Middle East

Iran has threatened to retaliate against any country that joins the United States’ “economic war” against it, as diplomatic efforts to end the months-long war have stalled and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has drastically decreased.

The warning from Iran’s top security official on Saturday came as the US plans to announce new sanctions on Monday that could further strain the struggling Iranian economy.

So, how can Tehran retaliate?

Here’s what we know:

What has Iran said?

On Saturday, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, told the IRIB state broadcaster that Iran was appealing to all countries around the world, including its neighbours, not to join the US’s “economic war”.

“Any country that takes part in imposing economic restrictions on us will be regarded as an enemy,” he said, warning of “seismic” retaliation.

Rezaei also warned Iran’s neighbours that if they participated in Trump’s economic warfare, “not even a drop of oil” would leave the Gulf region, including by alternative export routes away from the Hormuz chokepoint through which a fifth of global oil and gas exports pass in peacetime.

Iran has attacked US military installations and civilian locations since the war began on February 28 , on the pretext that Tehran was on the verge of having nuclear bombs. That claim was debunked by the US intelligence agency, as well as the UN’s IAEA nuclear watchdog.

The US operates military facilities in more than a dozen locations across the Middle East and North Africa, including in Gulf nations, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Thousands of US soldiers are also stationed across the region, including in Jordan.

Rezaei’s remarks came days after US President Donald Trump announced that his government would undertake the “most crushing economic operation” yet against Iran. He also pledged “tremendous economic consequences” for any country that gives Iran “any type of lifeline”.

The US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, echoed his threats the following day, saying, “You’re either with us or against us”. He also urged cooperation from China, which buys more than 80 percent of Iran’s oil shipments.

On Sunday, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian said: Iran is “in a full-scale economic, military and security war” with the US. He said Washington falsely predicted before the war that it would fall amid US aggression and become like Venezuela.

“The enemy had assessed that if Iran falls, it will become Venezuela,” he said in a televised speech.

“Not only did it not happen, but it became a power that amazed the world with its resistance, solidarity and cohesion.”

How can Iran retaliate?

Rezaei described Iran’s strategy as a three-stage sequence, starting with talks with countries cooperating with the US to de-escalate tensions.

“Of course, we will first negotiate with them. We will hold talks and tell them to step aside and distance themselves from the United States.”

“But if they do not act, we will strike. We will target that country’s interests,” he added.

Rezaei’s warning that alternative export routes outside Hormuz could be targeted, probably points to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait gateway to the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has used it to export its oil following the blockade of Hormuz. Tehran imposed a blockade on Hormuz in response to the US war and has since used it as leverage in negotiations with Washington to end the war. The US has put Iranian ports under a naval blockade, impacting Tehran’s international trade.

Hamidreza Azizi, a researcher on Iran at the Clingendael Institute, said in a post on X on Saturday: “Tehran appears to be trying to establish deterrence at an earlier stage, by signalling that even preparations for an attack could trigger an Iranian response.”

Azizi said two elements in the new “offensive doctrine” are emerging: preemption, which is aimed at preventing a perceived threat from materialising; and disproportionate retaliation, which is aimed at raising the cost of any attack that does occur.

Iran’s warning to Gulf states joining Trump’s economic war is “essentially an ultimatum” to the Gulf states, he said, adding that Iran’s military-security establishment “is increasingly preparing for another round of escalation”.

Will Iran’s neighbours join the US in its economic warfare?

Gulf countries, which are Iran’s neighbours and also US allies, have increasingly been finding themselves caught in the middle of the war. So it is unclear if they will join Washington in economically threatening Iran further.

Iran’s attacks on Gulf nations have impacted their economies, which use Hormuz for most of their exports, including oil and gas.

While Gulf nations have condemned Iranian attacks on their territories, analysts say Gulf states closely aligned with Washington recognise that a functioning political relationship with Iran is necessary due to its close proximity.

The UAE restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2022 but imposed a trade embargo last week after accusing Tehran of a missile attack. Iran denies responsibility.

Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to normalise ties in 2023 under a deal brokered by China, both likely a calculation that engagement with Iran was safer than permanent confrontation.

While the Iranian attacks on Gulf states have tested this idea, they have not necessarily shattered it.

“Ultimately, Gulf countries can’t change geography. They have to live and work alongside Iran,” Simon Mabon, a professor of international relations at Lancaster University told Al Jazeera in an interview last month. “They don’t want the instability that would come from the fall of the Islamic Republic. I think some Gulf states have pushed for harder strikes – not to precipitate its collapse, but to weaken the more hardline elements of the IRGC.”

Also last month, Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told Al Jazeera that confidence in diplomacy to end the crisis remains low but, at the same time, no nation in the region “can afford another long war”.

As a result, that “will keep them away from a completely uncontrolled level of escalation”, and depleted global oil inventories will make a prolonged confrontation between the US and Iran unattractive.

“All inventories have not been able to be replenished” during the ceasefire, Parsi added. “We are at a much lower level globally.”

What we know about international sanctions against Iran over previous decades?

Since 1979, Iran has faced sanctions from the US and other nations in the West. The United Nations has also imposed sanctions on Tehran.

The US first imposed sanctions after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the pro-Western ruler Reza Shah Pahlavi. Washington said that was in response to Iranian students taking Americans hostage at the US embassy in Tehran.

Washington also halted oil imports from Iran and froze $12bn in Iranian assets following the revolution. Iranian products were banned from import into the US, apart from small gifts, informational material, foodstuffs and some carpets.

In 1995, President Bill Clinton issued executive orders preventing US companies from investing in Iranian oil and gas and trading with Iran. He banned US trade with Iran and investment. A year later, the US Congress passed a law requiring the US government to impose sanctions on foreign firms investing more than $20m a year in Iran’s energy sector.

Then in December 2006, the United Nations Security Council, whose members include China, Russia, the UK and France, imposed sanctions on Iran’s trade in nuclear-energy-related materials and technology and froze the assets of individuals and companies involved in related activities.

The sanctions were mainly an effort to curtail Iran’s growing nuclear capacity, but while programmes to enrich uranium were stopped in 2002, they restarted in late 2005. In subsequent years, the UN toughened the sanctions and imposed more. The European Union also followed suit.

In 2015, Iran signed a nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – with the US, EU, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. The deal put a cap on Iran’s nuclear programme in return for the complete lifting of sanctions.

However, in 2018, during his first term, Trump announced the US withdrawal from the nuclear treaty and reimposed all sanctions on Iran that were lifted under the treaty as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran.

In 2019, the Trump administration designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’. Additionally, he imposed sanctions targeting petrochemicals, metals (steel, aluminium, copper) and senior Iranian officials.

During Trump’s first term, Qassem Soleimani, the head of the IRGC’s elite Quds Force, was assassinated in a drone strike in Baghdad in 2020. The US also imposed additional sanctions on Iran.

The Biden administration, in power from 2021 to 2025, kept in place most US sanctions.

Last September, UN sanctions were reimposed due to Iran’s nuclear programme when the UNSC voted against permanently lifting economic sanctions.

Israeli forces launch wide search in Jordan Valley after stabbing incident in the occupied West Bank village of al-Auja.

Israeli forces have launched search operations in the Jordan Valley after an Israeli man was wounded in a stabbing attack in a village in the eastern occupied West Bank.

Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported on Sunday, citing a security source, that the man was stabbed at a commercial complex on the main road near the village of al-Auja.

The victim, a man aged in his 20s, was moderately wounded, Israeli police said.

The suspect escaped from the scene after carrying out the attack, according to the Israeli army, which launched a large-scale search operation in the area, supported by a substantial police presence.

The army said it had set up roadblocks in the village and the surrounding areas. The military is “in constant contact with the residents and security forces in the area”, it said in a post on Telegram.

The incident comes amid a rise in state-backed Israeli settler violence against Palestinians across the occupied West Bank since Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza began in October 2023.

Data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) shows that between January 1, 2025, and June 31, 2026, there were 3,033 Israeli settler attacks.

Some 1,291 settler attacks were recorded in 2023, rising to 1,449 in 2024, 1,835 in 2025, and 761 in the first four months of 2026. That equates to an average of 190 attacks per month in 2026, up from 153 per month in 2025 – a 24 percent increase in the monthly rate.

Gas bombs fired, entrance closed at al-Mughayyir

In a separate incident on Sunday, Israeli forces used gas bombs and closed the western entrance of al-Mughayyir village, north of Ramallah, according to video footage and Palestinian officials.

Video clips documented Israeli forces firing gas canisters while blocking the western entrance to the village. The Palestinian news agency Wafa reported that Israeli troops prevented residents from entering or leaving al-Mughayyir, subjected a number of them to field interrogations, mistreated young men, and fired gas bombs towards vehicles.

The agency added that the western entrance is currently the only outlet for the village after Israeli forces closed its eastern entrance in October 2023.

Iran security chief Rezaei says any state joining US would be considered an enemy and Tehran would target their interests in retaliation.

The warning comes as US President Donald Trump threatens to isolate Iran economically, to weaken its government.

Iran has threatened to treat nearby countries as enemies and target their interests if they join a United States campaign to cripple its economy.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, issued the warning in a Saturday interview with state broadcaster IRIB.

“We’re telling all nearby countries not to join the US economic war. Otherwise, we will consider them as enemies,” Rezaei told IRIB.

His remarks come on the heels of escalating economic threats from the administration of US President Donald Trump.

On Wednesday, Trump announced his government would undertake the “most crushing economic operation” yet against Iran, as part of ongoing hostilities between the two countries.

The US and Israel have been locked in a war with Iran since February 28, when the two allies launched an initial volley of attacks against Tehran.

In addition to threatening Iran’s economy this week, Trump pledged “tremendous economic consequences” for any country that gives Iran “any type of lifeline”.

His Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, echoed his threats the following day, saying, “You’re either with us or against us.”

In Saturday’s interview, Rezaei described Iran’s regional strategy as a three-stage sequence, which would start with efforts to de-escalate tensions with neighbouring countries.

“First we negotiate. Then, we try to separate them from America with pleasant language, because we are not really looking to expand the war,” he said.

Any countries that continue to side with the US would then be given time to reconsider, he said. “But in the third stage, we will definitely act.”

While the US has not stopped its military operations against Iran, Rezaei suggested that the Trump administration was betting that economic pressure would fracture Iranian society, forcing the war to come to an end.

“They hope that, if possible, they can break our unity with economic pressure and a group of protesters will take to the streets, and in a way, they will come to the aid of American F-35s,” he said, referring to a kind of military aircraft.

Negotiations to end the conflict have stalled in recent months, following the failure of a June 17 memorandum of understanding (MoU) that called for an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations”.

Control over the Strait of Hormuz, a major shipping lane off the coast of Iran, has become an enduring sticking point between the US and Iran.

Iran quickly moved to shut down traffic through the strait early in the war, sending the price of goods like oil and fertiliser skyrocketing.

Countries in the Middle East that were previously reliant on the strait for exports have started to pursue substitute trade routes.

But Rezaei warned that Iran would target those alternative oil-shipping routes out of the Gulf if regional states took part in the US’s plans of economic warfare.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Saturday also decried the incoming US measures as an assertion of “extraterritorial sovereignty” over United Nations member states.

Tehran has also reportedly considered widening its target list beyond the Middle East, with media outlets reporting it could strike US allies in Europe who have supported Trump’s operations.

Illegal under international law, Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank have been expanding for decades.

The right-wing government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has fast-tracked the establishment of new ones.

The policy aims to tighten Israel’s hold on the occupied West Bank and block the creation of a contiguous Palestinian state.

With just months to go until the elections, the government has opened bids for the construction of 1,200 illegal housing units. It has also ignored international criticism of the planned illegal settlement, known as E1.

Some Western countries are threatening sanctions if Israel goes ahead. But would that make a difference?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Ammar Hijazi – Ambassador and head of the Palestinian Mission to the Netherlands

Alon Pinkas – Former Israeli ambassador and consul general in New York

On Tuesday, Israeli fighter jets attacked Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, drawing condemnations from the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, as well as regional countries. The Israeli government claimed that it had intelligence of Turkish military movement to the site.

In a subsequent interview, US Ambassador to Turkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said the US had received this intelligence from the Israelis six days before the attack. However, US intelligence conducted its own due diligence and found no basis for the claim.

The incident not only reflects a shift in the dynamics between Turkiye and Israel, but also signals a regional reordering that the latter is no longer at the centre of.

The Turkish response

Seeing the Israeli attack on the Syrian base as a provocation, Ankara refrained from escalating and instead provided an off-ramp out of the crisis. It framed the issue not in bilateral terms but as one between Israel and the US, and between Israel and the regional and international consensus.

Normally, there is a deconfliction mechanism between Turkiye and Israel. However, as Barrack indicated in the interview, Israel did not warn Turkiye about the attack, which could have triggered a military response.

The US envoy called for a deconfliction mechanism, but such an initiative can be effective only if the sides involved want it to be. In this case, there is no evidence that Israel sought de-escalation. In fact, it appears escalation was the intended outcome, as Israel notified neither Turkiye nor the US about the attack and acted on a pretext that the US intelligence found no basis for – a ploy to boost Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral campaign.

After the US-imposed lull on the Iran front, Netanyahu is likely seeking escalation on other fronts, be it Syria, Lebanon or Gaza, in the run-up to the Israeli election. The challenge for Turkiye would be to avoid taking Netanyahu’s bait while also preventing the normalisation of such aggression.

That would require direct intervention by US President Donald Trump to rein in Netanyahu. Indeed, a trilateral deconfliction mechanism can work and be credible only if the US throws real weight behind it.

But even if a mechanism is in place, it would not change the fact that Syria has altered the lens through which Turkiye and Israel view each other. For a long time, the core of Turkiye’s discontent with Israel was the Palestinian issue. Hence, it was more humanitarian-, identity- and solidarity-based in nature.

Today, Ankara views Israeli attempts to undermine the Syrian transition as having direct repercussions for its national security. Therefore, Turkiye is no longer seeing Israel solely through the prism of the Palestinian question. Rather, it increasingly sees it as a national security challenge, with Israeli regional revisionism threatening its interests.

The international consensus on Syria

From the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and the wider Middle East, Turkiye and Israel have conflicting policies, priorities and threat perceptions. Despite this, Syria serves as a microcosm of Turkiye and Israel’s visions of the regional order.

Ankara wants its southern neighbour to be centralised, stable and capable militarily. In contrast, Israel wants a Syria that is weak, fragmented and bereft of serious military might.

Yet this is not merely a conflict between Turkish and Israeli visions. Israel is at odds with the regional and international consensus on Syria. The US, the UK, Europe and regional states have all supported a centralised and stable government in Damascus. In an ironic way, the only other regional state that probably wants a weak or failed Syria is Iran.

Like any other sovereign state, Syria will have an army. If Israel believes that the only way to ensure its own security is by keeping its neighbouring or regional states weak, fragmented and bereft of military capability, this is a recipe for perpetual wars and for regional and international isolation.

The undermining of the Syrian state and the failure of its transition would pave the way for non-state actors and radicalism, which would bode ill for the entire region, including Israel. Indeed, neighbouring Lebanon should serve as a cautionary tale. The Israeli occupation and the weakness of the Lebanese state gave birth to and empowered Hezbollah.

Post-Abrahamic Middle East

Israel and Turkiye’s ideas of regional order are also at odds. The recent Mecca Pact, which brought together Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is not inherently anti-Israel. However, it represents a regional shift that signals the failure of the order envisioned by the Abraham Accords, or similar initiatives such as India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) or the strategic partnership between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the US known as I2U2.

The Abrahamic vision of the regional order was premised on Arab-Israeli normalisation and cooperation under the US security umbrella. Hard containment of Iran, soft containment of Turkiye, and de-emphasising the Palestinian issue were also part of the same vision.

Inherently, this Abrahamic vision had more to do with Israel and its regional normalisation than the Arab states and their needs and priorities.

However, with its aggressive and revisionist policies, Israel has deepened the prospect of its regional isolation, increased the cost of any normalisation, and doomed this Abrahamic – or Israeli-centric – vision of regional order.

Israeli revisionism is not only driving a wedge between Israel and other major regional states, but it is also revealing the gap between Israel and the US on the question of regional reordering.

While Israel opposes the Mecca Pact, Trump has hailed it, likely seeing it as aligned with his strategy of burden-sharing and burden-shifting with regional allies, and as enjoying more regional legitimacy and acceptance. The US position might also reflect a recalibration of Washington’s regional vision.

Over the last decade, the US invested heavily in creating a regional order premised on Israel and the Arab-Gulf states. But this was essentially an Israeli-centric project for the regional order.

This vision is no longer tenable, and no one is more responsible for its demise than Israel itself.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Syria condemns attack in southwest as a ‘flagrant violation of sovereignty’ and a ‘blatant breach of international law’.

An Israeli drone strike in southwestern Syria has injured several people, the country’s foreign ministry says, in the latest of near-daily Israeli incursions and attacks in the area.

Syria’s official Alikhbariya channel reported on Saturday that a man was wounded when an Israeli drone hit his truck near the town of Beit Jinn in the western Damascus countryside.

The Israeli military confirmed the strike, saying in a statement that it had targeted “a terrorist who advanced terror attacks in their final stages of preparation” in southern Syria. The activity “posed an immediate threat to our forces”, the military added.

Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates said in a statement that Saturday’s strike resulted in several civilian injuries.

It said it “condemns in the strongest terms” the targeting of a “civilian vehicle” by an Israeli drone.

“This attack constitutes a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic and the integrity of its territory, and a blatant breach of international law, and comes in the context of repeated Israeli attacks on Syrian territory,” it added.

Israel sees southern Syria ‘as a security zone’

Saturday’s strike hit a small delivery truck on the main road between the Beit Jinn farmland and the town itself, said Al Jazeera Arabic correspondent Adham Abu al-Hussam, reporting from the area.

“Residents say [one of the victims is] a civilian who works as a driver, delivering goods and orders on this truck,” Abu al-Hussam said, adding that neighbours rushed a wounded man to hospital after hearing the explosion. He is in stable condition with an injury to his right hand, according to a medical source.

Abu al-Hussam said residents had reported Israeli reconnaissance drones flying over the area for four days. Beit Jinn, which lies near Jabal al-Sheikh and roughly 55km from Damascus, has been repeatedly targeted in the past year, including in a late November raid that killed 13 civilians, he said.

Muhsen al-Mustafa, a security and strategic researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies in Damascus, told Al Jazeera that the attack could be Israel sending Syria’s government a message. “Israel currently treats Syria, particularly the south, as a security zone it is trying to fill any vacuum in.”

He said Israel had used a similar rationale days earlier when it struck Abu al-Duhur military airport in Idlib province, in northern Syria, saying the aim was to prevent a Turkish military presence there. That strike, he said, signalled that Israel’s declared security zone “isn’t limited to the south” but “extends even to Abu al-Duhur airport”, roughly in the middle of the country. “Israel’s security zone, it’s saying, extends further than that.”

Al-Mustafa suggested that Israel opted for a drone strike rather than sending in ground forces partly because of the November raid, when Israeli troops came under direct fire during the incursion into Beit Jinn, wounding six soldiers, three of them seriously. “Israel is always trying to apply pressure and ask for more in every round of negotiation,” he said.

A Syrian diplomatic source told Al Jazeera that Damascus remains committed to de-escalation and is pursuing a security arrangement with Israel through United States mediation, based on the 1974 disengagement agreement.

Tehran, Iran – The Iranian military is looking at how to respond to the United States’s planned implementation of economic measures that are designed to “collapse” the government in Tehran.

It comes as US President Donald Trump announced this week the “most crushing economic operation” against Iran, saying Tehran would face “economic warfare and isolation on an unprecedented scale”.

Iranian commanders are reviewing new military strategies to counteract the new US threats.

“The only intelligent and effective solution to navigate difficult historical junctures and neutralise the enemy’s plots today and in the future,” Ahmad Vahdi, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), warned on Friday.

Marking National Day of Defence Industry in Iran on Saturday, Ali Abdollahi, chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, hailed a “deterrent defensive industrial revolution” in the domestic production of weaponry.

But as happened last year, authorities opted not to exhibit new arms.

“We have limited unveilings of weapons and equipment in order to surprise the enemy and safeguard the country’s defensive information and secrets,” Ministry of Defence spokesman Reza Talaei-Nik told state media on Saturday.

However, he claimed that in the 12 months after the 12-day war with Israel and the US in June 2025, Iran doubled its production of weapons and defensive equipment.

Since the start of the current war with the US and Israel on February 28, manufacturing of some “strategic and prioritised products” has more than tripled, he claimed.

Talaei-Nik also said more than 9,300 companies in Iran are involved in producing weapons, which means US and Israeli strikes would not be able to destroy this sector.

Acting Defence Minister Majid Ebn-e Reza said on Friday that compared to last year’s war with Israel and the US, the Iranian armed forces were able to achieve deeper penetration of enemy bases, greater strike accuracy, and more successful air defence interceptions.

In another future war, the IRGC will deploy new generations of warheads for its ballistic and cruise missiles, as production and development never stopped, IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi said on Thursday.

The truce between the US and Iran, which took hold on April 8, followed nearly 40 days of intense bombing and involved thousands of flight sorties.

The White House claimed that more than 85 percent of Iran’s defence-industrial base had been destroyed, including the majority of its ballistic missiles, mobile launchers and long-range drones.

It also said that more than 150 Iranian warships were destroyed, every submarine sunk, and 97 percent of Iran’s naval-mine inventory eliminated.

But a confidential US intelligence assessment reported by media in May found that Iran retained approximately 75 percent of its mobile launchers and 70 percent of its pre-war missile inventory.

Even after an additional two weeks of intense bombardment by the US in July, the IRGC and the Iranian army continued to launch missiles and drones at US bases and international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz – although at a slower pace compared with the start of the war.

Iranian commanders have said the July strikes by the US signalled potential planning for ground operations in southern Iran, and the military was ready to counter any such efforts by Washington.

Experts have said Iran has continued to produce weapons in geographically dispersed underground bases that have stayed out of reach of US bombs, even as many overground manufacturing lines were decimated.

In addition to the more complex and costly ballistic missiles, cheaper and easier-to-make explosive drones have helped Iran consume a large number of US interceptors, reveal radar positions, force airports or energy sites to suspend operations, and create disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s air defences and ageing air force largely failed to prevent US, Israeli and Arab breaches of its airspace during bombing runs.

But smaller electro-optical, heat-seeking and man-portable systems have managed some interceptions, including the downing of an F-15 fighter jet.

At least 45 advanced MQ-9 Reaper drones of the US military, about a quarter of the entire fleet at the cost of more than $1.3bn, were either shot down by Iran or were lost through data-link or operational failures, according to US media reports.

In the Strait of Hormuz, which US President Donald Trump declared US territory this week, Washington and its allies have managed to increase discrete oil and energy transfers over recent weeks.

But despite significant damage inflicted on Iran’s naval capabilities, missile, drone and fast boat attacks mean oil flows via the Hormuz are still considerably lower than their pre-war levels.

Disruptions to sea traffic are also happening in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb strait, where Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen have intermittently clashed with Saudi Arabia and its interests.

Iran and the US are not engaged in any meaningful dialogue, so a diplomatic way out of the war is currently not in sight.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei slams Trump’s latest threat as a return to ‘full-scale classic colonialism’.

Iran has decried impending United States sanctions as a “complete erosion of sovereignty” following US President Donald Trump’s threat to punish any country doing business with Tehran.

In a post on X on Saturday, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said the US announcement was “an assertion of extraterritorial sovereignty” against the United Nations’ member states.

No state can compel foreign banks, enterprises or airports to renounce commerce with Iran, he said.

“The end result would be the complete erosion of sovereignty as the foundational basis of the UN-based inter-State system, and a recipe for an abysmal return to full-scale classic colonialism,” Baghaei said.

Trump announced on Wednesday the “most crushing economic operation” yet against Iran and said any country whose institutions interface with Tehran would face “tremendous economic consequences”.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent doubled down on the president’s words on Thursday, saying the new sanctions regime would “collapse” Iran and that other countries are “either with us or against us”.

Iranian state media was quick to point out that Tehran has faced US sanctions for decades. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the new measures were “bound to fail”.

“We have seen this movie before,” Araghchi wrote on X, alongside a screenshot of a tweet from former President Barack Obama referencing earlier sanctions in 2012. “Same bull. Different bullies.”

The latest rhetorical back-and-forth comes as peace talks with Tehran have sputtered out. The US Navy has maintained its blockade against Iran’s ports, while oil shipment traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has virtually ceased.

Trump told reporters Friday that his government is “seeing what happens” in the conflict.

“They would love to make a deal, but they’re not ready to make the right deal in my opinion,” the president said.

While the US has blockaded Iranian vessels in their ports, the Strait of Hormuz remained bottled up with thousands of seafarers stranded on hundreds of vessels.

Only four commodity ships sailed along the strait on Thursday, none of them large crude carriers or liquefied natural gas tankers, ship-tracking data showed.

However, Iran has granted permission for several Iraqi oil tankers to pass through the strait following repeated requests from Baghdad, Iran’s state news agency IRNA ⁠reported on Saturday.

IRNA said obtaining special permission for Iraqi tankers was one of Baghdad’s main requests during Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher ⁠Ghalibaf’s visit to Iraq.

Omani and Iranian foreign ministers hold a call as Washington prepares economic sanctions amid ongoing shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has called for an end to the months-long war with the United States, stating that Tehran holds a position of strength as diplomatic talks remain stalled.

“It is better that we bring the war to an end now as we are in a position of power and dignity,” Pezeshkian said in a meeting with doctors on Friday. “The whole world acknowledges our victory and emphasises that America has attacked our schools, hospitals and infrastructure in violation of all regulations and is hated around the world.”

Pezeshkian – whose authority as president is ultimately subordinate to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei – also defended the June memorandum of understanding agreed with Washington against hardline domestic critics in parliament, who accused his administration of giving concessions to the US.

“They cannot find even a single clause in this agreement that indicates capitulation. All the commitments concern the other side,” he said.

However, days after the memorandum of understanding expired, Iran’s military leadership has warned that the country remains ready to strike back against any new threats.

“With preparedness across land, sea, air, air defence and cyberspace, Iran’s armed forces will respond to the enemy’s new threats with crushing, punishing and devastating responses,” Major-General Ali Abdollahi, chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, was quoted as saying by Iranian media.

Strait of Hormuz

Meanwhile, Omani and Iranian foreign ministers discussed in a phone call on Friday ways to create suitable conditions for resuming dialogue and negotiations, as well as developments affecting navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, according to Oman’s state news agency.

Tehran continues to keep the key waterway partially shut while Washington persists with a naval counterblockade. Reports in US media indicate the US navy has been organising and protecting secret convoys of tankers through the southern sector of the strait, enabling between five and 10 million barrels a day of oil to be exported.

In Washington, President Donald Trump expressed scepticism over Tehran’s willingness to negotiate, telling reporters when asked if US military options with Iran were limited: “It just means that we’re seeing what happens.”

“We have total control of that entire region having to do with the Strait of Hormuz, and that means well into it, the land areas. So, they would love to make a deal, but they’re not ready to make the right deal, in my opinion,” Trump added.

He has also warned of economic consequences against any country that provides “any type of lifeline to Iran”.

The comments came as US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that Washington would “collapse” the Iranian government with a sanctions campaign.

Bessent will hold a news conference at the Department of the Treasury on Monday, where he is expected to outline planned sanctions against Iran, marking a shift by the Trump administration towards economic rather than military pressure as the war nears the six-month mark.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already condemned the US plan, accusing Washington of “economic terrorism” and stating that “the instigators of these sanctions are deserving of trial and punishment”.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lin Jian also criticised the US measures, stating that “sanctions and pressure will not help resolve the issue” and urging all parties to “take responsible measures and resolve the problem through political and diplomatic means”.

Israeli settlers fatally shot 17-year-old Karim Sanad Shalaldeh in Hebron, while Israeli forces killed 58-year-old Fathi Khazem in Jenin.

A Palestinian teenager in Hebron and a former colonel in Jenin have been shot and killed in separate incidents involving Israeli settlers and soldiers, as escalating attacks and the rapid expansion of illegal settlements drive a wave of forced displacement in the occupied West Bank.

The Palestinian Ministry of Health said on Friday that 17-year-old Karim Sanad Shalaldeh was fatally shot in an Israeli settler attack in Khirbet Hamroush.

Shalaldeh sustained a gunshot wound to the chest and was reported to be in critical condition before he was announced dead. A 70-year-old man was also shot and injured during the attack.

Local sources told the Palestinian news agency, Wafa, that large groups of armed Israeli settlers raided the Khirbet Hamroush area, opening fire at residents and setting Palestinian homes on fire.

In a separate incident on Friday morning, the Palestinian General Authority for Civil Affairs informed the Health Ministry that 58-year-old Fathi Khazem was fatally shot by Israeli forces in Jenin. The Israeli military was raiding the home of retired colonel in the Palestinian National Security Forces when the shooting occurred.

The Israeli army claimed Khazem attempted to stab Israeli troops during a military operation before the soldiers opened fire and killed him.

The Palestinian Health Ministry said the Israeli army did not release the body to the victim’s family for burial, and Wafa reported that Israeli forces prevented emergency services from reaching the house after the shooting.

Earlier, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society said its crews treated a 14-year-old boy who was shot with live ammunition in the chest and back during an Israeli raid near Jenin. The boy was transferred to a hospital, it added.

The Israeli military also arrested six people during a separate raid on the city on Friday.

The ‘most immoral’ army

Amid new attacks and Israeli army raids across the occupied West Bank, in Qusra, south of Nablus, Israeli settlers continue to besiege three Palestinian homes for a 13th consecutive day under the protection of Israeli forces.

Qusra Mayor Abdel Azim Wadi said Israeli forces and settlers were preventing families in the Ras al-Ain area from entering or leaving their homes, while one of the houses had been seized and turned into a military post. The area has also been declared a closed military zone.

Wadi said the families were running short of food and medicine because Israeli forces were preventing supplies from reaching them, Wafa reported.

Francesca Albanese, UN special rapporteur for the occupied Palestinian territory, called the Israeli military “the MOST IMMORAL ARMY” in a post on X.

“In the West Bank, soldiers and settlers cut water pipes, while Qusra’s siege continues,” she wrote. “In Gaza the pulverization continues and so the massacres. Since the ceasefire Israel has killed 1,200+ people, including 300 children.”

A report by Human Rights Watch on Thursday found state-backed Israeli settler violence fully or partially displaced 107 Palestinian communities in the occupied West Bank since January 2023.

The US-based rights group said increased settler attacks, along with the rapid expansion of Israeli settlements that are illegal under international law, are driving a wave of forced displacement of Palestinians.

Israeli plans to build a major new illegal settlement under the E1 settlement project, which would cleave the occupied West Bank in two, have provoked widespread condemnation from around the world.

The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada and Norway on Thursday called Israel’s opening of construction tenders for more than 1,200 housing units under the project “unacceptable” and in violation of “the territorial contiguity of the Palestinian Territories”.

“Not only will they take us further from peace, but they further undermine Israel’s international standing,” the statement said.

London, United Kingdom – The United States and Israel’s war on Iran was largely unexpected, given the repeated warnings from most US allies, as well as their lack of enthusiasm for a potential conflict.

Iran’s retaliation, too, has been unexpected, particularly Iranian missile strikes on several countries not party to the conflict, in the Gulf, and more recently, Jordan.

Beyond the immediate regional sphere, the Iranian military has reportedly attempted to hit targets as far as the joint US-UK military base on the island of Diego Garcia, 2,350 miles (3,780 kilometres) away from Iran.

And Tehran has recently threatened southeastern Europe – in particular, Bulgaria.

Bulgaria’s Bezmer airfield

In July, Bulgaria’s parliament approved the use of its Bezmer Air Base for refuelling US military aircraft, an agreement that functions as a support mechanism for the US military operations in the Middle East and against Iran.

Speaking to his Bulgarian counterpart, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that any country aiding US “aggression” against Iran would be considered a legitimate target of retaliatory attack by Tehran.

According to a recent report in the Financial Times, citing unnamed Iranian sources, Tehran will consider attacking Europe if Washington escalates the conflict.

According to Armida van Rij, a senior fellow at the Centre for European Reform, southeastern Europe could be seen as an attractive target.

“[The region] is the soft underbelly of Europe as it is strategically important, hosting a number of NATO bases and key supplies to Ukraine and being on the Black Sea”.

In Bulgaria, the Iran war is perceived as something “remote”, Angel Petrov, a Sofia-based journalist who covers southeast Europe and the Middle East for the news website, Dnevnik.bg, told Al Jazeera.

Bulgarians do not view the Iran war “as important as Ukraine, and whose implications in terms of oil prices seem bearable, given general inflation”.

According to Petrov, Sofia lacks the institutional capacity to defy a brash administration in Washington while managing the war in Ukraine and an increasingly active Russia. So it was not surprising when Bulgarian leaders obliged the Trump administration’s request for the use of the Bezmer Air Base.

By firing missiles at Bezmer Air Base, Iran might hope to raise the costs of that cooperation and possibly drive a wedge between Bulgaria and the US. Bulgarians would find themselves under threat from the Iran war, to which they are indifferent, at the behest of a US ally that has shown increasing reluctance to support them in the war in Ukraine that they consider more important.

Could Iranian missiles reach Europe?

While Iranian missiles could indisputably reach parts of Europe, whether those attacks would further Iranian goals is less clear.

Ali Bakir, a senior non-resident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, said an Iranian attack on Europe would play into Trump’s hands and intensify Iran’s isolation.

In the event of an attack on countries such as Bulgaria, Iran would effectively force an additional front on Europe to a conflict that many European leaders have resisted joining, much to the irritation of the US leader.

According to Bakir, engaging Europe in the Iran conflict would likely benefit Russia’s war in Ukraine, aided by further straining Europe militarily, “potentially triggering a much wider and more dangerous war with serious international economic and security consequences”.

It may be that, for Tehran, the threat of an attack on a less powerful European country is worth more than missiles actually fired towards Europe.

The threat could shape domestic politics in Europe, keeping focus alive on a conflict that is farther than the immediate war in Ukraine and making European leaders and populations more hesitant to give passive support to the US military effort against Iran.

Iran’s declared aim is to prise Europe away from the US campaign.

However, an actual strike on a member of both the European Union and NATO would turn Europe from a hedging bystander into a belligerent party, trigger Article 4 – which quite possibly results in military retaliation, and hand Washington the European coalition it has so far failed to assemble.

For now, a reasonable conclusion is that Iran has held back by calculating that an Iranian missile attack on Europe could hand Washington a strategic victory.

However, several factors keep the risk of an attack on Europe above zero.

The first is the credibility trap. Having declared that any base used to attack Iranian territory is a legitimate target, Tehran has threatened to extend its retaliation beyond the Middle East if pressed further by the US, but that threat will only remain effective as long as US allies believe Iran is actually willing to do so.

Another factor is that Iran would not consider itself to be attacking Europe at all, but US assets that happen to stand on European soil. Tehran has used a similar distinction in missile attacks against other countries in the region, such as GCC countries. Gulf nations have rejected that notion, saying their nations, populations and infrastructure should not be assaulted amid a war they did not launch, but have not thus far retaliated against Iran directly.

Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, the cohesion of the command and control mechanisms in Iran matters deeply. If the decision to attack is not made by those who devise political strategy, retaliation could be unpredictable. The desire to respond to renewed US attacks by attacking a perceived weak point could result in disastrous overreach.

The longevity of the conflict is arguably a greater threat to Europe than Iranian missile capabilities that NATO defences over Europe could well protect against.

As the war drags on, the real danger for Europe is a prolonged US-Iran war that Washington treats as dormant, with financial effects being felt in European streets and support diverted away from Russia and the Ukraine war.

For years, the day in Kulak ended when the generator powered down. Like thousands of villages across Iraq, this small farming community in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region lived to the faltering rhythm of an erratic power supply: a few hours of electricity, then the water pumps stopped, refrigerators warmed and children put down their books.

Today, Kulak runs on the sun. Solar panels harness its energy, batteries store the excess and residents have power 24/7. The change is visible beyond the homes: water pumps keep running, and cold storage gives farmers more control over when they sell their harvest.

This is the part of the energy transition the global climate conversation too often overlooks. Solar hardware is cheap; the world has learned how to install it. What matters is what comes after the panels go up: building the local capacity to keep the systems running and using reliable power to support farms, livelihoods and communities.

The energy transition will not be won in conference halls. It will be won, or lost, in places like Kulak.

Iraq’s rural energy crisis

Iraq’s energy story is usually told as a paradox. It is one of the world’s great oil producers, yet rural communities still endure daily power cuts. Summers now regularly push past 50 degrees, and the United Nations ranks Iraq among the nations most vulnerable to climate change. Drought has emptied farmland. Heat has made whole regions harder to live in. Rural families face a quiet, grinding choice between staying on land that can no longer sustain them or joining the drift towards overcrowded cities.

These pressures do not respect provincial boundaries. They are shared across Iraq, from the marshes of the south to the mountains of the north. They demand responses that work for the whole country.

For remote communities, decentralised power should not simply be treated as a stopgap while they wait for the grid. It can be part of the long-term answer.

Beyond electrification

Kulak is one of five villages in the Kurdistan region electrified through a solar initiative that pairs new infrastructure with local training and agricultural development. Residents are trained to operate and maintain their own systems, while research is under way into how reliable power can support local production.

Energy is treated not as a gift to be received but as an asset to be managed. That means looking beyond electricity itself to what it can enable: cold storage that allows farmers to hold their harvest for better prices, irrigation that no longer depends on diesel and processing that adds value before crops ever leave the village.

That distinction matters, because the graveyard of development is full of well-intentioned infrastructure. Anyone who has worked in this field has seen the solar array gathering dust because no one was trained to fix an inverter, or the water project abandoned when the foreign NGO moved on.

Sustainability is not a slogan; it is a design choice. Building local capability into a project from day one is the difference between a photo opportunity and a future.

Building the transition from the ground up

There is a broader argument here for the climate movement.

The energy transition is overwhelmingly narrated from the top down: through COP plenaries, G7 communiques and the financing pledges of wealthy nations, many of them unmet. Yet for hundreds of millions of people in the Global South, the transition will arrive, if it arrives at all, through decentralised solutions built close to the ground.

Rural Iraq will not wait decades for grid expansion to reach every valley. It does not have to. Distributed solar suits these communities better than centralised generation ever did, while local institutions can move at a speed that multilateral programmes rarely match.

There is also a quieter point about who gets to act on climate.

The prevailing image of climate action in the Middle East is the megaproject: vast desert solar farms, futuristic cities and sovereign wealth funds. Those have their place. But electrifying farming villages one by one represents a different kind of ambition, one rooted in the belief that Iraqis themselves, in all their diversity, can build the country’s energy future rather than wait for it to be delivered.

Local involvement matters particularly in places where reliable electricity is tied not only to household comfort but to whether farms can irrigate crops, preserve produce and remain economically viable.

Iraq has thousands of rural communities, and scaling this model will require partners, patient financing and supportive policy at every level of government. The agricultural research is promising but young.

On my last visit to Kulak, I was struck less by the panels than by what surrounded them: the cold store, the working pumps, the sense of a community planning for next season rather than next month.

The lights staying on is the least of it. What has really been switched on is the future tense.

If Iraq’s energy transformation is built like this across the whole country, village by village and from the ground up, it will be more durable than anything imposed from above. That means investing not only in the systems themselves, but in the people who will maintain them and the farms, businesses and livelihoods that reliable power can support.

The world’s climate diplomats could do worse than pay attention.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Taiz, Yemen – Mohammed Al-Homaidi, a labourer in his 30s, has been working at the al-Makha (Mocha) port in western Yemen since its reopening in 2021.

Even though he was reliant on a daily wage, his earnings provided a decent standard of living for his family.

But things changed on August 9, when the Red Sea port was targeted by Houthi attacks that killed at least seven people.

With the conflict between the Yemeni government and Houthi forces escalating after a long-standing truce collapsed last month, finding daily work was no longer his priority, but his safety.

“It was around 12:30pm when the explosions [were heard] at the seaport, which was full of workers at the time. I couldn’t understand what was happening, and we couldn’t flee because the explosions were continuous,” Al-Homaidi told Al Jazeera. “After about an hour and a half, I ran outside the port and didn’t stop until I reached home.”

Thirty more people were injured in the barrage of Houthi drone and missile strikes that targeted the port and surrounding areas.

Houthi forces have continued to target the port and surrounding areas on a near-daily basis, resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries.

On August 11, the Houthis targeted a vessel at al-Makha port, killing three Pakistani crew members and injuring eight other seamen.

Three days later, the Houthis targeted two cargo ships at the Red Sea port, damaging the facility’s remaining infrastructure.

Due to the repeated Houthi attacks, operations were suspended last Friday to avoid putting the port’s 1,500 workers’ lives in danger.

For Al-Homaidi and other workers whose salaries were dependent on their daily labour, the port’s closure means a new struggle to put bread on the table.

“I am happy that we are safe at home today, but we are jobless now because we rely on daily wages,” Al-Homaidi said. “I don’t have any savings, and our food at home is running out. How can I provide basic needs for my family?”

Life beyond the seaport

Al-Homaidi also has experience working in al-Makha’s other major industry: fishing. But dangerous attacks around the Red Sea mean this is not an option for him and his colleagues at the port either.

Local fishermen have been ordered by local authorities not to go out to sea until further notice – but with money running low, a group of fishermen still ventured out on August 11. Their families are continuing to desperately search for them after they failed to return home.

With near-daily Houthi attacks on al-Makha, public beaches, parks, the coastal walkway and other areas have also been closed.

Families avoid going outside due to the threats of Houthi drones and missiles, and a strict nightly curfew for motorcycles is in place from 11pm to 6am.

Compounding the community’s suffering is a complete blackout of landline and mobile communications. Residents who can afford it use Starlink satellite internet. But for most Yemenis in al-Makha, there is no way to reach the outside world.

Back to square one

Abdulmalik Al-Sharabi, director of al-Makha port, confirmed to Al Jazeera that repeated Houthi attacks have forced the port to halt operations. At least six merchant vessels carrying commercial cargo have been struck since the most recent bout of violence, resulting in casualties among civilians and seamen.

“More than 1,500 port workers lost their jobs, while 16 were killed and 22 injured as a result of the Houthi attacks,” Al-Sharabi told Al Jazeera English.

Missile strikes have specifically targeted civilian infrastructure at the port and in surrounding areas, he said.

“The attacks targeted commercial and service areas, workshops, equipment, and the port pier, destroying it to the point that it ceased operations,” Al-Sharabi noted.

Operations across 30 shipping and customs clearance agencies have ground to a halt, affecting workers.

The port, which was closed between 2015 and 2021, serves as an economic lifeline for Taiz governorate as well as other Yemeni economic hubs such as Lahj, Hodeidah and Ibb. With it now closed, traders there will be forced to route imports via the port of Aden, driving up logistics costs.

“We were happy to have a seaport with such operational capacity, but today we are back to square one,” Al-Sharabi said.

No money, no food

Abdulraoof Abdullah, a fisherman in his 50s from al-Makha, has no source of income for his eight family members other than the fish he caught in the Red Sea. Due to the instability off al-Makha’s coast, he has not been out to sea since August 11.

“We are out of work now, and our homes are almost empty of food. We try to secure meals each day either by going into debt or asking friends for help,” he told Al Jazeera English.

With the port closed and food imports reduced, Abdullah said he expects prices to rise in the market, and he has no choice “but to pray to Allah.”

“We don’t have money to buy food for today, so how could we possibly have money to stockpile food?” he added.

“Most residents in Makha are fishermen, and we are currently out of work,” Abdullah said. “When we have jobs, we can buy food; otherwise, we will have to displace to another area where we can find work to support our families.”

Trading woes

Rashad, a local trader in al-Makha who preferred to be identified only by his first name, was importing goods through shipping agencies at the port since 2021. Given that his warehouses are just a few kilometres from the port, this was by far the cheapest option.

“Our goods are currently held up in Djibouti, and shipping costs have surged due to ongoing tension in the Red Sea,” Rashad told Al Jazeera. “Furthermore, we were just informed that our cargo will now be redirected to Aden, meaning we will have to pay significantly more for overland transport from Aden to al-Makha.”

With the warehouses still stocked with food from earlier orders, prices have not yet risen. But if the port remains closed, traders will be forced to increase prices on future shipments arriving via Aden.

“I am a resident of al-Makha before I am a trader. Any price increase directly impacts my family and neighbours – something I desperately want to avoid. But unless al-Makha seaport reopens soon, price hikes will be inevitable,” he added.

Although Rashad didn’t have any cargo on the ships that were recently hit in Houthi attacks, he said he feels empathy for other traders who suffered financial losses.

“Some people assume traders are financially comfortable, but we are in a state of constant worry. We track our shipments for months until they safely reach our warehouses,” he said.

“No one can imagine the devastation felt by traders who lost everything at al-Makha port. The harsh reality of this war has impacted every single Yemeni, and we are no exception.”

Tunisia has seen an uptick in protests as economic conditions in the country have deteriorated.

Hundreds of protesters have taken to the streets of Tunisia’s capital to call for the ousting of President Kais Saied and the restoration of democracy.

Protesters in Tunis said on Thursday that they reject “one-man rule” and “a slide towards dictatorship”, and urged the release of jailed opposition figures, activists and journalists.

Thursday’s protest follows a similar one on July 25, which was scheduled to coincide with the anniversary of President Saied’s 2021 dismissal of the government and suspension of parliament. He began ruling by decree later that year and dissolved parliament in 2022.

One demonstrator at Thursday’s march, activist Wissem Sghaier, said the country is “experiencing a complete collapse”, the Reuters news agency reported.

Tunisians are facing mounting economic and cost-of-living pressures, ⁠with deteriorating public services and shortages of some basic goods and medicines.

Tunisia’s inflation rate currently sits at 5.2 percent, according to the World Bank. Investment in the country has fallen precipitously, and Saied’s government has introduced a series of cost-saving measures, including halting public sector hiring and reducing imports.

Protests have broken out in several parts of the country in recent weeks over water and power cuts and environmental problems, suggesting that public anger is spreading beyond political disputes with Saied to the mounting hardships of everyday life. The country was also one of a number of North African countries to be hit by major wildfires this summer.

Rights groups, meanwhile, say that Saied has presided over a broad crackdown targeting opposition leaders, independent civil society groups, journalists and activists.

Who is Tunisian President Kais Saied?

Saied, a 68-year-old independent politician and former constitutional lawyer, was elected in 2019 in a victory that he described at the time as “like a revolution”. His campaign refused to take money and instead relied on a diverse array of Tunisian volunteers, and its messaging focused heavily on tackling corruption.

Saied was one of the legal advisers who helped draft Tunisia’s 2014 democratic constitution, though he soon spoke out against elements of the document.

Since coming to power, Saied has drawn the ire of international rights groups for a series of measures perceived as anti-democratic. That includes reforms of the judiciary that gave Saied unprecedented control over Tunisia’s courts via the creation of a new governing body with him at the head, and mass trials of political opponents.

Egypt’s response to Ethiopia’s new Nile dam plans is centred on diplomacy, international pressure and cooperation with Sudan, rather than trying to stop construction outright. However, the experience of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has exposed the limits of Cairo’s influence.

The revival of three proposed Blue Nile hydropower projects – Karadobi, Mandaya and Beko Abo – will test whether Egypt can turn more than a decade of opposition into practical leverage over how Ethiopia develops the river.

The projects have been discussed for years. A 2024 academic study drawing on Nile Basin Initiative-sponsored work listed all three among proposed Blue Nile projects and noted that Karadobi and Beko Abo were considered alternatives in one potential three-dam configuration.

What is new is Ethiopia’s reported move to advance them. In March, the country’s Water and Energy Ministry announced plans for the projects, according to subsequent reporting. Their combined generating potential has been reported at about 5,700 megawatts, although the figures and specifications could change because the projects remain at the planning stage.

The announcement came months after Ethiopia inaugurated the GERD in September 2025, despite years of objections from Egypt.

Why does Ethiopia want more dams?

For Ethiopia, developing the Blue Nile is closely tied to electricity generation, economic growth and energy security. Addis Ababa argues that expanding hydropower is essential for a country where millions of people have historically lacked reliable access to electricity.

The three projects fit into that wider strategy. However, their eventual impact on Egypt and Sudan will depend on what Ethiopia builds and how the facilities are operated.

Ezekiel Gebissa, an Ethiopian professor at Kettering University in the United States, told Al Jazeera that the consequences would depend on the scale and purpose of the projects. “Smaller dams could generate electricity for local communities without significantly reducing the volume of water reaching downstream countries,” he said, while projects linked to large-scale irrigation could have greater implications for Egypt and Sudan.

The impact will depend on various factors, including reservoir size, filling schedules, water releases and operating rules. A dam designed mainly for electricity generation would have different consequences from one linked to large-scale irrigation.

For now, the projects represent a potential new source of tension rather than proof that they will reduce the water reaching Egypt.

Why is Egypt concerned?

For Egypt, the Nile is the country’s main source of freshwater. Any major change upstream is viewed through the lens of national security.

Cairo’s concern is not Ethiopia generating electricity. It is what happens when water is stored and managed upstream, particularly during periods of drought. Egypt has therefore pushed for rules covering dam operations, drought management, water releases and information sharing.

Last September, Egypt again raised the issue at the United Nations Security Council, arguing that Ethiopia’s inauguration and operation of the GERD violated its international obligations and called for a binding agreement. Those were Egypt’s stated legal and political positions, not findings by the council.

The dispute reflects two different priorities. Ethiopia views the Blue Nile as a resource for development, while Egypt seeks guarantees over the water flows on which it depends.

What did the GERD change?

The GERD demonstrated both the reach and the limits of Egypt’s diplomatic strategy.

Ethiopia inaugurated the dam on September 9, 2025, after years of negotiations with Egypt and Sudan failed to produce the binding agreement Cairo wanted. The nearly $5bn project, funded largely by Ethiopia itself, has an installed generating capacity of about 5,150 megawatts and is now a major part of Ethiopia’s electricity system.

For Egypt, the lesson was clear: diplomatic pressure could raise international attention but could not prevent Ethiopia from completing the project.

The focus has therefore shifted. Instead of trying to stop a single dam, Cairo is now seeking a role in how existing and future projects are designed, filled and operated.

Sudan’s role

Sudan remains central to Egypt’s approach because it lies between Ethiopia and Egypt and is directly affected by developments on the Blue Nile.

However, Khartoum is not simply aligned with Cairo.

Sudan could benefit from more predictable river flows and Ethiopian electricity, while also seeking greater transparency, information sharing and safeguards around upstream projects.

Mekki Elmograbi, a Sudanese governance expert, said transparency from Ethiopia was the starting point for cooperation. “Ethiopia must share more information with Sudan and Egypt; transparency is the first step toward cooperation,” he told Al Jazeera. “Who knows whether the new projects are good or bad for Sudan if there is not enough information?”

Elmograbi said Sudan should seek cooperation with both Ethiopia and Egypt to ensure major projects do not harm its interests. But Sudan’s ability to play a larger diplomatic role is constrained by its ongoing war.

While Sudan shares some concerns with Egypt, it also has its own relationship with Ethiopia and its own priorities, including access to electricity and effective management of the river.

What leverage does Egypt have?

Egypt’s strategy has centred on diplomacy, international pressure and cooperation with Sudan, aimed at pushing Ethiopia towards greater transparency and negotiated rules.

The experience of the GERD shows that Cairo’s strongest tools are political and diplomatic rather than coercive. Egypt can raise international attention, seek support from regional partners and push for agreements on issues such as data sharing, drought management and dam operations.

The challenge is that these tools are unlikely to give Egypt the ability to stop Ethiopia from pursuing new hydropower projects or to control decisions made in Addis Ababa.

Horn of Africa analyst, Abdiwahab Sheikh, told Al Jazeera that Egypt has “meaningful but limited leverage” over Ethiopia. He said Cairo’s strongest tools are diplomacy, alliances, international law and coordination with Sudan, while economic pressure is weaker and military coercion carries significant risks.

The three Blue Nile projects will test whether Egypt can convert diplomatic pressure into practical influence. For Sheikh, the path forward lies in negotiated rules rather than confrontation.

“A practical arrangement is possible if Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan accept transparent information exchange, advance notification, adaptive dam-management rules and mechanisms for addressing droughts and downstream impacts.”

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says Washington will impose its ‘toughest sanctions in history’ to ‘collapse’ Iran’s government, warning of consequences for countries that maintain economic ties with Tehran.