Germanys

The government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz approved a landmark bill to expand the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Domestic Intelligence Service (BfV) by 2027. This expansion grants them offensive and operational tools, including cyber counter-sabotage and espionage, with funding of €1.51 billion. This move has sparked significant concern among Chinese and Russian intelligence agencies regarding the radical shift in German security doctrine, stemming from the geopolitical context and the fears of Germany’s adversaries, China and Russia, regarding the ongoing hybrid warfare. The German initiative was driven by the escalating pace of gray and hybrid warfare, the most recent example being the discovery of a booby-trapped drone at Leipzig’s strategic airport. Consequently, intelligence, strategic, and security circles in Beijing and Moscow are closely monitoring this historic intelligence revolution approved by Chancellor Merz’s government on August 12, 2026.  This draft law (exceeding 700 pages) represents the most significant shift in Germany’s security doctrine since the end of World War II in 1945. From the perspective of Chinese and Russian intelligence, this shift constitutes a security revolution that ends the strict constraints imposed on Germany since World War II, transforming German intelligence agencies from mere information-gathering tools into entities capable of launching offensive and counter-sabotage operations. For these reasons, this internal German intelligence transformation is being closely monitored and analyzed in depth within intelligence and military circles in Beijing and Moscow, given its strategic dimensions and its connection to Berlin’s attempt to break free from American dependence. This move, analyzed by Chinese and Russian intelligence and military circles, is seen as a targeting of Russia and China. Although Berlin attempts to frame counterintelligence as a general effort, German officials, such as Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, have explicitly stated that the goal is to deter Russian and Chinese sabotage operations and enable German intelligence to inflict pain on adversaries and operate on equal footing with allies like the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), rather than relying on them entirely. The German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) is expected to formally pass the bill after the summer recess, allowing these offensive powers to become fully operational in Germany by early 2027.

Military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Russian circles alike are analyzing all the operational and political dimensions of this strategic decision in Germany, focusing on understanding the German desire to shift from a defensive doctrine to an offensive operational approach and to adopt a cyber sabotage strategy and a counter-terrorism measure called “Hack-Back.” For the first time, the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BfV) are granted legal authority to penetrate the information systems of adversaries and attackers and modify or delete data to prevent large-scale cyberattacks and dismantle the infrastructure of hackers. This includes German approval for field sabotage operations in situations of German defense tension, whereby the BND is permitted to carry out active sabotage operations abroad, such as disabling servers and replacing military or vital technology components with damaged ones to prevent attacks, such as in drone factories and chemical laboratories of hostile states. This has been interpreted by Chinese and Russian circles as a German crushing of the principle of separation between German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies.   According to Chinese and Russian analyses, the new German law is also generating considerable legal controversy within Germany itself, as it narrows the historical distance between intelligence agencies (those concerned only with collecting information) and the police agencies (those concerned with implementation).

Here, the Chinese intelligence reading of the German reform can be understood as the end of historical restrictions imposed on Berlin, as Beijing views the move as a reversal of the strict restrictions imposed since the end of World War II and Berlin’s shift from purely information gathering to carrying out covert operations and penetrating adversaries’ networks.  In addition to what this represents for Beijing and Moscow in terms of reducing dependence on Washington, Chinese intelligence is monitoring Germany’s attempt to build independent self-reliance capabilities to reduce intelligence dependence on the United States and its allies amid mutual strategic suspicions. Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing also view with caution the (militarization of German digital space). Here, the Chinese analysis considers that allowing the disruption of infrastructure and the modification and deletion of data places German agencies in the ranks of major countries with active offensive doctrines, given the reliance of German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies on the pattern of practical and technical dimensions of reform and hybrid capabilities in reforming their security and intelligence agencies, through directly confronting drones, disrupting spy servers, or tampering with components of a weapon under production without resorting to human physical violence, with the expansion of the use of artificial intelligence technologies, through expanding the use of facial recognition technologies and reducing data protection restrictions to store and analyze information for longer periods. However, at the same time, German circles are facing parliamentary challenges, given that the draft law is undergoing legislative proceedings in both houses of the German parliament (the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) amidst local human rights objections warning of the erosion of personal freedoms and the principle of separating intelligence from the police.

Here, the Russian intelligence perspective (Moscow) on the German intelligence draft law comes to the fore. Russian intelligence agencies (SVR, GRU, and FSB) view this move as a direct response to their operations and interpret it within the context of an acknowledgment of hybrid warfare. Moscow believes that Germany is now officially treating Russia as an enemy in a state of undeclared war.  The increase in the budget of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency (BND) by 26%, reaching €1.51 billion, is seen as an indication of a long-term security buildup against Russia. Moscow also viewed this as a move to neutralize cognitive denial, especially given accusations from German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies that Russia is exploiting German bureaucratic sluggishness and strict data privacy measures to carry out cyberattacks and sabotage operations. Therefore, the Russian interpretation of this German decision can be seen as a direct response from Berlin to Moscow, aimed at closing this digital and security gap between the two sides. It can be interpreted as a German intelligence strategy of reciprocity, or, according to the Russian analysis, as an attempt by Germany to encircle disinformation networks by granting German intelligence the ability to take down Russian propaganda and disinformation servers, which pose a direct threat to Russia’s soft power tools aimed at destabilizing Germany.

On the other hand, Chinese intelligence circles, primarily the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which acts as the Chinese intelligence service, analyze German law from the perspective of technological and geopolitical conflict, targeting industrial and academic espionage by China. Here, the Chinese analysis focuses on the expansion of the powers of the German domestic intelligence agency (BfV) and the use of artificial intelligence. This analysis primarily aims to track Chinese soft networks that focus on stealing advanced German technology and conducting economic espionage in order to protect German infrastructure and communications. Beijing believes that the new German laws, which compel German telecommunications companies and digital platforms to hand over data to German intelligence, are primarily intended to isolate Chinese technology and impose complete German sovereign control over cyber data in the face of China. The most sensitive aspect of Russian and Chinese analyses lies in their dual interpretation of Germany’s desire to break free from the Five Eyes framework. They see it as either an intelligence network for exchanging signals intelligence, comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, whose decisions are guided by Washington, or as a new dilemma facing Germany in building self-reliant capabilities and ending its dependence on the United States. This latter scenario serves the interests of China and Russia, promoting multipolarity and a multipolar international world and ending the one-way street of Washington.   The German Chancellery has publicly stated that reliance on allies (specifically the US) has been a one-way street, where Germany receives information without the ability to exchange it or protect itself independently. From a Chinese and Russian intelligence perspective, this represents a new German policy of hedging against Trump’s unpredictability. Moscow and Beijing believe that the primary motivation behind the conservative Merz government’s actions is strategic skepticism regarding the reliability of the United States, particularly with Donald Trump in the White House, and Berlin’s fear of the politicization or severing of US intelligence flows. This reinforces the Chinese-Russian view that this is a technologically impossible German attempt to break free from US control and dictates.

Accordingly, assessments in Beijing and Moscow agree that Germany—despite its ambition—will not be able to completely break free from intelligence dependence on America anytime soon. The United States controls the global cloud infrastructure, internet cables, and critical cyber technologies, making German intelligence independence a costly ambition that will take years to materialize technologically. However, it does give Berlin at least greater parity in dealing with partners, which China and Russia are trying to maximize.

‘Can you hear that?” my guide Andrea Wellmeyer asks as I sink a little deeper into the wet ground, cold mud seeping between my toes. When the wind drops, I detect a faint but distinct crackling, similar to the rustle of a sweet wrapper or the bubbling of sparkling water. “That’s the Wattknistern,” she says, “a natural phenomenon caused by the tens of thousands of mud shrimp that live here.”

We’re standing in the Wadden Sea mudflats on Norderney, an island just off Germany’s North Sea coast. It’s Friday evening at low tide. In the town centre, bars are pumping with music, but here, just 15 minutes along the southern edge of the island, it’s a completely different story.

“A lot of the flora and fauna is found under the surface,” Andrea says, showing me the tree-like tops of sand mason worm casings and the tips of marsh samphire growing upwards like tiny asparagus. Flipping over a cluster of wild oysters, she startles a crab that raises its pincers in the air before wriggling out of sight once more. Orange-beaked oystercatchers scurry back and forth on the exposed seabed and a pair of spoonbills wade gracefully through the shallow water beyond.

Norderney is one of the seven inhabited islands that make up the East Frisian islands (Ostfriesische Inseln) in Germany. The others are Borkum, Juist, Baltrum, Langeoog, Spiekeroog and Wangerooge. Stretching more than 50 miles from west to east, they are a popular holiday destination, known for their unique coastal landscapes and diverse wildlife, from grey seals and migrating birds to the creatures found in the mud.

Each island has its own identity, from upmarket Juist with its horse-drawn transport to the historic red brick houses of sleepy Spiekeroog; but all have vast sandy beaches, grassy dunes and tidal mudflats. The islands belong to the larger Wadden Sea Unesco world heritage site and have been part of the Lower Saxon Wadden Sea national park since its formation in 1986.

Norderney was one of the first German seaside resorts in the North Sea. Today, historic seaside villas and retreats founded on the health benefits of briny sea air sit next to modern hotels and restaurants, such as Inselloft Norderney and Michelin-recommended Oktopussy, where summer scallops come with a caramelised miso-cauliflower purée. My favourite spot quickly becomes Marienhöhe, a dune-top pavilion built more than 100 years ago, where I eat delicately battered fish with warm potato salad.

Despite being one of only two East Frisian islands where cars are permitted, the best way to explore Norderney is by bike. Leaving the town in the west, I zoom along the bike lanes that run through the dunes, stopping at a popular stretch of beach called Weiße Düne, before heading south towards the island’s tallest building, a lighthouse constructed between 1872 and 1874.

Soon after, roughly halfway across the island, I reach a sign that says I can’t go any further on my bike. This is a Ruhezone (quiet/restricted zone), a highly protected area where you can only walk on a couple of marked footpaths. A rusty shipwreck lies on the sand and seals bask in the sun at the far end.

There are strict rules governing access in several sections of the island, part of a quest to let nature be nature. Heading out with an official guide helps you see and learn more. Alongside Wattwanderungen (mudflat hikes), you can also book salt marsh walks, birding excursions and boat trips to see the seals. The newly renovated visitor centre at Norderney harbour also has extensive information about the local ecosystems.

My next stops are Spiekeroog and Langeoog, two calmer, car-free islands to the east. On Langeoog, I join a tour to learn more about the birds I have spotted over the last few days. “Many species need the Wadden Sea as the focal point of their migration, as a place to rest,” national park guide Fiona Wettstein says. “When they first arrive, they have completely burned through their fat reserves and practically drop down here.”

Setting off with bikes and binoculars, we spot red knots, redshanks, avocets and sandpipers, as well as squeaking lapwings with long crests and a short-eared owl swooping through the grasses. Geese with fluffy chicks in tow strut around the island, hissing loudly if you get too close. More than 10 million birds make a pit stop in the Wadden Sea every year, with spring and autumn the best time to see them. The shoulder season is also a good time to visit to avoid the summer holiday crowds.

I stay at Silt & Sand, a bright and airy design hotel just behind the dunes that opened last year. The expansive (almost 9-mile-long) beach on the other side is dotted with Strandkörbe, traditional hooded wicker armchairs found on beaches along the German coast.

Despite the chain layout of the islands and their close proximity to one another, it isn’t possible to “hop” between them. Instead, you have to return to the mainland and make your way along the coast to a different ferry terminal each time, the exception being Juist and Norderney, which have a shared departure point in Norddeich. It is possible to walk from the mainland to some of the islands at low tide, but only with a certified guide.

After my first few hours on Norderney, I give up on the weather forecast and start operating on a cloud by cloud basis instead, dark moody skies moving on as quickly as they appear. More reliable is the wind, churning the sea, bending the trees and blowing a fine mist of sand over the compact layer below. Having biked eastwards with ease, I’m met by a roaring resistance on my return, a fierce gust wrapping around my hat and prising it off.

“This connection to the elements is part of the experience,” says Andrea. “Your entire system is challenged and pushed out of its comfort zone, something that doesn’t happen so often these days,” she adds as we make our way back to the familiarity and ease of the town.

The trip was provided by Tourismus Marketing Niedersachsen and the German National Tourist Office. Doubles at Inselloft Norderney from €160 and at Silt & Sand from €141 room-only. Book ferries through individual websites: Norderney and Juist; Spiekeroog.

Back and forth over defence spending comes as NATO leaders set to meet in Ankara next week.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has defended his country’s NATO defence spending, shortly after US President Donald Trump re-upped his criticism of alliance members.

The statement on Friday came as NATO leaders were set to meet next week in Ankara. Trump has decried defence spending by members of the bloc throughout his political career, calling the balance of spending “ridiculous” and “one-sided” in his latest Truth Social posts on the issue earlier this week.

In one post, Trump said Germany’s spending was “MUCH ⁠LOWER” between 2014 and 2025 than the US or other NATO allies, which he again called “Ridiculous!”

When asked about the comment, Merz said Germany would double its defence budget within four years.

“This is the greatest effort we have ever made to strengthen our defence capabilities. In this respect, we have ‌no reason to shy away from anyone,” Merz said.

“We will state this, with all due modesty, and we are doing so as the European Union’s largest member state, bearing a responsibility within Europe,” he said.

US and European ties have been strained throughout Trump’s first term from 2017 to 2021 and his current term, which began in January 2025.

However, while largely dismissive of the president during his first four years in office, several European leaders have sought a more amenable approach to the president this time around.

At the behest of the US, NATO leaders agreed to spend 3.5 percent of their countries’ GDP on core defence items, such as weapons and troops, ⁠by 2035, an increase of the previous goal set by the bloc of 2 percent of its GDP.

However, relations have since frayed over several issues, including Trump’s pledges to take control of the autonomous Danish territory of Greenland. Denmark is a member of NATO.

The US-Israeli war in Iran has also proven to be a major wedge, with Trump launching the conflict without consulting European allies who have dealt with the fallout of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump had repeatedly condemned European allies for not joining the war effort.

Merz, meanwhile, roiled the president by saying in April the US had been “humiliated” by Iran. Trump, in turn, said the US would withdraw 5,000 troops currently stationed in Germany.

Speaking on Friday, Merz said Germany was ahead of schedule to reach its NATO commitments.

“We will reach the 3.5 percent benchmark set in The Hague as early as 2029,” he told reporters, “well ahead of the agreed deadline”.

Police say several people also injured while the suspected shooter has been arrested.

Five people have been killed and others wounded in a shooting at a youth welfare centre in the northern German city of Stade, according to police.

Two suspects were detained following the shooting on Monday, one of whom is believed to be the alleged attacker. The motive is not clear.

“Homicides involving multiple victims occurred at a youth welfare facility,” police said. “Five people were fatally injured and additional individuals sustained injuries.”

Police in Stade said a major operation was being conducted on Dankersstrasse, a street south of the city centre. People were urged to avoid the area and follow the instructions of the emergency services.

Stade is about 40km (25 miles) from Hamburg with a population of half a million.

A novel kind of drone-based air defense system has been shown for the first time by German weapon manufacturer Diehl Defence. The Cobra 600, which has not previously been seen in public, combines a jet-powered drone platform with a missile rail armed with one of the company’s IRIS-T missiles, a weapon already used in short-range air defense systems and air-to-air applications. The new system immediately recalls recent Russian developments, which add short-range air defense missiles to its versions of the Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack drone, known locally as the Geran.

Cobra 600 is being presented at the ILA Berlin airshow, taking place this week in the German capital. The Cobra 600 is also known as the Airborne Launching and Attack System (AirLAS), and the program was launched last year.

The concept behind the Cobra 600 is that of a ‘missile taxi,’ in which the drone platform carries the IRIS-T missile over a considerable distance. All the while, the drone is meshed with a ground-based air defense system. Typically, this would be one of Diehl’s IRIS-T SLM or IRIS-T SLS systems. Of these, the IRIS-T SLS employs the same missile as the air-to-air variant — and therefore the same missile as the Cobra 600. The physical interface between the drone and the missile is a standard pylon as used on the Eurofighter jet.

As for the drone platform, this is provided by another German firm, the Polaris Raumflugzeuge aerospace start-up. It has a similar kind of efficient delta planform as the Shahed-136, with a modified flying-wing-like design. On the wingtips are mounted endplate vertical stabilizers. As displayed, the drone is powered by a pair of JetCat-P1000-PRO micro turbojet engines, each of which provides a maximum thrust of 20 pounds. However, the drone has intake ports for another two engines. It’s not clear if these are only intended to be fitted if heavier payloads are being carried, but it’s certainly a possibility. Concept artwork released by Polaris, as seen at the top of this story, shows a four-engine configuration, with the turbojets buried in the airframe and fed by much longer intakes, helping to shield them from detection.

Polaris Raumflugzeuge has already built a variety of drones in the same configuration, and the company eventually aims to scale this up to produce a spaceplane.

Drawing on its design heritage, the Cobra 600 drone has retractable wheeled tricycle landing gear, meaning that it can be reused in some scenarios. The drone therefore takes off and lands from runways, although it is also able to operate from suitable shorter airstrips, such as stretches of highway. It’s also intended to be cheap enough that commanders will also be willing to risk losing it in combat, or after it runs out of fuel.

The concept of operations has the Cobra 600 serving as an adjunct to a ground-based air defense system, extending its range considerably.

With the missile fitted, the Cobra 600 has a range of around 250 miles. This compares to around 25 miles for the ground-launched missile used in the IRIS-T SLM, or approximately eight miles for the missile used in the IRIS-T SLS.

As such, the Cobra 600 has the potential to turn the ground-based IRIS-T into something a little closer to a long-range surface-to-air missile, in terms of the distance it can cover. Of course, this is only true in terms of absolute range, with the speed and maneuverability of the drone being far inferior to a long-range missile. Unless the target is nearby, or the Cobra 600 has been pre-positioned based on known target vectors, the reaction time it offers is strictly limited. The missile itself is also able to tackle a more limited range of potential targets than a dedicated long-range surface-to-air missile, some of which offer an anti-ballistic missile capability, for example.

On the other hand, the Cobra 600 offers the distinct advantage of being able to loiter in a given area, waiting for threats to emerge, or to perform combat air patrols to screen certain sectors. It is best viewed as a forward-positioned additional launcher for the ground-based IRIS-T, and is also entirely reliant upon that system (or a similar one) for its effectiveness. At the same time, leveraging existing ground-based air defense systems as a force multiplier is a clear advantage. Another possible operational scenario would involve setting the Cobra 600s up as interceptors on a runway, sitting ready for launch on a runway to defend against lower-end threats.

In its current form, the Cobra 600 has no onboard sensors to detect targets other than the imaging infrared seeker head that’s integral to the standard IRIS-T missile.

In an operational scenario, a target for the Cobra 600 would be detected and identified by the ground-based air defense system to which it is ‘tethered.’ Connected via datalink, the ground-based system would vector the drone to the appropriate location. Using its own seeker, the IRIS-T would lock onto the target and be commanded to launch by the operator of the ground-based system. Of course, this presupposes that the datalink is not compromised by hostile interference or due to line-of-sight limitations, although SATCOM capability, like Starlink, would help keep redundant control over the drone beyond line-of-sight.

At this point, the mode of engagement is not dissimilar to the ground-based IRIS-T SLS, which features a lock-on-after-launch (LOAL) capability. This means it can fire missiles without first establishing the weapon’s lock on the target. After receiving target information in the form of three-dimensional coordinates, the missile uses inertial guidance during the initial stage of flight. Upon reaching the designated engagement altitude, its imaging infrared seeker activates and begins searching the predicted target area.

Diehl Experts | Ulrike Bartel | IRIS-T system | Diehl Defence

Another conceivable option would be to add some kind of sensor, such as an infrared camera, to the Cobra 600 drone platform, meaning that a ‘person in the loop’ could establish that the missile had locked onto the correct target.

A further option could be to ‘uncage’ the missile seeker and let it search across its field of view only when the Cobra 600 is in a designated ‘kill box,’ within which it would have authority to engage any target it acquires, reactively, and autonomously. Issues such as this clearly need to be addressed, based on combat requirements and ethical concerns.

As well as operating the Cobra 600 in conjunction with the IRIS-T SLM/SLS, it could also be integrated with other ground-based air defenses. According to Polaris, it could also be embedded with aircraft or in a maritime environment.

The Cobra 600 has already completed its first flight tests, with a dummy IRIS-T missile fitted. Currently, the development effort is mainly funded by the company, but there has also been investment from at least one interested nation.

With the IRIS-T SLM/SLS combat-proven in Ukraine, experiences from this conflict have almost certainly helped inform the development of the Cobra 600.

The war in Ukraine also provides an interesting parallel to the Cobra 600, in Russia’s missile-armed adaptations of its Shahed/Geran drones.

Russian developments have seen the fielding of these drones carrying either a single R-60 air-to-air missile, a much older and less capable equivalent to the IRIS-T, or man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

According to Ukrainian accounts, as well as the rail-mounted missile on the top, these drones are equipped with a camera and a radio-frequency modem.

Russian forces are mounting Igla MANPADS on Shahed drones to target Ukrainian helicopters that intercept them. The drones carry a camera and radio modem, and the missile is launched remotely by an operator in Russian territory. pic.twitter.com/T5TKPHyhVu

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) January 4, 2026

However, the concept of operations for the missile-armed Russian drones is very different. While it gives the drones a means to engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, it works more as a deterrent than as a genuinely useful tactical application. As we have noted in the past, the difficulty in obtaining a high degree of situational awareness and the limited agility of the drone raises questions about the effectiveness of these solutions. On the other hand, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, which could potentially be used to operate the missile.

Considerably larger than the Shahed-136 design, the Cobra 600 will provide a higher performance delta overall. It is also jet-powered, and, with up to four engines, this would give more impressive response times and maneuverability than the Russian system.

It should be noted that there are other previous precedents for arming drones with air-to-air missiles. In at least one instance from 2002, a U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator drone fired a Stinger heat-seeking anti-air missile at an Iraqi MiG-25 Foxbat fighter that was trying to shoot it down, which can be seen in the video below.

Dogfight between MQ-1 Predator drone and Mig-25 Foxbat.mp4

The fast pace of development of the Cobra 600 reflects a growing need for ground-based air defenses more generally, after decades of neglect. There is also a need for less-expensive, less-exquisite solutions in this area, something that the Cobra 600 also addresses, with a price point that is significantly lower than a long-range surface-to-air missile (although with the various disadvantages outlined above). At the same time, the Cobra 600 may well end up being used against even lower-cost drones, for which the IRIS-T is still a very expensive solution.

The Cobra 600 reflects a broader shift in air defense thinking driven by the lessons of recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East, where persistent drone threats, as well as cruise missiles, have exposed the limitations of traditional ground-based air defense architectures.

By combining the endurance and flexibility of a drone with the proven, off-the-shelf IRIS-T interceptor, the Cobra 600 offers a potentially cost-effective way to extend defensive coverage over greater distances and to put ‘shooters’ into contested areas that crewed systems would not be able to venture. While some questions remain about how the Cobra 600 would be integrated with existing operational doctrine, the concept highlights the growing demand for innovative, layered, and resilient air defenses as militaries seek to counter increasingly varied and numerous aerial threats.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com