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‘Badge of honour’: Israeli settlers shrug off global condemnation | Occupied West Bank News

When the European Union issued its latest tranche of sanctions against Israeli settler groups and their leaders, Regavim, founded in part by the country’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, these groups welcomed the measures as a “badge of honour.”

Another sanctioned figure, Daniella Weiss, whose movement, Nachala, has held conferences on the Gaza border to discuss plans for settlement expansion into the occupied Palestinian territory, likewise dismissed the European penalties as “ridiculous” and “banal”.

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In total, the EU sanctioned four entities and three individuals associated with the settler movement, which includes high-profile characters such as Weiss, Regavim and its director, Meir Deutsch, and the Amana cooperative association, which offers logistical and financial support to settlements in the occupied West Bank.

Even government figures have been targeted in recent Western actions. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, a son of the settler movement, was sanctioned by the United Kingdom, Canada and several other countries for his alleged role in supporting or enabling violence in the West Bank, highlighting how the settlement project has the support of the highest echelons of the Israeli state.

Overall, the nonchalant response from the targeted figures and entities suggests that none of the EU measures will do anything to stop settlement expansion or make individuals accountable for the growing wave of violence against Palestinians.

Ironically, the largely toothless measures might instead become a source of domestic prestige for their leaders, analysts say, as few would expect these hardline settler figures to spend their summers in Paris or London and thus be affected by the sanctions. Instead, a wave of terror in the occupied West Bank will likely continue, with the tacit support of the government.

 

Endemic violence

In the eyes of many activists and observers who spoke to Al Jazeera, the EU’s focus on group and individual “violations” falls far short of articulating the scale of the highly coordinated settler attacks or the extent to which the state and society support them.

Following the Hamas-led attack of October 2023, United Nations and human rights monitors have documented systemic lethal settler attacks in places such as the South Hebron Hills, where residents of villages like Susiya and Umm al-Khair have been killed or seriously injured in collective incursions.

In the northern West Bank, Palestinian residents of villages around Nablus and Ramallah have seen their homes, vehicles and olive groves torched during nighttime settler raids. Entire Bedouin herding communities in the Jordan Valley have also been forcibly displaced following sustained campaigns of intimidation and violence.

All of this underscores the depth and breadth of settler activity, which, according to people on the ground, has the direct support of the Israeli government.

“It’s gotten much worse since October 2023. They now have the courage to attack into the heart of densely populated Palestinian villages. I see them, they came into the heart of my village outside Ramallah, they feel safe to do so,” Tahseen Alayan, deputy director of Al-Haq, told Al Jazeera.

“If you buy a sheep, they will steal it. If you build a house, they will destroy it. If you buy a car, they will burn it.”

BE'ERI, ISRAEL - OCTOBER 21: Daniella Weiss, founder of the Nachalot Association, attends the Jewish religious holiday of Sukkot (Feast of Tabernacles) activities, where activist Jewish people set up numerous gazebos in the area as a tradition in Be'eri, Israel on October 21, 2024. Israelis and far-right politicians are demonstrating demanding the expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and the reopening of settlements there, while others dream of invading many countries in the region in pursuit of “Greater Israel”. ( Enes Canlı - Anadolu Agency )
Daniella Weiss, founder of the Nachalot Association, described the EU sanctions as “ridiculous” and “banal” [Enes Canli/Anadolu Agency]

Examples of Israeli government complicity in these settler raids are not hard to find, and the statistics indicate collective efforts to entrench Israeli control over the West Bank, which has been occupied since 1967.

Israeli forces and settlers are accused of killing an estimated 1,168 people in the occupied West Bank since October 2023 and injuring a further 12,666 Palestinians. Another 33,000 people have been displaced, while Israel has also detained nearly 23,000 Palestinians in the West Bank during this period, many without charge.

“The violence does not happen in a vacuum,” Alayan continued. “This is an extension of the Israeli government; settlement is at the core of their identity. They are protected by the government and by the occupying services, and they freely admit it.”

A tragic incident that comes to mind is settler Yinon Levi, who allegedly shot dead Palestinian activist Awdah Hathaleen in Masafer Yatta last year. Despite the murder being captured on video, Levi nevertheless remains at large.

“Even if they are ever prosecuted, the sentences rarely reflect the severity of the crime,” Alayan said. “These people return to their homes and are seen as heroes.”

‘Entitlement and superiority’

This sense of impunity that settlers appear to be imbued with cannot be detached from the appointment to ministerial positions of leading figures or sympathisers of the settler movement – notably Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, the latter born in an illegal settlement in the occupied Golan Heights.

In a sign of state-settler cooperation to achieve direct control of the West Bank, in contravention of the Oslo Accords, Israel last year announced plans for the establishment of the E1 settlement that would link occupied East Jerusalem with its growing Maale Adumim bloc.

According to plans outlined by Smotrich, when established, this settlement would kill any hopes of the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and fulfil a biblical prophecy that many in the movement have been working towards.

Israeli far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich holds a map of an area near the settlement of Maale Adumim, a land corridor known as E1, outside Jerusalem in the occupied West Bank, on August 14, 2025, after a press conference at the site. [Menahem Kahana/AFP]
Israeli far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich holds a map of an area near the settlement of Maale Adumim, a land corridor known as E1, outside Jerusalem in the occupied West Bank, on August 14, 2025, after a news conference at the site [Menahem Kahana/AFP]

Daniel Bar-Tal, a professor of social-political psychology from the Department of Education at Tel Aviv University, interpreted the thinking behind the settlers leading this violence across the West Bank.

“It is divine order to settle West Bank. With divine order you do not argue but achieve it in the way Yehoshua carried it 3,000 years ago when he entered the promised land,” he explained. “He achieved it with sword, so we need to do the same.”

Shai Parnes of the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem told Al Jazeera that the absence of international pressure has bolstered the alliance between the state and settler movement.

“The Israeli regime is an apartheid regime based on Jewish supremacy and institutionalised discrimination against Palestinians,” Parnes told Al Jazeera.

“Any Israeli, civilian or soldier, who harms a Palestinian receives full immunity and support from the Israeli systems, and Israel itself receives this from the international community. These facts explain the Israelis’ sense of entitlement and superiority.”

Palestinian Nazem Saleh Shoman stands inside a pen at a sheep farm that was set on fire the previous night by Israeli settlers in the Palestinian village of Abu Falah in the central occupied West Bank on June 2, 2026.
Palestinian Nazem Saleh Shoman stands inside a pen at a sheep farm that was set on fire the previous night by Israeli settlers in the Palestinian village of Khirbet Abu Falah in the central occupied West Bank [AFP]

Yehouda Shenhav-Shahrabani, one of Israel’s leading sociologists, described the channelling of “Jewish supremacy” from the individual to the group, to the state, and back again, as a “closed loop”.

This, he said, fosters a sense of superiority among individuals, and when combined with a militarised society, makes violence against the native Palestinian population, who are in the way of realising this supposed biblical prophecy, almost inevitable.

“Some believe they’re in the West Bank because God said it was theirs. Others are there because they’re too poor to be anywhere else, and have been told they’re superior anyway,” he said.

“Two-thirds of the time, these same people are soldiers. They carry guns all the time. Looking on while they carry out this violence against Palestinians are other soldiers who believe almost exactly the same thing, and behind them politicians. Like I said, it’s a closed loop.”

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Oil Climbs as Middle East Tensions Rise While AI Rally Lifts Global Stocks

Global markets are navigating two powerful and competing forces: escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and continued investor enthusiasm for artificial intelligence-related stocks. While concerns over renewed conflict between the United States and Iran have boosted oil prices and supported demand for safe-haven assets, the AI-driven technology rally has continued to push stock markets higher, particularly in Asia.

What Happened

Oil prices rose for a third consecutive session on Wednesday after fresh hostilities emerged in the Gulf region. Brent crude climbed 1% to $94.74 per barrel as hopes for a quick resolution to tensions between Washington and Tehran faded.

The U.S. military reported that Iranian missile attacks targeting Bahrain, Kuwait and other regional locations were either intercepted or failed. The developments came after negotiations aimed at ending the conflict between the United States and Iran stalled despite both sides announcing a tentative agreement last week.

Meanwhile, financial markets showed mixed reactions. U.S. stock futures were largely unchanged, while European futures edged lower. In Asia, however, technology shares continued their strong advance, helping stock indexes in Japan and Taiwan reach record highs.

Why Markets Are Reacting to Middle East Risks

Investors had previously expected the United States and Iran to formalize an agreement that would reduce regional tensions and ease concerns about energy supplies. The lack of progress in negotiations has instead revived fears of a prolonged conflict that could disrupt oil shipments from the Gulf, a critical region for global energy markets.

Higher oil prices typically reflect concerns about potential supply disruptions. The latest military developments prompted traders to unwind some of their earlier bets on a diplomatic breakthrough, contributing to the rise in crude prices.

Currency markets also reflected growing caution. The U.S. dollar strengthened against the Japanese yen, briefly touching the closely watched 160 level before retreating amid concerns that Japanese authorities could intervene to support their currency.

AI Stocks Continue to Defy Market Uncertainty

Despite geopolitical concerns, enthusiasm surrounding artificial intelligence remained a major driver of equity markets. Wall Street indexes posted modest gains on Tuesday, supported by technology shares.

Chipmaker Marvell Technology surged more than 32% after Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang described the company as a potential trillion-dollar business. Investor optimism surrounding AI also helped propel SoftBank Group above Toyota Motor Corporation as Japan’s most valuable listed company.

The AI boom has continued to attract investment even as broader markets grapple with geopolitical uncertainty and concerns about interest rates.

What Comes Next

Investors are now closely watching upcoming U.S. economic data, including services sector activity, private payroll figures and Friday’s employment report. Strong labor market data could reinforce expectations that the Federal Reserve will keep interest rates higher for longer or even consider further increases.

Bond markets remained relatively stable, while traders adjusted expectations from potential rate cuts earlier in the year to the possibility of additional rate hikes. Markets have also priced in the likelihood of monetary tightening in Europe and Japan.

At the same time, developments in the Middle East remain a key risk factor. Any further escalation between the United States and Iran could push oil prices higher and increase volatility across global financial markets, while continued strength in AI-related stocks may help support broader equity markets despite geopolitical headwinds.

With information from Reuters.

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Putin Pressures Armenia as Russia Struggles to Maintain Global Influence

Russia’s influence across its traditional sphere of influence is facing growing challenges as the war in Ukraine continues to consume military, economic and diplomatic resources. For decades, Moscow maintained strong ties with former Soviet states through security guarantees, energy supplies and economic integration. However, several longtime partners have increasingly sought closer relations with the West, raising concerns in the Kremlin about the erosion of its geopolitical position.

One of the most notable examples is Armenia, a longtime Russian ally that has recently deepened engagement with the United States and Europe while exploring a path toward eventual European Union membership.

What Happened

Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned Armenia that pursuing closer integration with the European Union could come at a significant economic cost. Ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, Putin suggested that Yerevan could lose access to discounted Russian oil and gas if it continues moving toward the EU.

The warning comes as polls indicate that the party of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has pursued a more Western-oriented foreign policy, is likely to perform strongly in the vote.

Russia has already taken measures that many observers view as pressure tactics, including temporary restrictions on certain Armenian exports and warnings about possible reductions in economic cooperation.

Why Armenia Is Moving Closer to the West

Relations between Moscow and Yerevan have cooled significantly in recent years. Armenia signed a partnership agreement with the United States last month and has taken legislative steps that could eventually support EU membership aspirations.

Pashinyan’s government argues that Armenia must diversify its international partnerships and reduce its dependence on any single power. Supporters of closer Western ties point to economic opportunities, political reforms and security cooperation as key motivations behind the shift.

Russian officials, however, view Armenia’s growing engagement with Western institutions as part of a broader effort by the United States and Europe to weaken Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus region.

Russia’s Wider Struggle to Retain Influence

The dispute with Armenia highlights a broader challenge facing Russia as it attempts to preserve its global standing while remaining heavily focused on the war in Ukraine.

Across multiple regions, Moscow is confronting increasing competition from Western powers. In Europe, countries once considered friendly to Russia are strengthening ties with the European Union and NATO. In the Balkans, political pressure is growing on governments that have traditionally maintained close relations with Moscow.

Russia also faces challenges in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniestria, where pro-European political forces are gaining influence. In Central Asia, Moscow is closely watching expanding Western engagement in a region it has long regarded as part of its strategic sphere.

Beyond its neighborhood, Russia’s relationships with partners such as Cuba, Venezuela and Iran are being tested as geopolitical dynamics shift and Western pressure intensifies.

What Comes Next

The outcome of Armenia’s parliamentary election will be closely watched in both Moscow and Western capitals. A victory for Pashinyan’s party could strengthen Armenia’s efforts to deepen ties with Europe and the United States, potentially leading to further tensions with Russia.

For the Kremlin, the situation represents a broader strategic dilemma. As the war in Ukraine continues without a clear resolution, Russia must balance military commitments with the need to maintain influence among traditional allies increasingly exploring alternative partnerships.

The coming months are likely to reveal whether Moscow can preserve its position in regions it has long considered part of its sphere of influence or whether Western engagement will continue to reshape the geopolitical landscape across Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and beyond.

With information from Reuters.

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CFO Risk Management in a Fractured Global Order

Looking ahead to the second half of the year, corporate finance chiefs are hardwiring contingency into strategy.

Global corporate finance leaders are entering the second half of 2026 facing the most complex operating environment of the post-pandemic era, requiring them to balance cost discipline, technology investment, and capital deployment against a backdrop of geopolitical volatility and renewed energy uncertainty. 

At the center of that uncertainty is the Strait of Hormuz. Normally a conduit for around 20% of global oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports, the strait has remained largely blocked since war broke out in the Middle East in late February. 

The conflict has added a new shock layer to an environment that was already fragile as a result of tariff turbulence, weakening demand, and declining consumer confidence. 

The consequences for corporate finance professionals are direct and serious, forcing teams into defensive mode: conserving cash, deferring capital investment, and stress-testing portfolios against prolonged geopolitical disruption. 

Macro Shocks Add Strain

Cost pressures were already elevated before the war, and are continuing their upward trajectory. According to the ACCA and IMA Global Economic Conditions Survey (GECS), the further rise likely reflects some early impacts of the surge in energy and other commodity prices since the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Among the CFOs surveyed, the proportion reporting increased operating costs eased slightly in the first quarter of 2026, but remains high by historical standards.

Confidence across finance teams, meanwhile, fell sharply in the first quarter, taking sentiment to a low point previously seen only at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Since the GECS survey was conducted in the first half of March, the outbreak of hostilities would have been a major factor weighing on sentiment, owing to the surge in geopolitical uncertainty and the price jump in energy and some other commodities.

Logistics and energy are the most immediate concerns, according to findings of the Allianz Trade survey of 6,000 companies across 13 major economies: 60% said they are worried about supply chain disruption and rising commodity prices, with concern running highest in Vietnam, Poland, the UK, and the U.S.

One consequence of the war-induced shocks is that businesses are holding more inventory, adding to liquidity demand at precisely the moment rates are falling more slowly than expected, if at all. 

Beyond Hedging

When it comes to sustaining readiness in the months ahead, Naresh Aggarwal, associate director, Policy and Technical at the Association of Corporate Treasurers, says the framework is simple: “plan for the worst, hope for the best.” In practice, this means larger, more committed credit facilities, greater use of derivatives, and hedge duration adjusted to circumstances.

Alex Ashby, group treasurer, WPP
Alex Ashby, group treasurer, WPP

The effects of the war are extending far beyond the energy, shipping, and chemical manufacturing sectors. Alex Ashby, group treasurer at WPP, says the ongoing volatility has driven material change at the global media company. 

“Geopolitical volatility has led us to materially step up our focus on foreign exchange risk management,” he notes. “We have invested heavily in training across the organization to raise capability and accountability and introduced new monitoring and reporting so that FX exposures and outcomes are reviewed regularly at executive and board level. Alongside more frequent liquidity stress-testing, this ensures risks are identified earlier, decisions are taken closer to the underlying exposure, and we remain agile as conditions evolve.”

The world remains deeply interconnected, says Raphael Savalle, CFO at Montblanc, and so shocks travel fast and wide. Businesses are no longer operating in a world where companies can remove volatility by hedging, but one where operating models must be built to absorb it.

“This isn’t going away; if anything, it’s increasing,” he says. “It’s the butterfly effect, times 10. The key is to maintain long-term strategic direction while also building agility into how you operate – what I call dynamic P&L management, or dynamic resource allocation – and still be on the lookout every day for risks that may not at first seem relevant but turn out to be, because of the way the world is connected.”

What impact will this level of uncertainty have on the day-to-day in the coming months? Beyond a structured routine of information exchange, it demands the confidence to be candid about these less-obvious risks.

Reassessing the Tech Arsenal

The challenges of the coming months are also prompting some companies to review their technology needs. ERP systems are still the backbone of corporate finance, but their rigidity is fueling demand for smarter, more flexible tools to augment them. 

Enterprise Performance Management (EPM) platforms are emerging as a viable contender, says Armand Angeli, AI and automation specialist and vice president of the Digital Transformation and AI Group at DFCG, the French network of CFOs, broadening their scope beyond finance to cover sales, purchasing, and logistics. 

Major ERP transformation projects are stalling as companies wrestle with legacy integration, Angeli says; bridging old and new without discarding existing investment remains the central challenge. 

“We can’t just abandon ERP,” he says. “We have to create bridges or APIs between AI tools and all the ERPs. So the question becomes, How do you create these bridges? It’s not easy.” While ERPs can be inflexible, they are still valuable tools, “thought through by experts, for CFOs.” 

While the major ERP providers are working to embed AI in their offerings, corporate users are taking different routes, depending on individual views and budgets. In practice, then, AI adoption by corporate finance teams is advancing with extreme caution. 

“If the pace of change for these tools is 100, the pace of change among individuals is 10, and for companies, it’s 1,” Angeli observes.

Predictive AI, built on auditable algorithms, has earned trust as a tool for reconciliations, fraud detection, and cash posting, while generative AI remains a source of deep skepticism. Hallucinations, compliance failures, and the risk of over-reliance are tangible concerns. 

“We now see more and more suspicious posting, more and more duplicate payments,” says Angeli. 

Agentic AI is further still from meaningful deployment, he adds: “CFOs don’t trust agentic AI. And given that studies show that hallucinations account for between 30% and 70% of Gen AI output, we don’t trust Gen AI, either. Maybe 1% or 2% of companies can say they have agents working.” 

Aggarwal concurs, observing that corporate finance teams remain in the exploratory phase when it comes to AI, but with purpose. Companies are mandating structured upskilling; One treasury team of his acquaintance dedicates half a day every other week to some form of AI-related upskilling or evaluating AI processes, he says. 

Data Integrity

The priority for the second half of this year, however, will be data integrity and learning which insights are genuinely actionable, Aggarwal predicts; truly agentic AI is a story for 2027.

Raphael Savalle, CFO, Montblanc

“The word I hear a lot in these circles is trust: trusted data, trusted algorithms, trusted outputs, trusted use of the outputs,” he says. Going forward, the deeper cultural question of if and when to remove the human from the loop will become harder to avoid as, presumably, AI systems accumulate error-free track records.

Progress may be cautious for now, but Gartner estimates that CFOs who get AI deployment right could unlock 10 additional margin points by 2029. It won’t be isolated pilots that deliver returns, however; the gains will come from managing technology as a portfolio. Three quarters of CFOs are already raising technology budgets for 2026, the research firm finds, with nearly half boosting them by 10% or more.

Quantifying return on investment is difficult for the majority of AI-based projects, however, and will continue to be so through this year, Angeli predicts: “We know that we have to implement AI and hope for financial ROI in the future, but most companies are not seeing it yet.” 

Another aspect of the technology challenge that is intrinsically linked to wider geopolitical developments, says Montblanc’s Savalle, is digital sovereignty, or a nation’s ability to control, secure, and regulate its entire infrastructure: in accordance with its laws, but also its strategic interests. Different approaches to the governance of these technologies and the accompanying data have deepened geopolitical competition between the U.S., China, and the EU, according to the World Economic Forum.

“Many governments are now insisting that data centers sit within their own borders,” Savalle warns, “and increasingly, they’re looking at software dependency more broadly: not just AI, but email systems, video conferencing tools, the whole stack. As a CFO, you have to consider what that means for your IT architecture.” Under these circumstances, will the old ambition of a single global ERP still be viable in five years’ time? He is not so sure.

Permanent Contingency Thinking

Whether physical war or digital friction, geopolitical risks are forcing the finance function into a state of permanent contingency thinking. The closing of the Strait of Hormuz is an extreme case, but it sits within a pattern that was already familiar to CFOs and treasurers. The post-Covid supply chain collapse, the Russia-Ukraine war’s impact on energy and commodities, the Red Sea disruptions of 2024–25 — each forced treasury teams to rethink counterparty risk, liquidity buffers, FX exposure, and supply chain financing.

What’s different this time is that finance leaders are no longer treating the shocks as exceptional. 

Aggarwal sees the broader geopolitical realignment as structural rather than cyclical, and doubts even a change in US administration can reverse it: “The genie is out of the bottle around using trade as a way of imposing sovereignty.” Looking ahead, he foresees continued pressure on the finance function to operate against a challenging backdrop.

“What I understand from my CFO network is that there is no going back,” Savalle observes. “This is the new normal, and, if anything, it will continue and expand. So the question is about how you adapt your operating model. Make sure that you get that feedback loop and keep an open mind, because you are going into uncharted territory. Things used to work in a certain world order. This is changing.” 

For corporate finance leaders, the priority is no longer waiting for stability to return, but operating effectively in its absence. While keeping to a long-term strategy is vital, so is reconsidering some of the operating model assumptions that a world divided into regional blocs is calling into question. That could include maintaining higher liquidity buffers, diversifying supply chains geographically, stress-testing cash flow forecasts against energy price scenarios, and investing in planning and forecasting tools that allow the organization to model disruption faster. 

For the corporate finance function, these are no longer crisis measures, but the baseline. 

This article appears in the June 2026 issue of Global Finance Magazine.

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Korea rises to global No. 2 cosmetics exporter after France

The head office of APR in Seoul. The South Korean beauty company has emerged as a new powerhouse in the country’s cosmetics industry. Photo by APR

May 28 (UPI) — South Korea overtook the United States in 2025 to become the world’s second-largest exporter of cosmetics, according to the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) earlier this month.

The ministry noted that the East Asian country’s cosmetics exports amounted to $11.4 billion in 2025, up 11.8% from a year before, trailing only runaway leader France with $24.3 billion.

The United States ranked third with $10.8 billion, followed by Germany with $9.9 billion, Spain with $9.2 billion, Italy with $9 billion, China with $7.3 billion, and Japan with $3.9 billion.

Meanwhile, South Korea’s 2025 cosmetics imports declined 2.3% year-on-year to $1.29 billion, resulting in a trade surplus of $10.1 billion. It marked the first time Asia’s fourth-largest economy topped $10 billion in the annual cosmetics trade surplus.

By destination, the United States has emerged as the largest overseas market for Korean cosmetics last year as exports jumped 15% year-over-year to $2.2 billion. In contrast, shipments to China plunged 19% to $2 billion.

Demand for Korean cosmetics, widely known as K-beauty products, also increased sharply in Europe and the Middle East. Exports to Poland, in particular, more than doubled from a year earlier to $282 million.

To further beef up the competitiveness of the K-beauty industry, the MFDS pledged to pursue a range of policy initiatives, including expanded regulatory support programs.

“As countries such as the United States and China have recently introduced cosmetic safety assessment systems, we are preparing to implement our own safety evaluation framework in phases,” the MFDS said in a statement.

“To help domestic companies comply smoothly with the new system, the government plans to establish guidelines, provide consulting services, and train professional evaluators,” it added.

New players fueling K-beauty boom

In the past, South Korea’s cosmetics giants relied heavily on China as their primary offshore market. Traditional behemoths, including AmorePacific and LG Household and Health Care, resorted to such a business model for years.

However, a new wave of entrepreneurs has come to the fore with a different approach, reducing dependence on China while tapping aggressively into the United States, Europe, and Southeast Asia.

Leading the shift is APR, which was founded in 2014 and built its growth around online sales channels and beauty devices aimed at international customers.

Last year, APR almost tripled its operating profit to $240 million, which is almost equivalent to that of AmorePacific and well above $113 million of LG Household & Health Care.

APR continued its strong momentum this year as its first-quarter operating profit stood at $101 million, up 173.7% from a year ago, based on robust performance in such major markets as the United States and Japan.

According to U.S. business tracker Navigo Marketing, APR came in third place in Amazon’s beauty category last year with a 7.1% market share. The firm doubled it to 14.1% in the first quarter to claim the top position.

APR has also strengthened its offline presence by entering more than 1,500 Target stores across the United States last month. It plans to expand further into about 3,000 Walmart stores in June.

Meanwhile, first-quarter operating incomes of AmorePacific and LG Household and Health Care fell short of APR with $84 million and $72 million, respectively.

The strong earnings have prompted investors to pile into APR shares on the Seoul bourse.

As a result, APR’s market capitalization jumped 73.59% this year to reach $10 billion as of Thursday. Those of AmorePacific and LG Household & Health Care were $4.49 billion and $2.52 billion, respectively.

“Considering the expansion of offline channels in the United States and accelerating sales growth in Europe, APR’s stock is likely to maintain a medium- to long-term upward trajectory,” Yuanta Securities Korea analyst Lee Seung-eun said in a report.

HMC Investment Securities analyst Ha Hee-ji shared a similar view.

“APR’s growing brand recognition in the United States appears to be spreading across global markets, thus creating a virtuous cycle,” Ha said. “Business-to-business sales in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East are also showing steep growth trends.”

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How Middle East Supply Risks Are Growing in Impact on Global Oil Trading

The Middle East has been a difficult region to deal with in oil markets. When it comes to energy geographies, the region has proven to be a disproportionately significant part of the world’s energy resources, with export facilities traversing a handful of maritime routes and political situations that have been tense, if not outright volatile, at times. The change in 2025 and into 2026 isn’t the nature of the forces but rather the confluence of overlapping pressures: ongoing sanctions enforcement, multiple theaters of conflict, OPEC+ tensions that are more public than ever in previous years, and disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea, which now seem to have become a semi-permanent part of the shipping route landscape.

There is no background information for commodity traders, market analysts, and energy investors. It’s a real-time, constantly evolving dynamic that can make all the difference in the day-to-day performance of prices, and it’s particularly important when prices are sliding around rapidly, and the stories behind them are changing just as fast.

The Behavior of Prices and the Risk of Middle East Supplies

The area is responsible for about one-third of the world’s crude production. That should make it significant in and of itself. What makes matters worse is that export infrastructure is concentrated in a handful of terminals, pipelines, and maritime corridors where a disproportionately large share of oil is exported. The disruption of any of them (even for a moment) reduces a large supply signal to an extremely short time frame.

Traders who follow crude oil price live data are the first ones to witness this. Real-time feeds are a reflection of more than just the fundamental supply-demand elements, but the market’s real-time assessment of the value of geopolitical risk and how much it “should” be worth at any given moment. A news event, which is a minor detail in a more stable environment, can cause future prices to move $5 or more in less than an hour. The consistent and tough question – and it is a tough one – is, which events actually have physical supply implications and which ones are sentiment-driven moves that die in a session or two?

The Strait of Hormuz

About 20-21 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products go through the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 20% of the world’s oil consumption. No readily available bypasses can be found that can absorb that flow at a similar cost. There are partial alternatives, including the IPSA pipeline and Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, but they would not even come close to filling the deficit should the Hormuz be closed en masse.

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It is a strait between Oman and Iran. Geography makes it so that any serious disruption in U.S.-Iran relations or of security conditions in the Gulf in general puts Hormuz back on the market’s agenda. Traders are all familiar with this: when there is a lot of Iranian tension, the futures positioning will always reflect the chokepoint risk, even if there is no incident per se.

Production Outages That Don’t Make the Front Page

The issue of the supply is something that generally doesn’t get the same kind of attention it should get, but the clearest example of this recurring issue is Libya. In recent years, internal political squabbles about how to divide up oil revenues have led to several production shutdowns that have temporarily increased the tightness of the light sweet crude grades refined by European and Asian plants. The disruptions are likely to persist when there is no political agreement, and the pattern is robust. In recent years, Iraq’s export pipeline to the North through Turkey has also been down for extended periods of time. These relatively inconspicuous disruptions can add up and impact medium-term supply dynamics, though not necessarily have the same impact as a more conspicuous incident.

Key Risk Factors Shaping Market Sentiment in 2026

The Middle East is a geopolitical risk that has many variables. It’s a combination of interwoven pressures that work in various ways and to varying effects on the length of the price impact. The issues that currently have the greatest attention of serious analysts are generally of three types:

  • Export infrastructure and production infrastructure are currently under physical threat to production.
  • Sanctions regimes and the dynamics of their enforcement.
  • Disruption of shipping routes and attendant disruption of the trade economics.

Everything is unique, and sometimes they are not in the same direction at the same time. That’s part of what makes the current situation more complicated than any one risk headline implies.

Active Conflict Zones and Exposure to Infrastructure

The latest example of large-scale infrastructure targeting is the 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities in the country, which was carried out using drones and missiles. The loss in output occurred temporarily, amounting to about 5.7 million bpd, the largest sudden supply shock in modern oil market history. The recovery was quicker than many expected, partly because of the operational robustness of Aramco and partly because the situation was swiftly contained diplomatically. But the event has permanently changed the way markets view the vulnerability of infrastructure in the Gulf, and that repricing has not been complete.

The Persistent Iranian Supply Question

Iran’s petroleum sales have also been sustained in the face of sanctions, largely via Asian markets out of reach to Western sanctions. A full-fledged deal between Tehran and Western governments has yet to be hammered out, as of early 2026. That has left volumes of Iranian supply in a limbo of sorts: they could be rapidly reduced by stepped-up enforcement, and they could be dramatically increased by a change in diplomatic circumstances. Both of these results can have significant price consequences, and even the uncertainty can be a factor in the market without a clear decision.

Infrastructure Concentration Risk

The concentration levels in Saudi Arabia’s export system warrant a more significant focus than is generally found outside of export specialist circles. Abqaiq processes and stabilizes a huge percentage of Saudi crude before it is shipped to export terminals, removing the sulfur from it. That kind of ‘single point of failure’ is not typical in most industrial supply chains. In the case of oil, it’s a structural aspect of the market and one that has been proven, not just thought.

OPEC+ Internal Dynamics

However, OPEC+ compliance has been quite lackluster at times, notably from Iraq and Kazakhstan, which have had a history of overproduction. This gives rise to an everlasting discrepancy between OPEC+ declarations and the actual supply data. For analysts, the bottom line is that it is important not to take production decisions at face value but to also consider the track record of implementation once a deal has been agreed on to see what the real supply impact was.

Non-State Actor Activity and Shipping Friction

Since late 2023, the Houthis have started to attack commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea more frequently, and these attacks have persisted through 2025. What those disruptions drove home is that it’s not necessary to blow a wellhead to impact oil market economics. A round-the-Cape voyage will increase the time in transit by about ten to fourteen days, as well as the fuel costs. During periods of increased Houthi activity, insurance costs for tankers traveling in the Gulf area skyrocketed. Both impacts are not a direct factor in the crude benchmarks, but both impact the effective landed cost of Middle East barrels in destination markets.

How the Market Prices Geopolitical Risk

Knowing the difference is important, as geopolitical events do not affect oil prices in a single manner. Some effects are immediate and visible: a surge in the price of Brent futures within minutes of an incident report. Others come more slowly, via changes in freight rates, changes in the repricing of insurance, and changes in buyer behavior, which may take days or weeks to be reflected in trade flow data. The rate of these impacts varies, and so do their effects.

Then there is the issue of what the market “already” had in place whether there was an event or not. When there is a constant regional tension, there is usually some risk premium in prices. The incremental market move may therefore be less than anticipated when an event then reinforces concerns, the surprise element of the event, which is typically the one that produces the biggest market moves, is already discounted.

Risk Premium in Practice

Geopolitical risk premiums in times of heightened Middle East tension have varied from around $4 to $10 per barrel, depending on the market participants’ views on the probability of actual physical supply disruptions in the case of Brent crude, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. That’s a fairly broad window for economic trading, and it has a tendency to close up very fast when the tension subsides and without a supply event, which is the more common scenario.

The geopolitical risk premium factors analysts may consider are:

  • The nearness to active conflict, producing fields, or the working export terminals.
  • Production capacity that would be available to make up for the loss of production elsewhere.
  • The availability and magnitude of the IEA’s strategic stockpiles to be tapped.
  • Current tanker market conditions and the viability of an alternative route.
  • Diplomatic messages sent by governments in the area, including the United States and other great powers
  • Past examples of similar events, which have had identifiable supply impacts.

It is not easy to give exact weights to these inputs. Part of the reason for the price action to seemingly be different with comparable geopolitical events can be due to different analysts forming different conclusions from the same events.

Historical Supply Disruptions and Price Responses

The following table shows some of the more significant supply events that took place in the Middle East and the approximate market impact. The trend of most entries was that the first price movement has been greater than the actual physical supply effect, at times much greater, and then it has partially retraced to a more stable situation.

Event Year Estimated Supply Impact Approximate Brent Price Reaction
Abqaiq/Khurais Attacks (Saudi Arabia) 2019 ~5.7 mb/d temporary loss ~15% intraday spike
Libyan Civil War Output Collapse 2011 ~1.4 mb/d reduction ~$20/bbl over several weeks
U.S. Re-imposition of Iran Sanctions 2018 ~1-1.5 mb/d reduction ~15% sustained over several months
Iraq-Northern Field Disruptions 2014 Partial northern output loss ~$10/bbl elevated premium
Houthi Red Sea Disruptions 2023-24 Rerouting; limited direct supply loss Moderate – primarily freight cost impact
Iran Sanctions + Red Sea Friction 2025-26 ~0.8-1.2 mb/d constrained Iranian output Persistent $4-8/bbl risk premium in Brent

The 2025-2026 entry is a more diffuse form of market pressure than those acute events listed above. It is not one particular incident, but rather sanctions enforcement and Iranian volumes kept low and shipping activity in the Red Sea continuing to cause friction in the transport system, which has kept transport costs elevated. The World Economic Outlook from the IMF pointed out that this type of persistent supply constraint is likely to have a longer-lasting impact on medium-term price expectations than acute supply shocks, which markets have historically been able to absorb and turn around in relatively short periods of time. Thus, a slow-burning risk premium can be more ‘sticky’ than a dramatic risk premium.

Broader Market Implications

Crude oil benchmarks are not the only place where supply risk from the Middle East exists. It extends out to related markets in ways that are not always apparent when the world’s focus is on the Brent or WTI headline price.

The second-order victim is likely to be refined product markets. In times of crude supply shortages or increased uncertainty, refinery margins and regional product availability may be affected to a greater extent, and the effects on end consumers may be magnified, especially in regions where there is little local refining or a high concentration of import logistics. The energy crisis of 2022 in Europe was a prime example of how the upstream pressure to supply energy flows through the downstream more quickly than most market players would have thought.

Other segments of the market that are impacted by increased supply risks in the Middle East are:

  • Tanker freight rates, which can also rise sharply without reference to crude prices during times of major-scale rerouting.
  • In oil-dependent economies, currency markets can be affected by changes in the prices of the oil that the state supplies, which change expectations of fiscal revenue and sovereign credit risk.
  • LNG markets with some short-term fuel switching demand in the exposed economies as a result of regional geopolitical pressure.
  • In agricultural commodity markets, where there is known overlap between energy input costs and food production, processing, and transport economics

Strategic Reserve Releases (SRRs) as a Counterweight

During the IEA’s coordinated strategic reserve release in 2022, it was seen that policy tools are in place to mitigate short-term supply shocks and that they can be implemented on a material scale when political conditions are right. However, there are drawbacks to those processes. During that time, reservoir levels were lowered significantly, and a rebuild takes time. There are also doubts about the effectiveness as a deterrent because, over time, markets will factor in the possibility of a release during the next big disruption event, effectively canceling the effect of a release in advance.

Geopolitical Risk Analysis: What It Does and Doesn’t Accomplish

It’s easy to fall into the temptation, because of the amounts of money potentially involved, of viewing geopolitical risk analysis as a predictive tool. It generally lacks it there. It’s actually helpful for comprehending markets and its actions, as well as for charting structural weaknesses that are price-relevant. What it doesn’t do well is tell you when an event will happen, or how big the market’s reaction will be when it does.

Instead of getting lost in qualifications, the specific limitations should be called out:

  • Escalation and de-escalation are non-linear and unpredictable to a great extent. Conflict situations that appear to be intractable can be solved in a flash, and stable times can fall apart in an instant. Both directions remain silent and don’t herald themselves.
  • When demand for a commodity is the same, the market price may be quite different in the two market conditions. There are interactions between the geopolitical trigger and positioning, sentiment and open interest that are not modelable in advance.
  • Secondary effects (such as freight repricing, product supply shifts and insurance cost changes) happen at varying rates to the initial crude price move, and thus the total impact of the market is more difficult to gauge in real time.
  • Analytical path dependency can occur when geopolitical narratives set up a framework that later information gets filtered through, without being recognized as such.

All this does not negate the analysis. It’s about calibration and about honesty when the power of explanation runs out, and speculation sets in.

Conclusion

Middle East supply risk is not a succession of shocks that will come and go and be completely addressed but rather a structural state in global oil markets. The combination of production weight, geographic concentration of export infrastructure, and political complexity of the region always comes with a certain level of supply uncertainty as a base case. The level of that uncertainty and the extent to which that uncertainty is priced into securities on a given day are what change.

The hard part for traders, analysts, and energy investors is not recognizing that there is risk – that’s obvious. It’s gaining a good enough sense of what matters most at a given moment, what the big picture supply-demand dynamics are, and at what point a careful study of the facts begins to look like well-informed guesswork. The clear understanding of that boundary is, in fact, probably more valuable than any single analytical framework that can be applied to the boundary.

Disclaimer

This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute financial advice, investment advice, or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any financial instrument, commodity, or derivative product. Trading in energy markets, including crude oil futures, CFDs, and related instruments, involves substantial risk of loss, including the possible loss of capital invested. Past market behavior and historical price patterns referenced in this article are not reliable indicators of future performance. Geopolitical developments described may not materialize as anticipated or may evolve in ways that differ materially from historical precedent. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult a qualified financial professional before making any investment or trading decisions. Nothing in this article should be interpreted as a trading signal, directional market recommendation, or endorsement of any specific trading approach.

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Critical Minerals Rush Risks Creating Global Oversupply, Industry Warns

Western governments are pouring tens of billions of dollars into critical minerals projects as they attempt to reduce dependence on China for materials essential to clean energy, defence technology and advanced manufacturing.

But industry executives, analysts and investors are increasingly warning that poorly coordinated state-backed investment could create severe oversupply problems similar to past commodity booms that ended in market crashes.

The concerns come as countries including the United States, Australia, European Union and Japan accelerate efforts to build strategic reserves and expand production of rare earths and other critical minerals.

Governments Ramp Up Critical Minerals Spending

The United States has committed more than $20 billion toward critical minerals development through multiple financing programmes, including Project Vault, a strategic stockpiling initiative worth around $10 billion.

Australia has also allocated at least A$13 billion to support critical minerals projects and reserves through several government-backed programmes.

These investments are designed to secure supplies of metals used in electric vehicles, semiconductors, renewable energy systems, aerospace equipment and military technologies.

Particular attention has focused on rare earth elements, a group of 17 metals essential for producing powerful magnets used in advanced defence systems and high-tech manufacturing.

Although the global rare earths market was valued at only about $6.4 billion in 2024, combined Western financial commitments to rare earth projects have already exceeded that figure.

Fears Grow Over Potential Oversupply

Mining executives and analysts warn that aggressive subsidies and overlapping national strategies could eventually flood global markets with excess supply.

Brett Beatty of Resource Capital Funds said the biggest danger lies in governments pursuing independent strategies without coordination.

According to Beatty, simultaneous efforts to rapidly increase production could create volumes far beyond global demand, ultimately crushing prices and undermining the very industries governments are trying to build.

Analysts drew comparisons to historical commodity gluts, including Europe’s “butter mountains” of the 1980s, Russian aluminium oversupply and Australia’s wool crisis, where subsidies and state support distorted markets and triggered sharp price collapses.

Rare Earth Market Could Face Surplus Pressures

Consultancy Project Blue warned that several rare earth markets are already on track to move into surplus over the coming years due to expanding state-backed production.

However, analyst David Merriman said governments may still be able to avoid major imbalances if they carefully adjust subsidies, stockpiling programmes and guaranteed purchasing arrangements.

Industry leaders say current stockpiles remain relatively small, limiting immediate risks of market disruption.

Lynas Rare Earths CEO Amanda Lacaze recently said rare earth stockpiles around the world remain modest and are not yet large enough to destabilise markets.

Australian Resources Minister Madeleine King also argued that today’s critical minerals policies differ significantly from past commodity intervention failures because they are more targeted and linked to long-term industrial supply chains.

Global Coordination Emerging Among Western Allies

Concerns about duplication and oversupply are pushing Western governments toward greater policy coordination.

The Group of Seven is reportedly discussing the creation of a permanent secretariat focused on coordinating critical mineral strategies and ensuring continuity between rotating national presidencies.

Industry experts say such coordination could help prevent destructive competition between allied nations while supporting more stable investment planning.

Lessons From Congo and Indonesia

Governments outside the West have already experimented with aggressive intervention in mineral markets.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo boosted cobalt prices by introducing export quotas and stockpiling measures designed to increase mining revenues.

While the policy initially lifted prices, analysts warn prolonged restrictions could encourage manufacturers to seek alternative materials or suppliers.

Similarly, Indonesia dramatically expanded its dominance in nickel production after banning exports of raw nickel ore in 2020 to force domestic processing investment.

Indonesia’s production surged within just a few years, but authorities have since struggled with falling prices and oversupply, forcing Jakarta to tighten mining quotas and centralise export controls.

These examples highlight the difficulty governments face in balancing national industrial ambitions with long-term market stability.

Analysis

The global race for critical minerals is increasingly becoming a strategic contest shaped as much by geopolitics as by economics.

Western governments view supply chain independence as essential after years of relying heavily on China for processing capacity and rare earth production. The push is not simply about commercial competition — it is tied directly to national security, technological leadership and energy transition goals.

However, the very scale of state intervention now unfolding raises the risk of creating distorted markets. If multiple governments simultaneously subsidise production, guarantee prices and build stockpiles without coordination, supply could rapidly outpace actual industrial demand.

That scenario would likely trigger sharp price declines, weaken private investment and potentially create another boom-and-bust cycle in the mining sector.

At the same time, the market dynamics of critical minerals differ from traditional commodities. Many of these materials are essential for emerging technologies, and demand is expected to rise significantly over the next two decades as countries expand renewable energy infrastructure, battery production and semiconductor manufacturing.

This means governments are not only competing to secure supply today but also positioning themselves for future industrial dominance.

Another key challenge is that refining and processing capabilities remain heavily concentrated in China. Even if Western countries succeed in expanding mining output, they may still depend on Chinese infrastructure unless domestic processing networks are developed alongside extraction projects.

The growing emphasis on “friend-shoring” and allied supply chains reflects an attempt to address this vulnerability.

Industry experts also point to a more sustainable model emerging through byproduct extraction. Instead of building entirely new mines based purely on high prices, companies are increasingly looking to recover critical minerals from existing industrial operations, reducing the risk of uncontrolled supply growth.

Projects involving Alcoa, Sojitz and Trafigura illustrate how governments and corporations are experimenting with lower-risk approaches to expanding supply.

Ultimately, the success of Western critical minerals strategies may depend less on how much money governments spend and more on whether they can coordinate policies, manage supply carefully and build integrated processing ecosystems capable of competing with China over the long term.

With information from Reuters.

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JPMorgan Acquire Revolut? 4 Reasons a Deal Makes Sense| Global Finance Magazine

An acquisition is the easiest way for the titan to get a leg up with digital nomads and international customers.

At first glance, it seems an absurd idea: JPMorgan Chase & Co., with its roughly $850 billion market cap, acquiring European unicorn Revolut, a private neobank valued at $75 billion.

Seemingly absurd, yes, but also worth considering, because it underscores the challenge that upstart fintechs pose to traditional banks. JPMorgan has already tested the practicality of building a digital-first banking experience internally. It launched Finn in 2017 as a standalone mobile banking brand aimed at younger users, then shut it down in 2019 after it failed to gain traction.

But the Finn experiment was not a clean rebuttal; it looked more like a legacy institution’s attempt to market around a shifting banking relationship than a fundamental rethink. A Revolut acquisition would give JPMorgan an established entry point into a dynamic new field.

I’m old enough to remember when BlackBerry’s CEO scoffed at Steve Jobs, saying, “You don’t need an app for the web.” We know how that played out. It’s easy to dismiss what doesn’t seem to fit your current moment, and just as easy to miss the next shift when you have the means to act.

JPMorgan doesn’t need Revolut. But the point isn’t survival; it’s trajectory. If banking is moving toward super apps as primary accounts, the question is whether JPMorgan can realistically build that future internally, or whether buying it may be the faster path.

Here are four reasons it could actually make sense:

1. The Technology

Ask a senior engineer at Revolut whether JPMorgan could replicate its platform quickly, and you’re likely to get a laugh. Ask JPMorgan’s technology leadership, and you’re likely to hear the opposite.

Both can be true.

By the time JPMorgan was experimenting with the future, Revolut was writing it. The fintech hit 100,000 customers within a year of its funding and scaled to 50 million by the end of 2024. It’s redefining what consumers expect from banking in Europe, and its sights are now set on the U.S. as well. In March, it applied to the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for a U.S. national bank charter.

2. The Culture

JPMorgan has the resources to succeed in the era of super-apps. But building a globally integrated, mobile-first platform is as much about organizational culture as it is about technology. Revolut was built for speed, iteration, and cross-border functionality from day one. JPMorgan was built for scale, stability, and regulatory complexity.

As Finn illustrates, those traits are not easily interchangeable.

JPMorgan could buy smaller firms in payments, investing, foreign exchange, or onboarding to assemble its own version of a super app. But stitching together components is not the same as acquiring a scaled, integrated platform with tens of millions of users, unified technology, and talent that lives and breathes a culture built around speed and innovation.

Realistically, an acquisition would require a significant premium over Revolut’s most recent private valuation. But that cuts both ways; JPMorgan would be paying for a scaled operating system, not a collection of disconnected parts.

3. The Geography

The difference between the two banks shows up in their approach to competing in Europe. JPMorgan is already expanding its digital retail presence and building out its footprint beyond the U.S. But the approach is incremental.

Revolut is anything but incremental. The company has grown to more than 70 million customers, adding roughly 1 million every 17 days. It provides immediate scale in markets where JPMorgan is still building.

Banks like Banco Santander have spent decades building global retail networks, market by market. For JPMorgan, acquiring Revolut would dramatically shorten that timeline, turning a multi-year expansion into near-instant relevance.

4. The Demographics

Traditional banking still assumes a static customer: one address, one jurisdiction, one primary market. While that remains true for many customers, it doesn’t justify treating digital nomads and international customers as undeserving, which is exactly what many U.S. banks do.

A growing segment — freelancers, remote workers, and globally mobile professionals — lives across borders. They earn in one currency, spend in another, and expect their financial lives to follow them. Revolut was built specifically for this customer.

JPMorgan, for all its scale, still largely adheres to a domestic model. Acquiring Revolut would instantly position it at the center of a shift already underway: one that legacy banking structures are not designed to support.

Regulatory Hurdles

Of course, a deal this large would face serious scrutiny in the U.S. and the U.K. Regulators would question systemic risk, governance, the impact on competition, and whether one of the world’s largest banks should absorb one of fintech’s fastest-growing global challengers.

But “difficult” and “impossible” are not synonyms, especially in modern finance, where every few years brings a deal that once seemed unthinkable. If JPMorgan believed the strategic gap was large enough, regulatory friction would become part of the negotiation, not the automatic death of the deal.  

It would also send a signal to regulators and policymakers — intentionally or not — that U.S. banking structures may need to loosen if domestic institutions are to compete more effectively on the global stage. Even floating a deal like a JPMorgan/Revolut tie-up would force a conversation the industry needs to have.

No, JPMorgan doesn’t need Revolut. But at some point, it may have to decide whether to write the future of banking or keep refining the version it already dominates.

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Inside the EIB’s Global Maritime Blitz

From Spain to Cabo Verde, the EIB is building a blueprint for global maritime decarbonization.

When the European Investment Bank (EIB) signed off on an €80 million loan to Bilbao’s Port Authority in late 2024, most observers logged it as routine. It was anything but.

The facility bundled three priorities that now define the bank’s maritime strategy: capacity expansion, grid electrification, and renewable energy generation on port land. Over the past 18 months, operating through its core European window and EIB Global, the bank has deployed or committed well over €400 million in maritime financing, for the most active period of EIB maritime engagement in a generation.

The Bilbao loan and a subsequent package for Málaga form the European spine of the push. Bilbao’s €80 million facility finances breakwater expansion, the landside electricity grid, and renewable generation, positioning the port on the Atlantic Corridor of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) as a lower-carbon alternative to road freight. Málaga’s €50 million loan, signed in spring 2025, follows the same template on the Mediterranean Corridor: a new multi-purpose terminal, full shore-power electrification for docked vessels, and upgraded border and passenger facilities.

Regulatory Revolution

Both foreground onshore power supply (OPS)—enabling ships to cut auxiliary engines at berth—in anticipation of FuelEU Maritime, the EU regulation that mandates OPS at designated EU ports as of 2030.

The Cabo Verde Blue Economy Sustainable Ports Facility remains the EIB’s most ambitious external maritime bet in recent memory, however.

Assembled in layers over the past two years, the program combines €114 million in EIB loans with a €34 million EU investment grant for a total €148 million concessional package under the Global Gateway, the EU’s strategy to invest in sustainable infrastructure. The undertaking spans three of the four maritime hubs across the Cape Verde archipelago: Mindelo’s Porto Grande (new breakwater, expanded container and fisheries infrastructure), Palmeira on Sal (larger-vessel reception, improved fish-landing facilities), and Santo Antão’s Porto Novo (inter-island connectivity upgrades).

Solar energy systems across multiple ports aim to cut diesel dependency. The centerpiece of the project is the rehabilitation of CABNAVE, Cape Verde’s sole naval repair yard. The EIB intends to develop it into a regional maritime center of excellence: a goal with geopolitical resonance, given China’s longstanding interest in the facility.SUBHED

The series of deals comes fully into focus as an accompaniment to the regulatory revolution unfolding in parallel in the EU. FuelEU Maritime, in force since the beginning of last year, mandates progressive greenhouse-gas intensity cuts for ships above 5,000 gross tonnes calling at EU ports: 2% against a 2020 baseline now, rising to 6% by 2030 and 80% by 2050. Simultaneously, the EU Emissions Trading System covers shipping; companies must surrender allowances for 40% of verified emissions from 2024, 70% from 2025, and 100% from 2026.

This double pressure—a fuel-intensity standard alongside a carbon price—is the commercial incentive structure the EIB’s port electrification investments are designed to capitalize on. The bank is de-risking regulatory transitions for port authorities that might otherwise be delayed while awaiting final implementing rules. Additionally, bundling electrification, renewables, and capacity expansion into single loan instruments is more sophisticated than the EIB’s earlier methods of generating port loans, which were piecemeal and perceived as non-strategic.

€100 Billion Funding Gap

But the EIB is not the only major backer of the energy transition, nor could it be.

Last year, the European Investment Fund approved infrastructure fund investments explicitly targeting shipping-sector decarbonization, signaling a move beyond pure debt into equity and quasi-equity instruments that aim to crowd in pension funds and insurers at a scale individual EIB loans cannot reach. The European Commission has estimated that the full maritime energy transition will require around €100 billion by 2035; the EIF’s fund route is considered the most plausible mechanism for mobilizing capital at that magnitude.

Yet gaps remain. The portfolio is still weighted heavily toward port-side infrastructure rather than the fleet itself; direct EIB financing for vessel retrofits and alternative-fuel newbuilds has yet to materialize at scale. OPS deployment across all TEN-T ports by 2030 is a larger task than two Spanish loans can address. And the geopolitical role the bank has assumed in Cape Verde raises questions about mandate and institutional capacity that extend beyond the mid-Atlantic.

The EIB’s maritime schemes of the past 18 months are not isolated transactions; they are the outline of a strategy. Whether the bank receives the resources and political backing to match the scale of the transition it’s trying to finance is an open question.


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G7 Finance Chiefs Confront Bond Market Turmoil and Global Economic Imbalances

Finance ministers from the Group of Seven met in Paris to address rising global financial instability triggered by a bond market selloff and concerns over inflation linked to the ongoing conflict involving Iran.

The meeting comes at a time when global bond markets from Tokyo to New York are under pressure, as investors anticipate that higher energy prices could force central banks to maintain or increase interest rates.

Officials are also preparing for a broader discussion on structural global imbalances and coordination ahead of an upcoming G7 leaders summit.

Bond Market Pressure and Inflation Concerns

Bond yields have risen sharply across major economies as investors reassess inflation risks. Markets are increasingly focused on whether rising energy costs will translate into sustained price pressures that limit the ability of central banks to ease policy.

French officials have described the current situation as a correction rather than a crisis, though they acknowledge growing sensitivity around sovereign debt levels and fiscal sustainability.

The volatility has raised concerns particularly in highly debt sensitive economies such as Japan, where bond market movements are closely watched for spillover effects.

Diverging Views Within the G7

Despite the shared concerns, divisions remain among G7 members over how to respond to global economic instability.

European officials have emphasized the need for coordinated, temporary, and targeted responses to market shocks, while acknowledging that consensus with the United States may be difficult.

Some members argue that global economic imbalances are becoming structurally entrenched, with consumption and investment patterns increasingly misaligned across major economies.

Global Imbalances and Structural Concerns

A central focus of the discussions is the growing imbalance in global economic activity. European officials argue that long term trends show excessive consumption in some economies, under consumption in others, and insufficient investment in parts of Europe.

These structural disparities are seen as contributing to persistent trade tensions, capital flow imbalances, and financial market instability.

Officials warn that without coordinated policy responses, these imbalances could eventually lead to more severe market corrections.

Critical Minerals and Supply Chain Strategy

Another key agenda item is the global competition over critical minerals and rare earth supply chains, which are essential for electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and defense technologies.

G7 members are exploring ways to reduce dependence on dominant suppliers, particularly China, through coordinated investment, joint procurement strategies, and diversification of supply chains.

Proposals under discussion include pooled purchasing mechanisms, market monitoring systems, and industrial policy coordination to strengthen supply security.

Analysis

The G7 meeting highlights a convergence of financial instability and geopolitical fragmentation. Rising bond yields and inflation fears are no longer isolated market issues but are now directly linked to geopolitical disruptions in energy supply and global trade routes.

At the same time, disagreements within the G7 reflect deeper structural tensions in the global economy, particularly around debt levels, consumption patterns, and industrial policy priorities.

Efforts to coordinate on critical minerals signal a shift toward more strategic economic alignment among advanced economies, where supply chain security is becoming as important as price stability.

Overall, the meeting underscores a global transition toward a more fragmented and politically driven financial system, where economic coordination is increasingly shaped by geopolitical risk rather than purely market based forces.

With information from Reuters.

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WHO declares Ebola outbreak in DRC a global health emergency | World Health Organization News

An Ebola outbreak caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain has killed dozens in Democratic Republic of the Congo and is spreading into Uganda, raising fears of regional transmission. Health officials say instability and shared borders are complicating containment efforts as the World Health Organization declares a global health emergency.

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Passengers ‘entitled to this’ if flights are cancelled over ‘global health emergency’

Travellers have been told ‘not to panic’ if they have flights planned for the summer

Flight rule change to stop last minute cancellations

Many travellers are worried that their summer flights may be at risk as the jet fuel supply disruptions have left some airlines cancelling and rescheduling flights. Now, hantavirus has also trigger some anxiety as passengers fear they may be facing the same disruptions they experienced during the Covid pandemic.

While health experts have been assured the public that hantavirus is “not like Covid”, according to BBC’s Dr Xand, a travel expert explained exactly what rights you have if your flight is cancelled for these reasons.

Hannah Mayfield explained: “If your flight is cancelled because of a global health emergency or another major disruption outside the airline’s control, passengers are still entitled under UK261 to either a full refund or alternative flight.

“That obligation remains firmly with the airline, even in extraordinary circumstances. What may not apply, however, is additional compensation.

“We saw significant confusion around this during the coronavirus pandemic.”

The travel money expert with specialist travel insurance comparison website PayingTooMuch, urged people to learn the “crucial” distinction between these two as some travellers mistakenly believe that if they aren’t entitled to compensation then they aren’t entitled to anything.

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Ultimately, the expert assured everyone with upcoming flights: “The key message for travellers this summer is not to panic, but to understand where responsibility sits before problems arise. Knowing your rights in advance makes it much easier to act quickly and avoid unnecessary stress or expense if your faced with disruptions.”

She continued: “Airlines are responsible for passenger rights linked to the flight itself, including refunds, rebooking, and assistance during disruption.

“Travel insurance, by contrast, is there to protect against wider personal financial risks such as cancellation due to illness, emergency medical treatment abroad and repatriation as well as things like baggage lost items and in some cases irrecoverable costs that cannot be recovered from airlines or travel providers depending on the cover.”

Checking your travel insurance and how you paid for the flight before you leave can also add some extra protection. The expert urged: “It’s equally important to read the travel insurance policy carefully before travelling.

“Many people only discover exclusions relating to pandemics, wider disruption, or government travel advisories when they come to make a claim.”

Hannah explained that if you used a credit card to pay for your flight, Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act can “provide valuable additional protection in some instances”. While those who paid with debit cards may have “less robust” protections.

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Israel deports 2 activists detained from Global Sumud Flotilla

Thiago Avila, a member of the Global Sumud Flotilla, arrives to attend his trial for a remand extension at the Ashkelon Magistrate’s Court in Ashkelon, Israel, on May 3. Avila and Saif Abukeshek were deported on Sunday after Israel’s foreign ministry said it concluded an investigation into the two. Photo by Abir Sultan/EPA

May 10 (UPI) — Israel deported two activists who were part of the Global Sumud Flotilla attempting to deliver aid to Gaza more than a week ago.

Saif Abu Keshek and Thiago Avila were deported on Sunday after Israel’s foreign ministry said it concluded an investigation into the two. It had suspected Abu Keshek, a dual citizen of Spain and Sweden who is of Palestinian origin, of being affiliated with a terrorist organization and suspected Avila of being involved in criminal activity.

The foreign ministry confirmed on social media that Abu Keshek and Avila were deported on Sunday.

Abu Keshek and Avila were part of the flotilla of 22 boats and nearly 175 activists that was intercepted off the Greek island Crete more than a week ago. Armed Israeli naval troops boarded the vessels, destroyed their engines and blocked communications, preventing the flotilla from reaching Gaza, more than 700 miles away.

Hadeel Abu Salih, an attorney who represented Abu Keshek and Avila during their detention, called the detention of them and other activists unlawful and a “sham proceeding with no legal basis, intended to punish them for attempting to challenge Israel’s illegal blockade on Gaza.”

Abu Salih is part of the rights group Adalah. It alleges that they were subject to “psychological abuse” during their detainment.

The Global Sumud Flotilla released a statement on Saturday calling for sanctions against Israel for the detainment of activists.

“We demand explanations from the European Union, and specifically, Greece, after days of silence and complicity, and we call for immediate sanctions against Israel for this illegal abduction and for the constant violations of international law and human rights of the Palestinian people,” the Global Sumud Flotilla said in a statement.

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Pope Leo Urges Global Leaders to Ease Tensions After Meeting Rubio, Calls for End to Violence and Arms Trade

Pope Leo has called on global leaders to reduce international tensions and turn away from violence, delivering an emotional appeal during a visit to Pompei, Italy, on Friday. His remarks came just one day after he met U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Vatican, where both sides discussed efforts to improve strained relations between Washington and the Holy See.

The meeting took place against a politically sensitive backdrop, with U.S. President Donald Trump having recently criticized the Pope over his comments on the Iran conflict. Pope Leo, the first U.S.-born pontiff and former Cardinal Robert Prevost, has increasingly spoken out on global conflicts in recent weeks after initially maintaining a relatively low public profile following his election in May 2025.

Speaking to worshippers in Pompei, the Pope urged prayers that world leaders would be inspired to “calm rancour and fratricidal hatreds” and to take responsibility for reducing global violence. He also warned against becoming desensitized to images of war, and criticized what he described as an international system that often prioritizes the arms trade over human life.

Why It Matters

The Pope’s intervention highlights the growing moral and diplomatic role of the Vatican at a time of heightened global instability, particularly amid ongoing tensions involving Iran, the United States, and wider geopolitical rivalries. His criticism of the global arms economy directly challenges dominant security-driven foreign policy approaches, especially in Western capitals.

As the spiritual leader of more than 1.4 billion Catholics worldwide, Pope Leo’s statements carry significant symbolic and diplomatic weight. His increasingly vocal stance on war and governance also places him in a rare position of open tension with major political actors, including the U.S. administration.

What’s Next

The Vatican is expected to continue engaging diplomatically with U.S. officials despite emerging tensions, particularly following the Rubio meeting. Pope Leo is likely to maintain his public messaging on peace, conflict prevention, and criticism of the global arms trade, reinforcing the Holy See’s traditional role as a moral voice in international affairs. At the same time, reactions from Washington and other governments may further shape the evolving tone of Vatican–state relations in the coming months.

With information from Reuters.

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Major airline owner warns of ‘global jet fuel restrictions’ if Iran war continues

JET fuel restrictions could hit airlines on a global scale, a major airline owner has warned.

International Airlines Group (IAG), who owns British Airways, Iberia and Aer Lingus, initially said that most of its airlines will unaffected this summer.

British Airways passenger aircraft at London Heathrow Airport.
IAG, who owns airlines like British Airways, has warned of restrictions if the war continues Credit: AFP or licensors

However, they warned that if the crisis continues, shortages will result in restrictions across the globe.

They said: “If the current conflict continues to restrict flows of both crude oil and jet fuel from the Middle East, there is the potential for supplies of jet fuel to be restricted on a global basis.

“We are engaging with governments in each of our home markets as well as with the EU to ensure that the industry is getting the support it needs to navigate this situation.”

IAG has said they expect their profit to be lower than anticipated. It also expects spend more than £1.72billion extra on fuel costs that previously predicted.

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The closure of the Strait of Hormuz since March has resulted in fears of fuel shortages, and caused airlines to start hiking prices.

Some airlines, such as Lufthansa, Scandinavian Airlines and Cathay Pacific, have already reduced their flights scheduled for the upcoming months in an attempt to avoid cancellations caused by shortages.

Other airlines like Air France and Virgin Atlantic have already increased the cost of flights.

Despite the warnings, UK airlines have said they are not expecting to be affected by cancellations this summer.

Tour operators including Jet2 and TUI have said they are operating a full schedule as planned.

And IAG said that 70 per cent of the company has hedged fuel for the rest of 2026.

Here are all the airlines that have cancelled flights due to the jet fuel crisis.

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China tightens drone rules despite global industry dominance

A man talks to the vendor in a DJI drone manufacturer store in Shanghai, China. File. Photo by ALEX PLAVEVSKI / EPA

May 2 (Asia Today) — China has begun tightening regulations on its fast-growing drone industry, prompting concerns that the government may be undermining one of its most competitive global sectors.

Recent reports from Chinese media outlets, including the New Beijing News, indicate that China holds a commanding position in the global drone market, with an estimated market share of at least 70%. Industry leader DJI dominates both domestic and international markets, facing limited competition even as Taiwan makes inroads in Europe.

Despite this strong position, new regulations took effect Thursday in Beijing, effectively designating much of the capital as a no-drone zone. Under the new municipal ordinance on unmanned aerial vehicle management, the transport, sale, rental and operation of drones within the city have been broadly restricted.

The measures have already led to store closures. DJI flagship outlets in areas such as the 798 Art District in Beijing’s Chaoyang district have shut down, in some cases under pressure from authorities.

Officials say the move reflects growing concerns over national security and public safety, as drones are increasingly viewed as potential threats in sensitive areas. Beijing has previously imposed temporary flight bans on low, slow and small aerial objects during major political events, a policy that now appears to be expanding into a more permanent framework.

Analysts say the Beijing regulations could serve as a model for broader nationwide controls. If expanded, such measures may significantly weaken China’s dominance in the global drone industry and could even erode its competitive edge.

Industry insiders have expressed concern that excessive regulation could harm a key growth sector, with some privately warning that China risks damaging its own technological leadership.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260502010000045

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K-pop’s BTS comeback tour rallies South Korea’s global ‘soft power’ drive | Arts and Culture News

Seoul – Shekinah Yawra had no other option but to spend the night at a South Korean jjimjilbang, a 24-hour bathhouse, after every hotel near central Seoul sold out in late March.

But sleep was secondary for the 32-year-old Filipino who had made her way to Seoul’s Gwanghwamun Square at 7am to secure a spot in a crowd that city officials estimated would grow to hundreds of thousands.

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All this was for a glimpse at the seven-member K-pop supergroup BTS, who returned to the stage on March 21 after almost four years away from the limelight for their staggered, mandatory military service.

Though she failed to secure one of 22,000 free tickets for BTS’s first return concert in the square, Yawra was still ecstatic to stand on the sidelines and watch the concert live on a big screen set up for the occasion.

“We all came just for this,” she told Al Jazeera, recounting how friends had flown in from the Philippines for a single night to catch the concert.

Worldwide, more than 18.4 million viewers tuned in for the Netflix livestream of the concert.

FILE PHOTO: Kpop group BTS perform during ‘BTS The Comeback Live Arirang’ concert in central Seoul, South Korea, March 21, 2026. REUTERS/Kim Hong-ji/Pool EDITORIAL USE ONLY./File Photo
Kpop group BTS perform during ‘BTS The Comeback Live Arirang’ concert in central Seoul, South Korea, March 21, 2026 [Kim Hong-ji/Pool/Reuters]

With an estimated 30 million fans worldwide – who refer to themselves as the BTS ARMY – the K-pop group is the most visible symbol of “Hallyu”, or the “Korean Wave”, and the global surge of interest in South Korean popular culture and the financial revenues being generated as a result.

In late March, BTS’s 10th studio album, Arirang, topped the charts in the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom, the world’s three largest music markets. The group’s upcoming world tour is expected to generate more than $1.4bn in revenue across more than 80 shows in 23 countries.

Domestically, inbound tourist numbers for the first 18 days of March rose 32.7 percent from the previous month, according to Ministry of Justice data, as the return concert approached and hotel prices surged across central Seoul amid the demand for rooms.

In the week leading up to the concert, sales of BTS merchandise – from BTS glow sticks to blankets – surged 430 percent at the Shinsegae Duty Free retail outlet in central Seoul, the company said.

Over the concert weekend, revenues also rose 30 percent at the city’s Lotte Department Store and 48 percent at Shinsegae overall, compared with the same March weekend a year earlier, in 2025.

Fans of Kpop group BTS cheer ahead of 'BTS The Comeback Live Arirang' concert as they wait near the concert venue, in central Seoul, South Korea, March 21, 2026. REUTERS/Kim Hong-ji
Fans cheer before the BTS The Comeback Live Arirang concert as they wait near the concert venue, in central Seoul, South Korea, on March 21, 2026 [Kim Hong-ji/Reuters]

As far back as 2022, the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute (KCTI) – a government-sponsored think tank and research organisation – estimated that a single BTS concert in Seoul could generate up to 1.2 trillion won ($798m) in overall economic impact.

KCTI researcher Yang Ji-hoon told Al Jazeera that a sample study of the crowd at the BTS comeback event at Gwanghwamun Square highlighted the uniqueness of fandom-driven tourism. More than half of those at the concert were foreign visitors and many required long-haul travel to attend.

“In Europe and the United States, travel tends to be concentrated within its own regions,” Yang said.

“So, for people to overcome such travel barriers and come to South Korea, it usually requires more than just ordinary motivation or typical spending – it’s not something that happens easily,” he said.

K-pop’s transition to the global mainstream

The scale of BTS’s return to the entertainment world reflects a broader state-backed strategy.

When music promoter Hybe requested Seoul city support for the Gwanghwamun square comeback concert, authorities approved it on public-interest grounds, treating the event as a showcase of national cultural influence.

Almost befitting an official event, more than 10,000 state personnel were deployed for security, logistics and crowd control.

According to data retrieved by South Korean publication Sisain, through a public information disclosure request to the Seoul government, close to 130 million won ($87,400) of city funds were spent as part of logistics for the comeback concert.

South Korean government support for BTS has a precedent.

As members of the boyband approached South Korea’s mandatory military service age, policymakers debated special exemptions for members of BTS, which was estimated to have generated $4.65bn annually to the country’s economy.

After BTS’s forthcoming concerts in Mexico City sold out in just 37 minutes, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum urged South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung to “bring the acclaimed K-pop artists more often”, noting nearly one million fans in Mexico had attempted to secure 150,000 tickets.

South Korea’s cultural influence is also extending beyond music.

South Korea’s cosmetics exports surpassed $11bn last year, according to global accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), overtaking France in cosmetics shipments to the US, while South Korean food and agricultural exports reached a record $13.6bn, according to data from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs.

KCTI researcher Yang described the growing interest as a phase of “transition to the global mainstream”, where South Korean products are internationally recognised and content output is measured against worldwide benchmarks such as the Billboard charts and the Academy Awards.

He also warned that structural reform is now essential to keep pace with the wave of interest in South Korea.

“As the industries expand in scale, they must also evolve in its underlying systems, infrastructure, and workforce,” he said.

“Rather than focusing solely on direct financial support, future governmental policies should move toward strengthening foundational conditions – such as improving labour environments, addressing unfair practices, building relevant infrastructure, and establishing more robust statistical and data systems,” he said.

Politicians appear to be paying attention.

During his election campaign last year, President Lee framed the next phase of cultural expansion as “Hallyu (Korean Wave) 4.0”, with promises to grow the sector into a 300 trillion won ($203bn) industry with 50 trillion won ($34bn) in exports.

In line with this vision, the government set the budget to bolster “K-content”, support the “pure” arts sector and strengthen the overall culture-related fields at a record 9.6 trillion won ($6.5bn) — reflecting the president’s view of the cultural sector as a strategic national industry rather than merely a consumer market.

South Korea’s strategy appears to be paying off.

South Korea now ranks 11th globally in “soft power”, according to Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index, placing the country as both “influential in arts and entertainment” and “products and brands the world loves”, just behind the US, France, the United Kingdom and Japan.

The darker side of K-pop: Pressure to become a perfect idol

Amid its global success, the darker side of the K-culture industry has received more scrutiny.

Mega-promoter Hybe has been embroiled in a prolonged dispute with K-pop’s New Jeans, a band considered to be a potential heir to BTS and their all-female colleagues Blackpink. The highly public legal dispute that started in 2024 highlights industry tensions over creative control and artist autonomy.

Since the early 2000s, K-pop has also grappled with the legacy of “slave contracts”, or highly restrictive agreements limiting artists’ freedom. Although reforms by the Fair Trade Commission have improved protections for performers, contractual obligations in the K-pop industry are exacting on new performers and their strict work routines have long been documented.

From their trainee years, aspiring idols endure gruelling schedules that involve long workdays and little sleep.

Many top stars often face contractual restrictions on socialising, using their phones or dating. They are also typically limited in what they can say publicly, relying on agency-managed messaging to communicate with fans and the media.

While the rise of social media and other online platforms has opened new avenues for more direct expression and interaction in recent years, concerns over burnout and depression have continued to shadow the industry, with several high-profile stars taking their own lives.

Beauty standards associated with the K-culture genre have also become another flashpoint for controversy.

A 2024 report by South Korean economy news site Uppity found 98 percent of 1,283 respondents born between 1980 and 2000 viewed physical appearance as among the most desirable “social capital” an individual can possess.

Nearly 40 percent of respondents in the survey had undergone cosmetic procedures, while more than 90 percent held neutral or positive attitudes regarding undergoing medical procedures to enhance beauty.

According to the International Society of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, South Korea has the world’s highest rate of procedures, with 8.9 per 1,000 people compared with 5.91 per 1,000 people in the US and just 2.13 per 1,000 in neighbouring Japan.

 

Yoo Seung-chul, a professor of media studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, said that K-culture has reinforced the normalising of beauty as a significant metric of personal and social value.

“K-culture has reinforced systems and structures around self-expression,” Yoo told Al Jazeera.

“With the rise of webtoons that incorporate themes like plastic surgery, there has been a noticeable reduction in the stigma towards going under the knife among younger audiences in their teens and early twenties,” Yoo said, explaining that popular plastic surgery platforms such as Unni have further normalised the trend by connecting people to clinics and reviews of these clinics and their surgeons.

At the same time, globalisation has reshaped the K-culture industry itself. Many new K-pop acts now include international members to broaden appeal.

Hybe has expanded this strategy through its US subsidiary, Hybe America, producing globally oriented groups like Katseye, which only has one South Korean member in its six-member girl group.

The shift has prompted debate.

Even BTS’s latest album Arirang – a nod to South Korea’s most iconic folk song – has divided fans over its use of English lyrics and foreign producers.

“K-content is being designed with global audiences in mind from the outset. In film, there has been a noticeable rise in genres like horror and science fiction, which are easier to export internationally,” Yoo said.

“This global orientation is also reflected in K-pop agencies recruiting foreign members for idol groups,” he said.

But international audiences do not always prefer highly globalised versions of Korean content, Yoo said, adding, in fact, that many are drawn to K-pop’s “sense of locality”.

As audiences increasingly seek authenticity, Yoo argues the industry faces a defining challenge.

“Industries and companies need to figure out how to preserve a sense of local identity while effectively marketing to global audiences,” Yoo added.

“Striking that balance will be crucial in shaping the next phase of Korea’s cultural exports.”

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Somalia shapes its own destiny in global security forums | Opinions

In international politics, the platforms a country sits on often matter as much as what it says. For decades, Somalia was largely the subject of global security discussions, rarely a decisive participant in them. Today, that reality is changing in ways that carry symbolic weight and practical consequences.

Somalia’s recent election to the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), alongside its membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), marks a turning point in its diplomatic trajectory. For quite some time, Somalia was merely being discussed in the world’s most influential security forums. It is now shaping the agenda on the table.

This shift reflects more than a procedural achievement. It signals the maturity of Somalia’s diplomatic and security institutions, and the steady rebuilding of its international credibility after decades of conflict and state fragility.

For much of the past three decades, decisions affecting Somalia’s security were often made in rooms where Somali voices were either absent or marginal. External actors debated intervention strategies, sanctions regimes, peacekeeping mandates, and humanitarian responses, while Somalia struggled with internal instability.

This membership in the UNSC and AU PSC changes that dynamic fundamentally. These bodies are not symbolic; they make binding decisions, adopt resolutions, authorise peacekeeping operations, and shape international legal frameworks. For Somalia, this may seem something simple, but its impact is profound. Somalia is now part of the process that determines policies affecting its own security and development.

That participation strengthens state-building in several ways. It reinforces institutional capacity within Somalia’s foreign policy apparatus, promotes transparency and accountability through engagement with multilateral norms, and aligns Somalia more closely with international legal and diplomatic standards.

Somalia is transitioning from being a recipient of international decisions to becoming a contributor to them. Somalia’s role on these councils also carries representational significance beyond its own borders.

As a member of the UNSC and AU PSC, Somalia now occupies a rare diplomatic position. It simultaneously represents the interests of the African continent, the Arab and Muslim world, and the least developed countries (LDCs). The concerns of these categories of states have often been overshadowed by the priorities of more powerful nations. Somalia now stands for them.

Somalia’s own first experience in rebuilding institutions after conflict, managing complex security transitions, and balancing sovereignty with international cooperation enables it to advocate not only for itself, but also for broader principles: Inclusive peace processes, sustainable development approaches to security, and equitable participation in global decision-making.

Peace in the world, peace at home

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s 2022 political manifesto, “Somalia at peace with itself, and at peace with the world”, is increasingly reflected in these recent memberships. This vision is proving effective, as Somalia’s participation in global peace decision-making demonstrates a growing alignment between its external engagements and internal stabilisation efforts.

The seats at the UNSC and AU PSC will directly reinforce Somalia’s state-building process. Active involvement in shaping international peace also reflects and supports the way peace and security agendas are being handled domestically.

A defining moment in 2026

The year 2026 represents a rare convergence of opportunity. Somalia’s simultaneous presence at the AU PSC and UNSC provides a diplomatic platform unmatched in its recent history. This dual role should enable it to act as a bridge between regional and global security frameworks. It can ensure that Somalia’s security priorities are reflected in the AU decision, and forwardly, that African priorities are reflected in global resolutions. It can also translate international commitments into regional actions that qualify for alignment with local contexts.

This not only affects diplomacy and policy discussions but offers an opportunity to advocate for real change that directly affects the daily lives of Somalis. Such issues may include counterterrorism, stabilisation support, humanitarian access, development financing, climate security, and mechanisms for inclusive politics. By shaping the content and direction of relevant resolutions, Somalia can help align international commitments more closely with national priorities.

A future shaped by participation

With greater influence comes greater responsibility. Membership in these councils demands consistency and adherence to international norms. Somalia is now ready to navigate these complex diplomatic landscapes, balancing national interests with collective global security obligations. And it is now capable of maintaining credibility through constructive engagement, principled positions, and reliable partnerships.

With Somalia now seemingly committed to momentum on these fronts, its growing international stance will become self-reinforcing. Each diplomatic success will strengthen national institutions, which in turn will enhance future influence.

Somalia’s presence at the highest levels of global and regional security governance marks a significant milestone in its long journey towards recovery and stability. It reflects years of diplomatic effort, institutional rebuilding, and gradual restoration of international trust. It also signals a future in which Somalia is increasingly defined not by crisis, but by stability.

For a country that once stood on the margins of global decision-making, this transformation is both historic and hopeful. It signals a shift from isolation to engagement, from being acted upon to helping shape outcomes.

For young Somali generations who grew up hearing that Somalia could not advance, these diplomatic achievements offer a different narrative. They inspire pride, restore confidence, and help rebuild trust in the nation’s future.

That challenge lies ahead. But after a period of turmoil, Somalia is well positioned to meet it, not as a passive observer, but as an active shaper of its own destiny. This is also part of the broader Somalia policy on defence diplomacy, founded on global collaboration and mutual interdependency.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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Israel seizes Global Sumud Flotilla boats 1,000km away from Gaza | Gaza

NewsFeed

Israeli forces have intercepted around a dozen Gaza-bound aid boats from the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters near the Greek island of Crete, more than 1,000km from Israel. Organisers call it an illegal attack on civilians in international waters.

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Israel has begun intercepting Gaza-bound Global Sumud Flotilla aid boats | Gaza

NewsFeed

Organisers of a Gaza-bound aid mission say their vessels are being intercepted by Israeli military speedboats in Greek waters west of Crete, more than 1,000km from Israel. Crew members of the Global Sumud Flotilla say communications have been jammed and an SOS issued.

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