conflict

At the inaugural “Shield of the Americas” summit in South Florida, United States President Donald Trump announced the creation of what he calls the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition: a group of a dozen politically aligned countries committed to fighting drug trafficking.

But as he signed a declaration to cement that commitment, Trump signalled that it came with the expectation that cartels would not be confronted with law enforcement action, but instead military might.

“ The only way to defeat these enemies is by unleashing the power of our military. So we have to use our military. You have to use your military,” Trump told the audience of Latin American leaders.

“You have some great police, but they threaten your police. They scare your police. You’re going to use your military.”

Saturday’s summit was the latest step in a larger foreign policy pivot under Trump.

Since taking office for a second term, Trump has distanced himself from some of the US’s traditional allies in Europe, instead forging tighter partnerships with right-wing governments around the world.

The attendance at the Shield of the Americas summit reflected that shift. Right-wing leaders, including Argentina’s Javier Milei, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa, were among the guest list.

But notably absent was top-level leadership from Mexico, the US’s biggest trading partner, and Brazil, the largest country in the region by economy and population.

Both Mexico and Brazil are led by left-wing presidents who have resisted some of Trump’s more hardline policies.

The growing rift between the US and some of its longtime partners was a feature in the brief remarks delivered by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who praised attendees for their cooperation.

“They’re more than allies. They’re friends,” Rubio said of the leaders present.

“At a time when we have learned that oftentimes an ally, when you need them, maybe may not be there for you, these are countries that have been there for us.”

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, meanwhile, reiterated his view that criminal networks and cartels pose an existential crisis for the entire Western Hemisphere, which he described as sharing the same cultural and religious roots.

“ We share a hemisphere and geography. We share cultures, Western Christian civilisation. We share these things together. We have to have the courage to defend it,” Hegseth said.

A military-first approach

Latin America is one of several areas where Trump has launched military operations since returning to office in January 2025.

His rationale for authorising deadly operations in the region has centred primarily on the illicit drug trade.

Trump has repeatedly argued that Latin American criminal networks pose an imminent threat to national security, through the trafficking of people and drugs across US borders.

Experts in international law have pointed out that drug trafficking is considered a criminal offence — and it is not accepted as justification for acts of military aggression.

But the Trump administration has nevertheless launched lethal military strikes against alleged drug traffickers in Latin America.

Since September, for instance, the Trump administration has conducted at least 44 aerial strikes on maritime vessels in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean, killing nearly 150 people.

The victims’ identities have never been publicly confirmed, nor has evidence been publicly released to justify the deadly strikes.

Some families in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago have stepped forward to claim the dead as their loved ones, out on a fishing expedition or travelling between islands for informal work.

In Saturday’s remarks, Trump justified the attacks by arguing that cartels and other criminal networks had grown more powerful than local militaries — and therefore necessitated a lethal response.

“Many of the cartels have developed sophisticated military operations. Highly sophisticated, in some cases. They say they’re more powerful than the military in the country,” Trump said.

“Can’t have that. These brutal criminal organisations pose an unacceptable threat to national security. And they provide a dangerous gateway for foreign adversaries in our region.”

He then compared cartels to a disease: “They’re cancer, and we don’t want it spreading.”

A ‘nasty’ operation in Venezuela

In late December and early January, Trump also initiated attacks on Venezuelan soil, again defending his actions as necessary to stop drug traffickers.

The first attack targeted a port Trump linked to the gang Tren de Aragua. The second, on January 3, was a broader offensive that culminated in the abduction and imprisonment of Venezuela’s then-leader, President Nicolas Maduro.

On Saturday, Trump reflected on that military operation, which he characterised as an unmitigated success.

Maduro is currently awaiting trial on drug-trafficking charges in New York, though a declassified intelligence report last May cast doubt on Trump’s allegations that the Venezuelan leader directed drug-trafficking operations through groups like Tren de Aragua.

“America’s armed forces also ended the reign of one of the biggest cartel kingpins of all, with Operation Absolute Resolve to bring outlaw dictator Nicolas Maduro to justice in a precision raid,” Trump told Saturday’s summit.

He then described the military operation as “nasty”, though he underscored that no US lives were lost.

The early-morning raid, however, killed at least 80 people in Venezuela, including 32 Cuban military officers, dozens of Venezuelan security forces, and several civilians.

“We went right into the heart. We took them out, and it was nasty. It was about 18 minutes of pure violence, and we took them out,” Trump said of the operation.

Trump has since held up Venezuela as a model for regime change around the world, particularly as it leads a war with Israel against Iran.

Maduro’s successor, interim President Delcy Rodriguez, has so far complied with many of Trump’s demands, including for reforms to the country’s nationalised oil and mining sectors.

Just this week, the two countries re-established diplomatic relations for the first time since 2019, under Trump’s first term as president.

In Saturday’s remarks, however, Trump reiterated that his positive relationship with Rodriguez hinged on her cooperation with his priorities.

“She’s doing a great job because she’s working with us. If she wasn’t working with us, I would not say she’s doing a great job,” he said.

“In fact, if she wasn’t working with us, I’d say she’s doing a very poor job. Unacceptable.”

‘We’ll use missiles’

Trump did, however, express consternation with other presidents in the Latin American region, accusing them of allowing cartels to run amok.

“Leaders in this region have allowed large swaths of territory, the Western Hemisphere, to come under the direct control” of the cartels, Trump said.

“Transnational gangs have taken over, and they’ve run areas of your country. We’re not going to let that happen.”

He even delivered an ominous warning to the summit’s attendees: “Some of you are in danger. I mean, you’re actually in danger. It’s hard to believe.”

Many of the leaders in attendance, including El Salvador’s Bukele, have launched their own harsh crackdowns on gangs in their countries, employing “mano dura” or “iron fist” tactics.

Those campaigns, however, have elicited concerns from human rights groups, who have noted that presidents like Bukele used emergency declarations to suspend civil liberties and imprison hundreds of people, often without a fair trial.

Still, Trump dismissed alternative approaches in Saturday’s speech. Though he did not mention Colombia by name, he was critical of efforts to negotiate for the disarmament of cartels and rebel groups, as Colombian President Gustavo Petro has sought to do.

Instead, he offered to deploy military might throughout the region.

“We’ll use missiles. If you want us to use a missile, they’re extremely accurate — pew! — right into the living room, and that’s the end of that cartel person,” Trump said.

“A lot of countries don’t want to do that. They say, ‘Oh, sure. I’d rather not have that. I’d rather not have it. I believe they could be spoken to.’ I don’t think so.”

A call to ‘eradicate’ Mexico’s cartels

One country he did single out, though, was Mexico. Trump suggested that it had fallen behind other countries in the region in its efforts to combat crime.

“We must recognise the epicentre of cartel violence is Mexico,” he said.

“The Mexican cartels are fueling and orchestrating much of the bloodshed and chaos in this hemisphere, and the United States government will do whatever’s necessary to defend our national security.”

Since the start of his second term, Trump has pressured Mexico to step up its security efforts, threatening tariffs and even the possibility of military action if it does not comply.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has responded by increasing military deployments throughout the country.

In February 2025, for instance, she announced 10,000 soldiers would be sent to the US-Mexico border. For the upcoming FIFA World Cup, her officials have said nearly 100,000 security personnel will be patrolling the streets.

Just last month, her government also launched a military operation in Jalisco to capture and kill the cartel leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, nicknamed “El Mencho”. She has also facilitated the transfer of cartel suspects to the US for trial.

But Trump reemphasised on Saturday his belief that Sheinbaum had not gone far enough, though he called her a “very good person” and a “beautiful woman” with a “beautiful voice”.

“I said, ‘Let me eradicate the cartels,’” Trump said, relaying one of his conversations with Sheinbaum.

“We have to eradicate them. We have to knock the hell out of them because they’re getting worse. They’re taking over their country. The cartels are running Mexico. We can’t have that. Too close to us, too close to you.”

‘Last moments of life’ in Cuba

Trump also used his podium to continue his threats against Cuba’s communist government.

Since the January 3 attack on Venezuela, Trump has increased his “maximum pressure” campaign against the Caribbean island, which has been under a full US trade embargo since the 1960s.

His administration severed the flow of oil and funds from Venezuela to Cuba, and in late January, Trump announced he would impose steep economic penalties on any country that provides the island with oil, a critical resource for the country’s electrical grid.

Already, the country has been struck with widespread blackouts, and the United Nations has warned Cuba is inching closer to humanitarian “collapse”.

But Trump framed the circumstances as progress towards the ultimate goal of regime change in Cuba.

“As we achieve a historic transformation in Venezuela, we’re also looking forward to the great change that will soon be coming to Cuba,” he told Saturday’s summit.

“Cuba’s at the end of the line. They’re very much at the end of the line. They have no money, they have no oil. They have a bad philosophy. They have a bad regime that’s been bad for a long time.”

He added that he thinks changing Cuba’s government will be “easy” and that a deal could be struck for the transition of power.

“Cuba’s in its last moments of life as it was. It’ll have a great new life, but it’s in its last moments of life the way it is,” Trump said.

But while Trump’s remarks largely focused on governments not represented at the summit, he warned that there could be consequences even for the right-wing leaders in attendance.

Trump’s “Shield of the Americas” coalition comes as he seeks to bring the whole of Latin America in line with US priorities. It’s a policy he has dubbed the “Donroe Doctrine”, a riff on the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, which claimed the Western Hemisphere as the US’s sphere of influence.

To Trump, that means ousting rival powers like China as they seek to forge relationships and economic ties with Latin America. Trump has even mused about retaking the Panama Canal, based on his allegation that the Chinese have too much control in the area.

“As these situations in Venezuela and Cuba should make clear, under our new doctrine — and this is a doctrine — we will not allow hostile foreign influence to gain a foothold in this hemisphere,” Trump said.

He then made a pointed remark to Panama’s president, Jose Raul Mulino, who was in the audience.

“That includes the Panama Canal, which we talked about. We’re not going to allow it.”

This past week, the United States and Israel launched a war on Iran under the banner of regime change. But as the war escalates and with Iran firing missiles at US bases across the region and at Israel – questions are mounting over how far this conflict could spiral.

This week on UpFront Redi Tlhabi challenges former National Security Adviser and former US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton on why he believes that a diplomatic end to the war would be a mistake, and we speak to Joe Cirincione, author of, Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before it is Too Late, about the risk of nuclear proliferation.

A father and his daughter have been killed in an Israeli drone attack in central Khan Younis, southern Gaza, as Palestinians continue to suffer amid worldwide attention on the United States-Israeli war on Iran.

The two were killed early on Saturday. In a separate attack later in the day in Khan Younis, another person was killed and a young girl wounded, according to Al Jazeera correspondents on the ground.

Israeli forces continue carrying out air strikes, artillery shelling, and naval bombardment on Gaza on a daily basis, despite an October 11 “ceasefire” as Israel continues its ongoing genocide.

Suffering in Gaza and the occupied West Bank remains acute as the world focuses on the US-Israeli bombardment of Iran.

In the past 48 hours, two additional people have been wounded, the Palestinian Ministry of Health said.

Israeli army-affiliated militias, meanwhile, have advanced east of Gaza City, with heavy gunfire reported in the area. Initial reports also stated a member of the Palestinian police was abducted.

Israeli warplanes also struck several locations east of the Tuffah neighbourhood, near Gaza City, while the Israeli navy fired heavy machineguns and shells towards the coast of Gaza City, Palestinian news agency Wafa reported.

The Rafah border crossing, meanwhile, remains closed. Israel had shut it amid its attacks on Iran.

The Rafah crossing, located on Gaza’s southern border, had reopened only last month allowing a limited number of Palestinians to leave for the first time in months, including patients in urgent need of medical care. Thousands remain blocked from travelling for treatment.

The Karem Abu Salem crossing, also known to Israelis as Kerem Shalom, is partially open for the entry of humanitarian aid only, under strict restrictions.

Nearly all of Gaza’s population of more than two million people was displaced during Israel’s war on the territory, and the enclave remains heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance.

In a February report, Human Rights Watch said Israeli restrictions had contributed to shortages of medicine, reconstruction materials, food and water inside the Strip.

Since the ceasefire in Gaza, 640 Palestinians have been killed and at least 1,700 wounded, according to the Health Ministry. At least 72,123 Palestinians have been killed since October 2023, while 171,805 people have been injured.

Meanwhile, in the occupied West Bank, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society reported its teams in Hebron are treating a Palestinian injured by live fire near the illegal Karmei Tzur settlement, built on Palestinian land north of Hebron.

Three Palestinians were also injured on Saturday after being physically assaulted by Israeli settlers in the Ras al-Ahmar area, south of Tubas, Wafa reported. Medical sources at the Palestinian Red Crescent Society said their teams responded to three people with injuries.

Israeli forces also conducted raids in the towns of Qaffin and Kafr al-Labad, north of Tulkarem, early on Saturday, Wafa said.

A Palestinian man was also injured after being assaulted by Israeli soldiers near the village of Azmut, east of the occupied West Bank city of Nablus.

Palestinians have faced a wave of intensified Israeli military and settler violence across the West Bank since the war on Gaza began in October 2023.

At least 1,094 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli troops and settlers in the West Bank since October 2023, according to the latest United Nations figures.

Air raid sirens blared across occupied East Jerusalem on Saturday after missiles were reportedly fired by Iran, with explosions heard and interception trails visible in the sky.

Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian has apologised for attacking neighbouring countries, in a pre-recorded address released on state television. Within minutes of the statement’s release, an explosion was heard over Doha, as attacks on Gulf nations continue.

Pentagon asserts US forces are tracking Russian-Iranian operations amid escalating conflict in the region.

Washington has downplayed reports that Russia is sharing intelligence with Iran about United States targets across the Middle East amid the burgeoning US-Israel war on Iran, first reported by The Washington Post.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, in a CBS 60 Minutes interview on Friday, said the US is “tracking everything” and factoring it into battle plans when asked about the reports Moscow was aiding Tehran.

Since the war began on February 28, Russia has passed Iran the locations of US military assets, including warships and aircraft, three officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, told The Washington Post.

“It does seem like it’s a pretty comprehensive effort,” one of the sources told the newspaper.

Meanwhile, anonymous officials told The Associated Press news agency that US intelligence has not uncovered that Russia is directing Iran on what to do with the information, as the US and Israel continue their bombardment and Iran fires retaliatory salvoes at US assets and allies in the Gulf.

Hegseth said the United States is “not concerned” about the reports, also downplaying the possibility that Russia’s assistance could be putting US citizens in harm’s way.

“The American people can rest assured their commander-in-chief is well aware of who’s talking to who,” Hegseth said.

“And anything that shouldn’t be happening, whether it’s in public or back-channelled, is being confronted and confronted strongly.”

He continued: “We’re putting the other guys in danger, and that’s our job. So we’re not concerned about that. But the only ones that need to be worried right now are Iranians that think they’re gonna live.”

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt on Friday also claimed to reporters that “[the report] clearly is not making any difference with respect to the military operations in Iran because we are completely decimating them.”

Leavitt declined to say if Trump had spoken to Russian President Vladimir Putin about the reported intelligence sharing or whether he believed Russia should face repercussions, saying she would let the president speak to that himself.

First signs of Moscow’s involvement

Trump, for his part, on Friday evening berated a reporter for raising the matter of the report when he opened the floor to questions from the media at the end of a White House meeting about how paying student-athletes has recalibrated college sports.

“I have a lot of respect for you, you’ve always been very nice to me,” the US president said to Peter Doocy, the Fox News reporter.

“What a stupid question that is to be asking at this time. We’re talking about something else.”

The intelligence is the first indication that Moscow has sought to get involved in the war that the US and Israel launched on Iran a week ago.

Asked whether Russia would go beyond political support and offer military assistance to Iran, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said there has been no such request from Tehran.

“We are in dialogue with the Iranian side, with representatives of the Iranian leadership, and will certainly continue this dialogue,” he said on Friday.

Pushed on whether Moscow has provided any military or intelligence assistance to Tehran since the Iran war’s start, he refrained from comment.

Russia has tightened its relationship with Iran as it looked for badly needed missiles and drones to use in its four-year war against Ukraine. But the pair have long maintained friendly relations, even while Tehran has faced years of isolation from the West over its nuclear programme and its support of proxy groups in the Middle East.

Explosions shake Tehran as US-Israel attacks intensify, marking eight days of conflict and retaliation from Iran.

Huge explosions have hit several locations across Iran, including the capital, Tehran, as the war that has ignited the Middle East entered its eighth day.

The United States-Israeli attacks sent up clouds of dark smoke in the Iranian capital early on Saturday, and Tehran retaliated by firing missiles at Israel.

The US has warned of a forthcoming bombing campaign that officials said would be the most intense yet in the weeklong conflict, which has already killed at least 1,230 people and is set to cause further casualties daily.

Much of the region has become embroiled in the war, with Tehran not only launching retaliatory strikes on Israel but hitting US assets across the Gulf.

Israel’s military said early on Saturday it had started a “broad-scale wave of strikes” on targets in Tehran.

“Iranians are now waking to day eight since the initiation of the US-Israeli air strikes targeting different facilities and places across the Iranian capital and elsewhere in the country,” said Al Jazeera’s Tohid Asadi, reporting from Tehran.

Continuous attacks have been occurring since midnight, he said.

“According to the latest reports, Mehrabad, which is one of the two main airports in the Iranian capital, was targeted. The nearby area was said to be affected, as well,” said Asadi.

Meanwhile, attacks have been taking place in other cities across the country – targeting not just military areas or political centres, but also residential areas, schools and hospitals, he added.

Amir-Saeid Iravani, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, told the UN Security Council on Friday that the US and Israel are bombing civilian areas in his country, stating: “These acts constitute clear war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

The continued fighting comes as US President Donald Trump’s administration approved a new $151m arms sale to Israel after Trump said he would not negotiate with Iran without its “unconditional surrender”.

Iran’s UN ambassador said the country would “take all necessary measures” to defend itself.

Iran’s strategy to ‘keep Israelis in shelters’

Meanwhile, Iran has continued to strike back at Israel.

The Israeli military said early on Saturday that it had detected another round of Iranian missile fire headed towards Israel, and a series of explosions were heard in Tel Aviv following the launches from Iran.

Missiles were also detected heading towards other parts of the country, including southern Israel.

“Since midnight, the Israelis have detected at least five ballistic missile launches coming into Israel from Iran,” said Al Jazeera’s Nida Ibrahim, reporting from Ramallah in the occupied West Bank.

“They have led millions of Israelis into shelters throughout the night, which is something that Israeli analysts say the Iranians are intending to do to put more pressure on the Israeli government – by keeping Israelis in shelters and by keeping these missiles launching coming at different times.”

Islamabad, Pakistan – The reverberations of a war in which US-Israel attacks have killed more than a thousand people in Iran, including the country’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, and Iranian missiles and drones have fallen on Israel in retaliation, are being felt deeply in Pakistan.

Six Gulf countries have also come under Iranian missile and drone attacks, putting Pakistan in a tough position.

The country shares a 900-kilometre (559 miles) border with Iran in its southwest, and millions of its workers are residents in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations.

Since September last year, Islamabad has also reinforced its decades-long ties with Riyadh by signing a formal mutual defence agreement that commits each side to treat aggression against the other as aggression against both.

As Iranian drones and ballistic missiles continue to target Gulf states, the question being asked with increasing urgency in Pakistan is what Islamabad will do next if it finds itself pulled into the war.

Islamabad’s answer so far has been to work the phones furiously, engaging regional leaders, including Iran and Saudi Arabia.

When US-Israeli strikes killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, Pakistan condemned the attacks as “unwarranted”. Within hours, it also condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Gulf states as “blatant violations of sovereignty”.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, who was attending an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Riyadh when the conflict began last week, launched what he later described as “shuttle communication” between Tehran and Riyadh.

Speaking in the Senate on March 3, and at a news conference later the same day, Dar disclosed that he had personally reminded Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of Pakistan’s defence obligations to Saudi Arabia.

“We have a defence pact with Saudi Arabia, and the whole world knows about it,” Dar said. “I told the Iranian leadership to take care of our pact with Saudi Arabia.”

Araghchi, he said, asked for guarantees that Saudi soil would not be used to attack Iran. Dar said he obtained those assurances from Riyadh and credited the back-channel exchange with limiting the scale of Iranian strikes on the kingdom.

On March 5, Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, said his country welcomed Saudi Arabia’s pledge not to allow its airspace or territory to be used during the ongoing war with the US and Israel.

“We appreciate what we have repeatedly heard from Saudi Arabia – that it does not allow its airspace, waters, or territory to be used against the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said in an interview.

But only a day later, during early hours of March 6, Saudi Arabia’s defence ministry confirmed it intercepted three ballistic missiles targeting the kingdom’s Prince Sultan Air Base. And hours later, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir was in Riyadh, meeting Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, where they “discussed Iranian attacks on the Kingdom and the measures needed to halt them within the framework” of their mutual defence pact, the Saudi minister said in a post on X.

As the war escalates, analysts say that Pakistan’s tightrope walk between two close partners could become harder and harder.

A defence pact under pressure

The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, signed on September 17, 2025, in Riyadh by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif alongside army chief Asim Munir, was the most significant formal defence commitment Pakistan had entered into in decades.

Its central clause states that any aggression against either country shall be considered aggression against both. The wording was modelled on collective defence principles similar to NATO’s Article 5, though analysts have cautioned against interpreting it as an automatic trigger for military intervention.

The agreement followed Israel’s September 2025 strikes on Hamas officials in Doha, an event that shook confidence in US security guarantees across the six Gulf Cooperation Council states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Nuclear-armed Pakistan has maintained a military relationship with Saudi Arabia for decades, according to which an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Pakistani troops remain stationed in the kingdom.

Now the pact is being tested under conditions neither side anticipated.

Umer Karim, an associate fellow at the Riyadh-based King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, called Pakistan’s current predicament the outcome of a miscalculation.

Islamabad, he argued, likely never expected to find itself caught between Tehran and Riyadh, particularly after the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.

“Pakistani leaders were always careful not to take an official plunge vis-a-vis Saudi defence. It was done for the first time by the current army chief, and though the potential dividends are big, so are the costs,” Karim told Al Jazeera.

“Perhaps this is the last time the Saudis will test Pakistan, and if Pakistan doesn’t fulfil its commitments now, the relationship will be irreversibly damaged,” he added.

In 2015, it declined a direct Saudi request to join the military coalition fighting in Yemen, following a parliamentary resolution that the country must remain neutral.

Aziz Alghashian, senior non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum in Riyadh, pointed to that episode. “The limitation of the Saudi-Pakistan treaty is clear. Treaties are only as strong as the political calculations and political will behind them,” Alghashian told Al Jazeera.

But Ilhan Niaz, a professor of history at Islamabad’s Quaid-e-Azam University, said that if Saudi Arabia feels sufficiently threatened by Iran to formally request Pakistani military assistance, “Pakistan will come to Saudi Arabia’s aid.”

“To do otherwise would undermine Pakistan’s credibility,” he told Al Jazeera.

The Iran constraint

The complicating factor for Pakistan is that it cannot afford to treat Iran simply as an adversary if Riyadh calls for military assistance.

The two countries share a long and porous border, maintain significant trade ties, and have recently stepped up diplomatic engagement. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Islamabad in August 2025, and the two governments maintain a range of formal and backchannel contacts.

Niaz acknowledged that Tehran has also been “a difficult neighbour”, pointing to the January 2024 exchange of cross-border strikes initiated by Iran as evidence of the relationship’s unpredictability.

Even so, he said Pakistan had “vital national interests” in ensuring Iran’s stability and territorial integrity.

“The collapse of Iran into civil war, its fragmentation into warring states, and the extension of Israeli influence to Pakistan’s western borders are all developments that greatly, and rightly, worry Islamabad,” he said.

The domestic fallout from the US-Israel strikes and Iran’s response has already been immediate.

The army was deployed and a three-day curfew imposed in Gilgit-Baltistan after at least 23 people were killed in protests across Pakistan following Khamenei’s assassination. The protests were driven largely by Pakistan’s Shia community, estimated to make up between 15 and 20 percent of the 250 million population, which has historically mobilised around developments involving Iran.

Pakistan’s violent sectarian history adds another layer of risk.

The Zainabiyoun Brigade, a Pakistan-origin Shia militia trained, funded and commanded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has recruited thousands of fighters from Pakistan over the past decade. While many fought in Syria against ISIL (ISIS), many Syrians activists accuse them of committing sectarian violence.

Two years ago, Pakistan’s northwestern Kurram district, the Zainabiyoun’s primary recruitment ground, saw more than 130 people killed in sectarian clashes in the final weeks of 2024 alone.

Pakistan formally banned the group in 2024, but many believe the designation has done little to dismantle its networks.

Analysts warn that fighters hardened in Syria’s civil war could, if Iran’s conflict with Pakistan’s Gulf partners deepens, shift from a defensive to an offensive posture on Pakistani soil.

“Iran has significant influence over Shia organisations in Pakistan,” Islamabad-based security analyst Amir Rana, executive director of the Pak Institute of Peace Studies, told Al Jazeera. “And then you have Balochistan, which is already a highly volatile area. If there is any confrontation, the fallout for Pakistan would be severe.”

Pakistan’s Balochistan province borders Iran, and has been ground-zero for a decades-long separatist movement. “That reality cannot be ignored,” Muhammad Khatibi, a political analyst based in Tehran, said, pointing out that geography itself constrains Islamabad’s choices.

“Any perception that Islamabad is siding militarily against Tehran could inflame domestic sectarian divisions in ways that a full-scale regional war would make very difficult to contain,” Khatibi told Al Jazeera.

What are Pakistan’s options?

Analysts say direct offensive military action against Iran, such as deploying combat aircraft or conducting strikes on Iranian territory, is not a realistic option for Pakistan, given its domestic constraints.

Rana describes Islamabad’s current posture as an attempt to placate both sides.

“Iran’s primary threat is through air strikes using drones and missiles, and that is an area where Pakistan can help and provide assistance to Saudi Arabia. But that would mean Pakistan becoming a party to the war, and that is a major question mark,” he said.

He added that the most viable option for Pakistan could be to provide covert operational support to Saudi Arabia while maintaining diplomatic engagement with Iran.

Alghashian also agreed; he identified air defence cooperation as the most concrete role Pakistan could play — it would be both “militarily meaningful and politically defensible”

“They could help create more air defence capacity,” he said. “This is tangible, it is defensive, and it is in Pakistan’s interest that Saudi Arabia becomes more stable and prosperous.”

Karim, however, warned that the window for Pakistan’s balancing act may be closing faster than Islamabad realises.

“As the situation reaches a tipping point and as Saudi energy installations and infrastructure are hit, it is only a matter of time that Saudi Arabia will ask Pakistan to contribute towards its defence,” he said.

He added that if Pakistan deploys air defence assets to Saudi Arabia, doing so could leave its own air defences dangerously exposed, while deeper involvement could carry political costs at home.

For now, Islamabad’s strongest card remains diplomacy, using its access to both Riyadh and Tehran and the trust it has accumulated. Khatibi said Pakistan should protect that position “at all costs”.

“Pakistan’s most realistic positioning is as a mediator and leveraging its relationships with both sides. It is highly unlikely that Pakistan deploys forces into an anti-Iran coalition. The risks would outweigh the benefits,” he said.

The stakes for Pakistan

The scenario least favourable to Islamabad would be a collective Gulf Cooperation Council decision to enter the war directly, and the warning signs are mounting.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have both declared that Iranian attacks “crossed a red line”.

A joint statement issued on March 1 by the United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE said they “reaffirm the right to self-defense in the face of these attacks.”

For Pakistan, such an escalation could carry serious consequences.

Economically, with millions of Pakistani workers living and earning their wages in Gulf states, remittances from the region provide crucial foreign exchange for an economy still recovering from a balance of payments crisis.

Khatibi said any prolonged regional war that disrupts Gulf economies would directly affect Pakistan’s financial position.

“Energy prices could also spike, adding further strain,” he said, noting Pakistan’s heavy dependence on Gulf states for its energy needs.

Pakistan is also simultaneously managing its own military confrontation with the Afghan Taliban which began two days before the US-Israel strikes.

Karim warned that deeper involvement in the regional conflict could trigger internal instability.

“Sectarian conflict,” he said, “can reignite, taking the country back to the bloody 1990s. The government already has lean political legitimacy, and such an occurrence will make it even more unpopular.”

Alghashian also highlighted Pakistan’s reluctance to be drawn into the conflict.

“Saudi Arabia does not want to be in this war and is getting dragged into it. Pakistan will also certainly not want to be dragged into somebody else’s war that they didn’t want to be dragged into. It just wouldn’t make any sense,” he says.

But Niaz said that if the crisis eventually forces Islamabad to choose, the calculus may become unavoidable.

“If Tehran forces Pakistan to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the choice would unquestionably be in favour of the Saudis.”

Pro-Palestinian German activist Yasemin Acar told Al Jazeera about what she says was harassment at a Berlin airport where she recorded a border guard asking about her destination because of concerns over “hostility towards Israel”.

The Gulf states have spent years trying to broker peace between Iran and the West: Qatar brokered nuclear talks, Oman provided back-channel diplomacy, and Saudi Arabia maintained direct dialogue with Iran through 2024 and into 2025. Iran attacked them anyway. The idea that the Gulf states have a responsibility, a moral one, to protect Iran from the consequences of its actions because of good neighbourliness is now grotesque in context. Iran did not return good neighbourliness. Iran returned ballistic missiles.

Iran’s position is based on three propositions. First, that Iran acted in lawful self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter; that host countries relinquished territorial sovereignty by allowing US military bases on their territory; and that the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314 justifies the attack on those bases as lawful military objectives. Each of these propositions is legally flawed, factually skewed, and tactically wrong. Collectively, they add up to a legal argument that, if accepted, would ensure that the Gulf is permanently destabilised, the basic principles of international law are destroyed, and, in a curious twist, the very security threats that Iran is reacting to are reinforced.

The self-defence claim does not meet the required legal threshold

The UN Charter, in Article 51, permits the use of force only in self-defence against an “armed attack”, and this term is not defined by reference to the state invoking it. The International Court of Justice, in cases such as Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (1986) and Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) (2003), has interpreted the requirement of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the UN Charter restrictively. The Court distinguished between the most grave forms of the use of force, which qualify as armed attacks triggering the right of self-defence, and less grave uses of force that do not. Accordingly, not every use of force, such as minor incidents or limited military activities, amounts to an armed attack. In this light, the mere presence of foreign military bases in Gulf states, maintained for decades under defence agreements with host governments, would not in itself constitute an armed attack against Iran.

Necessity and proportionality are also part of customary international law, requiring that self-defence be necessary and proportional. Iran has not demonstrated either. Targeting the territory of other sovereign Arab states in response to the policy decisions of the United States is neither necessary, since diplomatic and United Nations avenues are still available, nor proportional, since it imposes military consequences on states that are not a party to any conflict with Iran.

Critically, Article 51 also has a mandatory procedural element, in that any state employing self-defence is immediately required to notify the Security Council. Iran has consistently evaded this requirement in each of its escalatory actions. While this may seem to be a minor element, it is in fact the means by which the international community is able to verify and check self-defence claims. A state that evades this requirement is not employing Article 51. It is exploiting the language of Article 51.

Iran’s reading of Resolution 3314 is a fundamental distortion

The provision of Article 3(f) of the Annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974) states that an act of aggression includes the “action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State”. Iran could rely on this provision to hold the Gulf states that host United States military bases liable for any act of aggression committed from their territories against Iran. Nevertheless, the mere presence of military bases is not sufficient to hold them to be lawful military objectives; this will depend on their actual contribution to military activities against Iran based on the rules of international humanitarian law.

Thus, such an Iranian reading would be wrong on three distinct legal grounds.

First, Resolution 3314 is definitional in nature. The resolution was adopted to assist the Security Council in determining when aggression has taken place, not to confer upon states the unilateral power to punish states deemed to have committed aggression through the use of force. The resolution itself, in Article 2, asserts the power of the Security Council to make the determination of what constitutes aggression. The self-application of Article 3(f) of the resolution is therefore bypassed altogether.

Second, Article 3(f) speaks of the active launching of an attack, not the passive hosting of a military base. The legal distinction is fundamental. A state, in signing a defence treaty with another and hosting the latter’s troops on its soil, is engaging in a measure of sovereignty. A state, actively launching, coordinating, or enabling military strikes against a third party, is engaged in a different matter altogether. Iran has not credibly shown this latter case. The presence of US troops or bases in the Gulf has been a fact for decades, and this has not constituted armed aggression against Iran under any legal standard.

Third, even if Article 3(f) were applicable, the appropriate course would be to bring the matter to the Security Council, not to launch unilateral military strikes. General Assembly resolutions do not override the Charter. Iran cannot rely upon a non-binding resolution defining terms to override the Chapter VII requirements for the use of force or the clear criteria of Article 51.

Sovereignty cannot be dictated by a neighbour’s strategic preferences

Iran, in invoking the principle of good neighbourliness, asks the Arab Gulf states to deny the United States basing rights. Good neighbourliness is a two-way principle, and it does not allow for interference in the internal affairs of other states, certainly not interference in the decisions of other states simply because they are deemed inconvenient to the interfering state. All UN states possess the inherent right to conclude defence treaties with whomever they choose, and this is so regardless of the opinion of their neighbours.

The asymmetry of Iran’s position is striking and self-disqualifying. Iran itself has active military relationships with Russia and China. Iran arms, finances, trains, and supports the activities of non-state military actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force operates openly in various states, and this has been extensively documented in United Nations Panels of Experts reports, as well as other international monitoring reports. According to the standards that Iran applies to the Gulf states, any state that hosts the activities of the IRGC, the transfer of Iranian arms, or the coordination of Iranian proxies on its soil would be engaging in aggression against third parties. Iran will not accept this principle when it is applied to itself. A legal principle that is unacceptable to the party to whom it would be applied is not a legal principle at all; it is a political tool.

A doctrine that defeats Iran’s own strategic interests

From the perspective of international relations theory, Iran’s position follows the logic of offensive realism, which seeks to remove the external balancing architecture of regional neighbours by claiming it to be hostile in nature. However, this approach is empirically self-defeating.

Under balance of threat theory, states react to offensive capability, geographic proximity, and aggressive intentions. Iran’s doctrine, in asserting the right to strike any state that hosts forces it perceives as a threat, drives each and every threat variable to maximum levels for each and every state in the region. The obvious consequence, evident in the data, is that the states in the region and external powers are becoming more, rather than less, securely integrated. The Fifth Fleet’s permanent base in Bahrain, the UAE’s negotiations over F-35s, Saudi Arabia’s deployments of THAADs, and Qatar’s expansion of the Al Udeid base are reactions to Iran’s escalation, not causes of it.

From the perspective of constructivism, the legitimacy of a legal argument is also partly based on the normative credibility of the state that presents the argument. The record of Iran’s compliance with IAEA regulations, including the enrichment of uranium to a purity level of 60 percent or more in 2023–2024, interference with inspections, the removal of monitoring cameras, and the overall violation of the non-proliferation regime, has undermined the credibility of the state significantly. A state that is itself a violator of the legal regime cannot claim the role of a law-abiding state seeking protection under the norms of the legal regime.

Iran’s legal rationale was always theoretically wrong. What has occurred since February 28, 2026, has made Iran’s actions morally and politically wrong. Iran did not simply target US military assets. The reality of the situation is now documented and undeniable. Ballistic missiles and drones were launched against Gulf states in the opening days of the conflict. This marked the first time one actor had simultaneously attacked all six GCC states. Iran escalated its attacks in deliberate stages. Day 1: Iranian missiles were fired against military bases. Day 2: Iranian missiles were fired against civilian infrastructure and airports. Day 3: Iranian missiles were fired against the energy sector. Days 3 and 4: The US Embassy in Riyadh was attacked by Iran. International airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait were attacked by Iranian missiles, resulting in the suspension of flights throughout the region. Videos from Bahrain documented an Iranian Shahed drone attacking an apartment building. This is not self-defence. This is the collective punishment of sovereign nations that went to extraordinary lengths to avoid the conflict.

The rationale provided by Iran falls flat when one considers the actions Iran itself took. Its doctrine held that only targets involved in the preparation or launch of an attack against Iran were legitimate targets. Civilian airports are not military bases. Hotels in Palm Jumeirah are not military command centres. An apartment complex in Manama is not a weapons storage facility. By Iran’s own stated legal rationale, none of these targets was legitimate, yet they were attacked. This was not a legal doctrine at all; it was a pretext for coercion, and the conduct of war revealed this to be the case.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Witness videos captured Iranian projectiles soaring over Tel Aviv as sirens blared and Israeli interceptors launched. Residents could be heard shouting as one of the missiles appeared to break apart into dozens of smaller projectiles.

As the United States and Israel’s war on Iran unfolds over the coming days and weeks, the scale of the fallout for the global economy will be measured at the petrol pump.

The biggest threat the conflict poses to global economic health lies in rising energy prices.

Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian attacks on key energy production facilities in Qatar and Saudi Arabia have paralysed a substantial chunk of the world’s energy supply.

For a global economy already rattled by US President Donald Trump’s tariffs and what many see as his unravelling of the post-World War II order, much now depends on how long the disruption lasts.

A sustained surge in energy prices would drive up the cost of everyday goods.

Central banks would then likely raise borrowing costs to curb inflation, dampening consumer spending and dragging down economic growth.

“It’s really a question on how long the disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz lasts and whether there will be destruction of physical assets,” said Anne-Sophie Corbeau, an analyst at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

“For the moment, the market is pricing a short disruption and no destruction. But that may change in the future. We simply do not know right now how this whole crisis ends.”

While Iran’s threats to shipping have halted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the conduit for one-fifth of the world’s oil, crude prices have seen relatively modest gains so far.

Brent crude hovered about $84 a barrel on Friday morning, US time, up about 15 percent compared with pre-conflict prices.

That gain pales in comparison with past crises.

During the 1973-74 oil embargo led by OPEC’s Arab members, prices quadrupled in just three months.

Since then, the world’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil has declined substantially.

Today, the US is the biggest producer globally, producing some 13 million barrels a day, more than Iran, Iraq and the UAE combined, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

But if supply disruptions extend beyond a few weeks, oil prices could rise precipitously.

Storage capacity constraints

The seven oil-producing Gulf nations – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – are likely to run out of crude oil storage capacity in less than a month if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, according to an analysis by JPMorgan Chase.

With storage capacity depleted, producers would be forced to cut production.

“While there will be some capacities elsewhere, and some options to use pipelines rather than shipping, it is incredibly difficult to replace the sheer volume as we are talking about an average of 20 million barrels of oil per day that usually cross the Strait of Hormuz,” said Sarah Schiffling, a supply chains expert at the Hanken School of Economics in Helsinki.

“This important maritime chokepoint provides very significant leverage in the global economy.”

This week, Goldman Sachs analysts estimated that global oil prices will likely hit $100 a barrel – a threshold not seen since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – if shipping through the waterway stays at the current reduced levels for five weeks.

In an interview published by The Financial Times on Friday, Qatar’s energy minister Saad al-Kaabi warned that producers in the region could halt production within days and that oil could soar as high as $150 a barrel.

Such increases would reverberate through the global economy.

The International Monetary Fund has estimated that global economic growth is reduced by 0.15 percent for every 10 percent rise in oil prices.

The pain would not be spread evenly.

About 80 percent of the oil shipped through the strait goes to Asia.

India, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, which are all highly dependent on foreign energy imports, would be among the economies most vulnerable to spikes in the cost of necessities such as food and fuel.

“The effect would be felt in Asia and Europe in particular,” said Lutz Kilian, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

“Some countries, such as China, have ample oil reserves to help weather a temporary outage, while others do not.”

Liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is also shipped through the strait and has fewer alternative suppliers outside the region than crude oil, has already seen much steeper price rises.

European prices of LNG surged by as much as 50 percent on Monday after state-run QatarEnergy, which ships about one-fifth of global supply through the waterway, announced a halt to production following drone attacks blamed on Iran.

“Gas will be more impacted because the market was still relatively tight and stocks are low in Europe as we are at the end of winter; also, there is no replacement for the LNG lost,” Corbeau said.

Prolonged uncertainty

With US President Donald Trump signalling that he intends to continue the assault on Iran for at least several more weeks, the extent to which Tehran is willing – or able – to keep the strait closed will be critical to the global economy.

At least nine commercial vessels have been targeted in attacks in or near the strait since the start of the conflict, prompting multiple insurance firms to cancel coverage for vessels in the Gulf.

While traffic through the strait has not halted, it is down about 90 percent compared with normal levels, according to ship tracker MarineTraffic.

“The uncertainty itself is probably the most dangerous part. Supply chains hate uncertainty,” Schiffling said.

“It is possible to plan for almost anything, but not knowing what will happen makes it really challenging to adapt operations.”

On Wednesday, Trump said he had ordered the US International Development Finance Corporation to start insuring shipping lines in the region in order to keep trade flowing.

Trump also said the US Navy could begin escorting vessels through the strait if necessary.

“As long as Israel and the US are able to suppress Iranian drone and missile attacks in the strait to the point that the bulk of the oil tankers gets through, and as long as the United States provides back-up insurance for shippers and their cargo, the global economy may make it through this war without a recession,” Kilian said.

“On the other hand, if there is a severe disruption of oil traffic, the economic costs will grow the longer the disruption lasts.”

Lionel Messi has been criticised for meeting US President Donald Trump and applauding his latest brief on the Iran war at a White House event honouring the Argentinian superstar and his Inter Miami team.

A video has been released showing huge explosions near Tehran’s Azadi Tower. The US and Israel are continuing to target locations across Iran as the war enters its seventh day.

The United States used Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) for the first time during its ongoing war with Iran, US Central Command (CENTCOM) said on Wednesday.

The war entered its seventh day on Friday, with attacks continuing across Iran and other countries in the Middle East.

CENTCOM stated in an X post that PrSMs provide an “unrivaled deep strike capability”.

“I just could not be prouder of our men and women in uniform leveraging innovation to create dilemmas for the enemy,” the post quoted Admiral Brad Cooper, head of CENTCOM.

It is unclear where these PrSMs were launched from, or which specific targets they hit in Iran.

So what is the PrSM, and why is it significant that it has been used by the US for the first time?

What are Precision Strike Missiles?

PrSMs are described as long-range precision strike missiles by their developer, the Maryland, US-headquartered defence firm Lockheed Martin, which delivered the first PrSMs to the US Army in December 2023.

PrSMs can hit targets ranging from 60km (37 miles) to more than 499km (310 miles) away, according to Lockheed Martin.

The company’s website adds that PrSMs are compatible with the MLRS M270 and HIMARS family of launchers, both also developed by Lockheed and used by both the United Kingdom and US armies.

MLRS stands for multiple-launch rocket systems, used to launch missiles. The UK sent a number to Ukraine in 2022. HIMARS stands for High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. In 2022, the US sent a number to Ukraine, as well.

M-142 HIMARS is a high-tech, lightweight rocket launcher that is wheel-mounted, giving it more agility and manoeuvrability on the battlefield. Each unit can carry six GPS-guided rockets, or larger missiles like Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) and PrSMs, which can be reloaded in about a minute with only a small crew.

Lockheed Martin adds that PrSMs can be rapidly developed. “We are ready to produce and deliver to meet the US Army’s accelerated timeline for this long-range precision fires priority,” the website says.

PrSMs feature “open systems architecture”, which means that it is easier to plug in new components, upgrade parts, or work with equipment from other companies. Similarly, they are “modular and easily adaptable”, enabling components to be switched around.

They also feature “IM energetic payload”, or Insensitive Munitions energetic payload, which makes explosions safer, the producer says. This means the warhead is made from explosives that are less likely to blow up accidentally if hit by fire, shrapnel or by accident, but still explode properly when triggered as intended.

What is different about the PrSMs?

PrSMs will ultimately replace the ATACMs currently being fired from the HIMARS launchers, significantly increasing their range from 300km (186 miles) to more than 499km (310 miles), without changing the vehicle carrying the missile.

PrSMs also offer double the “missile load” of ATACMs. While a HIMARS launcher is able to carry one ATACMS missile in its pod, it can carry two PrSMs per pod.

Does the PrSM give the US a strategic advantage?

CENTCOM confirmed that PrSMs have been used in the US and Israel’s attacks on Iran, codenamed Operation Epic Fury and launched on February 28.

CENTCOM posted a video of the PrSMs being launched from M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems in an open desert terrain.

PrSMs do give the US military a boost for its pre-existing long-range capabilities.

Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, specifically the Musandam Peninsula, which have military bases hosting US assets and troops, have at least some territory within 400km (250 miles) of Iran.

The US is using PrSMs in conjunction with other long-range missiles such as Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) one-way drones, MQ-9 Reaper drones, ATACMs and Tomahawk Cruise Missiles.

The range for LUCAS one-way drones is about 800km (500 miles), while the range for ATACMs is about 300km (186 miles) and the range for Tomahawk cruise missiles is about 1,600km (1,000 miles).

Why is the introduction of the PrSM significant?

The range of this missile is significant as it is likely that it would not have been permitted under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, which the Trump administration withdrew the US from in 2019. This is because it can exceed the maximum 500km (310-mile) range the treaty imposed on certain land-launched missiles.

The treaty was signed in 1987 by US and Soviet Union leaders Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. It sought to eliminate the presence of land-based nuclear missiles and medium-range arsenals between 500km and 5,500km (310 and 3500 miles) from Europe.

The US suspension of the treaty allowed Washington to resume development of its own medium-range, land-based arsenal.

Following the US suspension, Russia invited the US to reciprocate in a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles instead. While Washington initially rejected the offer, in 2022, it said it would be willing to discuss this.

In August last year, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced Russia’s withdrawal from this moratorium, however, saying the US had “made significant progress” and “openly declared plans to deploy US ground-launched INF-range missiles in various regions”. INF stands for intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The statement added that such actions by Western countries posed a “direct threat” to Moscow’s security.

Supporters of the United States and Israeli military campaign against Iran argue that weakening Tehran by degrading its missile capabilities, crippling its navy and reducing its ability to project power through regional allies will make the Middle East safer. But this strategy rests on an assumption that a weaker Iran would produce a more stable region. In reality, destabilising one of the Middle East’s largest and most strategically important states could unleash forces far more dangerous than the status quo.

According to briefings provided to congressional staff in Washington, DC, there was no intelligence suggesting Iran was planning to attack the US. Yet military escalation continues in the belief that weakening Iran will ultimately serve US interests. If that assumption proves wrong, the consequences could be severe not only for the region but also for American strategic interests.

The first danger is internal fragmentation. Iran’s population is ethnically diverse. While Persians form the majority, the country is also home to large Azeri, Kurdish, Arab and Baloch communities, among others. Several of these groups already have histories of political tension or insurgency, including Kurdish militant activity in the northwest and a long-running Baloch insurgency in the southeast.

A strong central state has largely kept these fault lines contained. But if Iran’s governing structures weaken significantly, those tensions could intensify. The result could resemble the fragmentation seen in other Middle Eastern states after external military pressure or regime collapse.

Recent history offers sobering examples. In Iraq, the dismantling of state institutions after the 2003 US invasion created the conditions for years of sectarian violence and ultimately the rise of ISIL (ISIS). Libya’s state collapse in 2011 left the country divided between rival governments and armed militias, a crisis that persists more than a decade later. Syria’s civil war produced one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of the century while turning large swaths of territory into battlegrounds for militias and extremist groups. At the height of the conflict, ISIS was able to seize and govern territory across eastern Syria, declaring a so-called caliphate that controlled millions of people.

Iran’s collapse would produce an even more dangerous scenario. Its population is far larger than Iraq, Libya or Syria, and its territory borders multiple conflict-prone regions. The emergence of armed factions, ethnic militias or insurgent groups inside Iran could quickly transform the country into another arena of prolonged instability.

Such instability would not remain local. Iran sits at the heart of the Gulf, one of the world’s most strategically important energy corridors. Roughly a fifth of global oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz along Iran’s southern coastline. Armed factions, rival militias or uncontrolled naval forces operating along Iran’s coast could disrupt shipping lanes, attack tankers or try to block access to the strait, turning a regional crisis into a global energy shock. That would have consequences far beyond the Middle East. Higher energy prices would ripple through global economies, affecting everything from transportation costs to inflation. American policymakers often view energy instability as a regional problem, but in reality, it quickly becomes a global one.

The strategic consequences would extend further. Iran currently serves as a central node in a network of regional alliances and proxy groups that includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militia groups in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. These actors operate within a framework influenced, to varying degrees, by Tehran. If the Iranian state weakens dramatically, that structure could fragment. Some groups might operate independently, others might compete for influence, and still others could radicalise further without central coordination. The result would be a far more unpredictable security environment across the Middle East, which would make diplomatic engagement more difficult and military conflicts harder to contain.

Another risk lies in leadership uncertainty. Some policymakers assume that weakening the current Iranian leadership will produce a more moderate political order. But regime change rarely follows a predictable script.

Iran’s political system contains multiple competing factions, including conservative clerical networks, reformist politicians and powerful elements within the security establishment such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran’s leadership transition is less about a single successor than about the balance of power between clerical institutions, elected offices and the security apparatus. If the existing leadership were weakened or removed during wartime conditions, that balance could quickly unravel. The IRGC, which already commands vast military and economic resources, could try to consolidate authority, potentially pushing Iran towards a more overtly militarised political order. In such an environment, more radical actors, particularly those who view compromise with the US as impossible, could gain influence.

There is also little evidence that sustained military strikes will generate pro-American sentiment among the Iranian population. History suggests that external pressure often strengthens nationalist sentiment rather than weakening it. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, did not produce pro-American attitudes but instead fuelled resentment and insurgency. Similarly, repeated Israeli military campaigns in Lebanon have tended to strengthen support for Hezbollah rather than weaken it.

Beyond the Middle East itself, instability in Iran could also trigger significant migration flows. Iran already hosts millions of refugees from neighbouring countries, particularly Afghanistan. If internal conflict were to erupt inside Iran, even a small share of Iran’s population of more than 90 million people seeking refuge abroad could produce migration flows far larger than those seen during recent Middle Eastern crises.

Many of those migrants would likely move towards Turkiye and eventually Europe, placing additional pressure on governments already grappling with migration crises. While this may appear distant from American shores, the political consequences for US allies in Europe would inevitably affect transatlantic relations and Western cohesion.

Taken together, these risks illustrate a broader strategic problem. Weakening Iran may appear attractive to the US from a narrow military perspective, but destabilising a large regional power rarely produces orderly outcomes.

The United States has confronted similar dynamics before. The collapse of state authority in Iraq after 2003 did not eliminate threats in the region; it produced new ones. Libya’s fragmentation after 2011 created an enduring security vacuum. Syria’s civil war turned into a multisided conflict that reshaped the politics of the entire region.

For Washington, the question should be whether the long-term consequences of destabilising Iran would ultimately make the region and the world more dangerous. If recent history offers any guidance, destabilising Iran may ultimately create the very threats Washington hopes to eliminate.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The head of US Central Command says B-2 bombers have dropped dozens of 2,000-pound bombs on buried Iranian ballistic missile launchers, contributing to a 90% drop in missile attacks. The commander added an Iranian “drone carrier ship” is currently on fire after being hit.

Multiple Gulf nations, Arab states, as well as Turkiye and Azerbaijan have been caught in the crosshairs of the war.

Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency has reported that overnight attacks on Bahrain’s capital, Manama, targeted the Financial Harbour Towers commercial complex, the location of the Israeli embassy in the city.

The first week of the United States-Israel war on Iran and Tehran’s retaliatory strikes on nations hosting US forces and assets has engulfed the region and beyond into a broader conflict.

The Reuters news agency reported Friday that an Iranian drone was intercepted and destroyed in the vicinity of the complex.

Multiple Gulf nations, Arab states, as well as Turkiye and Azerbaijan have been caught in the crosshairs of the war.

The Saudi Ministry of Defense on Friday said a cruise missile was intercepted and destroyed to the east of the country’s central al-Kharj governorate. The ministry provided no additional information.

The ministry also said later it had intercepted three drones to the east of the Riyadh region.

Additionally, the Qatari Ministry of Defence announced overnight that its air defence forces successfully intercepted a drone attack targeting the Al Udeid Air Base in Doha that hosts US assets.

Earlier, authorities issued an alert warning that the security threat level had been elevated, requiring people to remain indoors and to stay away from windows and other exposed areas.

Several explosions rang out in Doha on Thursday.

European Union leaders expressed support for Arab countries in the Gulf as Iran continues to launch missile and drone attacks on targets across the region, in response to attacks by the US and Israel.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and other European leaders held talks with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) officials on Thursday in Brussels, denouncing what they described as “Iran’s inexcusable attacks against the GCC countries”.

Elsewhere n Friday, air defences shot down several drones in the Jordanian city of Irb, according to an Al Jazeera correspondent on the ground.

New Delhi, India — Dressed in a blue Navy uniform and sleek sunglasses, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in late October, addressed a gathering of the country’s sea warriors.

He listed out the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean — the massive volumes of trade and oil that pass through it. “The Indian Navy is the guardian of the Indian Ocean,” he then said, to loud, proud chants of “Long Live Mother India” from his audience.

Less than five months later, India has been shown up as a “guardian”, unable to protect its own guest.

On Wednesday, the Iranian warship, IRIS Dena, was torpedoed by a US submarine just 44 nautical miles off (81km) southern Sri Lanka, as it was returning home from naval drills hosted by India. During the “Milan” biennial multilateral naval exercise, Indian President Droupadi Murmu had posed with sailors from the Dena.

Yet it took the Indian Navy more than a day after the Iranian warship was struck to respond formally to the attack, which US officials made clear was a sign of how the Donald Trump administration was willing and ready to expand its war against Iran.

“An American submarine sank an Iranian warship that thought it was safe in international waters,” US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said at the Pentagon on Wednesday. “Instead, it was sunk by a torpedo. Quiet death.”

Tehran is furious over the attack on its warship hundreds of miles away from home. And Iran made sure to note that the IRIS Dena warship was  “a guest of India’s navy”, returning after completing the exercise it joined upon New Delhi’s invitation.

“The US has perpetrated an atrocity at sea, 2,000 miles [3,218km] away from Iran’s shores,” Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said, referring to the sinking of the frigate. “Mark my words: The US will come to bitterly regret [the] precedent it has set.”

Now, the IRIS Dena is at the bottom of the Indian Ocean, and more than 80 Iranian sailors, who marched during joint parades and posed for selfies with Indian naval officers during their two-week visit, are dead.

What has also fallen, said retired Indian naval officers and analysts, is India’s self-image as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. Instead, they said, the US attack on the Dena has exposed the limits of India’s power and influence in its own maritime back yard.

‘War reaches India’s backyard’

After participating in the naval exercises, IRIS Dena left Visakhapatnam on India’s eastern coast on February 26. It was hit in international waters, just south of Sri Lanka’s territorial waters, in the early hours of March 4, local time.

In response, Sri Lankan Navy rescuers recovered more than 80 bodies and picked up 32 survivors, reportedly including the commander and some senior officers from the warship. More than 100 men are still missing.

In a tweet welcoming the Dena to the naval drills, the Indian Navy’s Eastern Command had posted: “Her arrival … [reflects] long-standing cultural links between the two nations [Iran and India]”.

Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, the former vice chief of India’s naval staff, told Al Jazeera that he attended the Iranian parade at the function.

“I met and really liked them, especially their march for sailors travelling thousands of miles,” Sinha said. “It is always sad to see a ship sinking. But in a war, emotions don’t work. There’s nothing ethical in a war.”

Sinha said that the Indian Ocean — central to the strategic and energy security of the nation with the world’s largest population — was thought to be a fairly safe zone earlier. “But that is not the case, as we are learning now,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The unfolding battle [between the US and Israel on the one hand, and Iran on the other] has reached India’s back yard.
New Delhi has to be concerned,” Sinha, who served in the Indian Navy for four decades, added. “The liberty we enjoyed in the Indian Ocean has apparently shrunk.”

India’s Catch-22 situation

Only on Thursday evening did the Indian Navy issue any formal statement on the attack — more than 24 hours after the Dena was hit by a torpedo.

The Navy said that it received distress signals from the Iranian ship and had decided on deploying resources to help with rescuing sailors. But by then, it said, the Sri Lankan Navy had already stepped to lead the rescue effort.

Neither New Delhi nor the Navy has criticised — even mildly — the decision by the US to sink the Iranian warship.

Military analysts and former Indian naval officers say India is caught in a classic catch-22: Was India aware of the incoming US attack in the Indian Ocean on an Iranian warship, or was it blindsided by a nuclear-submarine in its backyard?

Admiral Arun Prakash, the former chief of India’s naval staff, told Al Jazeera that if New Delhi was blindsided, “it reflects on the US-India relationship directly.”

“If it is a surprise, then that’s a great concern since we have a so-called strategic partnership with the USA.”

And if India knew about the attacks, it would be seen by many as strategically siding with the US and Israel over their war on Iran.

C Uday Bhaskar, a retired Indian Navy officer and currently the director of the Society for Policy Studies, an independent think tank based in New Delhi, said that the US sinking an Iranian warship in the Indian Ocean muddies the Indian perception of itself as a “net security provider” in the region.

Bhaskar said the incident is a “strategic embarrassment” for India and weakens New Delhi’s credibility in the Indian Ocean, while its moral standing “takes a beating” because of the Indian government’s near-silence.

‘India on aggressor’s side’

In the post-colonial world order, India was a leader of the non-alignment movement, the Cold War-era neutrality posture adopted by several developing nations.

India now no longer calls its approach non-alignment, instead referring to it as “strategic autonomy”. But, in reality, it has inched closer to the United States and its allies, most importantly, Israel.

Merely two days before the US and Israel bombed Iran, Modi was in Israel, addressing the Knesset and warmly hugging Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who called his Indian counterpart a brother.

But Iran, under the late Supreme Leader Khamenei, was a friend of India as well, with New Delhi making strategic, business, and humanitarian investments in the country.

However, Modi has not said a word in condolence after Khamenei’s assassination. On Thursday, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited the Iranian embassy in New Delhi to sign a memorial book. Indian governments normally deploy ministers — not bureaucrats or diplomats — for such sombre occasions.

It is against that backdrop that India’s response to the attack on the Dena has come under scrutiny.

Because the frigate was hit when it was in international waters, India had “no formal responsibility”, said Srinath Raghavan, an Indian military historian and strategic analyst.

“But the US Navy’s actions underline both the spreading geography of this war and the sharp limits of India’s ability to manage, let alone control, its fallout,” Raghavan told Al Jazeera.

Diplomatically, India has “objectively positioned itself on the side of the aggressors in this war,” he said, by “acts of commission — visit to Israel on the eve of war — and of omission, with not even [an] official condolence, let alone condemnation, of the assassination of the Iranian head of state.” Modi visited Israel on February 25-26.

Mallikarjun Kharge, the president of India’s opposition Congress party, said the Modi government had recklessly abdicated “India’s strategic and national interests”. And the government’s silence “demeans India’s core national interests and destroys our foreign policy, carefully and painstakingly built and followed by successive governments over the years.”

In addition, Raghavan highlighted that Modi has only criticised Iran’s retaliation, which threatens to drag the Gulf region to the brink of war.

“It is difficult not to conclude that India has drastically downgraded its interests in the relationship with Iran,” he said.

“All of this detracts from India’s credibility as a player in the region and will have short and long-term consequences for the equities in West Asia [as the Middle East is referred to in India],” Raghavan told Al Jazeera.

Videos showed a projectile striking near Kuwait’s Ali al-Salem Air Base, which has hosted a substantial number of US forces. Earlier on Thursday, the United States announced it was closing its embassy in the country and is reportedly evacuating its staff.

Debris from an intercepted Iranian missile has landed near Petach Tikva in central Israel. Video shows efforts by firefighters to quell the flames.