Hiltzik

Only a few days ago, Paramount Skydance’s planned $111-billion takeover of Warner Bros. Discovery appeared to be on the glide path to completion.

The deal, which would be the largest merger in Hollywood history, had won approval from several foreign governments and, on June 12, Justice Department antitrust regulators.

The Justice Department’s assent looked to be a major step toward fulfilling the ambitions of David Ellison, the son of multibillionaire tech tycoon Larry Ellison, to bring together Paramount and Warners, which owns CNN and CBS among other properties, under one roof.

The Justice Department’s action ignited suspicions that the Ellisons had profited from their support of President Trump. But it has turned out not to be the last word on the deal. The very next day, California and 11 other states filed a motion to block the merger, stepping in where the Justice Department chose not to tread.

“I will not let Warner Bros. and Paramount merge without a fight,” California Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta said in announcing the states’ action. A hearing on the motion is scheduled for Friday in San Francisco federal court.

There’s more to this development than an effort to block Ellison’s attempt to repave the entertainment landscape for his own benefit, even though, as my colleague Meg James reports, the states’ motion “poses a major headache” for Ellison. It’s also a pointer toward a major restructuring of antitrust enforcement in the United States.

Customarily, state regulators have piggybacked on antitrust cases brought and managed by the federal government. The feds generally have greater resources than most individual states to conduct the investigations that can lead to antitrust lawsuits. States often have relied on the government to craft consistent and coherent theories of antitrust law to undergird their lawsuits.

But the Trump administration’s apparent pullback from aggressive legal pursuit of allegedly anti-competitive mergers has left a vacuum that states have moved to fill. That’s what’s driving their motion to block the Paramount-Warner Bros. deal.

Dating back to the first Trump term, California and other states have enacted new laws resembling federal statutes requiring merger proponents to provide detailed information about planned deals.

States also have filed their own lawsuits to challenge anticompetitive conduct by pharmacy benefit managers and algorithmic pricing that has driven up housing rents via alleged collusion.

States may have an advantage over the federal government in that their regulators can move faster on complex cases than the feds. That’s what happened in the fight against the proposed 2023 merger of supermarket companies Kroger and Albertsons, something that was widely feared to presage higher prices at the shelf.

Although the Federal Trade Commission moved to block the merger, so too did Oregon, Washington and nine other states in court. The companies called off the merger after a state court in Washington and a federal court in Oregon, ruling on that state’s lawsuit, simultaneously enjoined the merger on Dec. 10, 2024. One day later, Albertsons dropped the proposal.

Some supporters of effective antitrust enforcement suggest that the states’ involvement in these cases could be an effective counterweight to the mercurial approach taken toward enforcement under Trump, which seems to be driven by personal pique, as Paul Glastris, editor of the Washington Monthly, has written.

In 2017, Trump’s Justice Department sued to block AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner, driven by Trump’s irritation over the coverage he received from CNN, which was owned by Time Warner. (I described the lawsuit as Trump’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason.) The merger eventually went through.

The best example of the states’ willingness to supplant the feds as antitrust enforcers in chief is the antitrust case against Live Nation Entertainment. The federal government and 30 states originally filed the case in 2024 in federal court in Manhattan. The lawsuit sought to break up Live Nation, which has controlled scores of top concert venues, in part by forcing it to divest Ticketmaster, the leading entertainment ticketing firm.

A few days after the trial began this spring, the Justice Department reached a settlement with Live Nation. The settlement led to accusations that the White House interfered in the Justice Department’s work on the case, including that Trump himself personally pushed for a settlement and that the deal was reached without the participation or even the knowledge of the Justice Department lawyers handling the case or of the state attorneys general who were participating. The White House referred my request for comment on these accusations to the Justice Department, which didn’t respond.

The states, asserting that the settlement wouldn’t cure Live Nation’s alleged violations of antitrust law, took over the lawsuit — and won. In mid-April, a federal jury found that Live Nation had maintained a monopoly over the live events business, exposing the company to the states’ claims of as much as $700 million in damages and a possible order that it sell Ticketmaster. The company says it will appeal.

The history of antitrust enforcement in the U.S. generally resembles the complaisant stance taken under Trump. Since the enactment of America’s first antitrust statute, the 1890 Sherman Act, industry has generally benefited from lax enforcement, in part because antitrust theory has been ever-changing. During the New Deal, President Franklin Roosevelt suspended antitrust enforcement so his National Recovery Administration could pursue its mandate to suppress industrial competition, which was thought to drive up prices and thereby foster the Great Depression.

The Supreme Court overturned the National Recovery Administration in 1935, though it had already lost credibility. Roosevelt responded in 1938 by appointing Thurman Arnold, a critic of existing antitrust theory, as the Justice Department’s antitrust chief. In his writings, Arnold implied that antitrust law as then interpreted was a fraud aimed at acclimating consumers to ever-larger business combinations through the pretense that “unfair” or “immoral” deals would be barred.

Arnold’s appointment marked what may have been the most productive period in antitrust enforcement. By the time he departed for a federal judgeship in 1943, he had brought more than 50% of all the cases brought under the Sherman Act in its half-century of existence. He broke the auto industry’s stranglehold on consumer auto lending, and started a case that concluded with the Hollywood studios’ forced divestment of their theater chains.

Since then, there have been a few notable antitrust successes, including the 1982 breakup of AT&T. That resulted from a Justice Department antitrust lawsuit launched in 1974. But the consolidation of major industries into fewer and fewer participants, especially in entertainment, has continued with very few roadblocks.

Occasionally, an aggressive enforcer comes into office. That happened under Lina Khan, whom President Biden appointed as chair of the Federal Trade Commission. (The FTC shares antitrust oversight with the Justice Department.)

Khan’s published academic work had taken aim at what she called the lax antitrust treatment of companies such as Amazon. Her argument was that antitrust enforcers’ focus on whether a monopolizing company brought consumers lower prices overlooked the longer-term consequences of giving companies the unfettered right to build market share at the expense of competitors and the free market.

Amazon “has evaded government scrutiny in part through fervently devoting its business strategy and rhetoric to reducing prices for consumers,” Khan wrote in a key article. Once it reached a critical mass, she argued, nothing would stop Amazon from extracting monopoly rents from consumers.

Khan’s aggressive stance on antitrust law earned her the enmity of targets such as Amazon and Facebook, which tried to force her to recuse herself from FTC cases against them. She refused, but due to corporate distaste for her policies, Trump replaced her as FTC chairman on his inauguration day last year.

The Paramount-Warner Bros. deal could be a key test of states’ authority and willingness to take over antitrust enforcement from the federal government. That’s because they’ll be fighting not only resistance from the merger partners, but the government’s conclusion that the deal poses no threat to consumers.

On the other hand, their case at least will be free of the suspicion that the government’s approval owed more to Trump’s friendship with the Ellison family than to sober, painstaking analysis of how reducing the number of big entertainment companies from five to four would be good for the rest of us.

Based on the words of President Trump, America is well on the way to becoming a “global superpower in manufacturing” — indeed, as he declared in a Father’s Day social media post, we are already experiencing the “BEST ECONOMY EVER.” (Capitalization’s his.)

Here’s what the government’s own statistics tell us: Manufacturing investment has crashed during his watch, with construction spending in the manufacturing sector down 26.4% from Trump’s inauguration through May, to $174.8 billion. That’s the lowest figure since February 2023, when the economy was in the midst of a post-pandemic recovery.

White House spokesman Kush Desai told me by email that “the last two jobs reports” showed manufacturing job growth. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a seasonally-adjusted decline of 2,000 manufacturing workers in May and a gain of 3,000 in June. But the June 2026 figure was 38,000 jobs, or about 0.3% below the level in June 2025, and 75,000 or about 0.6% below the level in January 2025, when Trump took office.

Desai said that “thanks to President Trump’s proven agenda of tariffs, deregulation, and tax cuts, American manufacturing will continue to rebound.”

There’s little mystery about what has come between Trump’s ambition and the real world. To a large extent it’s Trump’s economic program, particularly his tariff policies and, more recently, his war with Iran. Those have injected a level of uncertainty for corporate managements pondering whether to spend money on expansion that they haven’t had to confront in years.

The tariffs and the war have driven up manufacturers’ costs for raw materials and overseas shipping. The general economic atmosphere doesn’t help. U.S. gross domestic product growth came in at a 2.1% annualized rate in the first quarter of this year, but the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta expects it to have fallen to 1.3% in the second quarter ended June 30.

Meanwhile, the University of Michigan consumer confidence index reached 44.8 in May, its lowest level ever (though it improved to 49.5 in June). Wages have been rising modestly, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but those gains have been eaten up by higher prices, especially for gasoline and food.

To put things another way, the actual figures show the U.S. economy to be sputtering, and the “vibe economy” as measured by consumer confidence is doing even worse.

Now that Trump’s second term is about to reach its 18-month mark, let’s unpack the factors causing the discrepancy between his ambitions and claims, and the reality.

Trump declared economic victory just as his term was starting. On March 20, 2025, he proclaimed a “manufacturing renaissance” in the U.S. That was based on what he said were “trillions of dollars in new investments” he had “already secured in tech-based manufacturing.”

A White House statement said “the list of manufacturing wins is endless.” The provided list was a roster of announcements, not groundbreakings, much less completed ventures.

Business executives quite properly have taken these pledges with mounds of salt. “Announcements are what people say they’re going to do, but dollars spent is what’s actually happening,” Didi Caldwell, chief executive of a firm that helps companies find factory sites, told the Financial Times. “From where we’re standing, we are not seeing signs of a manufacturing renaissance in the U.S.”

Indeed, at least some of these announcements have had the flavor of performative efforts to satisfy Trump’s amour propre and extract government concessions.

For example, Apple Chief Executive Tim Cook appeared with Trump at the White House in August to announce a $600-billion U.S. spending plan to take place over four years. That was a $100-billion increase over its previously-announced program.

More to the point, however, it incorporated spending with suppliers that Apple had been working with for years. Mentioned in the news announcement was a commitment to buy cover glass for iPhones from Corning. But Corning has been supplying that glass since the first iPhone appeared in 2007. In any case, the announcement appeared to secure a commitment from Trump to exempt Apple from tariffs imposed on imported chips.

Apple’s announcement Wednesday that it will spend $30 billion to buy chips from Broadcom was similarly ambiguous. The announcement didn’t provide details about the terms of the commitment or the timing of its expenditures. I asked Apple for details and whether the deal was related to a desire to remain in Trump’s favor, but didn’t hear back.

A similar phenomenon occurred during Trump’s first term; Trump had built much of his 2016 presidential campaign on a promise to increase manufacturing jobs in the United States. He blamed shrinkage in the manufacturing sector on trade agreements such as NAFTA and the policies of the Chinese, and took credit when an American manufacturer agreed to create or save jobs in the United States.

As I reported in 2019, many of those arrangements turned out to be exaggerated or bogus, or predated Trump’s claim. Some disappeared as soon as public attention turned elsewhere, or were outweighed by job cuts made elsewhere by the same companies.

Trump’s tariffs appear to have had a direct effect on manufacturing employment in the U.S. Since Trump’s inauguration, the manufacturing sector has shed about 75,000 jobs, or 0.6%. After April 2, 2025, when he announced global “liberation day” tariffs supposedly as a response to years of unfair treatment of American exports, the decline picked up pace, with a shrinkage of 68,000 manufacturing jobs.

The Supreme Court invalidated those tariffs in February, but others are still in place, including tariffs on imported steel and aluminum and on goods from China. Nor has he ceased threatening partners with trade wars. As recently as Tuesday, he said he would cut off all trade with Spain because of that country’s disagreement with him over its defense spending and its criticism of his Iran war.

As it happens, Spain is one of the few countries with which the U.S. has a trade surplus. That means that any cutoff, which trade experts think will be unlikely, would come at a cost to the U.S.

One might have hoped that Trump had learned a lesson from his first-term trade war with China. That conflict provoked a sharp contraction in the manufacturing economy, with the Institute for Supply Management’s purchasing managers index falling to 49.1 by mid-2019. (A reading below 50 signifies contraction.)

The ISM index began to recover toward the end of Trump’s term but fell again during the pandemic. Lately it has been falling again, to 53.3 in June from 54 in May.

The Iran war is another deadweight on domestic manufacturing. That’s partially the consequence of blockages of the Strait of Hormuz, the crucial thoroughfare not only for middle eastern oil, but also for such industrial inputs as fertilizer and aluminum. Cement, concrete, olive oil and spices are also among commodities produced in the region that use the strait as an outlet to reach the outside world.

Uncertainties in the region, tensions between the U.S. and China, and heightened concerns over the safety of shipping overall have driven up shipping costs between the far east and the U.S. The price of shipping a benchmark 40-foot container from China to the West Coast has nearly quadrupled to $6,687 now from about $1,700 just before the Iran war began, according to an index maintained by the cargo firm Freightos — even though shipping prices typically decline during this time of year.

There can be little doubt that the U.S. would benefit from an industrial policy — if it’s coherent. China supplanted America as the world’s leading exporter of manufactured goods in 2010, and the gap has only widened since then. China’s dominance may be hard to reverse, as it’s built on lower labor costs and transport infrastructure that enjoys focused government investment.

Tariffs could be a component of a new industrial policy, but Trump’s tariffs aren’t rationally geared to protecting domestic industries that need protection. They’re expressions of his whims, and as such they’re totally ineffective. If there are government investment policies targeting industries that need assistance, they’re not apparent to economists or industrialists.

Trump can talk as much as he likes about a golden age for U.S. manufacturing, but from his first term through this one, it’s nothing but talk. And talk, of course, is cheap.

Picking the wildest fantasy promoted by President Trump as a basis for public policy is increasingly challenging — is it his yarn about schoolchildren being secretly abducted from their classrooms and given sex-changing operations? The notion that the vaccines given to children are like “a vat, like a big glass, of stuff pumped into their bodies?”

Here’s one that has disrupted the economics of renewable energy generation and will cost Americans billions of dollars: It’s Trump’s “completely weird war on wind power in the United States,” based on a sheaf of “fact-free arguments.”

That judgment comes from Steven Cohen, a climate policy expert at Columbia University, who points out that wind already accounts for 10.5% of U.S. energy generation, that it’s destined to continue growing — and that most of it is generated today in red states such as Texas, Oklahoma, Iowa and Kansas.

There is no question that Trump’s weird war against wind is full blown. On the day of his second inauguration, he issued an executive order shutting down all new permits for offshore wind farms and ordered the Interior Department to review existing permits.

A federal judge in Massachusetts blocked the executive order in December, and his orders suspending work on existing offshore wind projects have been halted by other federal judges. The Trump administration has blocked or delayed as many as 165 wind projects on private land, citing “national security” concerns, according to the American Clean Power Assn.

Most recently, Trump has reached agreements with offshore wind firms in which the government will pay them a combined $2 billion to abandon their U.S. projects.

At some level, this crusade resembles Trump’s misguided effort to revive the American coal industry, which is on the glide path to inevitable extinction. In that case, Trump is waging an explicitly partisan and ideological battle. “We’re ending Joe Biden’s war on beautiful, clean coal,” he declared last April.

Trump’s anti-wind program is part of his campaign to dismantle U.S. renewables policy because of its roots in the Biden administration.

Additionally, multiple commentators conjecture that his hostility to wind originated in 2011, when he groused that an offshore wind farm would be visible from one of his golf courses in Scotland. He sued to thwart the “ugly” project, and lost.

But Trump has mustered other arguments against wind, on- and offshore, none of which holds water.

During a cabinet meeting in July 2025, he called wind “a very expensive form of energy.” In fact, on average it’s cheaper than natural gas, coal and nuclear generation. Perhaps more important, the cost has been coming down sharply as technology improves and the sector reaches critical mass: falling to eight cents from 21 cents per kilowatt-hour from 2010 to 2024 for offshore projects, and to 3.4 cents from 11.3 cents for land-based wind farms over the same period.

Trump blamed wind turbines for mass killing whales and birds. Neither assertion is correct.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, a federal agency, says “there are no known links between large whale deaths and ongoing offshore wind activities.”

The Audubon Society reported in January that although wind turbines can present hazards to birds, “developers can effectively manage these risks without significantly increasing project costs.” The biggest risks to birds come from the climate: “Two-thirds of North American birds are at increasing risk of extinction from global temperature rise,” the society reported — a threat that wind power can ameliorate.

Trump spokeswoman Taylor Rogers didn’t respond to my questions about the derivation of his anti-wind stance, but told me by email only that “President Trump has been clear: hard-earned taxpayer dollars shouldn’t be wasted on unreliable and costly wind farms that pose serious threats to our national security. Instead, we should be strengthening and expanding our infrastructure that produces reliable, affordable, and secure energy like natural gas plants.”

That brings us to the recent deals with offshore wind developers. The largest single deal, signed in March, was with the French firm TotalEnergies, which is to receive approximately $1 billion from the federal government to abandon all of its U.S. offshore wind projects and invest instead in oil and gas projects, including a liquefied natural gas export facility in Texas.

In his March 23 announcement of the deal, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum called offshore wind “one of the most expensive, unreliable, environmentally disruptive, and subsidy-dependent schemes ever forced on American ratepayers and taxpayers.”

This is what Huck Finn would call a “stretcher,” given the decades of subsidies spooned out to the oil and gas industry, reaching more than $30 billion a year in federal and state tax credits, indulgent regulation of pollution and low-cost access to federal lands. Indeed, the investment firm Lazard recently reported that renewables, including wind, are a cost-competitive form of generation even without subsidies. (Lazard’s calculation is of the “levelized cost of energy,” meaning the average cost over a generating plant’s lifetime.)

TotalEnergies fell into lockstep with the Interior Department in its own announcement, explaining its willingness to renounce U.S. offshore wind power because “offshore wind developments in the United States, unlike those in Europe, are costly,” echoing the agency’s position that “the development of offshore wind projects is not in the country’s interest.” Never mind that one factor that makes U.S. offshore wind development costly compared with Europe is the Trump administration’s opposition.

The government subsequently reached an agreement to pay the French company Ocean Winds $885 million to walk away from two offshore wind projects, including one in the waters off California. Ocean Winds described the deal as one driven chiefly by economics, but hinted at pressure from the White House.

“We welcome the opportunity to engage constructively with the administration on this agreement and acknowledge the clarity they have provided with this decision and deal,” Michael Brown, the chief executive of Ocean Winds North America, said when the deal was announced last month. “Our priority remains disciplined capital allocation and delivering reliable energy solutions that create long-term value for ratepayers, partners, and shareholders.”

The TotalEnergies deal, which the government has described as a “refund” of money the firm paid for its offshore leades, raised the hackles of congressional Democrats, who assert that it violates the law and constitution in multiple ways.

“We will hold you accountable for this billion-dollar ripoff,” Reps. Jamie Raskin (D-Md.), ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee and Jared Huffman (D-San Rafael), ranking member of the House Committee on Natural Resources, warned TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné in an April 29 letter.

Among other infirmities Raskin and Huffman alleged, the government’s national security rationale for canceling offshore wind leases looks “fabricated”; the payout violates the statutory formula for compensation for canceled leases; the money is to come from a fund designed only to pay court-ordered judgments and settlements of lawsuits, which don’t exist in this case; and includes a provision preventing the deal from being reviewed by a court.

The last of those provisions would have to be authorized by Congress, the letter states, asking for documents and a response from the company by Wednesday. Committee spokespersons weren’t available to say whether they received a response from TotalEnergies, and the company didn’t respond to my request for comment. I received no response from the Department of the Interior.

The California Energy Commission has opened an investigation into the Ocean Winds deal.

“The Trump Administration is recklessly spending billions of taxpayer dollars on backroom deals that would turn back the clock on innovation” CEC Chair David Hochschild said. “Taxpayer dollars should be used to build a sustainable energy future, not to pay to make projects disappear.”

What’s especially wasteful about Trump’s crusade against wind power is that it’s almost certain to be time-limited.

It’s hardly debatable that renewables such as solar and wind will be our principal sources of energy in the future; holding back the clock achieves nothing but injecting uncertainty into investment decisions that need to be made now, at a time when the price of oil is on the upswing thanks to Trump’s Iran adventure and Europe and China are racing to transition away from fossil fuels, while the U.S. remains becalmed by ideology.

“In the long run, fossil fuels will be used for petrochemicals and not for burning,” Cohen told me. “Fifty years from now, people are going to be amazed that we burned these rare, useful hydrocarbons for fuel, when the sun was just sitting up there providing an essentially infinite source of energy.”

Here’s a riddle for you: A conservative Republican senator, a top economic advisor to the Trump White House and a venture capitalist walk into a conference room at a financial conference and claim a new government program will be a boon for all American families.

Question: Do you think these people are looking out for your interests?

If you trust Sen. Ted Cruz, economic advisor Kevin Hassett and millionaire Brad Gerstner to do so, feel free to stop reading here.

If you’re skeptical, read on.

But keep in mind that Cruz (R-Tex.) was last seen in these pages promoting yet another big tax break for the 1%, Hassett appeared the other day on Fox Business arguing that while Americans are spending a lot more on gasoline, “they’re spending more on everything else too” on their credit cards, as if forcing households to max out their credit is a good thing; and Gerstner is, well, a millionaire tech investor.

At their panel discussion on May 4 at the annual Milken conference, Cruz, Hassett, Gerstner and their interlocutor, Michael Milken, talked as though the Trump accounts would be so fabulous for average American families that they would obviate the need for Social Security.

“Here’s the dirty little secret,” Cruz said. “Trump accounts are Social Security personal accounts.”

Milken echoed that thought: “Do you have the right to decide where your money goes, or should you be giving it to the government and [letting] them decide where it goes?”

That gave the game away — this is yet another effort by Republicans and conservatives to end a program they’ve been trying to kill, and to give Wall Street firms a bigger bite of your retirement resources.

Let’s start with a primer about the Trump accounts, which were part of last year’s GOP budget bill and will be open to investment starting on July 4.

The headline pitch for these accounts is that they’ll be seeded with a one-time $1,000 government contribution for children born from 2025 through 2028, unless Congress extends the government donation. Accounts can be opened for children born before or after those dates, but they won’t get the government donation.

Families can add up to another $5,000 in contributions every year until the child reaches 18, but those donations won’t be tax-deductible.

The money must be invested in low-cost stock index funds or exchange-traded stock index funds, and can’t be withdrawn for any reason without penalty until age 18. After that, the funds can be withdrawn without penalty for certain purposes such as educational expenses or the purchase of a first home. The accounts eventually become converted to conventional individual retirement accounts, or IRAs, and distributions will be taxed as ordinary income, though family contributions will be returned tax-free.

That $1,000 donation is the best feature of the accounts. But that may be their only good feature. For almost all the financial goals confronting average American families, such as saving for college or retirement, they’re inferior to tax-advantaged savings plans already on the books.

Like those programs, they’re much more advantageous for wealthier than to low-income families: Wealthier families typically have the wherewithal to make their annual contributions, and get a larger break from the tax deferrals of investment growth within the accounts because their tax rates are higher.

Though their promoters claim that the accounts will level the economic playing field for all families — “helping the bottom 10%,” Hassett said on the panel — that’s not the case. “Clearly, the program is structured to subsidize savings for those who already have the capacity to save, rather than meaningfully closing the wealth gap,” observes Sheryl Rowling of Morningstar.

Another drawback cited by economists and financial planners is that the accounts are locked into corporate equity investments. Before the beneficiary reaches age 18, the investment mix can’t be adjusted. That’s dangerous because portfolio concentrations in corporate shares are inherently risky.

“A high school senior who plans to enroll in college next year cannot change the investment to a lower-risk portfolio,” say, to a mix of equities and bonds, notes Greg Leiserson of the Tax Law Center at NYU. “If the market crashes the summer before she plans to enroll, the Trump Account is of greatly reduced use.”

Trump account promoters have massively overstated the potential wealth gains for ordinary Americans. At the Milken conference, Cruz said that a child with a Trump account will have about $170,000 in it when he or she reaches 18 and $700,000 at age 35. “And very quickly after that, you get into the millions,” he said.

Cruz did acknowledge that those figures apply to households that “contribute regularly.” In fact, they apply largely to households that contribute the maximum $5,000 every year.

The White House estimates of potential returns are based on questionable assumptions about stock market gains over the 18-year periods in which the accounts will grow on a tax-deferred basis.

According to the government’s own estimates, the account of a family taking the $1,000 seed money but making no contributions beyond that would have as little as $2,577 in their account after 18 years if stock market returns come to 5.4% over that period.

The government estimates, however, that the account would hold $730,395 if the family contributes the maximum every year and the stock market returns more than 18%. Another 10 years of growth at that level, and the account would grow to $1.9 million when the child reaches age 28.

The problem with long-term market estimates, such as the ones offered by the White House, is that they’re highly variable. No 18-year periods are the same. One thousand dollars deposited in a hypothetical account invested in a Standard & Poor’s 500 index fund would grow to about $6,600 if its 18-year lifetime culminated in 2025; if the 18 years ended in 2008, however, that deposit would have grown only to $3,960. In the 18-year period that ended in 1960, the account would have grown only to $2,940. What will the next 18 years bring? Who knows?

Variability like this, along with the sheer uncertainty of stock market projections for the future, helped sink George W. Bush’s 2005 attempt to convert Social Security into private accounts, which was also pitched as a key to minting millionaires by the millions through the magic of the market.

I asked the White House to respond to these criticisms. Spokesman Kush Desai called my questions “both a stupid and out-of-touch take,” asserting that the accounts are “already shaping up to make a generational difference for working-class children.”

The truth is that if Trump were really intent on taking steps to “strengthen the financial security of American workers” and creating a “path to prosperity for a generation of American kids,” as he claims to be, he and his GOP followers in Congress wouldn’t have scissored away the American safety net, which is what they’ve done.

They wouldn’t have imposed new work requirements and narrowed eligibility standards for food stamps, resulting in the exclusion of more than 3 million people from the program, a decline of 8%. They wouldn’t have cut nearly $1 trillion in funding for Medicaid over 10 years, jeopardizing coverage for 3.6 million young adults. They wouldn’t have allowed Affordable Care Act premium subsidies to expire, resulting in a drop in Obamacare enrollments of about 1.2 million Americans this year compared with last year.

If they really cared about educational opportunities for “a generation of American kids,” they wouldn’t have narrowed eligibility for higher education Pell grants, and wouldn’t slash research grants for universities coast to coast.

So how can families better prepare for college and retirement expenses? For education, 529 plans are probably preferable to Trump accounts. The investment choices are more flexible, withdrawals are tax-free at the federal level and sometimes at state levels if used for most education expenses, and there are no federal limits on contributions (contributions aren’t tax-deductible).

For retirement, advisers have been favoring Roth IRAs. Contributions are not tax-deductible, and this year can be made by couples filing jointly with taxable income up to $242,000 ($153,000 for singles) and are limited to $7,500 a year ($8,600 for those 50 and older). But withdrawals aren’t taxed if you’ve held the account for at least five years and you take the money out after you turn 59 1⁄2.

The bottom line, then, is this. Take the $1,000 if your child is eligible. As Rowling wisely advises, “Any time the government offers free money, you should take it.”

As for the rest, treat any claims offered by Trump account promoters as inherently suspect.