India

Tamil Nadu, India – Standing on top of a customised van on a hot and humid afternoon in Tirunelveli, about 600km (373 miles) south of Tamil Nadu’s capital Chennai in southern India, C Joseph Vijay tells his supporters his opponents have joined hands to stop him from becoming the state chief minister.

“My rivals might appear different from outside, but they have only one aim: that Vijay should not become the chief minister,” says the 51-year-old actor-turned-politician to a mammoth crowd that begins to chant his name, which means “victory” in Tamil, in unison.

Tamil Nadu, one of India’s most developed states with impressive human development indices, also has a long history of electing film stars as leaders, some of whom are still revered by people as demigods years after their deaths.

As Tamil Nadu votes on Thursday to elect its 234-member state legislative assembly, Vijay’s bid for power is the latest addition to the state’s trend of film star-politicians, turning a traditionally bipolar battle into a triangular contest.

‘A blessing and a curse’

Vijay entered politics with much fanfare when he launched the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) party in 2024, promising to end the decades-old dominance of the governing Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the main opposition All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK).

Incumbent Chief Minister MK Stalin leads the DMK and its 14-party Secular Progressive Alliance, in which the Indian National Congress is a junior partner. On the other hand, opposition leader Edappadi K Palaniswami of the AIADMK heads the 10-party National Democratic Alliance, which also includes Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The DMK and the AIADMK identify themselves as Dravidian parties, which derive their names from a powerful political and social justice movement in Tamil Nadu that opposed caste inequalities, championed social reforms, and rejected perceived attempts by India’s more dominant north Indian parties to impose Hindi – and upper-caste Hindu values – on the non-Hindi speaking southern states.

Dravidian parties have held power in Tamil Nadu continuously since 1967, with national parties like the Congress and the BJP playing secondary roles. While the BJP is contesting 27 seats in alliance with the AIADMK, the Congress is fighting for 28 seats as part of the DMK-led coalition.

More than 87 percent of Tamil Nadu’s 72 million people are Hindu, followed by Christians at 6.1 percent and Muslims at 5.8 percent, according to the last census conducted in 2011.

Among Hindus, the so-called “backward” or less-privileged castes constitute 45.5 percent, “extremely backward” castes 23.6 percent, while Dalits are at 20.6 percent. Dalits, formerly referred to as “untouchables”, fall at the bottom of India’s complex caste hierarchy and have faced marginalisation and violence for centuries.

Vijay, son of a Christian filmmaker father and a Hindu mother who is a background singer in films, belongs to the Vellalar community, an affluent agrarian group in Tamil Nadu with both Hindu and Christian members.

Vijay started his film career as a child actor in movies directed by his father. His 1992 debut as a hero, however, in Naalaiya Theerpu (Tomorrow’s Verdict), flopped. Following the setback, his father cast him alongside popular star Vijayakanth — who later founded his own political outfit, Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK) — in Senthoorapandi (1993), which gave his career a new lease of life.

It was the 2004 film Ghilli (Gutsy), which carried a subtle political undertone, that catapulted Vijay to superstar status. He dropped hints about his political ambitions in the 2013 hit Thalaivaa (Leader), which was launched with the tagline “Time to Lead”.

Soon, political messaging became central to many of Vijay’s subsequent films. Even the title of his yet-to-be-released Jana Nayagan (People’s Leader) — which he claims will be his final film — alludes to his political aspirations.

Riding on personal charisma, Vijay has attracted millions of supporters to his rallies, despite allegations of poor crowd management, which caused a stampede at one such gathering in September last year, killing 42 people.

He is expected to draw a share of Dalit and minority Christian votes that would have otherwise flowed to the DMK-led coalition. He is also banking on anti-incumbency votes that could have benefitted the AIADMK alliance.

Yet analysts say Vijay’s ambition of becoming the next chief minister will not be as easy as the scripted blockbusters he has built his career on, since he faces two opponents with decades of experience in real politics.

That leads political commentator R Kannan to describe Vijay as “both a blessing and a curse” for the two Dravidian coalitions.

“When the AIADMK joined the BJP-led NDA, many predicted the Dravidian party would lose heavily, with minorities and Dalits flocking to the DMK. Vijay’s entry, however, has offered the AIADMK a ray of hope — he is expected to draw a decent share of votes that would otherwise have gone to the DMK,” he said.

“At the same time, he works in the DMK’s favour by siphoning off anti-incumbency votes that might not entirely have gone to the AIADMK. For both Dravidian parties, he is at once a blessing and a curse.”

Tamil Nadu’s tryst with stars

Vijay is aiming to follow the path of illustrious predecessors: Maruthur Gopalan Ramachandran, popularly known as MGR, and his protege, Jayaram Jayalalithaa – Tamil Nadu’s most beloved on-screen pair.

Born into poverty, MGR’s rise to stardom was nothing short of phenomenal. He captured the imagination of Tamil Nadu’s working class, who idolised him in return. From his first superhit, Rajakumari (Princess) in 1947, his films cast him as a champion of the masses, battling oppression and corrupt authority.

MGR launched the AIADMK in 1972 after breaking away from the DMK and served as Tamil Nadu’s chief minister from 1977 to 1987. He introduced several welfare programmes, the most significant being the Puratchi Thalaivar MGR Nutritious Meal Scheme, which provided free meals to schoolchildren to eliminate malnutrition and boost school enrolment.

His political heir, Jayalalithaa, was a six-time chief minister between 1991 and 2016, when she became India’s first female state leader to die in office. She is remembered for launching several women-centric programmes, including all-women police stations and subsidised two-wheelers for working women, apart from her work in curbing female infanticide.

The DMK also has a history of film personalities, including the party’s founder, CN Annadurai, who rose to fame as a pathbreaking scriptwriter with films like Velaikkari (1949), and MGR as the party’s star campaigner and leader before he founded the AIADMK.

Soon, Muthuvel Karunanidhi emerged as another prominent writer, poet and screenwriter with films like Parasakthi (1952), meaning Supreme Power, often cited as a turning point in Tamil cinema. Directed by Krishnan-Panju and written by Karunanidhi, then 28 years old, the film fiercely attacked casteism and social inequality, while propelling the spread of the Dravidian ideology.

Karunanidhi, popularly known as Kalaignar (artist), wrote scripts for more than 75 films that resonated with the struggles of the working class, championing rationalism and social equality.

He won the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly election for a record 13 terms and served as the state’s chief minister for five terms between 1969 and 2011. He died at the age of 94 in 2018, when his son, Stalin, took over as chief minister and DMK chief.

Film star-politicians who embraced Tamil identity politics flourished, while those who did not fell by the wayside.

“Successful leaders such as MGR, popularly known as Puratchi Thaalaivar [Revolutionary Leader], Jayalalithaa, who earned the monikers Puratchi Thalaivi [Revolutionary Female Leader] and Amma [Mother], embraced identity politics. Another popular film actor, Sivaji Ganesan, by contrast, could not make the same mark in politics even after he tried,” said Kannan, who has written biographies of MGR and Annadurai.

In 2005, popular actor Vijayakanth added to the starry mix by launching his DMDK party, another Dravidian political outfit. He made every attempt to position his party as an alternative to the DMK and the AIADMK, but failed. The party won just one seat in 2006 — Vijayakanth’s own — and drew a blank in 2009. Though he went on to become the leader of the opposition in the assembly in 2011, the election reverses forced him to seek alliances. The DMDK, now led by his wife Premalatha, is contesting 10 seats in alliance with the DMK.

Which is where, say analysts, Vijay’s pitch for power is unlikely to make an impact in this election. They say his TVK party does not fall in the long line of Dravidian parties that have a distinct political ideology and programme that appeals to their voters.

“Tamil Nadu is an ideologically and politically evolved state. Issues such as social justice, centre-state relations, and linguistic and cultural identity are paramount here. People will not back a politician without a clear ideology,” Ramu Manivannan, former professor of political science at the University of Madras, told Al Jazeera.

Manivannan said large crowds at Vijay’s rallies should not be mistaken for potential votes. “Film stars always attract crowds. To assume all of them will translate into votes is unfair.”

Vijay’s TVK is rooted in his fan clubs, which thrive on masculine aggression, said S Anandhi, retired professor at the Madras Institute of Development Studies.

“Vijay’s populist rhetoric — defying all authority — appeals strongly to the youth. But he never clarifies what he will actually do in power. He frames it as all established forces being arrayed against young men, and youngsters see this as an opportunity for a new kind of collectivisation. I would call it a dangerous class,” she told Al Jazeera.

Appeal to young, female voters

Vijay appears to be banking heavily on two voter blocs: younger voters between 18 and 39 years, who number 23 million of the state’s 57 million voters, and women, who account for more than half of them.

At his rallies packed with young people and women, Vijay has alleged that Stalin’s true allies are “bribery and corruption”, framing the contest as a personal battle between himself and the chief minister.

Stalin, for his part, has largely brushed off Vijay’s attacks. “Newly-formed parties have a wrong notion that they can survive by criticising DMK,” he said in a recent interview.

Instead, Stalin has focused his attacks on the Modi government, accusing it of depriving Tamil Nadu of its share of federal funds, and framing the election as a contest between Tamil Nadu and New Delhi – a ploy that simultaneously targets the AIADMK for allying with an “adversary”, the BJP.

The AIADMK’s Palaniswami has countered by saying Stalin raises the centre-state issue only because he has “no achievements of his own to show”.

Despite their ideological differences, all parties are competing heavily on welfare promises in a state known for freebies during elections.

The DMK has pledged to double the monthly women’s allowance to 2,000 rupees ($21), offer 8,000 rupees ($85) in home appliance coupons, and build one million homes for the poor over five years. The AIADMK, also promising a monthly allowance of 2,000 rupees for women, has additionally offered free refrigerators to the poor and a one-time family grant of 10,000 rupees ($106).

Vijay’s TVK, hoping to cash in on the ongoing global fuel crisis, has promised six free LPG cylinders annually, 2,500 rupees ($26.5) monthly support for the female heads of a household, 8gm gold and a silk saree for poor women getting married, 4,000 rupees ($42.5) stipend for unemployed college graduates, and interest-free education loans of up to 2 million rupees ($21,257).

Still, Kannan feels Vijay can at best be a disruptor in the three-cornered contest.

“Vijay’s campaign gained momentum in the final lap. He turned what was a bipolar contest into a three-cornered one. But apart from his personal charisma, he lacks proper organisational machinery. Many of his party’s candidates are unknown faces,” he said.

Waving a big Catla fish in his hands, Sharadwat Mukherjee went door to door canvassing for votes before Thursday’s election to the state legislature in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal.

Mukherjee is a candidate from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which rules nationally but has never come to power in the state, which has a greater population than Germany: more than 90 million people.

When he folds his hands to greet voters, the Catla just swings with a hook in its mouth. The big question: Can the fish also swing the election’s outcome?

Bengalis’ love for fish is legendary — on both sides of the border, in India and in Bangladesh. So much so that when a student-led uprising led to the ouster of then-Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, some of the protesters who broke into her residence after she fled were seen raiding her refrigerator and walking away with fish.

But as West Bengal votes for its next government, fish has now leapt from kitchen slabs to the campaign trail, as leaders cosy up to voters in a variety of ways — and in some cases try to distance themselves from suspicions that their wins could hit the Bengali diet adversely.

What’s happening in the West Bengal election?

Nearly 68 million people in West Bengal are expected to vote for their candidate of choice on April 23 and 29, to elect 294 lawmakers to the state assembly.

The results will be declared on May 4 in the crucial state vote, which the Hindu majoritarian BJP has never governed.

A revision of the electoral list, which controversially swept away a total of 9.1 million names from the register before polling, and has been criticised for disenfranchising minorities, was among the major polling issues. Some 2.7 million people have challenged their expulsions.

Another is identity politics.

On the campaign trail, in rallies, and in interviews, the chief minister of Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, a firebrand, centrist regional leader — who has been sometimes touted as a contender for Modi’s job in New Delhi, if the opposition were to win — has doubled down on identity politics to corner the BJP, analysts say.

BJP-led governments in several states have imposed bans or restrictions on the sale of meat. Far-right mobs have carried out lynchings of Muslims in BJP-ruled states over accusations that they were transporting beef.

Banerjee, who is seeking a fourth consecutive term, has time and again warned that if the BJP were to come to power, they would “ban fish, meat, and even eggs” — effectively labelling them as outsiders, unaware of Bengali culture. The BJP has rejected these allegations.

Biswanath Chakraborty, a psephologist and political analyst in West Bengal who has authored several books on voting behaviour, told Al Jazeera that the whole issue surrounding fish had been “constructed by Mamata Banerjee.”

“For long, she has peddled that fish is parallel to Bengali politics,” he said. “In election campaigning, every issue is constructed, and Mamata is the champion of that.”

Chakraborty argued that by fiercely pushing back against these allegations, the BJP had ended up helping the governing party in Bengal make sure the debate over fish remained a campaign highlight with voters.

“They [the BJP] are entering, or rather trapped, into the discourse set by Mamata,” the analyst said.

Why fish, though?

“Fish is very crucial in Bengal, very crucial,” said Utsa Ray, an assistant professor at Jadavpur University, in West Bengal’s capital Kolkata. She also authored a 2015 book on Bengal’s culinary evolution in colonial India, titled Culinary Culture in Colonial India: A Cosmopolitan Platter and the Middle-Class.

“First of all, due to Bengal’s geographical location itself – along the Bay of Bengal – [and as] a place situated near rivers and streams, fish have been the most available item,” she told Al Jazeera.

Fish has also been an integral part of many rituals in Bengal on auspicious days for both Hindus and Muslims, Ray said, adding, however, that there were sects of people in Bengal who refrain from eating fish.

A 2024 study found that nearly 65 percent of people in West Bengal consume fish weekly.

Against that backdrop, Ray told Al Jazeera that Banerjee’s party was looking to leverage “regional identity or the Bengali identity”.

Banojyotsna Lahiri, a social activist and voter in West Bengal, described the BJP’s response, with candidates like Mukherjee campaigning with fish, as a “gimmick”.

“In Bengal, [the BJP] have suddenly realised that they appear as aliens with their vegetarian posturing because both fish and meat are integral to the Bengal culinary choices, caste or religion notwithstanding,” she told Al Jazeera. ”

What’s up with the BJP and food choices?

In the run-up to the voting on Thursday, the BJP rushed to find a senior leader who could eat a fish in front of the cameras. They finally managed to get Anurag Thakur, a member of parliament from Himachal Pradesh, to do that on Tuesday.

“Questions of what food people will eat, especially non-vegetarian [food], have been associated with the BJP’s politics to impose restrictions and dictate food options,” said Neelanjan Sircar, a senior visiting fellow at the think tank Centre for Policy Research, in Delhi.

The BJP has been dictating food choices in northern India’s Hindi-speaking belt, with its “hyper masculine, Hindutva, and vegetarianism,” said Ray. “There have been cases of lynching for eating non-vegetarian food.”

However, that falls flat in Benga.

Still, both Sircar and Ray agreed that the display of fish on the campaign trail was a novelty — even in the often-bizarre world of Indian politics.

“Creating these new images for the BJP is important,” said Sircar. “So, to create another image in voters’ minds leads to these outlandish displays.”

Morbi, India – For seven years, Pradeep Kumar would walk into the ceramics factory in western India at 9am, load raw materials – clay, quartz and sand – into the kiln, and spend the day around the heat and dust of the furnaces.

He handled the clay at different stages, sometimes feeding it into machines, sometimes moving semi-processed pieces towards firing. The work was repetitive and demanding, with no protective gear, such as gloves and masks, against the high temperatures.

“It would be very challenging in the summers since the heat would be at its peak,” he told Al Jazeera.

But on March 15, he lost his job – not because of anything he or the company behind his factory had done, but because the United States and Israel attacked Iran, triggering another war in the Middle East and a global fuel crisis.

Barely two weeks after the war began, the ceramics company where he worked shut down due to a shortage of propane and natural gas. The company, in Morbi in Gujarat state – like all of its peers in the ceramics industry – depends on these critical ingredients.

Morbi is the centre of India’s ceramics industry that employs more than 400,000 people. More than half of these workers, like Kumar, are migrants from poorer Indian states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

Five days after Kumar lost his job, the 29-year-old took his wife and their three children back to their home in Uttar Pradesh’s Hardoi district.

“I am here until every other migrant worker who came back home with us goes back,” he told Al Jazeera.

“We don’t want to suffer like dogs, like we did during the COVID-19 pandemic,” he added, referring to the 2020 and 2021 exodus of migrant workers from India’s more industrialised western states to the poorer east, with millions of starving families, including children, walking on foot for days and sometimes weeks to reach their homes amid a coronavirus lockdown.

About 450 of 600 companies shut

With more than 600 companies, Morbi produces about 80 percent of India’s ceramics in the form of tiles, toilets, bathtubs and wash basins. But at least 450 of those companies have been forced to shut down as a standoff on the Strait of Hormuz, a lifeline for India’s gas imports, continues.

Meanwhile, the war continues, with the US on Sunday capturing an Iranian cargo vessel, even as Washington says it is willing to hold another round of talks with Tehran in Pakistan to reach a deal. Tehran has refused to commit to peace talks after its ship was seized.

The developments came as a fragile ceasefire agreed by Iran and the US after a month of fighting expires on Wednesday. But a re-escalation in hostilities has seen Iran shutting down Hormuz for traffic, disrupting global fuel supplies and raising oil prices.

“All manufacturing units in Morbi rely on propane and natural gas to fire kilns at high temperatures. While propane is supplied by private companies, natural gas is provided by the state to those with connections. Around 60 percent of manufacturers use propane because it is comparatively cheaper,” Siddharth Bopaliya, a 27-year-old third-generation manufacturer and trader in Morbi, told Al Jazeera.

Manoj Arvadiya, president of the Morbi Ceramic Manufacturers Association, said they had shut down the units till April 15, hoping that the Middle East crisis would be resolved by then.

“But even today, only around 100 units have opened, and most have still not begun the manufacturing process. For at least another 15 days, it is likely to remain the same,” he told Al Jazeera.

Arvadiya said the closure has impacted 200,000 workers, with more than a quarter of them forced to go back to their homes in other states.

India’s ceramic industry is valued at $6bn.

“About 25 percent of Morbi’s ceramics are exported to countries in the Middle East, Africa and Europe, with a net worth of $1.5bn. But exports are now delayed and, in some cases, completely halted, especially to Middle Eastern countries, due to the production slowdown over the past month,” Arvadiya told Al Jazeera.

Factories that rely on propane remain shut in Morbi. Though natural gas is mostly available, many units have not made the switch yet, as new connections are being priced at 93 rupees a kilo, while existing users receive it at about 70 rupees.

Khushiram Sapariya, a manufacturer of washbasins who relies on propane, said he will wait this month before deciding on reopening his factory.

“Because then I have to call hundreds of staff who have gone to their homes, and I want to be sure before taking their responsibility,” he said.

Returned home with ‘Morbi disease’

Among the workers who left Morbi last month is 27-year-old Ankur Singh.

“The shutdown of my company did not send me back alone, but with a Morbi disease – silicosis. I would often have fever and cough but kept ignoring it, until I came back to my hometown near Patna in Bihar and found after a check-up that it was silicosis,” he told Al Jazeera.

Silicosis is an incurable lung disease caused by inhalation of silica dust found in rock, sand, quartz and other building materials. One of the oldest occupational diseases in the world, it kills thousands of people every year.

Gujarat-based labour rights activist Chirag Chavda says the disease is “widespread in Morbi because workers are routinely exposed to fine silica dust generated during ceramic production”.

“Even those not directly involved in moulding or kiln work often inhale the particles due to poor ventilation and prolonged exposure across factory spaces,” he told Al Jazeera.

Chavda said most ceramic companies do not follow the government regulations regarding the safety of workers.

Harish Zala, 40, had worked in different ceramic companies in Morbi for two decades before he got silicosis two years ago. He said he received no help from his employer, who allegedly abused and threatened his father when he visited the company after the diagnosis.

“Every year, at least one labourer dies of silicosis in each company, while several get detected for silicosis,” Zala told Al Jazeera. “Some like me get lucky and survive, but have no choice but to quit the job immediately.”

Zala said many companies do not provide the workers with written proof of employment, such as appointment letters, salary slips, or identity cards. “This is done so that if a worker later demands labour rights or legal entitlements, they have no concrete evidence to prove that they were employed by the company.”

Chirag added that such workers are also denied social security under various Indian laws regarding salaries or pension funds, since doing so would establish proof of employment.

“As a result, even after working for years, workers are deprived of their labour rights due to a lack of evidence. This leaves employers with little to no legal accountability,” he said.

In Morbi, there are also migrants like Sushma Devi, 56, who did not go back to her home in West Bengal because the tile company her son works at has promised to continue giving them shelter and food as it waits for manufacturing to resume.

“I am here with a few more people because we did not want to spend money on travelling. Here, at least our ration is sorted,” she said as she walked with a bundle of dry twigs, wood and discarded plywood for the cooking.

“We step out to collect these every day to be able to cook our two-time meal,” said Devi. “I hope the kilns and manufacturing resume soon, but I also hope they don’t stop giving us rice and potatoes even if the kilns don’t start running anytime soon.”

Devi’s husband, Debendar, and their son Ankit live in a one-room set given to them by their company. The family has access to a common toilet for 10 families on one floor.

Kumar, meanwhile, is running out of his meagre savings and fears he could fall into a debt trap.

“Initially, we ate from whatever we had saved. But the house needed repair and we had to borrow 20,000 rupees ($214) from a relative, which we have no idea when or how we will repay,” he said, looking at the reworked roof of his brick house in Hardoi.

The recently concluded 14th Ministerial Conference of the WTO produced mixed results. While the multilateral system remains stuck on Appellate Body appointments, one of the most extensive pre-conference discussions focused on the Chinese-led Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA). With 129 member states backing the IFDA, including countries like Bangladesh and several least developed countries (LDCs) from Africa, this has put India’s position as a key representative of the third world into question.

However, a thorough examination of India’s position reveals deeper concerns about the WTO within the ever-changing framework of global economic governance. In this article, I argue that India’s opposition to the IFDA is based not merely on apprehensions about China’s strategic influence, but also on other considerations founded on the grounds of jurisdiction, sovereign right to regulate and the procedure.

The Jurisdictional Argument & Potential Fragmentation of the International Trade Regime:

India’s primary objection to the IFDA emerges from a very pivotal question in the field of international law, challenging the jurisdiction and mandate of the WTO. In a rules-based transnational system, international organizations operate on a mandate-based framework. This mandate is primarily derived from the substantive provisions of their founding agreements and the consent of member states. Historically, the WTO’s mandate has centred on trade, specifically the regulation of trade in goods and services, as well as certain trade-related aspects of intellectual property and investment. While instruments such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) incidentally touch upon investment, they do so only insofar as it is in relation with trade.

Given that the WTO’s mandate and primary focus are on trade, India maintains that the regulation of investment as an autonomous domain fall outside its negotiated competence. This position is grounded in the collapse of the “Singapore Issues,” which included investments as one of its four development agenda and were explicitly dropped from the Doha Developmental Agenda in 2004. The reintroduction of investment facilitation through the IFDA is thus viewed as lacking a legitimate mandate, raising serious concerns about the WTO’s overreach.

Another factor closely linked to the lack of mandate is the plurilateral character of the proposed agreement. Unlike multilateral agreements, which bind all WTO members on the basis of consensus, plurilateral agreements apply only to a subset of willing participants. While such arrangements are not unprecedented within the WTO framework, India views the IFDA as a symbolic representation of a broader trend towards fragmentation. The primary concern of New Delhi is the risk that plurilateralism brings to the system. India’s apprehension stems from creation of a two-tier system within the WTO, wherein economically powerful states effectively set the rules, leaving others in a position of reactive compliance. This seriously undermines the foundational principle of sovereign equality among the WTO members and erodes the consensus-based decision-making model that has historically been a salient feature of the WTO.

Right to Regulate

A further dimension of India’s opposition to the IDFA pertains to the preservation of regulatory autonomy. The IFDA, although framed as a facilitative instrument, introduces disciplines that may constrain domestic policymaking. The current bilateral system on which international investment law is based relies heavily on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and dedicated chapters on investment in comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPA). This empowers developing countries such as India to specifically negotiate foreign investment policy in accordance with domestic requirements and national priorities.

However, under the IFDA’s plurilateral approach, India’s apprehension is grounded in obligations relating to non-discrimination, administrative review, and procedural standardisation, which over time may limit the flexibility required to implement industrial policy, promote local value addition, or regulate sensitive sectors in the public interest.

Further, India is also careful of the potential consequences that may arise from incorporating investment-related disciplines within the WTO framework. Although the IFDA does not formally include investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, its provisions could nonetheless be invoked indirectly in arbitral proceedings under bilateral investment treaties (BITs).

Given India’s prior experience with investment treaty arbitration and the subsequent revisiting of its Model BIT in 2016 to ensure regulatory balance, this concern carries considerable weight. While at face value these provisions might seem benign and aimed at facilitation of flow of investments, their pro-investor interpretations might create problems by exposing India to international liability.

Another vital dimension of India’s critique pertains to the procedural legitimacy of the IFDA negotiations. It is quite commonly observed that the legitimacy of outcomes is intricately linked to the legitimacy of the processes that produce them. These negotiations were initiated through a Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) which remains controversial within the WTO system. India’s argument relies on the absence of an explicit mandate which contradicts the WTO’s decision-making framework, which is based on consensus.

Beyond these factors, India’s position can also be understood as a negotiation strategy. By resisting the incorporation of new issues such as investment facilitation into the WTO package, India seeks to preserve negotiating leverage in ongoing and future discussions. Accepting the IFDA could open a pandora’s box for the introduction of other areas, including digital trade and e-commerce, thereby shifting the balance of negotiations away from priorities of developing countries, such as agricultural subsidies.

It is important to note that India does not oppose investment facilitation in principle; rather, its criticism is related to the form, venue, and legal consequences of introducing non-trade disciplines at the WTO. India has, in fact, undertaken substantial domestic reforms aimed at improving the ease of doing business and attracting foreign investment. Its objection is more precisely directed at the form, forum, and legal implications of embedding such non-trade disciplines within the framework of WTO.

In summary, the refusal of India to sign the IFDA is a reflection of careful consideration of complex legal factors combined with prudence regarding institutional development and developmental policy. It underscores a broader tension within the contemporary multilateral trading system aiming to balance the ever-expansive rule-making to protect & promote investments, with preservation of regulatory policy space for host states.

The Indian government is seeking to expedite the implementation of a 2023 law that reserves 33 percent of seats in parliament and state assemblies for women, but has linked the move to a sweeping redrawing of parliamentary constituencies, sharpening political tensions.

“We’re set to take historic steps to empower women,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi said before a special sitting of parliament on Thursday as his government introduced three bills to be debated in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament.

While two of the three bills relate to extending the number of women in parliament and state assemblies, a third bill relates to “delimitation”, as the process to redraw parliamentary boundaries based on population is called in India. The bill aims to increase the overall size of parliament from 543 Lok Sabha seats to 850.

The bills are being taken up during a three-day special session and will require a two-thirds majority in both houses to pass. Modi’s National Democratic Alliance (NDA) holds 293 seats in lower house of parliament while a two-thirds majority would require 360 votes.

Women currently account for 14 percent of the Lok Sabha members. “We are all united to give rightful positions to women in India,” Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju said on Thursday.

Several Asian countries, including India’s neighbours like Nepal and Bangladesh, have similar quotas for women in national legislatures. India already mandates that one-third of seats be set aside for women in local governing bodies.

Opposition alleges ‘gerrymandering’

While there appears to be broad bipartisan support for putting more women into parliament, opposition parties have raised concerns over changing the voting boundaries, warning it could tilt the political balance in favour of Modi’s Hindu majoritarian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The BJP draws much of its support from the densely populated north, and critics said expanding seats in parliament would, therefore, benefit it the most. Leaders in southern states, where birth rates have declined more sharply, said a population-based delimitation exercise could increase seats in the north and disadvantage southern regions that have slowed population growth and built stronger economies.

The Indian Constitution mandates that parliamentary seats be allocated by population and revised after each census. However, boundaries have not been redrawn since the 1971 census as successive governments delayed the process.

The government is now proposing that delimitation of new seats be based on the last completed census, in 2011, and come into effect for the next general election in 2029.

But opposition parties want the government to wait for the results of an ongoing census, which was launched this month, a formidable logistical challenge that will take a year to carry out – and even longer for the data to be processed.

The main opposition leader, Rahul Gandhi, said that while his Indian National Congress party supports increasing the number of women in parliament, the government’s approach is aimed at consolidating power.

“The proposal that the government is now bringing has no connection to women’s reservation,” Gandhi said in a statement on social media. “It is merely an attempt to seize power through delimitation and gerrymandering.”

Congress parliamentarian Gaurav Gogoi alleged that the intention of the government was not to implement women’s reservation but to introduce delimitation “through the backdoor”, according to a report in India’s Scroll.in website.

Akhilesh Yadav, member of parliament from the Samajwadi Party, asked whether Muslims will be given some kind of reservation within the quota for women, The Indian Express reported.

The BJP pushed back on the criticism, saying it would implement a uniform 50 percent increase in seats across all states and maintain proportional representation nationwide. However, the draft delimitation bill does not explicitly spell this out.

Speaking in parliament, Modi said the legislation is “not discriminatory” and “will not do injustice to anyone”.

But the opposition was not convinced. Some members from southern states turned up in parliament dressed in black as a mark of protest.

MK Stalin, chief minister of the southern state of Tamil Nadu and a rival to the BJP, burned a copy of the bill and raised a black flag in protest, urging people across the state to do the same.

“Let the flames of resistance spread across Tamil Nadu,” Stalin said, accusing the BJP of trying to marginalise the state through redrawn boundaries. “Let the arrogance of the fascist BJP be brought down.”

Srinagar, Indian-administered Kashmir — The gold earrings were a gift from her father on her birthday just months earlier. But on March 21, as South Asia marked Eid‑ul‑Fitr, Masrat Mukhtar handed them over to an aid collection effort to help civilians in Iran trying to survive the US-Israel war on the country.

She was one of many in Indian-administered Kashmir who paused their customary rituals and celebrations on the auspicious day to contribute cash, household items, and personal assets for a people more than 1,000 miles away.

Her cousins followed, each bringing items of personal value. Families offered copper utensils, livestock, bicycles, and portions of savings. Children broke their piggy banks, sharing savings they had carefully collected over several years. Shopkeepers and traders handed over parts of their earnings.

“We give what we love. This brings us closer to them,” said Mukhtar, a 55-year-old woman from Budgam in the central part of Indian-administered Kashmir, before referring to a name by which the region has historically also been known. “This is what Little Iran does for its namesake. The bond persists through time and conflict.”

That bond, rooted in more than six centuries of historical connections, has taken on a much more overt presence during the war – drawing recognition from Iranian authorities, and concerns over some fund collection methods from Indian officials.

One daughter’s wealth, to another daughter

In Zadibal, a Shia-majority area of Srinagar – the biggest city in Indian-administered Kashmir – 73-year-old Tahera Jan watched neighbours contribute copper pots.

“Kashmiris traditionally collect these utensils for their daughters’ weddings. We chose to give them instead to daughters who lost mothers and sisters in the attacks,” Jan said.

Sadakat Ali Mir, a 24-year-old mini-truck driver, contributed one of the two vehicles he drives for his livelihood. Other contributors offered bicycles, scooters, and other essential items. Children, including nine-year-old Zainab Jan, handed over piggy banks.

To be sure, that Shia constitute between 10 to 15 percent of Indian-administered Kashmir’s population is a factor in why the war in Iran resonates so deeply in the region. But donations for Iran have extended well beyond Shia. Several Sunni families observed simpler Eid meals, redirecting household resources towards Iranian relief. Some shopkeepers closed early, while families adjusted daily routines to contribute.

Political and religious figures also participated. Budgam lawmaker Aga Syed Muntazir Mehdi donated a month’s salary to the relief effort. Imran Reza Ansari, a Shia scholar and leader of the People’s Conference party, noted public participation across communities.

Similar donation campaigns in support of Iranians have also been reported from Pakistan, Iraq and other countries.

But at the heart of this outpouring of support for Iran in Indian-administered Kashmir – which also witnessed large rallies after the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28 – are rare cultural ties that Kashmir and what was then Persia have shared for centuries.

‘Little Iran’

Sufi scholar Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani arrived in Kashmir from Hamadan in Iran in the 14th century, introducing religious practices, art forms, and Persian literary traditions. Persian architectural influences appear in historical mosques, and the Persian language has shaped local literature.

Irshad Ahmad, a scholar of Central Asian studies, said donation drives drew on this historical reservoir, with prayers, rituals, and art forms reflecting longstanding ties. Kashmir has historically been referred to as Iran-e-Sagheer, or Little Iran.

The donations carry personal and cultural meaning beyond financial value, said experts. “People are not only parting with objects; they are sharing emotional continuity,” Sakina Hassan, a lecturer on humanitarian practices in New Delhi, said.

More than 2,000 people have been killed in Iran during the war, which is on pause at the moment amid a fragile ceasefire brokered by Pakistan. The first round of direct talks between the United States and Iran in Islamabad last week broke down without a deal, and mediators are working on pushing the two sides towards new talks. The ceasefire is set to expire next Wednesday.

Millions in donations

The scope of donations from Kashmir is significant. Estimates from local authorities place the value of contributions at up to six billion rupees ($64m), including cash, gold, jewellery, household items, livestock, and vehicles.

Collection points in Srinagar, Budgam, Baramulla – another major city – and the region’s northern districts were staffed by volunteers documenting donations.

Small contributions, including coins, piggy banks, and utensils, make up a large portion of total aid in terms of volume. Syed Asifi, a volunteer managing central Srinagar collections, said even individuals with limited means brought what they could.

Medical kits were assembled by local doctors, and supply drives were organised by students and educational institutions based on assessed needs in Iran.

The Iranian embassy in New Delhi acknowledged contributions in a post on X: “We sincerely thank the kind people of Kashmir for standing with the people of Iran through their humanitarian support and heartfelt solidarity; this kindness endures.” A video shared by the embassy showed a widow donating gold she had kept as a memento of her husband, who died 28 years ago.

That post was subsequently pulled down by the embassy, though the mission later posted again, thanking the people of India and Kashmir.

The embassy added that Kashmir’s contributions constitute a substantial portion of donations from India, with local sources estimating the Valley’s share at more than 40 percent of the total.

Security concerns

But while the majority of donations are directed towards humanitarian purposes, Indian authorities have raised concerns about potential misuse. Jammu and Kashmir Police and the State Investigative Agency (SIA) have said some funds collected through door-to-door drives by unverified individuals could be diverted to local networks of separatists and armed groups.

“People depositing money directly to the Iranian embassy should not be worried,” said a senior official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Collections by middlemen without transparent monitoring may not reach the intended recipients.”

Authorities have also asked volunteers to maintain records to ensure compliance with fundraising regulations.

There’s a reason for this concern, say Indian authorities.

They point to the example of 2023, where funds collected in southern Kashmir – ostensibly for humanitarian purposes – were allegedly instead funnelled towards rebel groups. Organisers of the Kashmir drives for Iran maintain that all efforts are humanitarian.

Reporting from Washington — President Obama reassured India’s prime minister Tuesday that the partnership between their two countries would be “one of the defining relationships of the 21st century.”

Appearing with Manmohan Singh at the White House after two hours of talks, Obama said the United States and India have agreed to broaden cooperation in a variety of areas, including the economy, agriculture, technology, trade and counter-terrorism.

“The United States and India are natural allies,” the president said at a news conference.

Indian officials have worried recently that the Obama administration might be less committed than its predecessors to strengthening the U.S.-Indian relationship. Indians are anxious that their relationship is taking a back seat to growing U.S. ties with China and Pakistan. Obama returned last week from a trip to Asia that included a three-day stop in China.

But the administration made a special effort to dispel those perceptions: Singh is the first foreign leader invited to the Obama White House for a state visit, which included a state dinner Tuesday night.

The president emphasized that the U.S. is not looking solely to China for leadership in Asia.

“The United States welcomes and encourages India’s leadership role in helping to shape the rise of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia,” Obama said. He also accepted an invitation from Singh to visit India next year.

Ashley J. Tellis, who was a senior South Asia aide in George W. Bush’s administration, said Obama’s statements held valuable symbolism.

But the “real tests are yet to come,” said Tellis, now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

It remains to be seen whether the United States will devote the time needed to build a strategic relationship, and whether the two countries can work out their differences on such issues as climate change and nuclear nonproliferation, he said.

The Obama administration would like India to take aggressive steps to reduce carbon emissions, while India contends that the developed world should bear a larger share of that responsibility.

India, which has nuclear programs, has also been reluctant to impose tough economic sanctions on Iran, with which it has strong economic ties.

The United States and many other Western powers allege that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, but Iran says its nuclear development program is for civilian energy purposes.

Obama and Singh may have been closer on concerns about Taliban militants in Afghanistan, a subject that the prime minister raised repeatedly this week at a series of public meetings in Washington, and which the two leaders discussed at the White House.

Michael Hammer, a White House spokesman, said Singh and Obama “agreed that stabilizing Afghanistan and preventing a return of the Taliban to power are critically important.”

Hammer said that in their discussion of Iran, the two leaders “resolved to work together to make sure that all countries live up to their international obligations in the nuclear context.”

Teresita Schaffer, a former U.S. ambassador now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said Indians don’t want the U.S. to fail in Afghanistan because they believe it would mean “a much bigger footprint for militant Islam.”

More broadly, she said, “they’ve bet their international role on ties to a United States strong enough to deliver the goods.”

paul.richter@latimes.com

cparsons@latimes.com

Assam, India – Amoiya Medhi says attending an election rally organised by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in her hometown in India’s northeastern state of Assam is a matter of both religious compulsion and personal gratitude.

On March 29, Medhi was among thousands of men and women who thronged the rally held on the outskirts of Jagiroad, an industrial town in central Assam’s Morigaon district, ahead of the state assembly election scheduled on Thursday.

Nitin Nabin, the BJP’s national president and chief guest at the event, trumpeted the welfare schemes launched by Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma’s government – schemes that Nabin claimed benefitted the Assamese people, especially women.

Medhi, 38, nodded in agreement as she listened attentively to the speeches. “This government has done so much for everyone, including women,” she told Al Jazeera. “I am going to only vote for the BJP.”

Like Medhi, dozens of women attending the rally said they were the beneficiaries of multiple government schemes, including Orunodoi, a direct benefit transfer scheme that saw nearly four million women receive 9,000 rupees each on March 10 – the largest such disbursement in the state’s history, which included a three-month bonus to mark the Bihu festival held in April.

The disbursement came barely a month before Thursday’s vote in which Sarma, 57, is seeking a third consecutive term for his party.

Since becoming the chief minister in 2021, Sarma has been accused of pursuing a hardline Hindu supremacist agenda (popularly known as “Hindutva”) coupled with a xenophobic campaign targeting Muslims. They constitute 34 percent of Assam’s 31 million population, according to the last census conducted in 2011. That’s the highest among Indian states, with only the federally-governed territories of Indian-administered Kashmir and Lakshadweep higher.

An overwhelming nine million of Assam’s 10.3 million Muslims speak Bengali and not Assamese. They historically migrated to Assam in waves – a majority of them moving during British rule, when Bengali-speaking Hindu and Muslim communities moved from East Bengal (now Bangladesh) to work in Assam’s tea estates and rice fields.

‘Protecting our Hindu identity’

For decades, the BJP and other Hindu groups have labelled the Bengali-speaking Muslims as “foreigners”, accusing them of being undocumented immigrants from Bangladesh. Assam founded special tribunals to try these Muslims, sending hundreds to detention centres built across the state.

Thousands of “miya”, as Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam are pejoratively called, have also been declared “doubtful” voters. The “miya” issue has shaped the BJP’s politics in Assam. Leading the charge against them, Sarma himself publicly admitted that he had instructed BJP workers to file an objection with the Election Commission of India to remove half a million Bengali-speaking Muslims from electoral rolls.

In 2024, Sarma told the state assembly that his government “will take sides” and “will not let miya Muslims take over all of Assam”. Two months ago, a 17-second artificial intelligence-generated video, produced and shared by the BJP on X, showed Sarma holding a rifle and shooting at pictures of two Muslim men, with the caption saying: “No Mercy”. The clip, titled ‘Point Blank Shot’, was deleted after outrage.

Champa Hira, another woman attending the Morigaon rally, said while the BJP’s financial aid and other welfare schemes have been a major draw, her support for the party goes beyond financial benefits.

“For us, it is also about protecting our Hindu identity,” she told Al Jazeera.

“Our Hindu religion is born out of the lotus,” Hira said, referring to the BJP’s election symbol. “We will let the lotus bloom once again for such schemes and also for our Hindu identities.”

In the run-up to the polls, the BJP’s political messaging on roadside billboards, wall graffiti and posters had the party showcase its anti-Muslim policies pursued in the past decade.

The party boasts about clearing around 20,000 hectares of government land – an area more than three-and-a-half-times the size of Manhattan – from the “osinaki manuh” (“strange people” – a veiled reference to Bengali-speaking Muslims). The eviction drives, which intensified after Sarma became the chief minister in 2021, are a part of the BJP’s “war” on Bengali-speaking Muslims to “reclaim every inch of land” allegedly encroached by them. Without providing evidence, Sarma has repeatedly accused the Bengali-speaking Muslims of a conspiracy to change Assam’s demography and reduce Hindus to a minority. The government’s crackdown also saw dozens of Muslims “pushed back” to Bangladesh – their alleged homeland – or their properties bulldozed.

Alongside such hardline policies targeting Muslims, the BJP also touted the launching of various welfare schemes for women and youth. And has promised an increase in financial aid from $13 to over $32 in the Orunodoi cash transfer scheme. In the Udyamita scheme, an entrepreneurial fund reserved for rural women to bootstrap their businesses, the increase is from $107 to $269.

Akhil Ranjan Dutta, who teaches political science at Assam’s Gauhati University, says the Hindu nationalist party is using a strategy that mixes “heightened polarisation and a developmental pitch” to woo the Assamese voters.

“To me, it is a cocktail of Hindutva and welfarism,” Dutta told Al Jazeera. “The BJP is experimenting with a brand of Hindutva by co-opting Indigenous armed struggle and cultural nationalism, while solidifying Hindu identity and othering the Bengali Muslims.”

The Bengali-speaking Muslims say the BJP’s election promises have heightened their anxiety. In its manifesto, the party has promised more crackdowns on the community, including a proposal to implement a Uniform Civil Code, which, according to critics, will override Muslim personal laws on marriage, divorce and inheritance.

The Uniform Civil Code, a longstanding demand from Hindu groups, is already in place in two BJP-ruled states, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home state of Gujarat. The BJP has also promised a pushback against “Love Jihad”, an unproven conspiracy theory floated by right-wing Hindu groups, under which Muslim men allegedly lure Hindu women into marriage and convert them to Islam.

A former Assamese parliamentarian from the main opposition Congress party, who requested anonymity fearing reprisal from the government, agreed with political scientist Dutta. “The BJP has managed to turn Hindus against Muslims and enjoy support,” he added.

BJP spokesman in Assam, Kishore Upadhyay, rejected the allegation, claiming the government’s eviction drives were not targeted at any community.

“It is directed only against illegal encroachment, irrespective of religion or identity. Unfortunately, successive Congress governments in the past allowed or even facilitated such illegal settlements, creating today’s challenges,” he told Al Jazeera.

“It is also important to highlight that this is about restoring land rights of indigenous and tribal communities, protecting forest areas and ensuring proper land governance.”

Will welfare schemes help BJP?

Opposition parties and analysts say the BJP is mainly milking two cash transfer schemes – Orunodoi and Udyamita – to influence voters in this election.

In December 2025 and January this year, the government distributed cheques of $107 each under the Udyamita scheme. Additionally, it withheld a monthly honorarium of $13 for poor women under the Orunodoi scheme for three months, but handed it out last month in the run-up to the election.

Isfaqur Rahman of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) said the Sarma government’s disbursement of cash only days before the polls will help it in securing significant numbers of female votes. “If cash is disbursed to them on the eve of the election after making the beneficiaries wait, it will help influence their choice to vote,” Rahman told Al Jazeera. “This is nothing more than vote buying by the BJP.”

Economist Joydeep Baruah agreed, saying that distributing a lump sum of money will “bear a positive political result for the ruling party”, as he estimated that that at least 10 to 15 percent of the scheme’s four million women beneficiaries could vote for the BJP.

“While the rural wages in Assam have been stagnant due to a growing unemployment, the Orunodoi financial aid converts into 10-15 percent of their monthly income,” said Baruah, who teaches economics at state-run Krishna Kanta Handiqui State Open University in Assam’s main city of Guwahati.

Baruah said such populist schemes help in sustaining pro-incumbency.

“That way, the BJP is establishing more of a patron-client relationship, with patrons being the BJP and the clients being the beneficiaries,” he told Al Jazeera. “Such a transactional relationship materialises on the ground.”

Dipika Baruah, a 34-year-old woman in Kathiatoli town in central Assam’s Nagaon district – who is not related to economist Baruah – said the government grants empowered her to live with dignity.

“The money helped me keep the flame in my stove going,” she told Al Jazeera as she shopped at Mama Bazar, a marketplace named after Sarma, who is fondly called “mama” (maternal uncle in Assamese and Bengali) by his supporters. “This was possible because of mama. Women will only vote for Mama.”

Pre-poll surveys in Assam also suggest that cash transfer schemes will help the BJP consolidate votes in its favour.

An opinion poll conducted by political research firm, Vote Vibe, revealed that 54 percent of respondents believe the government’s cash transfer schemes will consolidate and even attract opposition voters. The survey also showed 38 percent of female respondents saying the schemes had strengthened the BJP’s voter base, while 21 percent of females said the schemes will poach opposition votes.

BJP spokesman Upadhyay told Al Jazeera the allegations of influencing voters by transferring cash before the election are “factually incorrect and politically motivated”.

“It [Orunodoi] is a long-standing welfare initiative aimed at supporting economically vulnerable women-led households, not a last-minute electoral measure,” he told Al Jazeera.

‘Kill us all at once’

Back at the BJP rally in Morigaon, where its leaders delivered fiery speeches calling for the expulsion of “infiltrators from Bangladesh”, Amir Ali remembered his sister Afsana.

On February 18, 1983, one-year-old Afsana was among an estimated 1,800 Bengali-speaking Muslims massacred by a Hindu and Indigenous mob in what came to be known as the Nellie massacre. The killings were in 14 villages, including Ali’s Matiparbat, a 40-minute drive from where the BJP rally was held.

Ali, now in his 50s, said he attended the BJP rally only to prove that he is not an “illegal immigrant” but a citizen of the state.

“When children were massacred, we had no choice but to vote to prove that we are not illegal Bangladeshis,” he told Al Jazeera. “Likewise, we have no choice now but to prove we are not infiltrators or ‘strangers’ as Sarma claims.”

In a quaint corner of Jagiroad town, Noorjamal shares Ali’s sentiments. Two years ago, he was rendered homeless after the houses of nearly 8,000 Muslims were bulldozed during a government eviction drive.

“The chief minister says he is evicting Bangladeshis from government land, but how are we Bangladeshis if my father and forefathers were born and died in India?” Noorjamal’s mother Maherbanu Nessa asked.

“The way Himanta ‘mama’ is bulldozing our homes, he might as well just kill us all at once.”

In a communication sent to India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, the United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) said on January 19 this year that Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam are facing racial discrimination, resulting in forced evictions, hate speech and excessive use of force by the law-enforcement agencies.

An investigation by The New Humanitarian, an independent news outlet, published on March 24 found that between May 2021, when Sarma became Assam’s chief minister, and early 2026, more than 22,000 structures were demolished and 20,380 families evicted in the state, an overwhelming majority of them being Bengali-speaking Muslims.

As Sarma’s BJP vows to “break the backbone of miyas” after the election, Ali and Nessa worry about survival amid such hostilities.

“We have nothing to resist this cruel government but prayers and our votes,” Ali told Al Jazeera. “But maybe, if not today, then someday we will find peace in this land. We are still hopeful.”

Fuel shocks from the US-Israel war on Iran are rippling worldwide, as Strait of Hormuz disruptions push prices higher. From Nigeria to Vietnam and India, workers face soaring costs, longer hours and lost jobs amid a deepening global energy crisis.

Gurdaspur, Punjab, India – Ramesh Kumar, 42, is anxiously doing the calculations for his crops this year.

Standing at the edge of his wheat field in northwest Punjab’s Gurdaspur, he runs through the numbers in his head, totting up fertiliser costs, expected yield, and market prices.

Then he shifts to more personal concerns: School fees, household expenses, loan repayments and the money he has been saving for his daughter Varsha’s wedding.

“I don’t know if we can afford it this year,” he says. “Everything depends on the crop.”

The uncertainty has crept in quietly.

Fertiliser, once a fairly predictable staple in farming, has become more expensive and harder to secure in time. For Kumar, it is not so much a question of cost as it is the difference between stability and strain.

“If prices go up more, we will have to cut somewhere,” he says. “Maybe delay the wedding. If things get worse … even children’s education becomes difficult.”

School fees for his eldest son, Amit, 12, are due in the coming weeks, and Kumar has been setting aside money for his younger daughter Varsha’s future wedding.

It’s never easily affordable, even in good times. “We somehow manage,” Kumar says. “But if the harvest is weak, then we have to think about what to prioritise, what to delay.”

For farmers like him across South Asia, the United States-Israel war on Iran – unfolding thousands of kilometres away – is not just a matter of distant geopolitics.

It is shaping decisions inside their homes.

A distant crisis with local consequences

At the centre of the unfolding crisis is the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping lane more than 2,000km (1,240 miles) from India’s northern plains. It lies between Iran and Oman, linking the Gulf and its oil producers to the open ocean and, from there, to global markets.

About one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies pass through this body of water, which Iran closed down shortly after the first US-Israeli strikes on Tehran on February 28.

Vast volumes of LNG, essential for manufacturing nitrogen-based fertilisers, are transported from Gulf producers to Asia via this route. Any disruption can delay shipments, push up freight and insurance costs and place a stranglehold on supply.

Interruptions to the supply of fertiliser can ripple quickly, reducing crop yields, increasing costs and raising food prices.

The risks are already being felt thousands of kilometres away.

South Asia, home to nearly two billion people, relies heavily on fertiliser-intensive farming to produce staple crops such as wheat and rice. Over the past few decades, the increasing use of fertilisers – which can hugely boost crop yields – has played a key role in agricultural productivity across the region.

The agriculture sector now employs about 46 percent of the workforce in India, about 38 percent in Pakistan, nearly 40 percent in Bangladesh, and more than 60 percent in Nepal.

The degree to which countries in the region depend on the Strait of Hormuz varies, but all rely heavily on the trade in fertilisers that this shipping route facilitates.

In India, the agriculture sector is worth $400bn, according to Indian government and World Bank data, and supports the livelihoods of more than half the population, either directly or indirectly. More than 100 million farming families are directly dependent on the sector.

The country imports a substantial share of its fertiliser requirements and other key raw materials, particularly phosphates and potash, as well as natural gas used to manufacture fertiliser, with about 30–35 percent of these supplies moving through or originating from routes that pass via the Strait of Hormuz.

In Pakistan, the agriculture sector contributes close to 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), according to Pakistan government estimates, and employs millions. About 20-25 percent of Pakistan’s fertiliser imports, particularly DAP (diammonium phosphate), pass through the Strait of Hormuz at some point in transit. Additionally, the sector relies on domestic natural gas for the production of urea, a key nitrogen-based fertiliser and, with Gulf natural gas supplies held up in the Strait of Hormuz, the price of natural gas everywhere – even at home – is on the rise.

In Bangladesh, where millions of smallholder farmers rely heavily on imported fertilisers, the agricultural sector accounts for about 12-13 percent of GDP, according to government data. The country’s farming industry relies heavily on imported fertilisers to sustain crops, meaning farmers are highly exposed to international supply shocks and price swings.

Furthermore, roughly 25-30 percent of Bangladesh’s imported fertiliser is shipped via routes passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Nepal, where agriculture contributes about 24 percent of GDP, imports nearly all of its fertiliser needs, with about 25-30 percent of arriving via India, via the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Livelihoods at stake

Overall, even minor disruption in the Gulf – let alone the complete closure of the critical Strait of Hormuz – can have dire consequences for hundreds of millions of people.

The Indian government has sought to reassure farmers that supplies remain secure – for now.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi told Parliament on March 23: “Adequate arrangements have been made for fertiliser supply for the summer sowing season…The government has diversified options for oil, gas and fertiliser imports… Domestic production of urea, DAP and NPK [nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium fertilisers] has been expanded… Farmers now have access to Made in India Nano Urea and are encouraged to adopt natural farming…”

He added: “Under the PM Kusum scheme, more than 22 lakh (2.2 million) solar pumps have been provided, reducing dependence on diesel… I am confident that through joint efforts, India will manage these challenges effectively and continue to support our farmers.”

On the ground, however, confidence is low. Farmers say uncertainty is already influencing decisions.

In Pampore, in the south of Indian-administered Kashmir, 53-year-old mustard farmer Ghulam Rasool says price signals travel faster than supply disruptions.

“We hear about war, about shipping problems,” he tells Al Jazeera. “Even before shortages happen, fertiliser becomes expensive.”

Rasool says farmers often respond early by cutting down on the amount of fertiliser they are using, even before actual shortages emerge.

“If we use less, production will fall,” he says. “But sometimes we have no choice.”

In Pakistan’s South Punjab, wheat farmer Muneer Ahmad, 45, is preparing for the next sowing cycle.

“If fertiliser becomes expensive, it will affect everyone here,” he says.

Government officials have expressed confidence in Pakistan’s fertiliser supply amid the Middle East conflict, and claim the government is fully prepared to ensure adequate supplies during the region’s peak sowing period, which typically begins between April and June, depending on the crop.

According to a statement by Pakistan’s federal secretary for agriculture to Al Jazeera, Federal Minister Rana Tanveer Hussain told a meeting on March 25 that the government has started proactive monitoring, is expanding domestic urea and DAP production and taking steps to ensure fertilisers reach farmers at affordable prices.

However, urea production requires supplies of natural gas, meaning global energy price shocks can still translate into rising production costs.

For farmers, even small increases matter

“We already have loans and expenses,” Ahmad says. “If costs go up, we feel it immediately.”

In Rangpur, northwestern Bangladesh, farmer Mohammad Ibrahim, 41, says fertiliser supplies are already becoming unpredictable.

“Sometimes it is available, sometimes not,” he says. “And when it comes, the price is higher.”

Meanwhile, in Nepal’s Gulmi district, farmer Meghnath Aryal, 38, worries that crops will be reduced if a major supply problem does appear.

“If fertiliser does not arrive on time, the crop suffers,” he says. “If it becomes expensive, we reduce use.”

Bangladesh’s Agriculture Secretary Rafiqul Mohammad told Al Jazeera the government is “closely monitoring the situation” and officials have tried to reassure farmers that fertiliser supplies are sufficient for the coming months.

The government has finalised plans to import about 500,000 tonnes of urea in the near term, while also exploring alternative suppliers such as China and Morocco to secure additional supplies in the longer term.

There is no immediate shortage at present, the Agriculture Ministry says.

Ram Krishna Shrestha, joint secretary at Nepal’s Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, told Al Jazeera that fertiliser distribution within the country remains largely stable for now, with supplies already secured for the upcoming rainy season, particularly for paddy crops such as rice.

However, he warned that there may be delays to contracted shipments as a result of the Middle East crisis.

“We have managed fertilisers for the upcoming season, but there could be challenges in timely supply because of the current situation,” he said, pointing to global price increases and logistical disruptions, including those caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Shrestha added that as companies report shortages and rising prices in international markets, the government has asked suppliers to expedite deliveries.

“Authorities are also advising farmers to increase the use of traditional nutrient sources such as farmyard manure, compost, green manuring and azolla [a natural fertiliser] to offset any potential shortfall in chemical fertilisers,” he said.

No immediate new fertiliser subsidies have been announced, he said, though adjustments remain under discussion as the situation evolves.

Rising food prices on the horizon

The implications extend beyond individual farmers.

Across South Asia, fertiliser use has been central to maintaining crop yields – and keeping large populations fed. Any reduction in availability or increase in costs can quickly lower production. That, in turn, pushes up food prices, a sensitive issue in a region where households spend a large proportion of their income on food.

For governments, the challenge is complex.

In the past, subsidies have kept fertilisers affordable for farmers, but this becomes a fragile balancing act if global prices rise, placing additional pressure on public finances.

In India, Ramesh Kumar is already making adjustments – but he is walking a tightrope.

He has decided to use less fertiliser this season, even though he knows it could reduce yields.

“It is a risk,” he says. “But what choice do we have?”

Lower production will mean less income and harder decisions at home.

“School fees have to be paid,” he says. “Household expenses cannot stop.” He looks across his field.

“And the wedding… we will see.”

Ultimately, sacrifices will have to be made in his household.

Across borders, the same uncertainty is unfolding.

In Pakistan, Ahmad is worried about rising costs. In Bangladesh, Ibrahim is mostly concerned about the availability of fertiliser and, in Nepal, Aryal fears delays in supply.

For Ramesh Kumar, the stakes are clear.

“For others, this is about war,” he says. “For us, it is about whether we can take care of our family.”

Indian teenage prodigy smashes his third IPL half century as Rajasthan routed Chennai Super Kings in the IPL.

Days after turning ‌15, Rajasthan Royals opener Vaibhav Sooryavanshi found a perfect way to ⁠celebrate, tearing ⁠to a 15-ball half-century in a commanding eight-wicket victory over Chennai Super Kings in the Indian Premier League (IPL) on Monday.

Sooryavanshi, who ⁠lit up his debut season with a 35-ball hundred against Gujarat Titans last year, took only 15 balls to smash his first fifty ⁠of the season – the third fifty-plus score of his eight-match IPL career so far.

Alongside fellow opener and India batter Yashasvi Jaiswal, Sooryavanshi tore into the Chennai attack in the powerplay, leading the team to 74 without loss.

Sooryavanshi was ‌dismissed for 52 after 17 balls, including five sixes and four fours, after sharing a blistering 75-run stand with Jaiswal. Rajasthan sealed victory in just 12.1 overs after chasing down a victory target of 128.

“I think of defending, but the plan was to decide the game in the powerplay as we’d restricted them to a low score,” ⁠Sooryavanshi said.

“If the bowlers had bowled well in ⁠the powerplay then the game might have turned their way, but we went all out in the powerplay.”

The Under-19 World Cup winner credited Rajasthan coach Kumar Sangakkara and staff for ⁠backing his attacking instincts.

“They told me to read the situation well and back my game,” he added.

Rajasthan’s quick ⁠chase followed a brilliant bowling effort. Their ⁠attack reduced Chennai to 41-4 at the end of the powerplay, putting the visitors firmly on the back foot before they were dismissed for 127 in 19.4 overs.

South Africa pace ‌bowler Nandre Burger led the charge with figures of 2-26 and was named player of the match, while Jofra Archer and Ravindra Jadeja also ‌took ‌two wickets apiece.

Rajasthan will next face the Gujarat Titans in Ahmedabad on Saturday, while Chennai host Punjab Kings on Friday.

Three deals across three key regions : Mercosur, India and Australia.

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While the Commission hailed the Australia agreement as a new geostrategic win, EU farmers continue to express deep discontent stemming from the Mercosur deal.

In practice, the backlash around the agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay has done little to shift the Commission’s dual approach in its negotiating line. On the one hand, the commission kept making concessions on entry-level or mid-range farm goods such as beef, while on the other hand, it pushed for market access for high value-added exports —like wine, Geographical Indications (GI) and cars— with mixed results.

“The EU has all the assets to be an agri-food power,” Luc Vernet, from the export-focused brussels think tank Farm Europe, told Euronews, adding: “We should develop a broader strategy beyond high value-added products, covering all sectors and all levels of quality, because the European model delivers exceptional quality not just in luxury products.”

Yet the opposition to the Latin America deal — which triggered a legal challenge suspending its ratification — crystallised among EU farmers over fears of unfair competition from meat imports.

The Mercosur agreement granted quotas of 99,000 tonnes of beef per year, 25,000 tonnes of pork and 188,000 tonnes of poultry. Despite conditions added to new quotas in the Australia deal, EU farmers complain of imports piling up across successive agreements.

Concessions made on beef

Over eight years of talks with Canberra—the world’s second-largest beef exporter—Australia pushed hard for greater access for beef and sheep meat. Tensions intensified in 2023, when negotiations broke down after the EU rejected Australia’s demand for 40,000 tonnes of beef per year, offering no more than 30,000 tonnes instead.

The final deal agreed Tuesday allows 30,600 tonnes of beef annually into the EU. For sheep and goat meat, Brussels accepted a 25,000-tonne duty-free quota, while sugar was limited to 35,000 tonnes of raw cane for refining and rice to 8,500 tonnes a year.

However, perhaps drawing lessons from Mercosur, Brussels imposed multiple conditions on the quotas. Beef imports, which will have to be from grass-fed cattle, will be phased in over 10 years, sheep meat over 7 years, and rice over 5 years. Sugar will also be subject to certification under a private sustainability scheme.

Safeguard clauses, allowing both sides to react to market disruption, will apply for seven years – but are extended for sensitive farm goods : 15 years for beef, 12 for sheep and 10 for rice.

But a farmers’ representative told Euronews there were serious doubts about the effectiveness of the safeguard mechanisms: “Our experience in general with safeguards is that they are extremely difficult to activate because the burden of the proof is on us, farmers.”

The offensive agenda of the Commission

By contrast, agriculture was far less contentious in the India negotiations, where New Delhi itself resisted opening its market due to domestic farm sensitivities, particularly in dairy. EU sensitive products were largely excluded.

But wine featured prominently on Brussels’ offensive agenda, with Indian tariffs cut from 150% to 20% for premium wines and 30% for mid-range products over seven years. Tariffs for cars will also fall from 110% to 10% but under a quota of 250,000 vehicles a year after a decade – by which point Chinese manufacturers have great chances to have strengthened their position.

In negotiations with Australia, the EU again sought greater access for its wine but encountered strong opposition from domestic producers. In the end, the deal protects more than 1,600 EU wine GIs, plus over 50 new ones from 12 member states.

On Prosecco, Australian producers will still be allowed to use the term domestically to designate a grey grape variety, provided it is linked to Australian GI, with Canberra agreeing to stop exporting such wines after 10 years.

The EU also secured protection for 165 agri-food GIs and 231 spirit drink GIs. But it failed to remove Australia’s luxury car tax, securing instead preferential treatment for EU electric vehicles. But Brussels won improved access to critical raw materials – a key EU demand, that may have lead to more concessions on meat.

As the United States-Israeli war on Iran enters its fourth week this weekend, pressure on oil and gas markets continues to mount due to severe disruption to shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz as well as attacks on and around key energy facilities in the Gulf.

In peacetime, 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas is shipped from producers in the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz – the only route to the open ocean – including 20 million barrels of oil per day.

To bridge the shortage its closure has caused, countries in the Middle East are exploring alternative routes to get energy exports out.

In this explainer, we look at three major pipelines in the Middle East that producers may be pinning their hopes on, and whether they can fill the gap.

What has happened in the Strait of Hormuz?

On March 2 – two days after the US and Israel began strikes on Iran – Ebrahim Jabari, a senior adviser to the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), announced that the strait was “closed”. If any vessels tried to pass through, he said, the IRGC and the navy would “set those ships ablaze”. Since then, traffic through the strait has plunged by more than 95 percent.

Iranian officials have most recently stated that the strait is not completely closed – except to ships belonging to the US, Israel and those who collaborate with them – but have also laid down new ground rules. Any vessel must secure Tehran’s approval to transit through the narrow waterway.

As a result, over the past fortnight, countries have been scrambling to do deals with Iran to secure safe passage and a few, mostly Indian, Pakistani and Chinese-flagged tankers have been allowed to pass.

On Thursday, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim thanked Tehran for granting Malaysian vessels “early clearance” through the strait.

Meanwhile, about 2,000 ships flying the flags of other nations are stuck on either side of the strait.

Which oil pipelines could serve as alternate routes?

The only alternative to shipping oil is piping it across land or under the sea. Three oil pipelines could work as ways around the Strait of Hormuz, including:

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline

The East-West pipeline is also known as the Petroline and is operated by Saudi oil giant Aramco. Aramco is one of the world’s largest companies, with a market capitalisation exceeding $1.7 trillion and annual revenues of $480bn. The oil giant controls 12 percent of global oil production, with a capacity of more than 12 million bpd.

It is a 1,200km (745-mile) pipeline which runs from the Abqaiq oil processing centre close to the Gulf in Saudi Arabia to the Yanbu port on the Red Sea, on the other side of the country.

However, the pipeline does not have the capacity to fully make up for the Hormuz closure.

In 2024, about 20 million barrels per day (bpd) passed through the Strait of Hormuz, according to data from the United Nations. Crude oil and condensate made up 14 million bpd of this, while petroleum was the remaining 6 million bpd.

The East-West pipeline has the capacity of transporting up to 7 million bpd. On March 10, Aramco said about 5 million bpd could be made available for exports, while the rest could supply local refineries.

Since the US-Israeli war on Iran began at the end of February, Saudi Arabia has ramped up its oil flow through this pipeline. In January and February, an average of 770,000 bpd flowed through the pipeline, according to data from Kpler, a data and analytics company. By Tuesday this week, this had increased to an average of 2.9 million bpd.

However, using the Saudi pipeline still carries a risk.

The Houthis, an Iran-backed Yemeni armed group whose attacks on ships in the Red Sea caused global shipping chaos during Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza from 2023 to 2025, could target the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean beyond.

An unnamed Houthi leader told the Reuters news agency that the Houthis remain ready to attack the Red Sea again in solidarity with Tehran, the agency reported on Thursday.

“We stand fully militarily ready with all options. As for other details having to do with determining zero hour they are left to leadership and we are monitoring and following up with the developments and will know when is the suitable time to move,” the Houthi leader said.

The Bab al-Mandeb is the southern outlet of the Red Sea, situated between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti and Eritrea on the African coast.

It is one of the world’s most important routes for global seaborne commodity shipments, particularly crude oil and fuel from the Gulf bound for the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal or the SUMED pipeline on Egypt’s Red Sea coast, as well as commodities bound for Asia, including Russian oil.

The Bab al-Mandeb is 29km (18 miles) wide at its narrowest point, limiting traffic to two channels for inbound and outbound shipments.

Iran could open a new front in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait if attacks are carried out on Iranian territory or its islands, Iran’s semiofficial Tasnim cited an unnamed Iranian military source as saying on Wednesday.

UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline

The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline is also called the ADCOP or the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline.

The 380km pipeline runs from Habshan, an oil and gasfield in the southwestern area of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.

The pipeline, which became operational in 2012, has a capacity of about 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd). It is unclear how much is now being transported through the pipeline.

However, oil exports from Fujairah do appear to have risen in the past month despite the closure of the strait, averaging 1.62 million bpd in March compared with 1.17 million bpd in February, according to Kpler analyst Johannes Rauball, who spoke to Reuters.

Iraq-Turkiye Crude Oil Pipeline

The Iraq-Turkiye Crude Oil Pipeline, also called the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline, links Iraq to the Mediterranean coast of Turkiye.

The pipeline, which has the capacity of 1.6 million bpd, currently carries about 200,000bpd.

Iraq is among the top five global producers of oil and is the second largest within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), exceeding 4 million bpd.

Can these pipelines replace the Strait of Hormuz?

No. While these pipelines can take on some of the capacity of Hormuz, their combined capacity is only about 9 million bpd, compared with about 20 million bpd for the strait.

Additionally, these pipelines are land-based and within the range of Iranian missiles and drones, which makes them just as vulnerable to attacks and damage in the ongoing conflict as ships travelling through the strait. Throughout the war, energy infrastructure all over the Gulf has suffered strikes.

Are there other options?

Theoretically, oil can be transported on trucks, but this is costly, slow and inefficient.

A standard truck can carry anywhere between 100 to 700 barrels per day, depending on the number of trips. Hundreds of thousands of barrels would be needed to meet needs, requiring thousands of trucks, which could also be targeted in strikes.

A week into the United States-Israeli war on Iran, and Iran’s attacks on its Gulf neighbours, Jaya Khuntia spoke – as he often did – to his Doha-based son Kuna on the phone.

It was March 6, about 10pm, and Khuntia and the family were worried. “He told me, ‘I am safe here, don’t worry,’” the father recalled from the conversation with Kuna.

It was the last time they spoke.

The next day, the family in Naikanipalli village of India’s eastern Odisha state received a phone call from Kuna’s roommate telling them that the son had suffered a heart attack after hearing the sound of missiles and debris from interceptions falling near their residence. He collapsed and was later declared dead. Kuna’s body reached home days later.

Al Jazeera cannot independently confirm the cause of Kuna’s death, but the family of the 25-year-old, who worked as a pipe fitter in Qatar’s capital, is among millions across South Asia directly affected by the war in the Middle East.

Of the eight people killed in the United Arab Emirates in Iranian attacks, two were Emirati military personnel, a third a Palestinian civilian, and the remaining five were from South Asia: Three from Pakistan, and one each from Bangladesh and Nepal. All three people killed in Oman were from India. An Indian national and a Bangladeshi national are the only deaths in Saudi Arabia.

Migrant workers from South Asia total nearly 21 million people in the Gulf nations, a third of the total population of the region. At stake, for their families back home, is the safety of their loved ones and the future of their dreams.

The Khuntia family had taken on a 300,000-rupee ($3200) debt in 2025 for the marriages of their two daughters. Kuna’s income in Doha – where he had moved only in late 2025 – of 35,000 rupees ($372) was helping them collect what they needed to pay back the loan. Kuna had been sending back about 15,000 rupees ($164) every month.

“We thought our suffering was finally ending,” Jaya said, his voice trembling. “My only son would say, ‘Baba, don’t worry, I am here.’ He was our only hope… our everything.”

That hope is now extinguished. “That one call finished us,” Jaya cried. “He promised to return after clearing our debts … but he came back in a coffin. We have nothing left now. Losing our only son is the biggest debt we have to live with.”

‘I thought we would be next’

In all, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – the six Arab countries in the Gulf – host 35 million foreign nationals, who form a majority of their total population, 62 million.

They include 9 million people from India, 5 million each from Pakistan and Bangladesh, 1.2 million from Nepal, and 650,000 from Sri Lanka. Most of them are engaged in blue-collar work, building or supporting the industries and services that are at the heart of the Gulf’s success and prosperity.

But since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran, these migrant workers have often been among the most vulnerable. That vulnerability extends beyond deaths and injuries to the very nature of their work: Oil refineries, construction areas, airports and docks, where many work, have been targeted in Iranian attacks.

The suspension of work at many of these facilities, coupled with fears of a major economic downturn in the region, has also left many workers and their families worried about the future of their jobs.

Hamza*, a Pakistani migrant labourer working at an oil storage facility in the UAE, recalled a recent attack that he witnessed. “A drone struck a storage unit right in front of us. We were completely shaken. Most of us there are from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

“We couldn’t sleep for nights after that. The drone was so close that it could have killed us, too,” Hamza added. “For a moment, I thought we would be next.”

Despite these dangers, he said, leaving is not an option.

“We want to go back, but we can’t,” Hamza said. “Our families depend on us. It’s dangerous here, but if we stop working, they will have nothing to eat. We have no choice.”

Experts say Hamza’s sentiment is common across South Asian blue-collar workers in the Gulf, because of poverty and limited employment opportunities back home.

Imran Khan, a faculty member at the New Delhi Institute of Management working on migration economics, said migrant labourers from South Asia are often driven by desperation to take up jobs in the Middle East. He said Western countries have, in recent years, dramatically raised entry barriers for less-educated blue-collar foreign workers.

“These workers are the worst affected during crises – whether war or natural disasters,” he says. “I have been speaking to several migrant labourers, particularly Indians in the Middle East, and many are living in distress since the conflict began.”

But, like Hamza, most cannot afford to leave, Khan said.

“They cannot simply quit. Their income would stop immediately, and there are very limited opportunities back home,” he explained. “They have families to support, and without these jobs, survival becomes difficult.”

Families – and societies – that depend on remittances

Middle Eastern countries remain a key source of remittances for South Asian nations such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The remittances these five countries receive from the region, $103bn, are comparable to Oman’s total gross domestic product (GDP).

Just the remittances that India receives from the Gulf, $50bn, are more than Bahrain’s entire GDP. Pakistan receives $38.3bn in remittances, Bangladesh $13.5bn, Sri Lanka $8bn, and Nepal $5bn.

With the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East, experts warn these flows could be significantly affected, especially if Gulf economies contract and layoffs follow.

Faisal Abbas, an expert in international economics and director at the Centre of Excellence on Population and Wellbeing Studies, a Pakistan-based research institute, said remittances from the Middle East form a crucial economic backbone for South Asian nations, not just families.

“Remittances are a critical pillar for Pakistan and other South Asian economies, and a large share comes from Middle Eastern countries,” he explained. “If the situation worsens, it will not be a positive development for the region.”

Pakistan’s remittances from the Gulf constitute nearly 10 percent of its GDP, about $400bn.

Abbas added that the effect may extend beyond remittance flows. “Migration patterns could also be disrupted. Many workers may return home, while those planning to migrate might reconsider,” he said. “This could further increase unemployment in a region already facing job shortages.”

Unlike Hamza, a number of South Asian workers are planning to return home.

Noor*, a migrant worker from Bangladesh employed at an oil facility in Saudi Arabia, said he no longer feels safe and plans to return home once his contract ends.

“I will never come back here again,” he said. “It’s too dangerous. We can’t even sleep at night. The fear never leaves us.”

Noor said drone attacks had occurred close to his workplace. “We saw it happen in front of us,” he said. “That fear stays with you… It doesn’t go away.”

His family, too, is deeply affected. “My children cry every time they call me. They are scared for my life,” he added.

He said he knows that returning to Bangladesh would mean more economic hardship for his family. But Noor said he had made up his mind.

“I would rather go back and struggle to survive with my family than live here in constant fear,” he said. “At least there, I will be with them.”

*Some names have been changed at the request of workers who fear retribution from contractors for speaking to the media.

Locals in northern India have a growing concern over essential resources like water, fuel and food, that have become costly due to the US-Israeli war on Iran. The conflict has brought implications on oil and gas prices, which has also affected bottled water and food costs.

Residents in Indian-administered Kashmir are donating their gold possessions and cash to support Iranians impacted by the US-Israeli war. Iran’s embassy in India has acknowledged the gesture, saying their kindness ‘will never be forgotten’.

The Foreign Office has updated travel guidance warning Brits heading to popular destinations to expect potential flight disruptions

This week, British travellers heading overseas have been warned that their holiday plans could face disruption.

The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the government department responsible for issuing travel guidance to ensure public safety, has updated its advice for several popular tourist destinations.

The continuing tensions in the Middle East mean delays and other forms of disruption are likely, even for those not travelling to the region itself. The FCDO sometimes advises against all travel to particular countries.

While these destinations don’t fall into that bracket, it remains crucial to follow the guidance.

The update states: “Escalation in the Middle East has caused widespread travel disruption, including airspace closures, delayed and cancelled flights.

“Your travel plans may be affected, even if your destination is not in the Middle East.”

The FCDO has issued this update for countries including Australia, New Zealand and Thailand this week. Before departing, travellers are advised to review the guidance for any countries or territories they’ll be passing through, reports the Express.

It’s also recommended that you check the latest information from your airline or tour operator before setting off.

Additionally, reviewing your travel insurance policy beforehand can be beneficial, just to confirm what’s covered if your arrangements are disrupted.

The FCDO added: “Monitor local and international media for the latest information and sign up for travel advice email alerts.”

Ignoring advice from the FDCO could potentially render your travel insurance null and void, so it’s crucial to check over the details before you take off.

Your insurance should cover your planned itinerary, activities and any emergency expenses.

Full list of countries in new FDCO update

• Sri Lanka
• Kiribati
• Marshall Islands
• Vanuatu
• Tonga
• Nauru
• Solomon Islands
• Samoa
• South Korea
• Cambodia
• Papua New Guinea
• India
• Malaysia
• Fiji
• Maldives
• Nepal
• Tajikistan
• Georgia
• Japan
• Brunei
• Australia
• Indonesia
• Bangladesh
• Uzbekistan
• Thailand
• Laos
• Tuvalu
• Philippines
• Vietnam
• Singapore
• Federal States of Micronesia

Workers in India’s textile hub Surat are returning home after days without cooking gas, as an LPG crisis linked to Iran war disruptions halts supplies. Industries face shutdowns, while authorities invoke emergency measures to prioritise households.

Russian oil is emerging as a key beneficiary of the US-Israeli war on Iran, as countries scramble to charter tankers following United States President Donald Trump’s decision to temporarily ease sanctions, analysts say.

Following a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 10, Trump said the US would waive Russian oil-related sanctions on “some countries” to ease the shortage caused by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which in peacetime carries 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas from producers in the Gulf.

This week, it was reported that a number of tankers carrying Russian oil bound for China had changed course and were heading for India instead.

According to figures from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), Russia earned an additional 672 million euros ($777m) in oil sales in the first two weeks of the war on Iran, which began on February 28 when Israel and the US launched strikes on Tehran, killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials.

Iran has since struck back, launching thousands of missiles and drones towards Israel as well as US military assets and infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf countries. The war stepped up a level this week, when Israel bombed Iran’s critical South Pars gasfield, and Iran hit back with strikes on Gulf energy assets, including Qatar’s Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility – the world’s largest.

This week, the average price of Urals oil – the Russian benchmark – was significantly higher than the pre-war price of less than $60, at around $90 per barrel.

Here’s more about who is buying Russian oil and which other nations might benefit from the oil crisis.

Why is Russian oil benefitting from the Iran war?

Iran’s effective closure of the Hormuz Strait, which is the only sea route from the Gulf to the open ocean, has “walled in” 20 million barrels of Gulf oil per day, George Voloshin, an independent energy analyst based in Paris, told Al Jazeera.

This has prompted the US to, at least temporarily, ease sanctions on shipped Russian oil to slow the ensuing energy crisis and potential global price collapse. The price of Brent crude, the international benchmark, has risen to above $100 a barrel since the closure of the strait, compared with about $65 before the war began.

Many analysts say a price of $200 is no longer “far-fetched”.

“Russia has emerged as a primary beneficiary of the Middle East conflict due to the massive supply vacuum created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz,” Voloshin said. “Global refiners are desperate for alternative medium-sour crudes, a need that Russia’s Urals grade specifically meets.”

He added that the US decision to grant a temporary reprieve for shipped Russian oil “has provided Moscow with a critical window to maximise export volumes and oil revenues, essentially allowing Russian crude to act as the world’s primary swing supply during the Iranian blockade”.

How has the price of Russian oil been affected so far?

The price of Russian Urals has surged significantly, experts say. As a result of US sanctions, the oil had been trading at below $60 a barrel for some time. However, while “Urals historically traded at a significant discount to Brent due to Western sanctions”, Voloshin said, “that gap has narrowed as demand outstrips supply”.

“Since the beginning of the year, the price of Russian oil is estimated to have risen by nearly 80 percent – most recently close to $90 per barrel – and consistently trading well above the G7 price cap of $60 as buyers prioritise energy security over regulatory compliance in a high-volatility environment,” he added.

Are ships changing course to deliver Russian oil to new buyers?

Earlier this week, Bloomberg reported that at least seven tankers carrying Russian oil had changed course mid-voyage from China to India, citing data from Vortexa, the data analytics group.

Then, Indian media quoted Rakesh Kumar Sinha, special secretary in the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, confirming that the Aqua Titan, a Russian oil-laden tanker originally destined for China, is now expected to arrive at New Mangalore port on March 21 having been chartered by Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited (MPCL).

India was the first country to receive a time-limited exemption from the US Treasury to import Russian oil that is already at sea, Voloshin said.

“There is clear evidence of a massive logistical redirection of Russian oil cargoes mid-voyage. Several tankers originally bound for Chinese ports have, indeed, switched trajectory to India. This shift is driven by India’s aggressive pursuit of discounted distressed cargoes to fill its strategic reserves and meet domestic demand, as well as the increased risk and insurance costs associated with long-haul shipments to East Asia via contested waters.”

Until recently, Trump had been strongly pressuring India to stop buying Russian oil, even slapping additional 25 percent trade tariffs on India last year in punishment for doing so. This was lifted earlier this year when Trump claimed he had received assurances from India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi that India would start buying US oil, or even Venezuelan oil seized by the US, instead.

Which countries are buying Russian oil now?

Indian media has reported that India’s purchases of Russian crude have surged in the past three weeks, since the war on Iran began and the Strait of Hormuz was closed.

“The primary buyers of Russian oil continue to be India and China, who together now account for the vast majority of Russia’s seaborne exports,” Voloshin said.

Turkiye is also a significant buyer, he added, now using Russian crude to stabilise its domestic market amid the gas shortages caused by the Israeli strikes on Iran’s South Pars field.

“Additionally, a shadow fleet of ageing tankers continues to move Russian oil to smaller, less-regulated refineries across Southeast Asia and the Middle East, often through complex ship-to-ship transfers designed to obscure the origin of the crude,” he added.

He said this shadow fleet is becoming the primary delivery mechanism for oil in several contested regions, meaning more buyers could appear. “Additionally, the degree of cooperation between the US and its European allies remains a wild card. If the EU continues to refuse participation in military operations near Iran, the diplomatic and economic pressure on the US to maintain the Russian oil reprieve will likely increase.”

Will Russian oil remain in demand if the US re-imposes sanctions?

If there is nowhere else to readily source oil, countries may continue to seek Russian crude even if the US reimposes sanctions, Voloshin said. The International Energy Agency (IEA) says the closure of the Hormuz Strait has caused a shortage of 8 million barrels of oil per day.

If that persists, “major importers like India may feel they have no choice but to continue buying Russian oil to prevent domestic economic collapse”, Voloshin said.

If secondary sanctions on Russian oil are reintroduced, he added, buyers may demand much lower prices to compensate for the increased legal and financial risks of dealing with Moscow. “At the same time, in the presence of a continued severe market disruption, the US is very likely to roll over [extend] current exemptions,” Voloshin said.

Which other energy-producing nations could benefit?

Two other major non-OPEC energy producers that could benefit are Norway and Canada, experts say. However, this will largely depend on their capacity to increase production.

“Norway has already signalled its intent to maintain maximum gas and oil production to support European energy security, primarily selling to EU nations seeking to replace lost Iranian and Russian volumes,” Voloshin said. “Canada is exploring ways to increase its export capacity to the US Gulf Coast. However, like Russia, its ability to significantly ramp up production in the short term is constrained by pipeline throughput and infrastructure bottlenecks.”

As part of its seemingly never-ending search for new fighters, the Indian Ministry of Defense says it wants to team up with one of the two rival European next-generation combat aircraft programs. Faced by the twin challenges of China and Pakistan’s modernizing air arms, Indian defense officials are now looking at sixth-generation fighters, although buying into either of these programs would be fraught with difficulties.

The development was revealed in a report on 2026 defense budget plans tabled in India’s parliament yesterday. Such a move would provide an alternative to India’s domestically developed next-generation fighter, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), which looks entirely unlikely to meet its timeline.

The two European efforts identified by the IAF are the British-led Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), the centerpiece of which is the Tempest next-generation stealth fighter, and the pan-European Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, at the heart of which will be the crewed New Generation Fighter (NGF). Both are expected to be in service by 2035, although that target is questionable in both cases.

As well as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan have joined the GCAP program, and other potential partners have been mentioned. Meanwhile, the pan-European FCAS program is led by France and Germany, with Belgium and Spain on board as junior partners. This may well change, however, with the program riddled by infighting.

The budget report states that the Indian Ministry of Defense has told the parliament’s Standing Committee on Defense that the Indian Air Force (IAF) wants to join one of these programs “right away.”

The result of such a partnership, the defense ministry contends, would help the IAF “ensure that they do not lag behind in achieving the target for advanced aircraft.”

First of all, it’s worth noting that the IAF badly needs new fighter equipment and has for some time. Multiple efforts to procure interim combat aircraft have either collapsed entirely or failed to deliver in terms of the required numbers.

As we described at the end of last year, the Indian government has said that the IAF needs at least 42 squadrons of combat aircraft. Currently, it has just 29, meaning the service is operating its smallest combat force since it went to war with China in 1962. This problem has been exacerbated by the retirement of the veteran MiG-21 Fishbed.

Meanwhile, the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft program, which should have provided a successor to the MiG-21, has been mired by delays.

In the background, India faces the dual threats of China and Pakistan.

On the one hand, China is ramping up its military development programs to a breathtaking degree, with combat aircraft at the forefront. Most spectacular has been the emergence of the tailless J-XDS and J-36 tactical jets, and ever sub-variations of them, as well as a navalized stealth fighter for its new carrier. Already well established are the J-20 stealth fighter, while development of the land-based J-35A continues.

The question of how the IAF shapes up against the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has long underpinned its status and planning. After the brief conflict last year, both services claimed success with contradictory reports from official channels and rampant speculation across social media.

More importantly, the PAF continues to develop its homegrown JF-17 Thunder fighter and appears to be lining up more advanced Chinese-made combat aircraft, specifically the stealthy FC-31, alongside acquiring highly capable air-launched weapons from the same source.

All of this piles on the pressure to modernize the IAF’s aging combat fleet.

At one point, the IAF appeared set on a fifth-generation fighter.

The twin-engine AMCA is planned to feature low-observable characteristics and — in later versions — a supercruise capability, among other advanced features. Bearing in mind that construction is yet to begin, the possibility of putting this aircraft production by 2035, as has been suggested, seems entirely far-fetched. The saga of the Tejas program, in particular, must cast doubt on the future of the AMCA, at least in terms of meeting schedules.

In the meantime, both the United States and Russia have pitched alternative fifth-generation fighters to India.

Last year, in something of a surprise announcement, U.S. President Donald Trump offered the F-35 to India, while Russia has long sought India as a customer for its Su-57 Felon. As long ago as 2003, the Prospective Multirole Fighter (PMF) was planned as an India-specific version of the Su-57, before New Delhi exited the program, as you can read about here.

The budget report indicates that the Indian Ministry of Defense would like to at least have the option of leapfrogging fifth-generation fighters like the AMCA, F-35, and Su-57, and move directly to the sixth generation.

In terms of keeping pace with China and Pakistan, that is an understandable aspiration.

On the other hand, joining either GCAP or the FCAS program would bring challenges of its own.

At this point, GCAP — involving the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan — might look more promising. Compared to FCAS, the relationship between the three partners is relatively peaceful. There has been talk of Saudi Arabia possibly joining in some capacity, and, more recently, Poland has been reported as being interested in buying the aircraft, too.

But the possibility of India participating more directly in GCAP/Tempest is somewhat remote, since workshare arrangements have already been agreed between the three partners. The IAF would likely be forced to buy the aircraft off the shelf.

And that is if the British-led program survives the considerable challenges, both technical and political, that lie ahead.

After all, the process of creating an all-new fighter, especially one incorporating stealth technologies, brings very lengthy development times and high costs. The prospect of the Tempest entering service long after 2035 is likely, and the IAF needs new fighters sooner rather than later.

The same goes for the FCAS program, of course.

With FCAS, however, the chances of the program actually making it as far as operational hardware currently seem much slimmer.

For months now, there have been reports of significant rifts between France and Germany on the course that FCAS should take, especially when it comes to workshare, which has yet to be resolved.

French and German officials have repeatedly tried to get the program back on track, in the face of a bitter standoff between the two primes, France’s Dassault Aviation and Germany’s Airbus Defense and Space.

Most recently, it has been reported that France and Germany will have one more go at finding common ground on the program in April.

In the meantime, Germany has raised the possibility of taking its own path to developing a future combat aircraft, something it hasn’t done for decades, and which France has campaigned against.

Whatever happens next month, India’s joining FCAS would be a big risk. Some Indian media reports have suggested that, as a Dassault customer (for the Rafale multirole fighter), India might be able to take Germany’s place in the FCAS program, although it’s equally unclear whether it would be able to negotiate the kind of workshare deal it might want.

In the best-case scenario, it might be able to buy a much-delayed aircraft that is not necessarily tailored to its own requirements. In the worst case, the program may fall apart entirely and force the various partners to start again from scratch or look for alternatives.

If there is a way for India to enter GCAP or FCAS, that could bring a huge financial windfall for either program. This is what each program needs more than anything else, while increased production rates would mean lower unit costs, preventing the program from entering a death spiral should it mature.

Then there is the future of the AMCA to consider. If India genuinely wants to push ahead with a fifth-generation fighter, which can be developed according to its own particular needs, and over which it retains sovereignty, this program will need to be urgently kick-started. It seems unlikely that it would be possible if India had one foot in either the GCAP or FCAS camps.

There is also the wild card of how an advanced uncrewed aircraft could affect these developments. India is already starting to work on such programs, and drones could make up some of the Indian fighter shortfall. This is especially the case for high-end Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), to achieve a higher combat mass.

Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that it is the Indian Ministry of Defense — acting upon the IAF’s wishes — that wants to join GCAP or FCAS, not necessarily a reflection of what the government wants. As one long-standing Indian defense observer told TWZ, “the standing committee has no teeth.” Until the government signs off on it, the Indian Air Force joining an existing sixth-generation fighter program remains just an aspiration.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Emergency responders carried patients out of a government hospital in Odisha, India, after a fire killed at least 10 ICU patients, according to officials.