Global

Abidjan, Ivory Coast – For decades, many of Ivory Coast’s biggest consumer markets were built around international companies with established brands, global supply chains and deep financial resources.

But a number of Ivorian businesses are now finding room to grow.

From petroleum distribution and digital banking to cosmetics manufacturing, these companies are entering sectors where foreign firms have long been dominant, building customer bases at home and looking beyond Ivory Coast’s borders.

Their rise does not signal the retreat of multinational companies, which remain major players across the economy. Instead, the experiences of Petro Ivoire, Djamo and Kaira Holding show how some domestic firms are competing by moving quickly, understanding their markets and investing in production.

Fuel challenge

When Petro Ivoire entered Ivory Coast’s petroleum sector in 1994, international oil companies controlled much of the market.

Today, the company says it is the country’s largest locally owned fuel distributor and ranks third overall behind TotalEnergies and Shell.

Sebastien Kadio-Morokro, Petro Ivoire’s chief executive, said the company’s founders believed a domestic business could compete by combining knowledge of the market with international standards.

“In the 1990s, the market was managed exclusively by multinationals,” Kadio-Morokro told Al Jazeera. “My late father’s idea was that, given the local expertise we had acquired in this industry, it was important to offer something authentic to the local market while strictly adhering to international standards.”

The company says it now holds about 15 percent of Ivory Coast’s fuel market. Kadio-Morokro said being locally owned allows the company to make decisions faster than larger international rivals.

“When a strategic decision needs to be made, we can convene our board immediately and move forward,” he said. “We don’t have to navigate a long chain of decision-making through headquarters overseas.”

That approach helped Petro Ivoire move into the butane gas market in 2007, a sector the company says it now leads. It is also investing in electric-vehicle charging infrastructure as Ivory Coast prepares for changes in transport and energy use.

For Kadio-Morokro, the company’s experience reflects a broader challenge facing African businesses: building confidence that companies created on the continent can compete at scale.

“Africans must trust their countries, themselves and their continent,” he said. “There is no reason why we cannot succeed at home.”

Digital banking

In West Africa’s financial sector, another company is challenging traditional ways of accessing banking services.

Djamo launched in Ivory Coast in 2020, offering accounts, savings and investment products through a mobile application. The company says it now serves more than two million customers and 10,000 small and medium-sized enterprises.

For cofounder Hassan Bourgi, one of the biggest obstacles was convincing investors that francophone West Africa could produce a technology company capable of scaling.

“The biggest hurdle we encountered was that our region was completely off the radar for global venture capital investors,” Bourgi told Al Jazeera. “Historically, tech investment flowed almost exclusively into four main hubs: Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Egypt.”

Djamo sought to challenge that perception by showing investors that companies from francophone markets could grow beyond their borders.

“We showed investors that it was possible to build a large company here,” Bourgi said. “We highlighted the stability of our economy and the CFA franc, which created a strong environment for us to build and expand.”

The company focused heavily on younger consumers, designing a platform around the habits of a generation already familiar with digital services.

“Generation Z was the cornerstone upon which we built our product,” Bourgi said. “We wanted to provide an experience that matched what people encountered every day on international platforms.”

Scaling up

The growth of companies such as Petro Ivoire and Djamo comes as Ivory Coast seeks to strengthen its domestic private sector and help businesses move beyond the national market.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Ivory Coast’s employers’ association, CGECI, have launched programmes aimed at helping promising companies improve access to finance, strengthen management and prepare for regional expansion.

For many entrepreneurs, the challenge is not only building a successful business at home but creating companies large enough to compete across borders.

Few stories capture that journey more clearly than Kaira Holding.

From cot to cosmetics

In 2009, Fode Kaira Yatabare launched his cosmetics company from a two-room apartment in Abidjan.

The apartment served as both home and office. Each night, he slept on a folding military cot that had to be packed away each morning to make space for work.

Today, Kaira Holding exports beauty and personal care products to 32 countries across Africa, Europe and the Middle East.

“I belong to a new generation of African entrepreneurs who passionately believe in local manufacturing and value addition,” Yatabare told Al Jazeera.

“When we started, capital constraints were immense. We launched from a tiny two-room flat. We only managed to scrape together four million CFA francs [about $7,000] to start producing soap.”

The company has since invested in its own packaging, printing and manufacturing processes, reducing its dependence on imported inputs.

“Many people fail to realise that manufacturing costs in Africa can actually be lower than in China if you fully integrate your value chain,” Yatabare said. “This vertical integration has made us more competitive.”

Kaira Holding is now expanding its research capacity and preparing to enter new markets, including China.

The experiences of Petro Ivoire, Djamo and Kaira Holding do not represent the end of multinational influence in Ivory Coast. But they show how some African businesses are building an advantage by staying close to consumers, making decisions quickly and investing in their own capacity.

For Yatabare, that ambition reflects a changing mindset among entrepreneurs on the continent.

“Africa has changed,” he told Al Jazeera. “We are moving forward guided by a singular ambition: from Côte d’Ivoire to the world.”

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio is hosting more than 65 countries for a conference focused on political violence from the far left, a designation that a number of critics say is being used to target legitimate opposition.

The “Ministerial on the Resurgence of Political Terrorism”, taking place on Thursday, brings together government representatives from around the world to coordinate on what the US Department of State calls a “renewed threat”  that has “remained a blind spot in the international community’s counterterrorism focus”.

Critics, including the American Civil Liberties Union, told the Reuters news agency that “the far-left terrorism designations could be used to target lawful protest activity and political opponents rather than genuine security threats.”

Here’s what’s driving the summit and who’s attending:

What is this summit about?

The Trump administration’s 2026 counterterrorism strategy identifies three primary threats: “Islamist terrorism”, “narco-terrorism”, and “violent left-wing extremists, including Anarchists and Anti-Fascists”.

The strategy states that the third category of left-wing “extremists” has been traditionally ignored, and notes that Charlie Kirk’s assassination in September 2025 was executed “by a radical who espoused extreme transgender ideologies”.

The counterterrorism strategy omits right-wing extremism and white supremacist groups, despite growing instances of violence that some of these outfits have been accused of – including several of those who attacked the Capitol on January 6, 2020, in an attempt to overturn the US presidential election that Donald Trump lost.

Thomas Renard, director of The Hague-based International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, said the summit reflects a fundamental shift in how the US sees the threat.

“What we are seeing now in the United States is that counterterrorism has been completely politicised, instrumentalised,” he told Al Jazeera. “For instance, the threat from far-right terrorism, which was for decades considered as the primary domestic threat, has now completely disappeared from the US counterterrorism strategy.”

Who has been invited?

Invites went to more than 70 countries as the State Department wrote on social media that countries had shown “overwhelming interest”. It is reported that Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Saar will be present alongside representatives from multiple countries. The stated aim is to “expand coordination, enhance information sharing, and strengthen international law enforcement mechanisms”.

The summit follows a series of smaller meetings held earlier this year, including one in The Hague with law enforcement officials.

Renard says many European nations are expressing their unease with this ministerial meeting by sending relatively junior ministers.

“They are not particularly convinced that this is a topic that justifies this type of gathering, but at the same time, they don’t want to antagonise the United States either. And therefore, this is the compromise they found,” he said.

In November, 2025, the US designated four European groups as terrorist organisations: The German Antifa Ost, the Italian Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front (FAI/FRI), the Greek Armed Proletarian Justice and the Greek Revolutionary Class Self-Defense.

What is “far-left terrorism”?

The term is usually used by governments to describe movements accused of violence and driven by left-wing ideologies, including Marxism, socialism, or anarchism. Such movements usually describe themselves as anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist.

Latin America saw several left-wing armed movements during the Cold War, a number of which carried out sustained campaigns of political violence, such as Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL) in El Salvador and the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Throughout the 20th century, Washington repeatedly backed hardline right-wing regimes that opposed left-wing movements across Latin America.

India has been dealing with the Naxalite rebellion, a far-left Maoist movement that started in the 1960s and claims to fight for the rural population. The group is seen as one of India’s most serious internal security threats. At its peak, about the year 2000, thousands of people were killed due to the conflict with the Naxalite rebellion.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Marxist groups like the Red Army Faction in West Germany were behind several assassinations, abductions and bombings that they argued were aimed at weakening the capitalist state.

By contrast, the Antifa movement, which the Trump administration has consistently tried to portray as a major violent threat, is a loose, decentralised collection of socialist-leaning individuals opposed to far-right extremism, white supremacy and authoritarianism. Several individuals described by prosecutors as Antifa members have been indicted on accusations of violence in US courts, especially in states like Texas that are ruled by Trump’s Republican Party, since he returned to power. In June, eight such individuals were sentenced to several years in prison: Benjamin Hanil Song, convicted of the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, was sentenced to 100 years in prison.

Far-right political violence and terrorism in the US

But the same Trump administration has pardoned all those charged with violence during the January 6, 2023 insurrection, including individuals accused of beating police officers.

This week’s summit also specifically focuses on far-left political violence but does not include the threat from far-right ideology and terrorism, similar to the counterterrorism strategy.

This, even though the Oklahoma bombing, which killed 168 people and wounded nearly 700 in the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in the US, was carried out by the right-wing hardliner Timothy McVeigh.

The Cato Institute, a US think tank in Washington, DC, stated in February that of politically motivated terrorism on US soil between 1975 and 2025, excluding the Oklahoma bombing and 9/11, “right-wing terrorists account for 45 percent of people murdered, Islamists are responsible for 32 percent, left-wing terrorists are responsible for 16 percent.”

Renard says the summit creates the very problem it claims to solve: “The United States, with this summit and with its strategy, is creating, actually, a blind spot about far-right terrorist threats, as that threat is strongly anchored and rooted in the United States.”

South Korea will further boost its airborne electronic warfare capabilities, buying another two platforms based on the Bombardier Global 6500 bizjet. These will eventually complement the four Global 6500-based airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft that Seoul has already ordered, and which you can read about here.

Canada’s Bombardier Defense announced today that its Global 6500 had been selected for a second South Korean special mission aircraft program. The aircraft have been acquired by Korean Air, which will modify them for the electronic warfare role. Specifically, these will be standoff jammer (SOJ) aircraft, intended to disrupt enemy electromagnetic signals from a safe distance.

“The Global 6500 aircraft is in demand around the world because of its performance and versatility, and we’re extremely proud that it was chosen for two very advanced, yet different defense missions in South Korea,” said Michael Anckner, vice-president of worldwide sales at Bombardier Defense. “This aircraft is trusted because of its proven military track record, yet it remains highly adaptable as defense needs evolve.”

The Global 6000 series is already a popular choice for military special missions adaptations. Outside of South Korea, prominent examples include the Saab GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft, as well as the German Luftwaffe’s PEGASUS signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft. Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force opted for a Global 6000-based solution for its E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) program, and the U.S. Army ordered a Global 6500-based solution for its ME-11B High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES), which will be the service’s next-generation intelligence-gathering aircraft. 

All these applications are aided by the Global’s relatively high-altitude flight profile, which provides a significant standoff capability, increasing line of sight for the sensors, and helping keep the jet and its onboard operators further away from enemy air defense systems. In general, bizjet platforms are also becoming increasingly cost-effective, helped by steady improvements in jet engine technology.

Both Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Korean Air had presented offerings for the SOJ to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), which serves as the central administrative agency of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense.

DAPA had approved the plan for the development of the so-called Block I Electronic Warfare System Development Project in April 2025, with around $1.2 billion earmarked for the program by 2034.

As of September last year, KAI was teamed with Hanwha Systems and was pitching a design based on the Global 6500 airframe. Meanwhile, Korean Air was partnered with LIG Nex1 and, according to some reports, was proposing a platform based on the Gulfstream G550. Other reports suggested that both teams favored the Bombardier bizjet, which provides commonality with the new South Korean AEW&C aircraft.

KAI had argued that it was the best fit for the requirement based on its previous involvement in the Peace Eye program, which provided South Korea with a version of the E-7A Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft, as well as the forthcoming Baekdu II intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform. KAI is also an established airframer, building the T-50/TA-50/FA-50 series as well as the KF-21 fighter and various helicopters.

Meanwhile, Korean Air is involved in heavy aircraft maintenance, military aircraft upgrades, and the development of drones, while LIG Nex1 developed advanced electronic warfare systems for the KF-21, as well as for warships, submarines, and reconnaissance aircraft.

From relatively early on, there had been indications that the Korean Air bid was favored. Reports in the South Korean media said that the proposal “scored higher” in the bid evaluation process by DAPA, which had been “evaluating each company’s electronic warfare equipment technology and airframe integration capability, among other factors.” 

In the past, DAPA had said that the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) required four aircraft capable of “paralyzing enemy air-defense networks and wireless command and communication systems in times of crisis.” While Bombardier has said it is providing two Global 6500s for the program, it remains possible that more might be added. We have approached the company for clarification.

South Korea becomes the latest nation to invest in an SOJ platform, reflecting the growing interest in these capabilities, especially as higher-end and longer-range air defense systems proliferate.

The U.S. Air Force has introduced the EA-37B Compass Call as a standoff electronic attack platform, while earlier this year we looked in detail at Turkey’s HAVA SOJ, based on the Global 6000 airframe and intended to undertake a similar kind of mission.

Typically, SOJ platforms are intended to support air operations by suppressing enemy air defense radars, disrupting command-and-control networks, and interfering with communications through long-range deception and noise jamming, all while remaining outside hostile airspace. By degrading an adversary’s sensing and coordination capabilities, they enable friendly aircraft to penetrate defended airspace through safer access corridors. In modern warfare, the effective use of SOJ platforms has become a critical capability, serving as a force multiplier and delivering significant asymmetric operational advantages.

In addition to jamming systems, the SOJ aircraft generally also have a surveillance capability, with passive electronic support measures (ESM) equipment, while some might include an onboard radar or other sensors. ESM, which is a passive system, can geolocate threats and communications nodes, and that data can be shared in real time with tactical aircraft and missile units to prosecute strikes.

In its rendering of the aircraft, Korean Air presented a platform with prominent fairings alongside the fuselage sides as well as a canoe-type fairing below the fuselage. The fuselage fairings likely contain conformal antennas, which may well be associated with active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology.

AESAs can be used to send out highly focused beams of electromagnetic energy to jam hostile radars and other radio-frequency sensors and emitters in the air, on land, and at sea. This is a capability we have talked about before in relation to the U.S. Air Force’s EA-37B. Potentially, these same AESA antennas could be used to trigger cyber attacks, a capability you can read more about here.

According to South Korean outlet Chosun, the aircraft should have a jamming range of “at least 200 kilometers [124 miles] to cover the entire Korean peninsula.” Additionally, “high-performance transmit-and-receive antenna technology is required to secure enemy electronic signals while disrupting the enemy by emitting powerful radio waves.”

While designed to work from outside hostile airspace, there have been increasing questions about the ability of specialized aircraft like these to survive against more capable air defenses, with the threat of long-range anti-air missile systems only set to grow. However, this kind of platform makes unique sense for South Korea, which has a very specific threat to counter: North Korean air defenses are becoming more capable, and hardened borders mean the geographic area that the new SOJ is expected to cover is clearly established. Criticism of aircraft survivability and range is less of an issue in this case.

At the same time, although South Korea has long relied heavily on the United States for defense, Seoul has increasingly emphasized greater strategic autonomy. This includes developing sovereign electronic warfare and AEW&C capabilities, reducing its reliance on U.S. military assets and American-provided equipment for these critical missions.

As well as the new SOJ and AEW&C platforms, the ROKAF is also set to receive four Baekdu II ISR aircraft. KAI is developing these in partnership with LIG Nex1 under a $675-million contract, with the mission equipment to be installed on the Dassault Falcon 2000LXS bizjet airframe.

The contract is due to be completed by the end of 2026, and the new ISR jets will replace the four Hawker 800XP Peace Pioneer signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft that first entered service with the ROKAF in 2001. These are known locally as the RC-800B Baekdu and are operated alongside a similar number of RC-800G Geumgang imagery intelligence (IMINT) aircraft provided under the Peace Krypton program.

Photos show the RC-800B Baekdu SIGINT aircraft:

A photo shows the RC-800G Geumgang IMINT aircraft:

Meanwhile, the ROKAF also operates two modified Dassault Falcon 2000S bizjets in a SIGINT role. These RC-2000s were also procured under the Baekdu project between 2011 and 2018 and incorporate a greater proportion of Korean-built electronics than the RC-800Bs. These aircraft are also specially equipped to detect North Korean missile launches.

A photo shows the RC-2000 SIGINT aircraft:

Then there is the AEW&C fleet, currently comprising four Boeing E-737s, and set to be bolstered by four new aircraft based on the Global 6500 airframe, valued at roughly $2.2 billion. As we have discussed in the past, these will be outfitted by L3Harris and will include the EL/W-2085 AESA radar from Israel’s Elta. This series of radars is already used in AEW&C aircraft operated by Israel, Italy, and Singapore. The new radar planes are due to be introduced by 2032.

Returning to the new SOJ aircraft, the fact that North Korea possesses dense, layered air defenses concentrated near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) makes an electronic attack platform like this a key enabler for military operations. This is only becoming more important as North Korean defenses continue to mature.

Beyond enhancing operational effectiveness, the SOJ program strengthens South Korea’s defense industrial base, which is fast becoming a true global player.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Published on
10/07/2026 – 13:58 GMT+2

Global oil demand will fall by one million barrels a day in 2026, the IEA said on Friday, making it the first annual contraction since 2020, when Covid lockdowns grounded aviation and shuttered industry.

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The comparison flatters this year’s decline in one respect, since demand collapsed by around eight million barrels a day at the height of the pandemic, but it underlines how severely the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has damaged the global economy.

The contraction is “highly skewed in both product and regional terms”, the agency noted in its monthly report.

Earlier IEA analysis traced the sharpest losses to Asia’s import-dependent economies and to petrochemical feedstocks such as naphtha and liquefied petroleum gas, whose supply chains run through the Strait of Hormuz.

At the time of writing, the front month contract on Brent crude, the international benchmark, was trading at around $76 a barrel, roughly 6% higher than before the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran in late February, and far below the peaks near $120 reached in March at the height of the conflict.

The US benchmark, WTI, was trading lower at around $72 a barrel.

June’s fragile rebound

Supply improved sharply last month, if from a desperately low base.

Global production jumped by 4.1 million barrels a day in June to 98.8 million as the partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz allowed Gulf producers to restart shut-in wells, though output was still running 9.4 million barrels a day beneath its pre-war level.

Gulf exports, counting cargoes rerouted around the strait, climbed by 6.5 million barrels a day to 16.1 million. Before the fighting began in late February, the region shipped an average of 24 million barrels.

Global oil inventories grew for the first time since US and Israeli strikes on Iran ignited the conflict, halting months of record drawdowns, although stockpiles in the wealthiest economies shrank further as buyers held back from importing.

The truce unravels

The IEA’s forecasts rest on an assumption now under visible strain which is that a ceasefire holds and the Strait of Hormuz gradually reopens.

On that basis, global supply would contract by 3.7 million barrels a day this year, leaving production 860,000 barrels a day short of demand, before expanding by 7.5 million next year and tipping the market into surplus.

Stronger output elsewhere and weaker demand than expected before the war could still restore a surplus by the end of the year, allowing countries to rebuild depleted reserves, the IEA noted.

This week brought the second and far larger breach of last month’s truce.

After Iranian forces struck three commercial vessels on Monday and Tuesday, US Central Command hit more than 80 targets across Iran, including air defences, coastal radar and over 60 Revolutionary Guard small boats, while Washington revoked the licence permitting Iranian oil exports.

Iran fired drones and missiles at Bahrain and Kuwait, causing no major damage, and US President Donald Trump has since declared the ceasefire over.

Tehran insists the only safe passage is the route it sets in the Strait of Hormuz as traffic fell to 13 tankers on Wednesday, against an average of 33 a day the previous week, according to shipping data from Kpler.

Additional sources • AFP

The second half of the year rests on a delicate chain of dominoes, according to a new briefing from Oxford Economics, and whether the US-Iran peace agreement holds is the factor that determines how the rest fall.

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“Its durability will determine whether the global economy gets an energy-driven disinflation tailwind or absorbs a second oil shock,” stated chief global economist Ryan Sweet in the report, calling the deal “the key domino that will determine whether other risks are amplified or dampened”.

The consultancy expects the global economy to accelerate, forecasting annualised growth of 3.1% in the second half against an estimated 1.6% in the first, powered chiefly by cheaper oil feeding through to household incomes, although Sweet puts the odds of reaching a durable deal at “a coin flip”.

If the truce holds, Oxford Economics sees Brent crude averaging in the low $70s per barrel, easing inflation and financial conditions across emerging markets and tech valuations.

If it breaks, the consequences would not stay contained to the oil market.

Early on Wednesday, the US military attacked Iran after it said Tehran struck three ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with strikes targeting Bahrain and Kuwait. The regional crossfire raised the risk that the interim agreement to halt fighting in the war could break down. However, the exchange of fire followed a pattern of similar attacks during the deal’s shaky ceasefire, and neither country immediately signalled it would step away from the negotiating table.

Oil prices reacted to the attacks by increasing more than 3% by Wednesday morning, with international benchmark Brent trading above $76 a barrel.

“A peace deal breakdown won’t just raise oil prices, it would also increase pressure on AI supply chains in Asia, force central banks to be hawkish, tighten financial conditions, and could shift the outcome of the US midterms and Israeli elections […] the cascade runs fast,” Sweet stated.

A coinflip with a $20 spread

Not everyone shares Oxford Economics’ outlook for oil prices.

Morgan Stanley’s mid-year outlook, published in May, forecast crude climbing back to roughly $90 a barrel by the end of the year, a gap of some $20 compared with Oxford Economics’ forecast that amounts to two different bets on the same peace process.

The World Bank is also more cautious, forecasting Brent crude to average about $94 a barrel this year while warning that global GDP growth will slow to 2.5% in 2026.

Reflecting on how the recent exchange of attacks is testing the fragile truce, Sweet said, “Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is a good bellwether. The deal committed to fully restoring traffic through the chokepoint within 30 days, making mid-July the first hard deadline,” he explained.

“A sustained return to 75% or more of pre-war traffic by mid-July would increase the odds that the agreement is holding and vice versa,” Sweet concluded.

The other indicator, he says, is whether Iran formally invokes the accord’s Lebanon clause over Israeli strikes, and whether its response comes in military or rhetorical form.

Tariffs, trade and AI

Trade is another risk that could reshape the outlook.

US Section 122 tariffs are due to expire on 24 July, but Washington has already lined up replacement levies under Section 301. Oxford Economics expects the changes to push effective tariff rates higher from late July as the US seeks to maintain monthly tariff revenues of between $25 billion (€21.8bn) and $30 billion (€26.2bn).

Europe is also taking a tougher stance. The European Commission has more than 50 trade-defence investigations open against China, up from 17 a year ago, and plans to unveil a broader economic security strategy by September.

These trade tensions also feed into the AI boom that has powered financial markets this year.

Oxford Economics notes the US AI industry depends heavily on semiconductors and other hardware shipped from Northeast and Southeast Asia, the regions with the most to lose from any further disruption to commodities passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Meanwhile, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the umbrella body for central banks, warned that the AI boom increasingly rests on opaque “circular financing” between chipmakers, cloud giants and artificial intelligence labs, as well as lightly regulated private credit, where lending to the sector has quadrupled in five years.

The BIS’s Asia-Pacific chief, Zhang Tao, cautioned that the sector’s reliance on non-bank funding means an AI downturn could trigger a sharper and faster correction than a traditional banking crisis.

Sweet modelled what such a reversal could look like.

“We have created a so-called tech bust scenario where US technology stocks fall by 25% over the course of a year,” he told Euronews.

According to Sweet, such a shock would cause the US economy to “grind to a halt”, spilling over to technology exporters and investor sentiment worldwide, leaving global growth 1.1 percentage points below Oxford Economics’ baseline next year.

Central banks, ballots and the calendar

The final dominoes are policy and politics.

Oxford Economics expects the major central banks to prove more dovish than financial markets currently anticipate, though they could pivot quickly if traffic through the Strait of Hormuz falters or AI-input prices signal supply stress.

The nearest test is the Federal Reserve’s rate decision under chair Kevin Warsh later this month, coming on the heels of June’s soft jobs report.

Beyond that lie November’s US midterms and Israel’s general election, due by late October, both of which could influence the Middle East peace process. In September, German state elections could also test the coalition behind Germany’s fiscal policy, a key driver of the eurozone economy.

Oxford Economics also flags genuine upside, from stronger AI-driven productivity to an EU economy that weathered the second quarter surprisingly well.

Whether the resilience in Europe is real will show up first in Germany and in credit data, Sweet argues.

“If corporates were absorbing margin compression from the jump in energy prices without cutting investment and drawing down credit lines, that would strengthen the case that underlying momentum in the economy is better than we expected,” he told Euronews, adding that a contraction in eurozone bank lending would push the other way.

It is important to highlight that the typical Oxford Economics forecast miss is nearly a full percentage point, and the range around this assessment in particular is wider than usual.

The United States-Israel war on Iran has inflicted the greatest disruption to merchant shipping since the back-to-back shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Since the start of the war in late February, shipping lines have faced attacks on their vessels, lengthy delays and steep rises in operating costs.

Yet even after more than four months of turmoil for the industry, the most enduring legacy of the war for shipping may end up being just how little it ultimately changes.

While shipping firms are expected to more explicitly factor risk into their expenses and diversify supply chains where possible in the future, the indispensable nature of seaborne trade means the industry is likely to continue much as before over the long term, analysts say.

That is likely to be especially the case for the container shipping industry, which, unlike the operators of the oil and gas tankers whose dislocation has roiled energy markets, is not heavily reliant on the Strait of Hormuz to transport its cargoes, which range from agricultural produce to apparel and consumer electronics.

While there is no alternative to the strait to access oil-producing Gulf nations by sea, container shipping firms have had the option of redirecting their vessels along longer alternative routes to avoid conflict in the region, including attacks by the Iran-aligned Houthis in the Red Sea.

The global shipping industry has long stood apart for its resilience in the face of crises, bouncing back from major upheaval at remarkable speed.

In 2020, the first year of the COVID pandemic, global container shipping volumes fell by just 1.2 percent compared with the previous year, according to the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), one of the world’s largest associations for shipowners.

By January 2021, the volume of cargo handled at ports worldwide had already surpassed pre-pandemic levels, rising 6.4 percent year-on-year, according to data from the Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics.

By contrast, it took more than four years for global air travel to fully recover from the shock of COVID-19.

While the Iran war and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since 2023 scrambled regional supply chains, shipping companies have been rapidly adding capacity since Washington and Tehran signed their memorandum of understanding on ending the conflict on June 17.

After plummeting from 3.2 million TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit of cargo) to 74,000 TEU as of mid-June, container capacity in the region has already rebounded to pre-war levels on some routes, according to Xeneta, an ocean and air freight rate market analytics platform.

Capacity between Asia and the United States’ West Coast last week surpassed its pre-conflict record, hitting 350,000 TEU, according to Xeneta.

On Monday, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd, the second- and fifth-largest container shipping firms, respectively, announced that they would begin sailing through the Suez Canal again for the first time since February, following an assessment of the security situation in the Red Sea.

Shipping is indispensable to global trade, in large part because no other mode of transport comes close in terms of capacity and cost-effectiveness.

The world’s largest container ships have capacities exceeding 24,000 TEU – the equivalent of roughly 12,000 trucks, 2,240 cargo planes, or 360 freight trains.

Lacking genuine competition in the transport of goods in huge volumes, shipping facilitates about 90 percent of global trade.

Shipping will look “remarkably familiar” in five years from now because it is an industry driven by demand, said Punit Oza, the head of the consultancy Maritime NXT and the former executive director of the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration.

Even the most severe conflict cannot change the “physics or the economics” of seaborne trade, he said.

“Ships do not sail because shipowners want them to; they sail because consumers somewhere want grain, iron ore, gas, or televisions,” Oza told Al Jazeera.

“It is the consumers of shipping – the cargo interests, the economies, the households – who ultimately shape the industry, and their demand will endure long after the headlines fade.”

Judah Levine‏, head of research at freight booking company Freightos, said container shipping in the future is likely to look “quite similar” to how it did before the war, with Dubai’s Port of Jebel Ali continuing to serve as the region’s main hub for both Gulf-bound goods and cargoes destined for Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas.

But Levine said diversion of cargoes to smaller hubs – such as the UAE’s Port of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan Port, and Port Sultan Qaboos in Oman – during the war offers a preview of the contingencies shipping firms are likely to deploy in future crises.

“All of a sudden, they were handling much larger volumes, and then creating these land bridges, usually to go on to Jebel Ali,” Levine told Al Jazeera.

“Containers find a way,” Levine said.

“It’s kind of like water. They’ll trickle, you know, to where they need to go by other paths.”

Another lasting impact of the war could be greater international cooperation on maritime security and safety.

The International Maritime Organization, the UN body responsible for shipping and seafarers, has listed the protection of shipping lanes as one of its top agenda items for discussion at its biannual meeting taking place from Monday to Friday.

“Seafarers have tragically lost their lives in connection with this conflict, and the impact has been felt well beyond the region, with real consequences for global trade, energy and food security,” IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez said in opening remarks to the session on Monday.

Ruth Banomyong, a professor of logistics and supply chain management at Thammasat Business School in Bangkok, Thailand, said he expects to see international coordination to strengthen trade routes that integrate both land and sea even as shipping networks remain “largely the same”.

“This means ensuring that maritime transport, ports, inland logistics, customs procedures and alternative land transport options work together as an integrated system when disruptions occur,” Banomyong told Al Jazeera.

“Maritime freedom is no longer just about freedom of navigation. It is about ensuring the continuity of global trade.

“The long-term lesson is not to replace the Strait of Hormuz, but to reduce overdependence on any single transport corridor,” Banomyong added.

Oza, the head of Maritime NXT, said the ad hoc naval coalitions deployed to ensure freedom of navigation during times of conflict could ultimately be succeeded by a multilateral security framework with “regional ownership rather than purely external enforcement”.

“Freedom of navigation is too important to be left to improvisation,” Oza said.

“If there is one consistent lesson from shipping’s long history, it is that human ingenuity always finds a way – pipelines get built, reserves get repositioned, technologies emerge, and trade, like water, finds its path. It will do so again,” Oza added.

“The innovations that follow this war will be a tribute to human resilience; the tragedy is that it took a war to summon them.”

One of the Premier League’s most gripping personal feuds goes global on Sunday when Brazil face Norway in the World Cup last 16.

Norway’s irresistible force of Manchester City striker Erling Haaland comes up against Brazil’s immovable object in the shape of Arsenal defender Gabriel in New York New Jersey Stadium.

Haaland and Gabriel have been central figures as their clubs battle for domestic supremacy, creating a rivalry that regularly boils over into animosity.

The outcome of their latest confrontation will go a long way to deciding whether it is Brazil or Norway who advance to the quarter-finals, where they will face either England or Mexico.

Former England striker Chris Sutton told BBC Sport: “For all the battling for the Golden Boot between the greats such as Lionel Messi, Kylian Mbappe, Harry Kane and Haaland, there have not been any great personal duels. Now we have one.

“This is the standout personal duel of the World Cup so far and make no mistake, it will have a huge bearing on the outcome of the game.

“It is the standout because of the bad feeling we know exists between the pair. I am sure there is a level of respect great players have for each other, but everything we’ve seen between them suggests they don’t like each other too much.”

Former England captain Alan Shearer is also relishing the confrontation between the pair, saying: “That will be a great battle because there is definitely a bit of niggle there.

“They don’t like each other which is fine, you don’t have to like your opponent, and we have seen them have clashes before so that’s definitely one to look forward to.”

Adding further intrigue is the statistical quirk that five-time world champions Brazil have never beaten Norway in four attempts – drawing two and losing two.

This makes Norway the only side the Selecao have faced, but never won against.

Global Policy Institute president, Paolo von Schirach, says the era of unrivalled US dominance that emerged after World War II has ended.

He points to the rise of China and other emerging powers as key forces reshaping the global order.

In May 2026, just hours before President Donald Trump met President Xi Jinping, OpenAI’s Vice President of Global Affairs Chris Lehane floated the idea of a US-led global governance body for artificial intelligence that would include China as a member. The model, according to media reports, was compared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a familiar reference for managing strategic technologies with global consequences.

One month later, at the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, a different tone emerged. Several influential AI executives joined leaders from advanced economies to discuss AI governance, online safety, and global security. According to Axios, Anthropic’s Dario Amodei and Google DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis leaned towards a more selective framework among democratic countries, while OpenAI’s Sam Altman used broader language, calling for an international forum to develop shared testing standards and risk assessments.

These two moments reveal something important: the meaning of “global AI governance” remains unsettled. In one setting, global means including China for legitimacy. In another, it can mean a trusted coalition designed to manage access, capability, and strategic risk. AI governance is becoming part of the architecture of global power.

Three Voices, Different Emphases

Their presence at the G7 showed how quickly AI firms have moved from building systems to helping shape the politics around them. The leaders of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Mistral, Cohere, and other firms were not simply observers of geopolitics. They were part of the conversation about how technological power should be governed.

Their positions were not identical. Amodei reportedly urged democratic countries to coordinate more closely so that AI governance would not fragment. Hassabis stressed the strategic importance of frontier capability. Altman, by contrast, used more institutionally neutral language, suggesting that advanced AI should not be shaped only by the companies building the most capable systems.

Even among frontier AI developers, there is no settled imagination of global governance. Should it include all major AI powers, including strategic rivals? Should it be built around trusted coalitions? Should it prioritize safety, democratic values, geopolitical advantage, or public legitimacy?

The question became more complicated because the G7 discussions came shortly after the US government imposed export controls that forced Anthropic to suspend foreign access to its Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models. Reuters reported that the order required Anthropic to block access to the models for foreign nationals, leading the company to disable them more broadly to ensure compliance. The episode showed how frontier AI governance can move from abstract principles to abrupt restrictions. Even among democratic allies, technological solidarity has limits. When AI becomes strategic infrastructure, every country begins to think about its own room for maneuver.

The Asymmetry of “Global”

The deeper issue lies in who has the power to define the word “global” in the first place. In May, global governance could mean a US-led institution that includes China. In June, it could mean coordination among democracies to manage frontier capability and strategic access. The definition changed because the political room changed.

This reveals a double asymmetry. The first is technical: only a small number of firms can define what counts as a frontier model, how its capabilities should be tested, and who should be allowed to access it. The second is narrative: the same ecosystem also helps frame the language through which the world discusses governance.

For countries outside the frontier AI circle, they may be invited to conversations but not always to the stage where categories, thresholds, and governance priorities are first shaped. They may be asked to adopt best practices whose assumptions were formed elsewhere. They may be told that risks are global, even when preparedness remains highly unequal.

G7 outreach to partner countries such as India, Brazil, Kenya, South Korea, and Egypt is important. It recognizes that AI governance cannot remain a conversation among advanced economies alone. Yet there remains a difference between being present in a forum and helping design the architecture of the forum itself. The question is who defines the table, the agenda, the risk categories, and the meaning of global governance itself.

When the AI Frontier Moves Towards the Market

There is another reason why a broader governance imagination is necessary. Frontier AI innovation is no longer centered primarily in universities or public research institutions. It is increasingly shaped by private firms with the capital, compute, talent, data access, and infrastructure required to train and deploy the most capable models.

Stanford’s AI Index 2025 noted that nearly 90 per cent of notable AI models in 2024 came from industry, up from 60 per cent in 2023. A report prepared for the European Economic and Social Committee on generative AI and foundation models also described significant US dominance across the value chain. These findings point to a structural shift: the frontier is becoming more concentrated, more expensive, and more closely tied to corporate and geopolitical capacity.

Much of AI’s progress has come from companies willing to take risks, scale products, and build technical capability at extraordinary speed. But the center of gravity has shifted. When frontier AI is largely financed, defined, and deployed by market actors, the default imagination of AI development can tilt towards commercial viability, platform advantage, user growth, and strategic positioning.

Public interest does not disappear in such a system. It risks becoming secondary unless other actors are strong enough to bring it back into the room.

Open Future, a European digital policy organization, has warned that concentrations of power in AI can make public activities dependent on “a narrow group of monopolists.” The phrase matters because infrastructure-level dependency can weaken society’s ability to negotiate the terms of the technologies it relies on.

A Wider Public-Interest Layer

In a multiplex digital world, power does not flow only through states or markets. It also moves through universities, civil society organizations, professional associations, media, labor groups, open-source communities, public-interest technologists, and moral institutions. Together, these actors form the society layer often missing from discussions dominated by states and markets.

States define security priorities. Companies define technical possibility. Society must help test legitimacy. Who bears the risk? Who benefits from deployment? Who is excluded from design? What harms are being normalized because they are commercially convenient or geopolitically useful?

This is why Pope Leo XIV’s recent intervention on AI is politically relevant beyond its religious context. In his encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, he argues that protecting the human person in the age of AI requires renewed reflection on the common good, solidarity, social justice, and human dignity. Such interventions will not replace regulation or technical standards. They help recover a truth easily lost in frontier AI politics: governance is also about preserving the human meaning of technological progress.

The same question of authorship is beginning to appear in empirical research. Ongoing fieldwork-based research at the University of Oxford has started to examine whether countries in the Global South are developing approaches to AI governance that are neither simple copies of Western regulatory templates nor rejections of international cooperation but pragmatic syntheses shaped by local institutional capacity, regulatory sequencing, and historical experience with technology transfer. Indonesia has appeared as one of the country cases in this line of inquiry.

Governance models worth studying are not only those negotiated in Évian, Brussels, Washington, or New York. They are also being improvised, often informally, by mid-sized digital economies navigating dependency and ambition at the same time.

The United Nations’ Global Digital Compact (GDC), adopted in September 2024, offers a useful multilateral reference point. It frames digital cooperation and AI governance around inclusion, human rights, open standards, interoperability, digital public goods, and multi-stakeholder cooperation. The Compact does not resolve the power asymmetries of frontier AI by itself, but it gives societies, alongside states and firms, a language for claiming a legitimate role in digital governance.

The practical task is to strengthen public-interest evaluation: the ability to test social impact, language bias, local risks, institutional misuse, and deployment consequences in different societies. The aim is to preserve enough room for public reasoning so that the future of AI is not defined only by those with the largest models, the biggest markets, or the strongest strategic leverage.

Imagining a More Inclusive AI Governance

The lesson from the IAEA analogy and the G7 discussions is not that one model is right and the other is wrong. Both reflect real concerns. A broadly inclusive governance arrangement may be necessary for legitimacy, especially when AI risks cross borders. A trusted coalition may also be necessary when capability access raises genuine security concerns. The problem begins when either model claims to be global while leaving too many societies downstream of decisions made elsewhere.

For emerging economies, the strategic challenge is not simply to wait for a better invitation to the next summit. Participation matters, but it is not enough. Countries and societies need stronger capacity to evaluate AI systems, understand their dependencies, articulate local risks, and negotiate governance terms with greater confidence.

This is a call for a more plural architecture of governance, where states, markets, and society all have meaningful roles. The uncomfortable question is not whether AI requires international coordination. It clearly does. The harder question is whether that coordination can remain open enough for societies, not only states and companies, to shape the terms of technological power.

In the age of frontier AI, the future will not be determined only by who builds the largest models. It will also be shaped by who gets to define risk, test systems, question assumptions, and decide what counts as progress.

Every era that has tried to govern a transformative technology eventually learns the same lesson: legitimacy borrowed from power is not the same as legitimacy earned through participation. The IAEA’s own history shows that global trust is rarely built at the moment institutions are created; it is earned over time, through broader representation, credible restraint, and shared accountability. The real question for AI governance is whether it can shorten that distance by design, rather than waiting for legitimacy to arrive only after contestation.

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz has restored the flow of oil and natural gas after more than 100 days of disruption, but the crisis has already left a lasting mark on global energy markets. The prolonged closure exposed the vulnerability of the world’s energy supply chain and has prompted governments to reconsider how they secure fuel supplies.

Analysts say the crisis mirrors the impact of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which transformed global energy policy by encouraging conservation, diversification, and strategic stockpiling. While today’s energy system proved more resilient, the Hormuz disruption may accelerate a broader shift away from fossil fuels.

What Happened?

The Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies normally pass, remained effectively closed for more than three months during the US Israeli conflict with Iran.

Despite the disruption, global markets avoided a severe supply crisis through rapid rerouting of cargoes, the release of strategic reserves, reduced Chinese imports, and shifting demand patterns.

However, analysts say these emergency measures were only temporary. Energy inventories fell sharply during the crisis, and markets were approaching a critical point before shipping resumed.

Why the Crisis Matters

The Hormuz disruption demonstrated that even today’s highly interconnected global energy system remains vulnerable to geopolitical conflict.

Unlike previous crises, the world avoided a complete energy collapse because governments, traders, and shipping companies quickly adapted. Nevertheless, the episode exposed the limits of those emergency responses and reinforced concerns about overreliance on a single strategic chokepoint.

The crisis is expected to influence long term energy investment decisions far beyond the Middle East.

Lessons From the 1973 Oil Embargo

The 1973 Arab oil embargo fundamentally changed global energy policy after oil producing nations restricted exports to countries supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

The embargo caused oil prices to surge, triggering inflation and prompting governments to adopt fuel efficiency standards, develop domestic oil production, establish strategic petroleum reserves, and create the International Energy Agency.

Rather than ending fossil fuel use, the crisis encouraged countries to consume energy more efficiently while reducing dependence on imported oil.

A New Energy Strategy Emerges

The Hormuz crisis appears to be driving another major strategic shift, particularly across Asia.

Countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil and gas are increasingly prioritizing energy security over low fuel costs. Governments are expected to expand strategic petroleum reserves while accelerating investment in domestic renewable energy, nuclear power, and alternative fuel sources.

India, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea are among the countries reviewing long term strategies aimed at reducing exposure to overseas energy disruptions.

Europe Continues Its Energy Transition

Europe entered the Hormuz crisis after already reshaping its energy system following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The loss of Russian energy supplies forced European countries to cut gas consumption, diversify imports, and rapidly expand renewable energy capacity.

The latest Middle East disruption is expected to reinforce that trend by encouraging further investment in clean energy and energy efficiency while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Investment Trends Support the Shift

Global investment patterns already suggest that energy markets are evolving.

According to the International Energy Agency, worldwide energy investment is projected to reach 3.4 trillion dollars this year, with much of the growth directed toward renewable energy, electricity infrastructure, battery storage, and grid resilience rather than new oil production.

Electric vehicle sales continue to rise rapidly across Europe, Latin America, and Asia Pacific, while Chinese solar panel exports have surged across Africa and Southeast Asia.

Governments are also increasing spending on energy efficiency, with around 20 countries introducing new conservation measures directly in response to the Hormuz crisis.

Why It Matters

The Hormuz crisis has reinforced that energy security is becoming just as important as energy affordability.

Rather than relying solely on global oil markets, governments are increasingly pursuing diversified energy systems that combine fossil fuels with renewables, nuclear power, strategic reserves, and domestic production.

This transition is expected to influence investment, industrial policy, and international trade for years to come.

Future Outlook

Oil and natural gas are expected to remain central to the global economy for decades, particularly in transportation, manufacturing, aviation, and power generation.

However, future growth in fossil fuel demand may become significantly slower as governments invest more heavily in renewable energy, electric vehicles, battery storage, and efficiency improvements.

The Hormuz crisis may ultimately be remembered not as the event that ended the oil era, but as the moment many countries accelerated preparations for a more diversified energy future.

Implications

The Hormuz crisis is likely to have consequences that extend far beyond the immediate recovery in oil and gas flows. Governments that experienced supply disruptions are expected to place greater emphasis on energy security, even if it comes at a higher economic cost. This could accelerate the expansion of strategic petroleum reserves, diversify import sources, and increase investment in domestic energy production, including renewables, nuclear power, and critical energy infrastructure.

For oil exporters in the Gulf, the crisis may strengthen the case for developing alternative export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, reducing dependence on a single maritime chokepoint. Import dependent economies, particularly across Asia, are also likely to rethink long term procurement strategies by securing more flexible supply contracts and expanding storage capacity.

Financial markets are also expected to assign a higher geopolitical risk premium to energy prices. Even after shipping has resumed, investors may continue to price in the possibility of future disruptions, increasing volatility across oil, gas, shipping, and insurance markets. The crisis could also accelerate capital flows into technologies that reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels, including electric vehicles, battery storage, hydrogen, and energy efficiency.

Analysis

The Hormuz crisis may ultimately prove more significant for what it revealed than for the physical disruption it caused. Although global energy markets demonstrated remarkable resilience, that resilience depended on temporary measures such as drawing down inventories, rerouting cargoes, reducing consumption, and relying on spare production capacity. These mechanisms bought time rather than solving the underlying vulnerability of the global energy system.

Unlike the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which primarily forced consuming nations to improve efficiency while expanding fossil fuel production elsewhere, today’s crisis occurred at a time when commercially competitive alternatives to oil and gas already exist. Renewable energy, electric vehicles, battery storage, and advanced power grids have matured into viable strategic assets rather than purely environmental investments. As a result, governments are increasingly viewing clean energy not only as a climate policy but also as a national security priority.

Another important distinction is the shift in investment behavior. Historically, supply disruptions often encouraged greater investment in oil exploration and production. Following the Hormuz crisis, however, a growing share of capital is moving toward energy diversification instead of simply increasing fossil fuel output. This suggests policymakers increasingly see reducing oil dependence as a more sustainable way to improve resilience than expanding strategic reserves alone.

The crisis also exposed a structural imbalance in global energy markets. While production remains concentrated in politically sensitive regions, demand growth is increasingly centered in Asia, leaving major importers highly exposed to geopolitical instability. Countries such as India, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea may therefore pursue parallel strategies of securing diversified hydrocarbon supplies while rapidly expanding domestic renewable generation, nuclear power, and energy storage.

Perhaps the most important takeaway is that energy security has overtaken cost as the dominant driver of policy decisions. For decades, governments largely optimized their energy systems for affordability and efficiency. The Hormuz disruption demonstrated that the cheapest energy source can quickly become the most expensive if geopolitical events interrupt supply. That realization is likely to reshape government policy, corporate investment, and global energy trade for years to come.

The crisis does not signal the immediate end of the oil era. Oil and natural gas will remain indispensable for transportation, petrochemicals, aviation, heavy industry, and electricity generation in many regions. However, it may represent an inflection point where the trajectory of fossil fuel demand begins to flatten as countries systematically reduce their strategic dependence on imported hydrocarbons. In that sense, the Hormuz crisis could be remembered less as an energy supply shock and more as the catalyst that accelerated the next phase of the global energy transition.

With information from Reuters.

June 24 (UPI) — Global aquaculture production reached a record high, while Chile maintained its position as the leading supplier of salmon to the United States and one of the sector’s top exporting powers, according to a report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

According to the report The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, global fisheries and aquaculture production reached 235 million tons in 2024. For the first time, aquaculture production surpassed 100 million tons of aquatic animals, 89% of which is destined for human consumption and provides at least one-fifth of the animal protein consumed by 3.1 billion people.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations said Latin America and the Caribbean account for 15% of global aquatic product exports despite representing 9% of worldwide production, with a total of 13 million tons.

The region exported $27 billion worth of aquatic products, driven mainly by Chilean salmon, anchoveta from Peru and Chile, and Ecuadorian shrimp.

In this context, Chile ranks first in aquaculture production in Latin America, is the largest supplier of salmon to the United States and the world’s fifth-largest exporter of aquatic animal products.

Together with Norway, Chile accounts for nearly half of the value of global salmon and trout exports.

“The growth aquaculture has experienced in recent decades has not been accidental. Behind this progress lies significant work in research, innovation and technological development,” Valeska San Martín, an academic at the Coastal Research Center of the University of Atacama and a researcher at the Millennium Institute in Coastal Socio-Ecology, told UPI.

She said these advances have enabled the development of better feed for farmed species, more efficient genetic selection programs, increasingly precise environmental monitoring systems and automated tools that optimize feeding and health management.

“All of this has helped increase productivity and improve the efficient use of resources while at the same time reducing part of the costs associated with production,” she said.

San Martín added that Chile has been one of the most important players in global aquaculture development and is recognized by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as one of the world’s 10 leading aquaculture producers.

“In 2024, it led global exports of frozen salmon and trout fillets, processed mussels, fishmeal and various algae-derived products, reaching more than 100 international markets, particularly the United States, Japan, Brazil, China and Europe,” she said.

Growth prospects remain positive, according to SalmonChile, the industry association representing salmon producers.

“Chilean salmon exports maintained a positive trend in 2026. During the first quarter, they reached $1.991 billion, representing growth of 8% in value and 19% in volume compared with the same period a year earlier,” the organization told UPI.

SalmonChile added that the record achieved by global aquaculture in 2024 confirms the growing prominence of aquaculture products in international trade and consolidates Chile’s position as one of the world’s leading salmon-producing powers.

If You Stay

(Giacomo Bagnara / For The Times)

When you live in Los Angeles, there are far worse fates than being stuck in the city all summer. Our thriving food capital draws diners out with sunlit farmers markets, midnight taco stands, multigenerational kebab shops and serene sushi dens. Community-oriented breweries, stylish wine bars and glimmering rooftop destinations round out the scene.

Whether you’re a lifelong Angeleno, new transplant or just passing through, you’ll want to get to know the 50 essential dining experiences that define eating in L.A. right now, from a pastrami sandwich at an iconic deli near MacArthur Park to a char-spotted tlayuda at a burgeoning food bazaar in West Adams and an L.A.-shaped churro from a rising Highland Park panadería.

Don’t miss our guide with nearly two-dozen new bar openings across the city. Finally, a handful of sparkling rooftops recently debuted across the city, offering vistas into neighborhoods we rarely spy from up above.

Thoughtfully compiled by our Food staff over the course of several months, we invite you to return to these lists whenever you’re seeking an answer to that perennial question: Where should I go next? — Danielle Dorsey

If You Go

(Giacomo Bagnara / For The Times)

There’s no easier way to get to know a new place than through its food. Wandering markets, eating at food stalls, sitting among locals and fellow travelers at the restaurants that embody a city. Its flavors and customs and ways of living are revealed to us over dinner or even a simple morning coffee.

And for those of us who are lucky enough to write about food for a living, traveling with an eater’s mindset gives us a deeper understanding of places we’ve read about in cookbooks and novels or seen in movies.

Each of us at L.A. Times Food keeps a running list of our favorite restaurants in some of the world’s great cities — and we want to share what we know with you. The recommendations that follow are not meant to be definitive for any given place. These are personal guides by dedicated eaters to some of the places we’ve loved during our wanderings around the globe.

If you’d like to share your own personal favorites with us, we’d love to hear from you in the comments below. — Laurie Ochoa

The disruption caused by the Iran war and the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz has prompted countries around the world to reconsider their energy security strategies. Governments that suffered economic damage from supply shortages and soaring prices are now looking to build larger strategic oil and gas reserves, potentially creating demand for hundreds of millions of additional barrels over the coming years.

Hormuz Crisis Exposed Energy Vulnerabilities

The near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted around one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies for more than three months, sending shockwaves through energy markets.

Brent crude prices surged to nearly $120 a barrel as import-dependent economies faced rising fuel costs, supply uncertainty and growing inflationary pressures.

Emergency Reserves Helped Stabilize Markets

One of the key factors preventing a deeper energy crisis was the release of strategic petroleum reserves.

All 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to a record release of 400 million barrels from emergency stockpiles, helping offset supply disruptions and ease pressure on global markets.

The coordinated action highlighted the importance of maintaining large emergency reserves during major geopolitical crises.

China’s Stockpile Strategy Pays Off

China emerged from the crisis in a stronger position than many other major importers due to its massive strategic petroleum reserve.

The country has spent years building what is believed to be the world’s largest emergency oil stockpile, estimated at more than one billion barrels.

During the conflict, China significantly reduced crude imports, allowing it to avoid buying large volumes of oil at elevated prices and limiting the economic impact of the disruption.

Import-Dependent Economies Face Greater Pressure

Countries with limited strategic reserves faced much greater challenges.

Several Asian economies relied on emergency measures such as:

• Fuel subsidies
• Consumption restrictions
• Reduced working hours
• Energy-saving programs

The experience exposed vulnerabilities among countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies without substantial emergency stockpiles.

India Eyes Larger Strategic Reserves

India is among the countries most likely to expand its emergency storage capacity.

As the world’s third-largest oil importer and one of the fastest-growing energy consumers, India currently holds reserves covering only a small fraction of its import needs.

Meeting International Energy Agency standards would require hundreds of millions of additional barrels of storage capacity.

Recent plans under consideration suggest New Delhi is moving toward expanding its strategic petroleum reserve network.

Pakistan Also Reviewing Energy Security

Pakistan, which relied heavily on Middle Eastern oil and LNG imports before the conflict, is also examining ways to increase domestic storage capacity.

The Hormuz disruption underscored the risks facing countries that lack sufficient reserves to absorb prolonged supply interruptions.

Australia Moves to Address Reserve Gap

Australia, long criticized for failing to meet International Energy Agency stockpile requirements, has announced plans to significantly increase fuel reserves.

The move reflects a broader recognition that energy security has become a national security issue amid growing geopolitical uncertainty.

Europe Considers Additional Gas Storage

Europe already maintains extensive gas storage infrastructure to manage winter demand.

However, the war has renewed concerns about dependence on imported LNG, particularly as the region increasingly relies on overseas suppliers.

Additional government-controlled gas storage facilities may become part of future energy security planning.

Gulf Producers Seek Overseas Storage

The lessons of the Hormuz disruption are also influencing major energy exporters.

National oil companies in the Gulf are exploring opportunities to expand storage capacity outside the region to maintain export flexibility during future crises.

Additional overseas storage could help producers continue serving customers even if regional shipping routes face disruptions.

Oil Market Impact

The expansion of strategic reserves worldwide could create substantial new demand for crude oil and refined products.

At the same time, emergency reserves that were depleted during the conflict will need to be replenished.

Together, reserve rebuilding and new storage programs could generate demand for roughly one billion barrels over the coming years, providing support for global oil prices even if overall supply growth remains strong.

What It Means for Global Energy Security

The Hormuz crisis has reinforced a lesson many governments learned during previous energy shocks: supply security can be just as important as supply availability.

Countries are increasingly viewing strategic reserves not as emergency assets to be used rarely, but as a core component of economic and national security planning. The crisis has also demonstrated how large stockpiles can provide governments with flexibility to reduce imports during periods of market stress and extreme prices.

Analysis

The most significant consequence of the Iran war may not be the temporary spike in oil prices but the long-term shift in how countries manage energy security. The conflict exposed a clear divide between nations with large strategic reserves and those forced to absorb the full impact of supply disruptions. China emerged as a model for energy resilience, while countries such as India and Pakistan were reminded of their vulnerability to geopolitical shocks.

If governments follow through on plans to expand storage capacity, the global oil market could gain a major new source of structural demand. Reserve construction and replenishment may help absorb future supply surpluses and provide a floor for prices, particularly during periods of weak economic growth.

At the same time, larger strategic stockpiles could make future oil shocks less severe. Countries with substantial reserves are better positioned to reduce imports during crises, dampening demand spikes and limiting extreme price volatility. In the longer term, the world could emerge from the Hormuz crisis with a more resilient energy system, but one in which strategic stockpiles play a much larger role in shaping oil demand, trade flows and government policy.

With information from Reuters.

For decades, historian’s discussion about colonialism has revolved around large armies, territorial conquests and vast empires. Yet, they often fail to focus on the fact that one of the most powerful empires did not begin with soldiers – it emerged because of corporations. The British East India Company, in 1600 started its commercial activities in the sub-continent, initially as a trading merchandise seeking profit in foreign markets. Within the period of two centuries, it acquired its own military, expanded its territorial influence, and started acting as a ruling government that ultimately blurred the difference between private capitalist enterprises and sovereign national authority. More than two hundred years later, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the latest incarnation of that colonial legacy. Unlike previous forms of colonialism of territory and resources, this control is primarily centered around data, algorithmic decision-making systems, and automated computation. Their territories are not like land, it is the dominance over data ecosystems; their currency is not raw materials, it is ‘data’, and their empires are not built on castles, but are gigantic ‘data-centers’. Instead of emancipation for the marginalized, this technology creates new forms of dependency known as ‘digital dependency’.  

The 21^st century is witnessing a growth of an imperial empire that is built on establishing control over datasets, computational power, and algorithmic sovereignty. Where a few Chinese and American tech giants such as NVIDIA, Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure are controlling the digital markets through complete ownership of cloud platforms, chip production, and algorithmic intelligence. These hegemonic corporations act as imperial powers that perpetuate similar inequalities to traditional colonists, in which the global south risks becoming a resource for the tech giants. The comparison might seem like an exaggeration, but in reality AI colonialism follows similar patterns. Historically great economies were built on extraction; they extracted raw materials from peripheries, and then the industrial base at the center transformed into a worthy product, geopolitical influence, innovation, and wealth. Cotton flowed from subcontinent to Britain; rubber moved from southeast Asia to European countries, while minerals obtained from Africa were sent to imperial empires.

Today, the AI economy adopts an akin model where “data” is the vital material for digital functioning.  Millions of people from the south utilize these platforms; every search, GPS location, digital personal profile, and digital transaction becomes part of the data ecosystem that is required for its training, but their economic value is located elsewhere. It is particularly evident in African countries, where millions of people rely on these foreign platforms for information. Their data from search engines, digital databases, and social media, is then used to train the AI models, whilst the African community receives little economic benefit or no influence over how these technologies are deployed in their region. By controlling these giant data ecosystems, these tech conglomerates also gain leverage over their political, social, cultural, and economic affairs. Even though having a digital footprint is a sign of progress, when it is foreign owned or funded by external actors, it can be manipulated as imperialistic power that not only controls the data system, but also significantly affects the local traders and businesses.

Similar to east India companies, these tech corporations operate across national jurisdictions, shape economic trajectories and influence domestic governments to sustain their digital dominance. They shape information systems, and their regimes of truth. They decide which technology should be introduced in the market, at what cost, what conditions, and for whom. The east India company governed India not through military conquests but because the local leaders became dependent on the commercial and political networks controlled by the corporation. Their economic dependency paved the way for the east India company’s takeover. Today, the danger is not that the tech corporations will rule the state directly, rather it is the fear that the national governments will become so dependent that the exercises of their sovereign autonomy will be meaningless. AI colonialism is at the front, recreating the colonial dependency traps.

Another manifestation of ‘digital colonialism’ in the global south is the extraction of data through coercive bundles of consent forms. Most people from third-world countries click ‘accept all’ to install an app or to log into a website without reading its full contents. It is an illusion of ‘choice’ created by these companies, but in actuality, these people have no choice. If they ‘refuse’ to click they might lose their access to digital accounts, bank apps, or mobile services. Colonial powers used a similar tactic of ‘terra nullius’ ­to lay claim on foreign land and resources. The new digital ecosystems are now integrating modern forms of terra nullius to govern the global data and algorithmic infrastructures. In addition to controlling the databases, the new AI colonial world order exploits the cheap labor services of the global south to maximize their profits. During Venezuela’s economic crisis, the prime educated force was readily exploited as ‘cheap labor’ by the Silicon Valley. In exchange for survival income, they were exposed to precarious working conditions, pay-cuts, unstable contracts. This reflects that the AI colonialism is following the legacy of historical empires step-by-step; controlling foreign ecosystems, exploiting cheap labor, and profiting over their raw materials.

The digital hegemony in the global south extends beyond economical matrix; it is the struggle over political influence, power, and raw materials that will ultimately determine who will produce the knowledge, who controls the technology, and who profits off the wealth generated by AI ecosystems. Colonial history should not be merely viewed as the ancient past, but as a lesson to reject the ‘modern empires’. In order to do so, the global south must invest in indigenous technology companies, data systems and regulatory digital frameworks to protect the local’s data. Unless the global south acts collectively against AI colonialism, it may again serve as a colony supplying critical resources that enrich others whilst itself remains excluded from the global power centers. 

China’s foreign minister says that emerging economies remain underrepresented in global governance institutions.

Presenting China’s new white paper on making global governance more equitable, minister Wang Yi argued that the role of the United Nations should be strengthened and developing countries should have a stronger voice in the world body.

In Beijing’s stated view, all countries should have an equal voice in global affairs, which means the Global South should have more representation.

China’s call comes as the world is engulfed in many armed conflicts and facing serious economic challenges.

But is Beijing now presenting itself as a leader of the Global South? And will it be able to garner enough support to play that role?

Presenter: Sami Zeidan

Guests:

Steve Tsang – Director of the SOAS China Institute

Cobus van Staden – Head of research at the China-Global South Project

Allen Carlson – Associate professor in the Government Department at Cornell University

For half a century, a handful of wealthy Western democracies wrote the rules of the global economy.

But the world order is becoming crowded, and even as the Group of Seven (G7) remains one of the world’s most influential clubs, a challenger has emerged.

BRICS has expanded, and says it wants a bigger voice for the Global South. This bloc of nations speaks for nearly half the world’s population – and accounts for a growing share of global output, energy and raw materials.

In the space between the two, a third force is gathering pace: the so-called middle powers, nations too big to ignore and unwilling to pick a side.