China

As the presidents of China and the US meet in South Korea, Zongyuan Zoe Liu at the Council on Foreign Relations says China may offer concessions on its rare earth minerals.

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ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE — President Trump described his face-to-face with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Thursday as a roaring success, saying he would cut tariffs on China, while Beijing had agreed to allow the export of rare earth elements and start buying American soybeans.

The president told reporters aboard Air Force One that the U.S. would lower tariffs implemented earlier this year as punishment on China for its selling of chemicals used to make fentanyl from 20% to 10%. That brings the total combined tariff rate on China down from 57% to 47%

“I guess on the scale from 0 to 10, with ten being the best, I would say the meeting was a 12,” Trump said. “I think it was a 12.”

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said China agreed to purchase 25 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans annually for the next three years, starting with 12 million metric tons from now to January. U.S. soybean exports to China, a huge market for them, had come to a standstill in the trade dispute.

“So you know, our great soybean farmers, who the Chinese used as political pawns, that’s off the table, and they should prosper in the years to come,” Bessent told Fox Business Network’s “Mornings with Maria.”

Trump said that he would go to China in April and Xi would come to the U.S. “some time after that.” The president said they also discussed the export of more advanced computer chips to China, saying that Nvidia would be in talks with Chinese officials.

Trump said he could sign a trade deal with China “pretty soon.”

Xi said Washington and Beijing would work to finalize their agreements to provide “peace of mind” to both countries and the rest of the world, according to a report on the meeting distributed by state media.

“Both sides should take the long-term perspective into account, focusing on the benefits of cooperation rather than falling into a vicious cycle of mutual retaliation,” he said.

Sources of tension remain

Despite Trump’s optimism after a 100-minute meeting with Xi in South Korea, there continues to be the potential for major tensions between the world’s two largest economies. Both nations are seeking dominant places in manufacturing, developing emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, and shaping world affairs like Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Trump’s aggressive use of tariffs since returning to the White House for a second term, combined with China’s retaliatory limits on exports of rare earth elements, gave the meeting newfound urgency. There is a mutual recognition that neither side wants to risk blowing up the world economy in ways that could jeopardize their own country’s fortunes.

When the two were seated at the start of the meeting, Xi read prepared remarks that stressed a willingness to work together despite differences.

“Given our different national conditions, we do not always see eye to eye with each other,” he said through a translator. “It is normal for the two leading economies of the world to have frictions now and then.”

There was a slight difference in translation as China’s Xinhua News Agency reported Xi as telling Trump that having some differences is inevitable.

Finding ways to lower the temperature

The leaders met in Busan, South Korea, a port city about 47 miles south from Gyeongju, the main venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

In the days leading up to the meeting, U.S. officials signaled that Trump did not intend to make good on a recent threat to impose an additional 100% import tax on Chinese goods, and China showed signs it was willing to relax its export controls on rare earths and also buy soybeans from America.

Officials from both countries met earlier this week in Kuala Lumpur to lay the groundwork for their leaders. Afterward, China’s top trade negotiator Li Chenggang said they had reached a “preliminary consensus,” a statement affirmed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent who said there was “ a very successful framework.”

Shortly before the meeting on Thursday, Trump posted on Truth Social that the meeting would be the “G2,” a recognition of America and China’s status as the world’s biggest economies. The Group of Seven and Group of 20 are other forums of industrialized nations.

But while those summits often happen at luxury spaces, this meeting took place in humbler surroundings: Trump and Xi met in a small gray building with a blue roof on a military base adjacent to Busan’s international airport.

The anticipated detente has given investors and businesses caught between the two nations a sense of relief. The U.S. stock market has climbed on the hopes of a trade framework coming out of the meeting.

Pressure points remain for both U.S. and China

Trump has outward confidence that the grounds for a deal are in place, but previous negotiations with China this year in Geneva, Switzerland and London had a start-stop quality to them. The initial promise of progress has repeatedly given way to both countries seeking a better position against the other.

“The proposed deal on the table fits the pattern we’ve seen all year: short-term stabilization dressed up as strategic progress,” said Craig Singleton, senior director of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “Both sides are managing volatility, calibrating just enough cooperation to avert crisis while the deeper rivalry endures.”

The U.S. and China have each shown they believe they have levers to pressure the other, and the past year has demonstrated that tentative steps forward can be short-lived.

For Trump, that pressure comes from tariffs.

China had faced new tariffs this year totaling 30%, of which 20% were tied to its role in fentanyl production. But the tariff rates have been volatile. In April, he announced plans to jack the rate on Chinese goods to 145%, only to abandon those plans as markets recoiled.

Then, on Oct. 10, Trump threatened a 100% import tax because of China’s rare earth restrictions. That figure, including past tariffs, would now be 47% “effective immediately,” Trump told reporters on Thursday.

Xi has his own chokehold on the world economy because China is the top producer and processor of the rare earth minerals needed to make fighter jets, robots, electric vehicles and other high-tech products.

China had tightened export restrictions on Oct. 9, repeating a cycle in which each nation jockeys for an edge only to back down after more trade talks.

What might also matter is what happens directly after their talks. Trump plans to return to Washington, while Xi plans to stay on in South Korea to meet with regional leaders during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, which officially begins on Friday.

“Xi sees an opportunity to position China as a reliable partner and bolster bilateral and multilateral relations with countries frustrated by the U.S. administration’s tariff policy,” said Jay Truesdale, a former State Department official who is CEO of TD International, a risk and intelligence advisory firm.

Boak, Megerian and Schiefelbein write for the Associated Press. Boak reported from Tokyo and Megerian reported from Busan, South Korea. Ken Moritsugu in Beijing and Seung Min Kim and Michelle Price in Washington contributed to this report.

Satellite imagery shows China has been building at least two facilities featuring hardened shelters with retractable roofs along its heavily disputed border with India. These look to be examples of a new pattern of air defense site, with the shelters allowing for surface-to-air missiles to be fired from transporter-erector-launchers situated within. The shelters, which offer added protection against various threats and create complexities for enemy forces, reflect larger trends when it comes to hardening of military infrastructure in China and elsewhere globally.

Geospatial intelligence firm AllSource Analysis was the first to call attention to the two sites in western China, which it assessed using satellite images from Planet Labs taken between August and September. Additional satellite imagery captured in September from Vantor (formerly Maxar Technologies), first obtained by India Today, offers further insights.

One of the sites is situated within Gar County, while the other is near the eastern end of Pangong Lake (also known as Pangong Tso). Both are located inside China’s Tibet Autonomous Region in relatively close proximity to the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC), which forms the current de facto border with India. Pangong Lake and other areas along the LAC have seen repeated confrontations between Chinese and Indian forces over the years that have sometimes escalated into violent skirmishes. In 2022, TWZ noted an already significant expansion of Chinese military infrastructure on that country’s side of the LAC following the conclusion of a particular serious flare-up in the border dispute that had first erupted two years earlier.

Static surface-to-air missile sites are present at bases across China, especially in border areas and along its coasts, all of which share common circular design patterns. The typical mode of operation at those facilities involves TELs moving out from garages to open positions when ordered.

The facilities in Gar County and near Pangong Lake, which are enclosed inside heavy perimeter walls, have distinctly different configurations from what is typically seen at Chinese air defense sites. Each one has four hardened shelters with retractable roofs, all with the same trapezoidal design. From what can be seen in additional satellite imagery from Vantor, the shelters look to have a reinforced concrete garage-like central section with angled additions, which may just be earthen berms, on three sides.

The Gar County facility also has what appears to be two radars in elevated positions, as well as channels linking them to the shelters and what looks to be the main command center. Communications cables could be laid in those channels.

Similar channels are visible at the facility near Pangong Lake, but there are no apparent radar positions currently. There are signs that construction is still ongoing at both locations to differing degrees.

The facilities in Gar County and along the shore of Pangong Lake also have an array of other structures that look to provide for munitions storage, vehicle maintenance, living spaces for personnel, command and control, and more. Each one also has a pair of basketball courts, a common feature at People’s Liberation Army (PLA) bases, large and small, across China.

Beyond the shelters, many of the other buildings at both locations, including the main command centers, look to have been built to extremely similar, if not identical patterns. This, in turn, points to the sites, which have different overall layouts, having the same core purpose.

As mentioned, the combination of the shelters, radar positions, and other features seen at the Gar Country site, in particular, points to an air defense mission for both facilities. AllSource Analysis assessed that the sites would be sufficient to support an HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile system. The HQ-9 is in widespread Chinese service today and is broadly analogous to later models of the Soviet-designed S-300P series. A typical complete HQ-9 system includes a number of 8×8 wheeled transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), each of which can be loaded with up to four interceptors at a time, and offboard search and fire control radars.

The HQ-9 TELs fire their missiles vertically, which aligns with shelters with retractable roofs. One of the Vantor satellite images of the Gar County site shows the roofs of two of the shelters retracted, revealing objects inside that are consistent with HQ-9 TELs in their deployed positions.

Other surface-to-air missile systems that launch their interceptors vertically could also potentially make use of the shelters. It is also possible that they could be used in combination with surface-to-surface missile systems, though this seems far less likely to be the intent with everything else that is visible at both sites.

First and foremost, the ability to fire anti-air interceptors from within hardened shelters offers additional protection for those assets, which could be particularly valuable for Chinese forces arrayed along the LAC with India. The facilities help extend the PLA’s anti-access and area denial bubbles deeper into Indian territory – India Today‘s report noted that there is an Indian air base on the opposite side of the LAC from where the site in Gar County is situated – but are also within range of Indian standoff strikes as a result. Their location also opens them up to the possibility of more direct and shorter-range attacks in the event of a major conflict, including ones involving armed drones or even ground raids. As mentioned, the facilities in Gar County and near Pangong Lake also have fortified perimeters.

The shelters also make it harder for enemy forces to readily determine what is inside, which could lead to opponents expanding valuable resources to destroy empty structures. They also simply provide a way to help shield assets and personnel from extremely low temperatures, harsh weather conditions, and other potentially problematic environmental factors commonly found in this part of the world.

It’s interesting to note here that this is not the first time that structures with retractable roofs that look intended, at least in part, to be used in combination with surface-to-air missile systems, and the HQ-9 specifically, have appeared at Chinese military bases.

In 2017, Reuters reported on the appearance of far less hardened structures with retractable roofs on China’s man-made island outposts in Subi, Mischief, and Fiery Cross reefs, all part of the hotly disputed Spratly Islands chain in the South China Sea. The suggestion, even then, was that those buildings were reflective of a broader trend in Chinese air defense sites.

United States President Donald Trump expects “a lot of problems” will be solved between Washington and Beijing when he meets China’s President Xi Jinping in South Korea for a high-stakes meeting on Thursday, amid growing trade tensions between the two.

Relations between the two world powers have been strained in recent years, with Washington and Beijing imposing tit-for-tat trade tariffs topping 100 percent against each other this year, the US restricting its exports of semiconductors vital for artificial intelligence (AI) development and Beijing restricting exports of critical rare-earth metals which are vital for the defence industry and also the development of AI, among other issues.

Officials from Washington and Beijing have been locked in trade talks since August to de-escalate trade tensions, and they also came up with a framework for a trade deal during meetings in Malaysia over the weekend.

On the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, on Wednesday, Trump said an expected trade deal between China and the US would be good for both countries and “something very exciting for everybody”.

But only a meeting between Trump and Xi can confirm if a trade deal is really in the making.

Expectations for the agreement are modest, with analysts expecting the two world powers to continue to clash over their myriad differences long-term.

When are the two leaders meeting?

Trump is scheduled to meet Xi on Thursday in the port city of Busan in southeastern South Korea. The meeting is expected to start at 11am local time (01:00 GMT).

It will be the first time the leaders have met in person since Trump returned to the White House in January.

The US president last met Xi in 2019, during Trump’s first term, on the sidelines of the Group of 20 (G20) summit in Osaka, Japan.

“I think we’re going to have a great meeting with President Xi of China, and a lot of problems are going to be solved,” Trump told journalists on Wednesday on Air Force One while en route to South Korea.

On Wednesday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the meeting between Xi and Trump in a statement and said the leaders “will exchange views on bilateral relations and issues of mutual interest”.

What will Trump and Xi talk about?

Discussions are likely to cover:

• Trade tariffs
• Trafficking of fentanyl, a drug responsible for tens of thousands of deaths in the US each year
• China’s export controls on critical rare-earth metals and its purchase of US soya beans
• US export controls on semiconductors
• Geopolitical and security issues, particularly Russia’s war in Ukraine and Washington’s position on Taiwan
• Port fees on Chinese ships docking in US ports
• Finalising a deal to buy TikTok, the social media platform, from its Chinese owners

Alejandro Reyes, adjunct professor at the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong, told Al Jazeera that at this meeting, both sides will want to steady an uneasy rivalry – but for different reasons.

“For Washington, the goal is to show that its tough line on China has delivered results. The Trump team is walking into this summit after signing trade pacts with Malaysia, Cambodia and Japan that link market access directly to national security cooperation. These deals require America’s partners to align with US export controls and supply-chain rules – essentially making ‘economic security’ a shared obligation,” he said.

“For Beijing, the priority is to project calm and endurance. The meeting comes just after the fourth plenum, which reaffirmed Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s authority and set the direction for the next five-year plan. China’s message is that it has weathered Western pressure and is back to focusing on growth and domestic stability,” he added.

But discussions on disputes over trade tariffs, critical rare-earth metals, AI technology and geopolitical strategies, the issues that most define the current relationship between the US and China, according to Reyes, are not going to be easy to resolve.

“The mistrust is structural now – it’s built into how both countries think about power and security,” he said.

What are the sticking points?

Fentanyl

A key issue for the Trump administration is stopping the illegal flow of drugs, particularly fentanyl – a powerful synthetic opiate which is 50 times more potent than heroin – from China to the US. In February, Trump slapped a 20 percent trade tariff on all imports from China, citing Beijing’s lack of effort in curbing the flow of the drug into the US.

In a media briefing note sent to Al Jazeera by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Bonnie Glaser, managing director of GMF’s Indo-Pacific programme, said the fentanyl trade has been “a really contentious issue between the US and China”.

“From what I have heard, a criminal money-laundering cooperation supports the fentanyl trade, and this is where China is willing to cooperate, in a way where it will have minimum negative impact on their domestic situation,” she said at a briefing held in Washington, DC, on Tuesday.

Late on Tuesday, The Wall Street Journal reported that during Thursday’s meeting, “China is expected to commit to more controls on the export of so-called precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl.” The newspaper added that if this agreement is reached, Trump would reduce the tariffs imposed because of fentanyl by as much as 10 percent.

Trade tariffs

Following the fentanyl-related tariffs, in March, China imposed a 15 percent tariff on a range of US farm exports in retaliation, triggering a tit-for-tat tariff war.

In April, Trump raised tariffs on Chinese imports to 145 percent, prompting China to hit back with 125 percent tariffs of its own.

Washington and Beijing later cut tariffs to 30 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in May, and agreed to a 90-day truce in August for trade talks. The truce has been extended twice, but despite repeated talks, a trade agreement has not been reached.

Rare-earth metals and soya beans

China has restricted exports of 12 critical rare-earth metals this year, as well as of the machinery needed to refine these metals, citing security reasons. Beijing also said its restrictions were in response to US restrictions on the Chinese maritime, logistics and shipbuilding industries.

The first seven metals to be restricted were announced in April, while the remaining five were announced on October 10. These metals are crucial for the defence industry and for developing AI technology.

In October, Trump responded by threatening to impose 100 percent tariffs on China from November 1, citing Beijing’s strict export controls on critical rare earths as the reason for the tariffs.

Trump added that the US would also impose export controls on “any and all critical software”.

Reyes noted that while the US wants guaranteed access to rare earths and battery materials, it signed a new agreement with Japan and trade clauses with Malaysia this week, which aim to reduce the US dependence on China for these. “Beijing sees this as an effort to contain its influence,” he said.

Meanwhile, US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent told many US media outlets this week that he expected China to defer its restrictions on rare earths and that Trump’s 100 percent tariff threat was “effectively off the table”.

Bessent added that the Chinese side would agree to increase purchases of US-grown soya beans.

Dylan Loh, associate professor in public policy and global affairs at Nanyang Technological University, said he anticipates some positive movement on solving these trade disputes but does not believe the fundamental economic tension between the US and China will be resolved at the meeting.

“The competition and mistrust go beyond simply economics,” he told Al Jazeera. “But the problems can be managed and must be managed well. It requires political capital and the ability to move beyond zero-sum thinking.”

Technology and TikTok

In September, Trump signed an executive order to transfer TikTok’s US assets to US investors, citing national security reasons. On Sunday, Bessent told US broadcaster CBS that the US and China had “reached a final deal on TikTok”, which will be finalised at the Trump-Xi meeting.

But, Reyes said, “the deal cools one dispute but doesn’t end the fight over chips, AI and digital control”.

In October, Washington blacklisted hundreds of Chinese tech firms, claiming they posed a risk to national security. The US has also restricted companies such as Nvidia from exporting advanced chips, important to manufacture key equipment used for the development of AI, to China, claiming that Beijing would use it to advance its global power.

Beijing has been irked by Washington’s restrictions and has launched antitrust investigations into Nvidia and Qualcomm, and has also increased its export controls on rare-earth elements.

Speaking to reporters on board Air Force One en route to South Korea on Wednesday, Trump said he might speak to Xi about Nvidia chips.

“I think we may be talking about that with President Xi,” Trump said.

Geopolitical Issues

According to analysts, Trump is eager to use this meeting with Xi to discuss ways to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Beijing, a close ally of Moscow, has said a prolonged war in Ukraine “serves no one’s interest”. But, in July, according to a report by The South China Morning Post, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the European Union that it can’t afford to have Russia lose the war in Ukraine since the US would then turn its attention to China.

Trump has threatened to slap sanctions and tariffs on countries that buy Moscow’s crude oil in efforts to end the war. It has already imposed an additional 25 percent tariff – bringing the total to 50 percent – on India as a punishment for purchasing Russian oil.

But the US has not yet taken this step with China, which imports about 1.4 million barrels of Russian oil per day by sea.

According to a Reuters report, however, after the US sanctioned two of Moscow’s largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, in October, Chinese national oil companies like PetroChina and Sinopec have said they will refrain from importing seaborne Russian oil for the short term.

“Trump wants a ceasefire and a peace deal in Ukraine. Putin has been unwilling to play ball, and Trump, I think, intends to raise this with Xi Jinping, possibly ask him if he can reach out to Putin and encourage him to come to the negotiating table,” Glaser said.

“We know so far, Xi Jinping has been very, very cautious about getting involved. I think he will be reluctant to pressure Putin to do,” she added.

Besides Ukraine, Beijing will be eager to discuss the US position on Taiwan, according to Glaser.

“Xi Jinping will raise concerns about what Beijing views as the pro-independence policies of Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, and I think he will want clarification of the US stance and may well press Trump to say that the US opposes Taiwan independence and supports China’s unification,” she said.

“The bottom line is that Trump is not likely to abandon Taiwan because doing so could lead to a PRC [People’s Republic of China] decision to use force, and Trump wants to take credit for ending wars, not starting them,” Glaser added.

Trump, however, told journalists on board Air Force One on Wednesday that he was “not sure” he would discuss Taiwan.

How strong are their negotiating positions?

The balance of power in the respective negotiating positions of China and the US has shifted in the recent past.

Former US President Joe Biden restricted exports of US semiconductors, which are crucial for the development of AI, much to China’s annoyance. Then, early this year, Trump compounded this with 145 percent tariffs on Chinese goods.

China retaliated with 125 percent tariffs on US goods, escalating a trade war, until the two sides agreed in May to pause tariffs to allow for trade talks.

But that was not before China placed export restrictions on seven rare-earth metals in April. In October, China restricted exports of five more rare-earth metals, and Trump threatened 100 percent tariffs again in retaliation.

This week, seeking to diversify trade and its supply chains, China strengthened a trade deal with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). But the US also drew up new trade agreements with Japan, Malaysia and Cambodia. On Wednesday, South Korea announced that it too had reached a trade agreement with the US, and was lowering tariffs on imported US goods.

According to Loh, it is unclear who has the upper hand right now between the US and China.

“While the signing of the FTA [with ASEAN] has certainly enhanced China’s position and influence and is indeed quite significant for ASEAN and China, it does not necessarily have a direct bearing on US-China itself,” Loh said.

“US retains considerable political and economic influence in this part of the world still, as evinced by Trump’s trip here,” he added.

According to Reyes, each side has different kinds of leverage.

“The United States has built a new network of allies who have literally signed on to Washington’s playbook,” he said, referring to the deal Washington signed with Malaysia, which obliges Kuala Lumpur to match US trade restrictions. Malaysia has clarified that this deal would only apply to matters of shared concern.

But Reyes said such a deal “gives Trump’s team political and legal momentum going into the China meeting”.

“China, though, has the economic stamina. It still anchors global manufacturing, dominates critical-mineral processing, and has proven that tariffs couldn’t break its model. China used the trade war to build muscles, resistance and resilience – it learned to do everything faster, cheaper and at scale,” he said.

“So the US has the ‘louder’ hand; China has the steadier one. Washington can escalate, but Beijing can outlast,” Reyes added.

So what is likely to come out of these talks?

The stakes are high with Trump announcing that he anticipates a “great” meeting. But expectations of any “great” outcome are low.

Reyes said he expects a truce in their strained ties with photo opportunities rather than any grand bargain.

“Expect both sides to announce small wins: a delay on tariffs, a joint statement on trade stability, maybe a working group on critical minerals cooperation,” he said.

“This summit won’t end the rivalry – it simply marks a new phase: the US building alliances through treaties, and China doing much the same, while consolidating power through endurance building. This meeting isn’t about ending the rivalry – it’s about learning to live with it,” he said.

Tensions between China and the US have escalated amid Donald Trump’s tariff threats and new restrictions on exports.

Since coming back to the White House earlier this year, President Donald Trump has made rare earth minerals one of his top priorities.

He’s focused on securing enough supply for the United States economy.

In March, Trump went as far as signing an executive order, where he invoked wartime powers to increase the production of rare earths.

And this week, he signed several agreements with a number of Asian countries, in the hopes of gaining access to the minerals.

This is all to counter China’s global dominance in this sector and Beijing’s recent restrictions on rare earth exports.

So, why are these minerals so crucial for the US economy? And can Trump break China’s monopoly?

Presenter: Bernard Smith

Guests:

Brian Wong – Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong.

Gracelin Baskaran – Mining Economist and Director of the Critical Minerals Security program at Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Huiyao Wang – President and Founder of Center for China and Globalization.

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army says it will pull out of the ruby-mining town of Mogok and nearby Momeik.

An armed rebel group in Myanmar says it has reached a truce with the military-run government to stop months of heavy clashes in the country’s north.

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced on Tuesday that it had signed an agreement with Myanmar’s government following several days of China-mediated talks in Kunming, roughly 400km (248 miles) from the Myanmar border.

Under the deal, the TNLA said it would withdraw from Mogok, the ruby-mining centre in the upper Mandalay region, and the neighbouring town of Momeik in northern part of Shan state, though it did not provide a timeline. Both rebel forces and government troops will “stop advancing” starting Wednesday, it added.

The group also said the military, which has not yet commented on the agreement, has agreed to halt air strikes.

The TNLA is part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which also includes the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Arakan Army. They have been fighting for decades for greater autonomy from Myanmar’s central government and are loosely allied with the pro-democracy resistance groups that emerged after the army deposed the elected government and seized power in February 2021.

Since October 2023, the alliance has captured and controlled significant swaths of northeastern Myanmar and western Myanmar. The TNLA alone seized 12 towns in an offensive.

Their advance slowed following a series of China-brokered ceasefires earlier this year, allowing the army to retake major cities, including Lashio city in April and Nawnghkio in July, as well as Kyaukme and Hsipaw in October.

China is a central power broker in the civil war in Myanmar, where it has major geopolitical and economic interests.

Beijing has more openly backed the military government this year as it battles to shore up territory before an election slated for December, which it hopes will stabilise and help legitimise its rule.

However, the polls are expected to be blocked in large rebel-held areas, and many international observers have dismissed them as a tactic to mask continuing military rule.

Kyiv, Ukraine – Both Russia and Ukraine depend on Chinese-made components for drones, jamming systems and the fibre optic cable attached to the drones to make them immune to jamming.

If Beijing wanted to end the Russia-Ukraine war, it could do so promptly and singlehandedly by banning the imports, according to one of the pioneers of drone warfare in Ukraine.

“Almost each component is made in China,” Andrey Pronin, who runs a drone school in Kyiv, told Al Jazeera. “China could cut off their side – or ours.”

Beijing supplies Moscow with four-fifths of drones, electronic chips and other dual-purpose goods that end up on the front line, keeping the Russian war machine rolling, according to Ukrainian intelligence.

Ukraine is trying to wean off its reliance on Chinese drones amid Beijing’s restriction of exports, but they still account for a staggering 97 percent of components, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank in Washington, DC.

United States President Donald Trump hopes that Thursday’s summit with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping can change that.

“I’d like China to help us out with Russia,” Trump said on October 24, two days after cancelling his talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and slapping sanctions on two Russian oil companies.

Trump is scheduled to meet with Xi in South Korea’s Seoul on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. Their last meeting was held in 2019, in Japan’s Osaka.

Zelenskyy hopes meeting will ‘help us all’

Beijing, which has claimed it is officially neutral regarding the war, denies direct involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. But it plays a role as Moscow’s main political and economic backer.

As Beijing seeks to “return” Taiwan to its fold, Moscow is understood by observers to be sharing with the Chinese military information on the use of drones, the vulnerabilities of Western-supplied weaponry and the management of airborne troops.

Meanwhile, amid mounting Western sanctions, Beijing is buying discounted oil, gas and raw materials, paying Moscow tens of billions of dollars a year.

That is the weak spot Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wants Trump to target in talks with Xi.

If Trump manages to “find an understanding with China about the reduction of Russian energy exports”, he said on Monday, “I think it’ll help us all.”

But Trump’s latest Russia sanctions slapped on state-owned oil giant Rosneft and the private Lukoil company could inadvertently strengthen Beijing.

Both companies will be forced to sell their foreign subsidiaries and diminish their role in international projects – namely, in ex-Soviet Central Asia and several African nations, where their place may be taken by Chinese companies.

According to Volodymyr Fesenko, head of the Kyiv-based Penta think tank, Xi’s role in ending the war is pivotal.

“Without the financial support, without the economic cooperation with China, Russia can’t continue the war,” he said. “China is Russia’s main economic resource.

“Had [Beijing] wanted to end this war, it would have achieved it very fast,” he added. “China’s harsh position in closed-door, non-public talks with Putin would be enough.”

However, Beijing has “no inclination or interest in making a gift to Trump”, said Fesenko.

During his first presidency, ties with Beijing spiralled as the White House sought to curb China’s growing global clout and its access to Western technologies.

China and the US have introduced tariffs on mutual exports as Beijing threatened to cut off the trade in critical minerals, and Washington promised to curb the transfer of technologies. The Russia-Ukraine war is unlikely to dominate the summit, as Trump and Xi have bigger fish to fry as their nations now face a trade war.

‘Freezing the war’

At the same time, Beijing has been boosting its economic clout in Eastern Europe, Moscow’s former stomping ground, investing heavily in new infrastructure.

“The escalation of the war, its spread to Europe, is something that contradicts China’s interests,” Fesenko said.

However, Washington and Beijing may want to keep the war simmering or frozen without letting Moscow or Kyiv win a decisive victory, argued Kyiv-based analyst Igar Tyshkevych.

Washington is not going to benefit from Russia’s “overwhelming victory” as the Kremlin will undoubtedly seek the role of a “third global leader”, he said.

But neither Beijing or Washington could benefit from Russia’s full defeat, as China is concerned by destabilisation near its northern and northwestern borders.

“Washington is active about freezing the war,” Tyshkevych said. “I won’t be surprised if Beijing will be active in the same direction.”

If frozen, there are fears that the war could reignite when Russia recovers economically and accumulates enough resources.

To avoid that, Kyiv would look to building new or strengthening existing partnerships, especially with the European Union and its individual members, as well as countries such as Turkiye and Pakistan that both have cordial ties with Beijing.

And Putin still has plenty of incentives to offer to Trump.

There is a reported proposal to create infrastructure for the Arctic sea route that will shorten the delivery of goods from Asia to Europe by weeks.

Moscow also considered a joint project to sell Russian natural gas to Europe, develop oil and gas fields in Russia’s Far East, and supply rare earths that are crucial for US tech giants.

In a post-war environment, Putin may also propose Russia’s expertise in processing spent nuclear fuel from US power stations – and come up with nuclear security deals, including non-proliferation.

Non-proliferation “is the only field where Russia is ‘equal’ to the United States,” Tyshkevych said.

WASHINGTON — President Trump faces the most important international meeting of his second term so far on Thursday: face-to-face negotiations with Xi Jinping, who has made China a formidable economic and military challenger to the United States.

The two presidents face a vast agenda during their meeting in Seoul, beginning with the two countries’ escalating trade war over tariffs and high-tech exports. The list also includes U.S. demands for a Chinese crackdown on fentanyl, China’s aid to Russia in its war with Ukraine, the future of Taiwan and China’s growing nuclear arsenal.

Trump has already promised, characteristically, that the meeting will be a major success.

“It’s going to be fantastic for both countries, and it’s going to be fantastic for the entire world,” he said last week.

But it isn’t yet clear that the summit’s concrete results will measure up to that high standard.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Sunday that the two sides have agreed to a “framework” under which China would delay implementing tight controls on rare earth elements, minerals crucial for the production of high-tech products from smartphones and electric vehicles to military aircraft and missiles. He said China has also agreed to resume buying soybeans from U.S. farmers and to crack down on fentanyl components.

In return, Bessent said, the United States will back down from its stinging tariffs on Chinese goods.

Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador in Beijing under then-President Biden, said that kind of deal would amount to “an uneasy trade truce rather than a comprehensive trade deal.”

“That may be the best we can expect,” he said in an interview Monday. Still, he added, “it will be a positive step to stabilize world markets and allow the continuation of U.S.-China trade for the time being.”

But U.S. and Chinese officials have been close-mouthed on what, if anything, has been agreed on regarding Xi’s other big trade demand: easier U.S. restrictions on high-tech exports to China, especially advanced semiconductor chips used for artificial intelligence.

Burns said the two superpowers’ technology competition is “the most sensitive … in terms of where this relationship will head, which country will emerge more powerful.”

Giving China easy access to advanced semiconductors “would only help [the Chinese army] in its competition with the U.S. military for power in the Indo-Pacific,” he warned.

Other former officials and China hawks outside the administration have said, even more pointedly, that they worry that Trump may be too willing to trade long-term technology assets for short-term trade deals.

In August, Trump eased export controls to allow Nvidia, the world leader in AI chips, to sell more semiconductors to China — in an unusual deal under which the U.S. company would pay 15% of its revenue from the sales to the U.S. Treasury.

Matthew Pottinger, Trump’s top China advisor in his first term, protested in a recent podcast interview that the deal risked trading a strategic technology advantage “for $20 billion and Nvidia’s bottom line.”

Underlying the controversy over technology, some China watchers warn, is a basic mismatch between the two presidents: Trump is focused almost entirely on trade and commercial deals, while Xi is focused on displacing the United States as the biggest economic and military power in Asia.

“I don’t think the administration has a strategy toward China,” said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “It has a trade strategy, not a China strategy.”

“The administration does not seem to be focused on competition with China,” said Jonathan Czin, a former CIA analyst now at Washington’s Brookings Institution. “It’s focused on deal making. … It’s tactics without strategy.”

“We’ve fallen into a kind of trade and technology myopia,” he added. “We’re not talking about issues like China’s coercion [of smaller countries] in the South China Sea. … China doesn’t want to have that bigger, broader conversation.”

It isn’t clear that Trump and Xi will have either the time or inclination to talk in detail about anything other than trade.

And even on the front-burner economic issues, this week’s ceasefire is unlikely to produce a permanent peace.

“As with all such agreements, the devil will be in the details,” Burns, the former ambassador, said. “The two countries will remain fierce trade rivals. Expect friction ahead and further trade duels well into 2026.”

“Buckle up,” Czin said. “There are likely more sudden moves from Beijing ahead.”

In the long run, Trump’s legacy in U.S.-China relations will rest not only on trade deals but on the larger competition for economic and military power in the Pacific Rim. No matter how this week’s meetings go, those challenges still lie ahead.

The world is closely watching the potential meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping, which could take place at the APEC summit at the end of October, as well as the formal state visit in January of next year. Undoubtedly, the top priority for both the U.S. and China is to ease tensions, with Washington even more eager than Beijing to achieve a “truce.” This is because Beijing imposed large-scale countermeasures against Washington in October, in retaliation for the various sanctions the U.S. has levied on China since August. China’s countermeasures caught the U.S. off guard and left it struggling to respond.

China’s strict restrictions on rare earth exports have shocked the West, particularly the automotive and semiconductor industries. On the other hand, China’s halt to soybean purchases from the U.S. has frustrated Trump’s most loyal supporters. Washington’s initial reaction was one of anger, with threats of retaliation, but within days, its tone softened. This signals that Beijing has struck at the opponent’s sore spot, while Washington lacks effective tools to fight back.

“You have no cards to play.” Trump’s famous rebuke to Zelenskyy has gone global and will undoubtedly go down in history. Embarrassingly, Trump now finds himself in a similar predicament with Beijing: nearly “out of cards.” To demonstrate that he still has some in hand, Trump has finally pulled Taiwan out of his pocket.

On October 20, in an interview with Bloomberg, Trump listed Taiwan as one of the four top priorities in U.S.-China negotiations—alongside rare earths, soybeans, and fentanyl—and stated, “We’ll get along very well with China.”

According to a report in The Guardian, Trump explicitly said that China “doesn’t want” to invade Taiwan and predicted that “nothing will happen.” He described Taiwan as “an apple in China’s eyes,” emphasizing that “America is the strongest military power in the world by far” and “no one dares to mess with us.” In a buddying tone, he added, “I love my relationship with President Xi. We have a great relationship, and that on the Taiwan issue, “we’ll get along very well.”

In the following days, Trump repeatedly made similar statements in the media. However, on October 26, during an interview aboard his plane en route to Asia, he refused to discuss the Taiwan issue and warned that if China invades Taiwan, “it would be very dangerous for China.”

Trump’s rhetoric follows a very simple logic, as is well known: he fabricates bargaining chips out of thin air, uses soft language to lure the opponent to the negotiating table, then employs tough rhetoric to hint at his confidence in making the opponent yield, while refusing to reveal his hand in advance.

In mid-October, the RAND Corporation—a think tank closely tied to the U.S. military—released a report titled Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry, urging Washington to abandon zero-sum thinking and instead adopt a “step-back” approach to stabilize U.S.-China relations and avoid military conflict. On the Taiwan front, the report suggests that the U.S. should encourage Taiwan and China to create shared interests and emotional bonds that gradually lay the groundwork for reunification. This proposal has been interpreted in Taiwan as “gradual unification,” drawing widespread attention and viewed as a signal of the U.S. abandoning Taiwan.

However, rather than “the U.S. abandoning Taiwan,” the RAND report is more accurately a “delaying tactic,” aiming to prolong the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through a “step-back” strategy, thereby securing U.S. strategic interests in the First Island Chain for the next 5-10 years.

The realist tone of the RAND report is becoming the mainstream view in the U.S. For instance, Time magazine recently published an article that enraged Taiwan’s ruling party: The U.S. Must Beware of Taiwan’s Reckless Leader. The piece argues that Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s reckless emphasis on Taiwan’s sovereignty is dragging the U.S. into the risk of military conflict with China. Furthermore, it stresses that Taiwan is a core interest for China but merely a non-treaty ally for the U.S.— America has no reason to get embroiled in war for Taiwan’s sake and should instead invest resources in treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

In other words, the restraint-oriented thinking in the U.S. that advocates “focusing on the big picture” is gradually gaining the upper hand. Such arguments often come from individuals and organizations familiar with U.S. military capabilities. Simply put, this rhetoric merely underscores a fact: the U.S. military has low odds of winning a war against China, and it’s not worth risking for a non-treaty ally.

Of course, hawkish thinking in the U.S. remains resilient. In contrast to the restrainers, hawks believe that losing Taiwan would severely damage U.S. credibility in East Asia, and from a long-term perspective, the U.S. would suffer more harm than good, thus stressing that “Taiwan is not for sale” and advocating continuing arms sales to Taiwan, even shifting from “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic clarity” policy.

But we know Trump doesn’t think that far ahead. Before he leaves office, Taiwan must be “cashed in” to feed this narcissist’s ego. In other words, the one inevitably waving the “Taiwan is for sale” sign is Trump.

In fact, for the West, Taiwan is rapidly depreciating because its most valuable asset—the semiconductor industry—is being hollowed out by the U.S. Taiwan’s vice president recently admitted that not only TSMC but also the ruling party has decided to replicate an identical semiconductor supply chain cluster in the U.S.

Taiwan’s authorities explain this investment plan as “avoiding over-reliance on the single Chinese market,” but those familiar with the semiconductor industry know that Taiwan has always relied on the U.S. market, not China—especially for high-end chips. Relocating the industry to the U.S. will only increase corporate costs, raise chip prices, and introduce even more unpredictable risks.

Rare earths are one such unpredictable risk. Semiconductor manufacturing requires rare earths, albeit in small proportions, but without them, chips cannot be produced. If Beijing wants to keep the semiconductor industry in Taiwan, it could completely ban rare earth exports to the U.S. while continuing normal supplies to Taiwan. Even if the U.S. tries to use Taiwan as a rare earth transshipment hub, that’s impossible, as China’s export controls can precisely calculate buyers’ demand volumes, eliminating any transshipment possibilities.

A more fundamental approach would be to ban rare earth exports to both Taiwan and the U.S., driving Taiwan’s value to rock bottom and preventing Trump from demanding too high a price.

In line with Trump’s style, consolidating proxies across the First Island Chain to form a military deterrence against China is undoubtedly another chip in his hand, but this card no longer works on China. Throughout this year, Beijing has repeatedly flexed its military muscles to signal to the U.S. that China cannot be contained. The U.S. military’s front line has effectively retreated to Guam, and Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea all know that the U.S. is pulling back. Without their backer, they dare not confront China.

The key point is that China understands the U.S.’s strategic goal is to stabilize U.S.-China relations, not to break ties. Therefore, only by doubling down on countermeasures against the U.S. can China achieve a stable state of “competition without rupture,” and facts have proven that a hardline strategy leads to a “TACO” outcome. Beijing has no reason or room to concede, especially on the Taiwan issue.

China is testing various tools to offset Western sanctions, leaving the entire West shrouded in fear and anger over rare earth cutoffs, yet powerless to retaliate. This proves that countermeasures to fully offset Western sanctions are nearly complete. If there’s any vulnerability, it’s the financial defense line, which is not yet fully prepared. This explains why China is actively promoting the internationalization of the renminbi and continuing to reduce its holdings of U.S. debt.

On the other hand, Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), replaced its party chairman in October with someone determined to change its U.S. policy. Due to the ruling party’s declining popularity, the KMT is poised to win majority voter support in next year’s elections and those in 2028. The new chairman opposes U.S. directives—demanding that Taiwan raise defense spending to 5% of GDP—and extends a peace olive branch to Beijing, potentially leading to dramatic changes in Taiwan-U.S. relations, a development unfavorable to Washington.

Admittedly, the KMT’s new chairman may neither be able nor willing to convince the Taiwanese people to unify with mainland China, but she could reverse the status quo where Taiwan’s major parties are all pro-U.S. Her support from over half the party members stems from two public opinion bases: first, acknowledging oneself as Chinese; second, opposing the U.S. hollowing out Taiwan. According to polls, 4 million KMT supporters accept Chinese identity, and over half (more than 9 million) of all voters, regardless of party, oppose the U.S. hollowing out Taiwan.

While Taiwanese public opinion is divided, most Taiwanese people oppose the Trump administration’s plundering of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and also oppose war across the strait—this is the main reason for the ruling party’s sagging approval ratings.

A “distrust of America” sentiment pervades Taiwanese society, along with dissatisfaction toward the anti-China president, prompting Beijing to establish “Taiwan Restoration Day” (October 25) to evoke Taiwanese people’s historical memory of China’s recovery of Taiwan after World War II. This aims to maximize nationalism to offset separatism and reduce Taiwanese resistance to unification. At the same time, Beijing uses this move to send a clear signal to the U.S. and neighboring countries: China is determined to resolve the Taiwan issue and is working to remove all obstacles.

Beijing now holds a strong hand; even the U.S.’s “Taiwan card” has become a card China can counter with. In line with Xi Jinping’s decision-making style, he will concede when unprepared, but once fully ready, he will strike suddenly, catching the opponent off guard.

Trump should be very aware that his current position is precarious, making it hard to reverse Beijing’s advantageous stance. Even the “chip card” is no longer effective. Thus, aside from selling Taiwan, he has no other good options—and this is the situation most feared by Taiwan’s elites: the window for “maintaining the status quo” is closing.

However, the sentiments of Taiwan’s elites are also shifting with the situation. Due to the KMT’s policy pivot, more and more Taiwanese elites may pragmatically reassess Taiwan’s future in the coming years, as KMT supporters lead the way, turning back to demand that elites devise countermeasures to change cross-strait relations and foster peace.

When U.S. hawks emphasize “Taiwan is not for sale,” it ironically highlights America’s intent to sell Taiwan. Yet, if this can lead to a peaceful resolution, the trend should be welcomed rather than doubted. After all, there are no winners in war, and those sacrificed are often innocent civilians.

Taiwan is for sale—the buyer is only one. The fear is that Trump might overprice it, backfiring and once again squandering his chance at a Nobel Peace Prize.

China and 11-member regional bloc sign an upgraded version of their free trade pact, as both weather the impact of the US tariffs.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia – China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have upgraded their free trade agreement as trade between the two regions continues to rise in the shadow of United States President Donald Trump’s trade war.

The trade pact was signed on the sidelines of the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur on Tuesday, in a ceremony witnessed by Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.

The “3.0 version” of the deal will broaden collaboration on “infrastructure, digital and green transition, trade facilitation and people-to-people exchanges”, according to China’s State Council. It builds on the region’s first free trade pact with China, which came into force in 2010.

The 11-member ASEAN and China have become each other’s largest trade partners in recent years, thanks to the China Plus One supply chain that emerged after Trump’s trade war with China in 2018.

Trade between China and ASEAN has already hit $785bn in the nine months of 2025, up 9.6 percent year-on-year. Much of this trade reflects integrated manufacturing supply chains, but it also increasingly includes finished goods from China that are destined for Southeast Asian consumers.

In his remarks to the ASEAN summit on Tuesday, Li praised China and the bloc’s deepening trade relationship, and spoke of his expectation for “expanded and higher-quality economic cooperation” under the upgraded trade pact.

“Cooperation in various fields has yielded fruitful results, trade volume continues to grow steadily, and ASEAN governments have promoted even closer people-to-people exchanges,” he said.

Zhiwu Chen, a professor of finance at the University of Hong Kong, told Al Jazeera that the “3.0” trade pact comes at a time when China is trying to shore up its relationship with ASEAN.

“This is very important for China, as its trade tensions with the US and EU have been rising, and China needs ASEAN countries. At the same time, this is a time for ASEAN to take advantage of the window of opportunities precisely for the same reason,” he said, describing the deal as a “win-win outcome for both sides”.

In his remarks, Li also took aim at Trump’s tariffs, which have disrupted global trade, and marked the most protectionist policy pursued by the US government since the 1930s.

“Unilateralism and protectionism have seriously disrupted the global economic and trade order. External forces are increasingly interfering in our region, and many countries have been unfairly subjected to high tariffs,” Li said.

The US president also attended the ASEAN summit on Sunday, and is due to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea later this week.

While at ASEAN, Trump signed trade deals with Cambodia and Malaysia, as well as framework agreements with Thailand and Vietnam, highlighting his preference for bilateral trade deals hammered out in one-on-one discussions.

The deals appeared to finalise Trump’s “reciprocal tariff” rate on the four countries, which were set earlier this year at 19 to 20 percent.

Tariffs and trade barriers are also expected to headline Trump’s meeting with Xi, after US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent announced that the two sides had reached a “framework agreement” on tariffs this week.

Earlier this month, Trump had threatened to impose a tariff of 100 percent on Chinese goods by November 1, after China strengthened export controls on rare earth minerals. Bessent said the framework agreement should help both sides “avoid” a tariff hike, according to Reuters.

TOKYO — President Trump opened his visit to Japan on Monday with greetings from the emperor a day before he meets new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who is banking on building a friendly personal relationship with the U.S. leader to ease trade tensions.

One key to this strategy might lie in an idea floated by Japan’s government to buy a fleet of Ford F-150 trucks, a meaningful gesture that may also be impractical given the narrow streets in Tokyo and other Japanese cities.

It’s an early diplomatic test for Takaichi, the first woman to lead Japan. She took office only last week, and has a tenuous coalition backing her.

Trump instantly bought into the idea of Ford trucks as he flew to Asia aboard Air Force One.

“She has good taste,” Trump told reporters. “That’s a hot truck.”

Japanese Emperor Naruhito welcomed Trump at the Imperial Palace after the president’s arrival, and the two spoke for about 30 minutes. Trump straightened his jacket as he stood next to Naruhito for photos before the two sat across a round table, with flowers in the middle, for their talks.

“A great man!” he said twice while pointing to the emperor. Trump last saw the emperor in 2019, soon after Naruhito ascended the Chrysanthemum Throne, becoming the first foreign dignitary invited to the palace.

Trump and Takaichi spoke over the phone while the president was mid-flight on Saturday. Takaichi stressed her status as a protege of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a favorite of Trump’s from his first term, and said she praised him for brokering the Gaza ceasefire that led to the return of hostages held by Hamas.

“I thought [Trump] is a very cheerful and fun person,” she said. “He well recognizes me and said he remembers me as a politician whom [former] Prime Minister Abe really cared about,” she said. “And I told the president that I extremely look forward to welcoming him in Tokyo.”

Trump spent Sunday in Malaysia, where he participated in a regional summit, and departed Monday morning for Japan. While on Air Force One on Monday, he said he planned to talk in Tokyo about the “great friendship” between the U.S. and Japan.

Resetting the trade relationship

Beneath the hospitality is the search for a strategy to navigate the increasingly complex trade relationship that Trump shook up earlier this year with tariffs.

Trump wants allies to buy more American goods and also make financial commitments to build factories and energy infrastructure in the U.S.

The meetings in Japan come before Trump’s sit-down with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Thursday in South Korea.

Both the U.S. and Japan have sought to limit China’s manufacturing ambitions, as the emergence of Chinese electric vehicles, artificial intelligence and advanced computer chips could undermine the American and Japanese economies.

“In light of the planned meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping shortly afterward, Trump may also be considering how he might strengthen his hand by demonstrating the robustness of the U.S.-Japan relationship,” said Kristi Govella, Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

Japan’s previous administration agreed in September to invest $550 billion in the U.S., which led Trump to trim a threatened 25% tariff on Japanese goods to 15%. But Japan wants the investments to favor Japanese vendors and contractors.

Japan’s economy and trade minister, Ryosei Akazawa, has said his ministry is compiling a list of projects in computer chips and energy to try to meet the investment target.

“As far as I know, I’m hearing that there are a number of Japanese companies that are showing interest,” he told reporters Friday, though he did not give further details.

Ford trucks in Tokyo would be a powerful symbol

Japanese officials are looking at the possibility of buying more American soybeans, liquefied natural gas and autos. The U.S.-China trade conflict has shut American soybeans out of the Chinese market, leading China to seek more Brazilian supply. China reported no U.S. soybean imports in September, a first since November 2018.

For Trump, the prospect of Ford trucks in the skyscrapered streets of Tokyo would be a win. The administration has long complained that American vehicles were being shut out of a market that is the home of Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Isuzu, Mitsubishi and Subaru. In a September interview on CNBC, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said Japan wouldn’t buy U.S.-branded vehicles because “Chevys” were popular with Japanese gangsters.

Takaichi may arrange for Ford F-150 trucks to be showcased in a place Trump gets to see them, Japan’s Nikkei newspaper reported. The government is considering importing the trucks for its transport ministry to use for inspecting roads and infrastructure, though there are concerns that the F-150 could cause congestion on narrow Japanese streets.

“We appreciate President Trump’s advocating for American made products,” Ford spokesperson Dave Tovar said. “We would be excited to introduce America’s best-selling truck to work and government customers in Japan.”

Japanese media have reported that Toyota Motor Corp. Chairman Akio Toyoda could announce plans to import his company’s American-made cars back to Japan during a dinner with Trump and other business leaders on Wednesday.

The gestures — combined with Takaichi’s connection to Abe — should help her deal with Trump, who seems predisposed to like her.

“I think she’s going to be great,” Trump said aboard Air Force One. “She’s a great friend of Mr. Abe, who was a great man.”

In 2016, Abe gave Trump a high-end golf club to celebrate his first election, and the leaders bonded over their love of golf. Trump often expresses sadness about Abe’s 2022 assassination.

But there are risks for Takaichi in emphasizing her ties to Abe, said Rintaro Nishimura, who specializes in Japan at the advisory firm The Asia Group.

“Because it’s Takaichi’s first diplomatic engagement I think she wants to start with sort of a bang,” Nishimura said. “Succeeding the Abe-line rhetoric is definitely going to be part of this engagement, although some also suggest that leaning too heavily on the Abe line might not exactly be good for her for creating her own kind of portfolio, her status as Japan’s leader.”

Following his meeting with Takaichi on Tuesday, Trump will give a speech aboard the USS George Washington aircraft carrier anchored in Japan, then hold a dinner with business leaders. Trump plans to leave for South Korea on Wednesday.

But aboard Air Force One on Monday, he told reporters that he was also ready to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, should that be an option.

“If he wants to meet, I’ll be in South Korea,” Trump said.

Boak and Yamaguchi write for the Associated Press. AP writer Chris Megerian contributed to this report from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Global tensions are escalating over rare earth minerals after China applied severe export controls on critical minerals required to manufacture almost everything – from cars to weapons. The move has also sparked concerns about the global supply chain.

Strategic meetings will be held between European Union officials and Chinese representatives, starting with a videoconference Monday, to be followed by a meeting in Brussels the following day.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump will meet his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Thursday in South Korea, with financial markets attentive to whether the world’s two largest economic powers can bury the hatchet in their trade war.

At the heart of the dispute is China’s 9 October decision to restrict exports of rare earth elements. While these controls were initially a response to US tariffs, the EU has become collateral damage in the dispute and is considering ways to respond.

Why is China restricting rare earth exports?

Tensions first emerged between the US and China after Donald Trump returned to the White House and carried through an aggressive tariff policy – which the administration argues is needed to narrow a growing trade deficit – on allies and rivals alike.

On 2 April 2025 — coinciding with what Trump defined as US’ “Liberation Day” — Washington announced a 34% tariff on Chinese goods imported into the country, which, added to the existing 20%, brought total duties to 54%.

The trade war escalated after China responded with counter-tariffs, which surpassed the 100% threshold, making trade between the two practically impossible. Beyond the tariffs, to hit back, China looked to weaponise its monopoly over rare earth elements, imposing additional export restrictions on 4 April that have since remained in place.

Rare earths are a group of 17 elements used across the defence, electric vehicle, energy and electronics industries.

The world, including the EU, is heavily dependent on China, as the country controls 60% of global production and 90% of their refining, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

After a short truce, the dispute flared up again in September, and on 9 October 2025, China decided to extend its control over rare earth elements from seven to 12. The announcement was seen as China building leverage over the United States. The meeting between the two sides this week is crucial in dictating the path forward.

Meanwhile, the EU is caught between the two. While these restrictions aimed mostly at the US, it has also impacted the European industry. The controls take the form of licenses that are difficult to obtain, with European companies bearing the brunt, as European Commisisioner for Trade Maroš Šefčovič has repeatedly pointed out.

How is the EU responding?

In a speech over the weekend, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, said the Union is prepared to use all the tools at its disposal to combat what some European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have described as economic coercion from China.

The remarks from the Commission president alluded to what is known as the anti-coercion instrument – designed with China in mind but never used.

The ACI, adopted in 2023, would allow the EU hit back at a third country by imposing tariffs or even restricting access to public procurement, licenses, or intellectual property rights.

“In the short term, we are focusing on finding solutions with our Chinese counterparts,” Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said on Saturday, warning, however, “But we are ready to use all of the instruments in our toolbox to respond if needed.”

European Council President António Costa met on Monday with Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur.

“I shared my strong concern about China’s expanding export controls on critical raw materials and related goods and technologies,” Costa said after the meeting, adding: “I urged him to restore as soon as possible fluid, reliable and predictable supply chains.”

Yet, tensions persist.

A planned meeting between Šefčovič and his Chinese counterpart Wang Wentao was cancelled and replaced by high-level talks between Chinese and European experts, a Commission spokesperson has confirmed. A video conference took place on Monday, and Chinese officials are set to arrive in Brussels for a meeting on Thursday.

While Brussels insists it wants to achieve a constructive solution without escalating, the Commission is pursuing a “de-risking” strategy to reduce its dependence on Chinese minerals. In addition, Germany and France have also suggested they would support stronger trade measures if a comprehensive solution cannot be found.

On Saturday, Von der Leyen announced a new plan – RESourceEU – exploring joint purchasing and stockpiling of rare earth, as well as “strategic” projects for the production and processing of critical raw materials here in Europe.

The EU also hopes to diversify its suppliers worldwide.

“We will speed up work on critical raw materials partnerships with countries like Ukraine and Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Chile or Greenland,” von der Leyen said.

Direct flights between India and China have resumed as relations between the countries appear to be thawing.

IndiGo flight 6E 1703 from Kolkata landed in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou on Monday, carrying about 180 passengers.

Flights between the two countries were first suspended during the Covid pandemic in early 2020 and did not restart after a deadly clash in a disputed Himalayan border area escalated tensions.

But the two countries have been steadily rebuilding relations, and last year they reached a landmark agreement on border patrols.

The Indian government had said the resumption of direct flights would “facilitate people-to-people contact” and help “the gradual normalisation of bilateral exchanges” in a statement announcing the development earlier this month.

It is part of a series of developments that indicate a gradual normalisation of ties between the neighbours.

In August, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the first time in seven years, meeting President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. Earlier that month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had visited India and discussed “de-escalation, delimitation and boundary affairs” with officials in Delhi.

In July, India had also restarted issuing visas for Chinese tourists.

According to travel data provider OAG, the two countries operated around 2,588 scheduled flights in 2019 before services were suspended.

At the Kolkata airport on Sunday evening, airline staff lit brass oil lamps to mark the resumption of direct flights as IndiGo passengers checked in.

A senior Chinese consular official, Qin Yong, told reporters at the airport that it was a “very important day for the India-China relationship”.

Passengers expressed happiness that the time taken to reach China would now reduce.

Krishna Goyal, who said he was travelling for business to China, told ANI news agency that direct flights would boost trade and relations between the countries.

“Earlier, we had to change two or three flights [to reach China]. We used to go to Singapore from Kolkata and from there to China,” he said.

China Eastern Airlines is set to launch a flight connecting Shanghai and Delhi next month. It will fly three times a week from 9 November, a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in India posted on X.

Additional reporting by Neyaz Farooquee in Delhi

In the southwestern corner of Pakistan, where the Arabian Sea meets the rugged Makran coast, Gwadar Port stands as one of the most ambitious and strategically important infrastructure projects in South Asia. Once a quiet fishing village, Gwadar is rapidly evolving into a global trade hub under the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The port’s transformation is not just about maritime logistics; it represents a broader economic vision linking China, Pakistan, and a wider network of countries stretching across the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia.

At the heart of this transformation lies China’s investment in Gwadar’s deep-water port facilities. Strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20% of the world’s oil passes, Gwadar gives China direct access to the Arabian Sea, bypassing the long and vulnerable sea route through the Malacca Strait. This geographic advantage is key to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offering the country a shorter and more secure trade path to the Middle East and Africa. For Pakistan, Gwadar is both an economic lifeline and a symbol of modernization, promising to uplift the impoverished Balochistan province through new industries, employment opportunities, and infrastructure development.

The China-Gwadar-Africa trade corridor, projected to create around 25,000 jobs and contribute up to 30% of Gwadar’s district GDP by 2027, underscores the scale of ambition behind CPEC. The port’s free zone expansion is already attracting manufacturing, logistics, and technology firms that view Gwadar as a cost-effective alternative to congested Middle Eastern ports. Chinese companies, through 2025 agreements with the Gwadar Port Authority, are investing in industrial parks, real estate developments, and energy projects aimed at turning the port into a self-sustaining economic ecosystem. These projects extend far beyond shipping; they’re setting the stage for an integrated trade hub that could reshape the economic geography of the region.

Infrastructure connectivity remains the backbone of Gwadar’s development. The construction of new highways, railway links, and power plants ensures that the port is not an isolated enclave but a vital node in the global supply chain. The planned rail corridor connecting Gwadar to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang province will cut transport time for goods significantly, allowing trade between western China and the Arabian Sea in under a week. Complementary projects, like the Gwadar International Airport, desalination plants, and solar energy stations, are also underway to support the city’s growing economic and population base. Together, these developments represent a holistic approach to urban and industrial planning that aligns with Pakistan’s long-term economic diversification goals.

The Gwadar Free Zone, now entering its second phase of expansion, is perhaps the clearest indicator of the port’s economic potential. Modeled after successful trade zones in Dubai and Singapore, the zone is expected to house over 400 companies from sectors ranging from petrochemicals and logistics to tourism and high-tech manufacturing. The fiscal incentives, tax exemptions, streamlined customs procedures, and energy subsidies are designed to attract both local and foreign investors. As Chinese and Pakistani firms collaborate on industrial and commercial ventures, the zone is emerging as a microcosm of regional economic integration.

Sustainability, often overlooked in large infrastructure projects, is also beginning to shape Gwadar’s future. One of the more innovative developments is the introduction of solar-powered fishing boats, designed to replace diesel-run vessels that pollute the coastline. Supported by Chinese firms and local cooperatives, these boats aim to improve the livelihoods of local fishermen while reducing carbon emissions. Such projects demonstrate how economic growth and environmental responsibility can coexist when supported by technology and policy alignment.

That said, Gwadar’s journey is not without challenges. Security concerns in Balochistan, bureaucratic delays, and local dissatisfaction over land use and employment distribution continue to shadow its progress. Critics argue that without more inclusive development, ensuring that the people of Gwadar directly benefit from the port’s success, the city risks becoming an enclave that serves external interests more than local ones. Transparency in agreements, fair labor practices, and reinvestment in local education and healthcare will be crucial to maintaining social stability and long-term sustainability.

From a broader geopolitical perspective, Gwadar’s rise introduces new dynamics into the Indian Ocean trade landscape. It competes indirectly with regional ports like Chabahar in Iran (developed with Indian support) and Dubai’s Jebel Ali, both seeking to maintain their relevance in global shipping routes. For China, Gwadar enhances its strategic footprint in the Arabian Sea, complementing its investments in East Africa’s ports like Mombasa and Djibouti. For Pakistan, it’s a chance to transform from a transit economy into a trading powerhouse, leveraging its geography rather than being constrained by it.

The real measure of Gwadar’s success will depend on how effectively it integrates with surrounding economies and global trade networks. If managed wisely, the port could help rebalance Pakistan’s trade profile, attract foreign investment, and serve as a catalyst for industrial modernization. But its development must remain inclusive, transparent, and environmentally responsible to ensure that the benefits of CPEC reach beyond the port’s fences and into the lives of ordinary Pakistanis.

In essence, Gwadar Port is not merely a logistical project; it’s a statement of intent. It reflects Pakistan’s aspirations to join the ranks of regional trade powers and China’s ambition to secure diversified trade routes. As CPEC matures, Gwadar’s success will likely be judged not only by the volume of goods passing through its docks but also by the depth of prosperity it generates across borders and communities.

Recommendations

• Prioritize local employment and vocational training to ensure Baloch communities benefit directly.
• Strengthen environmental management through renewable energy initiatives and waste control.
• Enhance port security and digital surveillance for safe and efficient operations.
• Encourage public-private partnerships to diversify investment beyond China.
• Fast-track railway and power infrastructure to improve trade connectivity.
• Implement transparent governance and community engagement programs.
• Promote sustainable fisheries and ecotourism to complement trade growth.
• Align Gwadar’s development with Pakistan’s national logistics policy for long-term coherence.
• Foster maritime innovation through research centers and green port technologies.

Oct. 26 (UPI) — Two U.S. Navy aircraft went down in the South China Sea in two incidents separated by half an hour on Sunday, according to U.S. Pacific Fleet, which said all service members were rescued.

In a statement, the U.S. Pacific Fleet said a U.S. Navy MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter crashed while conducting routine operations at about 2:45 p.m. local time.

It had deployed from aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and was assigned to “Battle Cats” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 73.

All three crew members were rescued.

The second incident involved a F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter jet assigned to the “Fighting Redcocks” of Strike Fighter Squadron 22.

According to the Navy, it went down at 3:15 p.m. while also conducting routine operations.

“Both crew members successfully ejected and were also safely recovered by search-and-rescue assets assigned to Carrier Strike Group 11,” it said.

“All personnel involved are safe and in stable condition.”

The incidents are under investigation.

Commissioned in 1975, the USS Nimitz is on its final deployment, which began late March, USNI News reported. It had operated in the Middle East this summer as part of U.S. military plans to thwart Houthi attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea and had entered the South China Sea on Oct. 17.

Officials signal that trade deal is close as Trump and Xi prepare to meet for the first time since 2019.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia – The United States and China have hailed the outcome of trade talks in Malaysia, raising expectations that Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will seal a deal to de-escalate their trade war at their first meeting since 2019.

US and Chinese officials on Sunday said the sides had made significant progress towards a deal as they wrapped a weekend of negotiations on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur.

Trump and Xi are set to meet on Thursday on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, marking their first face-to-face talks since the US president returned to the White House and embarked on a radical shake-up of global trade.

US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent told reporters in Kuala Lumpur that the sides had come up with a “framework” for Trump and Xi to discuss in South Korea.

Bessent said in a subsequent interview with NBC News that he expected the sides to reach a deal that would defer China’s threatened export controls on rare earths and avoid a 100 percent tariff that Trump has threatened to impose on Chinese goods.

Bessent also said in an interview with ABC News that Beijing had agreed to make “substantial” purchases of US agricultural products, which the treasury secretary said would make US soya bean farmers “feel very good”.

Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, Beijing’s top trade negotiator, said the sides had reached “a basic consensus” on “arrangements to address each side’s concerns”.

He said they agreed to “finalise specific details” and “proceed with domestic approval processes”, according to a readout from China’s Ministry of Commerce.

Asian stock markets surged on Monday on hopes of easing US-China tensions.

Japan’s Nikkei 225 and South Korea’s KOSPI both hit record highs, with the benchmark indexes up about 2.1 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively, shortly after midday, local time.

Hong Kong’s Hang Seng also saw strong gains, rising about 0.85 percent.

After attending the ASEAN summit, Trump on Monday departed for Japan, where he will meet newly sworn-in Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

The US president is scheduled to then travel on to South Korea on Wednesday.

While Trump has imposed significant tariffs on almost all US trade partners, he has threatened to hit China with higher levies than anywhere else.

Countries have been anxiously anticipating a breakthrough in the tensions, hoping Washington and Beijing can avoid a full-blown trade war that could do catastrophic damage to the global economy.

In a major escalation in US-China tensions earlier this month, Beijing announced that it would require companies everywhere to acquire a licence to export rare-earth magnets and some semiconductor materials that contain even trace amounts of minerals sourced from China or are produced using Chinese technology.

The proposed rules, which are set to take effect on December 1, have raised fears of substantial disruption to global supply chains.

Rare earths, a group of 17 minerals including holmium, cerium and dysprosium, are critical to the manufacture of countless high-tech products, including smartphones, electric cars and fighter jets.

Trump responded to Beijing’s move by threatening to impose a 100 percent tariff on Chinese goods from November 1.

Analysts have cast the tit-for-tat moves as efforts by the Chinese and US sides to gain leverage in their negotiations ahead of the Trump-Xi summit.

Reuters

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