Africa

The International Criminal Court confirmed 39 charges against Kony, paving the way for a trial if he is ever captured.

Judges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) have confirmed war crimes and crimes against humanity charges against Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony, nearly two decades after the court first issued a warrant for his arrest.

Kony, who remains at large, faces 39 charges, including murder, sexual enslavement and rape, making him the ICC’s longest-standing fugitive.

Judges from the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber III said there are “substantial grounds to believe that Mr Kony is criminally responsible for the crimes” committed in northern Uganda between 2002 and 2005, when he commanded the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

Besides crimes committed by his rebels, the judges said Kony could also be held responsible for 10 crimes he allegedly committed himself, linked to two women he forced to become his wives.

“Mr Kony issued standing orders to attack civilian settlements, kill and mistreat civilians, loot and destroy their property and abduct children and women to be integrated into the LRA,” the judges said in their ruling.

The ruling marks the first time the ICC has confirmed charges in a suspect’s absence, meaning the case can formally proceed to trial if Kony is ever captured. Under ICC rules, a full trial cannot begin without the defendant’s presence in court.

Prosecutors said efforts to track down and arrest Kony, now 64, are ongoing.

The ICC’s decision followed a three-day hearing in September in which prosecutors and victims’ lawyers presented evidence and testimony without Kony present – an unusual procedure that set the stage for Thursday’s ruling.

Years of investigations and witness accounts formed the basis of the decision.

Emerging from northern Uganda’s Acholi region in the late 1980s, Kony’s LRA combined Christian mysticism with an armed rebellion against President Yoweri Museveni’s government.

The United Nations estimates about 100,000 people were killed and 2.5 million displaced during the conflict.

Even after being pushed out of Uganda, LRA fighters launched deadly raids across South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, burning villages, looting communities and abducting tens of thousands of children – the abducted boys forced to fight and girls forced into sexual slavery.

Kony came back into international focus in 2012 when a viral video about his crimes led to the #Kony2012 campaign on social media.

Despite the global attention and years of military operations to apprehend Kony, he remains at large.

Two days after passing through the Strait of Gibraltar en route to the Caribbean, the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford has not moved significantly from a position just west of Morocco in North Africa, the Navy confirmed to us Thursday. The flattop and elements of its strike group were ordered by President Donald Trump to join the ongoing enhanced counter-narcotics mission in the region, but it is unclear if plans have changed.

The relatively static position of the Ford and at least two of its escorts comes as reports are emerging that the Trump administration has decided, for now, not to carry out land strikes against Venezuela. It is unknown at the moment if there is a correlation, and the possibility remains that the carrier could still soon sail westward. We have reached out to the White House for clarification.

The Trump administration on Wednesday told Congress it is holding off for now on strikes inside Venezuela out of concern over the legal authority to do so, CNN reported on Thursday. The briefing was conducted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and an official from the White House’s Office of Legal Counsel, the network reported, citing sources familiar with the events.

Lawmakers were told that the authority given to suspected drug boats did not apply to land strikes, the network noted. So far, nearly 70 people have been killed in at least 16 publicly known attacks on vessels allegedly smuggling drugs in the Caribbean and Pacific. The most recent acknowledged strike took place on Tuesday. The strikes have garnered heavy criticism for being extrajudicial and carried out without Congressional authorization.

Today, at the direction of President Trump, the Department of War carried out a lethal kinetic strike on a vessel operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization (DTO).

Intelligence confirmed that the vessel was involved in illicit narcotics smuggling, transiting along a known… pic.twitter.com/OsQuHrYLMp

— Secretary of War Pete Hegseth (@SecWar) November 5, 2025

Asked if the administration is indeed opting against land attacks on Venezuela, at least for now, the White House gave us the following response:

“President Trump was elected with a resounding mandate to take on the cartels and stop the scourge of narcoterrorism from killing Americans,” a White House official told us. “The President continues to take actions consistent with his responsibility to protect Americans and pursuant to his constitutional authority. All actions comply fully with the law of armed conflict.” 

CNN’s reporting came after a Wall Street Journal story on Wednesday stating that President Donald Trump “recently expressed reservations to top aides about launching military action to oust Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.”

Trump feared that strikes might not force Maduro to step down, the newspaper noted. Though ostensibly begun as an effort to stem the flow of drugs, it has grown into a massive show of military force aimed partially at Maduro.

The administration is considering three main options for dealing with Maduro, The New York Times reported earlier this week. They include stepping up economic pressure on Venezuela, supporting that nation’s opposition while boosting the U.S. military presence to add pressure on the Venezuelan leader, and initiating airstrikes or covert operations aimed at government and military facilities and personnel.

However, the goal is in flux, administration officials acknowledge, according to the Journal. Meanwhile, Trump has also delivered mixed messages, saying he doubts there will be an attack but that Maduro must go.

What is clear is that there is a massive U.S. military presence in the Caribbean, which includes at least eight surface warships, a special operations mothership, a nuclear-powered fast attack submarine, F-35B stealth fighters, AC-130 gunships, airlifters, MQ-9 Reaper drones and more than 10,000 troops.

The Ford was supposed to join that force, but if the administration is content for now to hit boats suspected of carrying drugs, it might not make sense to move the carrier and escort ships more than 3,600 miles west, especially as there is high demand elsewhere for American naval presence, including in Europe, where the supercarrier just came from.

The issue of wear and tear on the force is something that the Pentagon will have to evaluate as it decides which assets to keep and which to pull from the Caribbean. Navy vessels began arriving in the region in late August and at some point, they will need relief. That could mean bringing in ships, possibly from other regions. The same can be said for aircraft units and personnel deployed around the region for the operation. Those forces can only remain spun-up for so long, or the operation needs to be adapted for a long-term enhanced presence. This could very well be underway already, although we have not confirmed this as being the case. However, being so close to the U.S. mainland reduces some of those concerns, especially for rotating units in and out.

Regardless of Trump’s intentions, the U.S. military presence continues to endure in the region. Thursday afternoon, two more B-52H strategic bombers flew near the coast of Venezuela, according to online flight trackers. These bomber flights have become something of a routine at this point. In addition, the San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ship USS Fort Lauderdale is once again back in the Caribbean after a pitstop in Florida for routine maintenance.

At 5 p.m., the U.S. Senate is scheduled to hold a floor vote on a bipartisan war powers resolution that would block the use of the U.S. Armed Forces to engage in hostilities within or against Venezuela, unless that action has been authorized by Congress. A similar measure failed several weeks ago and it remains to be seen if news that the administration is holding off on striking Venezuela will move the needle on that resolution.

Meanwhile, we will continue to monitor the progress of the Ford and the U.S. military presence arrayed against Maduro and provide updates when warranted.

Update: 6:07 PM Eastern –

The Senate bipartisan war powers resolution was voted down by a vote of 51 to 49.

Contact the author: [email protected] 

Deadly protests followed the 92-year-old president’s re-election, which opponents have called ‘fraudulent’.

Cameroon’s longtime leader, Paul Biya, has been sworn in for a new seven-year term following his victory in last month’s presidential election, which his opposition rival has described as “a constitutional coup”.

Addressing Parliament on Thursday, the world’s oldest president promised to stay faithful to the confidence of the Cameroonian people and pledged to work for a “united, stable and prosperous” country.

There were deadly protests in several parts of Cameroon days after the October 19 vote, followed by a three-day lockdown this week after former minister and key contender Issa Tchiroma claimed victory and alleged vote tampering.

The government has confirmed that at least five people were killed during the protests, although the opposition and civil society groups claim the figures are much higher.

The incumbent, Africa’s second-longest serving leader, took the oath of office during a session of Parliament in what residents describe as the heavily militarised and partially deserted capital, Yaounde.

Priscilla Ayimboh, a 40-year-old seamstress in Yaounde, does not see a new term for Biya as likely to change anything.

“I’m tired of Biya’s rule and I no longer care whatever he does. It’s a pity. I wonder what will become of Cameroon in the next seven years: there are no roads, water, and jobs,” she said.

Munjah Vitalis Fagha, a senior politics lecturer at Cameroon’s University of Buea, told The Associated Press news agency that Biya’s inauguration was “taking place in a tense yet controlled political atmosphere, marked by deep divisions between the ruling elite and a growingly disillusioned populace”.

Fagha added: “The ceremony occurs amid calls for political renewal, ongoing security challenges in the Anglophone regions, and widespread concerns over governance and succession.”

Cameroon’s top court on October 27 declared Biya the winner of the election, with 53.66 percent of the vote, ahead of his ally-turned-challenger, Tchiroma, who secured 35.19 percent.

Tchiroma insists Biya was awarded a “fraudulent” victory in the election.

“The will of the Cameroonian people was trampled that day, our sovereignty stolen in broad daylight,” Tchiroma wrote on Wednesday night. “This is not democracy, it is electoral theft, a constitutional coup as blatant as it is shameful.”

Biya came to power in 1982 following the resignation of Cameroon’s first president and has ruled since, following a 2008 constitutional amendment that abolished term limits. His health has been a topic of speculation as he spends most of his time in Europe, leaving governance to key party officials and family members.

He has led Cameroon longer than most of its citizens have been alive – more than 70 percent of the country’s almost 30 million population is below the age of 35. If he serves his entire term, Biya will leave office nearly 100 years old.

The results of his nearly half-century in power have been mixed; armed rebellions in the north and the west of the country, along with a stagnant economy, have left many young people disillusioned with the leader.

Tigray was the centre of a devastating two-year war that pitted the TPLF against Ethiopia’s federal army.

Ethiopia’s Afar region has accused forces from neighbouring Tigray of crossing into its territory, seizing several villages and attacking civilians, in what it called a breach of the 2022 peace deal that ended the war in northern Ethiopia.

Between 2020 and 2022, Tigray was the centre of a devastating two-year war that pitted the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against Ethiopia’s federal army and left at least 600,000 people dead, according to the African Union.

In a statement released late on Wednesday, Afar authorities said TPLF fighters “entered Afar territory by force today”.

The group, which governs the Tigray region, was accused of “controlling six villages and bombing civilians with mortars”. Officials did not provide details on casualties.

“The TPLF learns nothing from its mistakes,” the Afar administration said, condemning what it described as “acts of terror”.

The conflict earlier this decade also spread into neighbouring Ethiopian regions, including Afar, whose forces fought alongside federal troops.

According to Afar’s latest statement, Tigrayan forces attacked the Megale district in the northwest of the region “with heavy weapons fire on civilian herders”.

The authorities warned that if the TPLF “does not immediately cease its actions, the Afar Regional Administration will assume its defensive duty to protect itself against any external attack”.

The renewed fighting, they said, “openly destroys the Pretoria peace agreement”, referring to the deal signed in November 2022 between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan leaders, which ended two years of bloodshed.

While the fragile peace had largely held, tensions between Addis Ababa and the TPLF have deepened in recent months. The party, which dominated Ethiopian politics from 1991 to 2018, was officially removed from the country’s list of political parties in May amid internal divisions and growing mistrust from the federal government.

Federal officials have also accused the TPLF of re-establishing ties with neighbouring Eritrea, a country with a long and uneasy history with Ethiopia. Eritrea, once an Italian colony and later an Ethiopian province, fought a bloody independence war before gaining statehood in 1993.

A subsequent border war between the two nations from 1998 to 2000 killed tens of thousands. When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he signed a landmark peace deal with Eritrea, but relations have soured again since the end of the Tigray conflict.

A months-long siege on the Malian capital, Bamako, by the armed al-Qaeda affiliate group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has brought the city to breaking point, causing desperation among residents and, according to analysts, placing increasing pressure on the military government to negotiate with the group – something it has refused to do before now.

JNIM’s members have created an effective economic and fuel blockade by sealing off major highways used by tankers to transport fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast to the landlocked Sahel country since September.

While JNIM has long laid siege to towns in other parts of the country, this is the first time it has used the tactic on the capital city.

The scale of the blockade, and the immense effect it has had on the city, is a sign of JNIM’s growing hold over Mali and a step towards the group’s stated aim of government change in Mali, Beverly Ochieng, Sahel analyst with intelligence firm Control Risks, told Al Jazeera.

For weeks, most of Bamako’s residents have been unable to buy any fuel for cars or motorcycles as supplies have dried up, bringing the normally bustling capital to a standstill. Many have had to wait in long fuel queues. Last week, the United States and the United Kingdom both advised their citizens to leave Mali and evacuated non-essential diplomatic staff.

Other Western nations have also advised their citizens to leave the country. Schools across Mali have closed and will remain shut until November 9 as staff struggle to commute. Power cuts have intensified.

Here’s what we know about the armed group responsible and why it appears to have Mali in a chokehold:

What is JNIM?

JNIM is the Sahel affiliate of al-Qaeda and the most active armed group in the region, according to conflict monitor ACLED. The group was formed in 2017 as a merger between groups that were formerly active against French and Malian forces that were first deployed during an armed rebellion in northern Mali in 2012. They include Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and three Malian armed groups – Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitun and Katiba Macina.

JNIM’s main aim is to capture and control territory and to expel Western influences in its region of control. Some analysts suggest that JNIM may be seeking to control major capitals and, ultimately, to govern the country as a whole.

It is unclear how many fighters the group has. The Washington Post has reported estimates of about 6,000, citing regional and western officials.

However, Ulf Laessing, Sahel analyst at the German think tank, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), said JNIM most likely does not yet have the military capacity to capture large, urban territories that are well protected by soldiers. He also said the group would struggle to appeal to urban populations who may not hold the same grievances against the government as some rural communities.

While JNIM’s primary base is Mali, KAS revealed in a report that the group has Algerian roots via its members of the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).

The group is led by Iyad Ag-Ghali, a Malian and ethnic Tuareg from Mali’s northern Kidal region who founded Ansar Dine in 2012. That group’s stated aim was to impose its interpretation of Islamic law across Mali.

Ghali had previously led Tuareg uprisings against the Malian government, which is traditionally dominated by the majority Bambara ethnic group, in the early 1990s, demanding the creation of a sovereign country called Azawad.

However, he reformed his image by acting as a negotiator between the government and the rebels. In 2008, he was posted as a Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia under the government of Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure. When another rebellion began in 2012, however, Ghali sought a leadership role with the rebels but was rebuffed, leading him to create Ansar Dine.

According to the US Department of National Intelligence (DNI), Ghali has stated that JNIM’s strategy is to expand its presence across West Africa and to put down government forces and rival armed groups, such as the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel, through guerrilla-style attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Simultaneously, it attempts to engage with local communities by providing them with material resources. Strict dress codes and bans on music are common in JNIM-controlled areas.

JNIM also destroys infrastructure, such as schools, communication towers and bridges, to weaken the government off the battlefield.

An overall death toll is unclear, but the group has killed thousands of people since 2017. Human rights groups accuse it of attacking civilians, especially people perceived to be assisting government forces. JNIM activity in Mali caused 207 deaths between January and April this year, according to ACLED data.

How has JNIM laid siege to Bamako?

JNIM began blocking oil tankers carrying fuel to Bamako in September.

That came after the military government in Bamako banned small-scale fuel sales in all rural areas – except at official service stations – from July 1. Usually, in these areas, traders can buy fuel in jerry cans, which they often resell later.

The move to ban this was aimed at crippling JNIM’s operations in its areas of control by limiting its supply lines and, thus, its ability to move around.

At the few places where fuel is still available in Bamako, prices soared last week by more than 400 percent, from $25 to $130 per litre ($6.25-$32.50 per gallon). Prices of transportation, food and other commodities have risen due to the crisis, and power cuts have been frequent.

Some car owners have simply abandoned their vehicles in front of petrol stations, with the military government threatening on Wednesday to impound them to ease traffic and reduce security risks.

A convoy of 300 fuel tankers reached Bamako on October 7, and another one with “dozens” of vehicles arrived on October 30, according to a government statement. Other attempts to truck in more fuel have met obstacles, however, as JNIM members ambush military-escorted convoys on highways and shoot at or kidnap soldiers and civilians.

Even as supplies in Bamako dry up, there are reports of JNIM setting fire to about 200 fuel tankers in southern and western Mali. Videos circulating on Malian social media channels show rows of oil tankers burning on a highway.

What is JNIM trying to achieve with this blockade?

Laessing of KAS said the group is probably hoping to leverage discontent with the government in the already troubled West African nation to put pressure on the military government to negotiate a power-sharing deal of sorts.

“They want to basically make people as angry as possible,” he said. “They could [be trying] to provoke protests which could bring down the current government and bring in a new one that’s more favourable towards them.”

Ochieng of Control Risks noted that, in its recent statements, JNIM has explicitly called for government change. While the previous civilian government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (2013-2020) had negotiated with JNIM, the present government of Colonel Assimi Goita will likely keep up its military response, Ochieng said.

Frustration at the situation is growing in Bamako, with residents calling for the government to act.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, driver Omar Sidibe said the military leaders ought to find out the reasons for the shortage and act on them. “It’s up to the government to play a full role and take action [and] uncover the real reason for this shortage.”

Which parts of Mali is the JNIM active in?

In Mali, the group operates in rural areas of northern, central and western Mali, where there is a reduced government presence and high discontent with the authorities among local communities.

In the areas it controls, JNIM presents itself as an alternative to the government, which it calls “puppets of the West”, in order to recruit fighters from several ethnic minorities which have long held grievances over their perceived marginalisation by the government, including the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, and Songhai groups. Researchers note the group also has some members from the majority Bambara group.

In central Mali, the group seized Lere town last November and captured the town of Farabougou in August this year. Both are small towns, but Farabougou is close to Wagadou Forest, a known hiding place of JNIM.

JNIM’s hold on major towns is weaker because of the stronger government presence in larger areas. It therefore more commonly blockades major towns or cities by destroying roads and bridges leading to them. Currently, the western cities of Nioro and gold-rich Kayes are cut off. The group is also besieging the major cities of Timbuktu and Gao, as well as Menaka and Boni towns, located in the north and northeast.

How is JNIM funded?

For revenue, the group oversees artisanal gold mines, forcefully taxes community members, smuggles weapons and kidnaps foreigners for ransom, according to the US DNI. Kayes region, whose capital, Kayes, is under siege, is a major gold hub, accounting for 80 percent of Mali’s gold production, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats.

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc) also reports cattle rustling schemes, estimating that JNIM made 91,400 euros ($104,000) in livestock sales of cattle between 2017 and 2019. Cattle looted in Mali are sold cheaply in communities on the border with Ghana and the Ivory Coast, through a complex chain of intermediaries.

In which other countries is JNIM active?

JNIM expanded into Burkina Faso in 2017 by linking up with Burkina-Faso-based armed group Ansarul-Islam, which pledged allegiance to the Malian group. Ansarul-Islam was formed in 2016 by Ibrahim Dicko, who had close ties with Amadou Koufa, JNIM’s deputy head since 2017.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM uses similar tactics of recruiting from marginalised ethnic groups. The country has rapidly become a JNIM hotspot, with the group operating – or holding territory – in 11 of 13 Burkina Faso regions outside of capital Ouagadougou. There were 512 reported casualties as a result of JNIM violence in the country between January and April this year. It is not known how many have died as a result of violence by the armed group in total.

Since 2022, JNIM has laid siege to the major northern Burkinabe city of Djibo, with authorities forced to airlift in supplies. In a notable attack in May 2025, JNIM fighters overran a military base in the town, killing approximately 200 soldiers. It killed a further 60 in Solle, about 48km (30 miles) west of Djibo.

In October 2025, the group temporarily took control of Sabce town, also located in the north of Burkina Faso, killing 11 police officers in the process, according to the International Crisis Group.

In a September report, Human Rights Watch said JNIM and a second armed group – Islamic State Sahel, which is linked to ISIL (ISIS) – massacred civilians in Burkina Faso between May and September, including a civilian convoy trying to transport humanitarian aid into the besieged northern town of Gorom Gorom.

Meanwhile, JNIM is also moving southwards, towards other West African nations with access to the sea. It launched an offensive on Kafolo town, in northern Ivory Coast, in 2020.

JNIM members embedded in national parks on the border regions with Burkina Faso have been launching sporadic attacks in northern Togo and the Benin Republic since 2022.

In October this year, it recorded its first attack on the Benin-Nigeria border, where one Nigerian policeman was killed. The area is not well-policed because the two countries have no established military cooperation, analyst Ochieng said.

“This area is also quite a commercially viable region; there are mining and other developments taking place there … it is likely to be one that [JNIM] will try to establish a foothold,” she added.

Why are countries struggling to fend off JNIM?

When Mali leader General Assimi Goita led soldiers to seize power in a 2020 coup, military leaders promised to defeat the armed group, as well as a host of others that had been on the rise in the country. Military leaders subsequently seizing power from civilian governments in Burkina Faso (2022) and in Niger (2023) have made the same promises.

However, Mali and its neighbours have struggled to hold JNIM at bay, with ACLED data noting the number of JNIM attacks increasing notably since 2020.

In 2022, Mali’s military government ended cooperation with 4,000-strong French forces deployed in 2013 to battle armed groups which had emerged at the time, as well as separatist Tuaregs in the north. The last group of French forces exited the country in August 2022.

Mali also terminated contracts with a 10,000-man UN peacekeeping force stationed in the country in 2023.

Bamako is now working with Russian fighters – initially 1,500 from the Wagner Mercenary Group, but since June, from the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps – estimated to be about 1,000 in number.

Russian officials are, to a lesser extent, also present in Burkina Faso and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali.

Results in Mali have been mixed. Wagner supported the Malian military in seizing swaths of land in the northern Kidal region from Tuareg rebels.

But the Russians also suffered ambushes. In July 2024, a contingent of Wagner and Malian troops was ambushed by rebels in Tinzaouaten, close to the Algerian border. Between 20 and 80 Russians and 25 to 40 Malians were killed, according to varying reports. Researchers noted it was Wagner’s worst defeat since it had deployed to West Africa.

In all, Wagner did not record much success in targeting armed groups like JNIM, analyst Laessing told Al Jazeera.

Alongside Malian forces, the Russians have also been accused by rights groups of committing gross human rights violations against rural communities in northern Mali perceived to be supportive of armed groups.

Could the Russian Africa Corps fighters end the siege on Bamako?

Laessing said the fuel crisis is pressuring Mali to divert military resources and personnel to protect fuel tankers, keeping them from consolidating territory won back from armed groups and further endangering the country.

He added that the crisis will be a test for Russian Africa Corp fighters, who have not proven as ready as Wagner fighters to take battle risks. A video circulating on Russian social media purports to show Africa Corps members providing air support to fuel tanker convoys. It has not been verified by Al Jazeera.

“If they can come in and allow the fuel to flow into Bamako, then the Russians will be seen as heroes,” Laessing said – at least by locals.

Laessing added that the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, in the medium to long term, might eventually have to negotiate with JNIM to find a way to end the crisis.

While Goita’s government has not attempted to hold talks with the group in the past, in early October, it greenlit talks led by local leaders, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats – although it is unclear exactly how the government gave its approval.

Agreements between the group and local leaders have reportedly already been signed in several towns across Segou, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, in which the group agrees to end its siege in return for the communities agreeing to JNIM rules, taxes, and noncooperation with the military.

Zohran Mamdani’s stunning victory in New York City’s mayoral race was built on a promise of hope and political change, a message that is resonating loudly with the people in Uganda, where he was born.

The 34-year-old leftist’s decisive win in the United States’ largest metropolis on Wednesday was celebrated by many in Uganda’s capital Kampala, the city where Mamdani was born in 1991.

For many Ugandans, the unlikely rise of Mamdani – a young Muslim with roots in Africa and South Asia – in the world’s most powerful democracy carries an inspirational message in a country where an authoritarian leader has been ruling since even before Mamdani was born.

Uganda’s 81-year-old President Yoweri Museveni is seeking a seventh term in January elections as he looks to extend his nearly 40-year rule. He has rejected calls to retire, leading to fears of a volatile political transition.

“It’s a big encouragement even to us here in Uganda that it’s possible,” Joel Ssenyonyi, a 38-year-old opposition leader in the Parliament of Uganda, told The Associated Press.

He said that while Ugandans, who are facing repressive political conditions, had “a long way to get there”, Mamdani’s success “inspires us”.

Mamdani left Uganda when he was five to follow his father, political theorist Mahmood Mamdani, to South Africa, and later moved to the US. He kept his Ugandan citizenship even after he became a naturalised US citizen in 2018, according to AP.

The family maintains a home in Kampala, to which they regularly return and visited earlier this year to celebrate Mamdani’s marriage.

‘We celebrate and draw strength’

While Mamdani, a self-described democratic socialist, has vowed to tackle inequality and push back against the xenophobic rhetoric of US President Donald Trump, opposition politicians in Uganda face different challenges.

Museveni has been cracking down on his opponents ahead of next year’s elections, as he has in the lead-up to previous polls.

In November last year, veteran opposition figure Kizza Besigye, who has stood against Museveni in four elections, and his aide, Obeid Lutale, were abducted in Nairobi, Kenya, before being arraigned in a military court in Kampala on treason charges. The pair have since repeatedly been denied bail, despite concerns raised by the United Nations’ human rights officials.

Other opposition figures have also faced crackdowns.

Tens of supporters of the National Unity Platform (NUP) party, led by 43-year-old entertainer Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine, have been convicted by Uganda’s military courts for various offences.

“From Uganda, we celebrate and draw strength from your example as we work to build a country where every citizen can realise their grandest dreams regardless of means and background,” Wine wrote on X as he sent his “hearty congratulations” to Mamdani.

Robert Kabushenga, a retired Ugandan media executive who is friendly with the Mamdani family, told AP that Mamdani’s win was “a beacon of hope” for those fighting for change in Uganda, especially the younger generations.

Describing the new mayor-elect as belonging to “a tradition of very honest and clear thinkers who are willing to reimagine … politics”, Kabushenga said Mamdani’s victory underlined that “we should allow young people the opportunity to shape, and participate in, politics in a meaningful way”.

Okello Ogwang, an academic who once worked with Mamdani’s father at Kampala’s Makerere University, said his son’s success was an instructive reminder to Uganda “that we should invest in the youth”.

“He’s coming from here,” he said. “If we don’t invest in our youth, we are wasting our time.”

Anthony Kirabo, a 22-year-old psychology student at Makerere University, said Mamdani’s win “makes me feel good and proud of my country because it shows that Uganda can produce some good leaders”.

“Seeing Zohran up there, I feel like I can also make it,” he said.

In 2019, a Sudanese team of jiu-jitsu athletes set out on an extraordinary quest: to travel by land from Sudan to Kenya, despite having no funding and limited resources, to compete in the LionHeart Nairobi Open.

Together members of the Muqatel Training Center for martial arts travelled across three countries, carrying not just their hopes and dreams, but the spirit of a revolution that reshaped Sudan.

Journey to Kenya is a documentary short about resilience, unity and determination — a powerful reminder that dreams can transcend borders.

A film by Ibrahim “Snoopy” Ahmed, produced by In Deep Visions.

Over the last two decades, the Horn of Africa has witnessed an increase of foreigntroops in Djibouti, a rise in investments along the Red Sea, and more pronounced engagement in its internal affairs by confirmed and emerging powers all of which showcase the geopolitical appetite for influence in the region. Yet current crises – the war in Sudan, persisting insecurity in Somalia, renewed tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and contentious relations between countries – underscore an uncertain future that could make the volatile region even more prone to external influence. Will local leadership step up to the task of preserving stability through improved regional relations or leave its most pressing issues unresolved?

An analysis by Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Mwachofi Singo, and Hallelujah Wondimu published earlier this year by the Center for Strategic and International Studies provides key insights on the risk posed by the absence of a clear pillar state(s) to push for peace and security within the region which could worsen its vulnerability to competing middle powers.

The three experts on African geopolitics argue that given its history of conflicts and ongoing tensions, the region demands the rise of Ethiopia and Kenya as stronger leaders able to drive reform initiatives aimed at protecting the interests of the Horn of Africa. As such, the two nations offer strong, suitable and strategic advantages for the region despite facing their own internal and regional challenges which they must also attend to.

The CSIS report view Ethiopia’s role as central to transforming the region towards a stable and self-sufficient neighborhood capable of addressing its own tensions, preserving peace and promoting economic development. Whether Ethiopia intends to assume this role, however, rests on the success of its current transition that began since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018 following decades of Tigray dominance over the country. Yet the envisioned reinforcement of the federal structure led by a strong central government has had setbacks in the last few years with the occurrence of the violent war in Tigray and ongoing security concerns over autonomy seeking movements.

This suggests that Ethiopia will inevitably have significant nation building to do to preserve the unity of the country hence the recent inward focus to stabilize domestic tensions. The achievement of the Renaissance Dam stands as good symbol of national harmony that could be replicated across other sectors of society to reinforce inclusion and equity. This image of improved and steady stability in Ethiopia is crucial to consolidate its leadership position in the region.

According to the researchers, Ethiopia’s (re)emergence as a leader in the Horn is also closely linked to its capacity to improve its relations with neighbors which have deteriorated the last few years. They cite the territorial dispute with Sudan, the sudden outreach to Somaliland irritating Somalia and Djibouti or one could add renewed animosity with Eritrea. Ironically, these frictions could lead to Ethiopia’s further rapprochement with external emerging actors eager to increase their influence in the region that will further complicate regional cooperation imperative for stability. This signals a pressing need for the country to reset its relations with its neighbors as the current trajectory could end up being an obstacle towards its economic development. Again, the Grand Renaissance Dam which is already a major component of Ethiopia’s trade policy in the region could be the catalyst needed to reinvigorate diplomatic ties.

While Ethiopia remains focused on its introspection and on pursuing a more bilateral approach to regional diplomacy, Kenya could seize the opportunity to accentuate its leadership position and diplomatic consistency. Kenya’s relatively peaceful independence transition and constant display of neutrality when engaging mediation processes forged its image as a credible leader for the region. The report also highlights a long history of proactive foreign policy by successive Kenyan presidents which emphasized economic development through regional trade integration. However, Kenya’s recent actions with regards to the Sudan conflict and the war in the DRC might alter its reputation and ability to conduct peace initiatives in the region while similar moves may instead translate an incoherent foreign strategy.

Nevertheless, it would be hard to imagine Kenya further jeopardize its stabilizing role as the country’s own development ambitions largely rests on its capacity to promote regional stability crucial to economic trade with its neighbors. This underscores the need for Nairobi to remain committed to its traditional diplomatic playbook to support impartial interventions while preserving its leverage and reputation throughout such processes.

In addition, Kenyan legacy could be further undermined by internal challenges in light of the gen z movement which may be a decisive political factor ahead of the 2027 elections. Latest developments in Morrocco or Madagascar could give a glimpse of the consequences of such social efforts in Kenya. Whether or not Kenyan youth are able to shake the government, political leaders should implement policies responding to the youth socioeconomic concerns as prolong unrests could diminish its global influence capacity so dear to the current administration.

In a rapidly shifting world order where middle powers are keen on exerting their own vision in the Horn of Africa, it becomes imperative for local leadership to assert regional autonomy to solve issues. Stability and improved inter-state relations should then discourage governments from seeking external support when pursuing domestic interests.

Kenya and Ethiopia both retain significant assets to affirm their influence in the Horn despite their own challenges. However, their capacity to assume an independent leading position might be more uncertain. The almost complete monopolization of the conflict resolution processes in Sudan or the DRC by the United States and the Gulf States clearly reveals the consequences of weak regional leadership. Kenya and Ethiopia could instead harmonize their regional policies through platforms such as the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Ultimately, Kenya and Ethiopia’s ability to intensify their strategic partnerships could lay the foundation for regional autonomy and stability.  

Tanzanian activists say graphic videos offer proof government forces killed dozens of people protesting over alleged election rigging. Incumbent President Samia Suluhu was named the winner of the October 29 vote in controversial circumstances.

A fuel blockade by al Qaeda-linked militants has severely impacted the capital of Mali, raising concerns that the jihadist group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), might attempt to impose its rule in the country. While analysts believe that JNIM currently lacks the resources to seize control of Bamako, they view the blockade as a strategy to weaken the government by cutting off fuel supplies, which has led to school closures and affected local businesses.

The blockade aims to pressure the military government, which took power in 2021 after promising to combat the Islamist threat. Analysts speculate that JNIM seeks to provoke another coup in Mali, potentially the third since 2020, which could destabilize the nation further and provide JNIM with more opportunities to gain power and resources. A recent report warned that the government’s stability is at high risk in the coming weeks due to the increasing pressure from JNIM.

JNIM announced the blockade was aimed at the ruling authorities, accusing them of oppressing citizens, particularly outside the capital. The group has been advancing from northern Mali into central areas and neighboring countries, increasing its attacks on military posts and acquiring more weapons. Recently, JNIM reportedly received a large ransom for hosting Emirati hostages and has begun extending its operations in southern Mali, intensifying its focus on Bamako.

The blockade is viewed as both an economic tactic and a means of instilling fear among Bamako’s leadership and its residents. Although there haven’t been significant protests despite the fuel crisis, tensions among military leaders and the arrest of several generals could threaten the current regime’s stability. Observers caution that the potential collapse of Mali’s government could have a domino effect on neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, where military-led governments are in place, thus destabilizing the Sahel region.

Malians have remained relatively quiet about the fuel shortage due to fear of government reprisals. One resident explained the struggles of finding fuel, while the military continues to deal with internal challenges. Analysts believe that the situation may make the current military leaders vulnerable to being ousted, given the growing pressures from both political factions and armed groups.

If JNIM were to gain control of Bamako, it could lead to significant restrictions on daily life, as seen in areas previously occupied by the group. Recent warnings from foreign embassies have urged citizens to leave Mali, yet there hasn’t been a significant exodus or an increase in flight bookings at this time. The future remains uncertain, with risks of JNIM attempting to advance into the city still possible, according to diplomats.

With information from Reuters

India’s women post 298-7 in Navi Mumbai before bowling South Africa out for 246 to claim the 2025 Cricket World Cup.

India’s women have lifted the Cricket World Cup for the first time after beating South Africa by 52 runs in Navi Mumbai, India.

Reaching the final for a third time, Harmanpreet Kaur’s side dominated the contest from the off at DY Patil Stadium on Sunday, although South Africa captain Laura Wolvaardt did her best to spoil the hosts’ party in the run chase.

Replying to India’s 298-7, Wolvaardt led from the off and totalled 101 off 98 when she was eventually caught in the deep off the bowling off Deepti Sharma, who finished with 5-39.

The support was not there for Wolvaardt, unlike that enjoyed throughout a team effort with the bat by India, as South Africa regularly lost wickets at the other end before being bowled out for 246 in the 46th over.

Wolvaardt’s heroic effort added to the century she scored in the semifinal win against England on Thursday. She is only the second player to achieve the feat of the back-to-back centuries at this stage of the competition after Alyssa Healy did so in Australia’s victorious run in the 2022 edition.

Neither team has lifted the trophy; indeed, this was South Africa’s first final.

India had come close twice before, reaching the final in 2005 and 2017, losing to Australia and England, respectively.

This was also the first women’s World Cup final that did not involve either Australia or England, the former being the record winners with seven victories to their name.

Having been put in, after a long delay due to rain, India posted the second-highest total in a women’s World Cup final. But they will feel they should have comfortably cleared 300, having reached 151-1 at the halfway stage of their innings.

Opener Smriti Mandhana’s 45 meant the India batter finished with 434 runs for the tournament.

It puts her top of India’s list of run scorers at a World Cup ahead of Mithali Raj, who registered 409 in the 2017 edition.

The limelight on the day belonged to her opening partner, however, as Shafali Verma struck 87 off 78.

Deepti Sharma’s run-a-ball 58 kept the momentum going through the middle over, while Richa Ghosh thumped two sixes in an innings of 34 off 24 late on that marked the best strike-rate of the innings.

South Africa started the chase solidly enough, the opening pair bringing up the fifty partnership in the 10th over. The loss of Tazmin Brits, run out by a brilliant piece of fielding by Amanjot Kaur for 23, started a wobble, though.

Anneke Bosch pushed back a painful six-ball duck before being trapped LBW by Sree Charani.

Verma then came to the party with the ball, picking up Sune Luus and Marizanne Kapp to leave South Africa reeling on 123-4 in the 23rd over.

When Sinalo Jafta fell in the 30th with her side 148-5, it was difficult to see a way back for a team hoping to be the first senior side from their country to lift a major International Cricket Council (ICC) title.

By the time Wolvaardt’s innings was done, India’s women knew they were about to go one better than their male counterparts, who similarly hosted the 2023 edition only to be denied by Australia in the final.

With both teams vying for their first World Cup title, the pre-match talk was all about who could handle the occasion – India with the enormous amount of expectation, contrasted with whether South Africa could use the underdog tag in their favour.

With rain washing out any hopes of starting on time, it was inevitable the captain who won the toss would bowl first but the Navi Mumbai surface remained batter-friendly as it had been in India’s high-scoring semi-final against Australia, exemplified by Smriti Mandhana and Verma calmly cruising to 64-0 in the powerplay.

It was actually South Africa’s bowlers who appeared consumed by the occasion as they bowled too wide to the openers, who reeled off the boundaries with ease, before Mandhana was caught behind off Chloe Tryon and Verma chipped Ayabonga Khaka to mid-off.

The Proteas’ ground fielding was brilliant, but they were guilty of dropping five catches including a crucial drop by Anneke Bosch with Verma on 56, while Deepti was also put down on 35 and 37.

Verma was visibly distraught to miss out on a World Cup century but it was a staggering knock considering the lateness of her inclusion in the side and the magnitude of the game, and its attacking nature was invaluable in taking the pressure off the tournament’s poster girl, Mandhana.

Jemimah Rodrigues, the semi-final hero, fell for 24 two overs after Verma which gave South Africa a chance to regain control, but India showed impressive composure in keeping partnerships ticking over, anchored by Deepti, before Richa Ghosh’s dynamic 34 from 24 balls ensured they finished with a late flourish.

Though it required a record chase, there was a sense that India did not have enough to feel completely comfortable – only adding 69 in the final 10 overs for the loss of three wickets – with the context of India’s semi-final chase of 339.

Though Deepti’s all-round performances have been sensational all tournament, few would have predicted that Verma would also be her accomplice with the ball.

Nigeria’s presidential spokesperson welcomes US assistance ‘as long as it recognises our territorial integrity’.

Nigeria says it would welcome assistance from the United States in fighting armed groups as long as its territorial integrity is respected after US President Donald Trump threatened military action in the West African country over what he claimed was persecution of Christians there.

In a social media post on Saturday, Trump said  he had asked the Department of Defense to prepare for possible “fast” military action in Nigeria if Africa’s most populous country fails to crack down on the “killing of Christians”.

A spokesperson for Nigeria’s presidency, Daniel Bwala, told the Reuters news agency on Sunday that the country would “welcome US assistance as long as it recognises our territorial integrity”.

“I am sure by the time these two leaders meet and sit, there would be better outcomes in our joint resolve to fight terrorism,” Bwala added.

In his post, Trump said the US would immediately cut off all assistance to the country “if the Nigerian Government continues to allow the killing of Christians”.

Earlier, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu pushed back against claims of religious intolerance and defended his country’s efforts to protect religious freedom.

“Since 2023, our administration has maintained an open and active engagement with Christian and Muslim leaders alike and continues to address security challenges which affect citizens across faiths and regions,” Tinubu said in a statement.

“The characterisation of Nigeria as religiously intolerant does not reflect our national reality, nor does it take into consideration the consistent and sincere efforts of the government to safeguard freedom of religion and beliefs for all Nigerians.”

Nigeria, a country of more than 200 million people, is divided between the largely Muslim north and mostly Christian south.

Armed groups have been engaged in a conflict that has been largely confined to the northeast of the country and has dragged on for more than 15 years. Analysts said that while Christians have been killed, most of the victims have been Muslims.

‘No Christian genocide’

While human rights groups have urged the government to do more to address unrest in the country, which has experienced deadly attacks by Boko Haram and other armed groups, experts say claims of a “Christian genocide” are false and simplistic.

“All the data reveals is that there is no Christian genocide going on in Nigeria,” Bulama Bukarti, a Nigerian humanitarian lawyer and analyst on conflict and development, told Al Jazeera. This is “a dangerous far-right narrative that has been simmering for a long time that President Trump is amplifying today”.

“It is divisive, and it is only going to further increase instability in Nigeria,” Bukarti added, explaining that armed groups in Nigeria have been targeting both Muslims and Christians.

“They bomb markets. They bomb churches. They bomb mosques, and they attack every civilian location they find. They do not discriminate between Muslims and Christians.”

Ebenezer Obadare, a senior fellow of Africa studies at the Washington, DC-based Council on Foreign Relations, agreed and said the Trump administration should work with Nigerian authorities to address the “common enemy”.

“This is precisely the moment when Nigeria needs assistance, especially military assistance,” Obadare said. “The wrong thing to do is to invade Nigeria and override the authorities or the authority of the Nigerian government. Doing that will be counterproductive.”

During its 3rd grandiose summit in Luanda that brought together a distinguished panel of leaders, including the ministers of transport from Zimbabwe and Rwanda, the secretary-general of the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), the director of strategies at Morocco’s Ministry of Transport and Logistics, the CEOs of Ethiopian Airlines and TAAG Angola Airlines, as well as representatives from the World Bank Group and the European Commission (EC), the African Union finally earmarked $30 billion for aviation infrastructure.

In his opening address, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, President of the Republic of Angola and Chairperson of the African Union (AU), stressed that Africa must invest between $130 billion and $170 billion annually to lay the foundation for sustainable growth. “We must move from words to action,” President Lourenço urged. “This summit represents a decisive step toward mobilizing the resources needed to enhance connectivity and integration across our continent.”

The ambitious investment plan strategically aims at modernizing the continent’s aviation infrastructure under the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM), according to summit reports. Lerato D. Mataboge, African Union Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy, during the high-level session on Financing and Modernizing African Civil Aviation Infrastructure to Promote Integrated Continental Airspace and Enable Free Movement Under SAATM, emphasized aviation’s pivotal role as both an engine of integration and a cornerstone of Africa’s economic transformation.

“Aviation is not merely a mode of transport,” Mataboge stated, speaking at the session. “It is a strategic engine of continental integration and a core enabler of Agenda 2063 and the AfCFTA. The Single African Air Transport Market will only succeed if we build the modern, safe, and efficient infrastructure that Africa’s growth demands.”

Citing findings from a Continental Aviation Infrastructure Gap Analysis conducted with AFCAC, ICAO, and the World Bank, Mataboge revealed that Africa needs between $25 and $30 billion over the next decade to close critical aviation infrastructure gaps. Passenger traffic is projected to triple from 160 million in 2024 to nearly 500 million by 2050, intensifying the urgency for investment.

Key funding requirements include US$10 billion for airport and aerodrome infrastructure and $8 billion for modernizing communication, navigation, and meteorological systems. The AU’s strategy aims to mobilize $10 billion in catalytic public finance to attract an additional $20 billion in private and institutional investment. Through partnerships with Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and AUDA-NEPAD, the AU is aligning investment priorities with SAATM and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

The modernization plan integrates cutting-edge technologies such as Airport Collaborative Decision-Making (A-CDM) and System-Wide Information Management (SWIM) to enable seamless continental airspace. It also incorporates renewable energy solutions at airports to attract green financing and advance sustainability goals.

“As we modernize African skies, we are doing so sustainably,” Mataboge added. “Every project we prepare is designed to meet global green standards, reduce fuel consumption and CO₂ emissions, and make African aviation an attractive asset class for the world’s growing pool of climate-focused capital.”

Mataboge reaffirmed the AU’s commitment to ensuring that a modern, efficient, and sustainable aviation network drives Africa’s economic integration, connectivity, and global competitiveness. The AU’s officials reaffirmed their focus on Africa’s most strategic priorities, including building aviation infrastructure, digital data systems, and data interoperability. The discussion underscored the importance of collaborative efforts in building a better aviation sector across Africa.

Deals and Dollars: Concrete Commitments 

The summit moved beyond dialogue to secure tangible commitments, marked by the signing of three key Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs):

– A partnership between the African Social Security Association and AUDA-NEPAD to channel African pension funds into continental infrastructure.

– An MOU with Qatar Airways establishing a $500 million endowment for renewable energy and climate-aligned industrialization.

– The establishment of the Angola Export and Trade Facility to promote regional cooperation and trade.

Ms. Nardos Bekele-Thomas, CEO of AUDA-NEPAD, reported significant progress since the previous summit in Dakar, Senegal. She announced that the AU, alongside African financial institutions, has already raised $1.5 billion to execute high-impact cross-border projects.

“The lesson from Dakar is clear: we can no longer treat financing as a fragmented market of scattered deals. We must transform it into a unified strategy,” Bekele-Thomas stated. She detailed new financial instruments, including the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa’s Project Development Fund, which has achieved a first close of $118 million and is managed by Africa50.

In his contribution, African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf emphasized that Africa is entering a new phase of self-determination, one in which the continent must take ownership of financing, planning, and implementing its own development. He underscored that infrastructure investment is not merely technical but deeply political and strategic, vital to Africa’s economic sovereignty, competitiveness, and unity. Highlighting progress made under the PIDA framework, he called for an African-driven ecosystem for development financing through domestic resource mobilization, stronger private sector participation, and greater access to climate funds.

Echoing the urgency of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, framed infrastructure investment as a deeply political and strategic imperative for Africa’s economic sovereignty. “We are shifting from a logic of assistance to a logic of alliance, where partners align their engagement with priorities defined by Africa itself,” he declared. He concluded with a powerful vision: “What we are building here are not merely roads and bridges. We are building an Africa that is connected, confident, and sovereign.”

There were special sessions designed to facilitate in-depth due diligence and accelerate projects toward financial close. The summit for Africa’s infrastructure development stands as a definitive moment, signaling Africa’s unified resolve to finance its own destiny and build the interconnected, prosperous future its people deserve.

Follow our live build-up, team news, score and text commentary stream from the final in Navi Mumbai at 09:30 GMT.

Aerial footage from Elgeyo-Marakwet County shows massive mudslides and flash flooding stretching over vast distances.

Heavy rains have triggered landslides in Kenya’s western Rift Valley region, killing at least 21 people and destroying more than 1,000 homes, according to officials.

Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for the Interior Kipchumba Murkomen, in a statement on X on Saturday, said at least 25 people with “serious injuries” have been airlifted from Elgeyo-Marakwet County to the city of Eldoret for medical attention, while at least 30 remain missing.

He said that rescue efforts would resume on Sunday, with help from the military and the police.

“Preparation to supply more food and non-food relief items to the victims is underway. Military and police choppers are on standby to transport the items,” he added.

The landslide occurred overnight in Elgeyo-Marakwet County’s hilly area of Chesongoch in western Kenya, which has been battered by heavy rains amid the country’s ongoing short rainy season.

Local Stephen Kittony told the Citizen Television station that he heard a deafening sound and, together with his children, rushed out of his house and ran in different directions.

The Kenyan Red Cross shared aerial images from the region that showed massive mudslides and flash flooding stretching over vast distances.

It said it was coordinating rescue efforts with the government, including air evacuations for the injured.

“Access to some of the affected areas remains extremely difficult due to flooding and blocked routes,” it said in a statement on X.

Aerial views show the extent of destruction in Chesongoch after heavy overnight rains triggered a landslide and flash floods.

Kenya Red Cross teams, working with the National and County Governments, are coordinating rescue and relief efforts, including air evacuations for the… pic.twitter.com/SrVmFYF5fr

— Kenya Red Cross (@KenyaRedCross) November 1, 2025

The hilly area of Chesongoch is prone to landslides, which left dozens of people dead in separate incidents in 2010 and 2012. A shopping centre was washed away in 2020 by raging floods.

Tanzania’s incumbent president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, has been re-elected with 98 percent of the vote in an election denounced by the opposition as a sham.

The government has denied that hundreds of people have been killed in a police crackdown.

So, what’s behind this crisis, and what’s next?

Presenter: Adrian Finighan

Guests: 

Tito Magoti – independent human rights lawyer and activist

Nicodemus Minde – researcher with the East Africa Peace and Security Governance Program at the Institute for Security Studies in Nairobi

Fergus Kell – research fellow with the Africa Programme at London’s Chatham House

Political Landscape & Key Contenders

Tanzania’s ruling Party of the Revolution (CCM) has dominated the country’s politics ever since its independence over 60 years ago. Incumbent President Samia Suluhu Hassan, Africa’s first female head of state, is widely expected to cruise to victory on October 29th.

In January 2025 CCM confirmed Hassan as its presidential candidate. In practice, the race is uncompetitive: Hassan’s two main competitors have been barred from standing. Tundu Lissu, charismatic opposition leader and 2015/2020 candidate of the opposition Chadema party, as well as Luhaga Mpina of ACT-Wazalendo, were both disqualified. With Hassan all but certain to win, 16 minor-party candidates who barely campaigned will fill the remainder of the ballot.

Vice-President under the late John Magufuli, Hassan reversed some of his hardline measures early on, by reopening political space and rejoining international vaccine efforts. She focused on completing mega infrastructure projects (such as roads, railways, and power) and has generally been credited with steady economic growth. Even with this, what remains undeniable is that her administration has returned Tanzania to an authoritarian style of government later in her term.

The Election Campaign Environment & Democratic Integrity

The campaign season took place under very tight restrictions and accusations of bias, with Chadema and ACT-Wazalendo effectively excluded, CCM ran largely unopposed nationally. State authorities reportedly attacked critics and journalists, by giving pro-CCM coverage nearly 24/7 while enforcing regulations to silence dissent.

For example, internet and social media were also tightly controlled: in the week before the vote Tanzania effectively banned “X” (formerly Twitter) for ordinary users, and on election day a nationwide internet blackout was reported.

For many Tanzanians and international observervers the process couldn’t be seen as anything but undemocratic. State security forces were omnipresent at rallies and polling stations; any public protests were swiftly banned. When small crowds gathered outside campaign events they were dispersed with force, and police warned that posting “inciting” political content online could lead to arrest.

Key Challenges and Threats

The election day triggered unrest in several major cities. Hundreds of young protesters took to the streets sometimes clashing violently with police. In Dar es Salaam and Mwanza demonstrators set buses and police posts on fire and security forces responded with tear gas and gunfire. Human-rights monitors reported that at least five civilians were killed (with some reports saying up to ten).

With dozens of unexplained disappearances of opposition figures and journalists in recent years, Hassan’s administration ordered an investigation into alleged abductions last year, but no official results were released. Prominent Chadema members remain on trial for “treason,” and several smaller opposition candidates were arrested in the final days just before the election. Combining these practices with the low turnout in urban areas especially among youth, suggests further loss of faith in the Tanzanian political system. All together, these threats mean that even a smooth tally would not resolve underlying tensions.

Regional & International Outlook

Regional bodies, such as observers from the African Union, the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) were present during the vote. The AU dispatched a 72-member mission led by former Botswana President Masisi and Nigeria’s ex-foreign minister Onyeama. In practice these delegations will issue preliminary statements after the vote and full reports in the coming weeks.

However, international reactions have been mixed. Most western observers have voiced sharp criticism: a statement by European Parliament members called Tanzania’s election “neither free nor fair,” and urged its global partners to defend democracy. While the U.S. and EU members’ embassies had previously expressed concern about the campaign environment, neither imposed sanctions.

By contrast, major developing powers have maintained a low profile. China and Russia, both deeply engaged economically in Tanzanian infrastructure and mining projects, have largely stuck to their policy of non-interference.

Signing a $1.4 billion deal with China for railway work and a $1.2 billion uranium mining agreement with a Russian firm this year, neither Beijing nor Moscow publicly commented on the vote, focusing instead on stable relations and continued investment. African neighbors similarly avoided direct criticism; the emphasis has been on observing procedure rather than questioning the outcome.

Future Scenarios & Implications

In the short term, this will bring continuity of policy: infrastructure projects under construction can proceed, and Tanzania’s economy, is likely to keep growing moderately, especially by investment from China and Russia, which see Tanzania as a strategic hub.. By sidelining credible opposition, the government sacrifices long-term political accountability and invites heavier criticism from human-rights NGOs.

Meanwhile, some youth activists have threatened further protests, declaring that Tanzanians are shifting into active citizens. Should street violence or international pressure grow, the election’s aftermath will set the tone for Tanzania’s next chapter. A smoothly managed outcome could cement CCM rule for years, but if the polls are viewed as a coerced victory it may instead erode trust in government and fuel future crises. Tanzania’s 2025 election shows how fragile stability without competition is. Unless the political space reopens, the country risks trading short-term order for long-term disillusionment.

Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan has been declared the winner of the country’s presidential elections amid deadly unrest which the opposition say has left hundreds of protesters dead.