Middle

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received precisely the kind of political support he had hoped for. The SCO condemned the military attacks against Iran, described them as violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

But the organisation did not offer to defend Iran. That distinction between political solidarity and collective defence is important. It tells us something not only about the Iranian experience with the SCO, but about the international order that is emerging around it.

For years, discussions about multipolarity have often suggested that the US-led international system would gradually be challenged by an alternative bloc centred around China, Russia and organisations such as BRICS and the SCO. From the perspective of middle powers, joining both institutions seemed to fit neatly into this transformation. Integration into non-Western organisations was supposed to make them less vulnerable to Western isolation and pressure.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has made clear that none of these alternative relationships can produce a security guarantee comparable to those provided by formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers. It is that the emerging multipolar order may work differently from what many expected.

Rather than replacing one alliance system with another, it is producing an increasingly dense network of overlapping partnerships in which states gain diplomatic and economic options without necessarily acquiring new security guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging order: more room for manoeuvre, but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye provides a particularly revealing example. It has been a member of NATO for more than seven decades and remains embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet Ankara has increasingly demonstrated that alliance membership does not require automatic political alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained relations with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner. At the same time, its differences with the US and Israel over the future regional order in the Middle East have become increasingly visible.

This does not mean Turkiye is abandoning NATO or moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led bloc. Quite the opposite. Ankara’s strategy depends precisely on avoiding such a binary choice. Its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO could not replicate. Its relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states and other regional actors, meanwhile, expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil represents another good example. Unlike Turkiye, Brazil is not bound to the US through a formal military alliance. But it has traditionally operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected considerable political alignment from regional governments.

Brazil’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), together with its positions on the Iran war and other recent international crises, reflects its reluctance to accept that regional proximity should translate into automatic strategic alignment.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching sides. Its participation in BRICS, its extensive economic relationship with China and its calls for reform of the international system coexist with important political and economic relations with the US and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing, but to preserve the ability to cooperate with both, and disagree with either.

This may be one of the most consequential opportunities that multipolarity offers middle powers. The rise of alternative centres of economic and political influence reduces the cost of saying no. For decades, weaker states often confronted a difficult choice when facing pressure from a dominant power: comply, resist and risk isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions complicates that calculation. A government that disagrees with Washington may deepen relations with Beijing without becoming a Chinese ally. A state dependent on China economically may strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington. Membership in BRICS does not prevent cooperation with Western institutions, just as membership in a US-led security framework does not necessarily preclude engagement with China or Russia.

India has made this logic almost an organising principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi participates in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while simultaneously belonging to both BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stressed to Pezeshkian the importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of this diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, continue to depend heavily on their relationships with the US for security, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India and other Asian powers and participating in new regional and international arrangements.

None appears eager to replace Washington with Beijing. They want relationships with both. This suggests that the most significant consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc to which they can attach themselves. It may be the declining necessity of attaching themselves exclusively to any bloc at all.

But greater autonomy comes with a cost. The same flexible arrangements that allow states to avoid choosing sides also provide fewer guarantees when crises become existential. BRICS does not have an Article 5. Neither does the SCO, which explicitly defines itself as a non-military organisation.

Strategic partnerships can provide weapons, investment, diplomatic backing and political support without obligating partners to go to war for one another.

The emerging international system is therefore unlikely to resemble a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or even a confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is not disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security relationships remain indispensable across much of Asia and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside it is another layer, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships and transactional relationships.

Multipolarity, in other words, may not require states to choose a new camp. That gives middle and smaller powers greater agency. But it also places greater responsibility for their own security upon them. The world they are entering may offer more partners, more bargaining power and more freedom to say no. What it may offer less frequently is certainty about who will say yes when they ask for protection.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Last week, a prominent Saudi Sheikh, Mohammed Al-Issa, visited the Auschwitz concentration camp in Poland to commemorate the 75th anniversary of its liberation, which signalled the end of the Nazi Holocaust. Although dozens of Muslim scholars have visited the site, where about one million Jews were killed during World War Two, according to the Auschwitz Memorial Centre’s press office, Al-Issa is the most senior Muslim religious leader to do so.

Visiting Auschwitz is not a problem for a Muslim; Islam orders Muslims to reject unjustified killing of any human being, no matter what their faith is. Al-Issa is a senior ally of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), who apparently cares little for the sanctity of human life, though, and the visit to Auschwitz has very definite political connotations beyond any Islamic context.

By sending Al-Issa to the camp, Bin Salman wanted to show his support for Israel, which exploits the Holocaust for geopolitical colonial purposes. “The Israeli government decided that it alone was permitted to mark the 75th anniversary of the Allied liberation of Auschwitz [in modern day Poland] in 1945,” wrote journalist Richard Silverstein recently when he commented on the gathering of world leaders in Jerusalem for Benjamin Netanyahu’s Holocaust event.

READ: Next up, a Saudi embassy in Jerusalem 

Bin Salman uses Al Issa for such purposes, as if to demonstrate his own Zionist credentials. For example, the head of the Makkah-based Muslim World League is leading rapprochement efforts with Evangelical Christians who are, in the US at least, firm Zionists in their backing for the state of Israel. Al-Issa has called for a Muslim-Christian-Jewish interfaith delegation to travel to Jerusalem in what would, in effect, be a Zionist troika.

Zionism is not a religion, and there are many non-Jewish Zionists who desire or support the establishment of a Jewish state in occupied Palestine. The definition of Zionism does not mention the religion of its supporters, and Israeli writer Sheri Oz, is just one author who insists that non-Jews can be Zionists.

Mohammad Bin Salman and Netanyahu – Cartoon [Tasnimnews.com/Wikipedia]

We should not be shocked, therefore, to see a Zionist Muslim leader in these trying times. It is reasonable to say that Bin Salman’s grandfather and father were Zionists, as close friends of Zionist leaders. Logic suggests that Bin Salman comes from a Zionist dynasty.

This has been evident from his close relationship with Zionists and positive approaches to the Israeli occupation and establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, calling it “[the Jews’] ancestral homeland”. This means that he has no issue with the ethnic cleansing of almost 800,000 Palestinians in 1948, during which thousands were killed and their homes demolished in order to establish the Zionist state of Israel.

“The ‘Jewish state’ claim is how Zionism has tried to mask its intrinsic Apartheid, under the veil of a supposed ‘self-determination of the Jewish people’,” wrote Israeli blogger Jonathan Ofir in Mondoweiss in 2018, “and for the Palestinians it has meant their dispossession.”

As the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Bin Salman has imprisoned dozens of Palestinians, including representatives of Hamas. In doing so he is serving Israel’s interests. Moreover, he has blamed the Palestinians for not making peace with the occupation state. Bin Salman “excoriated the Palestinians for missing key opportunities,” wrote Danial Benjamin in Moment magazine. He pointed out that the prince’s father, King Salman, has played the role of counterweight by saying that Saudi Arabia “permanently stands by Palestine and its people’s right to an independent state with occupied East Jerusalem as its capital.”

UN expert: Saudi crown prince behind hack on Amazon CEO 

Israeli journalist Barak Ravid of Israel’s Channel 13 News reported Bin Salman as saying: “In the last several decades the Palestinian leadership has missed one opportunity after the other and rejected all the peace proposals it was given. It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiations table or shut up and stop complaining.” This is reminiscent of the words of the late Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, one of the Zionist founders of Israel, that the Palestinians “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”

Bin Salman’s Zionism is also very clear in his bold support for US President Donald Trump’s deal of the century, which achieves Zionist goals in Palestine at the expense of Palestinian rights. He participated in the Bahrain conference, the forum where the economic side of the US deal was announced, where he gave “cover to several other Arab countries to attend the event and infuriated the Palestinians.”

US President Donald Trump looks over at Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman al-Saud as they line up for the family photo during the opening day of Argentina G20 Leaders’ Summit 2018 at Costa Salguero on 30 November 2018 in Buenos Aires, Argentina [Daniel Jayo/Getty Images]

While discussing the issue of the current Saudi support for Israeli policies and practices in Palestine with a credible Palestinian official last week, he told me that the Palestinians had contacted the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to ask him not to relocate his country’s embassy to Jerusalem. “The Saudis have been putting pressure on us in order to relocate our embassy to Jerusalem,” replied the Brazilian leader. What more evidence of Mohammad Bin Salman’s Zionism do we need?

The founder of Friends of Zion Museum is American Evangelical Christian Mike Evans. He said, after visiting a number of the Gulf States, that, “The leaders [there] are more pro-Israel than a lot of Jews.” This was a specific reference to Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, and his counterpart in the UAE, Mohammed Bin Zayed.

“All versions of Zionism lead to the same reactionary end of unbridled expansionism and continued settler colonial genocide of [the] Palestinian people,” Israeli-American writer and photographer Yoav Litvin wrote for Al Jazeera. We may well see an Israeli Embassy opened in Riyadh in the near future, and a Saudi Embassy in Tel Aviv or, more likely, Jerusalem. Is Mohammad Bin Salman a Zionist? There’s no doubt about it.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

George Orwell’s dystopian foresight could easily find new expressions in the ongoing Israeli wars of genocide in Gaza and Lebanon. Much like “war is peace”, the Biden administration and the European Union have contributed to creating phrases such as “aggression is self-defence,” “murder is collateral damage”, “safe areas are death traps” and “humanitarian aid is a starvation diet.”

After enduring a full year of Israeli terror, extreme torment and military occupation, fear never conquered Gazans. Despite the complete Israeli blockade – abetted with the help of the Egyptian regime – and the stark imbalance in military power, Gaza’s collective resistance, by all means necessary, remained steadfast and resilient.

Notwithstanding the above, Benjamin Netanyahu has not succeeded in achieving any of his declared objectives. For instance, less than seven per cent of the freed Israeli captives were recovered by force. Perhaps because the Israeli prime minister’s undeclared Zionist objectives, such as land grabs in the West Bank under the shadow of the Gaza genocide, took precedence over pursuing a proven venue for the release of Israeli prisoners.

Netanyahu’s war success can be only measured by Israel’s scale of vengeance, as the toll of the murdered and injured has reached 150,000. Gaza has been turned into a living hell. A war that pervasively and systematically diminished Gaza’s economic capacity, following an 18-year blockade that crippled the economy and forced upon it an ever-increasing sense of dependency.

Yet, Israel failed to bring any part of Gaza into submission. As a result, several Israeli generals, led by former national security adviser Israeli Maj-General Giora Eiland, contrived a new approach, the “General’s Plan”, to ethnically cleanse northern Gaza.

The General’s Plan is not exclusively a military strategy but rather an orchestrated noncombatant action, euphemistically termed to mask its true intention: genocide and ethnic cleansing through starvation. It calls first for the complete isolation of northern Gaza from the rest of the Gaza Strip. Second: compartmentalise northern Gaza into separate quarters and declare each section a war zone, forcing civilians to leave or become legitimate military targets.

The initial phase, which began in early October, blocked aid trucks from reaching the north and then segregated the Jabalia camp from its surroundings. In other words, genocide by attrition, one quarter at a time, in a slow motion.

READ: Israel is playing even more dirty to force people out of Jabalia

As part of the General’s Starvation Plan, Israel bombed the only UN distribution center in Jabalia camp on Monday, murdering ten civilians queuing to receive food aid. Since last October, around 400,000 civilians remain in northern Gaza out of the original 1.2 million. Many refuse to evacuate despite the unbearable conditions. They know from historical experience that evacuation is an Israeli alias for ethnic cleansing. Once they leave, they may never return, as happened in 1948. They also saw what happened to those who evacuated, many were killed as they “moved south”, while others were murdered in the Israeli death traps, otherwise known as designated “safe areas.”

The Biden administration has been whitewashing Israeli use of starvation as a method of warfare since 9 October, 2023 when the Israeli minister of war declared “no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed.” However, on Tuesday, a little over a year after the minister’s declaration, the American secretaries of state and defence sent Israeli officials a letter giving them another grace period of 30 days to allow food aid into north Gaza or risk a restriction of US military assistance to Israel.

The new warning feels like a classic case of a déjà vu. In April 2024, the Biden administration issued a similar warning to Israel ahead of a report that was being prepared by American officials examining Israel’s violation of the Leahy Law, particularly subsection 6201(a). The law stipulates that the US should not provide assistance to any country that “prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.”

Following that warning, US government agencies and officials concluded that Israel was blocking American humanitarian aid to Gaza. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) notified the State Department of Israel’s “arbitrary denial, restriction and impediments” of American aid to Gaza residents. In addition, the State Department’s refugee bureau issued a similar opinion stating that “facts on the ground indicate US humanitarian assistance is being restricted.”

Even after those palpable reports from the two US agencies, the Israeli Sayanim and American Secretary of State, told Congress on 10 May that Israel does not restrict “the transport or delivery of US humanitarian assistance” in Gaza.

Empowered by Washington, the General’s Starvation Plan aims to block the delivery of medical aid, food, fuel and water to the besieged quarter, currently Jabalia camp where more than 20,000 people live. This is part of what appears to be a gradual genocide, while creating the illusion of allowing aid trucks into the northern area, as the US ambassador informed the UN Security Council on Wednesday.

The entry of aid trucks does not guarantee the delivery of food to the starving population. It means that Israel retains complete control over what section is fed and who is left to starve. It also confirms that American officials continue to be Israel’s willing enablers to carry on with its General’s Starvation Plan in a systematic and phased mini-genocide.

READ: UN: 345,000 Palestinians in Gaza face ‘catastrophic’ hunger levels this winter

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Under heavy escort, the USS Abraham Lincoln transited the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait over the weekend, en route to Thailand for a highly publicized and much-needed liberty port call. Guided-missile cruiser USS Robert Smalls led the three-ship column, with guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. following astern of the supercarrier as she entered the South China Sea. Multiple Thai officials have confirmed the upcoming port visit since it was first reported by USA Today last week, with the flattop expected to pull into port at Laem Chabang in the coming days. Meanwhile, America’s other two deployed carrier groups are in the Middle East enforcing the ongoing blockade as the U.S. and Iran exchange fire for the first time since July.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s report here.

Lincoln Enters The South China Sea, Again, En Route To Thailand For Liberty

Abraham Lincoln flipped her Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder on ahead of the transit, broadcasting the flattop’s position publicly for the first time since January 28, 2026, when the CSG made the transit in the opposite direction prior to Operation Epic Fury. Lincoln has now been deployed for 285 days without a liberty call, but that streak is set to end this week.

For friends and family, we anticipate an arrival back home in late September or early October, depending on how long the crew stays in Thailand and whether any other stops are made along the way. When all is said and done, Abraham Lincoln’s deployment will likely become the second-longest in the modern carrier era behind the historic 326 days logged by the USS Gerald R. Ford earlier this year.

While the composition of the Abraham Lincoln CSG has shifted over the nine-plus-month deployment, Frank E. Petersen Jr., a Flight IIA Technology Insertion (TI) Arleigh Burke class destroyer and one of the newest in the fleet, embarked the commander of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) throughout the six months of almost nonstop combat operations against Iran. The IAMD commander is responsible for coordinating the detection, response, and interception of inbound aerial threats, and Petersen Jr. is equipped with the world’s foremost integrated naval combat system – the Aegis Combat System Baseline 9 – which delivers quick reaction times, concentrated and networked firepower, and advanced electronic countermeasure capabilities for anti-air warfare.

The unannounced addition of Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Robert Smalls, which has historically served as the IAMD commander for the carriers forward-deployed out of Yokosuka, Japan, adds 122 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells packed with missiles for protection and firepower. The rationale for the additional Tico cruiser, an iconic class that will be completely retired over the coming years without a comparable replacement, is unclear. TWZ has not received an on-the-record response from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) or U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) public affairs explaining the redirection.

Robert Smalls was part of the George Washington CSG as recently as August 18, making the northwest-bound Malacca Strait transit with the strike group the week prior, before peeling off to escort the Abraham Lincoln back through.

U.S. Launches Another Round of Strikes Against Iran Today As Tensions Escalate

Ahead of publication on Tuesday, CENTCOM announced a fresh round of strikes against targets in Iran that began at noon Eastern Time. “The strikes follow recent attempted attacks by the IRGC against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and against American service members deployed to the region,” the command posted in a statement on social media.

George Washington, which is currently accompanied by a single destroyer, USS Shoup, relieved the Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East earlier this month. Other U.S. 5th Fleet ships are reportedly moving in and out of the CSG, but the situation is fluid and TWZ cannot confirm the current, complete composition of the group. It’s unknown which warship, if any, is currently serving as IAMD commander for the CSG, which chopped into the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) on or around August 19.

Also operating in the Middle East, the four-ship George H.W. Bush CSG is underway at an undisclosed location in the Arabian Sea. Alongside USS George H.W. Bush is Tico cruiser USS Princeton, the IAMD commander, and two Burke destroyers, USS Ross and USS Donald Cook.

The carriers are enforcing the ongoing blockade of Iran – and presumably participating in the latest round of airstrikes – although they are both officially on station to “support maritime security and stability in the Middle East,” according to DVIDS, the military’s content-sharing platform. CENTCOM forces have redirected 84 commercial vessels, disabled three using kinetic force, and boarded another two since the blockade resumed, as of September 1.

Over the weekend, the United States and Iran traded blows for the first time in over a month. CENTCOM opened the tit-for-tat exchange on Sunday by targeting rocket systems on Larak Island, located in the Strait of Hormuz on the Iranian side of the northern corridor, that are fitted to launch naval mines, after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was observed making preparations to fire into the contested waterway.

“I can confirm that earlier today U.S. forces struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, CENTCOM’s spokesman, told TWZ. “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces were observed preparing to launch rockets with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz,” he added. The IRGC retaliated by launching a salvo of ballistic missiles at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, a Jordanian installation the U.S. military operates from. Jordan’s military said it successfully intercepted eight missiles.

The preemptive strikes to prevent Iran from deploying additional mines came just days after CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper said U.S. forces “successfully cleared” Iranian sea mines from international shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. Commercial traffic through the strait is slowly recovering but still well below pre-war levels.

Ongoing Maintenance Delays Stateside Impact Fleet Readiness

On the other side of the world, in the United States, three carriers are active: two are underway training while one is in homeport getting ready for an upcoming deployment. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, which left Norfolk on August 21, transited south in the Atlantic Ocean and was last operating approximately 70 nautical miles off the coast of Florida, well into East Coast Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) and Training Command (TRACOM) Carrier Qualifications (CQ). After departing San Diego on August 10, USS Carl Vinson was spotted on satellite imagery off the California coast by ship-tracker MT Anderson, in the process of completing Tailored Ship’s Training Availability (TSTA) and Final Evaluation Period (FEP) training.

USS Theodore Roosevelt, the next carrier slated to deploy from the continental U.S., is pierside at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego, based on commercial satellite imagery. Speculation is rampant about where Theodore Roosevelt will deploy, but as the Navy has told us many times, “we do not discuss future operations or timelines.”

The balance of America’s carriers (excluding USS Nimitz, which will begin deactivation in 2027) is either in maintenance or scheduled to begin an availability in the future.

The next flattop that will re-enter service, USS Ronald Reagan, is expected to finish a roughly 17-month Docking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA) soon. “The docking planned incremental availability for Ronald Reagan is on track for its scheduled completion at the end of August 2026,” Catherine Norton, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) for Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, told Stars and Stripes earlier this month. However, the ship has not gotten underway as of publication, even though yesterday was the end of the month, and it appears the DPIA will stretch into September. TWZ reached out to Puget Sound’s PAO but has not received a response yet. For the latest status of the other three carriers in current or upcoming maintenance, marked in red on the map above, check out our recent deep-dive here.

Current Big Deck Force Posture At A Glance

Overall carrier force posture is unchanged compared to our previous report on August 24. Three U.S. carriers are deployed (although one is on the tail end of her deployment and heading home to San Diego), one is preparing to deploy in the near term, two are working up in various states of readiness, four are in maintenance, and another, the USS Nimitz, is being used primarily for training before deactivating next year. One amphibious ready group is deployed, one is forward-deployed and at homeport, four are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io

Syria has suffered its worst bloodshed since Bashar Al-Assad was ousted in December, with more than 1,000 people reported killed in violence that has swept the coastal region of the country since Thursday. The violence has pitted the Islamist-led government’s security forces against fighters from Assad’s Alawite minority.

The dead include hundreds of Alawite civilians, whom the a British-based organisation that reports on the conflict, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, reported were killed in reprisals after attacks on security forces.

What has driven the violence; how has interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa reacted; and what have world powers said?

The violence began to spiral on Thursday, when the authorities said that their forces in the coastal region came under attack from fighters aligned with the ousted Assad regime. The interim government poured reinforcements into the area, which is heavily populated by Alawites, to crush what it described as a deadly, well-planned and premeditated assault by remnants of the previous regime.

As government reinforcements deployed, mosques in regions loyal to the new administration began calling on people to wage jihad, or holy struggle, in support of security forces.

By Friday afternoon, reports began emerging of scores of civilians being killed in sectarian reprisals in Alawite towns and villages. As of Sunday evening, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that 973 civilians were killed in reprisal attacks carried out by government forces or fighters aligned with them. More than 250 Alawite fighters were killed and more than 230 members of government security forces were also killed, it added. Reuters has not been able to independently verify the tolls.

READ: Children among hundreds of civilians killed in renewed fighting in Syria, says NGO

The Alawites are the second-largest religious group in Syria after Sunni Muslims. Their faith is an offshoot of Shia Islam. The Assad regime recruited heavily from the Alawite community for its army and security apparatus, which was notorious for its brutality during more than five decades of the family’s rule.

This put many Alawites on the front lines of the civil war that erupted out of protests against Assad’s rule in 2011. The conflict took on a sectarian dimension as Sunni Muslim rebel groups sought to topple the Assad government which was backed by Shia Iran, Lebanon’s Shia Hezbollah movement and others.

Al-Sharaa led the most powerful Sunni group fighting Assad. Known as the Nusra Front, the group was part of Al-Qaeda until he severed ties with the jihadist network in 2016 and renamed his organisation. In a 2015 interview with Al Jazeera, Al-Sharaa described the Alawites as part of a sect that “moved outside the religion of God and of Islam” and urged them to renounce Assad and change their beliefs to remain safe.

Since Assad was ousted, the interim president has pledged to run Syria in an inclusive way. But while he has publicly engaged Kurds, Christians and Druze, there have been no declared meetings between him and senior Alawite figures. Many Alawites say that they suffered like other Syrians under the rule of Assad and his father, both of whom came from the sect.

Prior to Thursday’s escalation, Alawite activists had reported violence and attacks on their community following Assad’s ouster, particularly in rural Homs and Latakia.

In a speech on Sunday, Al-Sharaa said that remnants of the Assad government, supported by external parties, were seeking to create strife and drag Syria back into civil war with the aim of dividing it. He promised to form a fact-finding committee and said its findings would be made public, vowing to bring to account anyone involved “in the bloodshed of civilians” or mistreating them.

He has also announced the formation of a committee aimed at preserving civil peace, which would be tasked with communicating with the people on the coast and providing them with the support they needed to guarantee their protection.

The violence has prompted international alarm.

The United States, which imposes sanctions on Damascus, urged the Syrian authorities to hold accountable the “radical Islamist terrorists” [sic] that had killed people in Syria and said it stood with Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said on social media that atrocities committed against the Alawites showed that Al-Sharaa had revealed his “true face” as a jihadist.

However, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, allies of Damascus, both signalled their backing for the interim administration as violence was escalating last week. Riyadh condemned “crimes being undertaken by outlaw groups” in Syria and their targeting of security forces.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, whose country has forces on the ground in north-west Syria, has urged calm and said unnamed foreign elements were partly to blame.

Iran, which backed Assad through the war, has warned that the violence in Syria could cause regional instability.

READ: Israel urges Europe to stop ‘granting legitimacy’ to Syria’s interim authorities

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

At the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza, the Israeli government made no secret of its intention to forcibly transfer Palestinians from the enclave and urged the international community to support its plans for what it called ‘resettlement’.

“Europe has a long history of assisting refugees fleeing conflicts,” Danny Danon and Ram Ben Barak wrote in 2023 in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. Describing participation in forced transfer as “a moral imperative”, Danon and Ben Barak suggested that countries accept as much as 10,000 people each to “alleviate the crisis”.

Had the suggestion been accepted by enough countries, Israel would have been granted its current greatest wish – to ethnically cleanse Gaza in full complicity with the international community. As things stand, the international community refused the Israel suggestion on grounds of breaking international law, while getting on board with Israel committing genocide. The real reason behind the stance, however, was that governments would rather witness large-scale massacres of Palestinians from a distance than accept refugees.

US President Donald Trump is now promoting Israel’s strategy. “You’re talking about probably a million and half people, and we just clean out that whole thing. You know, over the centuries it’s had many, many conflicts, that site. And I don’t know, something has to happen,” Trump said during a 20-minute meeting with reporters on Air Force One.

OPINION: Israel’s use of domicide to further its colonial endeavours

“It’s literally a demolition site right now. Almost everything is demolished and people are dying there,” Trump added, in his usual vague rhetoric. “So I’d rather get involved with some of the Arab nations and build housing at a different location where they can maybe live in peace for a change.”

Trump raised the idea with Jordan’s King Abdullah II and Egypt’s President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi. Gaza was deemed “interesting” – for real investment purposes, of course. One must not forget Jared Kushner’s plans for Gaza – beachfront properties. And, while the Biden administration dragged its feet on forced displacement, the genocide happened under its watch and with full collaboration. Which means that the previous administration paved the way for Trump to echo what Israel insisted upon since the start of the genocide – Palestinians are slated for displacement, one way or another.

Israeli Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, stated he will be working “to prepare an operational plan and ensure the realisation of President Trump’s vision.” But it’s best to call it the Israel vision, even if Trump is the President promoting forced transfer as a humanitarian necessity. The Israeli vision is colonial, fits in with genocide and the concept of Zionism’s Greater Israel. Real estate investments facilitate the Zionist concept. And what better way to promote rebuilding Gaza, even if for Palestinians, rebuilding Gaza means the total opposite?

As Palestinians return to their homes, Trump’s suggestion of forced transfer should be considered incitement to ethnic cleansing. The world is obliged to heed what is happening right after the ceasefire and the gradual return of Palestinian refugees to Gaza. Palestinians want to remain – it is their right – and that is all that matters.

OPINION: Could the head of the world’s highest court be a judge with Zionist tendencies?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Aug. 31 (UPI) — Oil prices surged early Monday after fighting flared in the U.S.-Iran conflict for the first time in four weeks since U.S. President Donald Trump announced a “pause” in U.S. military strikes on Aug. 1.

The contract for the benchmark Brent crude for November delivery jumped by 3.4% to $91.09 a barrel and the October contract for American crude saw a similar-sized increase to $86.22 after U.S. forces hit rocket launchers on Larak Island in the Hormuz Strait on Sunday night and Iran’s military retaliated, targeting American bases in Jordan.

The hikes were driven by the renewed hostilities stoking fears ongoing supply disruption caused by a drastic curtailment of tankers traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz would be made worse and persist for longer, according to experts.

“Supply risk will persist and oil inventories will continue to deplete in the coming weeks and months. The Iranian crisis has likely changed the security status quo in the Middle East,” said PVM Oil Associates’ London-based analyst Tamas Varga.

Investment bank Goldman Sachs, the impact of destructive attacks on refining capacity was responsible for upward pressure on margins.

“Rising strikes on refineries in the Middle East and Russia have further constrained already-stretched global refining capacity, pushing refined products margins to new highs,” the bank said in a note.

Prices at the pump in the United States on Monday remained broadly flat from the previous day, with the average price of a gallon of regular unleaded up 0.2 cents at 4.08 a gallon, and diesel down by a little over 0.3 cents at $5.60 a gallon, according to the American Automobile Association.

The developments came as the United States’ Strategic Petroleum Reserve has fallen to its lowest level since 1982.

President Trump said Sunday he would restock it with oil from his Venezuela deal giving the United States secure a stake in more than 65 billion barrels of oil despite the fact it could to produce take many years to before the agreements yields any significant volumes because the oil is reserves, as yet to be drilled.

The price of oil has seesawed over the past two weeks after rising in response to Trump’s Aug. 19 threat to wage a “crushing economic operation” against Iran that his officials said would cause the regime to collapse, and then retreating again in the hours before the mainly-sanctions package of measures were unveiled on Aug. 24.

The upcoming official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Egypt, scheduled for August 30 to September 3, 2026, coincides with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The visit will address economic and technological cooperation, as well as regional and international issues, and marks the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Egypt and China. The visit aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries and expand Beijing’s economic and political influence in the Middle East amidst escalating regional and international tensions, while also bolstering China’s role in the Global South.

As an Egyptian academic specializing in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can analyze and summarize the significance of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo and his meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and its importance to China’s influence in the Middle East and the Global South through the following points:

– First: What does China hope to achieve with Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt at this particular time?

This visit of President Xi Jinping to Cairo (the first by a Chinese president to Cairo in nearly a decade) coincides with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It carries several key objectives, including political and international dimensions related to Chinese coordination with Egypt on Middle Eastern issues. The visit comes at a sensitive time, as the region is experiencing tensions linked to the conflict between Iran and the United States and its repercussions on maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets. Beijing also seeks to strengthen its strategic balance and reaffirm its diplomatic presence as an international power that supports diplomatic solutions and cooperates with pivotal countries like Egypt to achieve stability. This follows President Xi Jinping’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.  President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo also carries several economic and trade dimensions, such as expanding the economic partnership and capitalizing on the significant increase in trade between the two countries to deepen cooperation. Furthermore, China will support infrastructure and energy projects in Egypt by boosting Chinese investments in Cairo, including renewable energy sectors such as wind turbine manufacturing plants, transportation deals, and electric trains, in addition to extending currency swap agreements between the two central banks.

The visit also aims to discuss the technological and artificial intelligence file in China’s relations with Cairo, particularly major technological offers, most notably the offer from the Chinese company Huawei to build data and artificial intelligence centers in Egypt. This project is viewed with apprehension by intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Washington, which are attempting to offer Cairo alternatives from major American technology companies such as Microsoft, Nvidia, and AMD.

– Second: Does the visit carry political messages that extend beyond bilateral relations, especially regarding the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit carries major strategic political messages that transcend the framework of bilateral cooperation. It aims to reshape the international order and build a multipolar world, starting with the Global South. The visit also carries messages that go beyond bilateral relations, pushing for a Global South leadership role. Beijing seeks to garner African and Arab support to assert its position as a major power, offering an alternative to Western and American competition and influence. China also aims to promote multilateralism by urging countries in the region to adopt common positions that support international stability and security, moving away from the unilateral polarization of the United States. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping’s visit signals China’s desire to secure its economic interests. Chinese actions are focused on ensuring the security of maritime routes and the stability of energy and trade markets within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Here, President Xi’s visit to Cairo coincides with the launch of the second iteration of the massive joint air exercises, Eagles of Civilization, in August 2026 at Egyptian air bases. These exercises, which follow the first iteration in May 2025, will involve advanced fighter jets from both sides. This sends political and strategic messages to Washington and Tel Aviv about the new military partnership between Egypt and China, the diversification of arms sources, and the independence of Egyptian military and political decision-making in diversifying its partnerships.

Furthermore, the Chinese president’s visit to Cairo carries support for Egypt’s regional role in the Middle East and Africa, reaffirming the pivotal role of Egypt. Choosing Egypt as a starting point reflects Beijing’s understanding of its geopolitical importance as a key link between the Arab world and the African continent and its commitment to addressing regional repercussions. China is also demonstrating its readiness to cooperate with its African and Arab partners to contain the economic crises resulting from conflicts in the Middle East.  In addition to China’s anticipated plan to expand alliances by strengthening the integration of Chinese development projects with major economic blocs such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this visit also aims to coordinate common positions on de-escalation and maintaining peace and security in the Middle East and to discuss regional conflicts, particularly in the wake of the Gaza and Iran wars.

– Third: What economic files could witness new agreements or steps between Cairo and Beijing?

Economic relations between Cairo and Beijing are increasingly moving towards signing new agreements and taking new steps focused on strengthening joint investments and supporting financial stability. The most prominent joint economic and investment files between Egypt and China are based on supporting financial partnership and currency diversification. This involves renewing and strengthening local currency swap agreements between the Central Bank of Egypt and its Chinese counterpart to facilitate trade and support monetary stability, independent of international currencies. Economic cooperation and currency swaps will be among the top economic priorities of the visit through monitoring the surge in trade and extending the local currency swap agreement to enhance economic partnership within the BRICS framework.

Furthermore, there is a shared Chinese-Egyptian desire to localize industry and technology in Cairo by attracting substantial Chinese investments in electric vehicle manufacturing, new and renewable energy sectors, and advanced technology industries. With the expansion of Chinese projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, through the expansion of Chinese industrial and logistical projects within the Suez Canal Corridor, a major value-added production base is being established. China is also supporting Egypt in achieving food security and agricultural development by preparing joint Egyptian-Chinese alliances targeting large-scale agricultural land reclamation projects to enhance food security. This is happening concurrently with Chinese support for infrastructure and smart cities in Egypt through cooperation in urban development projects and modern smart cities.

– Fourth: Can China strengthen Egypt’s role as a key hub for its projects in the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, China is already strengthening Egypt’s role as a key and central hub for its strategic projects in the Middle East and Africa. The pillars of Chinese strategic cooperation with Egypt are based on China’s projects and investments within the Belt and Road Initiative. China considers Egypt a strategic gateway and a vital corridor for the maritime and land Silk Road, given the Suez Canal’s role as a global trade artery.  With the diversification of Chinese partnerships and investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, given the concentration of major industrial projects by Chinese companies in the zone, such as the China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (TEDA). China aims to access African markets through Egypt. Chinese companies utilize Egyptian land and ports as a joint manufacturing base and a launchpad for exporting products and services to markets across Africa and the Middle East. China also seeks to achieve developmental and security integration with Egypt, aligning its five-year development plans with Egypt’s Vision 2030. This is further evidenced by the development of joint military cooperation and air exercises between Egypt and China, such as the Eagles of Civilization exercises between the Egyptian and Chinese air forces, the first iteration of which took place in May 2025 and the second in August 2026.

Beijing also seeks to disseminate artificial intelligence and innovation technologies through Egypt to the African continent, the Middle East, and the Global South.  Especially since Egypt hosts a number of Chinese companies across various sectors, particularly technology, such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, ZTE, Midea, and Haier. Furthermore, a $300 million investment fund has been established with Tsinghua University in China, focusing on artificial intelligence and semiconductor design.

– Fifth: To what extent can the Egyptian-Chinese partnership affect the balance of American influence in the region?

The Egyptian-Chinese partnership significantly impacts American influence in the Middle East by diversifying China’s economic and political alliances in the region. However, it does not eliminate the strategic alliances between the United States and several countries in the region, particularly the Gulf states. The partnership between Egypt and China is based on the economic and financial dimension, including major Chinese investments in Egypt. China is pouring billions of dollars into infrastructure projects and the Suez Canal region. China also supports Egypt’s bid to join the BRICS group, led by China and Russia, to reduce its dependence on the dollar and the Western and American financial system. Furthermore, China is keen to closely integrate its Belt and Road Initiative projects with the Egyptian economy. The partnership between Egypt and China also rests on the diplomatic and strategic dimension as well as the diversification of alliances. Egypt pursues a balanced foreign policy that is not limited to a single ally.  Here, the partnership with China grants Egypt greater freedom of movement and a wider margin to maneuver, free from American political conditions and pressures, particularly in the areas of armament and military deals. This creates a delicate balance for Egypt, as it refuses to fully align itself with one power against another, maintaining its security partnership with Washington alongside its relationship with Beijing.

In this context, Beijing does not view Egypt merely as an economic partner, but rather as a strategic gateway and a pivotal pillar of its geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Africa, countering American penetration. This approach stems from China’s desire to fill the political and military vacuums resulting from the decline or fluctuation of the Western and American presence in the region. To this end, China leverages Cairo’s historical and political weight as a platform to expand its diplomatic influence and build partnerships with other countries in Africa and the Arab world. China’s support for Egypt’s membership in the BRICS bloc has provided Beijing with a strong regional ally, bolstering its vision for reshaping the global financial system into a multipolar order in the face of the United States’ unilateral hegemony in the region. This is especially significant given that Egypt represents a crucial land and sea crossroads for China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Silk Road, considering the strategic and vital importance of the Suez Canal.

– Sixth: Does Beijing want Egypt merely as an economic partner, or does it see it as a strategic gateway for its influence in the Middle East and Africa?

Beijing views Egypt as a major strategic gateway for its influence, not just an ordinary economic partner. The relationship combines commercial interests with broad geopolitical ties. The economic dimension is based on the importance of the Suez Canal. China considers the Suez Canal a key artery for its trade with Europe and the rest of the world, and it is investing heavily to connect Egyptian ports and roads to its major commercial projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to China’s role as a major logistics hub in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, numerous Chinese companies have established factories there to export goods. This is further compounded by Egypt’s strategic and political importance, as well as its sensitive geographical location, which is crucial to China’s interests. Egypt’s position at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe serves China’s regional influence. This coincided with China’s support for Egypt’s formal accession to the BRICS group, a move fully backed by China to bolster both countries’ political and economic weight globally.

Beijing also focuses on the growing security and military dimension of its relationship with Cairo to secure investments and international maritime routes. Chinese ambitions extend beyond simply selling goods; it seeks a greater role in protecting its interests and citizens by strengthening military cooperation with Cairo and diversifying defense partnerships with countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South through Egypt. Beijing sees the growing military cooperation and arms sales to Egypt and the region as an opportunity to undermine Western and American military influence and to forge closer ties with the Egyptian army, one of the largest armies on the African continent. This is the true objective of China in transforming Egypt into a political and military hub that guarantees Beijing’s vital interests in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South.

Accordingly, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo comes at a time when Beijing seeks to strengthen its engagement in the Middle East and expand its relations with developing countries and the Global South, coinciding with escalating competition with the United States for economic and technological influence. Xi’s visit to Cairo also carries significance that transcends bilateral relations, given the ongoing repercussions of a potential US war with Iran and the instability in global energy markets. Therefore, China seeks to leverage Egypt’s pivotal role in achieving regional stability, mitigating crises, and protecting its interests in the Middle East and Africa.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Saturday urged US President Donald Trump to avoid creating turmoil, saying problems could be resolved through dialogue and implementation of a memorandum of understanding, Anadolu reports.

“If we proceed through dialogue and on the basis of the memorandum of understanding, we will resolve the problems and secure our rights,” Pezeshkian said in a ceremony in Tehran, as cited by Mehr News Agency.

“It is in the interest of the country, the region and the world that Trump does not create turmoil and that Israel does not cause insecurity and aggression,” he added.

Pezeshkian said Iran does not favor war but would respond firmly to any assaults.

“We do not like war, but we will stand with strength against aggression and defend ourselves,” he said, adding that no power could force a united nation determined to defend its territory to surrender.

He said Tehran was seeking to resolve problems through dialogue, but stressed that the Iranian people, officials and military commanders would “never surrender” in the face of threats and aggression.

The president also accused Israel of seeking to sow divisions among Muslim countries, saying greater unity among Islamic nations could thwart such efforts.

READ: Iran says it agreed with Oman on Hormuz passage route, links reopening to US commitments

Turning to domestic issues, Pezeshkian said maintaining industrial production during the coming winter was a “red line,” stressing that supplies of gas, electricity and water to production facilities should not be interrupted.

He said the government would manage consumption of water, electricity, gas and fuel and, if restrictions became necessary, would first impose them on government offices and public buildings rather than shift the burden onto the public.

Pezeshkian called on the public to cooperate with the government to maintain stability, saying Iran’s adversaries should not believe that pressure would force the country to surrender.

The US-Israeli war against Iran began on Feb. 28, with attacks targeting military, nuclear and infrastructure sites across the country. Iran responded with missile and drone strikes against Israel and US military facilities across the region.

Iran and the US reached a 14-point memorandum of understanding in June, mediated by Pakistan and Qatar, aimed at ending hostilities and opening a 60-day window for negotiations toward a broader agreement.

The memorandum also addressed the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and lifting of the US naval blockade, as well as sanctions and Iran’s frozen assets.

​​​​​​​Tehran has maintained that further progress in talks depends on Washington fulfilling its commitments under the memorandum, while Iranian officials have said the Strait of Hormuz will not fully reopen until those obligations are implemented.

READ: Dialogue ‘only viable way out’ of US-Iran conflict, China says amid sanctions threats

The administration of former US President, Joe Biden, knowingly allowed Israel’s genocide in Gaza to continue long after it had lost any clear military objective, with senior officials in Washington privately admitting it amounted to “killing and destroying for the sake of killing and destroying”. This damning assessment, along with revelations of political manipulation, diplomatic cover-ups and sabotaged peace efforts, comes from a bombshell investigation aired by Israel’s Channel 13. Details of the investigation have been translated by Drop Site News and shared on X.

The Biden administration allowed Israel unprecedented leeway to carry out its military offensive, despite the enormous death and devastation it inflicted on Gaza. Former Israeli ambassador, Michael Herzog, made a startling admission about Biden’s support: “God did the State of Israel a favour that Biden was the president during this period. We fought [in Gaza] for over a year and the administration never came to us and said, ‘ceasefire now.’ It never did. And that’s not to be taken for granted.” His remarks encapsulated a broader sentiment that the White House gave Benjamin Netanyahu all the political space he needed to execute the military offensive, which has claimed the lives of more than 52,000 Palestinians, mainly women and children.

READ: ICC judges order prosecutor to keep arrest warrant requests confidential in Gaza probes

The investigation, which included interviews with nine current and former US officials, reveals a deeply troubling portrait of US complicity in Israel’s genocide in Gaza. Former national security aide, Ilan Goldenberg, stated that the war amounted to “killing and destroying for the sake of killing and destroying”, with no viable political alternative ever established. Despite the White House’s public messaging about restraining Israel, the internal consensus appeared to be that the administration had no intention of exerting real pressure on the Occupation state.

The Biden administration also shielded Israel from allegations of war crimes, prompting a major backlash from staffers in the State Department. Lawyer Stacy Gilbert, for example, resigned in protest after being excluded from a key report that falsely claimed Israel had not violated US arms laws. Gilbert described the report as “shocking in its mendacity”, pointing out that aid obstruction and settler attacks were well documented, yet ignored. Meanwhile, Washington continued to certify Israeli compliance with US law, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of weapons.

The investigation also revealed that Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, deliberately sabotaged hostage negotiations in order to prevent a ceasefire. US officials confirmed that Netanyahu tanked talks out of fear that a deal would compel him to halt the war.

Despite public backlash, Biden’s private approach remained deferential. Even after reportedly telling Netanyahu he was “full of shit” and hanging up mid-call, Biden ultimately maintained support. After briefly halting a shipment of 2,000-lb bombs due to concerns about their use in densely populated areas of Gaza, Netanyahu publicly accused Washington of broader arms delays. Biden, rather than escalating pressure, resumed the shipment process shortly thereafter.

The Channel 13 exposé further confirms that Biden’s reluctance to push Israel was deeply tied to a failed diplomatic initiative with Saudi Arabia. A landmark normalisation deal was in sight, but it required Israeli recognition of Palestinian statehood. These were flatly rejected by Netanyahu’s far-right coalition. Former US ambassador, Jack Lew, said he found Israel’s refusal “shocking”, while Amos Hochstein expressed disbelief that such a strategic opportunity was squandered. Sources confirmed that Netanyahu deliberately stalled negotiations in hopes that President Trump would return to office and claim the diplomatic win for himself.

These revelations lend significant weight to long-standing accusations that the Biden administration has not only provided diplomatic cover for Israel’s propaganda by repeating lies, but also actively enabled what many view as a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Critics note that Biden himself amplified false Israeli claims, such as the widely discredited allegations of Hamas beheading babies, rhetoric that helped to dehumanise a population in order to carry out genocide.

OPINION: Advisory opinions will not stop genocide

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Fifteen years since the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya began, and with civil strife leading to the downfall of what was once one of Africa’s wealthiest countries, several actors are seeking to end the civil war and reunite the country.

Among them are the US, which has commercial interests in Libya’s oil fields. Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye are also pushing for a return to “One Libya”, after more than a decade of fighting between two rival authorities for control of the country.

Here’s what we know:

What happened 15 years ago?

The Libyan uprising erupted during the Arab Spring, when thousands of people in the port city of Benghazi took to the streets to protest against Gaddafi’s more than four decades of absolute power.

Violence against the demonstrations pushed the protesters into an armed rebellion against Gaddafi’s rule, with a civil war starting between the two sides.

A United Nations Security Council resolution authorised an international military intervention force – led by NATO members, the United States, United Kingdom and France – to enforce a no-fly zone and ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. This bombing campaign pushed back Gaddafi’s forces from Benghazi and aided the rebels in seizing territory.

Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed in October 2011, 42 years after he first seized power in a military coup that overthrew King Idris.

How is Libya divided?

Following Gaddafi’s death, a power vacuum emerged, with multiple groups – and their allied militias – competing for power.

Control of the country is now split between two rival administrations: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dheibah, and the eastern, Tobruk-based administration backed by Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA).

The GNU is recognised by the UN and other countries, and officially has authority in the capital and western Libya.

Under Gaddafi, Haftar was exiled in the US for two decades where he holds citizenship.

His forces control vast resource-rich lands in the east, including the strategic port city of Benghazi, reportedly with the backing of Russia.

The UN began formal mediation efforts in 2020 under the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This roadmap advocates for a three-track strategy that includes unifying the two rival administrations, presidential and parliamentary elections, and hosting national dialogue meetings.

The US was a key mediator behind the scenes, and in May 2021, appointed Ambassador Richard Norlan as Special Envoy to Libya, to lead high-level talks between the two sides.

What is the US’s new plan?

Under Massad Boulous, US President Donald Trump’s African and Middle Eastern affairs adviser, and father-in-law to Tiffany Trump, Washington is intensifying efforts to reunite the country. But this can only be achieved if both sides agree to form a single government.

According to leaked details, Trump’s initiative centres on the promise that if the rival governments cooperate, the US would encourage American investment in Libya’s sizable oil fields. This comes as the Libyan Central Bank, which is attempting to finance both authorities, sounds the alarm over the dire economic situation.

While Tripoli has international legitimacy, Haftar’s forces control the oilfields and terminals.

The US is also proposing a power-sharing deal that would see Dheibah continue to lead the government while Haftar’s son and LNA army chief, 35-year-old Saddam Haftar, serves as president.

There are obvious opportunities for US energy companies and economic and political incentives for European countries in a unified and stable Libya.

They include stopping irregular migration from Libya and other North African countries to the EU.

Some criticise the US-led plan as lacking input from the Libyan people. The deal, some say, could entrench the power of political dynasties, which might be best for long-term stability in Libya.

What have the results been?

There are signs that Haftar’s camp, at least, is on board with the US plan. Saddam Haftar, whose father, Khalifa, was based in Virginia until 2011, reportedly met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in DC in July.

Experts attribute the ongoing mediation efforts to the unified national budget of 2026, signed in April – the first in more than a decade.

However, there are still no talks or signs of a unified government forming.

What is Turkiye’s role?

Turkiye, which earlier deployed troops to support the GNU, has also made efforts to mediate between the two sides and is pushing a ‘One Libya’ policy.

Last month, Foreign Affairs Minister, Hakan Fidan, met with Saddam Haftar in Ankara. Earlier this month, Fidan travelled to both Tripoli and Benghazi for high-level talks with Dheibah and Khalifa Haftar.

What has Egypt done?

The Egyptian government has traditionally cooperated with Haftar’s Tobruk government, which is just across the border.

On Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo and discussed unification talks.

Earlier this month, Dheibah visited Cairo, while Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad travelled to Tripoli.

What is Qatar’s stance?

Qatar has largely backed the UN mediation channels in Libya: the UNSMIL and the UN roadmap for peace.

While it has good relations with the GNU, Qatar seeks stabilisation efforts led by Libyan parties and elections.

In April, Qatar and other states welcomed the unified budget for 2026. A statement issued by Qatar, Egypt, France, Germany and several others called for all parties in Libya to follow the UN roadmap to “advance a Libyan-led political process leading to unified governance and national elections.”

Senior Hamas officials, including the movement’s political bureau chief Khalil al-Hayya, held talks with US envoy Jared Kushner in Egypt to discuss disarmament and the future administration of the Gaza Strip, according to Hamas sources cited by Asharq on Sunday.

The sources said the meeting took place in El Alamein with the participation of senior officials from Egypt, Qatar and Turkey, which have been involved in mediation efforts over Gaza.

According to the report, the Hamas delegation discussed its position on a proposed roadmap for Gaza and expressed its commitment to provisions concerning the inventory and storage of weapons and the transfer of governing authority in the Strip.

The sources also said Hamas expressed readiness to participate in Palestinian elections and operate as a political party within the Palestinian political system.

READ: Kushner accuses Netanyahu of obstructing US Gaza plan

Kushner reportedly stressed that eliminating security threats originating from Gaza and ensuring that the territory is free of weapons were fundamental requirements for advancing the proposed political process.

Hamas, in turn, sought guarantees regarding implementation of the agreement, including a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, a comprehensive ceasefire, and assurances that the implementation process would not be delayed or obstructed.

The Hamas delegation also called for the rapid transfer of administrative responsibilities in Gaza to a Palestinian national committee or technocratic government, alongside the start of recovery and reconstruction efforts.

According to the report, mediators had informed Hamas beforehand that Kushner wanted to meet the movement’s leadership before traveling to Israel for talks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Hamas reportedly viewed the meeting as an opportunity to present its position directly and address outstanding disagreements over implementation of the proposed Gaza roadmap.

READ: El Sisi stresses need to resolve regional crises to preserve stability in meeting with Kushner

A United States aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington, has begun to depart the western Pacific Ocean, leaving its port in Da Nang, Vietnam, for an anticipated deployment to the Middle East.

The ship is expected to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln, which is currently participating in the US-Israeli war against Iran.

The vessel’s movement on Saturday comes amid mounting concerns about the conditions on board the USS Lincoln, sparked by reports of sailors attempting to jump overboard.

The USS Lincoln has been deployed without a port stop for more than 266 days, a record duration for the Navy. It houses about 5,000 sailors and Marines.

In the wake of reports about supply shortages and mental health strain on the ship, US President Donald Trump and acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao indicated that the vessel would be rotated. The Pentagon has not confirmed, however, that the USS Lincoln will be replaced by the USS Washington.

The department historically has not commented on movements of key military assets, citing security concerns.

Analysts note that the USS Washington’s departure from the Pacific leaves no US aircraft carrier in the strategically significant region, where the US has long acted as a bulwark against China’s might.

Back-and-forth over conditions

Members of the Trump administration have spent much of this week batting away reports about deteriorating conditions on the USS Lincoln.

US media outlets have carried reports not only of sailors attempting to leap from the vessel, but also of diminishing hygiene supplies and paltry food, as well as issues with plumbing and waste disposal.

Several US senators have called for more information about the conditions on board and the reason for its record-setting deployment.

Since leaving San Diego, California, last November, the USS Lincoln has been sent to support military operations in Venezuela, before leaving for the Middle East shortly thereafter.

Its deployment was supposed to end in May. But after the US and Israel launched a war against Iran in February, its mission was extended indefinitely.

The war with Iran has shown no signs so far of ending, though fighting has remained largely subdued in recent days. Talks have stalled over issues including control of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway for global trade.

Speaking to reporters on Friday, Trump downplayed concerns about the ship, saying instead the length of the aircraft carrier’s deployment was “not nearly enough”.

A day earlier, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth said conditions on board had been “completely misrepresented”.

In a separate statement on Friday, Cao maintained the issues on board the ship were not dire, but he acknowledged “a small number of mental health cases were treated with no loss of life”.

He added that meal plans had been adjusted “when fresh resupply was unavailable”, but not a single meal had been missed.

“There is no question our young men and women have been pushed to their limits  — but they have never broken,” he said.

Still, some analysts say Iranian attacks have taken a toll on US military assets across the region, particularly a US Navy base in Bahrain. That has likely complicated typical resupply and maintenance procedures for aircraft carriers like the USS Lincoln.

Concerns about China

News of the USS Washington’s shift from the Pacific has spurred concern that its departure may further harm US deterrence against China. It was not clear if or when another carrier would be deployed to the region.

Bryan Clark, a former Navy submariner and defence analyst at the Hudson Institute, a think tank, told The Associated Press that Beijing may try to project strength in the aircraft carrier’s absence to unnerve US allies in the region.

“They’re using this as part of the narrative to demonstrate to the Philippines, to Japan, to Indonesia and others that the US is not the big dog in the western Pacific any more,” Clark said.

“They would just prefer that countries in the region decide that China is the bigger power and the US is not able to guarantee their security any more.”

Clark added he did not believe the change would in and of itself embolden China to launch an attack on Taiwan, the self-governing island it claims as its own.

Still, the shift comes as the US contends with a reported depletion in both its offensive and defensive weapon supplies as a result of the war with Iran.

Those shortages have already piqued concerns of a declining US ability to serve as deterrence against military aggression. Critics point out that a country like China, unlike Iran, has advanced military technology and a sprawling air force, which could pose a challenge to the US military.

Like the USS Lincoln, the USS Washington is a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. It has the capability to carry more than 6,000 passengers and about 90 aircraft.

Switzerland has selected a documentary featuring testimonies from survivors in the Gaza Strip as its entry for the 2027 Academy Awards, media reports said Thursday, Anadolu reports.

“Who Is Still Alive,” directed by Geneva-based filmmaker Nicolas Wadimoff, will compete for a nomination in the Best International Feature Film category at the 99th Academy Awards, Swissinfo reported.

The documentary places Gaza survivors in an abstract setting where they recount their experiences.

READ: Gaza’s children suffer as they fetch water amid soaring summer temperatures

The jury said the film directly addresses feelings of loss, uprooting and belonging, according to a statement by Switzerland’s Federal Office of Culture.

“Who Is Still Alive” won the Prix de Soleure, Switzerland’s most prestigious film award, at the Solothurn Film Festival earlier this year.

The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences is expected to announce a shortlist of international submissions in December. The five final nominees will be revealed Jan. 21, ahead of the Academy Awards ceremony on March 14.

READ: Iran says Switzerland talks with US focus on ending war, easing sanctions, releasing frozen assets

With one-way attack drones playing an ever larger role in American military operations, U.S. Central Command announced it is creating what it calls “the first multinational attack drone task force.” The move comes as combat between the U.S. and Iran has paused, but tensions in the region remain high, including ongoing attacks on shipping by the Iranian-aligned Houthi rebels of Yemen. The task force is also being launched amid growing concerns about the U.S. magazine depth of high-end standoff weapons — a class of weapon one-way-attack drones aim to take pressure off of.

Dubbed Task Force Falcon Strike (TFFS), the command said it will “employ one-way attack drones consisting of unmanned systems from above, on, and below the sea operated by military support staff from the United States and regional partners.”

The CENTCOM announcement offered no further information about which nations will participate, what systems will be used, and whether those joining Task Force Falcon Strike will bring their own equipment. The command declined to provide further details when we asked.

The war against Iran saw the command follow global trends in warfare by deploying air and sea drones in combat for the first time. Other militaries in the Middle East have or are working on acquiring similar capabilities. Israel largely wrote the book on one-way attack munitions, for instance.

The establishment of TFFS follows the creation in December of Task Force Scorpion Strike (TFSS). As we were one of the first to report, this was the U.S. military’s first dedicated one-way attack drone squadron and the first operational unit armed with Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) kamikaze drones, a design reverse-engineered from the Iranian-designed Shahed-136, in the Middle East.

Initially, TFSS was created to send a warning to Iran, a U.S. official told us at the time. As we noted earlier in this story, after the launch of Epic Fury on Feb. 28, TFSS marked several operational firsts for America’s use of drones in war.

The first major milestone came on the opening day of the war, when LUCAS drones were used for the first time. The second came in June, when a Saronic Corsair uncrewed surface vessel (USV) rescued the crew of a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache that crashed in the Gulf of Oman after it was downed by Iran. That was the first known instance of a drone boat being used to recover personnel as part of a search and rescue mission.

The third large step forward for U.S. drone warfare came in July, when three Corsairs “hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base” and “successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran,” the command stated on X that day. It was the first U.S. use of a USV as an attack weapon.

You can see those attacks in the following video produced by CENTCOM.

As we have frequently reported, Ukraine has used USVs to devastating effect on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Magura line of drones, among others, has played a key role in this campaign.

Notably, the command also said the new task force will also use uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) as attack weapons. If they have been used in combat by the U.S., that has not been publicly acknowledged. The command did announce in April that it was using UUVs to assist in demining the Strait of Hormuz.

In December, Ukraine’s state security service (SBU) said it carried out the first-ever UUV attack on a Russian vessel. The strike was on a Project 636 Varshavyanka class, or Improved Kilo class diesel-electric submarine, in the Black Sea naval stronghold of Novorossiysk.

That attack can be seen in the video below.

Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz fell to its lowest level in a week on Tuesday as vessel operators continued to avoid the strategically vital waterway amid ongoing hostilities in the Middle East.

Kpler data showed that only eight vessels were tracked in the strait on Tuesday, below the 10-day average of around 12 and the lowest daily total since August 5. Of those vessels, only one, a coal carrier, had exited the strait, while the remaining ships were still making their way through.Seven vessels entered the waterway, all using the Iranian route, highlighting the limited movement through the strait as uncertainty over its security continues to weigh on shipping activity.

Separate data from LSEG recorded 11 vessel transits on Tuesday, down from 14 the previous day, also pointing to a slowdown in traffic through the crucial maritime passage.

The decline comes as the United States and Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis reported separate attacks, while prospects for an end to the Iran war appeared to weaken. Tehran has said the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed unless Washington accepts its conditions.

Hormuz Traffic Plummets

The scale of the disruption is stark compared with normal shipping activity. Around 130 to 140 vessels typically passed through the Strait of Hormuz before Iran closed the waterway following the start of U.S.-Israeli attacks on February 28.

The sharp reduction in traffic underscores the growing risks facing international shipping and energy markets as vessels avoid one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

The strait is particularly important for global energy supplies, meaning prolonged restrictions could increase pressure on oil markets and raise transportation and insurance costs for vessels operating in the region.

Red Sea Traffic Holds Up

Shipping activity through the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea showed a different trend.

Kpler data recorded 30 vessels crossing the waterway on Tuesday, above its 10-day average of 25.

The contrasting figures suggest that while some shipping activity continues through alternative routes, the Strait of Hormuz remains heavily affected by the ongoing hostilities and uncertainty surrounding its reopening.

With information from Reuters.

Death sentences will be replaced with life imprisonment with aggravated hard labour.

Lebanon’s parliament has passed a law to abolish capital punishment, making it the first country in the Middle East to do so.

The Lebanese parliament’s speaker’s office said lawmakers signed off on the legislation Tuesday after making several amendments.

A majority of the 128-member assembly voted in favour of ending the death penalty, with the exception of the parliamentary bloc of Hezbollah.

Justice Minister Adel Nassar, who was in parliament, called it a “historic step” for the country.

The new system replaces the death sentence with life imprisonment with aggravated hard labour.

While Lebanon has observed an unofficial moratorium on executions since January 2004, courts have continued to issue dozens of death sentences.

At the end of 2025, 85 people were facing death sentences, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Justice’s Directorate of Prisons.

‘Lasting legal protection’

Rights group Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa director, Heba Morayef, praised Lebanon’s move to end capital punishment as “a major milestone and a victory for human rights in the country”.

“After more than two decades without executions, today’s step transforms a precarious hiatus in executions into lasting legal protection upholding the right to life and bringing Lebanon in line with the global trend towards abolition,” Morayef said.

It is unclear how aggravated hard labour would be enforced, with some legislators saying the terms of the new punishment are not yet clear. Lebanon does have the punishment of hard labour written into law and court decisions, but even those have been rarely enforced in recent years due to cash-strapped Lebanon’s lack of resources and capacity within its overcrowded prisons.

Lebanon’s abolition of the death penalty comes as parliament also debates a controversial general amnesty law, the largest since the end of its 15-year civil war in 1990, that could reduce sentences or even release some people convicted of violence offences.

Family members of Lebanese soldiers and servicemen killed in attacks have repeatedly protested against the law, some saying they had hoped to see the perpetrators who killed their family members executed rather than be issued reduced prison sentences.

Kuwait has since the beginning of the Iran War in February been targeted by Iranian drones and missiles 1,400 times. Why has this state—smaller than the US state of New Jersey—been targeted more than any of its larger neighbors including Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates?

A military node

This question takes us all the way back to 1991 when the US intervenes when Iraq under Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. In return, Kuwait has since hosted one of the the largest US armies in the Middle East of 13,000 troops, and has the fourth biggest deployment of the US military globally. Furthermore, Kuwait is one of five U.S. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) sites across the world— a cornerstone of the US’ global military strategy as it allows for rapid deployment and display of influence. And not only does Kuwait not charge the US for its land use, or restrict US troop movements on its territory—unlike most other host countries—but indeed pays the US for its troop presence, and subsidies energy and water costs for the military bases.

A geostrategic asset  

In exchange, Kuwait’s geostrategic location on the Arabian peninsula and along the air corridor between Asia and Europe makes the country an important location for the US to secure its interests and exert influence in the region and beyond. Indeed, the US has designated Kuwait as a Major Non-Nato Ally since 2004, and has located its biggest air logistics facility in the Middle East in conjunction with Kuwait international airport. Thus, Kuwait has proven a key logistical hub for US military operations in the region including against the Islamic State and during the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

Furthermore, Kuwait holds 7% of the world’s oil reserves, reinforcing its importance for the US and other oil consuming countries, while also making it strategically vulnerable to Iranian attacks on energy plants in late July, as this adds to the ongoing energy insecurity created by the closure of the key oil trade route through the Strait of Hormuz.

The end of diplomatic balancing?

Despite these far-reaching strategic links with the US, Kuwait has long maintained a diplomatic balancing act, refusing to normalise relations with Israel while simultaneously refraining from condemning the Iranian regime. Moreover, Kuwait has often assumed the role of neutral mediator in the Middle East. For example, Kuwait mediated the 2021 rapprochement between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, and has contributed to peace efforts in Yemen. In addition, Kuwait has been much more cautious in its statements concerning the Iranian regime, unlike its vocally critical, yet less targeted neighbors such as the United Arab Emirates, and has even refused to allow the US to use military bases in Kuwait for launching attacks on Iran.

Geographic liabilities

Even so, Kuwait has fallen prey to its geography. For one, its geographical proximity to Iran makes Kuwait a comparatively cheap and easy target for Iranian missiles, while its lack of naturally occurring fresh water and consequent reliance on desalination provides Teheran an additional pressure point, as illustrated by Iranian attacks on desalination plants in late July. Furthermore, its proximity to Iraq has exposed it to attacks by Iraqi Shia militias, allied with Teheran.

And the risk of further attacks in the future is high. On 1 August, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that it would react ”decisively” against any US strikes, and warned Gulf states against permitting the US and Israel to use bases on their territories to launch attacks against Iran. Similarly, Iraq announced that its military forces stood ready to ‘thwart any attempts at targeting neighbouring countries within our regional sphere.’ Thus, recent developments suggest that Kuwait might no longer be able to remain an independent diplomatically oriented actor that can stay out of the conflicts in the Middle East.

Ideology

While Iran’s official rationale for the attacks has been to target US military targets and assets, the attacks on energy and desalination plants are neither; these are civilian infrastructures. Hence it is Kuwaiti civilians—not the US military capacity—that bear the brunt of the attacks. This suggests that Iranian attacks have not only immediate military objectives in context of the current war, but also underlying psychological and ideological motives, as these attacks can be seen as a way of scaring countries that go against Iran’s exhortations—reiterated since 1979–to its Gulf neighbors to cut ties with the US. In addition, the attacks expose the limitations of US security guarantee, and undermine the credibility of the US promises of stability and protection to its allies.

A change of strategy

Consequently, Kuwait may pivot toward building up more national military defence capabilities, as the deterrence guarantee that the well-accommodated US presence was supposed to provide has ostensibly failed, while Kuwait’s lack of domestic military resources to retaliate further enticed Iranian attacks.

Hence, it appears that the security order in the Middle East is set to become even more fragile, with the US increasingly proving incapable or unwilling to ensure what has long been considered a stabilising presence, and with regional actors increasingly divided and polarized, making neutral mediation harder.