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash said that new “geopolitical facts” could not be imposed on the Arab Gulf states as a result of what he described as the “treacherous aggression against them”.

Are ships returning – and which route are they taking?

Some commercial shipping through the strait has resumed, although traffic remains well below normal levels. Before the conflict, between 120 and 140 vessels typically transited the strait each day.

According to shipping analytics company Kpler, confirmed crossings rose to 70 vessels on Wednesday as demining progressed and more operators began using the Omani route.

“The US-Iran MoU framework and apparent lifting of the US blockade appear to have supported a short-term confidence boost, although IRGC warnings against use of the Omani route could create a new source of contention,” Kpler reported.

The company added that incomplete demining, continued “dark” routing by some vessels – when ships limit or switch off their tracking transponders – and unresolved questions over inspections, sanctions and future governance meant shipping had not yet returned to prewar conditions.

This comes as oil prices drop to the lowest level since before the Iran war, with Brent crude, the global benchmark, falling to a low of $72.24 a barrel on Thursday. This remains above the prewar price of $66, however.

The chart below shows how shipping through the strait before the war compares to its status in recent weeks:

Is a peace deal achievable?

The future administration of the Strait of Hormuz is only one of several issues still to be resolved before negotiators hope to reach a comprehensive agreement within 60 days, with another major sticking point being Iran’s nuclear programme.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi has said the agreement explicitly provides for international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities.

However, Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, has said inspectors’ access to nuclear sites damaged during the conflict will only be considered as part of a final agreement.

Questions also remain over the fate of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, the sequencing of sanctions relief and the release of frozen Iranian assets, while regional tensions continue to pose additional risks.

Israeli forces remain deployed in parts of southern Lebanon occupied during the conflict, according to a Lebanese military source, while Israeli strikes have continued, despite the MoU explicitly calling for “a permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon”.

Vaez said visible progress would be essential if negotiations are to survive, noting, “Both sides have to see progress, whether that’s greater access for UN nuclear inspectors, sanctions relief, or resolving the issue of Iran’s uranium stockpile.”

He cautioned against viewing the interim agreement as a series of smaller deals. “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” Vaez said.

“They [the Iranians] are determined to reach a comprehensive agreement within 60 days. That’s a very ambitious timetable, but there has to be visible momentum or the process risks falling apart.”

However, Vaez said both Washington and Tehran have strong economic incentives to bring about a lasting peace. “The situation in the Strait had become one of mutually assured economic destruction,” he said.

“The United States was facing rising energy and oil prices ahead of the midterm elections … At the same time, Iran was already in a deep economic hole before this conflict began. The war only made that worse.

“It became a lose-lose dynamic, and both sides needed a way out.”

June 24 (UPI) — The Israeli military has surrounded an underground base in southern Lebanon in which dozens of Hezbollah militants are trapped, Israeli officials said.

The base is located under the village of Tebnit, in an area where fighting taken place despite an Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire, The New York Times reported. The standoff, if it escalates, could disrupt ongoing peace negotiations between the United States, which backs Israel, and Iran, which backs Hezbollah.

Israeli officials said the trapped militants were running out of supplies. On Tuesday, Israeli troops killed at least two people in the area. Israel said those targeted were Hezbollah operatives, while Hezbollah said they were civilians.

The underground base is beneath the Ali al-Taher ridge, not far from the border with Israel and a strategic point. Israeli officials said Hezbollah built the complex of tunnels over 20 years with Iran’s help.

“From this place, you can launch missiles and munitions at Israel,” Sarit Zehavi, president of the Alma Research and Education Center, said to The New York Times.

The Jerusalem Post reported that Israeli leaders are concerned that operatives in the area could carry out a kidnapping attack against Israel’s forces to help their negotiations for those trapped. Soldiers have been told to stay in pairs or groups at all times.

Israel once occupied the ridge after its 1982 invasion of Lebanon. It was once outside the “buffer zone” that Israel established in Lebanon near the border, but Israeli redrew the line last week to include the ridge, The New York Times reported. Israel considers any armed fighter south of the line a threat and a target.

Bethlehem, occupied West Bank – In the narrow alleyways of the Dheisheh refugee camp, three children debate which of their encounters with the Israeli military is worth telling, and who gets to tell it.

Yanal, 14, wins the opening round on language skills alone. He speaks three languages: Arabic, English and Spanish, and insists on telling his story in English.

“Life in the camp is complex,” he says, because, as he explains, there is nowhere to run away to when the army comes.

Yanal keeps returning to one memory: a football match, soldiers entering the field, and there being no way out.

Mustafa Abu Aliyah, 13, counters with a raid that he ran into as he was on his way to his grandfather’s house. The Israeli army fired live rounds and tear gas, he says. “We were in the middle of the fire.”

He can’t remember his first encounter with soldiers, “but I definitely saw them when I was little, because they are always coming here”.

His sister Diyar, 12, was mid-piano lesson the last time the army came through.

“Whenever the army comes, there will be tear gas,” she says. “People will be beaten. There’s usually someone injured or killed.”

She compares it to life elsewhere. “I see children in other countries, in other worlds, living in safety, but we can’t even leave our front door without suffering.”

The raids happen so often that the children often can’t remember the dates of specific incidents. But what they do remember is the fear they experienced and the aggression displayed by the Israeli soldiers.

In the first nine months of 2025 alone, Israeli forces carried out nearly 7,500 raids across the occupied West Bank, or about 27 a day, and a 37 percent increase compared with the same period in 2024.

‘Essence of childhood destroyed’

The children in the Dheisheh refugee camp reflect a wider pattern of childhood experiences under Israeli occupation, set out in a report the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory released on Tuesday.

It examines Israel’s treatment of Palestinian children in Gaza and the occupied West Bank since October 2023.

Titled, “The essence of childhood has been destroyed”, it found that Israeli forces have killed at least 20,179 Palestinian children and wounded more than 44,000 across the occupied territory, most of them in Gaza – where it said that the deliberate targeting of children constituted part of the genocide in the Palestinian territory.

The report also documents a pattern of killings, mass arrests, torture, sexual violence and attacks on schools and hospitals.

In the West Bank, it records a sharp rise in settler violence against children and killings by Israeli forces, among them a two-year-old girl shot dead in January 2025. Children, the report notes, are held in Israeli detention, with no lawyer and no word sent to their parents, a separation it says can amount to enforced disappearance. Schools, too, are targets: 85 across the West Bank are under demolition or stop-work orders, and others have been closed or attacked by soldiers and settlers.

Beyond the casualty count

The UN commission argues that Israel has created conditions in which Palestinians live in a constant state of “diffused, ambient terror, that does not require constant bombing to remain effective”.

“We are talking about repeated shocks, about continuous events that never end,” says Lemis Farraj, a psychologist and the project coordinator at Shorouq in Dheisheh, emphasising that a child’s physical and mental health cannot be separated from each other.

The report calls this continuous traumatic stress, distinct from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), because there is no single event to recover from. The danger does not just come from experiencing one raid, but from the fear that comes with waiting for the expected raids that will likely come in the future.

Diyar explains that when the army enters her neighbourhood, she has to stay home and wait, no matter what her plans were. “Our life stops,” she says.

Her brother, Mustafa, says that the repetition has worn the fear flat.

“When I see the army, I [am] used to it and I stop being afraid.”

Farraj sees the same in the young children she treats: a startle at an ordinary sound, certainty that a raid has begun, and regression – skills already learned suddenly lost again.

Five-year-old Khour Hammad, who lives a few alleys away from the older children, has experienced the same raids.

She explains that both of her parents are in prison. Israeli forces arrested her father in July 2023 and her mother last March, according to the family.

Khour remembers the night the army came for her mother. Half-asleep, she heard a man’s voice and thought her father had finally come home. She climbed out of bed expecting him. Instead, she found soldiers inside the house.

The soldiers tried to question Khour. She says that she “felt like I was going to throw up”.

Handed an old family photo, she brightens at once, pointing out her mother, Islam Amarna, and her father, Osama Hammad, and rattling off memories in bursts.

Generational trauma

While Palestinian children in Gaza and the West Bank face different lived experiences, the UN finds the same cause behind the harm: a military occupation described as a “long-term mechanism of domination, subjugation and oppression”.

Farraj adds that children are affected not only by their own experiences of trauma, but also by what is passed down from parents and grandparents.

“The first generation of the Nakba lived in shock and passed it on to their children,” she says, referring to the ethnic cleansing of at least 750,000 Palestinians following the formation of the state of Israel in 1948.

The report similarly notes that Palestinian refugees, now in their fifth generation, have internalised a sense of “dispossession from the Nakba” alongside present-day experiences of occupation.

In the West Bank, roughly one in four Palestinians are refugees; in Gaza, it is about 70 percent.

Israeli violence and forcible displacement have been carried through generations of Palestinians, compounding as the cycle repeats. Farraj says trauma recovery depends on stability: family support, schooling, safe spaces and a predictable routine, all of which remain precarious under Israel’s occupation.

For Khour, that stability begins with her parents.

“I want the whole world to listen and see my picture,” Khour says, “and get my mom and dad out of prison.”

Published on 24/06/2026 – 12:44 GMT+2•Updated
13:06

One of Europe’s largest military equipment producers, KNDS, rolled out long-awaited details of its initial public offering (IPO), aiming for a dual listing in Paris and Frankfurt in the coming weeks.

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The IPO could value KNDS, the maker of Leopard and Leclerc tanks, at between €12bn and €15bn, according to the Financial Times, potentially making it one of Europe’s largest defence listings in recent years.

The listing comes at a time when European military budgets are surging, driven by the war in Ukraine and doubts over the reliability of the US as a security guarantor.

The company declined to comment on the precise date, but CEO Jean-Paul Alary told reporters the offering was expected within weeks.

According to Alary, the move comes as the continent enters what he called a new era of defence and security, with armed forces modernising rapidly and rebuilding the land-warfare capabilities run down during decades of lower spending.

According to Reuters, the firm has now formally launched the IPO process, which is expected to take place in mid-July.

The announcement comes days after Germany unveiled plans to acquire a 40% stake in KNDS, saying the move would secure long-term influence over a company it considers strategically important to European security and defence.

France, which currently owns 50% of KNDS, is expected to reduce its stake to 40%.

The remaining 20% of the company is set to be floated on the stock market, with France and Germany each retaining 40% stakes following the transaction.

According to the Financial Times, the shares are expected to be marketed primarily to institutional investors amid strong demand for European defence stocks.

Once the listing is completed, KNDS shares will begin trading on Euronext Paris and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, giving investors direct exposure to one of Europe’s largest land-defence manufacturers.

KNDS was created in 2015 through the merger of Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and France’s Nexter.

A growing headache for Rheinmetall

The rapid emergence of the rival adds to the pressure on Rheinmetall, Europe’s largest ammunition maker and KNDS’s main competitor in subsectors such as land systems.

The Düsseldorf-based group, whose shares have shed roughly a quarter of their value this year, had itself reportedly hoped to buy into KNDS, only to be shut out by the governments’ intervention.

To make matters worse, Berlin announced it would scrap Rheinmetall’s multi-billion-euro F126 frigate programme, which would have been Germany’s largest warship order since the Second World War, in favour of smaller vessels from rival builder TKMS.

Rheinmetall, which had been poised to take over the project, fell 13% in early trading on Wednesday due to the news.

The squeeze also coincides with regulatory scrutiny at home.

Germany’s Monopolies Commission has warned that defence procurement is concentrated among a small number of suppliers, potentially weakening competition and driving up costs.

Calling for reforms to procurement rules, commission chairman Tomaso Duso said competition was “the fundamental pillar of Europe’s economic order” and should play a greater role in the defence sector.

A listed KNDS will give investors a direct yardstick against which to measure Rheinmetall’s order momentum and margins.

Additional sources • AFP

The United States Senate has voted in favour of invoking its war powers to force President Donald Trump to halt his military campaign against Iran or seek congressional approval before any further action is taken.

Here is a closer look at Tuesday’s vote – the 10th attempt Congress has made to rein in the US-Israel war on Iran – and what this means for the US government.

Why did this vote take place?

A similar measure had already been approved in the House of Representatives on June 3 by a vote of 215 to 208, and on Tuesday, the Senate passed it in a 50-48 vote. Trump’s Republican Party has slim majorities in both chambers.

Speaking on the Senate floor before the vote, top Democrat Chuck Schumer advocated for the war powers resolution as he criticised Trump’s military campaign against Iran.

“For years, Trump promised to put maximum pressure on Iran, but he ended up delivering maximum confusion, maximum chaos, maximum cost to the American people with his disastrous war,” Schumer said.

“Time after time, the vast majority of Senate Republicans sided with Trump and his war instead of the American people. The American people have paid the price for Trump’s historic blunder in Iran. It’ll go down in the history books as one of the worst foreign policy forays America has ever made.”

The war against Iran has proved highly unpopular in the US. A poll released on Tuesday by the news agency Reuters and the research firm Ipsos found that 24 percent of respondents felt the war had been worth the cost.

The Senate passed its first war powers resolution against the Iran conflict on May 20, but that effort was a procedural move only and did not progress.

Who voted and how?

Four Republican senators crossed party lines to vote for the resolution, and all but one of the chamber’s Democrats also voted in favour.

Tuesday’s breakaway Republicans were Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, Susan Collins of Maine and Rand Paul of Kentucky. A further two Republicans did not vote: Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Dave McCormick of Pennsylvania.

The lone Democrat to vote against the measure was Pennsylvania’s John Fetterman.

What does the resolution say?

The war powers resolution “directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

Only if “explicitly authorised by a declaration of war or a specific congressional authorisation” would Trump be allowed to use further military force against Iran, it says.

The resolution, however, does allow for a limited military presence to remain in the Middle East to prevent any “imminent attack” against the US or its allies.

What is the significance of the vote?

The vote reflects growing unease even among some of Trump’s Republican supporters about the unpopular conflict, which began with US-Israeli air strikes on Tehran on February 28.

This is the first time both chambers of Congress have passed a resolution directing a president to remove US armed forces from a warzone under the War Powers Act although it was not immediately clear how the votes might affect the conflict.

Technically, the Trump administration should now seek explicit congressional approval for further strikes on Iran. However, previous administrations have found routes around this by securing more limited authorisations for the use of military force (AUMFs) instead.

For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Congress passed an AUMF that gave then-President George W Bush broad powers to conduct what would become the global “war on terror”.

And one year later, it passed another AUMF, allowing the use of the military against the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which became the basis of the 2003 invasion.

The two authorisations remain in place, and presidents continue to rely on them to carry out strikes without first seeking congressional approval. The assassination of top Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 in Baghdad was authorised by Trump under the 2003 AUMF.

In addition, a resolution does not have the force of law. Experts said, therefore, that while the Senate vote is viewed as a rebuke to Trump, it is largely symbolic.

What effect will this have on US-Iran talks in Switzerland?

Before the vote on Tuesday, some Republican senators had warned that the war powers resolution would weaken Trump’s standing in the Switzerland negotiations.

“If this passes, the Iranians are going to simply stand up and walk away from negotiations,” Senator James Risch of Idaho told the Senate on Tuesday.

“They’re going to say: This thing’s over. The Congress has told the president of the United States, ‘Leave us alone. We can do whatever we want to do,’ and they will walk away.”

How will the Trump administration respond?

Risch also argued that the resolution is essentially useless, given its symbolic nature. “It’s going to have no effect. The president isn’t going to pay any attention to it,” he said.

The US Constitution gives Congress the sole power to declare war, but that division of power has eroded over the past 75 years as successive presidents alone have committed US forces to overseas conflicts.

Trump has pointed to that precedent to argue that he does not need congressional authorisation at all.

In an appearance on The Axios Show last week, Trump denied learning any “lesson” about the limits of his executive powers during the Iran war. “There are no limits,” he said.

The last time Congress voted to go to war was during World War II although it has passed AUMFs in the decades since, which allow for limited military engagement without congressional approval for all-out war.

During Trump’s first term, there were concerns that he could use the 2001 AUMF to strike Iran under the unfounded claim that Tehran supports al-Qaeda.

Some critics pointed out that Republicans may be more willing to confront Trump over the issue of congressional authorisation now as they defend their seats before November’s midterm elections.

EXPLAINER

Iran and the US clash over nuclear inspections and Hormuz as negotiators push for a final deal within 60 days.

Iran and the United States have offered conflicting accounts of key issues as negotiators work towards a final agreement within a 60-day window. Differences remain over nuclear oversight and the implementation of any deal, underscoring the challenges facing both sides.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Iran would not be allowed to charge tolls in the Strait of Hormuz under a final agreement, stressing that the strategic waterway must remain open to international shipping.

Meanwhile, Iran rejected US claims that it had agreed to allow nuclear inspectors back into the country after President Donald Trump said Tehran had accepted the “highest level” of monitoring. The conflicting statements highlight the gaps that negotiators are still trying to bridge.

Here is what has happened:

In Iran

• Iran’s military shifts to ‘offensive doctrine’: General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan, head of Iran’s Army Strategic Studies and Research Center, said Tehran has moved away from a purely defensive posture and now includes preemptive operations in its military strategy. Quoted by the semi-official Fars news agency, Pourdastan said Iran could “severely surprise the enemy” if national interests required it and added that much of the country’s military capability has yet to be used.
• Iran says no IAEA inspections planned: Tohid Asadi, reporting from the Strait of Hormuz, says the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei has denied reports of a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi and said there are currently no plans for visits or inspections by the UN nuclear watchdog. Baghaei said Iran’s dealings with the IAEA would be governed by existing procedures, its safeguards obligations, parliamentary legislation and decisions by the Supreme National Security Council. Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA after US and Israeli strikes on its nuclear facilities in June 2025, and while diplomacy continues under a 60-day framework, Tehran says it has not granted permission for inspectors to return.

War diplomacy:

• ‘No way’ US and Iran can finalise deal in 60 days, analyst says: Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, told Al Jazeera there is “no way” Washington and Tehran can complete a final agreement within the 60-day timeframe repeatedly cited by President Donald Trump. “I think we’re talking about at least into the next calendar year,” he said, adding that he would not be surprised if both sides simply “run out the clock” by continuing negotiations and keeping the Strait of Hormuz open without reaching a final deal before the end of Trump’s presidency.
• Qatar says LNG production could return to normal within weeks: Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani told the Financial Times that Qatar is preparing to restore normal liquefied natural gas (LNG) production after the interim US-Iran deal. Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG producer, halted output in March following an Iranian drone attack on the Ras Laffan facility. Sheikh Mohammed said most production could resume within weeks, except at the damaged site, adding that QatarEnergy would only lift its force majeure declaration once it is satisfied that all safety and operational concerns have been addressed.

In the Gulf:

• Rubio ‘trying to sell the deal’ with Iran on Gulf tour: Alan Fisher, reporting from Washington, DC, said US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is visiting the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain, three Gulf countries seen as having been among the most affected by the war with Iran. Rubio, who also serves as Trump’s national security adviser, is expected to reassure regional allies that US security commitments remain intact. He will also address the Gulf Cooperation Council in Bahrain, where he is “really trying to sell the deal”, amid concerns over Washington’s response to Iranian attacks.

In the US

• US Senate approves resolution to curb Trump’s war powers on Iran: The Senate voted 50-48 to pass a measure requiring congressional approval for further US military action against Iran, marking the first time a war powers resolution on the conflict has cleared both chambers of Congress. Four Republicans – Bill Cassidy, Lisa Murkowski, Susan Collins and Rand Paul – joined nearly all Democrats in backing the measure, while Pennsylvania Democrat John Fetterman voted against it. The resolution is expected to face a veto from President Trump.

In Israel

• US ‘very naive’ on Iran, Ben-Gvir says: Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir said the US would be “very naive” if it believed Iran would abandon its nuclear programme, and hinted that Israel may act independently against Tehran. “It is Israel’s responsibility to confront this Iranian threat and act against it alone,” he told Israel’s Channel 7, adding that “no circumstances” could force Israel to act “according to the dictates of a friend, even if that friend is truly great”. His remarks come amid reported tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv over Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and ongoing US-Iran negotiations. Last week, US Vice President JD Vance publicly criticised Israeli cabinet ministers for “attacking” Washington, calling the US Israel’s “only powerful ally” left in the world.

In Lebanon

• UN says ceasefire ‘largely holding’ in southern Lebanon: The United Nations said the ceasefire in southern Lebanon appears to be “largely holding”, although peacekeepers continue to observe Israeli military ground and air activity. UN spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said UNIFIL troops witnessed “heavy” machine-gun fire and three tank rounds fired by Israeli forces near Biyyada on Monday, while drones were also seen “apparently to monitor UNIFIL peacekeepers”. The incident came a day after peacekeepers reported the first day without exchanges of fire since fighting escalated on March 2. The UN urged all sides to “adhere fully to the ceasefire and refrain from any escalation, particularly during this delicate period of ongoing negotiations”.

June 22 (UPI) — The United Nations Human Rights Office reported Monday that the Myanmar military is responsible for at least 702 civilian deaths between August and January.

The United Nations published its report on human rights abuses in Myanmar during conflict from the military’s announcement of elections through the end of the ensuing voting period. The United Nations notes that foreign actors have continued to supply the military with arms and ammunition, potentially facilitating human rights violations.

Of the deaths it says have been credibly verified, 476 were due to airstrikes. Victims included 224 women and 153 children. More than 500 civilians were killed in attacks from jet fighters, drones, paramotors and gyrocopters.

The highest volumes of civilian deaths spiked between two periods: August through September and December through January.

The absence of international assistance has also played a role, the United Nations said. Access to emergency healthcare declined due to military blockades and cuts to foreign aid.

U.N. Human Rights Chief Volker Turk called on the international community to re-engage in support for the people of Myanmar.

“As if the people of Myanmar have not suffered enough at the hands of the military, they have now seemingly been forgotten by those outside the country,” Turk said in a statement. “Funding for localised protection efforts was in many areas the only solace from the suffering caused by constant targeting and indiscriminate attacks by the military. The pullback just compounds the injury.”

Published on
22/06/2026 – 13:32 GMT+2

The German government announced on Monday that it intends to acquire 40% of the defence contractor KNDS, a move designed to bolster European arms production in partnership with its NATO and EU ally France.

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The decision deepens state involvement in a company whose hardware has become central to Europe’s rearmament efforts.

KNDS was created in 2015 through the merger of Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and France’s Nexter. The French state holds a 50% stake, while the other half belongs to the German family behind Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, whose planned exit has opened the door for Berlin to step in.

Based in Amsterdam, the group reported revenue of €4.4 billion last year and employs more than 11,000 people.

The timing reflects a broader scramble across Europe to expand military spending and manufacturing capacity, as governments weigh the continued threat from Russia’s war in Ukraine against growing doubts about the reliability of the US as a security guarantor.

Berlin framed the investment in explicitly strategic terms, saying it would secure lasting influence over a business it considers vital to European security and defence.

The German government added that the stake would reinforce domestic industrial output, technological independence and the safeguarding of key national security interests and technologies.

In a joint statement, Germany and France said they had agreed on the future strategy and governance of KNDS, which they intend to co-own through arrangements aimed at giving both countries equal shareholdings.

Clearing the path to a stock market listing

Neither government specified a timeline or the final level at which their holdings would settle, but they stated the agreement opens the way for a possible flotation of KNDS in the near future.

According to people familiar with the matter cited by the Associated Press, the two states plan to trim their stakes to around 30% within two to three years of any listing, while retaining equal voting rights regardless of the size of each holding.

The two governments cast the deal as a joint commitment to building up Europe’s defence industry and armed forces, and to securing the continent’s strategic independence well into the future.

State participation in the firm was first floated by German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius in 2025 as a way to protect strategic expertise and jobs.

Beyond its tanks, KNDS also manufactures the Puma infantry fighting vehicle and the Boxer and Dingo armoured personnel carriers, equipment which is in growing demand as European armies replenish stocks depleted by years of underinvestment and donations to Ukraine’s defence.

Additional sources • AP

The Chinese strategy employs research and intelligence institutions working to foster closer ties between Iranian national security institutions and the Egyptian military, aiming to undermine the American presence in the Middle East. Prominent among these institutions are the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Center for West Asian and African Studies. These Chinese research centers, which shape China’s relations with countries in the region and the Gulf, include the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), which directs studies related to security and defense issues and facilitates direct dialogue between think tanks in Iran and research centers in Egypt. Another example is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which reports directly to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and works to engineer diplomatic plans that align Egypt’s strategic interests with the objectives of Tehran and resistance movements in the region. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies also rely on a number of People’s Liberation Army-backed space intelligence companies, such as MizarVision and EarthEye. These Chinese companies have provided high-resolution satellite imagery and intelligence data to support operations targeting US bases in the Gulf and the Middle East. These Chinese entities coordinate and plan operations through various mechanisms and initiatives officially launched by China, most notably the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Beijing also uses forums, such as the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to pressure Middle Eastern and Gulf countries to withdraw foreign forces and end US hegemony in the Gulf and the Middle East. This is framed as ending direct interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. Beijing is also seeking to establish permanent overseas bases, most prominently the Djibouti naval base in East Africa, to support its regional alliances and ensure the continuity of global supply lines for Chinese interests and investments within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The relationship between Chinese military and intelligence think tanks and the Egyptian army is highlighted by their shared goal of countering American hegemony and expelling US military bases from the Gulf and the Middle East. China is strengthening its strategic cooperation with the Egyptian army as part of the Djibouti-UAE-Egypt axis, with Beijing relying on Cairo as a key launching pad to secure maritime navigation and reduce American military influence. Beijing is utilizing its strategic institutions and think tanks to provide technological and logistical support to the Egyptian army, aiming to create a regional power capable of maintaining strategic balance in the region against American hegemony and interventions. This escalating security and strategic relationship between the Egyptian and Chinese armies rests on several key pillars, most notably intelligence and military partnership. China aims to train the Egyptian military elite through Egyptian military academies and coordinate threat assessments and mutual monitoring of the military movements of the United States and its allies in the Gulf and the wider region. With the implementation of several joint exercises between the two sides, the Chinese vision crystallized in the (Civilization Eagles maneuvers), which brought together the air forces of China and Egypt. This paves the way for the transfer of military technology and the integration of Chinese systems with Egyptian defenses independent of the West, along with the localization of Chinese military industries in the heart of Cairo. China is negotiating with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to develop local manufacturing capabilities and transfer defense technology. There are also reports of integrating Chinese systems into Egyptian systems to reduce Egypt’s dependence on American-supplied weaponry. Beijing seeks to create a counterweight to American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. China sees Egypt’s refusal to host any American military bases as a cornerstone of its strategy, relying on the Egyptian and Emirati armies to guarantee regional security as an alternative to the traditional American presence in the Gulf and the Middle East.

Chinese research, military, and intelligence think tanks are working to engineer an asymmetric strategic partnership to end American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. Chinese think tanks, military research centers, and intelligence agencies are operating according to a clear strategic vision aimed at building asymmetrical partnerships in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf to reduce American influence and establish a multipolar world order. Beijing provides Tehran with technical and intelligence support to deter Washington, while simultaneously seeking to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt as a pivotal regional power. This strategy aims to diminish American influence and secure China’s vital economic interests. The Chinese strategy in the region rests on several pillars, most notably its strategy toward Iran and its technical and intelligence support for the country. China has secretly supplied Iran with advanced satellite technology from its BeiDou satellite system, bypassing Western and American GPS systems, as well as sophisticated air defense systems. This has significantly enhanced the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ability to monitor and target American military bases in the region and the Gulf.

The objectives of Chinese think tanks, political, strategic, military, and intelligence research centers become apparent here, as they attempt to plan a path to link Iran to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and transform Iranian military pressure into a tool for destabilizing the US bases deployed in the region and the Gulf. The convergence between China and the Egyptian military is highlighted through the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. Beijing is inclined to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt, capitalizing on its political stability and its geographic location controlling vital maritime trade routes, and to transfer advanced Chinese military technology to Egypt. Beijing has revealed its desire to be a major supplier of equipment to the Egyptian army, such as the J-10 aircraft. This aims to increase Egypt’s strategic maneuvering room and reduce the dominance of Western weaponry.

The stability achieved by the Egyptian leadership is a fundamental pillar supporting the comprehensive strategic partnership, as Beijing seeks to secure its economic and military interests with a stable and influential regional power. Therefore, China is investing in the Belt and Road Initiative, for which the Suez Canal is a vital artery in the Middle East. Cooperation extends to the exchange and transfer of military technology, joint military manufacturing, advanced air defense systems, and the evaluation of potential acquisitions of modern Chinese fighter jets. Furthermore, joint air exercises have been conducted, with the Egyptian Armed Forces carrying out their first-ever joint air exercise, dubbed Eagles of Civilization with China, involving multi-role fighter aircraft from both countries, underscoring the deepening defense partnership between them.

In this context, China relies on the Egyptian military within the framework of its strategic and African axis to counter American influence. For China, Egypt represents its strategic gateway to the African continent and a cornerstone in its maneuvers against the US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). In addition to joint military exercises, China and Egypt have conducted joint air force drills, a clear indication of an unprecedented military rapprochement that has drawn close American scrutiny. With China’s move to transfer technology and arms deals to Cairo, it is positioning itself to support the Egyptian army with advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B. This enhances Egypt’s air deterrence capabilities and forms part of strategic military deals aimed at reducing dependence on the United States and its Western allies. On the other hand, China relies on Iran as a deterrent and direct driver, exerting pressure on American bases in the region. Iran represents the spearhead of China’s brinkmanship policy against American military bases in the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, with Tehran threatening to strike them should any regional conflict erupt. In conjunction with the economic and diplomatic alliance between Beijing and Tehran, China uses emerging alliances, such as the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), to establish Iran’s political foothold. It sometimes resorts to mediation policies as a tool to reduce the likelihood of a direct confrontation with Iran, which could harm its commercial interests, such as China’s sponsorship of Pakistani mediation efforts between Iran and the United States to stop the war against Iran and allow the Strait of Hormuz to be opened to global trade and navigation.

China’s major objectives in the Middle East lie in a strategy of attrition against the United States. China uses Iranian actions as a clever pressure tactic to test and deplete American military technology without direct involvement in wars of attrition, while simultaneously attempting to create a new regional order. Here, Chinese intelligence agencies coordinate networks of overlapping interests to push countries toward understandings that transcend the American security umbrella, paving the way for the future withdrawal of foreign military bases. The pillars of China’s strategy for alternative hegemony are based on asymmetric partnerships. Beijing focuses on presenting itself as a reliable economic and technological partner without political conditions or interference in internal affairs, unlike the American model based on conditionality and direct military alliances. With China’s emphasis on the economy as a gateway to security, it utilizes the Belt and Road Initiative and its massive investments in infrastructure and ports, such as the Khalifa Port in the UAE and the Port of Duqm in Oman, to solidify its strategic presence and transform economic dependence into long-term geopolitical influence. With Beijing’s use of security diplomacy and mediation, Chinese decision-making centers have adopted a common security approach and offered political mediation, such as sponsoring the Saudi-Iranian agreement, to solidify Beijing’s role as an international peacemaker and portray the United States as a destabilizing force through the militarization of the region. This is coupled with China’s technological and intelligence penetration of the region and the Gulf, where Chinese partnerships focus on transferring 5G technologies, artificial intelligence, and space cooperation with Gulf states. This grants Beijing intelligence-gathering capabilities and allows it to connect the region’s vital systems to the Chinese technological infrastructure. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies are planning to cautiously fill the void, as China avoids direct military confrontation with Washington in the region and prefers to capitalize on the Gulf states’ desire to diversify their partnerships and hedge against the gradual decline of American interest in the Middle East.

Accordingly, we analyze that China’s military strategy in the Middle East and Africa relies on building defense partnerships with diverse objectives. It utilizes the Egyptian army as a pivotal regional power to bolster its influence and counterbalance the American presence through advanced training cooperation while simultaneously leveraging its relationship with Iran to exert pressure on American bases, particularly in the Gulf, and secure its oil interests all within a comprehensive policy aimed at dismantling American hegemony in the region.

United States President Donald Trump has pledged there will be no tolls for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, unless they are collected by his own country.

Trump’s statement, made in a Saturday afternoon post on Truth Social, is the latest sign that a recently signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) may be unravelling.

“There will be NO TOLLS in the Hormuz Strait for 60 days during the Cease Fire Period, and there will be NO TOLLS after the 60 day period has expired,” Trump wrote, “unless they are imposed by and for the United States of America.”

Since the US and Israel launched a war against Iran on February 28, Iran has successfully used the Strait of Hormuz as a pressure point, closing the strategic waterway to traffic.

But under the terms of Wednesday’s ceasefire memorandum, the strait is supposed to reopen for an interim period of 60 days. During that time, Iran is barred from charging vessels for passage.

On Saturday, however, Iran’s joint military command said it had closed the Strait of Hormuz, citing a “clear breach” of the memorandum’s commitments.

US Central Command (CENTCOM), the agency that oversees military operations in the region, denied that report and maintained that the traffic continues to flow through the waterway.

The Strait of Hormuz has long been a flashpoint in the conflict between the US and Iran. Nearly 20 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas is transported through the strait, as well as about 30 percent of the global fertiliser trade.

Closure of the strait has caused global fuel costs to soar and has tested agricultural sectors across the world.

Trump had responded to Iran’s chokehold over the strait by imposing a US naval blockade on Iran’s ports in the region.

But that naval blockade was lifted under the terms of Wednesday’s memorandum. The deal also paused fighting on all fronts in the regional conflict, including in Lebanon.

The memorandum, though, was not intended as a long-term deal. It serves as a launching point for negotiations on key issues, including the future of Iran’s nuclear programme.

Several points of divergence also went unaddressed in the memorandum. Nowhere does the memo say that future tolls cannot be collected from the strait after the 60-day period expires.

Before the war, there was no charge for passage through the strait. Trump himself said in an interview with The New York Times that the waterway should remain “permanently toll-free”.

But he appeared to reverse course in Saturday’s post, once again floating the possibility that the US could extract tolls in the strait, while barring Iran from doing so.

No fees should be levied, Trump wrote, “unless they are imposed by and for the United States of America, should the deal not be completed”.

He explained that such a charge would compensate the US “for services rendered as the Guardian Angel to the countries of the Middle East for purposes of both past, present, and future reimbursement of costs”.

Trump used similar language in his New York Times interview earlier this week, floating the US becoming “the guardian of the Middle East” in exchange for 20 percent of its revenue.

Saturday’s post is not the first time Trump has mused about the US imposing tolls in the strait, either.

In April, for instance, he discussed the idea with reporters, saying, “What about us charging tolls? I’d rather do that than let them have them. Why shouldn’t we? We’re the winner. We won.”

There has been no indication that Trump’s plans have been officially presented to countries in the region, many of whom have struck a careful balance in their dealings with both the US and Iran during the war.

Iranian officials, meanwhile, have repeatedly said they will not rule out imposing tolls in the strait, framing the issue as a matter of sovereignty and regional negotiation. The strait sits between Iran and Oman.

Further discussions are expected on the matter in the coming weeks.

But such negotiations have been thrown into jeopardy amid ongoing Israeli military operations in Lebanon, which threaten to violate Wednesday’s ceasefire memorandum.

Iran claimed that Saturday’s closure of the strait was a result of new Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon, which killed dozens of people after the ceasefire was announced.

Iranian officials have also said that any upcoming talks should focus on proper implementation of the initial memorandum, and that the 60-day negotiating period stipulated in Wednesday’s deal would begin after that was settled.

Pakistan, a top mediator between the US and Iran, has said that follow-up talks are set to begin in Switzerland on Sunday.

Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs has confirmed that an Iranian delegation, led by parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, has already arrived for the negotiations.

On the US side, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Vice President JD Vance are expected to attend.

Vance departed for Switzerland late Saturday.

June 18 (UPI) — The U.S. military on Thursday lifted naval blockades in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, with reports showing that shipping vessels have departed the region through the Strait of Hormuz.

U.S. Central Command said in a series of posts on X that, following direction from President Donald Trump, blockades on maritime traffic along the coasts of Iran have ended.

Centcom noted, however, that the U.S. Navy will stay in the “general area” to be sure that “all aspects” of the peace agreement signed by the United States and Iran “are adhered to, obeyed and in full force and effect.”

Trump signed the agreement Wednesday at the Palace of Versailles in France after the G7 Summit wrapped up, which included among its 14 points reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital shipping route for the region and much of the world.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian had signed the deal earlier in the day.

“American forces are not impeding the transit of vessels to or from Iranian ports,” Centcom said in one of the posts on X on Thursday.

“All U.S. military blockade efforts have ceased,” it said.

At least 12 energy tankers transited the Strait on Thursday, reopening a sailing route through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply is shipped around the globe, CNBC and the New York Post reported.

Among the vessels that transited the Strait were three Saudi Arabian supertankers, which together are carrying six million barrels of crude oil and are the kingdom’s first tankers to sail the shipping route since before the three-month-long U.S.-Iran war launched in February.

Vice President JD Vance also told reporters that more than 12 million barrels of oil had shipped through the Strait overnight Wednesday after the deal had been signed.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has signed a US-Iran memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war between the two countries. US President Donald Trump and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian signed on Wednesday.

President Donald Trump says it’s ‘unfair’ for Iran to lack ballistic missiles if other regional countries have them. Trump is at the G7 in France where the US-Iran deal has taken centre stage.

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich says Israel has transferred authority over Hebron to the army. It includes control of the key holy site, Cave of the Patriarchs. Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh explains.

FIFA President Gianni Infantino praised Iran’s players during a World Cup dressing room visit after the team’s 2-2 draw with New Zealand on Monday.

British armed forces intercepted an oil tanker believed to be part of Russia’s sanctioned shadow fleet. The oil tanker ‘SMYRTOS’ was taken in an first-ever operation by the British military in the English Channel.

United States President Donald Trump has said an initial agreement to end the US-Israeli war with Iran is “scheduled to get signed tomorrow”.

But that announcement, made on Trump’s Truth Social account on Saturday, contradicts an earlier statement by Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei.

In remarks carried by Iran’s IRNA news agency, Baghaei said a memorandum of understanding would not be signed on Sunday and that negotiators are not planning to travel immediately to Geneva, Switzerland, in preparation for such an event.

According to Baghaei, a signing could happen “in the coming days”.

Hours later, Trump wrote, “The Deal is scheduled to get signed tomorrow, and immediately after it is signed, the Hormuz Strait is OPEN TO ALL.” Sunday marks Trump’s 80th birthday.

In recent days, Iran and the US have repeatedly contradicted each other when describing the details of the anticipated agreement, even as both sides have broadly signalled that a deal was closer than ever before.

Still, no terms have been officially released, with US and Iranian officials on Friday stressing that the agreement had not been finalised.

Beyond opening the Strait of Hormuz, Trump said in Saturday’s post that the agreement would be a “A WALL TO NO NUCLEAR WEAPON!” and that “no money would exchange hands”.

Trump also maintained that “at the appropriate time, when all is calm, we will go in and get the Nuclear Dust”, referring to Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium.

But speaking on Iran’s Press TV on Friday, Iranian ⁠⁠Foreign ⁠⁠Minister Abbas Araghchi said the initial memorandum of understanding would only be a launch point for negotiations about the future of Iran’s nuclear programme.

He added that the signing would result in an immediate pause in fighting, but that Iran and Oman would continue to administer the Strait of Hormuz.

The issue of lifting foreign sanctions against Iran and unfreezing the country’s assets would be discussed following the signing of the memorandum of understanding, Araghchi said.

From threats to diplomacy

The latest flurry of diplomacy came after the US and Iran traded strikes for two days this week, threatening to end a pause in fighting that has persisted since April 8.

The US and Israel launched the war on Iran on February 28, amid ongoing indirect talks on the future of Iran’s nuclear programme.

The US and Israel had also launched a 12-day war on Iran in 2025, during another round of nuclear talks.

Iranian officials have said that deep distrust towards the US has slowed the progress towards creating a lasting agreement to bring the current war to an end.

Trump, meanwhile, has repeatedly pledged to reach a deal that would surpass the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), struck under his Democratic rival, former President Barack Obama.

That agreement, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew in 2018, saw Tehran agree to limit its nuclear programme and allow for international inspections in exchange for sanctions relief.

For years, Iran has maintained that it is building a nuclear programme for civilian use only and is not seeking a nuclear weapon.

In his post on Truth Social, Trump again pledged that any deal reached would be more stringent than the JCPOA.

“Our relationship with Iran is a much different and better one than previous Administrations have had,” he said.

“Hopefully, this process will all work out quickly, easily, and smoothly,” he added.

“If it doesn’t, we have the ultimate alternative, hopefully never to be used again!” he wrote, without elaborating on what his threat meant.

Israel has continued to attack Lebanon, despite Iran saying it was included in a potential memorandum of understanding with the US. Fresh forced displacement orders were issued on Saturday morning, following Israeli bombardment throughout Friday night on towns and villages in the south.

WASHINGTON — President Trump said Friday that a “swift and lethal kinetic” U.S. strike has killed Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, whom he called “the infamous leader” of the Tren de Aragua gang.

Tren de Aragua has been labeled by the United States as a terrorist organization. Guerrero Flores was charged in a New York federal court with racketeering conspiracy and other crimes, including lending support to terrorists in crimes that stretched more than a decade, authorities announced in December.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth posted on X that the strike occurred earlier in the week on a Tren de Aragua compound in Venezuela.

U.S. Atty. Jay Clayton alleged at the time that the gang is responsible for countless acts of violence, extortion and drug trafficking in North America, South America and Europe. Trump nominated Clayton on Thursday to be director of national intelligence.

The U.S. State Department had offered rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to Guerrero Flores’ arrest.

In a post on his social media site, Trump wrote, “Tren de Aragua terrorists no longer have safe haven in Venezuela or anywhere else and, under my leadership, we will find these vicious murderers and drug lords anytime, anyplace, and send them to the depths of hell where they belong.” Trump’s post referred to Guerrero Flores by his alias, Niño Guerrero.

Hegseth said, “The operation underscores the shared U.S. and Venezuelan commitment to take the fight to narco-terrorists and deny them any safe haven in our hemisphere.”

Venezuela’s ministry of communications did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the operation.

Trump has taken a series of extraordinary actions against the gang, including a series of strikes on small boats his administration has accused of smuggling drugs to the U.S.. At least 207 people have been killed in boat strikes by the U.S. military in the eastern Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea since the Trump administration began the campaign in early September.

Independent investigations, by the Associated Press and others, have raised questions about the boat passengers’ alleged connection to drug trafficking. And, in any case, many legal experts say the boat attacks amount to extrajudicial killings in violation of international law.

Trump and administration officials have consistently blamed Tren de Aragua for being at the root of the violence and illicit drug dealing that plague some U.S. cities. The president spent months repeating the claim — contradicted by a declassified U.S. intelligence assessment — that Tren de Aragua had operated under Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s control. The U.S. invaded Venezuela and seized Maduro in January to face U.S. drug charges.

Tren de Aragua originated more than a decade ago at an infamously lawless prison in Venezuela’s central state of Aragua. The gang has expanded in recent years as millions of Venezuelans migrated to other Latin American countries or the U.S. in search of better living conditions.

Guerrero Flores returned to the prison in Aragua on murder and other convictions in 2013, when Venezuela’s crisis began and corruption, mismanagement and a drop in crude prices wrecked the oil-dependent economy. Guerrero Flores and a few other inmates saw a profitable opportunity as the government neglected prisons.

They assumed control and administration of the prison, establishing a system that controlled the entire inmate population through force and extortion. Over time, they transformed the lockup into a sort of city that included a zoo, baseball field, casino and restaurants. Guerrero Flores had his own lavish suite.

The size of the gang is unclear. Countries with large populations of Venezuelan migrants, including Peru and Colombia, have accused the group of being behind a spree of violence in the region. Still, unlike other criminal organizations from Colombia, Brazil and Central America, Tren de Aragua has no large-scale involvement in smuggling cocaine across international borders, according to InSight Crime, a think tank that tracks crime across Latin America.

In Venezuela, gang leaders have long been known to participate in various illegal activities, including illicit gold mining.

Weissert writes for the Associated Press. AP writer Regina Garcia Cano in Mexico City contributed to this report.

As Washington and Tehran move towards a long-term ceasefire agreement, Gulf states will likely look for new long-term security solutions when a war in their region – which they did not start – finally ends.

It comes as United States President Donald Trump cancelled new strikes on Iran saying that a deal with Tehran was imminent, and that a “time” and “place” for signing would soon be announced.

In Tehran, officials appeared more cautious with one senior Iranian official telling Al Jazeera that the government was still reviewing a proposed Memorandum of Understanding with Washington.

Subsequent comments by Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif point to a deal being made, and what follows in the coming days could have important implications for collective regional security.

Attacks on the Gulf

The United States operates military facilities in at least 19 locations across the MENA region, including permanent bases in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Between 40,000 and 50,000 US troops were stationed across the region before the war on Iran started.

This US-Gulf nexus appeared to insulate states from conflicts engulfing other parts of the region, but over the past four months, Gulf states hosting US military facilities have been targeted by Iran.

“If there is a way to describe the prevailing security model in the region since the 1980s, the concept of security partnerships best encapsulates it,” said Mahjoub Al-Zuwairi, an academic and expert on Middle East politics.

“The countries of the region have chosen to align their security with broad international alliances. For decades, this model has provided a reasonable deterrent and logistical and intelligence depth that is difficult to replace.”

A security umbrella with holes

The war on Iran has exposed a paradox – while Iranian officials have repeatedly referred to their Gulf neighbours as “brothers”, they have also repeatedly targeted them during the war.

Despite the protestations of Gulf states that no attacks on Iran were launched from their soil, they have been repeatedly targeted.

At least 28 people have been killed across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in suspected Iranian drone and rocket attacks, since the US and Israel launched their offensive on Iran on 28 February. This has led to questions about the US-Gulf security arrangement.

“Just the war itself has pierced that sense of security, the US security umbrella is moribund at worst, or ineffective at best,” Simon Mabon, professor of international relations at Lancaster University, told Al Jazeera.

“They’ve long relied on it for their own security. Yet the presence of US forces on their territory directly meant they became targets. They can’t escape their geography [and] despite the tensions, despite the hostilities, despite the attacks, Iran isn’t going away. They have to find a way of dealing with this reality.”

The economic cost of war

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has proven be a setback for some Gulf states working to diversify their energy-reliant economies towards tourism, services and finance, but not all have been affected equally.

Saudi Arabia was able to redirect some oil exports through its East-West pipeline to the Red Sea, while Oman – whose main ports are outside the Strait of Hormuz – has also benefited from rising energy prices.

The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar have been more heavily affected due to their dependence on the waterway for their energy exports, but the war has encouraged new thinking on long-standing security and economic arrangements.

“There are new pipelines being set up, but the capacity of these alternatives is infinitely smaller than the Strait itself,” said Mabon. “It will take enormous investment and years of development before they can come close to replacing it.”

Moving closer to Iran?

One possible lesson from the conflict is that Gulf states may seek engagement with Iran rather than confrontation, something that Gulf states had already made some groundwork on before the US-Israel war began.

The UAE restored diplomatic ties with Tehran in 2022, and a year later, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to normalise relations in a deal brokered by China.

Al-Zuwairi says that the conflict could revive plans for MENA-led regional security arrangements, as envisioned in the 2019 Hormuz Peace Initiative, which proposed a Gulf security framework involving Iran, Iraq and the six GCC states.

But the distrust fostered since then – notably Tehran’s strikes on its Gulf neighbours – would make such a formation unlikely in the near future. 

“The recent war has opened the door wide to reconsidering the Gulf security system with its neighbours,” Al-Zuwairi said.

“How can Tehran propose a non-aggression pact while raining missiles on neighbouring cities? The initiative appears theoretically sound but practically bankrupt unless Iranian behaviour changes.”

Looking beyond Washington?

The solution for the Gulf could be a hybrid arrangement where ties with Washington are maintained, but other regional and domestic options are explored, including greater investment in local defence industries.

A possible blueprint for this could be the mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last September, stating that an attack on one country would be considered an attack on both.

Yet previous instances when Gulf states felt abandoned by the US have led to divergent responses, with the UAE and Bahrain deepening ties with Israel, but a new paradigm means that a more collective action to the issue of security might be considered.

“The war has demonstrated that every guarantor, no matter how many banners it flies, primarily protects its own interests,” said Al-Zuwairi.

“The region ends up paying the price for a war it did not choose … The security of the Gulf will not be created in Washington … It will be created when Gulf countries recognise that they must build it themselves, because when fires start, it is always those closest to the flames who pay the price.”

France and Germany have announced this week that they are ditching a landmark project to jointly develop a sixth-generation fighter jet.

French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed on Monday that the project is being terminated, in what is being seen as a major blow to efforts to boost defence cooperation between European Union states, a key issue amid uncertainty cast by United States President Donald Trump over the readiness of the US to help defend its NATO allies.

Trump’s disdain for Europe’s reliance on the US has been building for years.

Since 2019, the US president has been flirting with the idea of obtaining Greenland.

His remarks about his desire for the island, a self-governing territory which is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, built to a crescendo at the start of this year, with European leaders signalling their displeasure with the idea and Trump even threatening additional trade tariffs on those countries standing in his way.

Both Denmark and Greenland have repeatedly stated that the island is not for sale.

At one point, before Trump backed down after agreeing to a “framework of a future deal” on Greenland during a January meeting with NATO’s Mark Rutte in Davos, it seemed as if the US might even try to take the island by force – a notion that would have been inconceivable before the era of Donald Trump.

The threat of military action set off alarm bells in European capitals.

In addition to all this, Trump has withdrawn much of the US’s support for Ukraine and has consistently berated his European NATO partners for not spending enough on their own defence for years, outright urging them to reduce their reliance on the US for military protection.

More recently, Europe’s refusal to join the US-Israeli war on Iran, which began with strikes on Tehran on February 28, has further irked the US president and deepened concerns that a widening transatlantic rift could weaken the continent’s security and embolden Russia.

Until this week, a counterweight to these burgeoning concerns was in hand – the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, a landmark pact to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet involving France, Germany and Spain.

But disagreements over whether France’s Dassault Aviation, or Airbus, which also represents Germany and Spain, should take the lead on the project have ultimately led to its collapse.

Analysts, however, say all hope is not lost: despite the dissolution of the bellwether venture, Europeans can indeed become strategically autonomous, they say – but the road there runs through shared military integration, rather than shared political aspiration.

The FCAS hoopla does “highlight the limitation of Europe’s defence industrial landscape, where national needs sometimes clash with the broader goal of defence integration”, Giuseppe Spatafora, a policy analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, told Al Jazeera.

“But we also shouldn’t overestimate its impact.”

Setback, not collapse

According to Jamie Shea, a retired NATO official and associate fellow with the International Security Programme at Chatham House, FCAS’s dissolution is certainly a setback – but does not spell the collapse of European defence integration in its entirety.

“It was the type of high-tech, innovative and future-oriented programme that Europeans need to be able to achieve successfully if they are to become strategically autonomous and break their dependence on the US for major weapons systems,” Shea told Al Jazeera.

It had been hoped that FCAS would move the needle forward, particularly in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI), space, data fusion, and the manned and autonomous systems interface space, he said.

Others would have additionally joined the project as it gained momentum, as Spain did, he added, potentially creating a domino effect in next-generation defence technologies across the continent.

But, crucially, Spatafora said, the project dates back to 2017 – a different era, before Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine and before Trump’s return to the White House.

“Nowadays, the project might be designed differently to reflect the scenario,” he said.

“But it doesn’t affect the broader trend in Europe towards reducing dependencies on US military systems and strengthening its own defence capabilities.”

France and Germany will continue with some components of FCAS, such as its “combat cloud” feature, which will increase Europe’s cyber command-and-control capabilities, said Spatafora.

Airbus and a number of other German companies are also seeking to continue the programme in other areas, particularly software architecture and drone technology, Shea said.

“So there may be benefits for European defence and its defence technology base even if a manned fighter aircraft is not built,” said Shea.

Furthermore, there are “scores” of other joint defence projects being launched in Europe at the moment, even if they are not quite as ambitious as FCAS, he added.

Guntram Wolff, a senior fellow at the European think tank Bruegel, similarly urged against alarmism.

“I would not interpret this decision overly negatively,” Wolff told Al Jazeera.

“FCAS was a very complicated project and its military relevance may well be overstated at a moment of increasing importance of cheap autonomous systems. In part, the decision also reflects a reassessment of whether the high cost was really warranted.”

Europe, meanwhile, has other strengths it can build on, the analysts said.

The continent is strong in shipbuilding, submarines, short-range missiles and air defence – with systems like the German IRIS-T and the French-Italian SAMP/T – and has demonstrated it can build capable fighter jets, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, Tornado and Gripen programmes have shown, Shea said.

Lessons and challenges

Europe’s main problem is underinvestment and the difficulty it has in scaling up to the level of mass production that modern warfare demands, said Shea.

This issue was brought into sharp focus this week when the UK’s secretary of state for defence dramatically resigned from government over defence funding.

He simply cannot keep the country safe on what he has been given to spend, he said. In his resignation letter to the prime minister, he wrote: “You have been unable and the Treasury has been unwilling to commit the resources that the nation needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats,” he wrote.

Ultimately, European nations are going to have to come together if they have any hope of matching US military might in the future, analysts say.

“It is the challenge of integrating all systems and all domains into a single battlefield management space where the US is in advance of the Europeans,” Shea said.

“Drones, which Russia and Ukraine are producing in the millions, are a case in point. Even the US suffers from weapons shortages as we have seen in the Iran war,” the former NATO official added.

Spatafora echoed the idea that the Russia-Ukraine war has lessons to offer the rest of Europe.

“The lesson of the war in Ukraine is that, in order to deter and defend itself properly, Europe needs cheap, mass-produced capabilities,” he said.

FCAS was about a very expensive capability, “so it was not really the key need for Europe’s deterrence today”, the analyst said.

The more pressing question that FCAS raises is how European nations will coordinate large projects which single countries cannot produce on their own and which could clash with the interests of numerous national industries. This is the conundrum which will likely shape the design of future EU instruments to support cooperative defence projects, said Spatafora.

Another challenge facing the continent is that major platforms like aircraft, ships or land warfare vehicles can take decades to develop, and contracts signed today will yield equipment that will not be on the battlefield before 2040, Shea said.

Europe will need to upgrade its current capabilities – recent upgrades to the Eurofighter jet and the Leopard tank are examples he cited – and look for gap-fillers elsewhere.

Spatafora argues that the FCAS collapse should not push European countries back towards reliance on American systems – or at least not more than they already have.

“The Trump administration’s approach and the depletion of stock after the Iran war have significantly reduced the reliability of US supplies,” he said.

The reliability of US guarantees, he added, depends on other assets – long-range missiles, forward-deployed troops, command-and-control infrastructure – “rather than on a next-generation fighter jet”, the analyst added.

‘Military requirements’ over ‘political ambition’

The FCAS failure is certainly good news for Russia, Shea said, “and also for the US, which will hope to sell Europe even more F-35s and maintain Europe’s traditional dependency on US military equipment”.

A rebound from the collapsed project, therefore, he argued, is necessary. But that is already in the works, analysts say, as Europe is already turning away from US dependability.

They point to the high likelihood of renewed interest in the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) for a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet, in European Space Agency military space capabilities, and in EU defence financing mechanisms like the Security Action for Europe (SAFE).

Joint ventures with Ukraine, which, under fire from Russia for four years, has mastered mass production of drone technology and AI, should also help keep Europe up to speed in key areas, Shea added.

“The US has proven to be unreliable, or simply unable to remain committed to Europe, and the defence budgets are growing,” Spatfora said.

Washington will continue to remain relevant for certain capabilities – nuclear deterrence above all – but over time, European countries will seek to develop more and more on their own.

The ultimate lesson of FCAS, however, Shea argued, is that defence integration “has to be driven by military requirements rather than political ambition”.

Cooperation between France and Germany has always been difficult, he said – they have large defence companies “that do not want to play second fiddle to the other”, he said.

A more promising model, he said, is the joint UK-Norway agreement to produce a new destroyer-class warship, with BAE Systems as the main contractor and smaller Norwegian companies participating.

“Both countries operate in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea and share exactly the same concept of what the ship should be,” explained Shea.

“So it is this model of bottom-up, natural cooperation rather than top-down political cooperation that Europe needs to pursue.”