Middle East

Israel has only ever been governed by coalitions. Can you put one together that reaches 61 of the Knesset’s 120 seats?

Israelis voted on October 27, but there appears to be no clear winner.

The next government, like every government in Israel’s history, will have to be a coalition.

The question now is who can secure at least 61 of the Knesset’s 120 seats to form a government and become Israel’s next prime minister.

Al Jazeera has built an interactive tool that lets you test different combinations of parties. Start with any of the four exit polls or enter your own seat numbers. Then add parties until your coalition reaches 61 seats. You can add an entire bloc at once or select parties individually.

Who is ahead?

Initial counting by the Central Elections Committee put Likud ahead as the largest single party, with 27 seats.

Netanyahu’s bloc was projected to win 54 seats, against 50 for Eisenkot’s.

Four exit polls published on election night showed how close the race is.

Kan 11 and Channel 13 put Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc and Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition bloc level at 51 seats each. Channel 12 gave Netanyahu 52 seats to Eisenkot’s 49, while Channel 15 was most favourable to the incumbent, projecting 55 seats for Netanyahu’s bloc against 49 for the opposition.

How many seats are needed?

Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, has 120 seats. Parties win seats in proportion to their share of the national vote, provided they clear the 3.25 percent threshold to enter parliament.

A government needs the support of at least 61 politicians to secure a majority.

Neither of the main blocs has reached that number in the exit polls or the initial count. The next step is to find enough parties willing to join forces to make up the difference.

Why is forming a government so difficult?

The Arab-led parties Ra’am and the Joint List could hold the balance of power, with exit polls putting their combined support at between 16 and 19 seats.

But the political obstacles are considerable. Netanyahu has described a coalition with Arab parties as “shameful”, while leading figures in the Jewish-led opposition have also ruled out governing with them.

That leaves potential coalitions that may work on paper but face serious political barriers.

Which parties belong to each bloc?

Netanyahu’s bloc spans Likud, the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, and the far-right parties Religious Zionism, led by Bezalel Smotrich, and Otzma Yehudit, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Eisenkot’s opposition bloc includes his Yashar party, the Together list associated with former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beytenu and Yair Golan’s Democrats.

What happens next?

Once the results are certified, the president gives the mandate to the member of the Knesset considered most likely to assemble a majority.

That politician has 28 days to form a government, with a possible extension of up to 14 days. If they fail, another lawmaker can be given a chance. If no one can form a government, Israel may have to hold another election, as it did repeatedly between 2019 and 2022.

Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, with 19 years in office across three stints, remains caretaker prime minister while coalition negotiations unfold. He is also standing trial on corruption charges, which he denies.

Official results are due on November 4. Negotiations to form a government could take considerably longer.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi surprised observers when he recently announced his intention to leave office after his third presidential term ends in April 2030.

El-Sisi had been widely suspected of moving to amend the Egyptian constitution to allow him to serve another term, or possibly indefinitely.

But speaking at a graduation ceremony at the Egyptian Military Academy, el-Sisi insisted that his departure was a settled matter and that “no one would tamper with” the constitution.

So what is behind the decision? There has been much speculation that el-Sisi may use this declaration to rally popular support for a fourth term or preempt a move by the military against him. But there is also the possibility that he is setting up the next phase of military rule in Egypt.

It is important to point out first that voluntarily leaving power is a risky proposition for any authoritarian leader.

In el-Sisi’s case, his 2030 departure would leave open the possibility that a future Egyptian government could seek to use him as a scapegoat for the country’s problems, possibly even holding him to account for alleged crimes committed during his presidency.

El-Sisi led a coup in 2013 against Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, which was accompanied by massacres and the jailing of tens of thousands of politicians, activists, and journalists.

El-Sisi’s economic record has also been the subject of criticism, with detractors accusing him and his government of corruption, poor fiscal policy and lavish spending on vanity projects. Egypt’s debt stands at 81 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), with interest payments alone exceeding combined spending on healthcare, education, wages and subsidies. Meanwhile, the Egyptian pound has lost more than 80 percent of its value against the US dollar since 2014, while cumulative inflation exceeds 460 percent.

In this context, el-Sisi’s announcement that he plans to step down in 2030 was rather unexpected. Some have speculated that he has no intention of actually leaving office and could go back on his statement, as he has done before.

In 2013, following Morsi’s overthrow, el-Sisi denied that he would run for president.

After telling the media in 2017 that he was committed to “preserving [the constitution’s] two four-year terms and not changing it”, he helped lead the drive to amend the constitution in 2019.

A judicial source told Mada Masr last week that el-Sisi’s announcement left open the door for a “popular call” for the president to remain in office.

A second possibility is that with this move, el-Sisi may be attempting to preempt a possible military intervention, which could become more likely if the economy continues to falter.

In 2011, the military responded to popular protests against former President Hosni Mubarak by forcing him to step down.

The army could attempt to defuse public anger by presenting el-Sisi as a scapegoat, forcibly removing him from power, and replacing him with someone who can preserve a measure of stability as well as secure its vast economic interests.

In that context, a member of parliament said recently that he has heard el-Sisi say in private meetings that he would rather step down than wait for the military to force him out.

But a third and much more likely possibility deserves particular attention: el-Sisi may be preparing to leave the presidency while ensuring that Egypt’s military-dominated political system survives his departure.

It is perhaps not coincidental that during the announcement, he cited Article 200 of the constitution, which gives the armed forces an extraordinary role in Egyptian politics.

The article, amended in 2019, makes the military responsible for maintaining the country’s “democracy” and the “gains, rights and freedoms” of the Egyptian people.

According to el-Sisi, the aim of the article is “to protect the Egyptian state from any attempt to infiltrate it or allow people to take it over who cannot handle the responsibility of this country or who do not even understand the meaning of ‘state’”.

Article 200, combined with Article 234 — which requires that a president secure approval from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces before appointing a defence minister — gives the military significant control over Egyptian political life.

El-Sisi’s vision for the selection of Egypt’s next president gives the military an outsized role. His proposal includes setting up a committee of experts to draft legislation for selecting hundreds of highly educated Egyptians to undergo specialised training at the Egyptian Military Academy.

Applicants, el-Sisi proposes, should hold doctoral degrees, be between 40 and 50 years of age, and be prepared to spend 30 months at the academy learning about the Egyptian state.

The programme would also train future ministers, governors and members of parliament.

Combined with Articles 200 and 234, this proposed mechanism seems intended to preserve the military’s dominance long after el-Sisi leaves office. It could be favourable to him as well.

A genuinely independent, civilian president could seek to investigate massacres overseen by el-Sisi, allegations of corruption, or other alleged crimes. A transition process closely managed by the military is highly unlikely to yield such a result.

The open question now is how an increasingly frustrated and critical Egyptian public will respond to a political process managed by the military that effectively wipes out the need for a popular mandate.

For now, el-Sisi and the military appear determined to shape Egypt’s political future. But the people may have the last word.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Foreign ministers form security committee to share intelligence and follow up on impact of Jordan’s strikes on Syria.

Syria is reopening its border crossing with Jordan, and the two countries will investigate Jordanian strikes on suspected ISIL (ISIS) sites that killed seven in southern Syria.

Nassib, Jordan’s only border crossing with Syria, will reopen on Wednesday morning, with regular passenger and commercial traffic resuming, the state news agency SANA reported.

The crossing was briefly closed following the Jordanian airstrikes, which targeted ISIL “hideouts” in southern Syria on Monday in response to a Greek Orthodox church shooting by gunmen in Jordan’s Karak on Friday, the Jordanian military said in a statement. ISIL took responsibility for the attack.

Jordan’s strikes on Syria killed at least seven people in Deraa and Suwayda, including five members of the same family, three of whom were children. Syria’s Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management said its teams had responded to attacks at four sites.

The two countries also agreed to form a security committee to examine the aftermath of the strikes, foreign ministers said in a statement following a phone call between the two countries’ top diplomats.

Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said Monday’s air attacks were based on field intelligence and aimed at “neutralising confirmed threats and imminent terrorist operations targeting Jordan’s security”.

Safadi expressed “deep regret” over civilian deaths in his call with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and stressed Jordan’s respect for Syria’s sovereignty and stability.

Jordan had claimed that the strikes were coordinated with the Syrian government, which Damascus denied.

In addition to investigating the attacks, the security committee will develop “field and intelligence coordination in dealing with terrorist threats” to ensure the protection of innocent civilians.

The church shooting claimed the lives of at least nine people and wounded 34 others. Jordanian security forces arrested two brothers and their brother-in-law on suspicion of carrying out the attack.

Despite narrower exit poll figures, opposition leaders insisted the result was a defeat for Netanyahu’s government.

Israeli political leaders have traded sharp reactions to exit poll projections showing no clear winner between the country’s main political blocs.

Updated figures broadcast by Israel’s Channel 13 showed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud-led coalition tied at 51 seats with the opposition bloc led by challenger Gadi Eisenkot in the 120-seat Knesset.

Despite narrower exit poll figures, opposition leaders insisted the result was a defeat for the government.

Eisenkot, head of the Yashar party and a former military chief of staff, told supporters after voting closed that the initial projections showed a “complete lack of confidence in Netanyahu and the October 7 government”, according to the AFP news agency.

“Don’t let anyone confuse you: the Netanyahu bloc has suffered a crushing defeat,” opposition leader Yair Lapid said in a statement. “This is a total collapse and the public has told them to go home.”

Under the updated figures, unaligned Arab parties were expected to hold 18 seats, leaving both major camps 10 seats short of the 61 required for an absolute majority.

Supporters at Eisenkot’s watch party in Tel Aviv cheered projections as voter turnout reached 77.7 percent, according to the Central Elections Committee.

However, senior figures in Netanyahu’s camp pushed back against opposition declarations, saying the final results could shift the balance.

Gideon Saar, Israel’s foreign minister and a key Netanyahu ally, dismissed opposition statements as “premature”, writing on social media that Likud remained the largest single party in parliament.

Meanwhile, leaders of Arab political factions highlighted their potential role in upcoming coalition negotiations.

“We will transform the mandate we received into a new reality in the country,” Mansour Abbas, leader of the United Arab List (Ra’am), told reporters.

At the Joint List alliance headquarters in Nazareth, candidate Faten Gattas told supporters that high participation among Palestinian citizens of Israel aimed to block the return of Netanyahu’s nationalist coalition.

“We refuse the occupation and racism, and we will remain here,” Gattas said, according to the Reuters news agency.

With neither camp reaching a governing majority, political analysts suggested smaller parties would be key deciders as formal coalition talks begin in the coming days.

Record-breaking voter turnout in Palestinian-Israeli communities around 80 percent, early indications show.

Israel’s Arab parties are projected to win 18 seats in the Israeli parliament, exit polls indicate, after voting among Palestinian citizens of Israel surged to their highest levels in decades.

Exit polling data from Tuesday’s vote suggested that the leading Arab-led parties, the Joint List and Ra’am, are set to hold a record number of seats in the 120-member Knesset. Updated exit polling indicated that the opposition bloc led by former Israeli military chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party and the bloc led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party were tied at 51 seats each.

Early indications put voter turnout among Palestinian citizens of Israel at around 80 percent, historic numbers that break 1999 records, Israel’s Channel 12 reported on Tuesday.

The leader of Ra’am, or the United Arab List, Mansour Abbas, said he hopes the final election results will allow the anti-Netanyahu bloc, including his party, to win the 61 seats required to form a government.

“With the numbers we have now, there is no government,” Abbas told Israel’s Channel 12.

Abbas, whose Ra’am party currently holds five seats in the Knesset and joined the coalition that governed Israel from 2021 to 2022, added that both main blocs reached out to his party before and after the election.

‘Arabs can’t be kept outside’

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Alon Pinkas, a former Israeli ambassador, said creating a government might prove difficult for parties such as Eisenkot’s – which earlier exit polls had put narrowly ahead – because they promised not to form coalitions with Arab parties during the campaign.

“There’s a price to pay,” Pinkas said, because the “Arabs can’t be kept outside and only being considered and co-opted when you need their votes”.

He added that the Arab-led lists will make demands that a Jewish-led coalition government may not support.

Netanyahu and his far-right coalition made last-ditch efforts on Tuesday to get their supporters to the polls, warning of surging voter turnout among Palestinian citizens of Israel, a tactic Arab politicians denounced as racist and inflammatory.

Cars flying Netanyahu’s Likud party flags drove through Jerusalem blaring the Islamic call to prayer and urging supporters to cast their ballots because “Arabs are voting”, witnesses said.

In social media posts, the embattled prime minister highlighted long queues at polling stations in Arab communities and published an image that he said showed Arab voters, including women wearing the niqab, a veil that covers the lower half of the face, waiting to vote.

“If we don’t wake up now, we’ll find ourselves with a government of Mansour Abbas and Ahmad Tibi,” he said, referring to two leading Palestinian members of the Knesset.

Overall voter turnout was also historic, reaching its highest level since 1999 with 77.7 percent casting ballots in Tuesday’s election, the Central Elections Committee reported. Palestinian citizens of Israel make up about 21 percent of the country’s population of 10 million and have traditionally voted at lower rates than Jewish Israelis.

‘Existential moment’

Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh, reporting from Ramallah in the occupied West Bank, called the election “an existential moment for Palestinian-Israelis”.

She noted the record turnout among what has emerged as a key voting bloc, which drew “even [voters] who would usually boycott elections, who didn’t believe it would amount to any kind of influence, that it would change their reality, that it would alter the systemic discrimination that they face”.

The Knesset has passed more than 100 laws discriminating against Palestinian citizens of Israel, who also face discrimination in receiving state funds, Odeh said.

Al-Bureij, Gaza Strip – A Sack of Flour, an 11-minute documentary by the emerging filmmaker Mona Abu Qass, draws on her personal experience to examine Israel’s use of starvation against Palestinians in Gaza during Israel’s genocidal war on the enclave.

The film is one of five documentaries by Palestinian women screened Monday at the opening of the second Gaza International Women’s Film Festival, which also marked the official launch of the Gaza Cinema Academy.

The event took place at the site of the al-Nakheel Hall in al-Bureij, central Gaza, under the slogan “Women Creating Life from Death”. The hall is destroyed, like the majority of buildings in Gaza, after three years of Israel’s war, which has killed more than 74,000 Palestinians.

The film captures Palestinians’ struggle to find food in Gaza, the dangers at aid distribution points and the lives lost while trying to obtain flour.

Through Abu Qass’s own experiences, A Sack of Flour explores how the trauma of hunger continues to affect families even after food becomes available again.

Those experiences have renewed relevance as Israeli restrictions on goods entering Gaza and cuts to food assistance have caused shortages and fears of a return to famine.

“The idea for the film stems from a personal experience and a true story,” Abu Qass told Al Jazeera. “It documents daily life in Gaza, weighed down by bombardment, destruction, siege, hunger, and loss.”

“I want to capture details that reveal suffering and people’s determination to hold on to their life,” she added. “I seek to show reality as people experience it and help viewers understand what the war has done to their relationships, dreams, and hopes.”

Highlighting struggles of the disabled

Another film, Beyond Silence, by emerging filmmaker and journalist Raghda al-Buhaisi, explores wartime struggles in Gaza for people with disabilities through the story of a deaf artist who never learned to read, write or communicate through sign language. His art studio in southern Gaza’s Rafah was destroyed by Israel, and his parents and several family members were killed.

After being displaced to Deir el-Balah in central Gaza, another family took him in and set up a modest studio by the roadside. His paintings reflect loss and displacement, expressing what words cannot through colour and line.

“I want to highlight the additional challenges people with disabilities face during war, including displacement, family loss, and the destruction of livelihoods,” al-Buhaisi told Al Jazeera. “Art can cross barriers of language and silence, turning an individual experience of pain into a visual message that conveys Gaza’s suffering to the world.”

Alongside those films were three others by emerging Palestinian women filmmakers – Soso: The Lifeline, Remnants of Light, and Dandana. The films document life in Gaza and the suffering brought by war.

Soso: The Lifeline follows an orphaned child and his donkey, who help people survive in Gaza. Remnants of Light follows a filmmaker struggling with the loss of her family and home, while Dandana tells the story of a mother whose eight children were killed, and who turns to Palestinian songs with her surviving family to cope with her grief.

The five documentaries were produced through a filmmaking diploma programme that began in March and brought together 25 young Palestinian women.

Preserving Gaza’s stories

Festival director Ezzedine Shallah said the films draw on experiences women and girls lived through during the war, offering visual testimony to daily life and giving women space to tell their stories in their own voices.

“Though their subjects differ, the films turn individual pain into broader human stories, revealing war’s psychological and social scars,” he told Al Jazeera. “They preserve stories that might otherwise never reach the screen, transforming suffering into cinematic testimony and bringing Gaza’s stories to audiences beyond its borders.”

The festival, which runs until October 31, features 73 films from 24 countries and offers a broader platform for filmmakers from Gaza and beyond.

But even with events like the festival, filmmaking in Gaza comes with formidable challenges. The destruction of cultural institutions, scarce equipment, limited funding, power and internet outages, and the pressures of war and displacement have severely restricted opportunities for film production. Women filmmakers also struggle to access training, production opportunities and international festivals.

Filmmaker Rima Mahmoud, a co-founder of the festival, said that war and the Israeli siege on Gaza – which predates 2023 – have hindered young women’s filmmaking, pushing some to use simple methods, self-fund projects and document Gaza’s reality even with the difficulties.

“Despite limited resources, these films deserve international exposure,” Mahmoud said. “Their makers need technical and financial support, translation, and partnerships with festivals and platforms.”

Resisting attempts at erasure

Palestinian filmmaker Mai Masri, based in Lebanon and another co-founder of the festival, said the films help young women tell their own stories, resist erasure and preserve collective memory, while building skills and accessing work in Gaza or through digital platforms.

The academy has also developed a filmmaking diploma in cooperation with al-Quds Open University and accredited by the Palestinian Ministry of Education.

Masri said that the academy is also now trying to help directors reach international festivals.

“We are seeking agreements with distributors to screen these films in educational and cultural institutions outside Palestine, and through international platforms and festivals focused on women’s and human rights,” she said.

“This would bring the voices of Palestinian women to a global audience, shed light on their human experiences and artistic creativity, strengthen the presence of Palestinian cinema internationally, and open new horizons for young female directors to reach global screening platforms and film festivals,” Masri added.

BREAKINGBREAKING,

The official results are due to be published on November 4, more than a week after the vote.

Exit polls following what many pundits and voters have billed as the most pivotal election in Israel’s history indicate no clear winner in the hard-fought contest.

According to exit polls, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc is projected to secure 50 seats, while the bloc led by opposition candidate Gadi Eisenkot is expected to win 52 or 53 seats. Sixty-one seats are needed to form a majority government. Arab parties are projected to collectively win 18 seats.

Polling stations closed at 10pm (20:00 GMT) local time. Preliminary results are expected on Wednesday, followed by a final tally on Friday. The official results are due to be published on November 4, eight days after the vote.

Exit polls are based on interviews with voters immediately after they have cast their ballots. The interviews help project the election’s outcome and have in previous elections tended to anticipate the results closely.

Voter turnout in the Israeli election reached 74.3 percent as of 8pm (18:00 GMT), according to data released by the Central Elections Committee. By comparison, turnout in the 2022 election was 70.63 percent.

Polls predicted a tight race between incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and leading opposition candidate Gadi Eisenkot, the leader of the Yashar party and a former army chief.

Israel’s Central Elections Committee rejected a request by Netanyahu’s Likud Party to extend voting hours.

The election is the first since Israel launched its genocidal war on Gaza three years ago, following Hamas-led attacks on the country, and is widely seen as a referendum on Netanyahu’s handling of the events on October 7, 2023 and the conflicts that followed.

The deportation was the first of its kind since a mass border crossing into the territory from Morocco in July.

Spain has deported more than a dozen migrants from its North African enclave of Ceuta, prompting criticism from Amnesty International, which said Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s left-wing government was endangering their human rights.

It was the first deportation of its kind since a mass border crossing into the territory from Morocco in July.

The Spanish Interior Ministry said on Tuesday that it had deported the migrants from Ceuta after their asylum applications were rejected, and that Morocco had agreed to receive them.

Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) told the Reuters news agency that 16 people from African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries had been deported.

About 80,000 people entered from Morocco over a 48-hour period in late July. At least 100 people died during the mass crossing into the autonomous city, which covers just 18.5 square kilometres (7.2sq miles) and has a population of about 80,000.

The crisis has evolved into a major political challenge for Sanchez, who is seeking re-election in snap polls scheduled for November 29.

Tens of thousands of protesters have gathered across Spain in recent months to denounce the government’s handling of the situation. Meanwhile, right-wing parties have used the crisis to attack Sanchez.

The leader of the far-right Vox Party, Santiago Abascal, has branded the prime minister a “traitor”.

Human rights guarantees

Amnesty International has warned that the human rights of those deported from Ceuta on Tuesday could be at risk.

“Spain, despite its [progressive] speeches in Europe, is not ensuring that human rights guarantees are met for people who cross its borders in Ceuta and Melilla,” said Virginia Alvarez, an Amnesty International researcher.

“Morocco does not respect many human rights.”

However, Madrid disputes the rights group’s accusations. In a statement, the interior ministry told Reuters that the European Union considers Morocco to be a safe country, adding that deportations are carried out “with all the necessary safeguards”.

Most of those who entered Ceuta in late July left within days. However, about 8,000 migrants still remain. Some are sleeping on the streets, while others are being housed by Spain, charities and civil society groups.

Almost 45 percent of Israelis had cast a ballot by mid-afternoon, but questions have been raised about possible voter suppression in Arab towns.

Almost 45 percent of Israeli voters had cast a ballot by mid-afternoon on Tuesday, according to Israel’s Central Elections Committee, marking the highest election turnout by 2pm (12:00 GMT) in 50 years.

The figure was 6 percent higher than at the same time in the last elections in 2022.

Mitchell Barak, a pollster and former aide to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, told Al Jazeera that voter turnout “is really high and that’s good”.

“I think … it will probably pass its historic peak in ‘73 – when Israel was also involved in a huge war – so draw what conclusion from that you will,” he added.

The election is largely seen as a referendum on Netanyahu’s handling of the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks and the wars that followed, the most intense period of combat for Israel since the 1973 surprise military campaign by Egypt and Syria.

“Those numbers are going to help the incumbent parties,” Barak said, “as the 3.25 percent threshold a party needs to get into the Knesset remains, the number of votes you need to meet that threshold increases dramatically.”

Israeli officials noted that several polling stations had faced exceptionally long lines, which were attributed to high voter turnout despite rainy and blustery weather in parts of the country, and a flood warning in some areas.

Arab vote

In a message more than five hours after polls opened, Netanyahu urged supporters to vote, saying turnout was high among his opponents on the left and among Palestinian citizens of Israel, about a fifth of the population.

“We need it to be high too. You all need to stream to the polls,” he said. “This is a fateful moment.”

Netanyahu had repeatedly warned supporters of the prospect of high turnout among Palestinian citizens in Israel ahead of the vote, seeking to mobilise his base under the slogan “the right or Palestine”.

Those voters were casting ballots in “unprecedented” numbers, Palestinian candidate Ahmed Tibi said.

Netanyahu and his main rival Gadi Eisenkot have ruled out partnering with Arab parties, citing a lack of shared values, although some possible scenarios envision them propping up a minority government to ensure Netanyahu is removed from office.

Meanwhile, an Israeli rights group has filed a complaint with the country’s election commission warning that widespread delays could be suppressing the vote among Israeli Palestinians.

Though delays could be a result of high voter turnout, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) said in its complaint to the Central Elections Committee that delays had been reported in at least 18 communities. It asked the committee to investigate “whether these delays are deliberate.”

The ACRI also reported “a large presence” of police and National Guard officers at a polling station in the Negev Desert, raising concerns that officers were using crowd control as a pretext to prevent people from entering to vote.

Strikes hit a major bridge in the Ukrainian capital as leaders push for ‘direct discussions’ to end the war.

Russia has attacked transport infrastructure in Ukraine’s capital, targeting a major bridge, as the leaders of Finland and Norway held a rare call with Russian President Vladimir Putin and a separate one with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Officials in Kyiv said the South Bridge was hit in overnight attacks on the city ⁠⁠that included 16 ballistic missiles and more ⁠⁠than 280 drones. Zelenskyy said Russian forces struck again while emergency crews were still dealing with the aftermath of the initial strikes.

“This is a serious escalation in Russia’s campaign targeting our logistics,” he said.

Russian attacks also caused deaths and injuries in the cities of Kharkiv and Pavlohrad.

Russia’s Defence Ministry said on Telegram that its forces had targeted transport infrastructure in Kyiv and a logistics hub in the Kharkiv region, along with industrial sites and cargo vessels it said were serving military purposes.

Officials in the Russian-controlled part of Ukraine’s southeastern Zaporizhzhia region said a drone strike on a bus killed one person and injured 30 others.

One person was also killed and six others were wounded in a drone attack on the Russian city of Bryansk, near the Ukrainian border.

The attacks come as the warring sides prepare for talks. On Friday, Kyiv and Moscow said they had agreed to hold United States-mediated technical meetings in Abu Dhabi in early November.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store called Putin from Helsinki on Tuesday to convey messages on future negotiations ahead of the Abu Dhabi meetings, according to a statement from both governments.

Zelenskyy, who spoke to the pair afterwards, said on X that they had told Putin real steps were needed to de-escalate attacks on Ukraine’s energy facilities and infrastructure. He said they also discussed preparations for the November talks.

“There must be peace, de-escalation is needed, and Russia must stop dragging out the war,” he said.

In the Finnish-Norwegian statement, Stubb said the war’s outcome would directly affect the security of Finland and Norway, both of which border Russia, and of Europe more widely.

“Ending the war requires direct discussions,” he said.

Store said the two leaders had stressed the importance of de-escalation during the call.

Both leaders said they spoke for their own countries, not Europe, and that Finnish and Norwegian support for Ukraine would continue.

Most Western European leaders have avoided direct contact with Putin since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022.

The calls come amid a renewed US push to end the war. The two governments described Tuesday’s call, held in consultation with Ukraine, as a follow-up to talks in Oslo on October 20 with Zelenskyy and US special envoy Steve Witkoff.

Witkoff met Putin in St Petersburg the next day, after which the Kremlin said it was ready to resume US-mediated talks with Kyiv that stalled in February.

US President Donald Trump has also credited his wife, First Lady Melania Trump, with securing a localised ceasefire in the southern Kherson region, which took effect on Tuesday to allow aid into the Russian-controlled town of Oleshky.

Dutch withdrawal is the latest in a number of boycotts by countries unhappy about Israel’s inclusion.

The Netherlands has withdrawn from next year’s Eurovision Song Contest, its public broadcaster NPO has confirmed, citing “sensitivities” over Israel’s participation.

“We have known for some time that Israel’s participation elicits various reactions in society and causes discussion and division,” the NPO’s media director Jurre Bosman said in a statement.

“Therefore, after consultation with the board of broadcasters, the NPO has decided to forgo participation in 2027.”

The announcement follows a decision in August by Dutch broadcaster AVROTROS to boycott the competition. AVROTROS, which usually selects the Netherlands’ entry and broadcasts the show, said the event could “no longer be considered neutral”.

NPO stepped in last month, saying it would take responsibility for the Dutch entry to the competition, before reversing course on Tuesday.

Jet de Ranitz, NPO’s executive chairman, acknowledged that the decision would disappoint fans but stressed that the contest would still be aired on public channels.

“Due to the sensitivities surrounding the themes currently at play, we have decided to take a step back for the time being,” De Ranitz said.

The announcement follows the Netherlands’ boycott of the 2026 edition. Iceland, Spain, Ireland, and Slovenia all pulled out, with the latter three refusing to broadcast the show at all.

More withdrawals

In August, the organisers announced that countries would be unable to host the competition if “an armed conflict, a sensitive geopolitical situation, or any other situation materially affects the security, safety or stability of their state or immediate region.”

But that has not prevented withdrawals, with Ireland already having announced that it will not be participating in next year’s contest for the second year in a row.

Earlier this month, the Czech broadcaster also pulled out of next year’s event, but cited spending cuts as the reason.

Bulgaria will host next year’s edition of Eurovision for the first time in the Black Sea city of Burgas, after Bulgarian singer Darina Yotova, known as Dara, won this year’s contest in Vienna, Austria, with her catchy floor-filler ‘Bangaranga’. 

Since its first edition in 1956, Eurovision has become the world’s biggest live televised music event. It catapulted Swedish icons ABBA to worldwide fame, as well as boosting artists such as Celine Dion and Olivia Newton-John. 

Developments in the Gulf since the beginning of this year have raised fundamental questions about the security of the region in general and Qatar in particular. How can Qatar and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states become effective, independent military powers that do not rely on external security guarantees to ensure their safety?

The question for Qatar is how it can build, over the next five years, a national defence capability that would enable it to protect the state and its vital interests even in the absence of Gulf or regional support, or if the United States provides only limited assistance. The aim is to explore whether Qatar can achieve what might be described as defence autonomy, rather than isolation. In other words, Qatar should remain open to alliances and partnerships without making its security dependent on the decisions of another state.

Qatar is a small country in terms of geography and population, but it enjoys numerous advantages. It has highly valuable critical infrastructure, a sensitive geographical location and an economy that depends heavily on the uninterrupted flow of energy exports, trade and shipping to almost every part of the world. At the same time, it possesses substantial financial resources, extensive international relationships, a major military base hosting US forces, advanced air defence capabilities and a network of political relationships that give it influence beyond its physical size.

These advantages, however, do not amount to “strategic autonomy”. In a major crisis such as the one the region has been experiencing for several months, Qatar’s protection remains heavily dependent on the US. Nor does reliance on the collective capabilities of the GCC provide sufficient assurance that its member states would be able, or willing, to take risks in defence of another member.

Against this backdrop, Qatar’s policy objective over the next five years should be to design and build an independent national strategy based on the capacity to prevent threats, withstand attacks and maintain continuity. The goal should be to achieve defence autonomy, rather than to build an army capable of confronting a major regional power on its own.

Such a strategy would rest on six pillars:

• Air and missile defence
• Early warning capabilities and information sovereignty
• Protection of critical infrastructure
• Air and naval power
• Cybersecurity and electronic warfare
• Restructuring security and military policy around the principle of multiple security guarantees rather than dependence on a single guarantor

Defence autonomy

Qatar does not need to exhaust its resources building the capabilities required to fight an all-out war alone against a major regional power, regardless of which power that might be. Such an ambition would be unrealistic for a country with limited territory and population.

A more realistic objective is to achieve a degree of defence autonomy appropriate for a small state such as Qatar. This means being able to perform a number of essential tasks without waiting for assistance from others.

These include, but are not limited to:

• Detecting threats and identifying their nature before they reach Qatari territory
• Delaying or absorbing an initial strike
• Protecting the country’s leadership and strategic centres
• Maintaining energy and water supplies, electricity, communications, ports and airports
• Keeping political and economic activities functioning during a crisis
• Imposing sufficiently high costs on an aggressor to force it to reconsider its calculations
• Withstanding a prolonged crisis without making the state’s continued functioning conditional on the arrival of external forces

To carry out these tasks effectively, the strategy should focus on the following priorities:

First: Building an integrated Qatari air defence shield

This is the most important gap that needs to be addressed. Possessing advanced fighter aircraft and air defence systems is not enough to make Qatar militarily autonomous. What is needed is an integrated national air and missile defence system.

The objective by 2031 should not be to possess the best defence system, but one that continues to function even in the absence of US forces or any other external security guarantor.

Such a system should include:

• A multilayered Qatari radar network
• Integration of civilian and military radar systems
• A unified national command and control centre
• Integration of short, medium and long-range air defences
• Expanded counter-drone capabilities
• Stronger electronic warfare capabilities and equipment
• Low-cost interception systems for small targets
• Enhanced mobile protection for radar installations and command centres
• Large national stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts

Second: An air force designed for independence

Qatar currently possesses an advanced air fleet. But the independence of an air force cannot be measured by the number of aircraft it operates. The crucial question is whether the Qatari air force can sustain operations for several consecutive weeks if external supply lines are disrupted.

For the answer to be yes, Qatar must develop the capacity to continue air operations even without direct US or other foreign support, albeit at a reduced level.

This requires policymakers and those responsible for developing the national defence strategy to focus on the following priorities over the next five years:

• Increasing ammunition stockpiles, whether through domestic production or imports
• Expanding domestic defence manufacturing capabilities and strengthening maintenance capacity
• Training more Qatari personnel to carry out a range of functions, including maintenance
• Building up dispersed ammunition stockpiles rather than concentrating them in a single location
• Increasing stocks of drones and other unmanned aircraft
• Developing ground and aerial refuelling capabilities and strengthening logistical support

Third: The sea as a second line of defence

For Qatar, a peninsula surrounded by water on three sides, protecting its maritime domain is not merely a military concern. It is also an economic necessity of the highest importance.

Liquefied natural gas, oil exports and imports all depend on the security of the surrounding waters. Qatar should therefore develop a naval force suited to its needs, equipped with advanced technology and capabilities.

The objective is not to build a large fleet, but to make attacks on Qatar’s maritime infrastructure both difficult and costly.

This requires a focus on several important priorities:

• Continuously improving and expanding maritime surveillance capabilities to protect Qatar’s waters and offshore installations
• Strengthening and developing capabilities to counter maritime drones
• Enhancing the protection of ports and securing shipping routes

Fourth: A national resilience programme

The most serious vulnerability of a country with limited territory and population lies in its infrastructure. A successful attack on a small number of critical facilities could have severe and far-reaching consequences for the entire country.

Given the importance of this threat, the national defence strategy should include the establishment of what might be called a “national resilience and protection programme”.

Such a programme would aim to protect critical infrastructure, including gas and energy facilities, water desalination plants, power stations, telecommunications centres and towers, civilian and military airports, ports and fuel networks, hospitals, government institutions and data centres.

One aspect of this protection is ensuring that every sector has adequate backup capacity. If a major desalination plant were to stop operating for any reason, for example, an alternative source of supply should be available to prevent a water supply problem from escalating into a national crisis. The same principle should apply to every other sector.

Fifth: Qatar must know what is happening around it before the US does

Military independence begins with information. Qatar therefore needs to develop its own national capabilities in the following areas:

• Space-based reconnaissance
• Unmanned aerial vehicles
• Radar systems
• Electronic intelligence
• Artificial intelligence-driven data analysis

This does not mean that Qatar needs to launch large satellites for every mission. Instead, it should work towards building an integrated system combining commercial and military satellites, international partnerships and national capabilities for collecting and analysing data.

The underlying principle is that Qatar should not depend on an external party to inform it of a threat approaching its territory.

Qatar will undoubtedly continue to need intelligence from the US, France, the United Kingdom and other countries. Nevertheless, it must possess the independent capacity to produce its own national intelligence picture, assess the nature of threats and determine how to prepare for them at an early stage, before requesting assistance from allies or partners.

Sixth: Diversifying security guarantees

The events of this year have demonstrated to all GCC states the importance of diversifying their alliances and security guarantees rather than relying on a single external power, particularly the US.

That power could become involved in future international crises, decide for one reason or another to limit its direct involvement in regional crises, or even reduce its military presence.

This makes it necessary to adopt a forward-looking approach based on diversifying alliances and making the security of the Gulf a matter of global interest requiring international cooperation.

In this context, GCC states could benefit from partnerships with South Korea, Turkiye and certain European powers, as well as regional powers such as Pakistan and China in specific fields, without hastily abandoning cooperation with the US.

The objective is to reduce the risks associated with dependence on a single supplier or ally. Such diversification does not mean building an alliance against the US.

Achieving defence and political autonomy for Qatar by 2031 does not mean isolating the country from its partners or dispensing with existing alliances. Rather, it means developing national capabilities that can ensure the protection of the state and its vital interests under all circumstances.

This strategic objective requires the development of an integrated air defence system, stronger intelligence and cyber capabilities, and better protection of critical infrastructure. It also requires improving the effectiveness of Qatar’s air and naval forces to ensure resilience and allow state institutions to continue functioning during a crisis.

Defence autonomy also requires diversifying international partnerships and establishing multiple security guarantees to reduce dependence on any single external power.

The foundation of this strategy is a transition from dependence on external protection towards the ability to deter threats, withstand crises and make independent national decisions at the appropriate time, while remaining open to international cooperation and partnerships.

A version of this piece in Arabic was originally published by Al Jazeera Arabic here.

For the majority of Israelis, the general election on October 27 is a choice between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the forces that oppose him, led by former general Gadi Eisenkot. But for the Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 20 percent of the population, the upcoming polls present a different dilemma.

As the political mainstream in Israel continues to shift to the far right, Palestinian citizens face growing threats to their political and collective rights. Palestinian communities in Israel experience increased violence, while settlers are encroaching on their boundaries. The recent push to expand policing and militarisation of civilian life is another source of growing anxiety within the Palestinian population.

In this context, the anti-Netanyahu bloc does not seem to offer the prospect of policy reversal or change. Therefore, the question on many Palestinian minds is whether voting in the Israeli elections can make any difference at all.

Recolonisation of 1948 Palestine

Since the Nakba of 1948, the Palestinians who managed to remain in their homes in what was declared as territory of the new State of Israel have had a different fate than the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In 1952, they were granted Israeli citizenship, and in 1966, the martial law under which they were forced to live was lifted.

Although Palestinian citizens of Israel have the right to vote and participate in politics, citizenship has not shielded them from the broader system of dispossession and attempts to reshape their Palestinian identity and national belonging.

Through land confiscation and the regulation of education and culture, the Israeli state has sought to detach Palestinians from their historical roots and collective past, promoting instead a model of the “Arab Israeli” as a citizen whose identity is separate from its Palestinian and Arab national context.

Formal citizenship has not secured substantive equality for Palestinians as they face discriminatory laws, systemic underfunding of basic services, and political and socioeconomic marginalisation.

Instead of engaging in direct violence towards Palestinian citizens – as it has done in the West Bank and Gaza – the Israeli state has instead “outsourced” brutality to criminal networks.

As a result, Palestinian communities have faced killings, shootings, bombings and arson while Israeli law enforcement has largely ignored the problem. More recently, this problem has escalated, as organised crime groups obtained advanced weapons reportedly stolen from Israeli army stockpiles or smuggled across borders. This growing militarisation of organised crime has claimed hundreds of lives.

In parallel, Israeli settlements next to Palestinian communities have expanded, accompanied by accelerated seizure of land. This process of “recolonisation” began in mixed cities, such as Jaffa and Lydd, where religious-nationalist settler groups started establishing themselves in Palestinian neighbourhoods in 2021.

Since October 2023, this process has accelerated. In August, Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich unveiled his party’s plan to “Judaise” the Naqab and northern Israel. He proposes to add one million Jewish residents to the two regions, establishing 40 new settlements and dozens of farms, expanding existing settlements, and creating hundreds of thousands of new housing units.

The idea is to extend the model of territorial control from the occupied West Bank into the Naqab and northern Israel, where Palestinian communities are concentrated.

There are also indications that the policing of Palestinian towns and villages could increasingly fall under the National Guard, established under National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

The idea of creating the force was prompted by the May 2021 protests, known as the Dignity Uprising, which spread across Palestinian communities in Lydd, Haifa, Umm al-Fahm, and dozens of other towns and villages.

Ben-Gvir has advocated expanding the state’s capacity to suppress such unrest. Although the National Guard’s precise role and operational framework remain under development, its potential deployment against mass protests raises serious concerns about the right to protest and the protection of democratic freedoms.

The government has strengthened settler security squads and integrated them into a broader security framework, raising concerns about the growing role of armed civilian groups in enforcing control over Palestinian communities.

At the same time, Ben-Gvir has widened access to personal firearms, issuing 300,000 gun licences since taking office.

Together, these measures normalise civilian policing and deepen the militarisation of everyday life, reinforcing the unequal distribution of coercive power in a society structured on the dispossession and subordination of Palestinians.

The Palestinian response

Parties seeking to represent Palestinian citizens of Israel, such as the United Arab List (Ra’am), led by Mansour Abbas, have long argued that parliamentary participation and support for the anti-Netanyahu camp can help remove the far right from power and halt its settler-colonial agenda. But the party’s own track record proves this premise wrong.

Ra’am joined the coalition government formed after the elections in 2021, which excluded Netanyahu, but it failed to bring about fundamental changes in the conditions of Palestinian citizens. The coalition was fragile and often rocked by deep ideological contradictions.

In 2022, Mazen Ghnaim, a member of Ra’am, publicly acknowledged that he could not push through policies that would benefit the Palestinian population, despite his party being part of the ruling coalition and despite promises being made that such policies would be accepted. He also lamented the heavy criticism he faced whenever he was visiting Palestinian communities.

Ra’am’s experience in that coalition illustrated the challenge of sustaining Palestinian political participation in a government whose other constituent parties uphold exclusionary nationalist policies.

The problem, therefore, extends beyond Netanyahu himself: Palestinian support for the anti-Netanyahu camp cannot translate into meaningful policies that challenge the broader structures of discrimination and dispossession Palestinian citizens of Israel face.

Voting may offer a way to slow down this project, but it cannot reverse the deeper transformation taking place within Israeli society. The cultural shift towards fascism extends beyond the government and its political leadership, becoming increasingly embedded in social attitudes and everyday life.

That said, I believe another four years of far-right rule would pose an immediate threat to Palestinian communities and their rights. Therefore, I will vote in Tuesday’s election.

But Palestinians need to recognise that electoral participation must be accompanied by a more radical political response capable of confronting the structures and ideologies driving this transformation. This requires, among other things, reforming the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel and rooting it more firmly in Palestinian society through popular committees and grassroots organising.

It also demands a broader commitment to democratisation and de-Zionisation across historic Palestine, as part of a larger political project aimed at building a different future through alternative institutions, mechanisms, and forms of collective action.

Whatever the Israeli state might claim, the fate of the Palestinian citizens of Israel is tied to the fate of the rest of the Palestinian population. That is a realisation that Palestinian political leaders must finally embrace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Doha, Qatar – African countries are feeling the economic fallout from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, with rising fuel and fertiliser prices threatening to drive up food costs, according to trade ministers from the region and the United Nations’ top trade official.

The crisis around the Strait of Hormuz due to the United States and Israel’s war on Iran needs to be resolved “sooner rather than later”, Luz Maria de la Mora, director of the Division on International Trade and Commodities at UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), told Al Jazeera at the World Investment Forum on Monday. She warned that soaring fertiliser prices could affect harvests next year.

“Prices of fertilisers have risen dramatically … so many countries have decided to reduce the use of fertilisers, which will have an effect next year in terms of crops,” she said.

“It may have an effect on availability of food and prices of food.”

The US-Israel war on Iran has highlighted the world’s heavy reliance on the strategic waterway, through which one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade previously passed.

Against this backdrop, Doha hosted UNCTAD’s World Investment Forum on October 25 and 26, bringing together heads of state, policymakers, CEOs and investors to discuss global investment and sustainable development.

The Strait of Hormuz’s disruption has rippled through African economies. In Zimbabwe, rising fuel and fertiliser prices are a critical concern in a country where more than 70 percent of the population depends on agriculture, Monica Mutsvangwa, the country’s minister of women affairs, community, small and medium enterprise development, told Al Jazeera.

Uganda, another heavily agrarian economy, has also been hit, with fuel prices more than doubling, Sanjay Tanna, the country’s minister of trade, industry and cooperatives, told Al Jazeera.

The impact extends beyond the immediate cost of energy. Rising oil prices have disrupted supply chains, with effects lasting longer than anticipated, according to de la Mora.

“The effects are lasting longer than we would have expected or would have wanted,” she said.

‘Friend to all, enemy to none’

The shock has also exposed differences in how African economies weather global disruption.

Uganda’s reliance on subsistence farming has helped cushion the impact, with domestic food production offering some protection from international market volatility, said Tanna.

But the country has not been insulated from financial pressures: its currency has lost 10 percent of its value against the US dollar, the minister said. The Ugandan shilling has steadily declined since mid-2026.

For Zimbabwe, the crisis has reinforced the importance of attracting investment while maintaining economic ties across geopolitical divides.

Amid the simmering trade war between the US and China, Harare considers itself a potential partner to investors from either side, Mutsvangwa said.

“We are a friend to all and an enemy to none,” she said.

“Money has no color … If we get an investor who comes into our country, follows the rules and regulations of the country, makes his money, and Zimbabwe develops, that’s what we want.”

The official pointed to Zimbabwe’s deposits of more than 60 critical minerals, including lithium and graphite, as well as its tourism potential.

Trade in an unequal system

But attracting foreign capital remains a challenge for developing economies, with investment concentrated in a relatively small number of countries.

That concentration is “very understandable”, de la Mora said, arguing that investors need confidence that their money will generate returns.

“Capital is risk averse. Capital needs to have certainty that its investment is going to yield returns and it’s going to come to fruition,” she said.

Governments can help build that confidence through transparent institutions, the rule of law and investment in infrastructure, including reliable electricity, energy supplies and digital connectivity, she added.

The question of whether the international trading system treats all countries equally prompted a more blunt assessment from Uganda’s trade minister.

“Of course not,” said Tanna. “The world cannot be equal … It’s unfair, but we believe that, within the space that we are in, we are in a good space.”

Uganda was well placed for the future, he argued, because it produces its own food – an advantage at a time when international supply chains are under pressure.

For both Uganda and the Republic of Congo, building resilient economies also means investing in younger generations.

The Republic of Congo’s Deputy Prime Minister for Coordination, Development Infrastructure and Land Planning, Jean-Jacques Bouya, said the country had aligned its national development plan, Vision 2063, with the African Union’s broader development ambitions.

Connectivity – through electricity, digital infrastructure and physical links – is central to that strategy, he told Al Jazeera.

The Republic of Congo also wants to expand local processing so that more value from its natural resources remains within the country.

“Africa can no longer be a reservoir of raw materials, and neither can Congo – a place where raw materials are extracted, taken elsewhere, processed and then sold back to us at a much higher price. We cannot go on like this,” Bouya said.