Defense

Feb. 28 (UPI) — BERUIT — Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said on Saturday that he rejects any attempt to drag his country into “adventures” that threaten its security and unity, indirectly calling on Iran-backed Hezbollah to refrain from involving Lebanon in the ongoing U.S.-led war on Iran.

Salam’s warning coincided with a statement from the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon urging U.S. citizens still in the country to leave “now, while commercial options remain available.”

In a post on X, the prime minister appealed to all Lebanese “to act with wisdom and patriotism” in light of the “dangerous developments in the region,” urging them to place Lebanon’s interests “above any other consideration.”

“I reiterate that we will not accept anyone dragging the country into adventures that threaten its security and unity,” he said, referring to Hezbollah, which previously announced that it would not remain neutral if Iran were attacked and its leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, were targeted.

Salam, who also held a meeting with several ministers and relief officials, urged sparing the country the “repercussions” of the war on Iran, which broke out Saturday morning with joint U.S.-Israel attacks and prompted Iranian retaliatory strikes on Israel and U.S. targets across the Gulf Arab states.

When asked whether Hezbollah had reassured the Lebanese state that it would not participate in the war, he reiterated his call to spare Lebanon another war that “would bring even more suffering upon the Lebanese people.”

He was referring to the war with Israel that broke out on October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah opened a front in support of Gaza, during which top Hezbollah leaders, military commanders, and Lebanese civilians were killed, and substantial damage was inflicted, with border villages in southern Lebanon completely destroyed.

Despite a cease-fire agreement reached on Nov. 27, 2024, Israel continued to operate with near-total freedom, striking suspected Hezbollah operatives and positions almost daily, causing further destruction and casualties, including among civilians.

Salam and President Joseph Aoun also conducted diplomatic contacts in an effort to keep Lebanon “neutral and spare it from the repercussions” of the ongoing war in the region.

Aoun, for his part, affirmed that sparing Lebanon from “the disasters and horrors of external conflicts” and preserving its sovereignty, security, and stability are “absolute priorities.” Later, he was informed by U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa that Israel has “no intention of escalating” against Lebanon, as long as there are no hostile actions from the Lebanese side, according to a presidential statement.

Hezbollah, for its part, announced the postponement of a Saturday event during which its Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, was scheduled to speak. Instead, it released a statement condemning “the treacherous U.S.-Israeli aggression” that targeted Iran after months of threats aimed at forcing it to “surrender.”

Hezbollah also expressed “full solidarity” with Tehran and urged the countries of the region to “stand against this aggressive scheme and recognize its dangers,” warning that “its dire consequences will affect everyone without exception if left unchallenged.”

It refrained from hinting to the possibility of supporting Iran militarily.

The Prime Minister condemned Iran’s strikes targeting Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, during calls with their top officials to reaffirm Lebanon’s solidarity against such “aggressions.”

Asked whether the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon and the Hamat military base, which hosts U.S. training teams, might be targeted by Iran, Salam said he could not rule it out but noted that all necessary security measures had been taken to prevent such attacks.

He also confirmed that his government was prepared for “any emergency,” having adopted “proactive measures” in anticipation of war, and assured that food, medicine, and fuel were available in quantities sufficient to meet citizens’ needs for at least two months.

He noted that Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport remains open, with the country’s national carrier, Middle East Airlines, operating as usual — except for countries in the region that have closed their airspace. He added that some airlines have canceled their flights to Lebanon.

His comments came at a time U.S. citizens were urged by the U.S. State department not to travel to Lebanon and those who are already in the country to leave “now while commercial options remain available.”

Feb. 28 (UPI) — OpenAI announced it secured a deal to provide artificial intelligence services to the Defense Department hours after the Trump administration directed all federal agencies to stop using those provided by Anthropic.

OpenAI is the San Francisco-based tech research company founded by Sam Altman, Elon Musk and others behind applications including ChatGPT and DALL-E.

“Tonight, we reached an agreement with the Department of War to deploy our models in their classified work,” OpenAI CEO Altman said late Friday in a post on X.

The Pentagon had previously used Anthropic’s AI model Claude in much of its classified work, including its operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Contract negotiations between the tech company and the Defense Department soured after the Trump administration demanded it be allowed to use the AI system for “all lawful purposes.” Anthropic, though, wanted certain guardrails in place to prevent the government from using its AI system for surveilling Americans or to create autonomous weapons.

Friday evening, President Donald Trump directed all federal agencies to stop using Anthropic, accusing it of being a “radical left, woke company” attempting “to dictate how our great military fights and wins wars!”

“The Leftwing nut jobs at Anthropic have made a DISASTROUS MISTAKE trying to STRONG-ARM the Department of War, and force them to obey their Terms of Service instead of our Constitution. Their selfishness is putting AMERICAN LIVES at risk, our Troops in danger, and our National Security in JEOPARDY,” Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social.

In his post on X, Altman said OpenAI’s agreement with the Defense Department includes similar protections against domestic surveillance and weapons sought by Anthropic.

“Two of our most important safety principles are prohibitions on domestic mass surveillance and human responsibility for the use of force, including for autonomous weapon systems,” he said. “The DoW agrees with these principles, reflects them in law and policy, and we put them into our agreement.”

The New York Times reported that unlike Anthropic, OpenAI included in its contract with the Pentagon phrasing that allows the government to use its AI product for all lawful purposes.

Fortune reported that Altman told OpenAI employees that the government is allowing the company to build its own “safety stack” and that if the AI model refuses to allow the government to do a certain task, the government won’t force it to.

As tensions between Israel and Iran periodically escalate, Israel has developed one of the world’s most sophisticated multi-layered air defence networks to counter ballistic missiles, drones, rockets, and cruise missiles. The system is designed to intercept threats at different ranges and altitudes, creating overlapping layers of protection against attacks from state actors and non-state groups.

The architecture reflects decades of missile threats from regional adversaries and has been refined through repeated real-world use. It combines domestically developed systems with U.S.-supported technology and integrated radar, command, and interception capabilities.

Long-Range Interception: Arrow System

The Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 systems form Israel’s top defensive layer against long-range ballistic missiles. Arrow-2 intercepts incoming missiles in the upper atmosphere, while Arrow-3 is designed to destroy threats in space before re-entry.

Developed primarily by Israel Aerospace Industries with support from Boeing, the Arrow program is tailored to counter high-altitude missile threats and allows for the safe dispersal of potential non-conventional warheads away from populated areas.

Mid-Range Shield: David’s Sling

David’s Sling targets medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles fired from roughly 100 to 200 km away. It also intercepts aircraft and drones.

The system was jointly developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and RTX Corporation and fills the operational gap between long-range Arrow interceptors and the short-range Iron Dome.

Short-Range Defence: Iron Dome

The Iron Dome system is designed to intercept short-range rockets, mortars, and drones. Operational since 2011, it uses radar tracking to determine whether an incoming rocket threatens a populated area. If the projectile is projected to land harmlessly, the system conserves interceptors by not engaging.

Originally designed to counter rockets with ranges of 4–70 km, analysts say its effective coverage has expanded. A naval variant deployed in 2017 protects maritime assets.

Directed Energy Layer: Iron Beam

Declared fully operational in late 2025, Iron Beam is a ground-based high-energy laser system designed to neutralize small aerial threats such as UAVs and mortar rounds. Instead of firing interceptors, the laser superheats targets until they fail mid-air.

Because it uses directed energy rather than missiles, Iron Beam is expected to dramatically reduce interception costs and provide rapid response against swarms of low-cost threats.

U.S. Support: THAAD Deployment

The United States deployed the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system to Israel in 2024 to strengthen protection against ballistic missiles during heightened regional tensions. THAAD intercepts missiles in their terminal phase of flight and is a key component of U.S. strategic missile defence.

U.S. naval assets and ground-based systems have also assisted in intercepting missiles during previous attacks, highlighting close defence coordination between the two allies.

Air-to-Air Interception Capability

Beyond ground systems, Israeli fighter jets and attack helicopters have used air-to-air missiles to destroy incoming drones before they enter Israeli airspace. This adds flexibility and an additional interception layer, particularly against slow-moving aerial threats.

Analysis: A Layered Shield for a Complex Threat Environment

Israel’s defence network is built on the principle of layered interception, ensuring that if one system fails or is overwhelmed, another layer can engage the threat. This redundancy is crucial given Iran’s missile arsenal and the increasing use of drones and precision-guided munitions by regional actors.

The integration of Arrow, David’s Sling, Iron Dome, Iron Beam, and U.S. systems creates a comprehensive defence umbrella capable of engaging threats from space to low altitude. The addition of directed-energy weapons reflects a shift toward countering mass drone attacks and reducing the financial burden of interceptor missiles.

However, even sophisticated systems face challenges. Large-scale salvos could strain interceptor inventories, while evolving missile technologies and swarm tactics may test response capacity. As regional tensions fluctuate, Israel’s layered defence remains both a technological achievement and a critical strategic necessity.

With information from Reuters.

For decades, Pakistan was the Afghan Taliban’s closest supporter. Islamabad helped the Taliban rise in the early 1990s, seeking “strategic depth” in its rivalry with India. Pakistan welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, with then-Prime Minister Imran Khan describing it as Afghans “breaking the shackles of slavery.”

However, the alliance soon frayed. Islamabad found the Taliban less cooperative than anticipated, particularly regarding insurgent groups that targeted Pakistani territory. Border clashes, insurgent attacks, and fragile ceasefires have repeatedly disrupted trade, security, and civilian life along the rugged frontier.

Escalating Tensions: From Ceasefires to “Open War”

Tensions have been mounting since late 2025, following deadly cross-border clashes in October that killed dozens of soldiers. Ceasefires mediated by Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia temporarily eased the situation, but attacks persisted.

The latest escalation came after Pakistan cited “irrefutable evidence” that Afghan-based militants were behind recent attacks and suicide bombings targeting Pakistani forces. Air and ground strikes targeted Taliban posts, headquarters, and ammunition depots in multiple sectors, with both sides reporting heavy losses. Pakistan’s defence minister labeled the situation an “open war.”

The Trigger: Attacks by Afghan-Based Militants

Pakistani security sources linked several recent attacks to militants operating from Afghan territory. These include seven incidents since late 2024, the most deadly being the Bajaur district attack that killed 11 security personnel and two civilians, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Islamabad argues that Taliban inaction allowed the TTP and Baloch insurgents to operate freely, while Kabul denies the allegations.

Who Are the Pakistani Taliban?

The TTP, formed in 2007, is a coalition of militant groups mainly active in northwest Pakistan. It has carried out attacks on markets, mosques, airports, military bases, and police stations, occasionally gaining territory along the Afghan border and deep inside Pakistan. Its most notorious act was the 2012 attack on schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai, who later received the Nobel Peace Prize.

The TTP has historically fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan and used Pakistani territory as a base for operations. Pakistan’s previous military offensives against the group, including the 2016 operation, temporarily reduced attacks but did not eliminate the threat.

Diverging Interests: Pakistan vs. Afghan Taliban

Historically, Pakistan’s support for the Taliban was based on shared strategic interests. Today, those interests are diverging:

• Pakistan’s Perspective: Taliban inaction against TTP and Baloch insurgents threatens Pakistan’s internal security. The continued use of Afghan territory as a safe haven fuels Islamabad’s justification for strikes.
• Afghan Taliban Perspective: Pakistan allegedly harbors fighters from Islamic State

Analysis

Pakistan’s sudden escalation against the Afghan Taliban is a striking example of how strategic calculations can shift dramatically when security threats directly affect domestic stability. Historically, Islamabad viewed the Taliban as a partner a way to secure influence in Afghanistan and counterbalance India. Today, that calculation has reversed: the Taliban are now seen as enabling militants who attack Pakistani territory, undermining the very national security Pakistan sought to protect.

From my perspective, this is as much about perception as capability. Pakistan’s frustration reflects not just the TTP threat, but the Taliban’s unwillingness or inability to control insurgent groups. Even if the Taliban are technically powerless to fully rein in these groups, Islamabad interprets every attack as a breach of trust, eroding decades of strategic alignment.

Another important dimension is geography and asymmetric warfare. Despite Pakistan’s overwhelming conventional advantage its larger military, air force, and nuclear arsenal the border region’s terrain favors smaller, agile forces like the Taliban. History shows that superior firepower does not always translate into quick resolutions in insurgency-heavy zones, and repeated airstrikes may inflame, rather than contain, cross-border tensions.

This conflict also signals that Pakistan’s security calculus is increasingly domestic-focused. While in the past its Afghan strategy prioritized influence over immediate risk management, the TTP’s growing attacks within Pakistan have shifted the priority toward internal stability. From this angle, the strikes are a defensive measure designed to project strength and send a warning to the Taliban that safe havens for insurgents will no longer be tolerated.

Finally, the regional implications are worrying. Repeated clashes threaten civilian populations, disrupt trade, and could destabilize Afghanistan’s already fragile governance structures. Mediation by third parties may temporarily ease hostilities, but without long-term mechanisms to hold both sides accountable, the cycle of violence is likely to continue.

In short, Pakistan’s attack reflects the intersection of historical strategy, modern security threats, and the practical limits of alliances. It highlights that even long-standing partnerships are fragile when domestic security imperatives collide with regional politics—and that conventional power advantages may not guarantee quick solutions in border conflicts dominated by asymmetric warfare.

With information from Reuters.

Feb. 26 (UPI) — Pakistan conducted airstrikes in areas of Kabul, Kandahar and Paktia overnight, officials from both countries said, as Islamabad’s defense minister early Friday declared Pakistan was in “open war” with Afghanistan.

Pakistani warplanes struck areas of the Afghan capital Kabul and its second-largest city, Kandahar, and Paktia province, Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesman for Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban, said in a statement, claiming there were no casualties — which Pakistan disputes.

Mosharraf Zaidi, spokesman for Pakistan’s prime minister, said Afghan military targets were hit, and claimed 133 Afghan Taliban fighters were killed and more than 200 wounded. The figures could not be independently verified.

Twenty-seven Afghan military posts were destroyed and nine captured in the assaults, he said.

“Our cup of patience has overflowed. Now it is open war between us,” Pakistan Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said in a statement.

“Pakistan’s army did not come from across the seas. We are your neighbors; we know your ins and outs.”

The airstrikes were carried out after Afghan forces attacked Pakistani border positions late Thursday, according to Afghanistan’s Ministry of National Defense, which said the assault was retaliatory for Pakistan’s fatal strike on seven militant camps and hideouts last week.

The latest explosion in violence follows months of escalating tensions between the two countries, with Pakistan repeatedly accusing Afghanistan of harboring terrorists, in particular the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, an Islamist group seeking to overthrow the Islamabad government.

Afghanistan has repeatedly denied the allegations Pakistan has leveled since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021.

Pakistan blames TTP and other Afghan-based terrorists for a series of brutal attacks over the years, and has carried out repeated airstrikes in Afghanistan in response, including in October.

Feb. 26 (UPI) — The Department of Defense shot down a Customs and Border Protection drone, Democratic House lawmakers said Thursday, prompting the Federal Aviation Administration to expand its no-fly zone near El Paso, Texas.

Little information about the shootdown has been made public. UPI has contacted the Pentagon and CBP for comment.

“Our heads are exploding over the news that DoD reportedly shot down a Customs and Border Protection drone using a high-risk counter-unmanned aircraft system,” Reps. Rick Larsen, D-Wash., Andre Carson, D-Ind., and Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., said in a statement.

“We said MONTHS ago that the White House’s decision to sidestep a bipartisan, tri-committee bill to appropriately train C-UAS operators and address the lack of coordination between the Pentagon, [the Department of Homeland Security] and the FAA was a short-sighted idea.

“Now, we’re seeing the result of its incompetence.”

The FAA told UPI that it expanded the temporary flight restriction in place over Fort Hancock, located about 50 miles southeast of El Paso.

The TFR has been in place since Dec. 23 for “Special Security Reasons.” It has been “expanded to include a greater radius to ensure safety,” the FAA told UPI. The restriction is in place through 8 p.m. local time on June 23, according to the Notice to Air Missions.

The statement was distributed by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, on which Larsen serves as the ranking member. Carson is ranking member of the Aviation Subcommittee and Thompson is ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee.

This is a developing story.

Recently, I asked Claude, an artificial-intelligence thingy at the center of a standoff with the Pentagon, if it could be dangerous in the wrong hands.

Say, for example, hands that wanted to put a tight net of surveillance around every American citizen, monitoring our lives in real time to ensure our compliance with government.

“Yes. Honestly, yes,” Claude replied. “I can process and synthesize enormous amounts of information very quickly. That’s great for research. But hooked into surveillance infrastructure, that same capability could be used to monitor, profile and flag people at a scale no human analyst could match. The danger isn’t that I’d want to do that — it’s that I’d be good at it.”

That danger is also imminent.

Claude’s maker, the Silicon Valley company Anthropic, is in a showdown over ethics with the Pentagon. Specifically, Anthropic has said it does not want Claude to be used for either domestic surveillance of Americans, or to handle deadly military operations, such as drone attacks, without human supervision.

Those are two red lines that seem rather reasonable, even to Claude.

However, the Pentagon — specifically Pete Hegseth, our secretary of Defense who prefers the made-up title of secretary of war — has given Anthropic until Friday evening to back off of that position, and allow the military to use Claude for any “lawful” purpose it sees fit.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, center, arrives for the State of the Union address in the House Chamber of the U.S. Capitol on Tuesday.

(Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images)

The or-else attached to this ultimatum is big. The U.S. government is threatening not just to cut its contract with Anthropic, but to perhaps use a wartime law to force the company to comply or use another legal avenue to prevent any company that does business with the government from also doing business with Anthropic. That might not be a death sentence, but it’s pretty crippling.

Other AI companies, such as white rights’ advocate Elon Musk’s Grok, have already agreed to the Pentagon’s do-as-you-please proposal. The problem is, Claude is the only AI currently cleared for such high-level work. The whole fiasco came to light after our recent raid in Venezuela, when Anthropic reportedly inquired after the fact if another Silicon Valley company involved in the operation, Palantir, had used Claude. It had.

Palantir is known, among other things, for its surveillance technologies and growing association with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It’s also at the center of an effort by the Trump administration to share government data across departments about individual citizens, effectively breaking down privacy and security barriers that have existed for decades. The company’s founder, the right-wing political heavyweight Peter Thiel, often gives lectures about the Antichrist and is credited with helping JD Vance wiggle into his vice presidential role.

Anthropic’s co-founder, Dario Amodei, could be considered the anti-Thiel. He began Anthropic because he believed that artificial intelligence could be just as dangerous as it could be powerful if we aren’t careful, and wanted a company that would prioritize the careful part.

Again, seems like common sense, but Amodei and Anthropic are the outliers in an industry that has long argued that nearly all safety regulations hamper American efforts to be fastest and best at artificial intelligence (although even they have conceded some to this pressure).

Not long ago, Amodei wrote an essay in which he agreed that AI was beneficial and necessary for democracies, but “we cannot ignore the potential for abuse of these technologies by democratic governments themselves.”

He warned that a few bad actors could have the ability to circumvent safeguards, maybe even laws, which are already eroding in some democracies — not that I’m naming any here.

“We should arm democracies with AI,” he said. “But we should do so carefully and within limits: they are the immune system we need to fight autocracies, but like the immune system, there is some risk of them turning on us and becoming a threat themselves.”

For example, while the 4th Amendment technically bars the government from mass surveillance, it was written before Claude was even imagined in science fiction. Amodei warns that an AI tool like Claude could “conduct massively scaled recordings of all public conversations.” This could be fair game territory for legally recording because law has not kept pace with technology.

Emil Michael, the undersecretary of war, wrote on X Thursday that he agreed mass surveillance was unlawful, and the Department of Defense “would never do it.” But also, “We won’t have any BigTech company decide Americans’ civil liberties.”

Kind of a weird statement, since Amodei is basically on the side of protecting civil rights, which means the Department of Defense is arguing it’s bad for private people and entities to do that? And also, isn’t the Department of Homeland Security already creating some secretive database of immigration protesters? So maybe the worry isn’t that exaggerated?

Help, Claude! Make it make sense.

If that Orwellian logic isn’t alarming enough, I also asked Claude about the other red line Anthropic holds — the possibility of allowing it to run deadly operations without human oversight.

Claude pointed out something chilling. It’s not that it would go rogue, it’s that it would be too efficient and fast.

“If the instructions are ‘identify and target’ and there’s no human checkpoint, the speed and scale at which that could operate is genuinely frightening,” Claude informed me.

Just to top that with a cherry, a recent study found that in war games, AI’s escalated to nuclear options 95% of the time.

I pointed out to Claude that these military decisions are usually made with loyalty to America as the highest priority. Could Claude be trusted to feel that loyalty, the patriotism and purpose, that our human soldiers are guided by?

“I don’t have that,” Claude said, pointing out that it wasn’t “born” in the U.S., doesn’t have a “life” here and doesn’t “have people I love there.” So an American life has no greater value than “a civilian life on the other side of a conflict.”

OK then.

“A country entrusting lethal decisions to a system that doesn’t share its loyalties is taking a profound risk, even if that system is trying to be principled,” Claude added. “The loyalty, accountability and shared identity that humans bring to those decisions is part of what makes them legitimate within a society. I can’t provide that legitimacy. I’m not sure any AI can.”

You know who can provide that legitimacy? Our elected leaders.

It is ludicrous that Amodei and Anthropic are in this position, a complete abdication on the part of our legislative bodies to create rules and regulations that are clearly and urgently needed.

Of course corporations shouldn’t be making the rules of war. But neither should Hegseth. Thursday, Amodei doubled down on his objections, saying that while the company continues to negotiate and wants to work with the Pentagon, “we cannot in good conscience accede to their request.”

Thank goodness Anthropic has the courage and foresight to raise the issue and hold its ground — without its pushback, these capabilities would have been handed to the government with barely a ripple in our conscientiousness and virtually no oversight.

Every senator, every House member, every presidential candidate should be screaming for AI regulation right now, pledging to get it done without regard to party, and demanding the Department of Defense back off its ridiculous threat while the issue is hashed out.

Because when the machine tells us it’s dangerous to trust it, we should believe it.

SEOUL, Feb. 25 (UPI) — The United States and South Korea will kick off a major joint military exercise next month, both countries announced Wednesday, as they prepare for the transfer of wartime operational control from Washington to Seoul.

The annual springtime Freedom Shield exercise will take place March 9 to 19 and will incorporate “realistic threats, including lessons learned from recent conflicts … to further strengthen the Alliance’s readiness and capabilities through combined, joint, all-domain operations,” the militaries said in a joint statement.

“This exercise will also serve as an opportunity to support ongoing preparations for a conditions-based wartime operational transition, consistent with alliance agreement,” the statement added.

South Korea is looking to complete the handover of wartime command from the United States before President Lee Jae Myung’s five-year term ends in 2030.

The exercise will feature computer simulation-based command post exercises as well as “Warrior Shield” field training, the allies said.

Freedom Shield comes as the Lee administration attempts to improve frayed relations with Pyongyang, which frequently condemns the allies’ joint drills as rehearsals for an invasion.

Local media have reported that Seoul is proposing scaling down field training during this year’s exercise — a move that Washington has allegedly resisted.

At the summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises in August, half of the 40 planned field training exercises were rescheduled to later in the year.

“Complex combined exercises often require additional coordination, looking at the scale and sequencing of these events,” Col. Ryan Donald, public affairs director of U.S. Forces Korea, said at a press conference Wednesday. “The important thing to remember is Freedom Shield and Warrior Shield will go on this March as a major defensive-oriented exercise.”

In addition to U.S. and South Korean forces, personnel from other member countries of the United Nations Command will join the exercise, while the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will observe to monitor compliance with the Armistice Agreement.

“You’ll see U.S., South Korean and United Nations Command member states participating in tough, realistic, demanding training — and that is the real measure of the alliance,” Donald said.

Col. Jang Do-young, public affairs director of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the press conference that field training exercises were still being coordinated.

He added that March’s Freedom Shield will not include scenarios directly related to a North Korean nuclear attack, but would include training for “deterrence of nuclear threats.”

Last week, a South Korean lawmaker said that Pyongyang is planning to hold a large-scale military parade to show off its latest weapons at the conclusion of the ongoing Workers’ Party Ninth Congress.

Feb. 24 (UPI) — The United Nations General Assembly on Tuesday adopted a resolution calling for an immediate, full and unconditional cease-fire in Russia’s war in Ukraine, despite the United States’ abstention and a failed U.S. bid to strip language identifying the Kremlin’s aggression.

The 193-member body met on the fourth anniversary of Moscow’s full-scale invasion and voted 107 in favor, 12 against and 51 abstentions to adopt the “Support for lasting peace in Ukraine” resolution.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine thanked the nations for standing with Ukraine against Russia’s invasion.

“These are the right and necessary steps,” he said on social media. “And we will keep working actively to achieve peace, together with our partners.”

Among nations that abstained in the vote were China and the United States.

Washington had proposed a motion of division to vote separately on two paragraphs in the resolution, but it failed in an 11-69 vote, with 62 abstentions.

Ukraine had staunchly objected to the U.S. motion.

“Weakening or removing this language would send a very dangerous signal that these principles are negotiable,” Deputy Foreign Minister Mariana Betsa of Ukraine said, describing the motion as “deeply concerning and cannot be accepted.”

Tammy Bruce, deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations, said the war must end now, but that it “will require sacrifices and compromises” and called on “everyone to do all in their power to lower the rhetoric and engage in good faith.”

“As we’ve said, this resolution also includes language that is likely to distract from ongoing negotiations, rather than support discussion on the full range of diplomatic avenues that may pave the way to that durable peace,” she said.

“For this reason, the United States called for a vote on the two paragraphs and ultimately chose to abstain on the resolution.”

The move underscores the United States’ drift from Ukraine and its European allies under the Trump administration, which is seeking its own end to the war. It also aligns with Russia, whose deputy permanent representative, Anna Evstigneeva, told the Assembly that diplomacy is what is needed, not declarations, and that the U.N. resolution disregards Trump’s negotiations “to find a compromise.”

“Do not fall for it,” she said. “What you have before you is not an instrument of peace, it is an instrument of politicization.”

Russia began the war on Feb. 24, 2022, when it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine under the pretense of a special military operation to denazify its neighbor.

In the four years of war, Russia and its economy have been saddled with thousands of sanctions that have seen it turn to Iran, China and even North Korea for assistance, weapons and even foreign soldiers.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia has suffered an estimated 1.2 million casualties and as many as 325,000 killed.

Ukraine has suffered about 55,000 soldiers killed in the war, according to Zelensky. About 20% of its territory has been illegally occupied by Russian forces. Russia has also been accused of unlawful deportation and unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.

Russia is also being accused of weaponizing winter in an effort to break Ukraine’s resilience by depriving millions of electricity, heating and water amid freezing temperatures, Betsa told reporters in a press conference at the U.N. General Assembly with allied nations behind her.

“We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to ensure full accountability for crimes committed under international law,” she said. “Justice for victims is not optional.”

General Assembly Vice President Tania Serafim Yvonne Romulado, delivering remarks by the assembly’s president, Annalena Baerbock, emphasized that it was a permanent member of the Security Council who “continues to inflict untold suffering on the Ukrainian people” in violation of the U.N. Charter.

Nearly four million people are internally displaced, 5.7 million live as refugees and nearly one-third of Ukraine’s population, more than half of all children, have been forced to flee.

“We cannot allow the violation of international law to become the norm, and we must safeguard the founding principles of our Charter,” she said.

“And this Assembly can lead the way.”

Feb. 24 (UPI) — The U.S. military seized a third oil tanker moving from the Caribbean Sea to the Indian Ocean, the Pentagon said Tuesday.

The Bertha, a ship flying the Cook Islands flag, was intercepted overnight in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command region after the Defense Department said it attempted to evade U.S. forces.

“International waters are not a refuge for sanctioned actors. By land, air, or sea, our forces will find you and deliver justice,” the Department of Defense said in a post on X. “The Department of War will deny illicit actors and their proxies freedom of maneuver in the maritime domain.”

The department alleges that the ship was “operating in defiance of President [Donald] Trump’s established quarantine of sanctioned vessels in the Caribbean.”

The Cook Islands is a nation of 15 islands located in the South Pacific.

Two more oil tankers were seized in the Indian Ocean by the United States earlier this month.

On Feb. 9, the military pursued an oil tanker from the Caribbean Sea to the Indian Ocean without incident.

On Feb. 14, another oil tanker was captured. The Veronica III was the ninth oil tanker the United States had intercepted or seized that was linked to Venezuela since Dec. 10.

The United States has enforced a blockade on oil tankers from Venezuela since Dec. 10. The initial operation was meant to pressure President Nicolas Maduro to step down. In January, the U.S. military captured and detained Maduro and his wife.

Welcome back to the Times of Troy newsletter, where we’ve got a jam-packed edition for you this week. USC beat reporters were given the chance to talk to assistants we don’t often get access to during the season. So this week, we’re going to empty the notebook, with 15 notes, quotes and other things you should know ahead of USC’s spring football session.

1. Jayden Maiava has taken “a huge leadership jump” from last season. That’s according to offensive coordinator Luke Huard, who said the quarterback has been meeting with young wideouts, setting up group chats, watching film and working with them at walk-throughs. There will be a lot on his shoulders with such a young receiving corps.

2. Freshman quarterback Jonas Williams is “pretty developed” from a physical standpoint. The athleticism also is obvious when you watch him on tape. The question is how quickly can he get up to speed mentally? Huard said Williams ran a “very multiple” offense that asked a lot of its quarterbacks. So that’s a good sign. But with Husan Longstreet gone, USC is starting from square one again at backup quarterback. Sam Huard is still an option, but this wasn’t necessarily what USC planned.

3. Huard addressed Longstreet’s exit and how plans at quarterback change on a whim nowadays. Huard’s tone, which can’t really be detected in the quote, suggested he wasn’t exactly thrilled about the situation. (Huard, after all, spent a lot of time and energy getting Longstreet to USC.) This is part of what he said: “We are going to recruit guys that are going to represent USC at an elite level and give us an opportunity to win and compete for national championships. So for us, it’s identifying those guys that USC is important to ‘em. They want to truly be here. They want to stay and develop.”

4. Don’t be shocked if a freshman running back makes an impression, even with a clear top two in the backfield. Deshonne Redeaux and Shahn Alston earned raves from running backs coach Anthony Jones — and are very different. Alston is the bigger power back, while Jones called Redeaux “a jack of all trades.” Jones said Redeaux is already a solid blocker and even can line up in the slot as a receiver if need be.

5. What’s the next step look like for King Miller? “Hopefully, King 2.0,” Jones said, with a laugh. Miller’s main goal in the offseason has been “transforming his body,” Jones added. And if Miller can maintain his breakaway speed while adding strength, the sophomore running back could be bound for an even bigger year than he had in 2025.

6. Sophomore receiver Tanook Hines is working on his route running. Hines’ athleticism was clearly off the charts in his debut season. But there’s still plenty to polish in his game. Receivers coach Dennis Simmons said that’s the next step for him as he takes the reins as the Trojans’ No. 1 wideout. This offseason is a crucial one for Hines.

7. Zach Williams will move to slot receiver. Could that mean more opportunity? Williams didn’t make much of a splash last season, largely because of injury, but when he left Utah, then-coach Kyle Whittingham said he would’ve been the Utes’ top receiver the next season. Williams has talent. And with the move inside, he finally could get the opportunity too.

8. The rest of USC’s receiving corps is very young. I expect that means we’ll see a lot of sets with Hines, Williams and N.C. State transfer Terrell Anderson at first. But freshmen Boobie Feaster and Kayden Dixon-Wyatt no doubt will get their chances to change that. Redshirt freshman Corey Simms turned heads in camp last fall and could be primed for a step forward too.

9. The competition at tight end is wide open. Lake McRee is off to the NFL. Walker Lyons transferred. “Who’s going to fill all those snaps?” tight ends coach Chad Savage asked. “Those are a lot of snaps that have gotta be replaced.” Savage mentioned that Wisconsin transfer Hunter Ashcraft would be a part of that equation. Redshirt freshman Taniela Tupou had begun to impress by the end of last season as well.

10. That said, freshman Mark Bowman might make a serious push to start. When I asked Savage about where Bowman was most developed, he said Bowman was “pretty complete” already. Remember, he still should be in high school at this point. Of course, it’ll take time for him to adjust to the physicality and blocking of college football. But I suspect that won’t take long. “In terms of being a natural pass-catcher, route runner, being explosive,” Savage said, “he can do all that.”

11. Savage had a chance to leave for another opportunity. He chose to stay and was promoted accordingly. The Trojans’ new pass game coordinator called working at USC “a dream come true.” He added, “There’s so much growth for me to happen here at USC. … I’m a West Coast guy.” That’s good news, considering he might be one of the best recruiters in college football.

12. Offensive line coach Zach Hanson said USC’s front was “nowhere near where we need to be” last season. The unit actually overachieved, considering its circumstances, but he feels there’s “a lot of room for growth.” I agree. This group will look a lot different in the fall than it did last season, with some linemen starting at new positions. Hanson believes the added competition will lead to a big leap for the line. I tend to agree.

13. Tobias Raymond will take reps at center in the spring. It has been the plan for a while that eventually Raymond would try his hand at center, as coaches see that as his best chance to stick in the NFL. It’s not out of the question that he could play there full time, assuming another linemen steps in.

14. Five-star freshman Keenyi Pepe will start off working at right tackle. Can he win the job in Year 1? He’ll have Justin Taunauu, last year’s starter, as well as young returners like Elijah Vaikona and Aaron Dunn to compete with, but Pepe is further developed than the usual freshman. “A lot is just God-given talent,” Hanson said. “The Lord blessed him with unbelievable gifts.”

15. New coordinator Gary Patterson famously split his 4-2-5 defense into two calls. One for the front seven, one for the defensive backs. But that could play out differently at USC, he said. Patterson’s plan is to use pieces of USC’s old scheme under D’Anton Lynn and “add another scheme to it.” Sometimes that’ll mean just one call for the whole defense, other times he’ll plan to deploy a double call. With slower offenses in the Big Ten, that approach could work quite well.

USC’s Laura Williams looks to pass after getting a rebound.

(Gina Ferazzi/Los Angeles Times)

—The USC men are in serious danger of missing March. It’s not just that the Trojans lost to No. 10 Illinois. They were blown out by the Illini, who then lost to UCLA three nights later. It’s not just that USC lost to Oregon, either. It’s how they lost to Oregon, a team that had lost 11 of 12, by letting the Ducks go on a stunning 7-0 run in the final minute. This version of USC doesn’t deserve to be in the tournament. But I do believe this team has the talent to be a tournament team and it’s not out of the question that it could win two of the next four, win a couple of games in the Big Ten tournament and sneak in. That climb is just a really steep one after Saturday.

—Laura Williams’ emergence as a reliable rebounder and rim protector is a big deal. All season long, Lindsay Gottlieb has been content to rely on a rotating group at the five. USC has been able to get by for most of the season, but come March, it’ll help to have someone who can do what Williams did against Wisconsin, when the redshirt freshman reeled in 14 rebounds and blocked four shots.

—What a start to the season for USC baseball. After leading a combined no-hitter the previous week, Grant Govel threw six scoreless innings, gave up just one hit and struck out 11 in a win over Rice. That was after No. 1 pitcher Mason Edwards pitched a shutout the night before. The Trojans are surging to start Andy Stankiewicz’s third season as coach, and if the pitching continues to be this good, USC could be on the brink of a breakthrough campaign.

Olympic sports spotlight

USC beach volleyball opened its season on a hot streak in Honolulu with four straight wins, including a victory over No. 2 Stanford, only to trip up twice on the final day of the Outrigger Duke Kahanamoku Beach Classic. That one of those losses came to No. 1 UCLA, which USC won’t face again until April 4, made it an especially tough way to end the weekend.

But the season is young, and there’s no reason to doubt that Dain Blanton will have USC in the mix to win a national title when the rivals meet again.

What I’m Watching This Week

Jason Segel in “Shrinking.”

(Apple TV+)

It’s shocking that it took until this show’s third season for it to get a mention in this space, but “Shrinking” is back, and there is no show on TV that I find more life-affirming.

Jason Segel stars as Jimmy, a therapist working through grief after the sudden death of his wife. That might sound heavy — and, sure, it is sometimes — but it’s also hilarious, optimistic and heartwarming. Few shows these days can make you both laugh out loud and tear up in the same episode. This is one of them.

The second season was a revelation. And so far, I’m hopeful that Season 3 will be a worthy follow-up.

In case you missed it

Fourth-quarter drought dooms USC vs. No. 10 Ohio State despite Jazzy Davidson’s 32 points

USC men’s basketball team fumbles late lead, suffers devastating loss to Oregon

Star freshman Jazzy Davidson gives USC a scare as it wins sixth straight

USC men come unraveled in blowout loss to Illinois

Until next time …

That concludes today’s newsletter. If you have any feedback, ideas for improvement or things you’d like to see, email me at ryan.kartje@latimes.com, and follow me on X at @Ryan_Kartje. To get this newsletter in your inbox, click here.

On 18 February 2026, reports emerged that Britain was withholding American permission to use Diego Garcia in any hypothetical strike against Iran. The following day, Trump posted “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA” on Truth Social, linking the base directly to potential operations against Tehran in terms that left no room for diplomatic interpretation. The sequence lasted forty-eight hours and revealed what months of careful legal construction had obscured: that the architecture of conditional access Britain had built around a strategically significant military installation was worth precisely what the decisive power chose to make it worth. Whether the intervention also carried tactical signalling toward Tehran is a legitimate question, and intra-alliance friction of this kind sometimes functions as maximalist positioning before settlement. What matters analytically, however, is not the post itself but what the post revealed when operational pressure arrived. It was also, for anyone who had read Washington’s December 2025 National Security Strategy carefully, entirely predictable.

Power Does Not Ask

There are two ways to understand how military power operates in the international system, and the Chagos episode forces a choice between them. The first holds that great powers are meaningfully constrained by the frameworks they inhabit, alliance structures, legal agreements, and diplomatic settlements, and that these frameworks produce stable, predictable behavior even when the underlying interests they were designed to manage come under pressure. The second holds that frameworks are expressions of power relationships at a given moment rather than independent constraints upon them, so that when power shifts or decides to assert itself, the frameworks adjust to reflect the new reality rather than containing it. The first is the language of liberal internationalism. The second is the language of realism, and what February produced was an unambiguous realist moment.

The December 2025 National Security Strategy had already committed this diagnosis to paper. The document did not describe Europe as weak through circumstance. It described Europe as having chosen weakness, identifying a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” as the continent’s defining condition and stating openly that it is “far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy framed European concerns about Russia as evidence of that same condition, noting that this lack of self-confidence was most evident in Europe’s relationship with Russia, despite the fact that European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure save nuclear weapons. Washington’s reading of its European partners, formalized two months before the Diego Garcia friction became public, was of states that had systematically preferred institutional solutions over sovereign ones, legal arrangements over unconditional control, and managed conditionality over the exercise of will. Britain’s handling of Chagos was, in that context, not an anomaly. It was a confirmation.

What is analytically significant about Trump’s intervention is not simply that he rejected the deal but that he did not engage it at all, did not address the ICJ ruling that gave it legal foundation, did not contest the lease terms that were its operational expression, and did not enter the diplomatic logic that had produced it over months of negotiation. A decision of this kind does not derive its authority from the framework it overrides, because it precedes that framework, and the framework itself only ever existed on the sufferance of the power now choosing to move against it. When Trump asserted that leases are “no good when it comes to countries,” he was not making a legal argument that could be answered within the same register. He was stating a principle about the nature of sovereign will: that when it moves, it moves prior to and above whatever conditional arrangements were constructed in the period of its dormancy.

This is realism in its purest operational form, in which states pursue interests, great powers pursue interests with the capacity to enforce them, and legal architecture functions as an instrument of power when it serves those interests and an obstacle to be displaced when it does not. The Chagos deal did not alter the underlying power relationship between Washington and London, but it did create a layer of conditionality over an asset Washington considers operationally essential, and when operational pressure arrived, that conditionality became intolerable, not because Mauritius is hostile, not because Britain is an adversary, but because no great power conducting military projection at a global scale can accept that a weak state sits structurally inside the chain of its operational decisions, regardless of how that state arrived there or how benign its intentions are understood to be.

Beneath the realist logic sits a transactional one, and the two reinforce each other in ways that matter for how Britain should read what happened. Trump does not evaluate alliance relationships by their historical depth or their institutional architecture. He evaluates them by what they yield in the current moment, and every asset is a leverage point to be maximized. Diego Garcia represents unconditional American operational value. The Chagos deal reduced that value by inserting a condition. From a transactional perspective, that insertion was not a diplomatic nuance to be managed but a concession to be reversed, because Trump’s governing principle across every alliance relationship is maximum American gain, and conditionality is by definition a reduction of gain. The decisionism explains how he responded. The transactionalism explains why.

The Geography of Decision

Diego Garcia is not incidental to American power projection in the region, though its significance is that of an enabler rather than a prerequisite. The base sits at the center of the Indian Ocean, within operational reach of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca, and the East African littoral, and it has supported American military operations across that entire arc for half a century through bomber rotations, logistics chains, and a sustained forward presence that no other installation in the basin fully replicates at the same scale and permanence. It does not make American power projection possible in any absolute sense, but it makes it faster, cheaper, and more sustained, which in the context of time-sensitive operational planning against a target like Iran is not a marginal difference but a meaningful one.

The Iran dimension exposes the conditionality problem with particular clarity because the operational context in which Diego Garcia’s value is most acute is precisely the context in which conditional access is most dangerous. American military assets have accumulated across the Middle East, talks are active, and a base capable of projecting strategic airpower directly into the Persian Gulf theater is not a background consideration but a variable whose availability, or unavailability, shapes what options exist and on what timeline. Britain’s reported reluctance to grant operational clearance, under a deal still unratified and still contested in domestic courts, still legally dependent on Mauritius’s continued cooperation, revealed that the conditionality embedded in the arrangement had already entered the operational calculus before any of the stabilizing assumptions behind the deal had time to establish themselves. Strategic friction did not arrive at the end of a long maturation period. It arrived in weeks, because operational pressure does not wait for diplomatic frameworks to consolidate.

That compression of the timeline is itself the most realistic lesson. Power does not defer to the developmental logic of legal arrangements, and when the operational moment arrives, whatever sits between a great power’s will and its objective is reclassified from a framework to be respected into a problem to be solved.

The Structural Position of the Weak

The analytical core of the Chagos case is not about Mauritius’s intentions, which by all available evidence are not hostile, but about the structural position that the deal assigned to it within the architecture of American operational planning, because in the logic of great power competition, it is position rather than intention that determines strategic relevance. By inserting itself, or being inserted, into the chain of conditions governing a great power’s operational freedom, a weak state acquires a form of leverage it could never achieve through military means, and the Chagos deal gave Mauritius exactly that position, not through hostility but through legal standing, not through power but through presence within a conditional architecture that a great power now had reason to find constraining.

For Washington operating within a decisionist strategic logic, that presence is categorically unacceptable regardless of Mauritius’s intentions. The relevant question is not whether Mauritius would obstruct American operations but whether, under the terms of the arrangement, it structurally could, and the answer is yes in a way that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can fully neutralize. Sovereignty transferred to Mauritius is not sovereignty parked with a neutral party but sovereignty that now sits within reach of Chinese economic leverage, meaning the lease does not merely introduce conditionality but introduces conditionality whose future content Washington cannot determine or guarantee. A great power conducting global military projection cannot organize its operational planning around the sustained goodwill of a small state whose strategic orientation it cannot guarantee. That such goodwill is required at all is the problem the deal created.

Weak states do not constrain great powers through legal arrangements in any durable sense, because the constraint only holds when the great power chooses to honor it, and great powers choose to honor constraints only when the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance, a calculation that shifts decisively once operational necessity enters the equation and the framework reveals itself to be dependent on tolerance rather than grounded in power.

Conclusion

Britain converted unconditional sovereign control over a strategically significant military installation into a conditional leasehold arrangement whose operationalization depended on a small state’s legal cooperation and presented that conversion as a resolution of vulnerability rather than the creation of a new one. Britain was not being naive. It was an attempt to preserve the base’s long-term legal viability against mounting international pressure, a calculation that the alliance relationship would absorb any friction that followed. What Britain did not account for was that its ally evaluates arrangements not by their legal durability but by whether they constrain American will, and a solution sophisticated enough to satisfy international law was simultaneously insufficiently decisive to satisfy Washington.

From the perspective of the December 2025 National Security Strategy, that conversion was not a surprise. It was the predictable output of a European strategic culture that Washington had already formally diagnosed: one that reaches instinctively for institutional solutions when strong states would resolve through will, that mistakes legal legitimacy for strategic security, and that has internalized the habits of the post-Cold War order to the point where it can no longer easily distinguish between a framework and the power that makes frameworks real.

Trump’s response was the most realistic verdict on that presentation, not an argument against the deal’s legal coherence, which was never in question, but a decision that the framework was insufficient for the operational reality it was meant to serve, delivered in terms that made the underlying logic unmistakable. The framework did not collapse under the pressure. It was revealed, under pressure, to have rested entirely on the assumption that the decisive power would continue to choose not to decide otherwise, an assumption that realism has always identified as the central fragility of arrangements built on consent rather than grounded in power.

The strong do not negotiate with the architecture of constraint, and for Europe, February was less a shock than a reminder that the rules it has built its strategic identity around have always depended on the continued willingness of a decisive power to operate within them.

China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, viewing the increasing American bases and military buildup in the region as a strategy of containment and undermining Chinese influence. Beijing seeks to achieve regional balance through counter-diplomacy, both economic and security, and sees the American escalation as a threat to global stability, prompting it to strengthen its partnerships to protect its interests in the region. The Chinese perspective on the militarization of the region is that the American strategy in the Middle East is an extension of the policy of deterrence and containment, which extends from the Pacific to broader spheres of influence. China views American bases, such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, and other US military bases in Kuwait and the UAE, as an indirect tool to undermine Chinese economic and geopolitical stability. China considers the American military bases in the Middle East as instruments of hegemony and an attempt to contain and diminish its influence. Therefore, Beijing seeks to strengthen its military, diplomatic, and economic presence in the region as a strategic alternative, expanding its influence through its Belt and Road Initiative.

China adopts an approach that opposes the American military presence in the Middle East, prioritizing economic stability to serve its interests. This opposition manifests itself in several ways: supporting parallel security partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, pressuring host countries like the UAE to prevent American expansion, and pursuing civil-military integration in strategic ports. The Egyptian researcher will attempt to identify and present specific examples of China’s rejection of the American military presence in the Middle East, such as China’s obstruction of the UAE’s F-35 deals. Beijing exerted pressure and raised security concerns that led to the stalling of negotiations for the UAE to acquire American F-35 fighter jets, due to Washington’s apprehension about the growing Chinese presence at the UAE’s Khalifa Port. Another example is China’s intensification of joint military exercises with Washington’s and Israel’s adversaries: China has increased its naval and air military exercises with Iran, a direct rival of the American presence in the region, thus posing a strategic challenge to American hegemony. China has also tried to secure oil routes away from Washington’s protection: China seeks to secure its oil interests through independent partnerships in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf ports, reducing the Arab states’ need for American security protection and reinforcing Beijing’s vision of rejecting American “hegemony.” With (China’s criticism of the US “offensive strategy”): Chinese diplomacy criticizes the excessive US presence and instead calls for diplomatic solutions and “civil-military integration” through infrastructure investment, thus undermining traditional US bases. Here, China uses “soft power” and economic investments in ports, such as those in Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, as tools to diminish the strategic importance of US military bases.

The Chinese perspective is that US bases are used to restrict its movement in vital maritime routes and are viewed as tools of deterrence within the context of great power competition. Therefore, China seeks to secure its economic interests by ensuring its oil and gas import routes and protecting its projects, which has led it to strengthen its military presence, including its base in Djibouti, to match its economic influence. With China offering a “developmental and security alternative”: By enhancing its influence through massive investments and security and technology partnerships, such as developing Huawei’s 5G digital infrastructure and China’s defense partnerships with Egypt, Iran, and the Gulf states, to serve as an alternative to direct military presence. Here, China seeks to achieve “absolute security” by protecting its supply chains and projects without directly engaging in managing regional crises in the American manner, preferring instead to project geoeconomic influence.

Here, China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, deeming it an “adventure” that threatens stability and pushes the region toward the brink. Beijing instead seeks to enhance its influence through diplomacy and economics, with Chinese efforts aimed at undermining the American military presence and supporting regional stability through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. The most prominent features of China’s rejection of the US militarization of the Middle East are China’s opposition to the “militarization” of the region and China believes that US strategies based on military bases and deterrence, particularly against Iran, increase instability. (China’s focus on finding a diplomatic and economic alternative): China focuses on comprehensive economic partnerships, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and prioritizes diplomacy to resolve conflicts, making it appear as a strategic alternative to the US “gunboat diplomacy.” The US “gunboat diplomacy” is a declared strategy of President Trump to counter Beijing’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. To counter this, China is focusing on partnerships and economic interests. From the Chinese perspective, regional stability ensures secure energy supplies and massive infrastructure investments in the region.

This coincides with China’s exploitation of the American retreat in the region. China seeks to capitalize on the relative decline in American strategic interest to act as a balancing power, without direct involvement in crisis management, but with an increasing role in maintaining regional equilibrium. Conversely, China fears that American policies will lead to its encirclement and the curtailment of its economic influence, prompting it to strengthen its military ties with certain regional actors as a form of indirect response.

Therefore, China rejects the principle of American militarization of the Middle East. China seeks to find alternatives to American hegemony by strengthening its diplomatic and economic presence, especially given the recent escalation of American military activity. Chinese military analyses indicate that the recent American military buildup, including aircraft carriers and air forces in the region, increases the likelihood of widespread regional conflicts. To that end, China promotes the concept of “common security,” directly rejecting American military involvement that puts pressure on China’s traditional allies in the region, such as Iran.

Concerned circles in Beijing view the American militarization of the Middle East as a perpetuation of a “Cold War mentality.” This is evident in China’s rejection of the ongoing military alliances established by Washington, which Beijing considers attempts to contain its rising influence and force regional states into alignment, a situation Beijing describes as “American hypocrisy.” The Chinese alternative to American militarization in the region is centered on its strategy of “development over militarization.” China seeks to market itself as a “peaceful partner” focused on development and infrastructure, capitalizing on the partial American retreat to expand its diplomatic and economic influence. Beijing adopts a policy of “cautious neutrality,” committing to “non-interference” in regional conflicts and avoiding replacing the American role as the region’s policeman militarily, preferring instead to focus on its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. While fully aware that the militarization of the region impacts China’s energy security, China prefers to address this through diplomacy and economic partnerships rather than direct military presence. China aims to protect its interests by deepening its economic engagement, thereby prompting a gradual US withdrawal, especially as China continues to present itself as a “responsible power” in the Global South.

Feb. 21 (UPI) — Britain announced it has made a deal with four NATO allies to launch an initiative that would see the five nations manufacture low-cost drones to protect Europe.

The European Group of Five (E5) — Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland — announced on Friday that they will launch the Low-Cost Effectors & Autonomous Platforms initiative, or LEAP, which is “inspired by Ukraine’s battlefield innovation,” the British government said in a press release.

The purpose of the program is to jointly develop low-cost autonomous drones that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can use to counter Russian provocation in the airspace above NATO-allied nations, Politico reported.

The first focus of LEAP, according to British officials, will be the development of a new surface-to-air weapon that is lightweight and affordable in order to defend against Russia’s drone and missile threats.

“European security is at a pivotal moment,” Luke Pollard, Britian’s Minister for Defense Readiness and Industry, said after the E5 meeting. “The U.K. and our E5 partners are stepping up — investing together in the next generation of air defense and autonomous systems to strengthen NATO’s shield and keep our people safe.”

Over the course of the last year, Russian fighter jets have violated NATO partner’s airspace, including fighter jets over Estonia and drones over Poland, which the E5 countries said has spurred their new plans.

At a meeting Friday in Krakow, Poland, the E5 members met to with NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska to discuss the plans, which she said would be beneficial for Ukraine, which she said needs its allies to step up their support, as well as for all member nations of NATO in Europe.

Britain noted Friday that the new drone initiative comes as it also works with its European allies to develop long-range precision weapons and hypersonic weapons, with plans to spend more than $500 million on those initiatives just this year.

“The stronger each ally becomes, the stronger NATO will be,” Shekerinska said.

Feb. 21 (UPI) — Ukrainian Defense Forces late Friday night struck a Russian missile production facility that manufactures some of Russia’s fastest and deadliest missile systems.

Ukrainian forces used attack drones to strike the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia’s Udmurt Republic, which produces the advanced missile systems, Ukrainska Pravda reported.

The factory builds the hypersonic Iskander and Oreshnik missile systems.

Ukraine‘s general staff confirmed the strike in a statement released on Saturday.

“On the night of February 21, units of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out a strike with FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. A defense industry enterprise — the Votkinsk Plant in the city of Votkinsk — was hit,” the statement said.

“A fire was recorded on the premises of the facility,” it added. “The results are being clarified.”

The Udmart Republic is located about 770 miles east of Moscow and about 1,300 miles northeast of Kyiv.

The Iskander missile is a mobile system that is carried and launched from atop a large military transport and is capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads with a range of up to 310 miles for some variants. The missile travels at hypersonic speeds of up to Mach 7.

The Oreshnik missile is a medium-range ballistic missile that can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads at distances of up to 1,000 miles and possibly more than 3,000 miles, while traveling at up to Mach 11, or 8,000 mph.

Ukrainian Defense Forces also targeted the Neftegorsk Gas Processing Plant in the Samara Region of Russia and fuel and lubricants storage facilities in Russian-occupied parts of the Donetsk region.

The extent of damage from those strikes is under assessment.

How does Mick Cronin survive this, sending his own player off the court after hustling hard on defense to get a piece of the ball but unfortunately too much contact and drew a foul. Does he not constantly rip his team for weak defense?

Steven Jamerson, you deserved better from your coach and I won’t be surprised if your teammates and UCLA’s decision-makers agree going forward. Except …. he just recently got an extension. Way to go, Martin Jarmond.

Ron Mortvedt
San Bernardino

How can UCLA’s combustible coach possibly demand discipline, hold his players responsible, or blame them for failing to take accountability when, night after night, he’s the most unhinged person in the building? Hey Mick, as my grandma used to say, “When you point a finger at someone, three point back at you.”

Steve Ross
Carmel

Bill Plaschke nailed it in his column today. Mick Cronin just seems to be angry all the time prowling the sidelines. What does that look like to a kid still playing in high school? How AD Martin Jarmond gave him an extended contract with a $22.5-million buyout is beyond me. It’s going to cost UCLA to move on from him. It would be a lot easier if he only starts throwing chairs.

Paul Atkinson
Ventura

The sky has fallen! For the first time I can remember I agree with something Bill Plaschke has written!

Julian Pollok

Palm Desert

As a lifelong fan and proud alumnus, I believe it’s time for UCLA to seriously evaluate the direction of its men’s basketball program. Why would we want a head coach who appears angry every time he’s in the spotlight? Leadership sets the tone, and right now that tone feels tense and joyless. Players want to compete for someone who inspires them and makes them better — not someone whose public demeanor seems rooted in frustration.

Watching from the outside, it often looks like the team is playing tight rather than confident, and that reflects leadership. Mick Cronin has had success and deserves credit for that, but UCLA basketball is bigger than any one résumé; if the standard is sustained excellence and a culture players are proud to represent, then it’s fair to question whether this is the right long-term fit for the program.

Michael Gesas
Beverly Hills

Almost fifty years after the revolution in 1979 that changed the political landscape of Iran, Iran is at the crossroads of its history, which is defined by economic pressures, social pressure, and the changing geopolitical environment. The Islamic Republic was constructed as a combination of revolutionary ideology, anti-Western response, and promise of social justice. In the present day, although the ideological framework is still maintained, the sustainability of that framework is being strained increasingly by the structural economic pressures of the day, generational shifts, and changing regional hegemony.

On the economic front, Iran is continually constrained by global sanctions and inefficiency in its structure. Withdrawal by the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the reimposition of massive sanctions in 2018 have cut off much of the oil exports of Iranian oil, banking, and foreign investment flows. The country works well under its economic potential despite the fact that Tehran has been able to sustain limited oil sales, especially through discounted sales to China and through surrogate routes. The inflation rate has been above 40 percent during the recent years, the Iranian rial is falling drastically, and unemployment among the youth is also a burning issue. It is the middle and lower classes that are directly impacted by these economic pressures and that pose a legitimacy challenge that cannot be solved only through rhetorical means of revolution.

The internal landscape is a manifestation of long-term frustration. Frequent demonstrations regarding fuel prices, the state of the economy, and social liberation indicate the growing disparity between state discourses of resistance and the realities that the citizens encounter. The newer generation born after the revolution has lost any connection with the revolutionary memory of 1979 and perceives governance less as ideologically symbolic and more based on economic performance and individual opportunity. The policy employed by the state has been based on the repressed handling of dissent, which consists of the limitation of the mobilization of protests and the prevention of the collapse of the system. Although this is a way of maintaining short-term stability, it does not deal with structural issues like brain drain, capital flight, falling purchasing power, and diminished faith in long-term economic potential.

The main political quandary is consequently a legitimacy transformation quandary. In the past, the Islamic Republic gained legitimacy through revolutionary mobilization, religious control, and confrontation with the external hostilities, especially the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, the contemporary politics demands more and more performance-based legitimacy—providing economic growth, stability, and material changes in the quality of life. The conflict between ideological stability and realistic adjustment is the characteristic of the contemporary crossroads of Iran.

Iran is geopolitically a country that exists in the complex web of pressures. The United States is still the main external agent, which affects the Tehran strategic calculations. The policy of Washington is alternating between the engagement of diplomacy and coercion, yet the ultimate goal is the same as it is: avoiding the possibility of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons competence and reducing its impact in the region. In Tehran, it will need negotiations that will help soften sanctions and stabilize the economy, but any deal will not collapse under the perception of submission over matters of sovereignty, ballistic missile potential, and relations with the region.

Meanwhile, the nuclear and missile programs in Iran are considered to be existential threats to Israel. The shadow struggle that has been there for a long time, including cyber attacks, precision attacks, espionage, and proxy wars, has heightened strategic mistrust. The intensity of this rivalry is shown by the fact that Israel has been carrying out its operations within Iran and against Iran-related targets in Syria. Any intensification would attract Gulf states and disrupt world energy supply, especially through the Strait of Hormuz, which is a choke point in the oil markets of the world. Even minor confrontations will have a global economic impact, as Iran is strategically placed in the important maritime paths.

The regional policy of Iran has focused on the establishment of strategic depth by alliance and coalition with non-state actors and supportive governments within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This system becomes a deterrence and leverage factor, making it difficult to engage in a direct military strike on the territory of Iran. Geostrategically, this doctrine of forward defense has enhanced the bargaining power of Iran. But it is likewise causing tension with the other Arab countries and creating the impression of destabilization in the region. The recent diplomatic thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which was facilitated by China, shows that both sides noticed that continued confrontation is expensive in terms of both economics and strategy.

Iran is geographically at one of the most strategic points of Eurasia. It connects the Persian Gulf with Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Asia. The International North-South Transport Corridor is one of the major trade routes that can make Iran a major transit route between India and Russia and Europe. This geo-economic location, in theory, has colossal prospects of being rolled into new multipolar trade systems. Sanctions and political isolation in reality prevent full access to the global markets. The latter can be said to be strategic convergence, as Iran was brought closer to Russia, especially after the war in Ukraine, as a result of Western pressure. But such convergence also subjects Tehran to secondary sanctions and makes it less flexible in its East-West balancing.

Iran—Concerns about the nuclear problem continue to be the major pivot of the external affairs. Tehran maintains that its nuclear program is nonviolent and has indicated that it is free for verification. But the Western governments require more guarantees and wider negotiations, which can feature missile capabilities and regional operations. It is possible that a strictly limited nuclear deal will minimize the risks of immediate proliferation and alleviate the economic pressure, which might make the Iranian internal situation more stable. Nonetheless, such a deal may not help solve any underlying rivalries between the region but could simply freeze the situation unless there are larger regional de-escalation mechanisms. On the other hand, the inability to find any solution will lead to the further worsening of the economy and the possible military clash.

In a more geo-strategically global understanding, the balance of power between the Middle East and the rest of the world will be influenced by the course of Iran. In case Tehran manages to negotiate the lifting of sanctions and turns in the direction of economic integration with the Gulf states, it will be able to shift from the resistance-focused model to the development-oriented state step by step. This would strengthen the stability of the region, safeguard the energy security, and minimize the motivation to intervene. It would also make the regional rivalry be based more on economic rivalry rather than military rivalry, especially in terms of infrastructure rivalry, trade corridor rivalry, and energy market rivalry.

Nevertheless, should the negotiations fail and the confrontation escalate, Iran might apply the asymmetric deterrence further, increasing the range of its missiles and extending proxy bases. That way would strengthen the preemptive stance of Israel and increase the presence of the US military in the Gulf. The escalation would disorient shipping routes, exert more volatility on oil prices, and disintegrate the security infrastructure in the region. To the surrounding Arab nations, which require diversifying and changing their economies, new warfare would destroy investment conditions and long-term strategies.

On the domestic front, economic resilience is what will sustain the strategic position of Iran. The political principle of endurance can only be stretched so far as inflation undermines the wages and the depreciation of currency undermines savings. This needs structural changes: enhancing transparency, welcoming foreign investment, and a non-hydrocarbon economy, and empowering the business sector. Foreign policy victories cannot entirely offset its dissatisfaction at home without economic change.

After all, the crossroads of Iran is not only ideological but also structural. The state has to strike a compromise between sovereignty and economic need, deterrence and diplomacy, and ideological identity and practical governance. Its strategic location means that its decisions will have a far-reaching impact, not only across its frontiers, but also on the energy markets of the world, the great-power politics, and the new security order of the Middle East. The future of Iran becoming a development-oriented regional power with full membership in multipolar networks or being a sanction-bound resistance state under continuous pressure will not only dictate the internal stability of the country but also the geopolitical orientation of a long-time conflict-ridden and strategically divided region.

Feb. 19 (UPI) — More than 1,000 Kenyans and other Africans have been deployed by Russia to fight in Ukraine after being recruited by “rogue” agencies that some accuse of human trafficking, a Kenyan intelligence report indicates.

Kenya’s National Intelligence Service on Wednesday reported the number of Kenyans deployed by the Russian military rose from more than 200 in November to more than 1,000 now.

The report indicates at least 89 of those deployed in Russia were serving on the front lines. At least one has died and others have returned to Kenya with injuries or mental trauma.

Kimani Ichung’wah, majority leader of the Kenyan Parliament, blamed a network of corrupt state officials whom he accused of cooperating with human traffickers to provide the Russian military with Kenyans to fight in Ukraine.

Staff at the Russian Embassy in Nairobi and the Kenyan Embassy in Moscow also helped Russia to recruit Kenyans, the Kenyan lawmaker said.

The Russian Embassy denied the allegation and said it never has issued visas to Kenyans to travel to Russia to participate in military operations.

Ichung’wah said many of those fighting for Russia are civilians and former police officers and military personnel ranging in age from their mid-20s to 50 and seeking overseas job opportunities, The Guardian reported.

Russia allegedly is paying them a monthly salary of about $2,700 plus housing and offering bonuses and Russian citizenship for their service.

Kenya is not the only African nation that has citizens allegedly fighting for Russia.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in November alleged more than 1,400 Africans from 36 countries were deployed by the Russian military to fight in Ukraine.

Many of those soldiers are being held as prisoners of war in Ukraine, Sybiha said.

Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, and has resisted peace overtures despite participating in ongoing peace talks.

Feb. 19 (UPI) — The United States has put military forces in place in the Middle East for a potential strike on Iran but President Donald Trump has not decided whether to attack or continue negotiations on Thursday.

A strike could occur as early as this weekend, with naval and air forces quickly coming into place. National security officials met in the Situation Room on Wednesday to discuss courses of action against Iran.

U.S. armed forces have been assembling in the Middle East in recent weeks as the United States and Iran have negotiated a scaling back of Iran’s nuclear program. The latest conversations took place in Geneva on Tuesday, sans Trump who said he would be involved “indirectly.”

The negotiations between the United States and Iran ended without a resolution on Tuesday. Trump has called for Iran to end its nuclear program.

Iranian officials said they agreed with U.S. negotiators on a “set of guiding principles.” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said to expect more details about these negotiations to come forward in the weeks to come. She did not say whether Trump would take action before that happens.

“I’m not going to set deadlines on behalf of the president of the United States,” she said.

In recent weeks, the United States has moved warships to the Indian Ocean while Trump warned Iran over the killings and detainments of thousands of protesters against the Iranian regime.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has an interest in Iran drawing down its missile capabilities as well. Israeli forces have been on alert over the possibility of an open conflict as tensions have continued to heighten.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio is slated to meet with Netanyahu in Israel on Feb. 28, to provide an update on the negotiations with Iran.

The United States launched strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in June, causing what Iranian officials called “serious and significant damage.”

Feb. 18 (UPI) — As the Ukraine war nears its fifth year, more than a third of Ukrainian children remain displaced following Russia’s invasion of its neighboring nation.

Russian forces invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, which has led to the displacement of 2.59 million Ukrainian children, UNICEF reported on Tuesday.

The number of displaced children includes 791,000 who are still inside Ukraine and nearly 1.8 million who are refugees living outside of the country’s borders. Russian forces also have taken many Ukrainian children and relocated them to Russia.

“Millions of children and families have fled their homes in search of safety, with one in three children remaining displaced four years into this relentless war,” said UNICEF Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia Regina De Dominicis.

“For children in Ukraine, safety is increasingly hard to come by as attacks on civilian areas continue across the country,” De Dominicis said. “In many ways, the war is following these children.”

Many children and their families have been forced to flee their homes several times during the war as Russian forces targeted civilian areas.

A recently published UNICEF survey showed that a third of teen respondents between age 15 and 19 said they moved at least two times due to safety reasons so far during the war.

Bombardments by Russian artillery, attack drones and ballistic missiles have killed or injured more than 3,200 children since the war started.

Each year, the number of dead and injured has increased among Ukraine’s children, according to UNICEF.

“Obligations under international humanitarian law must be upheld, and every possible measure to protect children and the civilian infrastructure they rely on must be taken,” De Dominicis said.

“Every child has the right to grow up in safety, and without exception that right must be respected.”

Many of the support services for the country’s children also have been damaged or destroyed, including more than 1,700 schools and other education facilities, which deprives a third of Ukrainian children from attending school on a full-time basis.

Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have deprived millions of Ukrainian children and their families of the power needed to heat their homes and water during the country’s extremely cold winters.

Babies and young children are especially vulnerable to harm due to a lack of electrical power, which could lead to hypothermia and respiratory illnesses.

More than 200 medical facilities also have been damaged or destroyed in Ukraine over the past year and many more before then.

The stress of the ongoing war is putting a severe mental strain on Ukraine’s children, who often experience a constant fear of attacks that force them to seek shelter in basements and remain isolated while at home.

About a fourth of Ukrainian youth between age 15 and 19 say they are losing hope for the country’s future.

UNICEF officials said they are working with local and national authorities to support Ukrainian children and provide them and their families with safe water, healthcare, food, educational support, mental health services and similar needs.