conflict

WASHINGTON: For a third time, the US House has voted to end the war in Iran, approving a war powers resolution that would halt President Donald Trump’s ability to continue military action without congressional approval.

The roll call late Tuesday, 220-204, was similar to earlier efforts this summer, with a few more Republicans joining all Democrats voting to bring an end to the conflict. None of the resolutions have made it to the president’s desk, where Trump would almost certainly veto the measure.

“Remember when Donald Trump said that this war would last just a few weeks?” said Rep. Seth Moulton, D-Mass., who served as a Marine during the Iraq War and pushed the resolution forward.

He said it’s time for Congress to “actually ask tough questions, as the Constitution directs us to do, rather than be subservient to another warmongering administration.”

Republican Rep. Brian Mast of Florida, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, questioned which military resources Democrats would want to remove from the region where he said Iran remains a threat.

Mast said Trump is against “forever wars, and that is what he is ending” — the decades of hostilities from Iran.

“They are a continuous ongoing threat to the United States,” Mast said. “Enough is enough.”

Last war powers vote before the midterms

The action is likely the last House vote on the Iran war ahead of the midterm elections, where the conflict overseas is playing a substantial role in the political campaigns. The war that Trump launched Feb. 28 has dragged, with on-again, off-again deadly missile strikes being exchanged and causing havoc in the region for nearly seven months.

Lawmakers are heading home at the end of the week to campaign nearly full-time, with less than 50 days to go before the elections that will determine control of Congress as Democrats try to wrest power from Republicans.

Voters are confronting high prices, particularly for gas at the pumps, as the conflict disrupts the flow of oil resources through the vital Strait of Hormuz.

The Congressional Budget Office said Tuesday that the war has cost more than $38 billion, as of Aug. 1, and is projected to be costing between $2 billion and $3 billion monthly, depending on the intensity of the fighting. The budget office projected inflation will be 0.5 percentage points higher than expected heading into 2027 due to the war.

Trump himself had promised not to involve the U.S. in foreign wars when he won a second term in the White House, and his actions against Iran are weighing on the Republican Party that controls the House and Senate. Most Americans say the war in Iran has not been worth fighting, according to an AP-NORC poll in July.

In the previous House actions, four Republicans voted to halt the war in Iran, but that number rose to seven in Tuesday’s war powers vote, including GOP lawmakers from battleground Iowa, Rep. Zachary Nunn and Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks, and retiring Rep. Nancy Mace of South Carolina.

They joined GOP Reps. Tom Barrett of Michigan, Warren Davidson of Ohio, Brian Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania and Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky voting in favor of the war powers resolution, with all Democrats.

War powers being put to the test

Congress has tried repeatedly to alter the trajectory of the war against Iran, but efforts to limit the Trump administration’s military action remain a longshot so long as the president is able to fend off or veto the measures.

The House first approved a war powers resolution in June, and followed up with another one in July, all seeking to halt U.S. action in Iran. The Senate on its 10th try also approved a war powers resolution to end the conflict, but GOP senators quickly reversed course the next day after Trump berated them during a closed-door lunch.

While the Constitution gives Congress the authority to declare war, it also gives the president authority as the commander in chief to engage in some military actions. The War Powers Act, created in the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict, sought to put a more specific time limit on the president’s power, requiring congressional approval for sustained military actions after 60 or 90 days.

House Speaker Mike Johnson acknowledged at a press conference Tuesday the need to bring gas prices down.

But the Republican speaker said he believes the Iran conflict is entering a “new phase” as allies step up to help stabilize the region. When that happens, he said, “you’re going to see, as the president said, anytime gas prices will go down again, the cost of groceries will as well.”

Johnson said Trump expects the shift after the election, and the speaker added, “I’d love it to happen today.”

At a highly sensitive juncture, and amid increasing talk regarding the possibility of a third round of regional escalation, Iraqis are confronted with a fateful question: Is there someone seeking to make Iraq a part of this conflict – not merely a venue from which messages are dispatched or through which pressure is managed, but rather one of its open arenas?

There can be no avoiding the question, as the answer is linked to Iraqi blood, state sovereignty, the future of the economy, and Iraq’s standing among its brethren, neighbors, and the world. The matter is no longer a limited security issue; rather, it is a question of statehood, destiny, and direction, as well as a question of Iraq’s ability to protect itself from being dragged into what it does not want.

Repeated attempts to use Iraqi territory to target fraternal and neighboring Arab countries – the latest of which was the announced targeting of Saudi Arabia, preceded by the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan – reveal that we are facing a systematic trajectory rather than an isolated incident. If not decisively resolved, this trajectory could transform into a de facto policy.

Should the state succumb to the blackmail of forces acting outside its authority, it loses not only its security decision-making power but the very meaning of statehood itself. Iraq must not remain a conduit for messages, a proxy mailbox for others, a negotiating card in their conflicts, or an arena pushed forward during every regional escalation.

The problem is no longer about issuing a statement after each incident or settling for a reassuring narrative that does not prevent the recurrence of danger. The deeper problem is the existence of a repeating pattern that consumes Iraq’s political and moral capital, leaving the government to face the consequences of actions that do not reflect its own decisions. The longer a decisive resolution is delayed, the more a dangerous perception takes root abroad that the Iraqi state alone does not control its security decisions. This is an unfair image of Iraq and harmful to its interests, but it cannot be corrected by words alone.

Sovereignty is not safeguarded through slogans; rather, it is maintained by the state’s capacity to serve as the sole authority for force and decision-making. Consequently, restricting weapons to state control is neither a stance against any faction nor a detraction from anyone’s sacrifices. Instead, it is a prerequisite for the survival of the state and the protection of everyone. A state that does not hold exclusive authority over the decisions of war and peace can neither demand that others respect its borders, reassure its citizens, nor build stable relations with its neighborhood. It is in the interest of all forces, above all others, for the state to be strong, because a weak state protects no one; instead, it leaves everyone exposed.

Today, under highly sensitive circumstances, the Iraqi government is working to reconnect Iraq with its Arab, regional, and international surroundings, and to sincerely leverage available support and openness to serve the interests of Iraqis. These efforts deserve support – not because they are the efforts of a specific government, but because they represent the trajectory of a state. However, there are those, both internally and externally, who do not want Iraq to move past the logic of conflict and axes, and who seek to undermine any attempt to solidify its position as a balanced, secure partner state that is capable of speaking for itself, rather than for others.

The truth is that the Arabs, despite all the complexities that have affected the relationship, have not turned their backs on Iraq; rather, they have continued to view it as a pivotal country indispensable to regional stability. Throughout the difficult years, there remained an Arab readiness to embrace Iraq and restore it to its natural position, out of belief in its role, presence, and civilized and political depth. The problem has never been an Arab desire to break ties with Iraq; rather, it lay in Iraq’s ability to present itself as a state with a single decision-making authority – not a country where decisions are contested between the government and factions, the constitution and weapons, and national interest and wills that do not emanate from Iraqi state institutions. It is unfortunate that opportunities for openness and trust are squandered due to practices that reflect neither the will of Iraqis nor the interest of their state.

The risk of slipping today is greater than some believe. Every uncalculated action could drag Iraq into a confrontation it does not want, and every use of its territory outside state decisions could push it an additional step toward isolation. Isolation is neither heroism, an interest, nor a viable option in a world where countries thrive on economy, partnerships, investment, and trust. Every armed message launched outside the state is met with a message of concern from the investor, the partner, and the fraternal state, and every new disruption reflects on the market, labor, energy, banks, and Iraq’s image in the world. Iraq needs projects, energy, job opportunities, education, infrastructure, and openness – not more anxiety, armed messages, and alignments that deplete it.

We must be candid with our people: statements are no longer enough. Neither the domestic public is convinced by statements, nor is the outside world reassured by them. What preserves Iraq’s standing is action: a professional investigation, fair accountability, real control, and a clear decision that no entity, regardless of its title, can place the country in war, isolation, or economic loss. Backing the government along this path is a national duty, because it is a support for the state, its right to protect sovereignty, preserve relations, and build the future.

Iraq is subordinate to no one, an enemy to no one, and an arena for no one. It is a great homeland, and the decision of war and peace within it belongs to the Iraqis and their state alone. This is the hour of the state, the hour of reason, and the hour to say clearly: Iraq first.

Moscow and Copenhagen trade blame for the incident as Denmark says it will not invoke NATO treaty.

Moscow has warned Denmark to avoid “reckless” action after a Russian frigate fired two flares that narrowly missed a Danish military helicopter.

Moscow’s ambassador in Copenhagen, Vladimir Barbin, on Tuesday insisted that “dangerous manoeuvres” taken by the Danish aircraft were to blame for the Baltic Sea incident.

The Russian diplomat told state news agency RIA Novosti that he had delivered a formal note demanding steps to prevent a repeat of the episode.

He said that the helicopter’s actions were provocative and condemned Danish attempts to call them routine, saying they raised “serious concern about the possible consequences of such recklessness”.

The Fennec helicopter was on a routine mission to photograph the frigate as it sailed in international waters off Denmark, the Danish defence command said. Ships typically use such flares as warning signals.

Denmark’s Defence Minister Jeppe Bruus told TV 2 News that one flare passed within a “matter of metres” of the aircraft, and accused Russia of “deeply unprofessional seamanship”.

When asked if Denmark would seek Article 5 consultations over the incident – invoking the NATO measure that considers an attack against one member of the bloc to be an attack against all of them – Bruus said the incident was being taken seriously, but “we are not there”.

Barbin said he had complained last year about what he called dangerous fly-bys and low hovering by a Danish helicopter over the Russian warship Vice-Admiral Kulakov.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to comment, saying he lacked details.

The Danish Straits – where most Danish incidents with Russia have taken place – are the Baltic’s main shipping gateway and a key oil route, including for Russian oil tankers.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called the incident serious but not surprising, describing it as part of a pattern of intensifying Russian hybrid warfare against Europe and testing NATO.

‘Fear and discord’

“Russia wants to sow fear and discord,” Frederiksen said, calling for closer unity and stronger defences for Denmark and Europe.

Russia denies carrying out hybrid attacks in Europe. However, the potential for the war in Ukraine to escalate and entangle Europe’s NATO member states is rising.

A spokeswoman for Russia’s Foreign Ministry later on Tuesday warned Western politicians and diplomats to “soberly” assess ⁠the risks of travelling to Ukraine, following a Russian drone strike on a rail line on which a train carrying former British ⁠Prime Minister Boris Johnson ⁠and former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt had passed minutes earlier.

Rail hubs ⁠and transport infrastructure serving Ukraine’s ⁠military are legitimate ⁠targets, she said, and Russia warned foreign diplomats in May to leave ‌Kyiv because of strikes on Ukraine’s military-industrial ‌complex.

Yemeni government forces have advanced in western Taiz after successfully repelling a Houthi offensive.

Armed forces affiliated with Yemen’s internationally recognised government have retaken positions from the Houthis and are advancing in the southwestern Taiz province as clashes intensify.

Reporting from Taiz on Monday, Al Jazeera Arabic’s Yasser Hassan said forces loyal to the Saudi Arabia-backed Yemeni government advanced in western Taiz on Sunday after successfully repelling a Houthi offensive.

“This comes with the support of air strikes targeting Houthi gatherings. The air force continues to bomb the Houthis. On the west coast in Mocha, Dhubab, and their surroundings,” Hassan said, citing a source in government forces.

In a statement on Monday, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), said they launched attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia using dozens of ballistic missiles and drones.

The group said the attacks targeted “military facilities and infrastructure, including aircraft hangars, radar installations, runways, ammunition depots and other targets at King Khalid airbase in Khamis Mushait”, Saudi Arabia.

It said the attacks were a response to a Saudi offensive, which involved more than 300 air strikes across Yemen over five days.

There was no immediate comment from Saudi Arabia on the Houthi claims.

On Sunday, the Saudi civil defence agency sent alerts for the city of Abha and the region around Khamis Mushait, but they were quickly lifted shortly afterwards.

Fighting in Yemen’s more than 10-year civil war reignited in July, threatening a United Nations-brokered truce that halted large-scale violence in 2022, after the Houthis declared a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia and began targeting its ships in the Red Sea.

The fighting soon spilled over beyond the country’s borders, with the Houthis carrying out air attacks on southern Saudi Arabia, including oil facilities. Dozens of people were wounded in those attacks.

Clashes in Yemen intensified last week after the Houthis captured parts of the country’s Red Sea coast, fortifying their hold on the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a key waterway which handles about 12 percent of global trade, including 11 percent of maritime oil and 8 percent of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The waterway has been an economic lifeline for Saudi Arabia and its oil exports, as the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively blocked by Iranian forces since the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran in February.

The Houthis captured more strategic islands in the southern Red Sea, The Associated Press news agency reported on Monday, citing Yemeni government and Houthi officials.

Houthi fighters were deployed on the islands of Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish about 86 nautical miles (160km) north of the Bab al-Mandeb, according to two government officials and a Houthi official, the AP reported.

Meanwhile, the International Organization for Migration said on Sunday the fighting in Yemen in recent weeks had displaced nearly 86,000 people.

It added that some of those displaced by the conflict were fleeing Yemen altogether, with more than 2,000 people reaching neighbouring country Djibouti.

Niamey, Niger – The failed mutiny in Niger has shown the extent to which President Abdourahamane Tiani now relies on Russian support when his government comes under threat, including from within his own security forces.

On August 29, soldiers calling themselves the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Homeland attacked Air Base 101 at Niamey’s international airport, the presidential palace and the national broadcaster in a coordinated assault. A statement circulated during the fighting falsely declared that Tchiani had been removed.

Loyalist presidential guard units held the palace overnight, while about 200 Russian Africa Corps soldiers, backed by drones and reportedly reinforced from Mali and Libya, helped retake the airbase by evening. At least 27 people were killed, and about 100 mutineers were arrested.

The mutiny showed who Tchiani could rely on when his own security forces turned against him. Nigerien troops held the presidential palace, while Russian personnel and equipment helped loyalist forces retake the key airbase.

A fractured army

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Ryan Cummings, head analyst at Signal Risk, said the attempted mutiny was rooted in grievances that had been building inside the military.

“The insurrection indicates discord within the Nigerien armed forces,” he said. “This stems from multiple sources. The foremost pertains to significant casualties being inflicted against the country’s military by an array of non-state armed actors which appear to be as well equipped, if not better, than their military counterparts.”

Cummings pointed to a widening gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those protecting the country’s political leadership.

“Other factors include discrepancies in deployment and remuneration between low- to middle-ranking officers, who led the attempted mutiny and putsch, versus their more senior counterparts, such as the presidential guard who thwarted the coup attempt,” he said.

“Junior to middle-ranking soldiers are generally deployed to conflict front lines, where they face well-equipped and increasingly professional militant units that are capable of overrunning their positions,” Cummings noted. “Conversely, more senior military units, most notably the presidential guard, are deployed to garrisoned cities such as Niamey and Agadez, where the threat of engagement is generally lower. Despite facing a lower risk profile, senior military units generally enjoy significantly higher remuneration than their low- to middle-rank counterparts.”

The mutiny exposed the gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those serving in better-protected units in the capital.

Russia’s role grows

Tchiani expelled French and American troops in 2023 and 2024, and troops from Russia’s Africa Corps entered Niger as the military government sought to replace Western support.

But the mutiny showed that Moscow’s role now goes beyond helping Niger fight armed groups.

When soldiers inside Niger’s own military threatened the government, Russian personnel and equipment helped loyalist forces retake Air Base 101. The episode showed that Russia’s role in Niger now extends beyond the fight against armed groups to helping protect the military government itself.

That is a significant shift from how the partnership was initially presented to Nigeriens: as a way to strengthen the fight against armed groups after the departure of Western forces.

For Tchiani, that reliance on Moscow comes as he faces continued attacks by armed groups and growing discontent among soldiers fighting them.

A test for the AES alliance

The response from Niger’s fellow military leaders also raised questions about how much help the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) can provide when one of its members is under serious pressure.

According to Romane Dideberg, a research analyst at Chatham House’s Africa Programme, the response was one of the most revealing aspects of the rebellion.

“What the security response says about the cohesion of the Alliance of Sahel States might be one of the most telling elements of the mutiny,” she said. “As with the April attacks in Mali, the two other Sahelian juntas remained largely unreactive during this existential moment for the Nigerien junta, reacting only once the mutiny was neutralised.”

“This partly reflects the operational shortcomings of the confederation’s security architecture, but also, more critically, the sensitive relations between Tchiani’s junta and his Malian and Burkinabe counterparts,” she said.

Dideberg said Tchiani was rumoured not to have reached out to Mali. She also pointed to a generational and cultural gap between Tchiani and his Sahelian allies, saying his government showed more continuity with the former establishment while a different rationale had underpinned the coup that brought him to power.

The mutiny tested how far the three miltary governments were prepared, and able, to come to one another’s aid.

The UAE allegations

Alongside the Russian role, allegations have emerged that French and Emirati interests were connected to the mutiny, amid wider friction over Niger’s Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project.

The allegations have not been independently substantiated.

Roger Gabriel, a Nigerien army captain and commander of the elite 1st Parachute Battalion, appeared on state television on September 4 and alleged that several people, including associates of deposed President Mohamed Bazoum and officers from Chad, Benin and the Ivory Coast, were behind the attack.

He also said people from the United Arab Emirates had called and urged him to join the mutiny.

The claims are difficult to independently verify, but they have put fresh attention on the UAE’s growing presence in the Sahel.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI), said the possibility of Emirati involvement “cannot be dismissed” given the information circulating and the UAE’s broader regional activity.

“The UAE has been expanding its influence across the Sahel, from the western states to Sudan, primarily through official partnerships with military regimes, but also via informal networks, resource extraction, notably gold, and ties to non-state actors including separatist groups when needed,” he said.

“Its approach is pragmatic and dual-track: it prioritises formal state-level relations first, then pivots to alternative channels if the official path falters,” Ibrahim said.

“All of this is deeply political and strategic, interlinked with ambitions to secure leverage over Mediterranean and Red Sea routes. The growing friction with Algeria underscores how these moves are widely read in the region as an effort to reshape the balance of influence, making any allegations around the recent events in Niger worth careful scrutiny rather than either exaggeration or dismissal,” he said.

For now, the allegations remain allegations.

Tchiani survived the mutiny, but the failed attempt to remove him exposed strains inside his military, highlighted his growing reliance on Russia, and raised questions about how much help his closest regional allies can provide when he needs it.

For Dideberg, the implications go beyond the failed attempt to unseat Tchiani.

“This mutiny calls the effectiveness, but also, to an extent, the sincerity, of the mutual assistance pact into question,” she said.

South Korea said it boosted its surveillance posture and was closely exchanging information on the launches with the US and Japan.

North Korea has fired ballistic missiles towards the sea off its eastern coast, according to South Korea’s military.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said that it detected several missiles launched from North Korea’s eastern coastal area of Wonsan about 5:20am on Saturday (20:20 GMT on Friday), which flew about 250 kilometres (155 miles). It added that it is closely exchanging information on the launches with the United States and Japan.

South Korea’s presidential National Security Office said it held an emergency security meeting with the Defence Ministry, the JCS and other relevant agencies following the launch.

The US Pacific Command said North Korea’s launch event does not pose an immediate threat to US territory or to its allies, adding that Washington remains committed to the defence of South Korea and its other allies in the region.

The missiles were launched a day after South Korea concluded five days of joint maritime drills with the US and Japan that were focused on North Korea.

Hours after the exercises began on Monday, North Korea’s defence minister, Kim Song Gi, criticised the exercise and warned North Korea was capable of taking “strong and reflective countermeasures from the standpoint of power”.

Late last month, North Korea slammed plans for the so-called Freedom Edge exercises in international waters off South Korea as a “threat” to Pyongyang and other countries in the region.

The North also fired a barrage of missiles into the sea on August 20, despite an overture from US President Donald Trump, who said he planned to meet this year with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

The August launch from the nuclear-armed North came as South Korea and the US held a shorter edition of their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercises, following an order from Trump to scale back the drills.

The order from Trump, who called the exercises “inappropriate and hostile” towards North Korea, alarmed US allies in the region.

Pyongyang has long condemned US-South Korea joint exercises as rehearsals for invasion, often staging missile launches around the drills.

On Tuesday morning, 12-year-old Sundus al-Hamamdeh left her home in the Masafer Yatta village of Khirbet al-Fakhit, and went to school.

It was the third day of the new school year in the occupied West Bank.

But when the sixth-grade student at al-Fakhit Secondary School returned from her classes, the house she had left behind was gone.

Israeli forces had carried out a large-scale demolition operation in Khirbet al-Fakhit, destroying homes, livestock shelters, water infrastructure, and solar-power installations.

For al-Hamamdeh, her house was more than four walls and a roof. It was her safe space, the place she came back to every day.

For children in Masafer Yatta, south of Hebron in the occupied West Bank, the spectre of demolition is always present.

Much of Masafer Yatta lies in Area C of the West Bank, where Israel has control over planning and construction. Israeli authorities justifies the demolition orders by saying that the structures were built without permits; Palestinians, backed by the United Nations, note that such permits are nearly impossible for them to obtain.

And it’s not just their homes that are under threat, but their schools.

On August 4, Israeli forces surrounded Shaab al-Butum school, according to Bassam Jabr, the director-general of education in Masafer Yatta.

An Israeli military bulldozer then demolished two rooms used by teachers and administrators, and a storage room.

The UN independently documented the demolition of the rooms, saying Israeli authorities had cited the lack of an Israeli-issued building permit.

Things could still get worse; the main school building remains under a demolition order.

Focus of attacks

Established in 2015, the school serves about 60 students from kindergarten through 11th grade. Its remote location makes transferring students to other schools particularly difficult, Jabr said.

Education officials have appealed to Israeli courts, and called on the United Nations and foreign governments to intervene.

But the schools remain under threat. Even as the Israeli military and settlers’ pogroms against Palestinians continue across the West Bank, Masafer Yatta is especially targeted.

The remote communities there have little ability to defend themselves and conditions are harsh. In addition, the Israeli military has designated large parts of the area a military firing zone, another justification for forcing out the Palestinian population.

Masafer Yatta’s schools are a central part of the effort to keep Palestinians here – ensuring that families do not have to travel far for their children to be educated. Palestinians argue that is why the schools have been particularly targeted.

Intisar Omar Abu Sabha, an administrative director at the Masafer Yatta Directorate of Education, says schools in the communities of Zif, ar-Rifaiyah, Umm Qussa, Umm al-Kheir, Jinba, Shaab al-Butum, Khirbet al-Daba, and al-Majaz are among those facing demolition orders.

In addition to the threats to their schools, students and teachers also have to navigate road closures, checkpoints, and the presence of settlers to reach their classrooms.

Abu Sabha said schools have also faced damage and settler incursions or harassment in and around their grounds. She describes a cycle in which children risk losing both their homes and their schools.

“Imagine a student who is at school, then returns home and finds their home demolished … and comes back the next day to find their school demolished,” she said.

Yasmeen Sallaq, a Palestinian lawyer, says the threat to the Masafer Yatta schools directly undermines children’s right to education.

But Sallaq says that Israeli restrictions on movement, military raids, arrests, displacement, and attacks affecting students and education workers make that right increasingly difficult to exercise.

“We face the demolition of schools every day, making the continuation of the educational process almost impossible,” Sallaq said.

‘The only outlet’

At Zif Secondary School for Girls, headteacher Hanaa al-Salameen says about 250 students attend the school.

It first received a demolition notice in 2016. Years of legal proceedings followed, but an appeal against demolition was dismissed this year, with efforts continuing to obtain an interim injunction.

The uncertainty has already taken a toll. Some girls are experiencing fear and anxiety, while others have transferred to different schools, al-Salameen said.

“The school is not just a place for education,” she said. “This school is the students’ only outlet.”

She fears the school’s demolition could push some girls out of education altogether if alternative schools are too far away or require them to travel along unsafe roads.

At Zif, 10th-grade student Rabiha Yousef Jibril described the school’s importance.

“I am growing up in this school, and my dreams are growing with me day by day,” Jibril said, adding that while students fear its demolition, they insist they will continue to attend.

“Even if they demolish the school, we will continue to study, even under the trees,” she said. “Even if they confiscate the books, we will keep them in our hearts, as well as our minds.”

The rapid Houthi advance down Yemen’s Red Sea coast this week is an astonishing military victory, but not quite the game-changer it is being portrayed as.

The group has been able to threaten the vitally important shipping route, but they have been doing so since 2023. This new victory consolidates that control, proving that Yemen’s government is not currently in a position to defeat them.

The prior Houthi control over the northern section of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the major port city of Hodeidah, has allowed the Iran-allied rebel group, for years, to first attack shipping linked to Israel and the United States – and then, in recent months, Saudi Arabian-linked vessels.

That control also damaged the global economy. Long before the US war with Iran and the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a tool to throttle international trade, Houthi attacks around Yemen had turned Bab al-Mandeb into a similar weapon, and led to bombing campaigns against the Houthis by the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

Houthi officials themselves have emphasised this, with one leading official, Abdulqader al-Murtada, saying earlier this week that the group did “not need control over Bab al-Mandeb, for the blockade [on Saudi ships] is already in place”. Al-Murtada could point Saudi ships that have avoided Bab al-Mandeb since the Houthis began attacking them in July, even before their latest progress.

However, the Houthi lightning advance makes it even easier for the group to disrupt shipping. They now have access to the Red Sea’s narrow entry point and several islands in it, allowing them to use shorter-range weapons and more easily reach vessels they want to attack and board, as well as potentially using sea mines to further restrict shipping.

Not going away

The increase in the Houthi ability to target shipping – even with the caveats outlined above – does have an impact on market sentiment. Oil prices have increased as traders price in the ability for Iran and its allies to disrupt shipping in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, the two maritime chokepoints of the southern Arabian Peninsula.

However, the consequences of this advance are not limited to the increased ability of the Houthis to attack shipping, but to the increasing reality that the Houthi problem on the Red Sea is not going away.

For months, after Saudi Arabia backed a Yemeni government campaign against southern Yemeni separatist forces earlier this year, the mood had shifted in the country’s anti-Houthi camp.

The perception was that the Yemeni government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council, had finally gotten its act together. President Rashad al-Alimi repeatedly spoke of a unified military chain of command, allowing the military to overcome the divisions blamed for its inability to defeat the Houthis.

Yemeni and Saudi officials had hinted at an anti-Houthi campaign all year. The Red Sea coastline was a possible location: the largely flat geography suited the government, allowing Saudi Arabia to effectively use its air power; much of the population is not made up of the Houthis’ traditional support base; and prior Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping meant that there would likely be international buy-in for such a campaign.

The seizure of the Red Sea coastline has broken all of those narratives.

The momentum the Yemeni government thought it had, even at the start of this week when it claimed advances in al-Jawf, to the east of the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa, is now gone.

After months of projecting unity, Yemen’s anti-Houthi camp is once again turning on itself, trading accusations of blame for the defeat.

Saudi dilemma

The message the Houthis have for Saudi Arabia is clear: ‘Your partners in Yemen can’t defeat us.’

Therefore, the potential Houthi argument is that Saudi Arabia has to make a deal with them and agree to their terms, including Riyadh funding public sector salaries, access to income from Yemen’s oil and gas reserves, and no restrictions on flights and shipping to Houthi-controlled ports.

The Houthis have an incentive to lock in their gains and raise the cost of escalation before Saudi-backed Yemeni forces can reorganise.

Their attacks on Saudi Arabia, escalating in the past week, have been damaging, and the group is promising more if Riyadh increases its military support for the Yemeni government.

The risk of any such intervention is clearly there for Saudi Arabia. But so is the risk of inaction. The Houthis have repeatedly demanded more concessions when they were in positions of strength.

With the Yemen war unresolved, the Houthis may decide to escalate again in the future, even if a deal is agreed now.

And so, policymakers in Riyadh could determine that it makes more sense to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem head-on now, rather than allow it to fester into the future.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) warns that the figure is rising ‘by the hour’ as it calls for safe humanitarian access.

More than 46,000 people have been driven from their homes in Yemen in the wake of the latest escalation in fighting between Houthi rebels and government forces, according to United Nations data.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) warned that the figure is rising “by the hour” in a statement issued on Friday.

The UN agency called on all parties to the conflict to guarantee safe humanitarian access and protect civilians, aid workers and humanitarian assets on the ground.

“Families are being forced to flee for the second or third time in this conflict, with almost nothing left,” Amy Pope, head of the IOM, said in the statement.

The agency said many people had reportedly fled Mocha with their belongings overnight after the Iran-allied Houthi rebels captured the strategically important Red Sea port city from the internationally recognised government on Thursday.

Entire villages were said to have been abandoned in some areas of the war-torn country. The IOM urged the parties to the conflict to guarantee humanitarian access and ensure the safety of aid workers.

The statement came amid reports on Friday that the Houthis had captured a strategically located island in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and now control Yemen’s entire Red Sea coast.

‘Two new crises’

Separately on Friday, the UN also voiced concern over the Houthis seizing a key humanitarian compound and its assets in Mocha, warning that humanitarian personnel and facilities must be protected.

“The compound houses staff of UN agencies working to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in the area,” UN deputy spokesperson Farhan Haq told reporters.

All UN personnel working at the compound had left before the seizure and were “safe and accounted for”, Haq added.

Haq stressed that humanitarian personnel, premises and assets “must be respected and protected at all times”, while calling for safe and unimpeded humanitarian access so life-saving assistance can continue reaching people in need.

Farea Al-Muslimi, a Yemen researcher at the London-based Chatham House thinktank, told Al Jazeera that deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen will build on what was already one of the world’s worst crises.

“Yemen was already going through one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world,” Al-Muslimi said.

“It got terribly worse after the Houthis cracked down on aid organisations in northern Yemen. But the war continued despite the fragile truce, and what that meant was the destruction of what remained of the economy, with millions of families left without income,” he said.

Al-Muslimi warned that the latest escalation “will create two new crises”, one being further internal displacement, noting that “we’ve already seen more than 10,000 families displaced in the last week alone”, and the other being rising prices for goods inside Yemen.

“Since this is [happening in] a maritime [trade] corridor, it will, for sure, drive further violence inside Yemen, but also from outside Yemen,” Al-Muslimi added.

“The Yemeni population will continue to suffer, first and foremost, more than anyone else, inside or outside the country.”

WASHINGTON: President Donald Trump vowed Friday that the United States would never forget the September 11, 2001 attacks and suggested the country was continuing the “war on terror” 25 years later by fighting Iran.

Speaking at the Pentagon after skipping the main 9/11 commemorations in New York, Republican Trump also hit out at domestic “fanatics” in an apparent swipe at Democrats.

“Today we renew the sacred oath that we first swore in their names a quarter of a century ago. We will never, ever forget. That’s why we fight today,” Trump said in a speech.

“We don’t have a choice. There can only be victory. We fight hard. We fight to win,” added the president, who was accompanied by First Lady Melania Trump.

One of the jets hijacked on 9/11 hit the Pentagon in Washington, killing 184 people who were remembered by a single bell tolling as their names were read out.

But presidents have previously marked major anniversaries by attending several sites including New York, where the majority of the 2,977 victims were killed in the attacks on the World Trade Center.

Trump went on to link the fight against Al-Qaeda launched by his Republican predecessor George W. Bush to the US-Israeli war on Iran which is now in its seventh month.

“Today we salute every member of the United States military who served in the ‘War on Terror.’ It is a war on sick, horrible terror,” Trump said.

“And we salute the service members working right now to ensure the world’s number one sponsor of terror, the Islamic Republic of Iran, will never ever have a nuclear weapon.”

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth also lashed out at Iran in his remarks to the Pentagon ceremony.

“Over the past six months, we have laid waste to the world’s most prolific state sponsor of terrorism. Our warriors have fought an Islamic theocracy that has wished us death for nearly half a century,” Hegseth said.

The Iran war has slid into a stalemate with Iran largely maintaining its grip on the Strait of Hormuz, and keeping oil prices high, despite sporadic exchanges of fire with the United States.

Trump also turned to the domestic front, a day after a Republican convention for the US midterm elections in which Trump and Vice President JD Vance accused Democrats of sympathizing with the 9/11 attackers.

“A generation after 9/11, we also know that the final response to those atrocities and the ultimate victory over the perpetrators will not be found on a foreign battlefield,” Trump said.

Telling the story of a firefighter killed in the attacks whose son went on to become a US Navy veteran, Trump said it showed that “we can be a nation whose heroes are not fanatics for an abstract cause.”

In his speech to the Republican convention on Wednesday, Trump had used the same term: “With your vote in this election, you can tell these far-left lunatics and fanatics that America is not for sale to them or to anybody else.”

Republicans at the convention repeatedly trained their fire on left-wing Democratic senate hopeful Abdul El-Sayed over his previous social media posts about 9/11.

Israeli attacks come a week after it said to have established operational control over the strategic ridge.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure at a key site in southern Lebanon, with Israeli government officials adding that the operation consolidated its so-called security zone in the area.

In a joint statement, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Thursday that Israeli forces would remain in the area to prevent the Iran-aligned Hezbollah militant group from re-establishing its presence and rebuilding its capabilities.

The Ali al-Taher ridge, about 15 km (10 miles) from the Israeli border, has become one of the most contested areas of the war between Israel and Hezbollah. Katz claimed last Friday that Israeli forces had driven Hezbollah fighters out of what he said was a network of tunnels ⁠⁠under the disputed highland.

Reuters reported that Hezbollah is believed to have built an underground command centre and weapons stores there in July, quoting unnamed Lebanese security sources.

Lebanon’s National News Agency said that the Israeli military carried out a powerful blast at the ridge, with tremors and the sound of the explosion felt across Nabatieh and surrounding areas in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah has yet to respond to the recent Israeli attack.

The Israeli military said its forces had established “operational control” over the ridge, both above and below ground, before dismantling the infrastructure. The network extended for more than 2 km (just over 1 mile) and contained dozens of rockets, missiles and drones, as well as anti-tank missiles, mines and explosive devices, it said.

The military said a central command complex belonging to Hezbollah’s Badr unit was located within the underground infrastructure. The complex contained command centres, weapons storage rooms and living quarters that allowed fighters to remain underground for extended periods, it said.

Iran reportedly warned the United States last month that it would respond forcefully if Israeli attacks on the ridge continued.

Over the last weeks, Israeli strikes and ground operations around the Ali al-Taher ridge continued despite a ceasefire agreed in June, after Israel gained control of nearby Beaufort Castle and part of the higher ground overlooking much of southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

A US-brokered framework agreed after a June ceasefire — between Lebanon and Israel, without negotiating with Hezbollah — called for Israeli forces to gradually withdraw from southern Lebanon while Lebanese troops disarm Hezbollah.

The process has stalled, however, with Hezbollah refusing to give up its weapons and Israel saying it will not withdraw until the group disarms.

Since 2023, Israel has pushed into southern Lebanon and seized several strategic positions, occupying swathes of land, which it now increasingly says it needs to maintain a so-called buffer zone between Israel and Hezbollah positions in Lebanon.

Dallas, Texas – The Republican midterm convention has represented a gambit for the party: centring US President Donald Trump in the final stretch of the midterm elections, even as the first two years of his second term have cast a polarising political shadow.

That has been particularly true when it comes to the war on Iran, which Trump launched alongside Israel on February 28, and the knock-on effects on affordability in the United States, a key issue for many voters.

As Trump prepared to deliver a keynote address on Wednesday in Dallas, prices for Brent Crude, the global benchmark, rose above $100 a barrel for the first time since July, a reminder of the conflict’s continued fallout for global markets.

Nevertheless, supporters who spoke to Al Jazeera still saw the president as the man to rally Americans to vote Republican in November, as the party fights to hold onto control of the House of Representatives and Senate.

But some voiced concern – or confusion – over the impact of the war.

“This really is a Trump-a-palooza, as people have been saying,” said Carter Eisinger, a 27-year-old electrician who travelled from Fargo, North Dakota.

“I think some people say that in a derogatory way, but I think it’s very much a complimentary phrase,” he added. “The reality of it is we are in a Trump Republican Party.”

Still, Eisinger struggled to see how the war fit into Trump’s “America First” vision.

“In my opinion, I don’t really see the connection of how a war in Iran helps us here in the country,” he said. “If the Iran war is justified, I’m willing to pay the gas prices, but I haven’t seen that justification.”

He felt a similar confusion about the close relationship between the US and Israel.

“At the end of the day, I’m going to come right back to whatever is best for families, young people, anyone in America,” he said. “If it’s helping Israel in a way that helps us, then great… but it needs to help us first.”

Others were more charitable towards Trump’s approach to the Middle East, even if they saw the war on Iran as a misstep.

Bijay Dixit, a 59-year-old photographer from Houston, Texas, gave Trump high marks on his approach to immigration. He also believed Republicans were the party to steward the economy in the years ahead.

But on Iran, he said there had been a “miscalculation”, even if he agreed with the Trump administration’s position that the war was ultimately a necessary response to the totality of Iran’s actions in the 47 years since the Islamic revolution in 1979.

“Iran needed to be stopped at some point,” he said. “When I say miscalculation, what I mean is underestimation of the capacity of the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps].”

Helen Vennett, a 65-year-old small business owner from Maryland and the chairman of her county’s Republican Party, likened the convention to a high-school pep rally.

“All of us need to have cheerleaders in our life… It just gets you fired up again. You kind of need to know that you’re not alone, that there are believers,” she added.

But while she said she broadly supported the Trump administration’s justification for the war, she acknowledged the potential political fallout.

“It’s a tough one,” she said.

Polls have regularly suggested widespread disapproval among US citizens of the war on Iran, with independents in particular expressing disapproval. Many, in turn, rank affordability as their top issue heading into the midterm vote.

A recent Reuters/Ipsos poll suggested that only a quarter of Americans think the war is worthwhile.

For its part, the Trump administration has downplayed the prospect of ending the war, focusing instead on efforts to open shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz, over which Iran continues to assert its influence.

Speaking to reporters on Wednesday as he departed for the convention, Trump sought to temper expectations that the war would end before November’s pivotal vote.

“I think it’s going to take a little bit longer than the midterm,” he said, accusing Iran of intentionally holding out until November.

“They’re desperate to try and affect the election so that we can get a nice weak group of people in there and leave them alone and let them have their nuclear weapons,” he said.

He predicted the war would end swiftly after the final votes have been cast.

“They can’t hold out any longer,” he said.

John Russell, 55, from Rockford, Illinois, who regularly travels to Trump rallies as part of the “Front Row Joe’s” group, said he believed voters would still view the first two years of Trump’s second term as a net positive.

“It’s been a small bump with the gas going up,” he told Al Jazeera from the convention.

“But it had to be done. We can’t allow [Iran] to have a nuclear bomb,” he said, referring to one of the administration’s main justifications for the war.

Tehran has long denied seeking a nuclear weapon, with military analysts generally agreeing that destroying its nuclear programme would require a major military escalation, involving boots on the ground.

Russell predicted that the Republican Party’s bet would pay off at the polls.

“It’s going to fire up the base,” he said of the convention. “It’s going to switch some independents to vote for the Trump-backed candidates, and they will win.”

The war in Yemen is threatening to open a new front as the Iran-allied Houthi rebels are trying to advance along the Red Sea coast, through the mountain chains of Taiz province, edging closer to strategic ground that overlooks one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries.

For the internationally recognised Yemeni government, this is an offensive with global consequences.

In Wednesday’s interview with Al Jazeera, Yemen’s Ambassador to Qatar, Rajeh Badi, a former government spokesman, said that his government and its armed forces had not violated any truce since 2021.

The Houthis, he argued, are “the aggressors”. “What we are seeing now is a surprise Houthi offensive to seize strategic ground along the Red Sea, in order to allow Iran, through its Houthi proxy, to tighten its grip on maritime routes,” Badi said.

He added that the Houthis, who have advanced on al-Makha (Mocha) and al-Waziyah, and over large stretches of the mountain chain overlooking the Red Sea in Taiz province, “want commanding positions to launch more effective strikes on ships and disrupt navigation in the Red Sea”.

Badi said the Yemeni government responded by opening fronts in al-Jawf, Marib and al-Bayda, and that the consequences could extend far beyond Yemen.

“We are now facing a real threat that does not stop at Yemen’s borders,” he said. “It threatens the entire region and the world. If the Houthis manage to choke maritime traffic in the Red Sea, we will be looking at another Hormuz in these waters – with potentially even greater impact.”

The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb “represent a vital artery for global shipping, for both energy and food supplies”, he added.

A chokepoint that belongs to the world

Bab al-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. To the north, the Red Sea leads to the Suez Canal, while farther east, beyond the Arabian Sea, lies another critical chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz. This geography is what gives Yemen’s conflict consequences far beyond its borders, as Saudi Arabia is already being drawn into the confrontation.

The Houthis have targeted Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea.

Major-General Turki al-Maliki, spokesman of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis on Wednesday attacked Saudi cities of Khamis Mushait, Abha, and Jizan with ballistic missiles and drones. He did not elaborate on any casualties as a result of the attacks.

Badi, who has spoken to the media for the first time since taking up his post, said those attacks are designed to change the nature of the war.

“By targeting Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south, and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea, the Houthis are trying to drag Saudi Arabia into their war. Their calculation is simple: they want to rebrand this conflict as a Saudi-Yemeni war,” he said.

The ambassador assessed that “every time their militias suffer heavy losses inside Yemen at the hands of the Yemeni armed forces, they respond by firing missiles and drones at civilian sites in Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to inflame Yemeni public opinion and convince the outside world that Yemen is at war with Saudi Arabia”.

The conflict, he said, is fundamentally about Yemen’s state and its future. The Yemeni people are fighting to “reclaim their state, their republic, their dignity and their stability”.

Iran’s hidden hand

Behind Yemen’s fragmented front lines, a larger regional confrontation looms, and its architect, according to Badi, is Iran.

The official said that Tehran’s relationship with the Houthis is now impossible to hide. “Iranian officials openly boast about it, and Houthi leaders proudly talk about their ‘strategic’ ties with Tehran,” he said.

The Houthis are “one of Iran’s key regional arms – just like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Many of Tehran’s other proxies have come under pressure,” he added.

“Former Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi used to say that if Iran gains control over Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, it will not need a nuclear weapon – its grip over these two chokepoints would be more powerful than any nuclear arsenal. Events have proved him right,” Badi recalled.

‘We have exhausted all peaceful avenues’

For Yemen’s government, the alternative to another war was supposed to be diplomacy.

Badi urged the world “to stand with us so we can rid ourselves of this scourge – a threat that no longer targets Yemenis alone”.

“We have exhausted all peaceful avenues. For more than 13 years, we have been engaging in dialogue rounds and signing agreements, whether inside Yemen or after the Houthis seized the capital, Sanaa,” he said.

Badi added that the Houthi rebels have effectively “buried peaceful options. Peace is simply not part of this movement’s culture or mindset. That is what ultimately forced us to take up arms”.

“The world must understand this difficult equation,” the ambassador concluded, that the Houthis are “an armed proxy, an extension of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthis do not represent us”.

British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband has said the United Kingdom will sanction illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, describing the move as “overdue” and necessary to “salvage” a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

He made the comments on Tuesday as 11 nations joined the UK in supporting or ⁠considering curbs on trade in goods with settlements that are a barrier to a future Palestinian state.

But analysts say the step is far from enough to drive momentum for Palestinian statehood, threatened by ever-expanding settlements in the West Bank and an increasingly hostile Israeli political environment.

Tahani Mustafa, a lecturer in international relations at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera the latest anti-settlement measures are “modest” and unlikely to have a significant impact on ambitions for Palestinian statehood.

“After three decades of breakneck settlement expansion, Palestinian territory is only being held together by its sinews,” said Mustafa. “If what remains is still territorially viable as a state, it is only barely so. Much more decisive action is needed to salvage the two-state solution and a durable lasting solution to the conflict.”

Settlements dividing Palestinian territory

More than 30 years after the Oslo Accords set out a negotiating process aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel has remained the foundation of international efforts to forge peace.

But since the Oslo process began in 1993, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank, including occupied East Jerusalem, has ballooned from about 260,000 to more than 700,000, according to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, posing a glaring roadblock to the plan.

The challenge is not just the raw number of settlers, but their geographic spread. Today, many Israeli settlements are embedded deep inside West Bank areas that would be needed for a contiguous Palestinian state, including near major Palestinian urban centres such as Nablus, Salfit and Hebron.

Israel’s recent E1 settlement plan, which would build thousands of illegal housing units between the Israeli settlement of Maale Adumim and East Jerusalem, is a case in point. The plan would effectively split the West Bank in two and fully sever it from East Jerusalem, which Palestinians seek as their future capital.

Experts have long said Israel will need to dismantle some of its West Bank settlements, as it did in the Gaza Strip in 2005, to make room for a cohesive Palestinian state. But many Israeli settlements, especially those closer to Israel’s pre-war 1967 borders, would likely need to be addressed through land swaps.

“A complete withdrawal from some of the deeply embedded settlements is highly unlikely,” so land swaps would be the only way to create some form of Palestinian “territorial integrity”, Andreas Krieg, associate professor at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

However, such an arrangement – under which Israeli settlements close to the pre-1967 borders would become part of Israel and some “northern Arab-Israeli communities would be integrated into a Palestinian state” – would be “highly controversial” and face blowback from multiple communities, said Krieg.

He argued that Israelis would be certain to oppose any forced withdrawal from West Bank settlements, while some “Arab-Israelis may not want to live within a Palestinian state”.

Palestinian citizens of Israel make up approximately 21 percent of Israel’s overall population but are treated as second- or third-class citizens at the institutional level. According to rights groups, several dozen Israeli laws actively discriminate against Palestinian citizens across a number of issues, including education and housing.

Israeli ‘consensus’ against Palestinian state

Beyond the physical obstacle created by settlements is the Israeli political landscape, in which the idea of a Palestinian state has become toxic.

The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be among the most hardline in Israel’s history on the issue. Netanyahu has emphatically ruled out the prospect of a Palestinian state, while his far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also oversees Israeli settlements in the West Bank, has celebrated blocking Palestinian statehood as a badge of honour.

The views of Netanyahu’s most influential domestic critics do not deviate much. His top rival in elections slated for October, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, has promised not to allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. And Naftali Bennett, a Netanyahu rival from the far right, fervently opposes Palestinian statehood.

As for the Israeli public, a June poll by the Council for a Secure America found that only 22 percent of Jewish Israelis favour a two-state solution, while 63 percent oppose it.

“The consensus within Israel, socially and politically, does not allow for any party to make any steps towards a Palestinian state,” said Krieg.

Meanwhile, Israel’s closest ally, the United States, is unlikely to apply significant pressure over Israel’s settlement policy so long as President Donald Trump remains in office for the next two and a half years, he added.

Krieg said a “best-case scenario” is for Israel’s next elected government to reverse some of the country’s recent settlement advances.

John Strawson, professor at the University of East London, said that any new Israeli government is “unlikely to support a Palestinian state”, but that a more moderate Israeli government may at least “stop the ethnic cleansing and other moves which are aimed at making that impossible”.

“Removing Netanyahu is the first step towards a two-state solution,” said Strawson.

Two states are the ‘only alternative to violence’

If the two-state model is still alive at all, it is largely due to pressure from the international community.

More than 150 countries, including the majority of European Union nations, have recognised Palestinian statehood. And several Arab states with whom Israel seeks better ties have indicated Palestinian statehood is a precondition for normalisation with Israel.

Krieg said Tuesday’s move by the UK and the 11 other mostly European nations is an “overdue step in the right direction”, but also “shows the laziness and lack of creativity on the part of the international community to actually think outside the box in terms of a two-state solution”.

Anders Persson, a political scientist specialising in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, said that while the settlement sanctions are concerning to Israel, other previous anti-settlement measures, such as 2013 EU restrictions on funds for Israeli entities operating in occupied Palestinian territory, “changed little on the ground”.

He said the latest sanctions may be “too late” and “too limited … to save the two-state solution”.

Strawson said that while a two-state solution may “seem optimistic”, it is the only alternative to “permanent war and violence”.

Yemen’s more than a decade-long civil war has flared up once again after the Houthi rebel group launched an offensive in several locations against Saudi Arabian-backed government forces. The conflict has already spilled over beyond the country’s borders with the Houthis launching an attack on southern Saudi Arabia, targeting oil facilities and wounding dozens of people this week.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a United Nations-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

So who is involved in this conflict? Here’s a look at the main actors:

The Houthis

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), are an armed group controlling most parts of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, and some of the western and northern areas close to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to international prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, forcing it to step down and causing a crippling humanitarian crisis.

The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The two warring sides have also repeatedly tried to hold peace talks.

Seen as part of a regional alliance known as the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, the Shia Zaidi group nevertheless has its own base, its own interests – and its own ambitions.

The Houthis have demonstrated their missile and drone capabilities during the Yemen war in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, targeting oil installations and vital infrastructure. They have also proven resilient, defying more than 10 years of bombing by the Saudi-led coalition, as well as US and British strikes in recent years.

The group has gained international prominence for its attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea since the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza in October 2023.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh entered the Yemen war when it led a military coalition against the Houthis in March 2015, seeking to restore the government of then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Back then, Saudi Arabia and Iran were at the peak of a regional competition, both deeply distrusting each other. An Iran-supported group expanding control at the kingdom’s southern border was unacceptable, hence the military action.

This was before a China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 marked the beginning of a more practical and less confrontational relationship.

Presidential Leadership Council

The PLC was established in 2022 when the former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, formally transferred his powers to the new eight-member body.

It represents the internationally recognised government of Yemen, with a mandate to manage the country’s political, security and military affairs, and to steer negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire. It is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the late president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Its membership is drawn from a mix of northern and southern politicians and military-linked leaders in a bid to unite major anti-Houthi forces under one roof.

The PLC is backed by Saudi Arabia and the alliance that Riyadh leads.

Islah party

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, better known as Islah, is a Sunni Islamist movement with historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a faction within the recognised PLC-led government but has long had an independent identity. Its major stronghold has long been Marib, the country’s sole gas-producing region with one of its largest oilfields.

National Resistance Forces

The National Resistance Forces is a government-aligned military faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The force has maintained ties to Saudi Arabia and, like the Islah party, is part of the PLC. It aims for a unified Yemen, positioning itself as a counterweight to both the Houthis and southern secessionists.

The United Kingdom has announced a ban on the import of all goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said in Parliament on Tuesday.

It comes in response to an intensifying wave of Israeli settler pogroms and settlement expansions in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The ban, set to come into effect within six to nine months, would target settlement exports such as dates, olive oil and agricultural products, with Miliband saying he did not believe “the British people want us supporting the occupation by accepting products from settlements in our shops”.

The International Court of Justice in July 2024 called Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory “unlawful”. Months later, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for an end to the Israeli occupation within a year.

Israel’s response was furious, as it announced four “counter-measures”, including banning 12 British MPs from entering Israel and closing the British consulate in Jerusalem.

After Miliband’s speech, 11 more countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, shared a joint statement supporting the so-called two-state solution and announcing their own intentions to impose restrictions on trade with illegal Israeli settlements.

Spain and Ireland had already announced their own national bans earlier this year, alongside the Netherlands and Belgium.

How much do these countries trade with Israel?

Aside from Canada and the UK, the rest of the countries considering or already banning settlement goods are European Union members.

The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for 31.7 percent of Israel’s total trade in goods in 2025 (43.3 billion euros, or $50.4bn), according to the European Commission. The EU supplied 33.1 percent of Israel’s imports (28 billion euros, or $32.6bn) and received 29.4 percent of Israel’s exports (15.3 billion euros or $17.8bn).

Israel is the EU’s 27th largest trade partner, with Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany being its biggest individual trade partners.

According to a 2026 report by Global Echo Litigation Center, a Palestinian rights legal advocacy group, roughly 5,900 shipments from Israel were headed to Europe, with more than 17 percent containing products originating from settlements.

While no specific figures for settlement trade alone are known, it is understood to be a tiny fraction of total EU-Israel trade, meaning the ban’s impact is much more symbolic than economic.

The table below shows each country’s total trade with Israel for the European countries that have banned, or are introducing bans on, illegal Israeli settlement goods.

The top five European trading partners with Israel either enforcing or set to introduce settlement bans are Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK, France and Spain.

Ireland

Ireland-Israel bilateral trade totalled $5.36bn in 2025. Ireland is Israel’s second-largest export market for goods after the United States, driven largely by tech, particularly semiconductors and integrated circuits.

The Netherlands

Netherlands-Israel bilateral trade totalled roughly $4.8bn in 2025. The Netherlands is also Israel’s largest single foreign investor, accounting for roughly two-thirds of all EU investment in the country.

United Kingdom

According to UN Comtrade, UK-Israel bilateral trade totalled $3.73bn in 2025. An Al Jazeera investigation found at least 17 companies linked to illegal Israeli settlements hold more than 2.1 billion pounds ($2.85bn) in UK public-sector contracts.

France

France-Israel bilateral trade totalled $3.62bn in 2025. A large part of France’s trade with Israel constitutes export licences for surveillance and military technologies.

Spain

Spain-Israel bilateral trade totalled $2.79bn in 2025. In September that year, Spain banned the import of goods from illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, as well as the trade of arms.

What are Israeli settlements?

Israeli settlements are Jewish-only communities built illegally on Palestinian land.

Settlements are illegal under international law as they violate the Fourth Geneva Convention, which bans an occupying power from transferring its population to the area it occupies.

Illegal Israeli settlements continue to grow, decades after the 1993 Oslo Accords, which established limited Palestinian self-rule and were meant to lead to a permanent peace settlement.

At the time, about 270,000 settlers lived across the occupied territory. Today, that figure has more than doubled to between 600,000 and 750,000 people, about 10 percent of Israel’s Jewish population, living across some 250 illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.