India

United States President Donald Trump has made no secret of his hostility towards BRICS.

Last year, he threatened an additional 10 percent tariff on any country aligning itself with what he called the bloc’s “anti-American policies”. Since then, his administration has continued to wield tariffs aggressively against trading partners, including BRICS members such as Brazil, India and China.

The message appears straightforward: Countries that challenge US economic power should expect to pay a price.

But coercion has consequences. And as BRICS leaders meet in New Delhi today, Trump may be strengthening the very incentives that made the bloc attractive in the first place. The more Washington demonstrates its willingness to use access to its markets, its financial system and the dollar as instruments of political leverage, the more reason other countries have to reduce their exposure to them.

This does not mean BRICS is becoming an anti-US alliance. Far from it.

The bloc’s 11 members – Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates – have enormous political and economic differences. Together, they account for nearly half the world’s population and about 40 percent of global gross domestic product, but they do not share a common ideology, security policy or even geopolitical orientation.

Recent events have made those divisions impossible to ignore. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE find themselves on opposite sides of a growing regional conflict. In May, Iranian and Emirati representatives clashed during a foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. India and China have had a heated border dispute that led to deadly skirmishes in 2020-2021; only in the past two years have their relations gradually stabilised.

So Trump is not producing a united geopolitical front against Washington.

He may, however, be giving countries with otherwise divergent interests a common reason to cooperate economically: Protection against vulnerability to US power.

For countries outside the Western core, dependence on US-centred economic infrastructure carries risks.

The dollar’s centrality gives the US enormous structural advantages. International transactions pass through financial institutions subject to US jurisdiction; access to US markets can be restricted; sanctions can isolate governments and companies from parts of the global financial system.

BRICS’s efforts to diminish dependence on the US financial system do not mean the dollar is about to lose its position as a global reserve currency. This claim is often made around BRICS summits, usually accompanied by breathless predictions of a new BRICS currency. The evidence does not support it.

The dollar remains overwhelmingly dominant. According to the International Monetary Fund, it accounted for 57.1 percent of global foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026. The Chinese renminbi accounted for just 2 percent. Indeed, the dollar’s share rose slightly during the quarter.

But replacing the dollar and reducing dependence on it are two very different things.

BRICS countries are already experimenting with the latter. South Africa has connected to China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, allowing transactions with China to be settled directly in renminbi. Brazil and China are increasingly using their own currencies in bilateral trade, while India and the UAE have settled transactions in rupees and dirhams. China and Russia have shifted much of their bilateral trade into their national currencies.

BRICS itself is also moving cautiously towards greater financial connectivity.

Last year, its leaders called for continued work on a cross-border payments initiative and greater interoperability among members’ payment systems. In August, Reserve Bank of India Governor Sanjay Malhotra confirmed that BRICS countries are discussing linking their fast-payment networks and potentially their central bank digital currencies. India itself is also encouraging greater use of the rupee in international trade.

The New Development Bank offers another example. Established by the original BRICS countries as an alternative source of development finance, it has made lending in members’ currencies an explicit strategic objective. Its current strategy targets 30 percent of financing in local currencies, partly to reduce borrowers’ exposure to foreign-exchange risks and costly currency swaps; the number could increase to 40-50 percent for the next cycle, 2027-2031.

None of this amounts to a rival global financial system. Much of it remains experimental, bilateral or limited in scale.

But that is precisely why the fixation on whether BRICS can “replace” the dollar misses what is happening. The more significant development is the gradual construction of options that allow governments and businesses to conduct a number of transactions without relying on the dollar and Western-dominated financial infrastructure.

Trump’s policies give this process additional urgency.

Consider Brazil. Washington imposed a new 25 percent tariff on a range of Brazilian products in July, affecting billions of dollars in exports, despite running a trade surplus with the country. The Trump administration has also scrutinised Brazil’s hugely successful Pix instant-payment system, which competes with established card-payment networks.

Sanctions demonstrate the same vulnerability more dramatically. Russia and Iran have been pushed towards alternative payment and trading arrangements precisely because their access to Western financial networks has been restricted. Washington is now considering further measures that could penalise countries heavily reliant on Russian energy, including China and India.

No BRICS member needs to sympathise with Moscow or Tehran to understand what this implies.

US financial power depends not simply on possessing the world’s largest economy or issuing its dominant currency. It also depends on other countries continuing to regard participation in a US-centred system as more advantageous than the alternatives.

The more frequently Washington turns that system into an instrument of coercion, the stronger the incentive to construct escape routes from it.

That said, most BRICS countries do not appear eager to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing.

India maintains extensive relations with the US while buying Russian energy and pursuing closer economic cooperation within BRICS. Brazil has long sought greater autonomy without becoming a Chinese satellite. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain deeply intertwined with Western economies while expanding their relationships with China.

Their objective is less likely to be replacing one hegemon with another than increasing their ability to manoeuvre between competing centres of power.

That distinction matters. A trade transaction settled in rupees, a loan denominated in renminbi or rand, or a payment made through a system that does not depend on the same Western intermediaries will not overthrow dollar dominance.

But multiply such arrangements across countries and over time, and they begin to reduce the costs of saying no to Washington.

This is why portraying BRICS simply as an anti-US threat risks becoming self-defeating. Punishing countries for seeking alternatives gives them another reason to develop those alternatives.

Trump wants to make challenging US power costly. Instead, he may be making dependence on US power costlier still.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The US-China G-2 concept is both normatively exclusionary and strategically constraining. The inherent limits of a G-2 framework—hierarchy, power structure, and systematic constraints—make it a non-starter in a multipolar reality. Here, I completely agree; the concept of a G2 is unworkable and constitutes a strategic exclusion of many international actors in a multipolar world order characterized by a complex distribution of power and multiple centers of decision-making. The Structural and Political Constraints, represented in:

· Unacceptable Hierarchy: This framework attempts to impose a bipolarity that ignores the rise of major regional and international powers such as the European Union, India, and Russia.

· Lack of Methodological Flexibility: This framework fails to accommodate global issues that transcend borders and require broad collective cooperation, not just bilateral understandings.

· Conflicting Interests: The current strategic and geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing makes it impossible to manage the international system through joint governance. The structural conflict of interests between Washington and Beijing renders joint management of the international system impossible, amidst a fierce struggle for technological leadership, economic dominance, and the reshaping of national security rules. This manifests itself in:

– First: The Roots of the Strategic Conflict

A) The Challenge to Hegemony: China seeks to reshape international rules and challenge absolute American supremacy.

B) The American Shift: Washington adopts a strategy of confrontation and containment to reduce Chinese influence and supply chains.

– Second: Arenas of International Conflict

A) Technology and Trade: The chip war, tariffs, and control over advanced technology.

B) Regional Sovereignty: The escalating competition in the South China Sea and the Taiwan issue.

Trump’s China policy has shifted from confrontation to accommodation. If we wonder how true that is, to claim that Donald Trump’s policy toward China has completely shifted from confrontation to accommodation is inaccurate. It is merely a superficial shift toward de-escalation and managing disputes through deals, while the underlying geopolitical and structural competition remains intense.

– Manifestations of De-escalation and Deals (Tactical Accommodation)

· Diplomatic Summits: A state visit to Beijing in mid-May 2026 and frequent summits with President Xi Jinping to reduce escalating tensions.

· Trade Settlements: Temporarily reducing some reciprocal tariffs and concluding major deals, such as Boeing aircraft orders and easing chip restrictions for major companies.

· Regional Crisis Management: Seeking cautious coordination or neutralizing China’s role in some global energy and shipping crises.

– Constants of Conflict and Confrontation (Ongoing Competition)

· Technological Restrictions and Economic Structure: The complex core of the conflict over intellectual property and control of advanced technology remains unresolved.

· Legal and Institutional Pressures: Reciprocal restrictions and legislation continue, with China activating its blocking statute to counter extraterritorial US sanctions.

· The Taiwan file and military strategy: Divergent major strategic interests and military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

China wants to be seen on par with Washington. The Chinese gave Trump everything he wanted but nothing of substance. Taiwan was off the table at the Beijing May 2026 meet. Here, political assessments of the Beijing summit held in May 2016 vary. Some believe China successfully established itself as a rival to Washington, while others consider the results to have ranged from symbolic gains to continued ambiguity regarding issues such as Taiwan and trade deals. The summit’s dimensions and outstanding issues can be summarized as follows:

· International parity: Beijing sought to solidify its image as a major power capable of competing with and managing the power struggle with the United States.

· Taiwan’s position: Taiwan was naturally absent from the direct bilateral talks between the two leaders, amidst strong Chinese warnings to Washington about the dangers of arms sales to the island.

· Mutual gains: Opinions differed regarding the extent of concessions. Analysts believe the Trump administration did not secure any decisive, substantive commitments on certain regional issues in exchange for a temporary easing of trade tensions.

Beijing has sought to solidify its image as a major power capable of rivaling and managing the struggle for influence with the United States. It aims to establish itself as a major power on par with Washington through a variety of economic, technological, and military tools, skillfully managed through a policy of gradual retaliation and the management of international competition. This is achieved through:

– First: Economic and Technological Tools

• Rare Earth Minerals: Controlling the production of raw materials vital to advanced technologies and imposing export restrictions on them.

• Trade War: Reciprocal and gradual retaliation against US tariffs to mitigate the effects of economic pressure.

• Supply Chains: Leveraging the Belt and Road Initiative to enhance global trade routes.

– Second: Geopolitical and Diplomatic Presence

• Multipolarity: Supporting a new international order that limits unilateral US hegemony.

• Partnerships and Alliances: Expanding diplomatic and economic influence in vital regions such as Africa and Latin America.

There were some raised questions related to whether US-China friendship is bad for India and whether their infighting is bad for India too. Here, I partially agree with this view, as the interaction between Washington and Beijing presents both gains and risks for India. The conflict grants New Delhi strategic room for maneuver and security alignment with the US, but sharp conflicts or a sudden rapprochement between the two giants could exert economic and political pressure on India’s interests.

– First: Risks of US-China Conflict and Friendship for India

· Bilateral Accords Between Washington and Beijing: If the two powers reach trade agreements or strategic stability without India’s involvement, it could diminish New Delhi’s importance as a crucial ally for containing China.

· Economic and Trade Pressure: Global conflicts, tensions, and reciprocal tariffs affect the stability of markets and supply chains upon which India depends.

· Regional Military Escalation: Direct conflict increases the likelihood of India’s regional involvement due to its direct border disputes with China.

– Second: Opportunities and Gains for India from Competition

· Strengthening Strategic Partnerships: US-China competition is driving Washington and Western countries to deepen military and technological cooperation with India to counterbalance Beijing’s influence.

· The strategy of multiple independence: India benefits from competition by implementing a policy of multiple alignment, protecting its decision-making independence without being completely dependent on any party.

The interaction between Washington and Beijing presents India with both opportunities and risks, most notably strategic room for maneuver, security cooperation with the US, and potential economic pressures. In terms of gains and risks, these can be assessed as follows:

– Strategic Gains

· Role for Maneuvering: New Delhi skillfully balances its relations between the two powers.

· Security Cooperation: Stronger cooperation with the US and the Quad countries to counter China’s influence.

· Economic Gains: Global companies are seeking to relocate their factories from China to India.

– Risks and Threats

· Military Escalation: A direct confrontation could force India to choose sides.

· Sudden Rapprochement: Any major deal between the US and China could marginalize India’s regional role.

· Economic Pressures: Markets and supply chains could be affected by any trade tensions between the two giants.

Beyond the US and China, India and others are building a G Minus Two for Indo-Pacific. Here, the fundamental error in the statement lies in describing India and other countries as building a G-2 alliance with the United States and China. The G-2 concept actually refers to a potential bipolar hegemony or joint management of the world solely by Washington and Beijing, while India and other regional powers are pursuing a strategy known as G-Minus Two to expand their options for independence. This can be understood through:

– Rejection of Bipolar Hegemony:

India adopts a policy of strategic independence and rejects any bipolar system or joint US-China hegemony that diminishes the role of emerging powers.

– The G-Minus Two Strategy:

New Delhi is working with partners such as Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Australia, and Indonesia to build a network of flexible partnerships that balance influence and protect regional interests.

Here, the statement of Beyond US and China, India, and others building a G Minus Two for Indo-Pacific, accurately describes the shift of major regional powers like India towards building a network of independent strategic partnerships, moving away from the bipolar hegemony of the US and China. This is achieved through:

– Concepts of International Alliances

• The G2 concept refers to a shared global management or potential bipolar hegemony confined exclusively to Washington and Beijing.

• The G-Minus Two concept: expresses the middle power strategy of expanding its economic and defense cooperation with countries such as Australia, Japan, Indonesia, and South Korea to safeguard its strategic independence.

– Dimensions of the G-Minus Two strategy

• Diversifying partnerships: avoiding the trap of bipolar polarization between the two superpowers.

• Securing sea lanes and supply chains: building flexible regional blocs to enhance Asian stability.

In a historic move last week, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to encourage the use of new world maps which more accurately depict continents with their true sizes.

The move followed months of lobbying by the African Union, which itself adopted a new map earlier in February. A total of 164 countries voted in favour while six abstained.

The United States was the only member to oppose it. US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution was “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”.

“Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

But since the resolution was approved, at least three other countries have voiced concerns about the changes: India, Ukraine and Japan.

None are explicitly opposed to adopting a new projection. However, they are raising concerns about how certain disputed territories should be depicted.

Here’s what we know:

Why is there a new world map?

The UN endorsed a resolution promoting the Equal Earth projection of the world map, rather than the Mercator projection, which is currently widely used.

The resolution does not ban Mercator or impose a particular replacement – it merely encourages nations to adopt the Equal Earth version, which was created by three researchers in 2018.

The Mercator projection, which was produced by Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator in 1569 when the West was busy “conquering” new territories, attempts to show a three-dimensional globe on a two-dimensional surface. That is why countries closer to the poles appear much larger than countries at the equator.

For decades, map experts have pointed out that Mercator’s projection disproportionately shrinks the true size of the African continent and that of other developing regions, while making Europe and the US seem much larger by comparison.

For example, Greenland is shown as roughly the same size as Africa, but, in reality, it could fit into the continent 14 times over. Europe, which is portrayed as bigger than South America, is actually half its size.

Advocates from African countries pointed out that the map is problematic because of the size issues. Importantly, they argued, it reinforces negative perceptions of Africa.

Several cartographers have attempted to develop equal area maps. However, African activists specifically pushed for the Equal Earth projection map, which significantly expands Africa and shrinks Europe and the US.

Experts say while maps are inherently inaccurate because of the constraints of depicting a spherical world on a flat plane, the Equal Earth projection is as close as it gets.

Why is Ukraine worried about the new map?

Ukraine was one of six countries which abstained from the vote at the UNGA, along with Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Lithuania, who voted in solidarity with Ukraine.

Kyiv has complained that the Equal Earth projection depicts the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula in a distinctly lighter shade than mainland Ukraine.

Russia illegally occupied and annexed Crimea in February 2014, a move the UN has denounced.

Although the peninsula is also shaded differently from mainland Russia on the new map, its yellowish tint appears closer to the Russian shade than Ukraine’s.

“Ukraine does not in principle oppose the core issue addressed in this draft resolution,” Andrii Melnyk, the country’s permanent representative to the UN, said in an address to the assembly.

Melnyk said Kyiv had asked for corrections before the vote but had not received positive responses. The new map, he said, could be tantamount to opening a Pandora’s box, enabling the “abuse and distortion” of the world map.

“It would be a truly fatal mistake for all of us, and for this General Assembly, to seek to correct a historical injustice in the geographical depiction of countries and continents by simultaneously allowing a deeply troubling interpretation of the text of this draft resolution,” he added.

What is Japan demanding?

Meanwhile, on Thursday, Tokyo, which voted in favour of the new map, said it had also asked for corrections to the Equal Earth projection because the map uses the same colours and shades for Russian territory as it does for the disputed Kuril Islands.

Russia and Japan have long fought over control of the four islands, known in Russia as the Southern Kurils and in Japan as the Northern Territories. In 1945, during World War II, the Soviet Union invaded and annexed the islands as part of a pact with Western Allies that stipulated the Soviets would take the disputed territory. The islands’ Japanese inhabitants were removed.

Subsequently, Japan and the US have claimed that the islands were not part of the original pact. The islands, however, remain under Russian administration.

In August this year, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin paid his first-ever visit to the islands, drawing condemnation from Japan. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi called the visit “absolutely unacceptable”, saying it “offends the sentiments of the Japanese people”.

This week, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said the Japanese embassy in the US has asked Equal Earth’s creators to change the map.

“Displays that contradict the Japanese government’s position are seen [on the map],” Kihara said at a news conference. “We need to prevent incorrect perceptions regarding our country’s territories and geographical names from spreading.”

Why is India uneasy about the map?

India also voted in favour of the Equal Earth projection, but on Sunday, the Ministry of External Affairs published a caveat regarding depictions of the disputed border territory of Kashmir.

Following the Indian partition of 1947, both Pakistan and India lay claim to the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had been controlled by the British through indirect rule. The region has subsequently been a flashpoint for tensions between the two rivals and has led to several wars.

Parts of Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, while other parts are administered by India. China, which also disputes some Kashmir territory with India, administers its northeastern portion.

In his statement, spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal noted that the UN vote was in favour of encouraging the use of equal area projections and that it had not made the use of any one map mandatory.

“India’s sovereign territory, including the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, must be depicted in accordance with India’s official map,” he said. “Any inaccurate or misleading depiction is unacceptable.”

Caracas, September 10, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez presided over the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Ecosocialism and India’s Greens Zoological Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre (GZRRC) to “modernize and strengthen” Venezuela’s network of zoos, bioparks, and wildlife conservation centers.

GZRRC is the operating entity of the global conservation initiative Vantara, based in the Indian state of Gujarat.

According to the Venezuelan leader, Greens will provide “technical assistance, training, and technology to raise the standards for the management and protection of Venezuela’s biodiversity.” 

“Our professionals will be able to attend courses in India,” she added during the televised event on Saturday, September 5.

Rodríguez noted that Venezuela has 16 zoos and aquariums, 12 breeding centers, and four rescue centers. She also announced that the agreement involves “incorporating an aquarium, a wildlife conservation center, a veterinary center, and a wildlife hospital into the master plan for the recovery of La Guaira State” in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake.

The initiative with Vantara, which has a five-year time frame, also includes exchange programs for veterinarians, biologists, and other professionals involved in wildlife management and conservation.

Days earlier, Venezuela enacted the Law Approving the Framework Agreement for the Establishment of the International Big Cat Alliance (IBCA), which will focus on protecting seven feline species considered among the planet’s most representative. Venezuela is home to six of the world’s most important feline species, accounting for 14 percent of global feline biodiversity.

The legislation stems from a proposal put forward by India in 2023, which currently has the backing of 13 member states and applications for membership from more than 25 others.

During the recent ceremony, Rodríguez thanked Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Ambassador P.K. Ashok Babu, Vantara, and the wealthy Ambani family for “all their support.”

Venezuela’s Acting President held a four-day visit to India in June to offer investment and trade opportunities to major Indian companies, including the Tata Group, Amul, and Reliance. The latter has been a major importer of Venezuelan crude in recent months.

Vantara is backed by Reliance Industries, a major conglomerate owned by the Ambani family, with a major presence in multiple economic sectors, including energy, telecommunications, financial services, and retail. Its wildlife rescue center is located within the Jamnagar refining complex in Gujarat, the largest in the world. The facility, which covers approximately 3,500 acres, is managed by businessman Anant Ambani, the youngest son of India’s richest man, Mukesh Ambani.

Despite Vantara’s declared wildlife conservation mission and philanthropic endeavors, the company has faced controversy in recent years.

Various environmental groups and international organizations have accused it of operating as “a large-scale private zoo,” managing wildlife as commodities around the world, and taking advantage of loopholes in international regulations that seek to ensure that the trade in wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival.

In 2024, India’s Supreme Court appointed a panel of retired judges to investigate the alleged illegal acquisition of animals by Vantara, particularly elephants, as well as possible violations of wildlife regulations and money laundering allegations. The court ultimately dismissed the complaint filed by the Karanartham Viramah Foundation.

However, criticism that Vantara is breeding exotic animals for trade, as well as environmental concerns over setting up a wildlife sanctuary in the vicinity of an oil refinery, have persisted.

Venezuela had dealings with the Indian group before the latest memorandum of understanding. A joint investigation by Süddeutsche Zeitung and Venezuelan outlet Armando.info claimed that at least 39,000 wild animals from all over the world had been transferred to Vantara’s facilities by the end of 2024. 

The identified transfers included over 5,000 animals from Venezuela, among them members of protected species such as the Orinoco crocodile, harpy eagle, lowland tapir, giant anteater, jaguars, and spider monkeys.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Bettiah, India – Neyaz Miya was adjusting a kitchen handle. Mehadi Hassan was fixing a bracket for a bed.

They were at different construction sites – Miya in a half‑constructed home, a little higher up the hill, while Hassan was on the ground floor of Ganesh Hotel, closer to the Trishuli River that flowed through Syafrubesi, a bustling market town near the Nepal‑Tibet border, now wiped off the map by the August 26 flash floods.

More than 1,200 bodies have been recovered since then, at least 4,000 people remain missing, and more than 13,000 have been rescued.

“First came the terrifying loud sound. Then the ground trembled, and dark clouds descended upon us,” recalls 34‑year‑old Miya, who ran further up the hill with his phone and slippers that morning, five or six others running alongside him.

Hassan, lower on the slope, did not wait to reach for his slippers or his phone. He just ran, climbing a narrow, stair‑like path, up the hill, stopping only when he reached roughly 60 metres (200ft) above the road.

At some point, Miya and Hassan found each other. Around them were 60 to 70 other survivors who had also gathered high up on the hill.

A decade earlier, Miya had arrived in Syafrubesi as a carpenter. Three years later, he brought Hassan with him – both men from Bihar’s Bettiah district. Over the years, they built the town’s interiors – sofas, beds, almirahs, and kitchens for hotels and homes.

On that Wednesday morning, they watched all of that washed away. The multi‑storey hotels where they had worked – Red Panda, Garden Hotel, Buddha Hotel, Sunrise Hotel – were all swallowed by the flood.

“The town was gone in a blink,” Miya recounts, now sitting in his home in Turhapatti village of Bihar, India, just across the Nepal border. “There were only three kinds of people who survived that day: Those who were out of town, those who were at work and managed to run, and those who lived a little higher up the hill.”

Based on what he witnessed, Miya says only a few hundred people in Syafrubesi, a town that had a population of 2,271 in the 2011 census, likely survived.

Miya and Hasan are among them. Three of their close friends and colleagues, also migrant workers from Bihar, are not.

A workday like no other

When the floods reached Syafrubesi, the men were already at work: Their shifts began at seven in the morning.

“To start at seven, we would wake up at four or five,” Miya recalls. They would leave with empty stomachs and were fed tea with doughnuts or biscuits at the construction site by building owners. Their first break came at 11am, when they returned to the rented one‑room space (3,500 Nepali rupees or $23 a month) that housed five to seven migrants at a time.

On the morning of August 26, they left for work alongside 34‑year‑old Arman Ansari, 20‑year‑old Samir Ansari, and 52‑year‑old Mukhtar Ansari, all migrants from Miya’s Turhapatti village.

In the rented room, two teenage boys, Arman’s 14‑year‑old son, Salman Alam, and his friend Shibu Alam, 17, remained asleep. They had come a month earlier to visit the hills.

“My father had cooked meat bhaat (rice with meat),” Salman recounts. He was waiting for his father to return at 11am so they could eat together.

Arman, his father, was working beside Hassan on the ground floor, pasting sunmica onto the same bed. Samir and Mukhtar were on the top floor of the Full Moon Hotel.

When Hassan ran out of the under-construction building and up the hill, he believed Arman was behind him. But by the time Hassan and Miya met higher up, there was no sign of the other three: Arman, Samir and Mukhtar.

Miya and Hassan found the boys, Salman and Shibu, terrified, on the hill. “Salman was crying, howling and searching for his father,” Hassan said.

The flood, which came with a high speed, took half an hour to recede. Soon, helicopters started hovering above them, airlifting the critically injured.

The four of them – Miya, Hassan and the boys – walked down the hill on foot to search for the three missing in the debris. They found nothing but sludge. Miya’s furniture-cutting tools and machines, worth 80,000 Nepali rupees ($530), were buried in the debris.

When they got back to their room, perched high on a slope, they found that it had survived.

But the army had taken charge, and soldiers herded survivors away from tenements near the river. “They said it [the flood] might come again,” Miya recalls.

They slept that night in a government school building in a village, he says. “At night, we were given daal bhat (rice and daal), and we wrapped ourselves in tarpaulin and slept.”

The next morning, a helicopter took them to another village. From there, another helicopter carried them to an army compound in a town. In the evening, they teamed up with five other migrants and hired an SUV to reach Nepal’s capital Kathmandu, each paying 3,500 rupees ($23).

The next morning, on August 28, they hired another SUV, which charged them 950 rupees ($6) each for a distance of 290km (180 miles) to Birgunj, a town on the India-Nepal border. They then crossed the border on foot before boarding buses for their villages.

It wasn’t the homecoming Indian migrants who work in Nepal usually plan.

‘No regular work’ back home

Turhapatti is among thousands of villages tucked along the 1,715km (1,066-mile) stretch of the India-Nepal border, where generations have crossed back and forth in search of work.

The two countries share an open border, and on both sides, especially in Bihar, the bond is known as a roti-beti ka rishta (a relationship of food and daughters), alluding to ties of livelihoods and matrimonial kinship. People live, work, and marry across the border.

Kathmandu is as close to Turhapatti as is Patna, the capital of Bihar. Per its 2021 Population and Housing Census, Nepal had 700,000 foreign-born residents, 97 percent of them from India.

Miya and Hassan say the wages for a carpenter or a mason on the Indian side are between 600-700 rupees, while for the same work in Nepal, wages are about 900 rupees. That drives migrant workers from India over the border into Nepal.

Nepal, for its part, is facing a major out-migration crisis — its per capita income is the lowest in South Asia, barring Afghanistan, and hundreds of thousands of young men and women leave each year to find work elsewhere. This creates a demand for migrant workers from Bihar, India’s poorest state that lies just across the border.

In Turhapatti, Miya owns only 0.03 hectares (0.06 acres), not enough to feed his family of six children, wife and parents. In recent years, he transitioned from being a carpenter to a contractor, which allowed him to bring in more workers from Bihar.

He had been sending 30,000 Indian rupees ($315) back to his family every month.

Hassan has even less back home: He inherited a 6×8-metre (20×25ft) room from his father and no agricultural land. “There is no regular daily work here,” he says. He would send 15,000 Indian rupees ($157) home from Nepal each month for his wife and four children.

Their story echoes in most homes in Turhapatti. The village had a population of 16,000 people in the 2011 census, India’s latest one. In nearly every household, men have left to work in other parts of India and abroad as carpenters, masons, or labourers mixing cement and sand into mortar.

The destinations are Kashmir, where close to 700 men from the village work; Nepal, with nearly 600; and thousands scattered across Indian cities: Chennai, Kolkata, Delhi, Mumbai. About 100 men have migrated to Dubai, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

The houses they built in Turhapatti stand in stark contrast to those of those who remain in India. The marble-fronted and iron-gated homes belong to men working in the Gulf, while semi-permanent dwellings belong to those who stayed behind.

Migrants in Nepal fall in between: Miya has been able to raise a brick house.

‘My body shivers at the thought’

This economic reality is what drove Arman Ansari to Syafrubesi. On July 26, Arman left for Nepal with Samir and Mukhtar. Arman’s son and his friend Shubu went with the three adults; the teenagers were on a trip to the hills.

Now, Arman’s brother-in-law. Jameel Miya, a carpenter in Kathmandu, scours the city’s hospitals for Arman’s body, telling authorities that his brother-in-law’s right hand and chest had deep scars, cut by shards of glass when he was young.

Arman’s wife, Sahrun Khatun, has only her last phone call with Arman to hold on to. They spoke two hours before the floods swept him away. “He was about to get his wages on September 1 and return home,” she says.

Salman, who had tagged along with his father to see the hills, hasn’t been able to sleep since the flood.

“The moment I close my eyes, I feel the flood is coming for me,” he says.

Mukhtar’s family lives a few lanes away.

Since the floods, Kasmun Khatun, Mukhtar’s wife, has been glued to the internet for any news of her missing husband. Joining her in that remote search are her daughter Asmana (18) and son Sadre Alam (14).

Her eldest son, Osama, 25, a tailor in Kathmandu, has been busy searching for his father in city hospitals.

“After waiting for a week and watching the videos, I submitted my DNA samples,” he says over a phone call. Osama manages to send home 6,000 rupees ($63), but that is no longer enough – his mother needs eye surgery that has already been delayed and cannot be put off much longer.

“The guardian has gone, all of a sudden,” he says, referring to his father.

At the far edge of Turhapatti stands the home of Samir Ansari, the youngest among the missing migrants and youngest of his five migrant brothers.

The Ganesh Hotel project he was working on was only three days from completion.

“He said he found another site to work on,” recalls his father, Hasmuddin Miya, remembering their last phone call on the evening of August 25.

Samir was a mason who specialised in marble tiles, a skill he had learned in Kashmir while working under his elder brothers at construction sites.

The three families are preparing to host a bhoj, the funeral feast – a custom of feeding hundreds of people – having given up on hope.

Meanwhile, the two survivors, Miya and Hassan, are already making calls to find work again. This time, their search turns towards Nepal’s plains. They pledge never to return to the hills.

“My whole body shivers at the thought of going there,” says Hassan.

The Eiffel Tower was temporarily closed on Monday after workers went on strike to protest the sidelining of female staff during a private visit by a Hindu religious group.

The tower, which has since reopened, shut after members of Bochasanwasi Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (BAPS), a global socio‑spiritual Hindu denomination, visited the site. Female staff were reportedly asked to give way to male staff for the group’s tour, prompting protests from the workers’ union, outrage from French politicians and an apology from the Hindu group.

Here is more about BAPS and how the controversy unfolded.

What’s the controversy about?

The Eiffel Tower closed after staff walked out over the removal of women staff during a weekend visit by BAPS.

The Societe d’Exploitation de la Tour Eiffel, or SETE, which runs the Paris landmark, acknowledged that the group had requested the Saturday visit be organised in a way that limited “interactions with women”, and said “these conditions should not have been accepted”.

The BAPS monks, or sadhus, practise strict celibacy, which requires them to avoid physical contact with women and being alone in their company, and to minimise personal interaction or attention towards the opposite sex.

Wider community members of BAPS are not bound by these celibacy rules. According to news reports, the BAPS delegation visiting the Eiffel Tower comprised both monks and community members.

Eiffel Tower staff said in a statement that they condemned “professional instructions that led to female employees being sidelined, replaced and made invisible because of their sex” during the visit by the delegation.

“Some were asked to leave their posts and withdraw to other areas. In some posts they were replaced by men. And all female employees were instructed not to go through or cross certain areas while the delegation was present,” the staff union said, adding they were shocked to have been put in such a situation.

Paris Mayor Emmanuel Gregoire said an investigation would be launched “as soon as possible”. In a post on social media, he said he was aware of the employees’ anger and agreed their dissatisfaction was legitimate.

What is BAPS and how have they responded?

BAPS was founded in India in 1907 and began expanding internationally from the 1960s. It is a spiritual organisation which works on community building, constructing temples, helping with disaster relief and running medical camps, environmental drives and educational programmes.

It now also runs an extensive network of temples and cultural centres across the world, including more than 100 in the United States and more than 1,000 worldwide, including across Europe, Africa and Asia. BAPS also runs a temple in Paris.

On Tuesday, the BAPS Paris account posted a statement on X responding to the controversy.

“To our knowledge, at no time was access to the Eiffel Tower denied to anyone,” the account wrote, originally in French.

“Nevertheless, we wish to offer our sincere apologies to anyone who may have been hurt or inconvenienced by this situation,” it added.

How has the response in France been?

Leaders within France expressed outrage over reports of women being removed from the premises.

Aurore Berge, the minister delegate for gender equality and fight against discrimination in France, wrote in an X post on Monday: “In France, we do not ask women to step aside. No dogma, no religion is superior to the laws of the Republic.”

Yael Braun-Pivet, president of the National Assembly, wrote in a post on social media: “Welcoming others never means giving up our values. In France, women are fully present in public life. No one tells them to become invisible.”

Former French President Francois Hollande, now an MP, wrote on X on Tuesday: “We do not ask women to step aside to satisfy religious demands.”

He expressed support for the Eiffel Tower staff who walked out.

“Equality between women and men is a fundamental achievement of our Republic. It applies everywhere, to all women and all men, without exception,” Hollande wrote.

Parliamentarian and former PM Michel Barnier wrote on X: “It is therefore utterly unacceptable that an order aimed at making women disappear from this space could have been issued.”

Barnier added that “women are not hidden. They are not erased. They are respected, and their freedom is defended”, demanding an explanation from the SETE.

Jordan Bardella, the president of the far-right National Rally, wrote on X on Tuesday: “This degrading demand should never have been met. In a free country like France, gender equality is respected, and no religious reason can override women’s dignity.”

Prominent far-right MP and leader of the National Rally (RN), Marine Le Pen wrote in an X post: “In France, we will never accept that the presence of women be ‘limited.’”

Is BAPS linked to the Modi government?

BAPS is not officially part of a political party in India, and has long insisted that it is apolitical.

But researchers have long pointed to a close, cooperative relationship with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government.

In fact, the Eiffel Tower closure came just a day after Modi virtually inaugurated the BAPS temple in Paris.

Modi also attended the physical inauguration of the BAPS temple in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2024.

Has BAPS faced other controversies in the past?

BAPS has faced a series of high-profile controversies in the past.

During a landmark legal battle in 1966, BAPS leaders argued in court that their sect was not part of Hinduism but a distinct religion. They did so in an attempt to avoid the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act, which required Hindu temples to open their doors to Dalits, a historically marginalised caste group. The Indian Supreme Court rejected the appeal made by BAPS.

In 2013, two former BAPS monks filed a complaint accusing senior BAPS leaders of sexual assault dating back to the 1970s. BAPS leaders denied the allegations. The complaint did not result in any publicly reported criminal charges.

In 2021, a US federal class‑action lawsuit accused BAPS of exploiting low‑caste labourers from India to work on its temples. The case, brought on behalf of about 200 Indian workers, alleged they were lured from India, coerced into employment agreements, and forced to work more than 12 hours a day with only five days off a year at a temple in Robbinsville Township, New Jersey.

The suit says they were paid as little as $1.20 an hour, far below the US federal minimum wage of $7.25 and New Jersey’s $12 statewide minimum.

A US federal investigation into labour trafficking at the Robbinsville temple has since been closed without criminal charges, but the civil class‑action lawsuit brought by the workers continues.

Rescue teams work to locate survivors after New Delhi building collapse.

A multistorey building in the Indian capital, New Delhi, has collapsed, killing at least six people and trapping dozens of others.

Rescue teams are searching the rubble of the collapsed building, which housed mostly students, near a Delhi University campus in Satya Niketan on Sunday.

The All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) said it treated several victims after the incident.

“Out of the 10 patients, five were brought dead, while one patient who was in critical condition later succumbed to his injuries,” AIIMS said in a statement.

Crews from India’s disaster response agency, police and firefighters cleared debris with earthmovers and used detection dogs to search for those trapped inside. A nearby building was evacuated over concerns that it could also collapse.

Up to 40 people remain trapped under the rubble, according to fire officer Abhilash Malik. The number of survivors and the cause of the accident were not immediately clear.

A video filmed by a man trapped under the rubble as onlookers called for rescuers to help him has circulated online. Additional footage showed residents attempting to rescue survivors before disaster response teams arrived.

“The most important thing for us is to save the lives of these students. Rescue operations will carry on,” Delhi Chief Minister Rekha Gupta told local news outlets.

“I assure you we won’t spare the guilty,” she said.

“Condolences to those who lost their loved ones. Praying for the speedy recovery of the injured. Authorities are working at the site and assisting those affected in the mishap,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s office said on X.

Building collapses are frequent in parts of India during the rainy season from June to September. A similar incident occurred on Saturday after a three-storey building collapsed in northern India following heavy rain. No casualties were reported.

In 2025, at least 11 people were killed after a residential building collapsed in the northeastern district of New Delhi.

India claim seven-wicket win after Pakistan lose 10 wickets for just 28 runs as they are bowled out for 55.

India produced a dominant display to defeat Pakistan by seven wickets in the Women’s T20 Asia Cup in Dubai, bowling their rivals out for their lowest total in the format before rattling off their target inside nine overs.

Pakistan, having won the toss and elected to bat at the Dubai International Stadium on Saturday, made a promising start but collapsed spectacularly after an opening partnership of 27.

India eventually dismissed them for just 55 in 18.1 overs, with their spinners responsible for much of the damage.

Shree Charani and Prema Rawat were the stars of the bowling attack, taking three wickets apiece. Charani finished with remarkable figures of 3 for 7 from four overs, while Rawat returned 3 for 9. Deepti Sharma added two wickets for only five runs.

Pakistan’s innings initially appeared under control. Muneeba Ali made 13, and Shawaal Zulfiqar scored 14 for the first wicket.

But Shafali Verma broke the partnership by bowling Muneeba, and Charani then struck twice in the sixth over. She dismissed Gull Feroza for a duck before removing Zulfiqar, leaving Pakistan 29 for three.

The collapse continued almost immediately as Pakistan slipped to 32 for four in the eighth over before Rawat and Deepti Sharma intensified the pressure. By the 13th over, Pakistan were 45 for seven, and there was no prospect of recovering to a competitive total.

The final three wickets eventually fell with Pakistan on 55, giving India an exceptionally modest target. The total was Pakistan’s lowest in women’s T20I cricket, surpassing their previous low of 63 against India in the 2012 Women’s Twenty20 Asia Cup.

India survive brief wobble

Despite requiring only 56, India did not have everything their own way at the start of the chase.

Pakistan’s bowlers claimed three wickets, giving their opponents a brief glimpse of an unlikely route back into the contest. Fatima Sana was Pakistan’s most successful bowler, finishing with 3 for 17.

The target, however, was simply too small. India reached 57 for three in 8.4 overs, completing a seven-wicket victory with Harmanpreet Kaur unbeaten on 18. The Indian captain ensured there was no late drama and guided her side across the line with plenty of deliveries to spare.

The victory maintained India’s perfect start to the tournament. They now have six points from three matches and have already secured their place in the semifinals.

For Pakistan, meanwhile, the defeat leaves their qualification hopes dependent on their final group match against Hong Kong. They remain on two points and need a victory to give themselves a chance of progressing.

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), including Chinese President Xi Jinping, his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, are set to gather in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek for an annual summit.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is also attending the summit, which marks 25 years of its existence.

The two-day summit, starting on Monday, comes at a time when the world is grappling with the aftermath of the US-Israel war on Iran, which has upended global energy and financial markets, and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

So, what will be the main agenda of the summit, and will the SCO leaders try to use the gathering to push for a multipolar world and Global South cooperation on trade and security issues, as United States President Donald Trump’s unilateral foreign policy has eroded the global rules-based order?

Here’s what we know:

Who is attending the SCO summit and where is it being held?

This year’s summit is taking place in Bishkek under the motto: Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity.

Xi, Putin and Modi will be joined by the Iranian president and leaders of Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, among others.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn are also expected to attend the summit.

William Yang, senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, noted that the ongoing wars are putting more strain on the rules-based international order, and against this backdrop, the summit serves as an important occasion for several of the world’s rising great powers, including China and India, to elevate their global influence and deepen their engagement and cooperation with other countries in the Global South.

“For years, SCO has been viewed as one of the avenues for China to promote the multipolar world order and form its own bloc with other developing countries. Despite its narrow scope of cooperation at the beginning, SCO member states have sought to expand the scope of their mandate and the number of member states,” Yang told Al Jazeera.

Amid the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Europe, Yang said, “China could use this year’s summit to present itself as a great power that advocates for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts, thereby sharpening the contrast with the US.”

“However, these efforts are likely to be limited to rhetoric rather than any substantive proposal for conflict resolution,” he said.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero, chief economist for Asia Pacific at French investment bank Natixis, said the summit is particularly significant because it marks the grouping’s 25th anniversary and offers the first chance to turn last year’s Tianjin strategy, which called for a multipolar world order that fosters mutually beneficial international cooperation, into action. Last year’s summit took place in China’s Tianjin region.

“Putting Modi, Putin and Xi in the same room, with India-China border talks still live and a scheduled Modi-Putin bilateral, is a visible test of how far the recent thaw goes and how Eurasia wants to organise security, connectivity and trade without defaulting to Western institutions,” she told Al Jazeera, referring to the recent India-China talks amid the warming up of New Delhi-Beijing ties.

What is the SCO?

The SCO started in 1996 as a security bloc, dubbed the “Shanghai Five”. It was formed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to settle their border disputes following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But in June 2001, the grouping evolved into the SCO, and expanded to include Uzbekistan, with headquarters in Beijing. In 2017, the bloc expanded to include India and Pakistan. Iran and Belarus were also added as full members in 2023 and 2024, respectively.

In addition, the organisation has 14 key dialogue partners, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Turkiye, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Cambodia.

SCO member states account for 43 percent of the world’s population and 23 percent – or almost a quarter – of the global economy.

Analysts have pointed out that while the SCO emerged with a focus on regional security, the expansion of its mandate to include trade and other Global South concerns means it is difficult to understand what sets the grouping apart from other Global South organisations like the BRICS, which is an acronym derived from the initials of the founding member countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Alejandro Reyes, adjunct professor in the department of politics and public administration at the University of Hong Kong, said the SCO has grown into a “counterbalance” to the US-led Asia Pacific alliance aimed at countering China’s rise. India is part of both groupings. “Interestingly, India is part of the SCO, and the US appears to have dropped the Indo-Pacific nomenclature,” he said.

Reyes emphasised that “the SCO is not a coherent anti-US, anti-Western alliance”. “It is better understood as a forum in which countries with very different interests can demonstrate that they have alternatives and strategic room for manoeuvre – agency in this more volatile geopolitical order, dominated by China and the US. It is less an anti-American alliance than a venue for countries hedging against and hinging away from American power,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The significance this year is that current US policies, especially with regard to Iran and continuing US tariff and sanctions action, may be making that hedging more attractive and necessary,” he added.

What is on this year’s agenda?

The US-Israel war on Iran, the Russia-Ukraine war and the economic and social situation in Afghanistan are key issues leaders are expected to discuss this year, according to the SCO Secretariat.

Relations between India and China – Asia’s two major economies – are also expected to be discussed. Last year, Beijing and New Delhi began a rapprochement after five years of tensions over a 2020 deadly border skirmish. Trump’s tariff war on Indian goods last year forced New Delhi to mend ties with Beijing. For the first time since 2018, Modi visited China last year for the SCO summit.

Border tensions between India and Pakistan also persist, and the issue is expected to be discussed at this summit.

Manoj Kewalramani, chairperson of Bengaluru-based think tank Takshashila Institution’s Geostrategy Programme, told Al Jazeera that apart from the traditional security agenda, this year’s summit might include any forward movement on issues of economic integration or financial cooperation architecture.

“In Tianjin, we had the agreement on establishing the SCO Development Bank,” Kewalramani said.

“The Kyrgyz leadership has said that its priority will be to move the needle on the bank, the SCO Development Fund and SCO Investment Fund,” he said, adding that while talks have reportedly been taking place in this direction, there is no clarity on whether any agreements will be announced at this year’s summit.

According to the SCO Secretariat, economic connectivity will be a key topic the group will discuss as the US and Israel’s war on Iran continues to paralyse key maritime routes like the Strait of Hormuz, which has upended global supply chains, the energy market and financial markets.

The group is expected to discuss new trade and transport corridors, such as the 7,200km (4,474-mile) International North-South Transport Corridor, which links the Russian port city of St Petersburg with India’s financial capital, Mumbai, through Iran and ports on the Gulf.

Herrero pointed out that with Modi and Putin scheduled to hold a bilateral meeting, discussions on the Northern Sea Route, which runs through the Arctic coast, are also expected. China last month announced a new shipping route through the Arctic Ocean, aimed at easing global trade amid the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks in the Bab al-Mandeb in the Red Sea, which will pass through the Northern Sea Route.

According to Indian media reports, Moscow and New Delhi could negotiate the use of the Northern Sea Route by India as the crisis in West Asia continues to affect trade routes.

The SCO will also seek to establish a network of Silk Road stations to support international freight traffic across Eurasia.

Can the SCO agree on all issues?

The Eurasian grouping has often been unable to agree on global geopolitical issues.

For instance, Russia has been able to get most SCO members to align with its interests when it comes to its war in Ukraine, but India has attempted to play a more balanced role – seeking peace and stronger ties with Ukraine, while also buying record levels of oil from Russia.

But this year, Ukraine is expected to feature in discussions, with Turkiye’s Erdogan and Russia’s Putin holding bilateral talks on the matter, according to a Kremlin aide. Europe’s deadliest war since World War II is in its fifth year.

Yury Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, said the meeting would take place on the sidelines of the SCO summit.

“There are many issues to discuss. Of course, these include the situation in the Black Sea and the Ukraine issue in general,” he told reporters, referring to the rise in attacks in the Black Sea.

The SCO has, however, taken a more collective position on the US-Israel war on Iran and Israel’s genocidal actions in Palestine.

In March, the SCO condemned the US-Israel war on Iran. “The SCO member states considered the use of force as unacceptable and advocate for the resolution of existing differences exclusively by peaceful means, based on dialogue, mutual respect, and taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties, in accordance with the norms of international law and the principles of the UN Charter,” it said in a statement.

India, which has strong ties with Israel, had refused to endorse an SCO joint statement condemning Israel for its attack on Iran in June 2025.

Iranian President Pezeshkian is also scheduled to meet Putin on the sidelines of the summit, according to Iran’s official IRNA news agency. Russia is a close ally of Iran and the two countries cooperate on defence issues. China has emerged as Iran’s biggest economic lifeline as it buys more than 80 percent of its crude oil. Moscow and Beijing have also lent diplomatic cover to Tehran at the UN.

Frictions also exist on how the group views border tensions between India and Pakistan. New Delhi has repeatedly called on the organisation to condemn “cross-border terrorism”, for which it blames Islamabad, a close economic and defence ally of China.

Last July, India demanded that the grouping condemn the April 2025 attack by armed men in Indian-administered Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed. Pakistan has also blamed India for armed attacks inside its territory.

During the Tianjin summit, the bloc condemned “terror” attacks in both India and Pakistan, taking a more balanced position on the issue.

What are Russia, China and India going to gain at the summit?

Reyes from the University of Hong Kong pointed out that all eyes will also be on Russia, China and India.

“For China, the SCO is partly about institution-building. Beijing wants to demonstrate that it can convene a large part of Eurasia around an agenda of security, connectivity, trade and development, while promoting a more multipolar, agentic international order. It also reinforces China’s increasingly important economic position in Central Asia, a strategically key region of the Eurasia landmass,” he said.

“For Russia, the summit is an opportunity to show that it is not isolated internationally. Maintaining strong relationships with China, India, Iran and Central Asia is economically and diplomatically important, given the Ukraine war and Western and other sanctions. But Moscow also has an interest in preserving its own influence in Eurasia rather than simply becoming more and more dependent on China.

“India is in an intriguing position. Modi’s participation is not an indication that India is joining the China-Russia axis, such as it is. India itself describes its SCO priorities as ‘security, connectivity and opportunity’. That is much more consistent with India’s longstanding pursuit of strategic autonomy – its agency amid the great-power rivalry,” Reyes explained.

He added that New Delhi wants “access and influence in Central Asia, continued relations with Russia [from which it buys the bulk of its defence equipment], and a mechanism for managing its difficult but gradually stabilising relationship with China”.

“At the same time, New Delhi maintains important relations with Washington, including through the Quad security arrangement.

“So China and Russia may see the SCO partly as an instrument for building a less US-dominated international order. India, meanwhile, sees it more as one of several overlapping platforms through which it can maximise its own agency.”

What does all this mean to the US?

As part of his unilateral foreign policy vision, Trump has undermined the Western-led international order and lashed out at Global South blocs, such as BRICS, which he sees as a threat to the US’s economic dominance. He has called the grouping “anti-American”.

However, Kewalramani noted that the Trump administration has continued some of its predecessors’ approaches and deepened engagement with countries in the region where this year’s SCO is being hosted, especially with the C5 or Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

“Joe Biden had established a leader-level meeting mechanism with C5 countries in 2023. Trump also hosted them in DC in November 2025. [US Secretary of State] Marco Rubio and subsequently Trump are expected to visit the region later [this] year. Kazakhstan has announced accession to the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Central Asian state to join [the Trump-led diplomatic efforts to cajole Muslim countries to recognise Israel]. The US has been engaged with the region on critical minerals and other business deals,” he said.

“In other words, C5 members are also adopting a diversified diplomatic approach, seeking to balance China and Russia’s dominance,” he noted.

“But the fact that you are witnessing these countries meeting with far more purpose to think about alternative financial and energy architectures is a reflection of the limitations of the US’s disruptive foreign policy,” Kewalramani added.

Herrero said for the US, the SCO summit is a reminder that countries like India will keep practising strategic autonomy: it will sit in the Quad and buy US defence equipment while also talking to Moscow and Beijing in a China-heavy forum.

The Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was established by India, Japan, Australia and the US in 2007 to counter China’s growing influence in the Asia Pacific region. Over the past quarter-century, India has grown closer to the US and its allies, amid shared concerns over Beijing’s rise.

Reyes warned that Washington should be careful not to read the SCO as a consolidated anti-US coalition, even though China, Russia and Iran are members.

“The differences among China, Russia and India are far too substantial to substantiate that label. The more important message is that American economic and geopolitical pressure can sometimes produce convergence among countries that otherwise might disagree with one another more,” he said.

“The SCO’s criticism of unilateral economic measures is significant in that respect. China and Russia explicitly want a less US-dominated international order. India does not necessarily share that objective, but it does want a world in which Washington cannot dictate its foreign-policy choices.”

This week, three newborns died in an NICU (neonatal intensive care unit) fire at a government hospital in Amravati, in the western Indian state of Maharashtra. Two days later, 14 newborns were killed in a fire that broke out in the maternity ward at one of Pakistan’s most prominent state hospitals. The reported causes of the fire were different – a faulty ventilator in Amravati and an exploding air conditioner in Islamabad – but the harrowing stories of the parents on both sides of the border are identical.

On both sides, parents stand outside a government hospital, trying to make sense of this state-inflicted cruelty. In Amravati, one father was still distributing sweets to celebrate the birth; he had not yet seen the baby’s face. In Islamabad, a family was celebrating the first baby boy in years. The circumstances are different, but the institutional failures and official response followed a familiar pattern. Rescue teams arrived late, while emergency evacuation was hampered by basic fire-safety failures. Politicians were quick to express their sorrow. High-level inquiries were announced, along with financial compensation and fire safety audits. As the dust settles, the two tragedies expose the same indecent truth: lives of poor, vulnerable families are expendable in both nations.

The two countries are rivals in cricket, military posturing and diplomatic rhetoric, but united when it comes to spending lives of ordinary citizens like pocket change.

Over the past 26 years, as a health reporter, I have watched hospital fires in India and Pakistan result in significant and frequent loss of life, without a jot of difference in regulating these institutions. In India, the AMRI Hospital fire of 2011 in which 89 people died and the SUM Hospital fire in Bhubaneswar in 2016 in which 24 people died were traumatising to write about. Not a single person was convicted.

In Pakistan too, a fire at Services Hospital in Lahore killed 10 newborns in 2012 and another 11 infants died at Sahiwal Teaching Hospital in 2024.

I dredge these memories because the latest fires – in Amravati and Islamabad – cannot be reduced to stories about faulty equipment or individual negligence. The hospital fires did not happen in the boondocks, but in India’s wealthiest state and Pakistan’s capital. They are stories about government priorities.

The longer you look at government data, the more grisly it gets. Year on year, both nations sacrifice their citizens to fire like medieval societies trying to appease indifferent gods. India and Pakistan are not poor or war-torn countries without knowledge or wealth to do what is needed. The refusal to make any meaningful improvements is a political choice. An unforgivable one at that.

India and Pakistan have spent decades convincing their citizens that the highest form of security is protection from each other. The truth is that the greatest co-morbidity citizens of both nations live with is our own careless governments.

Fires in large buildings such as factories, shopping centres and hospitals are frequent in India and Pakistan, often due to poor compliance with safety laws and lax enforcement of building codes. These repeated incidents raise questions about our political system, the judiciary, our newsrooms and civil society all in one sweep. What they expose is the very core of these two democracies – what they prioritise and who they value. And all the questions raised are being answered in one voice – not the vulnerable or the sick or the poor.

Earlier this month, both nations marked 79 years of independence. Both have, for 79 years, reminded each other of the pride they take in their complicated histories and their fabled cultures, languages and cuisines. Yet, on both sides of the border, we are governed with careless barbarity. What we have right now are nations that have the trappings of procedural democracies but refuse to concern themselves with bringing change to the poorest. We are taught to sacrifice – wealth, family members, dignity – everything in the service of our nation, and must forage for our own safety without expecting anything from the governments.

This week, as I watched newborns utterly unable to protect themselves die in an inferno on both sides of the border, I wondered if the men leading both states are filled with some shame. Shame over the fact that women who had just given birth had to run down several flights of stairs and climb out of windows and down ladders to escape. Or that families found to their horror that the ward’s water spray system failed to function when the fire broke out. Or that these families will spend the rest of their lives recovering from the horror of seeing charred babies, their bodies covered in black ash.

I wondered what the military might and nuclear arsenal mean to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif as they stand facing a mother crying outside a neonatal ward. This is not polemic or rhetoric, simply a sober assessment of our incompetent leadership that has no love for its own people. Because countries that can spend billions preparing for war cannot plausibly claim that a functioning sprinkler system or fire safety regulation in a hospital is an unreasonable expectation.

Fire safety is not a luxury. It is not a Western or colonial aspiration. It is not even an infrastructure of affluence – like, say, bullet trains – that a country acquires once it has become sufficiently rich, sufficiently modern or sufficiently powerful. It is the floor. The floor beneath which a government cannot allow its people to fall repeatedly and remain shamelessly indifferent every single time.

Seventy-nine years is a long time for a country to become itself. Long enough to build armies, send satellites into space, build a nuclear arsenal and to flex them at neighbours. But what good is national security if a newborn cannot survive the building in which she was born? Or does security only mean the ability of the state to protect itself from another state – while its citizens die like insects in unpredictable ways.

The parents in Amravati and Islamabad did not need a nuclear arsenal to defend their babies. They needed the fire alarm to work and emergency exits to not be blocked. Nations that cannot guarantee such a basic amenity must have no right to national pride.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance

India has taken a major step towards opening one of its most sensitive areas of defence production to private companies.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved the transfer of technologies developed by the state-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for all conventional missile systems to Indian industry for domestic production, the country’s Ministry of Defence said on Tuesday.

The move marks a significant shift for the sector dominated by government-run firms and research laboratories. Private companies will be able to compete for the technology and production rights, subject to technical qualifications, certifications and other regulatory requirements, the ministry said.

The Narendra Modi-led government says the aim is to move missiles from development into mass production faster, increase domestic manufacturing and reduce India’s dependence on imports.

So, does India’s private defence industry have the capacity to manufacture sophisticated missile systems at the scale and reliability the military needs, is the country moving towards developing its own military-industrial complex, and are there security risks involved?

What did the government announce?

India’s Defence Ministry said Singh had approved the transfer of DRDO-developed technology for all conventional missile systems to Indian defence companies for production inside the country.

“The objective is to enhance domestic manufacturing capabilities, strengthen the defence industrial base, and create opportunities for the participation of Indian MSMEs (micro, small and medium-sized enterprises) and other technology partners in the supply chain,” the ministry said in a statement.

The measure would enable the “successful transition of missile system development to industrial production” and create opportunities for MSMEs and other technology partners, the ministry added.

“DRDO remains committed to working closely with Indian industry to facilitate the transfer and absorption of advanced defence technologies and to further strengthen the country’s indigenous defence capabilities.”

The announcement spans a wide range of missiles, said Aditya Ramanathan, a research fellow with the Bengaluru-based Takshashila Institution.

“It will include surface-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, anti-radiation missiles, antitank systems, and so on. It will also include more heavy-duty hardware like land-attack cruise missiles,” he told Al Jazeera.

Why is India doing this?

India has traditionally relied heavily on state-owned defence companies to turn weapons developed by DRDO into large-scale production. Bharat Dynamics, one such state-owned company, has long held a monopoly in missile production.

Tuesday’s announcement is a “big change” because it ends that monopoly, said Ramanathan.

“Private companies have been making missile components for years, but what this decision does is allow them to move up the value chain and become prime integrators for these systems,” he said.

While India largely relies on domestically made missiles, it also imports missiles — especially from Russia and Israel, two key weapons suppliers to the country.

But under Modi, India has attempted to both encourage self-reliance in defence — a concept that the government calls Atmanirbhar Bharat or self-reliant India — and prod foreign defence majors to manufacture in India.

At a time when geopolitical allegiances are changing fast, and India faces uncertainties on both major borders — with rivals Pakistan and China — the country under Modi has more than doubled its defence budget, from $38bn in 2014 to $86bn in the current financial year.

The brief four-day conflict with nuclear-armed rival and neighbour Pakistan last year has injected fresh urgency into India’s defence preparedness plans. This year’s defence budget is 16 percent higher than the previous year’s.

Other geopolitical events have forced the government’s hand too, suggested Ramanathan.

“I don’t think this move would have happened as soon as it did if not for the experience of recent wars. Indian decision-makers have been looking at Ukraine, they’ve been looking at the US war with Iran, and of course they’ve been imbibing the lessons of operations from last year,” he said.

“One reason you’re going to need large stockpiles is that, as we’ve seen recently, you’re going to burn through your inventory pretty quickly. The other reason is that your adversary could also degrade your stockpiles using their own precision-strike systems.”

China, he said, was a major factor in India’s calculations.

“India believes that to deter China, which is its most capable adversary, it will need to demonstrate that it can both inflict and absorb really punishing attrition over weeks of gruelling warfare,” Ramanathan said.

To that end, India is also creating a tri-services conventional missile force. “To be a viable and effective force, it’s going to require serious magazine depth, and this cannot be achieved without the active involvement of the private sector,” he added.

What is India’s defence industry already manufacturing?

In June, India announced that it was preparing to spend more than $2bn on military drones from domestic manufacturers, reflecting the rapid expansion of the country’s private defence industry.

More than 600 companies were involved in India’s drone industry, including major groups such as Adani, Larsen & Toubro, and Tata Advanced Systems, as well as startups.

In July, India also approved the purchase of a range of military equipment for its defence forces worth $5.46bn, including missiles, electronic warfare systems and Kamikaze drones.

India is also pushing to rapidly modernise its navy with an eye on Beijing’s growing influence in key Indian Ocean shipping lanes. In December, New Delhi announced plans to procure at least 75 ships and submarines, with most expected to be constructed domestically.

At the same time, India is trying to diversify the foreign sources of its weapons. Over the past decade, New Delhi has worked to move away from its longstanding reliance on Russia for military hardware, expanding defence ties with countries such as the United States, France and — increasingly — Israel.

Does the private sector have the capacity to build missiles?

Private arms manufacturers in India have been increasing spending on bolstering military production in the past few years.

Major conglomerates have invested heavily in ammunition, drones, aerospace and military electronics. Of late, they have started to invest in facilities that aim to manufacture missiles.

Adani Defence & Aerospace, owned by business tycoon Gautam Adani, a close associate of Indian Prime Minister Modi, announced plans in 2024 to invest more than 30 billion rupees ($315m) in ammunition and missile manufacturing facilities in Uttar Pradesh.

The facilities would include capabilities for handling explosives used in missiles and precision munitions.

But commitments and intent don’t build missiles.

“Ultimately, I think the success or failure of this move will depend on how the Indian government places orders,” Ramanathan said. “Making missiles is an incredibly complex and costly affair, and companies are going to have to invest a lot in infrastructure, technology and people. These sorts of investments will only pay off if the government places large enough orders to justify them and also, hopefully, leave these companies with some profits that they can pour back into research and development.”

What missiles does India have?

India has a range of cruise and ballistic missiles, several of which are also capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

In May, on the anniversary of the 2025 war with Pakistan, India successfully test-fired the Agni-V, its most advanced nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach a distance of 5,500km (3,418 miles) — a range that covers all of China, the Middle East and even parts of Europe.

Its other ballistic missiles have ranges from as little as the Prithvi-1 (150km or 93 miles) to the Agni-IV (4,000km or 2,485 miles), again covering everything from border skirmishes with Pakistan to India’s extended neighbourhood.

It also has powerful cruise missiles, like the BrahMos, co-developed with Russia, which has a range of up to 500km (311 miles), and was used in last year’s war with Pakistan.

Is India also exporting missiles and other weapons?

India has dramatically ramped up its military exports in recent years, from just $72m in 2014-15 — when Modi came to power — to $4bn in 2025-2016.

Paras Defence, one of India’s fast-growing defence manufacturers, said this month it expects its exports to more than double in the 2026–27 financial year, up to $14m, driven partly by increased demand linked to conflicts in the Middle East.

Indian arms makers have also been involved in joint ventures with companies abroad. Adani Defence, in partnership with Elbit Systems – Israel’s largest weapons manufacturer – produces the large Hermes 900 armed drone systems.

A 2024 investigation by Al Jazeera exposed how India was exporting rocket parts and ammunition to Israel, even as the Modi government was publicly calling for diplomacy to end the war on Gaza.

In June 2026, Amnesty International said in a report that India’s weapons exports to Israel made it complicit in the genocide in Gaza.

But it isn’t just Israel that has sought and received weapons from Indian manufacturers. Nor is it just bullets and weapons parts that India is exporting today — complete missiles are in demand, too.

In 2022, the Philippines bought three batteries of the BrahMos missiles from India. Since then, Vietnam and Indonesia have signed deals with India for the purchase of these missiles. And India has submitted a proposal to the United Arab Emirates offering to supply the Gulf country these missiles, too.

Is the latest move a step towards building a military-industrial complex?

That appears to be the intention.

While Tuesday’s announcement marks the first time that India’s state-run research and manufacturing facilities will transfer missile technology to the private sector, the government earlier this year shortlisted private firms to manufacture the country’s next-generation fighter jets.

Tata Advanced Systems, a subsidiary of Tata Sons, and Bharat Forge are among companies to be shortlisted, and are emerging as major makers of artillery systems, ammunition and aerospace systems. India has its homegrown jets, but imports the most cutting-edge planes in its arsenal, including the Rafale fighters from France. The Indian Air Force also relies heavily on Soviet-era jets.

Still, while India “wants to build a wider defence industrial base”, said Ramanathan, “it is very far from developing the sort of military-industrial complex that [former US President Dwight] Eisenhower worried about. Power in India still resides overwhelmingly with the government.”

What about India’s military imports?

Despite the surge in domestic manufacturing and exports of specific weapons systems and parts, India on the whole remains a major military importer.

India was the world’s second-largest importer of weapons between 2021 and 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Russia was its biggest source, accounting for 40 percent of India’s imported weapons.

Are there risks in transferring sensitive technology to the private sector?

As the US and Israel bombed Iran in March this year, a group of Iranian hackers claimed it broke into the servers of major US defence manufacturer Lockheed Martin, stealing blueprints of components used in the F-35 fighter jets.

The alleged data breach exposed the risks of private companies — which often have lower security standards and oversight than top-secret government laboratories — holding sensitive information.

But Ramanathan pointed out that in India’s case, “the companies that are most likely to get the missile contracts are all old hands”.

“They’ve been involved in the defence sector in some capacity for decades, and they have experience in dealing with confidentiality and secrecy,” he said.

The Indian government, on its part, also “doesn’t want the technology or its missile secrets to go to its adversaries, and it also wants to abide by its commitments to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which gives India several advantages,” he said, referring to one of the world’s major export-control regimes.

“So India has good reasons, in its own self-interest, to ensure that missile technology doesn’t leak.”

India’s Supreme Court has ordered an inquiry into police conduct during last month’s “cockroach” protests.

Police have rejected an Amnesty International report accusing them of brutality.

With more protests planned, how big a problem has the youth-led movement become for the government?

Presenter: Cyril Vanier

Guests:

Sravasti Dasgupta – senior political correspondent at The Wire in New Delhi

Shaina NC – national spokesperson for Shiv Sena, a political party in India aligned with the governing Bharatiya Janata Party

Uday Chandra – professor of comparative politics and international relations at Ashoka University

Police used water cannons and batons as a few thousand protesters broke through security barricades in Bihar’s capital.

Indian students and unemployed youth have clashed with police as they marched towards the residence of the chief minister of the eastern state of Bihar, ruled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s party, demanding access to jobs and transparency in recruitment exams.

The government forces in Bihar used water cannons and lathis – the Indian version of batons – as a few thousand protesters broke through security barricades in the state capital Patna, videos seen by Al Jazeera showed on Tuesday.

The demonstrations came a month after massive Gen Z protests in New Delhi pushed for the ouster of India’s education minister over alleged irregularities in conducting key competitive examinations.

The July 25 resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan also marked a significant political defeat for PM Modi, who has tried to maintain a strongman image, while India has continued to slide in multiple democratic indices under his rule since 2014.

Police in Bihar, home to about 130 million people, detained at least 25 protesters in Patna and released them later, according to the Indian Express newspaper.

Local police accused some protesters of attacking security personnel.

“Police will identify those involved in stone pelting at police and will take action against them,” Patna Police Superintendent Kartikeya K Sharma told reporters on Tuesday.

The protests began last week with unemployed youth demanding jobs, but they later expanded to include calls for education reform.

Bihar Chief Minister Samrat Choudhary said his office was “listening to every student’s voice”.

A delegation of student representatives met Bihar’s top bureaucrat, Pratyaya Amrit, after the protests. Amrit then told reporters that the discussion “was positive, and we were assured of a favourable response within a couple of days”.

The tight employment market in India makes government jobs, which offer long-term stability, a major draw for millions.

Since the massive youth-led protests organised by the online Cockroach Janta Party in New Delhi, there have been similar demonstrations in other states challenging both the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and opposition parties.

In southern Karnataka, members of a BJP-linked student body staged a protest near the state chief minister’s residence on Tuesday over alleged irregularities in recruitment for government jobs.

Bihar’s regional Education Minister Mithilesh Tiwari said the government had addressed students’ demands, without giving more details, and added that the door for dialogue remained “wide open”.

In New Delhi, the Cockroach movement has also announced a march next month to protest against what it says is the Modi government’s failure to fulfil several promises of change, including the withdrawal of police cases against protesters.

New Delhi, India – An investigation by human rights group Amnesty International has confirmed that Indian government forces used lethal weapons, including pellet-firing shotguns, grenades, batons and electric shock devices against demonstrators in Gen Z protests that rocked the national capital last month.

On July 20, thousands of protesters had all but shut down New Delhi, blocking off Parliament Street, demanding the resignation of then-Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan following a string of examination scandals involving the leaking of national exam papers and other irregularities.

More than 100 students were injured in the crackdown by police and paramilitary forces that day. Indian newspapers obtained hospital records that showed that doctors had treated pellet wounds in several cases.

India’s opposition, led by Congress party leader Rahul Gandhi, has since called on Home Minister Amit Shah, seen as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s confidant, to answer questions about the alleged police brutality and has joined protesters in calling for his resignation.

But despite mounting evidence and growing political criticism, the Modi government repeatedly insisted that security forces had been measured in their response to the protests and denied using excessive force.

Now, an Amnesty investigation has found the use of tactics that Indian law enforcement rulebooks themselves warn against using in all but exceptional circumstances.

What happened on July 20 in New Delhi?

In July, the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a satirical, youth-led movement which gathered momentum in response to the national examinations scandal, called on its supporters to march on the Indian Parliament after a monthlong sit-in failed to oust the education minister.

Two days before the march, the police forcibly removed renowned activist Sonam Wangchuk, who had been taking part in a hunger strike. That move galvanised public anger, bringing out more protesters in New Delhi.

On the morning of the march day, the police used tear gas as protesters swelled, then attacked them with electric shock batons, as well as shooting at them with pellet guns, Amnesty International’s Evidence Lab has verified from video and photographic evidence alongside witness testimony.

Amnesty also found that government forces had put up barricades and enforced a communications blackout.

“The weapons were deployed in a manner that breached international law and standards and domestic policing guidelines,” Amnesty said in a statement on Monday.

The rights group’s report also noted that the Delhi Police had publicly denied any disproportionate use of force, specifically pellet guns. The police also repeated this before India’s top court during a hearing about the alleged use of excessive force.

Amnesty says the evidence it has gathered “directly contradicts [the police’s] account”.

Four days after the July 20 march, as protests spread across the country, police in Bihar state’s Siwan town opened fire on protesters, injuring at least three youths.

Did government forces fire pellets at protesters?

Following the July 20 protest, several videos and photos emerged of protesters with injuries consistent with pellet wounds, which were reflected in their medical records as well.

The Evidence Lab verified two videos showing a paramilitary Rapid Action Force officer firing a shotgun into the crowd at the intersection of Connaught Place and Parliament Street in New Delhi, where protesters had gathered.

At least two protesters had wounds consistent with those caused by birdshot, a hunting round that fires a large number of small metal pellets, the group noted.

“The doctors confirmed that they were pellet injuries. Thankfully, my bones have been saved, but my body has been scarred badly,” one protester told Amnesty.

Amnesty said birdshot ammunition has not been developed for law enforcement purposes due to the widespread dispersion of the metal pellets, which “is inherently inaccurate and presents a high risk of serious injuries to the targeted person and even bystanders”.

Amnesty also said the police did not issue a public warning before firing pellet guns, as recommended by the Indian government’s Bureau for Police Research and Development.

Police and security forces have used metal pellets for more than a decade in Indian-administered Kashmir, leading to the first mass blinding during a 2016 civilian uprising.

Posting on X, Delhi Police called the reports of pellet injuries during the latest protests “fake news”, “completely false and misleading” and warned that “appropriate legal action” would be taken against anyone “spreading rumours”.

A subsequent internal inquiry by India’s paramilitary forces, however, reportedly found that personnel had fired at least seven rounds of ammunition containing metal pellets.

“Instead of facilitating the right to protest, Indian authorities suppressed it first with a communication blackout, barricades and transport disruption. They then attempted to crush it with unnecessary or excessive use of force against peaceful protesters, including children,” said Aakar Patel, chair of the board, Amnesty International India.

“This heavy-handed response was state-sanctioned violence masked as crowd control. The continued impunity after a month is a testament to that,” Patel said.

Did police use tear gas grenades and batons?

Government forces did use tear gas grenades to disperse the crowd at several places in New Delhi, as seen by Al Jazeera and verified by Amnesty, not just on July 20 to prevent CHP supporters’ march to Parliament.

“Tear gas grenades releasing an excessive amount of explosive energy are extremely dangerous and should be prohibited for use in public assemblies,” Amnesty said, referring to videos of tear gas shells exploding near students.

The group also noted that witnesses observed that “tear gas grenades were launched directly at protesters instead of at an angled trajectory above the head of protesters, at odds with UN Guidance on the use of Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement”.

Amnesty has also verified claims that the police used lathis, the Indian version of batons, to beat protesters.

The UN special rapporteur on torture considers lathis to be inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading as “they deliver a greater level [of] kinetic force than conventional batons, causing excessive pain and increasing the risk of serious injury” and has called for them to be prohibited, a position that Amnesty supports.

The group also found men in civilian clothing beating protesters “while uniformed officers, who escorted them toward the crowd, stand beside them and make no attempt to intervene”, as visible in videos seen by Al Jazeera. Several officials were not wearing their name tags or badge numbers, as required.

What has been the reaction to the use of excessive force?

A day after the crackdown in New Delhi, CJP founder Abhijeet Dipke told the crowd, “Every police person who attacked you would be identified and dragged to the courts”.

The group also launched a platform for protesters to upload videos and photos from the crackdown.

The opposition, led by the Congress’s Gandhi, pushed the home minister for a discussion on the issue in Parliament, an issue that plagued the monsoon session with Shah missing.

Gandhi argued that either Shah ordered the usage of lethal weapons, in which case “he is guilty”, or he was unaware of the situation, which makes him “incompetent” for the job.

Sahil Lochab, a 19-year-old who lost vision in one eye due to pellet injuries, said the police had been refusing to register his complaint. In response, Gandhi staged a seven-hour sit-in outside the office of the Delhi Police chief, insisting that a case be registered over the use of pellet guns on protesters, alongside Lochab.

After Gandhi’s pressure, the police relented. A student at the University of Delhi, Lochab received multiple pellet injuries on his chest, back, arms and face. Several pellets could not be taken out, he said in his complaint.

“My medical documents show that there are over 200 pellets in my body. Doctors have told me that the possibility of my eyesight coming back is less than 1 percent,” Lochab wrote in his complaint.