India

Youth group threatens return to mass protests, sets deadline for Gyanesh Kumar to quit due to reports of meddling with voter lists.

India’s ‘cockroach’ party youth movement has threatened to launch nationwide protests unless the country’s chief election officer does not resign by Saturday.

Founder of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), Abhijeet Dipke, announced on Friday that protests would begin in Mumbai on October 2 – if Gyanesh Kumar does not step down.

The CJP, a satirical outfit born on Instagram in May after India’s chief justice compared unemployed young Indians to “cockroaches” and “parasites”, has shaken the staunchly conservative government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

On Thursday, the group demanded that Kumar quit within 48 hours, following a newspaper report linking him to altered voter lists. Opposition parties say the lists have been manipulated to benefit Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

“If Gyanesh Kumar does not resign by tomorrow, CJP will begin its nationwide protest from Mumbai on 2 October, and take it to cities across India,” Dipke posted on X.

“This Gandhi Jayanti let’s pledge to save democracy,” he added, referring to the October 2 holiday marking independence leader Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday.

Report provokes political storm

On Wednesday, the Indian Express newspaper reported that two election commissioners had raised questions or voiced concern with Kumar at least 14 times in 10 months, mostly over the process of updating voter lists that began last year.

The main opposition Congress party announced protest marches on state election offices across India on Friday, demanding Kumar’s arrest, his removal and an independent review of decisions and voter-list changes made under him.

Opposition parties have long accused the commission of deleting the names of millions of voters without warning and adding new voters without verification to favour the BJP.

Election panel rejects claims

The Election Commission of India said that “differing views and observations are a normal part of deliberation in any institution” and that all its actions were lawful.

The BJP has defended the commission, accusing the opposition of a smear campaign because it keeps losing elections.

“Neither the Election Commission of India nor any constitutional body in India is under dictatorial rule,” BJP spokesperson Sambit Patra said on Wednesday.

CJP-led protests in July forced the resignation of Modi’s education minister over exam-paper leaks, one of the prime minister’s biggest political setbacks since coming to power in 2014.

Prime Minister Balendra Shah told the UN that world leaders must act on climate change.

Nepal’s Prime Minister Balendra Shah has appealed for action to combat the rising threat of climate change, calling the flood that devastated his country last month “a warning to the world”.

Shah made the comments during his address to the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Thursday night. He told the gathering that the August disaster “was not just a local tragedy”, asking them the question, “Have you really heard that warning?”

Political leaders “have been negligent to translate those warnings in action at the speed and scale that the vulnerable people require,” he said.

At least 1,453 people died when a torrent of mud, rock and water struck northern Nepal and the China-Tibet border on August 26, triggered by a glacial collapse.

According to Nepal’s National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority, 5,500 people were still missing and 13,795 had been rescued.

Researchers from the World Weather Attribution (WWA) group said in a report released last week that the disaster was not caused by a single extreme weather event, but rather a “compound crisis” shaped by long-term warming, glacier retreat, permafrost thaw and geological instability.

Shah said climate change was hurting people not responsible for the crisis but who “are paying a colossal price for it”.

He said Nepal contributed less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the heat-trapping gases behind climate change. About 99 percent of the country’s electricity comes from hydropower, and many workers were trapped in tunnels by the flooding.

“Our glaciers are retreating, our mountain slopes are becoming unstable, our rivers are becoming less predictable, and every major disaster threatens to erase years of development,” Shah said.

Shah urged the international community to help bear the cost of helping Nepal adapt to climate change.

He proposed to create a ‘Himalaya Climate Resilience Mechanism’ which would include Nepal and neighbours India and China, and would allow them to share satellite data and expertise, monitor glacial lakes and strengthen joint early warning systems.

Nepal has asked the UN’s loss and damage fund for $20m in aid, the maximum allowed, but a tiny fraction of what it needs. A preliminary assessment by the government has placed the cost of the disaster at $5bn.

The fund, established in 2022 in the aftermath of catastrophic floods in Pakistan, has yet to make even its first disbursement, and observers see Nepal as a key test of its credibility.

Earlier this week, the United States pledged an additional $31m in new flood recovery support.

Kovalam and Mumbai, India – When Sugar Shanti Banarse and Kamali Moorthy entered their first surfing event in 2022, the girls could scarcely have imagined they would end up representing India at the Asian Games within a few years.

Though the competition at the Covelong Classic in Kovalam, about an hour’s drive from Chennai in Tamil Nadu, southern India, featured just seven women among about 50 competitors, the possibility of winning was an afterthought. Their intention was to simply get a taste of competition.

At 12, Moorthy was the youngest of the lot, thrilled to surf alongside some of the senior girls. She failed to catch a single wave, but the experience stayed with her. She vowed to train harder and return stronger.

Finishing second was a decisive moment for Banarse, then aged 16. A recreational surfer until then, she loved the competitive aspect of the sport. In that moment, she knew she wanted to be a professional.

The duo has come a long way since then. Alongside their male counterparts Kishore Kumar and Sivaraj Babu, they will take on the best continental talent at September’s Asian Games in Japan, where surfing makes its debut and runs from Friday until Tuesday.

“We’ve been putting in the work over the last couple of years and made good progress. It’s our time to shine now,” Banarse told Al Jazeera.

Even though India has thousands of miles of coastline and breaks of different kinds, it’s taken a while for surfing to catch on.

India’s team coach Samai Reboul comes from the first generation of Indian surfers, who had few resources at their disposal. He would watch holidaymakers surf near his home in Auroville, Tamil Nadu in the late 1990s and had a go when they lent him a board. He was soon hooked.

“I grew up at a time when there were no coaches, no access to training material and no surfboards. [It was] really frustrating,” he told Al Jazeera.

Surf schools started cropping up along the coast over the next few years. This is how Banarse, now 20, got her first opportunity back home in Mandrem in Goa, when she decided to accompany a friend. Moorthy, now 16, was luckier – her uncle is a surf instructor who gave her the first lesson off the coast of Mahabalipuram in Tamil Nadu.

Kumar, 18, and Babu, 22, hail from families who fish for a living in Kovalam and Mahabalipuram, respectively. They started out by jumping into the sea on hot summer days, then body surfing, before finally hopping onto a board.

“A local school in Mahabalipuram would let us use surfboards in exchange for chores. There were a few boards and many boys, so a lot of fights once the patience ran thin,” Babu told Al Jazeera.

Though their lives revolved around the sea, it was difficult to get their families to understand what they were chasing.

A beating awaited Kumar when his family discovered he was sneaking away to surf – they considered it a waste of his time.

Babu was expected to help his father with his fishing, as his elder brother had done.

Moorthy’s mother, who runs a beach shack, knew what the harsh sun could do to her daughter’s complexion and asked her to stay out of the water.

“She was worried I would get [too dark], but at the back of her mind, she knew I was enjoying surfing and that it would reach a point of no return. And here I am today,” Moorthy says, laughing.

More importantly, the sport lacked structure. Though the Surfing Federation of India (SFI) was launched in 2011, there were no regular competitions, and participants had to fend for themselves when it came to travel and accommodation. Babu doubled up as an instructor and banked on community support to make money to compete. He once had to camp in a forest during an event in Mangaluru.

“My family didn’t quite understand the scope of what I was doing. But I had some imagination of what I wanted to achieve and persisted against their wishes,” Babu says.

Turning point

Circumstances improved after Arun Vasu took over as the president of the SFI in 2020. As chairman and managing director of the prominent Indian conglomerate TT Group, he secured money from the company’s Corporate Social Responsibility funds to support a handful of athletes. The older surfers were encouraged to pursue their coaching and judging licences to improve the level of domestic competitions.

Meanwhile, Vasu worked towards getting the SFI recognised by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. That moment arrived in March 2025, and changed the trajectory of the sport. Besides the injection of funds through the government-run Sports Authority of India, it brought stability for the SFI. Its members could now focus all their energy on growing the sport.

“The first generation of Indian surfers worked really hard without much support. They’ve brought us to this point where we are enjoying the benefits,” Moorthy says.

The goal was to prepare the athletes for the Asian Games. Reboul started monitoring the team and refining their technique during camps. A sports psychologist worked on the mental aspect of competition, while other staff focused on improving physical conditioning.

“Besides quality equipment, what really changed was access to cameras and software for video analysis. Even outside of camp, they could send across videos through which I could offer feedback,” Reboul said.

Over the last few years, the SFI has hosted prestigious competitions such as the World Surf League series and the Asian Surfing Championships, which have allowed Indians to rub shoulders with top international surfers. Trips across Asia have given them a feel for different conditions as well as elite competitions.

“It’s very different from a few years ago when we had limited opportunities to train systematically,” Banarse says.

The Olympic dream

Their performances have shown promise. Ramesh Budihal took bronze at the Asian Surfing Championships in August 2025, and a few months later, Kumar won silver at the Asian ProAm Surf Series.

“At the Asian Championships last year, [Kumar] beat Ikko Watanabe of Japan, a country that is up there [with the best]. So we know it’s possible [to compete],” Reboul says.

The focus is also on developing the next generation of surfers. SFI has joined the Asian Surf Ecosystem’s Grom Patrol – youth surf training camps and competitions – and runs three age group contests (under-12s, under-14s and under-16s), with the winners qualifying for the final in Bali.

Besides the talent that usually comes from fishing communities along the coast, it has attracted young surfers from cities such as Chennai, Bengaluru and Mumbai. And more importantly, girls who are ready to test the waters.

“We’ve struggled to find women surfers, so it was really encouraging to see 15-odd girls in every competition,” Vasu says. “Parents see a future, and these kids are hungry to learn. It makes us realise we are doing something right.”

Indian surfers still face a number of challenges. The monsoon season means surfers need to constantly shuttle between the two coasts or travel abroad to train year-round, which requires resources. There is also a need to create a deeper pool of skilled coaches to work with young athletes.

“More of the older surfers are getting into training. This year, we brought down an experienced coach, Ivan Villalba, to conduct a programme for them,” Reboul said.

“Good training and a competitive surf culture is what is required to put India on the map, rather than get a particular athlete to win.”

In the world of Asian surfing, India is still a young nation compared to the likes of Indonesia and Japan. Competing at the Asian Games will be valuable exposure for the current crop, especially ahead of the Los Angeles Olympics in 2028.

“A lot has happened for Indian surfing in the recent past. Some of the guys I’ll be competing against are my idols and I know I can put up a good fight for the podium,” Kumar says.

“The dream is to represent India at the Olympics.”

Islamabad, Pakistan – On September 16, a delegation from Powerus, a year-old United States drone company backed by two sons of President Donald Trump, was received by Pakistan’s military chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, at military headquarters in Rawalpindi.

A day later, the company announced it had received a “limited procurement order” from Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence for unmanned aerial systems. It also said it had signed a separate memorandum of understanding (MoU) with senior Pakistani defence officials.

Neither the value of the order nor the systems involved have been disclosed. But for analysts studying Pakistan’s venture in drone technology, even bigger concerns have arisen from information that has since emerged.

Less than three months earlier, the same company had given an Indian defence manufacturer the exclusive right to make and sell its drone interceptor technology in India. And one of the cofounders of Powerus is an Israeli military veteran. Pakistan does not recognise Israel and accuses it of carrying out a genocide in Gaza.

Analysts are questioning why a country that already builds its own drones and buys others from China and Turkiye would turn to a company that was founded only last year – and has links to Israel and sells drones to India too.

“Pakistan technically already makes or is capable of making each of the drones shown by Powerus,” Bilal Khan, founder of the Quwa Group, a Toronto-based defence news and market intelligence platform, told Al Jazeera. “It’s unclear where Powerus fits in the long term [from Pakistan’s perspective].”

What did Pakistan sign?

In its statement on the meeting, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the Pakistani military’s media wing, said the two sides discussed cooperation in defence procurement, production and capacity building.

The statement did not mention the MoU.

But Powerus told Al Jazeera which institutions were involved. “The MoU was signed with the Pakistan army. The related procurement order was placed by Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence,” a company spokesperson said.

In its own statement, Powerus said the memorandum was not a definitive agreement, created no purchase obligation and would be subject to US laws and government approvals.

“We are proud to support Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence, and the memorandum gives both sides a strategic framework to build upon,” Brett Velicovich, the company’s cofounder, said in the statement.

According to media reports, Velicovich has also said the company is exploring ways to build technology in Pakistan.

The ISPR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting did not respond to Al Jazeera’s requests for comment.

Founded in 2025 and based in Florida, Powerus is set to merge with Aureus Greenway Holdings, a Nasdaq-listed company that owns golf courses in the US state, in a deal expected to close in the final quarter of this year.

Donald Trump Jr and Eric Trump, President Trump’s oldest sons, are investors in Powerus through a vehicle called American Ventures, which is expected to hold a 9.9 percent beneficial stake in the combined company, according to US regulatory filings.

A spokesperson for Donald Trump Jr has told media outlets that he is a passive investor with no role in the company’s operations or contracts and had no prior knowledge of the Pakistan deals.

The White House has said there are no conflicts of interest.

The company makes about 3,000 interceptor drones a month, according to media reports, and last month won a US Air Force contract with a ceiling of up to $90m.

Asked how it addresses conflict of interest questions while pursuing government defence work in the US and abroad, Powerus said the Trump brothers played no part in its operations.

“Trump’s sons are not advisers to Powerus and have no involvement in how the company runs its business or structures its defence relationships, domestically or internationally. They hold no corporate-governance role. Our government relationships are pursued on their own merits,” the company told Al Jazeera.

The India question

Powerus’s first deal in South Asia, however, was not in Pakistan.

It was in India, Pakistan’s archrival, with which Pakistan fought a brief but intense conflict in May last year, one in which drones were used by both sides.

In a June 30 filing to India’s stock exchanges, Paras Defence and Space Technologies said Powerus had granted it an exclusive licence to manufacture and sell its Guardian-1 interceptor technology in India.

Mansoor Ahmed, an honorary lecturer at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, said Washington has long armed rival states.

“The US has previously sold F-16s to Greece and Turkiye and Egypt and Israel and is now selling F-35s to Saudi Arabia, which Israel already operates,” he told Al Jazeera.

A former Pakistani government defence analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity said Pakistani planners had probably known about the Indian deal.

“Pakistan’s defence planners were likely aware of Powerus’s engagement with India,” he told Al Jazeera.

This isn’t the first time that Pakistan and India have ended up buying military equipment from the same company, the defence analyst pointed out. He cited the build-up to the conflict over the Siachen Glacier, where India launched Operation Meghdoot in April 1984 to take control of the heights.

“In 1983, Pakistan ordered high-altitude warfare gear from a London supplier, unaware that the same firm also provided gear to the Indian army, and subsequently, India learnt of it and planned Operation Meghdoot in 1984,” he said.

The analyst said the burden now lies with the company.

“In the present case, the challenge is more for Powerus than Pakistan or India as Powerus’s management must ensure it can manage and meet the requirements of two adversaries without jeopardising either side’s operational security.”

A retired Pakistan air force air marshal who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak publicly said the arrangement carries risks for Pakistan.

“Two adversary countries procuring from the same source has its pitfalls, especially when one of the adversaries has taken the lead as well as has a larger financial capacity,” he told Al Jazeera.

An Israeli link

The company’s leadership also has links to Israel, a country Pakistan does not recognise.

Powerus’s website described one of its cofounders, Ziv Marom, as a veteran of the Israeli military and said he founded Kaizen Aerospace, now a Powerus subsidiary.

Another senior executive, Justin Gans, the company’s vice president for mergers and acquisitions and a former member of the US Navy SEAL special forces, served as a vice president at Elbit Systems of America, the US arm of the Israeli defence company Elbit Systems, from 2018 to 2019.

A retired three-star army Pakistani general who served in senior roles before retiring in 2019 and requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject said such a background would normally draw attention during vetting.

“So under normal circumstances, a cofounder’s service in the Israeli military would be flagged as a sensitivity marker, even if the company itself is American,” he told Al Jazeera.

“In other words, for a serious acquisition, this background would be scrutinised carefully. For a political MoU, it may not have been a decisive factor.”

Quwa’s Khan, however, said Pakistan has long accepted Israeli components inside US or European systems.

“We can see that, generally, as long as there’s a country in the middle, Pakistan does not have qualms being in close proximity to Israel,” he said. “However, the two sides very, very rarely talk to each other.”

What drone technology does Pakistan already have?

Beyond questions over who else Powerus works with, analysts said the more fundamental issue is what Pakistan actually needs from the company.

Pakistan’s air force has publicly displayed Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones, Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones and the domestically developed Shahpar-II.

China supplied 80 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports from 2021 to 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

This month, the Pakistan air force revealed in a video that it had incorporated into its forces China’s HQ-17AE air defence missile system and Turkiye’s Korkut anti-aircraft gun and Sahin counterdrone system, all built to take on drones and other low-flying threats.

Khan said the state-owned Heavy Industries Taxila was also working with private firms to develop interceptor drones.

“So as it stands, Pakistan is following all the right best practices to build its C-UAS posture,” he said, referring to counterdrone systems.

“For Pakistan, the challenge isn’t whether it can get the designs but whether it can produce or induct these in large enough numbers fast enough.”

An official at a private drone manufacturer in Rawalpindi who requested anonymity because he is not authorised to speak to the media said Pakistan’s drone market has grown well beyond state-run firms.

Dozens of private companies and more than half a dozen state-owned enterprises now make drones besides the army’s own production facilities, he said. According to him, Powerus would have to compete with all of them on the quality of its products.

The retired general offered a different reading of why Pakistan might be interested in a tie-up with a US firm.

“The gap is not drone manufacturing. It is electronics, integration and systems-level capability, which is where American firms traditionally dominate,” he said. “How far this particular company can help in this regard is a million-dollar question.”

Powerus’s Guardian interceptors are small, low-cost drones designed to knock down incoming drones. They are a weapon widely used by both sides in the war in Ukraine.

Hammad Waleed, a research associate at the Islamabad-based Strategic Vision Institute, said such systems fill a cost gap that conventional air defences cannot.

“Traditional air defences use costly missiles against incoming cheaper drones,” he told Al Jazeera. “Interceptor drones are way cheaper and easier to operate than traditional air defences.”

Capability or signalling?

The retired Pakistani general, who has experience with defence production, said a supplier of this kind would normally face financial, technical and security checks as well as a review of its track record.

“A company less than a year old, not yet listed and without a delivery record would not usually clear these checks for a strategic defence partnership,” he said.

“Such firms are typically considered too immature unless the MoU is political signalling rather than a procurement decision.”

Khan agreed that the process has been unusual.

“Yes, the way this deal came about is not generally in line with how the procurement heads of the tri-services typically operate,” he said, referring to the three branches of Pakistan’s military.

The Powerus agreements were made as Munir has built close ties with President Trump, who has called him “my favourite field marshal” and praised him on several occasions during the past 15 months.

In September last year, weeks after Pakistan signed a $500m critical minerals agreement with a US company, Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met President Trump at the White House, where the Pakistani leaders presented him with samples of Pakistani minerals.

In January, Pakistan also signed an MoU with an affiliate of World Liberty Financial, the Trump family’s main cryptocurrency business.

Khan said Pakistan’s security establishment needs to ask what it is getting in return for that closeness.

“There was a time when such gains were measured in F-16s and the billions in US financial assistance, yet today, we are seeing more photo ops and supposed pacts that obligate the armed forces, but are they helping the armed forces as a fighting force?”

He also offered what he called a “less cynical take”.

Pakistan has a growing number of drone start-ups that lack the capital to build production facilities, he said, and ties with Powerus could draw US investment into them.

“So there is an argument that building rapport with Powerus and its backers can lead to that capital,” Khan said.

Ahmed said Pakistan is looking beyond a single purchase.

“Pakistan’s primary interest appears to be the acquisition of state-of-the-art drone technologies that also allow for local production and indigenisation,” he said.

What about China and Turkiye?

The retired Pakistani general said bringing in a foreign private company could overlap with Pakistan’s existing Chinese and Turkish partnerships.

“It has the potential of being seen by Turkiye and China as Pakistan hedging politically,” he said.

Khan, however, disagreed.

“There’d be no issue with the Turks as they work with US companies all the time and the drones on offer by Powerus don’t overlap with the ones NASTP is designing with Turkiye,” he said, referring to Pakistan’s National Aerospace Science and Technology Park.

He added that any Powerus designs built cheaply in Pakistan would still rely on Chinese parts.

“With the Chinese, it’d be less of an issue because, ultimately, the only way to make these Powerus designs at a low enough cost for the Pakistani armed forces to induct is to literally import the upstream subassemblies from China.”

Waleed said the deal would not dent Pakistan’s defence ties with Beijing and Ankara.

“Pakistan is prioritising China and Turkiye for the sophisticated and modern combat systems in the drone and counterdrone domain. That relationship is not only unaffected and is going upwards in trajectory,” he said.

For now, Khan said, the real test of the Powerus deal would be what follows it.

“I would not pass judgement on the Powerus deal yet, but we can track whether it’s serious by seeing if the MoD [Ministry of Defence] signs similar deals with other foreign and local vendors in the coming months,” he said.

“Basically, will we see a consistent pattern moving forward, or will this be a one-off?”

Sri Lanka were bowled out for 69 runs, 10 less than Mandhana’s belligerent match-winning innings as India retained gold.

Smriti Mandhana’s whirlwind innings of 79 runs helped India crush Sri Lanka by 147 runs and win a second consecutive women’s cricket gold at the Asian Games.

India smashed 216-3 off their 20 overs, the highest women’s total in Asian Games history, with 18 fours and 13 sixes in the final on Tuesday.

Richa Ghosh and Bharti Fulmali plundered 25 off the final over from the hapless Mithali Ayodhya, who did not help her cause by conceding eight wides.

Sri Lanka were never in the hunt, and captain Chamari Athapaththu’s 29 was their only innings of note as they were skittled for 69 in 15.4 overs and had to settle for silver.

Opening batter Mandhana hit seven sixes and five fours in a 45-ball knock that sent the ball to all parts of the Korogi Athletic Park ground in Nagoya.

After India captain Harmanpreet Kaur won the toss and opted to bat, Shafali Verma, who made an unbeaten century in the semifinal, and Mandhana put on a blistering opening partnership.

The pair had raced to 99 in the 10th over when Verma had a rush of blood, playing a needless reverse sweep which she top-edged to Kawya Kavindi at point to fall for 48 off 29 balls.

Mandhana, the greatest run-scorer in women’s T20 cricket history, had reached her fifty earlier in the over and sailed on in style, clubbing anything loose to the boundary.

Harmanpreet joined her, and the pair took the score to 141 before the captain holed out to long-off for 19.

Mandhana, looking to accelerate further in the latter overs, skied an attempted six and was out in the 17th over with the score on 163.

Ghosh clattered 49 off 22 balls with three sixes and six fours to take India past 200 in the final over.

Earlier, some late-order hitting by Pakistan captain Fatima Sana set up a 31-run win over Bangladesh in the bronze medal match.

Sana came in with her side rocking at 67-5 in the 12th over but plundered 45 off 30 balls, including three fours and three sixes, and was out off the last ball of the 20 overs after seeing Pakistan to 145-8.

Her 67-run partnership with Aliya Riaz (25) for the sixth wicket proved the turning point, and Bangladesh could only muster 114-7 in reply.

India defeat Bangladesh by 114 runs to book women’s cricket final against Sri Lanka, who beat Pakistan by eight wickets.

Smriti Mandhana has become the highest run-scorer in women’s T20 international cricket, guiding India to a crushing win over Bangladesh in an Asian Games semifinal in Japan.

The recently crowned Asian champions defeated Bangladesh by 114 runs on Sunday as Mandhana’s fellow opener Shafali Verma hit her maiden T20 hundred at the Korogi Athletic Park ground in Nagoya.

Mandhana scored 37 off 19 balls with five fours and two sixes in her side’s 195-4 in 20 overs and, in the process, went past New Zealand all-rounder Suzie Bates’s 4,758 runs at the top of the all-time list to stand on 4,788 runs from 171 innings.

Earlier this month, Mandhana reached the top of overall run-scoring charts in women’s international cricket after smashing a record-breaking 124 off 64 balls in the Women’s Asia Cup in Dubai.

Mandhana overtook former India captain Mithali Raj, who had been the top international scorer with 10,868 international runs, during her match-winning innings against Hong Kong on Thursday.

Verma was the star on the day for India in the Asian Games semifinal, scoring 100 not out off 49 balls with three fours and nine sixes. She reached her hundred off the final ball of the 20-over innings and was clearly emotional as she took off her helmet and raised her bat in celebration towards her applauding teammates on the boundary.

India then restricted Bangladesh to 81 in 15.4 overs.

The 50-over world champions will meet Sri Lanka on Tuesday in the gold medal match, which will be a replay of the Asia Cup final from last Sunday, when India won a record-extending eighth title.

Sri Lanka advanced to the final after their captain Chamari Athapaththu led them to an easy eight-wicket win over Pakistan with more than two overs to spare.

The island nation hunted down the 178-run target with 13 balls to spare as Athapaththu led the scoring with 83 not out.

Earlier, Pakistan were asked to bat first and, with half-centuries from Ayesha Zafar and Shawaal Zulfiqar, they posted a total of 177-4 in 20 overs.

Zafar, who hit the joint third-fastest fifty for Pakistan in WT20Is off 27 balls, shared a record stand of 115 with Zulfiqar, which is the second-highest in the format for Pakistan and the highest for the third wicket.

Pakistan were able to score 27 runs off the last three overs as their all-rounder captain Fatima Sana hit two fours and one six in her 12-ball 20.

In reply, Sana broke Sri Lanka’s 36-run opening stand in the fifth over, bowling out Imesha Dulani for 27. Athapaththu, who hit seven fours and six sixes in her 50-ball knock, joined forces with Hasini Perera (42) to form a match-winning 95-run partnership off 56 balls.

Nashra Sundhu provided Pakistan the breakthrough in the 14th over, with Sri Lanka requiring another 47 runs off the last six overs, but Athapaththu’s quickfire stand of 47 off 23 balls with Harshitha Samrawickrama (17 not out) took their team over the line with 13 balls to spare.

Pakistan will play Bangladesh for the bronze medal, also on Tuesday.

New Delhi, India – On the morning of August 26, the Himalayan landscape above Nepal’s Rasuwa district changed in minutes.

A mass of ice and rock broke loose high in the mountains and sent a violent surge of water, mud and debris down the Lhende Khola River. The torrent travelled through valleys, swept away settlements and infrastructure and eventually reached the Nepal-China border.

What followed was not simply a flood.

It was a chain reaction.

By mid-September, more than 1,400 people had been reported dead and at least 6,000 remained missing in Nepal and across the border in Tibet. Twelve hydropower plants were destroyed, while roads, bridges and homes were buried or washed away.

The scale of the destruction has left scientists and disaster managers confronting a difficult question: How do you warn communities about a disaster whose trigger may occur high above them, in terrain that is difficult to monitor and where there may be only minutes to react?

Basanta Raj Adhikari, director of the Centre for Disaster Studies at Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu, described the event to Al Jazeera as unprecedented in size, affected area and mechanism. His estimate suggested that the energy involved was greater than that released by the Hiroshima atomic bomb, a comparison intended to illustrate the scale of the physical forces involved rather than suggest that the event was equivalent to a nuclear explosion.

For scientists who study the Himalayas, the disaster demonstrated how quickly an event originating in a remote, high-altitude environment can become a regional catastrophe.

And Nepal is not alone.

The warning problem

A warming climate is altering glaciers, snow cover, permafrost and high-altitude lakes. At the same time, roads, hydropower projects, tourist facilities and settlements have pushed deeper into mountain valleys.

That combination is creating a new risk landscape in which one hazard can trigger another.

An avalanche can block a river. A blocked river can form a temporary lake. A sudden release can become a debris flow. That debris can destroy a road or bridge, block another river and create another flood downstream.

The August disaster in Nepal showed how quickly such a sequence can unfold. It also exposed a weakness in the way early-warning systems are often designed.

Many systems are built around a particular hazard: rainfall, river level or glacial lake outburst flood. But the Himalayas do not always respect those categories.

In July, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, or ICIMOD, warned that a below-normal monsoon should not be interpreted as a safer one.

“The biggest misunderstanding is that less seasonal rainfall means lower flood risk,” said Saswata Sanyal, a disaster risk reduction specialist at ICIMOD.

“A drier monsoon can still be a dangerous monsoon,” he added, warning that seasonal averages cannot capture the cloudbursts capable of producing catastrophic flooding in mountain valleys.

The Nepal disaster went a step further.

The immediate trigger was not simply heavy rainfall.

Scientists have been examining an ice-rock avalanche and other possible processes that temporarily obstructed the river system before releasing a destructive surge. ICIMOD has described the event as an ice avalanche rather than a conventional glacial lake outburst flood, while other scientists have examined the role of local seismic activity and other high-altitude processes.

That distinction matters.

A warning system waiting for rainfall or a rising river may not provide enough time when the real trigger happens several kilometres upstream and above the line of sight of the communities below.

Kashmir’s warning signs

Thousands of kilometres away, scientists studying Kashmir’s Himalayas are seeing another part of the same problem.

A study published in the Journal of Glaciology this year mapped 155 glacial lakes above 2,500 metres (8,200ft) across the Himalayas in Indian-administered Kashmir.

The researchers found that the area of ice-contact proglacial lakes – bodies of water that form directly against the margin of a melting glacier, trapped by moraine ridges, bedrock basins, or ice dams – had increased by 26 percent between 1992 and 2024.

Five lakes were classified as having very high susceptibility to glacial lake outburst floods.

An outburst from those lakes, the researchers found, could threaten several thousand buildings, 15 major bridges, roads and a hydropower project.

More significantly, the study warned that hazards could occur in chains, with an upstream lake outburst potentially triggering secondary events downstream.

For Irfan Rashid, a glaciologist and associate professor at the University of Kashmir who co-authored the study, the implications extend beyond individual lakes.

Rashid recently told Al Jazeera that without action, the melting, thinning, and destabilisation of glaciers, seasonal snow cover, and permafrost along the Hindu Kush-Himalayas system would increase, and water shortages could become a major problem across the Upper Indus, Ganga and Brahmaputra basins by the end of the century.

That is why the Nepal disaster resonates in Kashmir.

The landscapes are different, the rivers are different and the individual hazards may differ. But the underlying problem is increasingly similar: Communities living downstream of a rapidly changing high-altitude environment may have little time to respond when something breaks loose above them.

The challenge is particularly acute in places where roads, bridges and hydropower projects occupy narrow valleys.

Once a mountain river begins carrying enormous quantities of rock, ice and mud, infrastructure designed for conventional floods can quickly become irrelevant.

Pakistan has already begun building a warning network

The same concern runs across the western Himalayas and Karakoram ranges.

The Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan-administered Kashmir contains hundreds of glaciers and glacial lakes, while communities and infrastructure sit along valleys exposed to sudden floods and landslides.

Pakistan has responded by expanding early-warning infrastructure.

Under a United Nations-supported programme, early-warning systems, evacuation shelters, disaster-management centres and other protective measures have been established in vulnerable valleys.

But technology alone cannot solve the problem. A sensor can detect a change. Someone still has to receive the message. Someone has to understand what it means. And people downstream have to have a route to safety.

That last part is often the weakest link. A siren is useful only if the people hearing it know where to go. An automatic warning is useful only if it arrives before the flood. A satellite image is useful only if the information can be converted into a decision quickly enough to save lives.

This is why disaster scientists increasingly talk about anticipatory action rather than simply disaster response.

“The era of preparing for a single, predictable hazard is over,” Sanyal said earlier this year. “Anticipatory action and early warning must now be the foundation.”

The infrastructure trap

The Himalayas are also becoming more heavily engineered.

Hydropower is central to Nepal’s economy. Roads are being expanded. Border crossings are growing in importance. Tourism is pushing deeper into remote valleys.

The benefits are obvious. So are the risks.

The August disaster struck an area where hydropower infrastructure was concentrated along the river corridor. At least 900 workers were believed to have been inside tunnels and other facilities in the aftermath, making rescue operations extraordinarily difficult. Two workers were eventually pulled alive from a hydropower tunnel nine days after the disaster.

The question is no longer simply whether infrastructure can withstand a flood. It is whether planners have adequately considered what happens when a flood is carrying an enormous mass of rock and ice, when a river changes course, or when one mountain hazard triggers another.

For decades, engineering risk assessments have often relied on historical records. But history becomes a less reliable guide when the physical conditions producing disasters are changing.

A river that flooded once every several decades may no longer behave according to the same pattern. A glacier that appeared stable from satellite imagery may sit beneath an increasingly unstable slope. A lake that was considered remote may suddenly become a threat to a road, village or power plant hundreds of metres below.

The border problem

There is another complication that no satellite can solve on its own.

Borders.

The Himalayas are divided among countries with different political systems, security concerns and approaches to sharing information. But rivers do not stop at international boundaries. Neither do floods.

The August disaster reached the Nepal-China border and damaged the Gyirong crossing, an important trade and pilgrimage route. The disaster also raised questions about how quickly information about hazards in high mountain areas can move between countries.

This is where regional cooperation becomes more than a diplomatic slogan, experts say. A sensor positioned in one country can provide warning to people in another. A satellite image collected over one mountain range can reveal a developing hazard that threatens a valley downstream. A river gauge can provide critical information before floodwaters reach a settlement.

The technical capability already exists in many cases. The missing piece is often the architecture connecting it.

A 2026 assessment of Himalayan disaster risks has argued for stronger monitoring, early-warning systems and regional coordination because hazards are increasingly interconnected.

The idea is simple: Information about a mountain hazard should not stop at the same line where a political boundary begins.

From Nepal to Sikkim to Kashmir

The August disaster in Nepal isn’t a tragedy belonging to one country, point out experts.

The Kashmir Himalayas study has already identified lakes capable of producing destructive outburst floods and has warned of cascading processes.

Northeast India’s Sikkim provides another example.

After the 2023 South Lhonak glacial lake outburst flood killed dozens and damaged major infrastructure, India expanded monitoring and mitigation efforts.

Today, 40 high-risk glacial lakes have been identified in Sikkim, including 16 placed in the highest-risk category, with authorities working on drainage, flood-retention and other protective measures.

But the lesson from each disaster is broadly the same: Waiting for a disaster to prove the risk is the most expensive form of preparedness.

The Third Pole test

The Himalayas are sometimes called the Third Pole because they contain one of the world’s largest concentrations of snow and ice outside the Arctic and Antarctic.

Major Asian rivers depend on water originating in these mountains. Hundreds of millions of people live downstream.

That makes the changing Himalayas not only an environmental issue but a security, infrastructure and humanitarian one.

The August disaster demonstrated the most frightening version of that future. A mountain can collapse without warning. A river can become a weapon of debris. A hydropower tunnel can become a trap. A border crossing can disappear in minutes. And by the time people downstream understand what is happening, the water may already be there.

It’s a future that a region stretching from northeast India, spanning Tibet, Nepal, Kashmir and Pakistan, can no longer ignore. Yet disaster management remains largely divided by national boundaries. That contradiction is becoming harder to navigate.

The next glacial collapse could begin in Kashmir. It could begin in Pakistan’s high mountains. It could begin in Sikkim, Nepal or Tibet.

Wherever it starts, the same question will follow the mountain downstream: Who knew, how early did they know, and did the warning reach the people in time?

For a region entering an era of increasingly complex mountain hazards, that may be the real measure of whether the Third Pole is prepared.

Vaibhav Sooryavanshi told to be patient after playing back up to Abhishek Sharma and Sanju Samson in Sri Lanka series.

India coach ‌Gautam Gambhir said Vaibhav Sooryavanshi will have to ⁠wait for his ⁠chance to break into the side after he left the 15-year-old prodigy on the sidelines of ⁠their three-match Twenty20 series sweep against Afghanistan.

Abhishek Sharma and Sanju Samson opened for India in the series, with ⁠Abhishek scoring the third-fastest century in T20 internationals in Thursday’s 127-run victory in New Delhi.

Sooryavanshi, who was the highest scorer in this year’s Indian Premier League, made his international debut against ‌England in July, but the top-order batter failed to make an impact as the hosts dominated India in the T20 series.

He scored two fifties against Zimbabwe in Harare later that month but has not played for India since.

“Whether you’re a 15-year-old or a 30-year-old, when ⁠you have to wait for your ⁠opportunity, you have to wait for your opportunity,” Gambhir told reporters after the match.

“We know the kind of talent he has and what he ⁠can do, but someone who has been performing for the last two to three ⁠years will always be ahead of ⁠someone who has just entered the team.”

Sooryavanshi will travel to Nagoya for India’s Asian Games campaign, with a one-off T20 against hosts Japan set ‌for Tuesday before the Asiad quarterfinal on September 28.

“Whenever he gets his run, he will get a longer run ‌as ‌well … We want competition and talent in the dressing room,” Gambhir added.

The family of a Scottish Sikh activist who has been locked up in India for almost nine years without conviction have said he has been granted bail.

Jagtar Singh Johal, from Dumbarton, was arrested in 2017 in connection with alleged terror offences.

He was arrested for his alleged role in a series of targeted killings of religious and political figures.

His family said they were still waiting for the details of what will happen next but are “relieved” by the Indian court’s decision.

The 39-year-old was acquitted last year in a case in which he was accused of financially supporting terror group the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), which has carried out attacks in the Punjab region.

But he still faces federal charges lodged by the Indian authorities.

Johal’s imprisonment was recognised by a UN panel as arbitrary detention in 2022 and he has claimed to have been tortured.

Indian authorities have previously denied the torture claim and have repeatedly maintained due process is being followed.

He was arrested in the Punjab region just weeks after his wedding in the country.

His supporters say he was targeted for blogging about alleged human rights abuses against the Sikh community in India and was coerced into signing a false confession to participation in the killings.

His brother Gurpreet Singh Johal has lobbied successive governments calling for his brother’s release.

An unprecedented surge in border crossings over the last decade reshaped America: Millions of people from more than 150 countries arrived, bringing the U.S. immigrant population to its highest levels.

Now, data obtained exclusively by the Associated Press paint a picture of who these migrants are, where they went and what happened after the border.

Some went to cities that have long been magnets for immigrants — New York, Miami — but increasingly, others found their way to smaller cities with less developed immigrant footholds. Blocks, neighborhoods and entire cities were remade in places like Elkhart, Ind., Knoxville, Tenn.,and Dodge City, Kan.

And while the vast majority of migrants traditionally were from Mexico, this surge included people from an astonishing number and diversity of countries: India, Ecuador, Ghana.

Via a Freedom of Information Act request, AP obtained federal records on the self-reported destinations of 4.5 million migrants released in the United States after crossing the Mexican border — both legally and illegally — between October 2018 and July 2025.

Migrants must provide U.S. Customs and Border Protection with a street address. AP obtained their destination ZIP codes, citizenship by country, ages, genders and the dates and border regions where they encountered authorities.

Some probably never arrived at the addresses they gave. Authorities lacked resources to check, though migrants must report truthfully to pursue their cases in court and get work permits. Some have moved elsewhere in the United States or left the country, voluntarily or involuntarily. But many have stayed put.

Data on their initial destinations after the southern border provides both a sweeping and an unusually granular look at how the immigration surge — one that peaked during President Biden’s administration and was a major reason voters returned his predecessor, Donald Trump, to the White House — is playing out today.

Here are some key takeaways from the data.

Cities drew migrants from several continents

The Border Patrol encountered migrants from 174 countries in one year alone, a sharp departure from earlier periods when they were nearly all Mexican and Central American. The growth of social media and new migration routes were key in bringing people from around the world. Cincinnati, for example, experienced a large number of arrivals from West Africa, Uzbekistan and India.

Some cities — ones that for generations have had robust international communities — were further diversified by the range of countries from which people arrived.

New York City’s Queens borough registered at least 25 nationalities with significant arrivals, including five countries that each sent more than 7,000 people: Ecuador, China, Colombia, Venezuela and India.

Philadelphia had 11 nationalities with at least 1,000 new arrivals, led by Brazil, Haiti and the Dominican Republic but also including Russia and Venezuela. The city’s metro area also received more than 1,000 migrants from Georgia.

Florida remained No. 1, but many people looked elsewhere

While Florida was the most popular state, Latin American immigrants increasingly looked elsewhere for more promising job prospects and a better quality of life. Many turned to places with small but established communities of immigrants from their homelands.

For Cubans, nine of the top 10 destination ZIP codes were in Florida, but people of the Caribbean nation also flocked to Louisville, Ky., Grand Island, Neb., and Odessa, Texas. Colombians went to the Denver suburb of Aurora. Paterson, N.J., was the top pick among Peruvians. Some Venezuelans headed to the growing suburbs south of Salt Lake City; others to pockets of Atlanta, Chicago and Denver.

More women and children came than men

Nearly 6 of every 10 migrants released at the border were women and children, a dramatic shift from a few years earlier when migrants were predominantly men.

The change is visible in many places and across nationalities, but some stand out. Tulsa, Okla., attracted Mexican women and children. Ecuadorian women and children went to Spring Valley, N.Y. Guatemalan women were drawn to Chattanooga, Tenn.

Those who came from China headed to L.A. and New York

Chinese migrants, who trekked by hundreds nightly in California’s mountainous border with Mexico, largely gravitated to two places: New York City, especially the Queens and Brooklyn boroughs, and a cluster of neighborhoods in the Los Angeles area.

Trump’s deportation machine hit some migrant magnets and overlooked others

Immigration arrests have hit some areas that ranked among the most popular destinations for migrants in recent years, including Miami and New York. Others that experienced a large migrant influx have gotten less attention from authorities, including Silicon Valley, Madison, Wis, and Stamford, Conn.

Jarrett, Kessler, Lodhi and Spagat write for the Associated Press.

Islamabad, Pakistan — More than 16 months after India and Pakistan fought a four-day air war, firing missiles and drones at each other, the South Asian neighbours came the closest since then to a military face-off — this time in the Arabian Sea.

Indian and Pakistani naval vessels collided on Tuesday, setting off tit-for-tat accusations. Pakistan’s government summoned India’s top diplomat in Islamabad on Wednesday, mirroring action New Delhi had taken hours earlier when it summoned Pakistan’s charge d’affaires and lodged a protest of its own over the incident.

The collision is the first direct military encounter between the nuclear-armed neighbours since their four-day conflict in May 2025, when Indian air strikes and Pakistani retaliation brought both countries closer to full-scale war than at any point in decades.

So far, details of what happened remain disputed. Neither government has released video, track data or an independent account – and each statement places the blame on the other’s vessel.

But analysts say it underscored the risks of unintended incidents in the seas that could potentially escalate into broader crises, when India and Pakistan have few military and diplomatic mechanisms left in place to defuse tensions.

Two accounts

According to Pakistan’s Foreign Office statement issued on Wednesday evening, the navy has been conducting its biennial SEASPARK-26 exercise inside its exclusive economic zone since September 1 .

A country’s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles (370km) from its coast. Its territorial waters are only 12 nautical miles (22km) from the coast, with the rest of the EEZ in international waters. While vessels from other countries can pass through a nation’s EEZ in international waters unencumbered, they cannot exploit the waters economically: that right belongs only to the country whose EEZ it is.

Pakistan said that an Indian vessel, identified as the guided-missile destroyer INS Kolkata, had “repeatedly” tried to enter the exercise area since September 7 .

On September 15 , it said, Kolkata made a “dangerous” change of course that brought it into contact with a Pakistani vessel identified in local media as PNS Hunain, an offshore patrol vessel.

“Pakistan strongly rejects this belligerent Indian action,” the Pakistani Foreign Office said, calling it a violation of a 1991 bilateral agreement requiring warships to stay at least three nautical miles (5.5km, 3.4 miles) apart in international waters.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs said the warship was on “routine surveillance” in international waters when a Pakistani vessel approached at high speed and manoeuvred unsafely.

Neither government has named the vessels in its own on-record statement, and India has not confirmed or denied the Kolkata identification.

The two navies last collided in June 2011, when Pakistani frigate PNS Babur brushed against Indian frigate INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden, while escorting a merchant vessel freed from Somali pirates.

Each side blamed the other then too. That row faded within weeks.

The risks

Retired Vice Admiral Ahmad Saeed of the Pakistan Navy said the pattern — two ships pressing close without a clear intent to collide — was familiar from Cold War-era “bumping” incidents between Soviet and US ships in the Black Sea.

But he argued that India and Pakistan are worse placed to manage similar encounters.

“There’s no bilateral Incidents at Sea agreement, the kind the US and USSR signed in 1972, and no navy-to-navy hotline,” Saeed told Al Jazeera. “Article 10 sets a distance, but it gives no manoeuvring rules and no procedure for investigating an incident afterwards. That gap is exactly why each side can just accuse the other.”

Article 10 of the 1991 confidence-building agreement between the two nations requires warships to stay at least three nautical miles (5.6km, 3.5 miles) apart in international waters.

Saeed said the greater risk was what might follow the collision: sharper tactics such as fire-control radar lock-ons or helicopter overflights and eventually “a contact with actual casualties.”

Muhammad Shareh Qazi, a Lahore-based security and maritime analyst, however, pointed to the same 1991 agreement, which he said requires 30 days’ written notice before a military exercise, as well as international collision regulations that apply to both countries as signatories to the UN maritime convention.

“If this collision really had the potential to escalate militarily, you’d have noticed by now,” Qazi said. “There’s a tool for that, called chaff, fired just above the bow or stern purely to signal you could escalate if needed. Nothing like that happened here.”

Both navies also have their own internal accountability channels, he added, with a captain found to have acted without authorisation facing a court martial process separate from any diplomatic protest.

On fishermen routinely detained for straying across the Sir Creek boundary, which is not demarcated between India and Pakistan further south, Qazi said the link to incidents further out at sea was indirect but real.

“Clear demarcation could help close those ambiguities over time, by reducing the ambiguity around where and how these interactions are expected to occur,” he added.

Saeed was more cautious about how contained an incident like this would remain.

“This hasn’t stayed quiet. Both governments went public with protests within a day of each other,” he said, adding that what made the moment riskier than 2011 was that “both publics are primed after last year’s conflict, which was not the case in 2011.”

Similar close-quarters confrontations have become more frequent between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

In the most recent flare-up, on July 24 , Philippine officials said a Chinese vessel came within about seven metres (23 feet) of a Philippine fisheries boat near Scarborough Shoal, the Philippine-claimed reef that China has controlled since 2012, and that Chinese coast guard ships fired water cannon at Philippine vessels.

Whether this week’s collision follows that pattern or fades like the 2011 incident depends less on the ships than on what comes next diplomatically, Qazi said.

“If, in the next 24 to 48 hours, an official statement suggests there was a genuine cause to manufacture an incident for the purpose of escalation, then yes, there may be a real possibility of this happening again,” he added.

The Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games get under way this weekend under the shadow of a housing crisis that has organisers scrambling to placate athletes and officials from participating nations.

The tournament has been mired in complaints over housing options for athletes travelling to Japan, after the host nation decided not to build a dedicated Games village for the 17,000 competitors and officials.

To cut costs this year, organisers are relying on a cruise ship, temporary wooden cabins and hotels, but this temporary accommodation has met with criticism in the days leading up to the continental competition.

On Monday, South Korean officials slammed beds in shipping container-style huts as the “worst-ever”, as the South Korean basketball chief said the beds were too short to stretch out in.

Here’s everything we know:

Why are the Asian Games facing an accommodation crisis?

The official housing committee said the issue arose because they expected 15,000 athletes and officials, but numbers increased as new sports were added.

This year’s Games will feature several newcomers, including mixed martial arts, padel and surfing, as well as virtual taekwondo and teqball, which ‌‌combines aspects of football and table tennis.

Ahead of the Games’ opening, chief organiser Hideaki Omura said efforts are being made to ensure athletes are comfortable.

“If there are different opinions, then we will respond to them appropriately,” Omura, who also serves as governor of Aichi prefecture, told the AFP news agency.

“At this point, while we are responding to individual opinions, we have been improving everything as issues arise, and we will continue to respond that way.”

He added that a committee of former athletes, including Olympians, gave a favourable assessment of the plans for the huts built this year.

“We explained everything to them and had them take a look around, and they said it looked functional and good,” he said.

Where will the Asian Games athletes stay?

Alternative housing options range from a cruise liner and wooden containers to hotel rooms.

On Tuesday, the Italian cruise ship, Costa Serena, which will host 4,000 athletes and officials, arrived in Nagoya.

The shipping container-style huts in the dock area of Japan’s biggest port will host 2,000 other athletes and officials.

On Thursday, Japan’s deputy Chef de Mission Hisashi Mizutori told a news conference that athletes have been going through entry procedures since the cruise ship village opened a day earlier.

“There have been cases where coaches, team officials and athletes have been assigned to the same room. There are also situations where room assignments were made purely based on the numbers, such as assigning five twin rooms for a group of five men and five women,” Mizutori said.

“While the numbers match on paper, practically it creates challenging situations such as men and women being assigned together, coaches being assigned with athletes, or trainers who need to accommodate a lot of medical equipment being assigned together.”

He added that the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) had also anticipated accommodation “challenges” and secured hotels in the city as a backup.

“We are currently working to coordinate and negotiate adjustments wherever possible. For cases where that proves too difficult, we are considering using the backup accommodations that Team Japan prepared in advance as alternatives.”

Why are participating nations and athletes complaining about the accommodation?

Jung Jae-yong, vice president of the Korea Basketball Association (KBA), slammed the cabins hosting the men’s basketball team.

“Athletes who are over two metres tall cannot even stretch their legs out on the beds. It’s unreasonable.”

Jung also accused the organisers of failing to respond to South Korea’s concerns about the housing options.

“The organisers have still not said anything,” he said, adding: “We are very concerned and discussing extensively with the Korean Sport and Olympic Committee what to do about this.”

Player Byeon Jun-hyeong, from the basketball team, posted a video on social media showing a leaking sink and a soaked floor in his hut.

“Please help us,” he posted.

Philippine Olympic Committee president Abraham Tolentino also said that while all his athletes had been given a room, “some officials, like coaches, were moved to different hotels and Airbnb”.

Why will cricketers get the best accommodation at the Asian Games?

Head of Japan’s cricket association, Naoki Alex Miyaji, said in early September that cricket would get better accommodation than other sports.

According to Miyaji, the cricket tournament is being run by the Asian Games organising committee in collaboration with the Asian Cricket Council.

He said that the two bodies had been discussing accommodation options “for a long time”.

“The participating teams in cricket are being offered hotel accommodation,” Miyaji said.

“Many other sports are being accommodated in much more limited facilities, such as a cruise ship or container hotels.”

What other issues have hit the Asian Games?

While the opening ceremony has yet to take place, several events such as basketball, football, cricket, hockey and modern pentathlon have already begun.

On Thursday, Tropical Storm Dujuan was located off Japan’s Pacific coast as of 03:00 GMT and heading northwest towards central Japan, where Nagoya is located.

Last week, torrential rains hit Nagoya and the surrounding areas, forcing schools to close and suspending train services. Several hundred athletes were also forced to leave their accommodation.

Kosei Inoue, Japan’s chef de mission for the Games and a senior executive board member of the JOC, said at a news conference on Thursday that some competitions have already experienced “delays or postponements, and there is also a possibility that a typhoon could approach on September 21”.

“Under these circumstances, we are holding thorough meetings within the JOC to ensure that we are fully prepared and capable of responding appropriately to these situations.”

New Delhi says it has ‘made clear’ its determination to ‘protect its trade and economic interests’.

India has warned the United States that new measures to levy tariffs over the purchase of Russian oil could impact ⁠bilateral ties, hours after the US Congress approved a bill that would give President Donald Trump new abilities to punish buyers of Russian oil.

The US House of Representatives on Wednesday passed a sweeping sanctions and tariff bill intended to increase economic pressure on Russia over its invasion of ⁠Ukraine.

The bill targets Russia’s energy and defence sectors, President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials, as well as Moscow’s so-called shadow fleet of tankers used to circumvent Western sanctions.

It also authorises President Donald Trump to impose stiff tariffs of up to 100 percent on countries, including India, to reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas, and⁠ extend sanctions on Iran.

The bill has been sent to Trump to sign into law.

India’s foreign ministry said on Thursday that it “remains firmly committed to ensuring energy security for its 1.4 billion people”.

The Indian foreign ministry said that it had noted the bill’s passage, adding that New Delhi had raised the issue with various US interlocutors in recent months, and had “very clearly articulated” the potential implications for the bilateral relationship and the international energy market.

“The Indian side has also made clear its determination to take all necessary measures to protect its trade and economic interests,” it said in a statement.

The government would work closely with trade and industry bodies to deal with the legislation’s implications, it added.

India, the world’s third-biggest oil importer, is among the biggest buyers of Russian oil, which is seen as helping Moscow replenish its budget since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and was hit with ⁠sweeping Western sanctions.

New Delhi has repeatedly sought to resist pressure to reduce its oil trade with Russia, saying its large population and economy need secure, affordable and reliable energy supplies.

Follow our live build-up, team news, predictions, scores, photos and text commentary stream from the final in Dubai.

Who: India vs Sri Lanka
What: Women’s T20 Asia Cup final
Where: Dubai International Stadium, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
When: Sunday, September 13, 6:30pm local time (14:30 GMT)
How to follow: We’ll have all the build-up on Al Jazeera Sport from 3:30pm local time (13:30 GMT) before our live text commentary stream.

Record seven-time winners India face defending champions Sri Lanka in the Women’s T20 Asia Cup final on Sunday, as the 15-match competition in the United Arab Emirates readies itself for its closing act.

In a tournament which has largely yielded low-scoring contests, both Indian and Sri Lankan spin units have tasted success – Deepti Sharma spearheading the heavyweights’ charge and captain Chamari Athapaththu leading by example for the title holders.

Shafali Verma and Smriti Mandhana’s terrific top-order pairing has further strengthened India’s title bid at the tournament, where both teams boast a perfect record.

Having reached the final in every edition of the Women’s Asia Cup they have played, India are favourites to add another trophy to their glittering cabinet.

But Sri Lanka possess a threat of their own – they are one of only two sides who have beaten India in the title clash in past and will be eager to retain the trophy they proudly lifted two years ago.

Before Sunday’s showdown, Al Jazeera Sport takes a closer look at the game:

Who did India and Sri Lanka beat in the semifinals?

India defeated Bangladesh in the first semifinal on Thursday by 40 runs before Sri Lanka beat Pakistan by four wickets in Friday’s low-scoring thriller.

When did India and Sri Lanka last meet?

The pair last met in a T20 international in Thiruvananthapuram on December 30, 2025, as hosts India defeated Sri Lanka by 15 runs, sweeping that series 5-0.

Records swing heavily in India’s favour – they have won nine of their last 10 T20Is against Sri Lanka.

How many Women’s Asia Cup titles have India won?

India are the most successful team in the Women’s Asia Cup, having won a record seven titles.

They won the 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008 editions, when the tournament was played in a one-day international format, as well as the 2012, 2016 and 2022 T20 editions.

How many Women’s Asia Cup titles have Sri Lanka won?

Sri Lanka have won the Women’s Asia Cup once, winning the last edition in 2024 after beating India by eight wickets in the final.

Who are India’s key players?

India’s openers Shafali and Mandhana are the top two leading scorers in the ongoing edition, having scored 168 and 154 runs each in four matches.

Shafali has registered two half-centuries – scoring identical 64s against Thailand in the opener and Bangladesh in the semifinals – while Mandhana hit an incredible 124 against Hong Kong in the league phase.

With the ball, all-rounder Deepti has been most impactful with her spin bowling, bagging a joint-highest 11 wickets with an average of 3.63.

N Shree Charani has also played a key role with eight wickets and holds the record for the second-most economical bowler (3.27).

Who are Sri Lanka’s key players?

Captain Athapaththu, who bowls right arm off-break, has been Sri Lanka’s most impactful player, sharing the honours of the most wickets with Deepti at 11, with an average of 5.36. Left-arm orthodox bowler Sugandika Kumari has also contributed with six wickets.

With the bat, top-order left-hander Harsthitha Samarawickrama has chipped in 89 runs for the fourth-highest scorer in the competition.

Form guide

Last five matches, most recent first:

• India: W-W-W-W-L
• Sri Lanka: W-W-W-W-L

What have the players said?

India’s Deepti Sharma: “[This] team doesn’t take any team lightly … We always think as a team, ‘How we can do better in each and every game. As a collective team performance, how we can do better.’”

Sri Lanka’s Chamari Athapaththu: “If we can execute our plans in the final, I think we can beat any team.”

Probable India XI

Smriti Mandhana, Shafali Verma, Pratika Rawal, Harmanpreet Kaur (captain), Richa Ghosh (wicketkeeper), Bharti Fulmali, Deepti Sharma, Prema Rawat, Kranti Gaud, N Shree Charani, Nandani Sharma

Probable Sri Lanka XI

Imesha Dulani, Chamari Athapaththu (captain), Sanjana Kavindi, Harsthitha Samarawickrama, Hasini Perera, Kavisha Dilhari, Nilakshika Silva, Kaushini Nuthyangana (wicketkeeper), Sugandika Kumari, Chamudi Praboda, Mithali Ayodhya

Where can I watch India vs Sri Lanka?

• India: Sony Sports, SonyLIV
• Sri Lanka: TV1, Sirasa TV
• Pakistan: PTV Network, Tamasha
• Bangladesh: T Sports, iScreen
• United Kingdom: Sony MAX
• MENA region: StarzPlay Cricket, StarzPlay

United States President Donald Trump has made no secret of his hostility towards BRICS.

Last year, he threatened an additional 10 percent tariff on any country aligning itself with what he called the bloc’s “anti-American policies”. Since then, his administration has continued to wield tariffs aggressively against trading partners, including BRICS members such as Brazil, India and China.

The message appears straightforward: Countries that challenge US economic power should expect to pay a price.

But coercion has consequences. And as BRICS leaders meet in New Delhi today, Trump may be strengthening the very incentives that made the bloc attractive in the first place. The more Washington demonstrates its willingness to use access to its markets, its financial system and the dollar as instruments of political leverage, the more reason other countries have to reduce their exposure to them.

This does not mean BRICS is becoming an anti-US alliance. Far from it.

The bloc’s 11 members – Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates – have enormous political and economic differences. Together, they account for nearly half the world’s population and about 40 percent of global gross domestic product, but they do not share a common ideology, security policy or even geopolitical orientation.

Recent events have made those divisions impossible to ignore. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE find themselves on opposite sides of a growing regional conflict. In May, Iranian and Emirati representatives clashed during a foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. India and China have had a heated border dispute that led to deadly skirmishes in 2020-2021; only in the past two years have their relations gradually stabilised.

So Trump is not producing a united geopolitical front against Washington.

He may, however, be giving countries with otherwise divergent interests a common reason to cooperate economically: Protection against vulnerability to US power.

For countries outside the Western core, dependence on US-centred economic infrastructure carries risks.

The dollar’s centrality gives the US enormous structural advantages. International transactions pass through financial institutions subject to US jurisdiction; access to US markets can be restricted; sanctions can isolate governments and companies from parts of the global financial system.

BRICS’s efforts to diminish dependence on the US financial system do not mean the dollar is about to lose its position as a global reserve currency. This claim is often made around BRICS summits, usually accompanied by breathless predictions of a new BRICS currency. The evidence does not support it.

The dollar remains overwhelmingly dominant. According to the International Monetary Fund, it accounted for 57.1 percent of global foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026. The Chinese renminbi accounted for just 2 percent. Indeed, the dollar’s share rose slightly during the quarter.

But replacing the dollar and reducing dependence on it are two very different things.

BRICS countries are already experimenting with the latter. South Africa has connected to China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, allowing transactions with China to be settled directly in renminbi. Brazil and China are increasingly using their own currencies in bilateral trade, while India and the UAE have settled transactions in rupees and dirhams. China and Russia have shifted much of their bilateral trade into their national currencies.

BRICS itself is also moving cautiously towards greater financial connectivity.

Last year, its leaders called for continued work on a cross-border payments initiative and greater interoperability among members’ payment systems. In August, Reserve Bank of India Governor Sanjay Malhotra confirmed that BRICS countries are discussing linking their fast-payment networks and potentially their central bank digital currencies. India itself is also encouraging greater use of the rupee in international trade.

The New Development Bank offers another example. Established by the original BRICS countries as an alternative source of development finance, it has made lending in members’ currencies an explicit strategic objective. Its current strategy targets 30 percent of financing in local currencies, partly to reduce borrowers’ exposure to foreign-exchange risks and costly currency swaps; the number could increase to 40-50 percent for the next cycle, 2027-2031.

None of this amounts to a rival global financial system. Much of it remains experimental, bilateral or limited in scale.

But that is precisely why the fixation on whether BRICS can “replace” the dollar misses what is happening. The more significant development is the gradual construction of options that allow governments and businesses to conduct a number of transactions without relying on the dollar and Western-dominated financial infrastructure.

Trump’s policies give this process additional urgency.

Consider Brazil. Washington imposed a new 25 percent tariff on a range of Brazilian products in July, affecting billions of dollars in exports, despite running a trade surplus with the country. The Trump administration has also scrutinised Brazil’s hugely successful Pix instant-payment system, which competes with established card-payment networks.

Sanctions demonstrate the same vulnerability more dramatically. Russia and Iran have been pushed towards alternative payment and trading arrangements precisely because their access to Western financial networks has been restricted. Washington is now considering further measures that could penalise countries heavily reliant on Russian energy, including China and India.

No BRICS member needs to sympathise with Moscow or Tehran to understand what this implies.

US financial power depends not simply on possessing the world’s largest economy or issuing its dominant currency. It also depends on other countries continuing to regard participation in a US-centred system as more advantageous than the alternatives.

The more frequently Washington turns that system into an instrument of coercion, the stronger the incentive to construct escape routes from it.

That said, most BRICS countries do not appear eager to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing.

India maintains extensive relations with the US while buying Russian energy and pursuing closer economic cooperation within BRICS. Brazil has long sought greater autonomy without becoming a Chinese satellite. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain deeply intertwined with Western economies while expanding their relationships with China.

Their objective is less likely to be replacing one hegemon with another than increasing their ability to manoeuvre between competing centres of power.

That distinction matters. A trade transaction settled in rupees, a loan denominated in renminbi or rand, or a payment made through a system that does not depend on the same Western intermediaries will not overthrow dollar dominance.

But multiply such arrangements across countries and over time, and they begin to reduce the costs of saying no to Washington.

This is why portraying BRICS simply as an anti-US threat risks becoming self-defeating. Punishing countries for seeking alternatives gives them another reason to develop those alternatives.

Trump wants to make challenging US power costly. Instead, he may be making dependence on US power costlier still.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The US-China G-2 concept is both normatively exclusionary and strategically constraining. The inherent limits of a G-2 framework—hierarchy, power structure, and systematic constraints—make it a non-starter in a multipolar reality. Here, I completely agree; the concept of a G2 is unworkable and constitutes a strategic exclusion of many international actors in a multipolar world order characterized by a complex distribution of power and multiple centers of decision-making. The Structural and Political Constraints, represented in:

· Unacceptable Hierarchy: This framework attempts to impose a bipolarity that ignores the rise of major regional and international powers such as the European Union, India, and Russia.

· Lack of Methodological Flexibility: This framework fails to accommodate global issues that transcend borders and require broad collective cooperation, not just bilateral understandings.

· Conflicting Interests: The current strategic and geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing makes it impossible to manage the international system through joint governance. The structural conflict of interests between Washington and Beijing renders joint management of the international system impossible, amidst a fierce struggle for technological leadership, economic dominance, and the reshaping of national security rules. This manifests itself in:

– First: The Roots of the Strategic Conflict

A) The Challenge to Hegemony: China seeks to reshape international rules and challenge absolute American supremacy.

B) The American Shift: Washington adopts a strategy of confrontation and containment to reduce Chinese influence and supply chains.

– Second: Arenas of International Conflict

A) Technology and Trade: The chip war, tariffs, and control over advanced technology.

B) Regional Sovereignty: The escalating competition in the South China Sea and the Taiwan issue.

Trump’s China policy has shifted from confrontation to accommodation. If we wonder how true that is, to claim that Donald Trump’s policy toward China has completely shifted from confrontation to accommodation is inaccurate. It is merely a superficial shift toward de-escalation and managing disputes through deals, while the underlying geopolitical and structural competition remains intense.

– Manifestations of De-escalation and Deals (Tactical Accommodation)

· Diplomatic Summits: A state visit to Beijing in mid-May 2026 and frequent summits with President Xi Jinping to reduce escalating tensions.

· Trade Settlements: Temporarily reducing some reciprocal tariffs and concluding major deals, such as Boeing aircraft orders and easing chip restrictions for major companies.

· Regional Crisis Management: Seeking cautious coordination or neutralizing China’s role in some global energy and shipping crises.

– Constants of Conflict and Confrontation (Ongoing Competition)

· Technological Restrictions and Economic Structure: The complex core of the conflict over intellectual property and control of advanced technology remains unresolved.

· Legal and Institutional Pressures: Reciprocal restrictions and legislation continue, with China activating its blocking statute to counter extraterritorial US sanctions.

· The Taiwan file and military strategy: Divergent major strategic interests and military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

China wants to be seen on par with Washington. The Chinese gave Trump everything he wanted but nothing of substance. Taiwan was off the table at the Beijing May 2026 meet. Here, political assessments of the Beijing summit held in May 2016 vary. Some believe China successfully established itself as a rival to Washington, while others consider the results to have ranged from symbolic gains to continued ambiguity regarding issues such as Taiwan and trade deals. The summit’s dimensions and outstanding issues can be summarized as follows:

· International parity: Beijing sought to solidify its image as a major power capable of competing with and managing the power struggle with the United States.

· Taiwan’s position: Taiwan was naturally absent from the direct bilateral talks between the two leaders, amidst strong Chinese warnings to Washington about the dangers of arms sales to the island.

· Mutual gains: Opinions differed regarding the extent of concessions. Analysts believe the Trump administration did not secure any decisive, substantive commitments on certain regional issues in exchange for a temporary easing of trade tensions.

Beijing has sought to solidify its image as a major power capable of rivaling and managing the struggle for influence with the United States. It aims to establish itself as a major power on par with Washington through a variety of economic, technological, and military tools, skillfully managed through a policy of gradual retaliation and the management of international competition. This is achieved through:

– First: Economic and Technological Tools

• Rare Earth Minerals: Controlling the production of raw materials vital to advanced technologies and imposing export restrictions on them.

• Trade War: Reciprocal and gradual retaliation against US tariffs to mitigate the effects of economic pressure.

• Supply Chains: Leveraging the Belt and Road Initiative to enhance global trade routes.

– Second: Geopolitical and Diplomatic Presence

• Multipolarity: Supporting a new international order that limits unilateral US hegemony.

• Partnerships and Alliances: Expanding diplomatic and economic influence in vital regions such as Africa and Latin America.

There were some raised questions related to whether US-China friendship is bad for India and whether their infighting is bad for India too. Here, I partially agree with this view, as the interaction between Washington and Beijing presents both gains and risks for India. The conflict grants New Delhi strategic room for maneuver and security alignment with the US, but sharp conflicts or a sudden rapprochement between the two giants could exert economic and political pressure on India’s interests.

– First: Risks of US-China Conflict and Friendship for India

· Bilateral Accords Between Washington and Beijing: If the two powers reach trade agreements or strategic stability without India’s involvement, it could diminish New Delhi’s importance as a crucial ally for containing China.

· Economic and Trade Pressure: Global conflicts, tensions, and reciprocal tariffs affect the stability of markets and supply chains upon which India depends.

· Regional Military Escalation: Direct conflict increases the likelihood of India’s regional involvement due to its direct border disputes with China.

– Second: Opportunities and Gains for India from Competition

· Strengthening Strategic Partnerships: US-China competition is driving Washington and Western countries to deepen military and technological cooperation with India to counterbalance Beijing’s influence.

· The strategy of multiple independence: India benefits from competition by implementing a policy of multiple alignment, protecting its decision-making independence without being completely dependent on any party.

The interaction between Washington and Beijing presents India with both opportunities and risks, most notably strategic room for maneuver, security cooperation with the US, and potential economic pressures. In terms of gains and risks, these can be assessed as follows:

– Strategic Gains

· Role for Maneuvering: New Delhi skillfully balances its relations between the two powers.

· Security Cooperation: Stronger cooperation with the US and the Quad countries to counter China’s influence.

· Economic Gains: Global companies are seeking to relocate their factories from China to India.

– Risks and Threats

· Military Escalation: A direct confrontation could force India to choose sides.

· Sudden Rapprochement: Any major deal between the US and China could marginalize India’s regional role.

· Economic Pressures: Markets and supply chains could be affected by any trade tensions between the two giants.

Beyond the US and China, India and others are building a G Minus Two for Indo-Pacific. Here, the fundamental error in the statement lies in describing India and other countries as building a G-2 alliance with the United States and China. The G-2 concept actually refers to a potential bipolar hegemony or joint management of the world solely by Washington and Beijing, while India and other regional powers are pursuing a strategy known as G-Minus Two to expand their options for independence. This can be understood through:

– Rejection of Bipolar Hegemony:

India adopts a policy of strategic independence and rejects any bipolar system or joint US-China hegemony that diminishes the role of emerging powers.

– The G-Minus Two Strategy:

New Delhi is working with partners such as Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Australia, and Indonesia to build a network of flexible partnerships that balance influence and protect regional interests.

Here, the statement of Beyond US and China, India, and others building a G Minus Two for Indo-Pacific, accurately describes the shift of major regional powers like India towards building a network of independent strategic partnerships, moving away from the bipolar hegemony of the US and China. This is achieved through:

– Concepts of International Alliances

• The G2 concept refers to a shared global management or potential bipolar hegemony confined exclusively to Washington and Beijing.

• The G-Minus Two concept: expresses the middle power strategy of expanding its economic and defense cooperation with countries such as Australia, Japan, Indonesia, and South Korea to safeguard its strategic independence.

– Dimensions of the G-Minus Two strategy

• Diversifying partnerships: avoiding the trap of bipolar polarization between the two superpowers.

• Securing sea lanes and supply chains: building flexible regional blocs to enhance Asian stability.