TODAY

For the first time, the U.S. Air Force has publicly released imagery showing a B-1B Lancer bomber carrying an AGM-183 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon hypersonic missile, or ARRW. The development comes with the B-1B now officially slated to serve for another decade, while it has been earmarked as a hypersonic weapons test platform. For its part, the ARRW, at one point expected to be the U.S. military’s first operational hypersonic weapon, is also back from purgatory, after continued questions about its future. The Air Force now wants to develop an improved version, as well as a separate air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM).

A brief clip showing a B-1B flying with an ARRW carried on an external hardpoint was released on Edwards Air Force Base’s Instagram page recently. The emergence of the video was first brought to our attention by The Aviationist.

It is unclear when the test-flight footage was taken, and it is not directly referenced in the video, which is otherwise dedicated to the work of maintainers on different aircraft platforms at Edwards.

The B-1B was originally designed to carry external stores on up to eight external hardpoints. The Air Force had also developed special pylons that would have allowed the bombers to carry two nuclear-tipped AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) on each one. Following the end of the Cold War, the B-1Bs lost their nuclear mission and, as a result, the external pylons fell into disuse, at least as far as weapons are concerned.

However, as long ago as 2020, the Air Force detailed plans to add the ARRW to the B-1B, after the service highlighted work to expand the bomber’s ability to carry hypersonic weapons and other new stores, both internally and externally.

“My goal would be to bring on at least a squadron’s worth of airplanes modified with external pylons on the B-1, to carry the ARRW [Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon],” Gen. Timothy Ray, then head of Air Force Global Strike Command, told Air Force Magazine. He added that the service had contemplated several options for integrating the missile onto the bombers, “but we believe the easiest, fastest, and probably most effective in the short term will be to go with the external pylons.”

In the meantime, we have seen examples of the ARRW carried under the wing of the B-52H bomber during multiple test sorties, and a live version also notably appeared on a Stratofortress during a training event at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam.

The Fiscal Year 2026 budget request confirmed that the Air Force plans to use the B-1B as a testbed for the Load Adaptable Modular (LAM) pylon, intended for hypersonic weapons and other outsize loads. The B-1B can accommodate six of these pylons, each capable of carrying two 2,000-pound-class weapons or a single 5,000-pound-plus-class weapon. The ARRW would fall into the latter category.

The budget documents noted: “The Hypersonic Integration Program successfully demonstrated the B-1’s ability to execute a captive carry of a 5,000-pound-class store and the release of a proven weapon shape from a Load Adaptable Modular (LAM) pylon.” This suggests that the video we are now seeing could have been taken during this demonstration, but it might also refer to external load tests involving the Air Force’s new bunker-buster bomb, the 5,000-pound class GBU-72/B.

In the same position as seen in the ARRW video, the LAM has also been used for external carriage tests of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). More routinely, this same position mounts an external pylon that accommodates a Sniper targeting pod. The same location has previously been used in external carriage tests of the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) cruise missile, too.

As for ARRW, it carries an unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicle as its warhead. A rocket booster accelerates and lifts the vehicle to the required speed and altitude, after which it separates and glides through the atmosphere on a relatively shallow path toward its target. The weapon’s high speed and unpredictable flight path make it difficult for opponents to intercept and engage it, and give very little response time.

B52 ARRW Hypersonic evaluation test at Edwards Air Force Base 12 JUN 2019

The Air Force’s plans to move ahead with purchases of ARRWs notably re-emerged in the Fiscal Year 2026 budget proposal. The service had moved to cancel the AGM-183A in 2023, and refocus resources on the development of the air-breathing Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), but there were steady signs afterward that there was still life left in the ARRW program.

Meanwhile, in its Fiscal Year 2027 budget request, the Air Force seeks funds for the development of what it calls ARRW Increment 2, as well as to kick-start a new air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) program. The service wants almost $350 million to fund these two efforts. ARRW Increment 2 involves adding undisclosed enhanced capabilities onto the baseline weapon, while the ALBM effort would seek to field a new air-launched, long-range strike capability to complement the ARRW and HACM.

The US Air Force plans to kick off Air Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) Increment 2 development and stand up a new Air Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM) program in Fiscal Year 2027. The service has set aside nearly $350 Million combined for these two efforts. ARRW Inc 2… pic.twitter.com/pe0SKPlrDO

— Air-Power | MIL-STD (@AirPowerNEW1) April 27, 2026

In its Fiscal Year 2027 budget documents, the Air Force further notes:

“We are doubling production rates for our two developmental hypersonic weapons, the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) and the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), with a planned investment of $1.8 billion across the FYDP to accelerate delivery of these critical strike capabilities into the hands of the warfighter.”

The documents don’t give any details on how many ARRWs they want to order.

Regardless, these developments are especially notable as China continues to push ahead in the development and fielding of these capabilities, and especially ALBMs.

Despite previous plans to retire the B-1B by 2030, the bomber’s ability to carry outsize loads, in particular, has helped ensure that it’s now expected to remain in service until at least 2037.

Fiscal Year 2027 budget documents indicate that the Air Force plans to spend $342 million on modernizing its 44 remaining B-1Bs from 2027 to 2031. “This request provides the necessary funding to modernize the platform, ensuring its lethality and relevance through 2037,” the budget said.

The B-2 stealth bomber will also be modernized, as the Air Force seeks to address growing demand for bomber capacity, pending the arrival of the new B-21. The intensity of recent operations against Iran, combined with day-to-day bomber task force operations around the globe, and the growing specter of a conflict with China, underscores just how important the bomber fleet is to the Pentagon at large.

B-1s first mission to Iran out of RAF Fairford UK

With a capacity to carry more conventional weapons than any other aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory, we will surely see the B-1B carrying additional external weapons and larger numbers of them, as it continues its service career.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The US president has accused some NATO countries of not doing enough to support the US-Israel war on Iran.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte says European leaders have “gotten the message” after United States President Donald Trump announced plans to withdraw 5,000 soldiers from Germany.

Trump has grown increasingly frustrated with NATO allies, accusing them of not doing enough to support the US-Israel war on Iran. Speaking on Monday, Rutte acknowledged “disappointment from the US side”.

“European leaders have gotten the message. They heard the message loud and clear,” Rutte said before a European Political Community meeting in Armenia.

“Europeans are stepping up, a bigger role for Europe and a stronger NATO,” he added.

The Pentagon announced the troop withdrawal from Germany on Friday, days after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Iran was humiliating the US during the negotiations aimed at ending the war.

The European Union’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, called the announcement’s timing a “surprise”.

“I think it shows that we have to really strengthen the European pillar in NATO, and we have to really do more,” Kallas said while stressing that “American troops are not in Europe only for protecting European interests but also American interests.”

Over the weekend, NATO spokesperson Allison Hart said officials in the 32-nation military alliance “are working with the US to understand the details of their decision on force posture in Germany”.

‘Dangerous military intervention’

European criticism of the war on Iran has mounted in recent weeks as the conflict sends shockwaves through the global economy due to the continued disruption to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

Last week, Merz compared the war to previous military quagmires, such as the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

“It is, at the moment, a pretty tangled situation,” he said. “And it is costing us a great deal of money. This conflict, this war against Iran, has a direct impact on our economic output.”

Spain has refused to let the US launch attacks on Iran from its airspace or military bases. Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has condemned the war as “unjustified” and a “dangerous military intervention” outside the realm of international law.

In response, Trump called Spain “terrible” and threatened to end all trade ties.

Despite this, Rutte said “more and more” European nations were now pre-positioning assets such as minehunters and minesweepers close to the Gulf to be ready for the “next phase” in the war.

He provided no details, and European nations have previously insisted they would not help to police the Strait of Hormuz until the war is over.

Increased defence spending

Many European countries have committed to ramping up defence spending in the face of fears over Trump’s commitment to NATO and Russia’s assault on Ukraine – a push underscored by several leaders in the Armenian capital.

“Europeans are taking their destiny into their own hands, increasing their defence and security spending, and building their own common solutions,” French President Emmanuel Macron said.

“We have to step up our military capabilities to be able to defend and protect ourselves,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told reporters.

In one of the world’s most deprived and volatile regions, HumAngle’s reporting and experience reveal that journalists in Nigeria are not just observing suffering but are pulled into it as they try to report it. Consequently, they say, they find themselves paying out of pocket to feed the people whose stories they are trying to tell.

In theory, the profession is expected to observe some emotional distance from its sources and the stories they tell. However, that model is inoperable in conflict-affected regions of northern Nigeria and the Sahel.

Journalism here is embedded in environments shaped by violence, poverty, and dense social networks. Since these variables affect people at random, the reporter is not an outsider; sometimes, the conflict directly affects them as well. Ethical decisions are then made under pressure, repeatedly, and often without the comfort of certainty.

HumAngle operates in this space. Its work across Lake Chad, Central Africa, Nigeria’s Middle Belt, the North West, the South East, and other conflict zones forces a confrontation with a difficult question: What does ethical journalism look like when the people you report on are not just sources, but individuals whose survival may intersect directly with your presence?

The limits of imported ethics

Global journalism standards discourage payment for information, and while exceptions exist, they do so under strict editorial oversight, a clear public-interest justification, and transparency. Journalism teachers say that, though these frameworks are expected to provide clarity, they don’t in conflict-affected Nigeria, where the assumed context doesn’t apply. The ideal context has clear distinctions between sources and service providers and functioning identity systems. This is hardly obtainable in conflict-affected environments.

Dr Kabiru Danladi, a Mass Communication scholar with the Ahmadu Bello University in northwestern Nigeria, says, “Our curriculum borrows heavily from Euro-American ethical frameworks – objectivity, detachment, neutrality – principles rooted in relatively stable societies. The failure becomes evident when our graduates are deployed to cover issues that weren’t directly taught in class, or they are sent to cover conflicts in places like Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Borno, Yobe or Benue, where journalism is not just a profession but a survival exercise.”

Dr Obiora Chukwumba, a researcher and media expert in Abuja, identifies the same problem in the moral obligation created by field contact. “There is no ethical barrier to a journalist intervening on grounds of goodwill to assist a source who is in a vulnerable position,” he said.

The reality of field reporting

A fixer in Zamfara, where terror groups continue to kill, abduct, and loot, is not simply an access broker but may also translate, assess risk, and act as a negotiator in certain environments. A driver in Borno, North East Nigeria, may carry more situational intelligence than any formal briefing. An intermediary in the southeast may navigate relationships across vigilante groups and separatist networks.

These individuals are essential. Without them, our reporters’ access vanishes. But they are also embedded in the same systems the journalist is trying to understand, which creates layered risks, including legal risks that emerge when payments made for legitimate services are later interpreted as material support. 

Barrister Joseph Danboyi, a senior lawyer in Jos, North Central Nigeria, says, “Payment to a fixer creates liability if the journalist knew his connection with criminals. Ordinary payment for information is insufficient. The journalist will be aiding and abetting when payment is purposefully linked to criminal conduct.”

He goes further to add, “The practical bottom line is that a journalist who unknowingly pays a criminal for information is generally not liable… liability requires knowledge… and intent to help or further it.”

This distinction between knowledge and intent anchors the legal reality that sits beneath field decisions. 

Dr Obiora also treats fixers and access arrangements as part of newsroom operations, not automatically as ethical breaches. “Parts of the routine (investigative) costs tied to the operations of a newsroom include such services as engaging fixers, obtaining access to a reasonably considered newsmaker, and appreciation handouts,” he said. “They are all legitimate operational costs.”

There is no procedural checklist that eliminates these risks. What exists instead is a need for structured awareness and disciplined judgment in newsrooms.

The Knifar women: A case that reshapes the debate

HumAngle’s engagement with the Knifar movement brings these tensions into focus. The Knifar women are part of a grassroots movement shaped by prolonged suffering. Their husbands, sons, and brothers were detained during military operations, often for years, without trial. In many cases, these men were the primary providers, and so their absence triggered cascading consequences for these women, including food insecurity, poverty, and social fragmentation. The women organised into a pressure group to demand accountability for the detention of their male relatives.

HumAngle’s reporting amplified their efforts, influencing outcomes that ultimately led to the release of over a thousand men that the women were advocating for. 

Our work required prolonged engagement with the women, whose daily reality was defined by deprivation. In some instances, our journalists provided stipends. In other cases, some of these women became part of the reporting process as fixers and contributors with fixed incomes in our newsroom. We have even given some of them ‘additional reporting’ credit for their work. Since they are both sources and resource persons for our newsroom, we are often clear about what we are paying them for – their work, not their information. We have spoken publicly about the dynamics of our relationship with these women, including in a Pulitzer Centre-supported documentary.

Kunle Adebajo, a renowned award-winning investigative journalist, reflects on his own experience in being moved to provide money to vulnerable sources: “I’ve often had to pay vulnerable sources. This is because the majority of them live from hand to mouth and rely on wages from daily labour to get their sustenance, and so such interviews could be very disruptive and uncomfortable for them. Oftentimes, they also have to transport themselves to meet at the interview location. The sums given were trifling, and there was never an understanding that the interview itself was transactional. 

Dr Obiora agrees that the understanding must always be clear. “If the source or interviewee presents the personal need to overshadow the reason for the meeting with the journalist, then that could be a red flag,” he said, “pointing to potential compromised narrative or ‘adjusted facts’ from the source or interviewee.”

When observation is not enough

Journalists are trained not to pay sources because it could risk distortion and affect credibility, but what happens when the people you are interviewing live in destitute conditions?

“I met residents, elderly men and women who could not feed themselves, who could not afford basic healthcare. I met a father who lost his wife to a particular ailment, and whose two kids are still suffering from the same ailment. Yet, he could not help.”

The award-winning journalist said he felt compelled to help. “I offered to buy meals for some of them through my fixer. Yes, I offered them some cash to buy what they needed. When I got back to my hotel room that evening, I actually cried. I felt the depth of these people’s suffering.”

He is not unaware of the ethical grey spots in giving money to sources. “Ethically, I did not really care at that point whether offering them some cash would be seen as an inducement. I told myself that I had to act as a human being at the moment and drop the toga of ‘a journalist’ at that point.” 

Dr Danladi understands this and says that “Students must be taught that they are a journalist, yes – but they are also human beings. Refusing to help in the name of ‘objectivity’ can itself be an ethical failure.” He says that liability only becomes possible “where the journalist knows or is willfully blind to criminal activity… or where the payment itself is tied to illegal conduct.”

Another journalist from southwestern Nigeria, who declined to be named, described facing similar situations in which his sources were suffering. 

“They had had to eat rotten food sourced from the nearby markets, and sometimes they went days without eating anything because their husbands, who provided for them, had been killed. I saw that most of their children were malnourished and looked so skinny. It was such a touching situation, and I couldn’t help but give them some money that I had with me so that they could buy food and cook.”

The practice of support

Payment for content implies a transaction because it links money to information, but support that exists independently of reporting is different. It protects the integrity of the story while still acknowledging the reality of the environment.

Hauwa Shaffii Nuhu, an award-winning journalist and newsroom manager, said that though in her early days as a journalist, she could not resist the urge to help vulnerable sources, she has now learned to favour long-term external support. “Now, I connect them [the vulnerable subjects of her story] with NGOs… or make it possible for society to donate directly to them or through an independent third party like a fixer.”

In cases where reporters have to provide any form of support, journalism scholars like Obiora say documentation matters. Record decisions and rationale for such actions while in the field. According to Obiora, “one of the most important structures for documenting and reviewing ethical footprints in the newsroom is within the internal editorial space.” He proposed an Editorial Board of Line Editors, chaired by the title editor, and another layer through an Editorial Advisory Board, where “it would be necessary to bring the platform’s legal advisor as a member.”

“These steps will not protect you from state action if authorities choose to act,” a senior security official said. What they only do is to protect the integrity of your journalism, he implied. They help you draw a line between necessary support and inducement, between humanitarian assistance and conduct that could be interpreted as enabling someone directly or indirectly tied to the crime you are investigating.

The unresolved tension

Speaking more to the legal position of a source, unknown to the journalist, being tied to criminal activity, Danboyi reiterates that a journalist who unknowingly pays a criminal is generally not liable, as exposure begins when there is knowledge, or when you consciously ignore signals that should raise concern.

Consider the fixer a journalist has worked with closely. Not a transactional contact, but someone embedded in the reporting process, with days, sometimes weeks, spent together. The journalist has covered his meals, made stops at his home during fieldwork, supported him beyond the assignment, helped with school fees, and contributed when his child was ill. Then, months or years later, the fixer is named in a crime. The record of the journalist’s relation with him exists: Transfers, messages, shared locations. A traceable history of proximity that can be turned into proof of complicity.

A different kind of responsibility

The Knifar women’s story forces a reconsideration of responsibility and demands a different approach to how journalism ethics is taught and judged. “We graduate students who know the code, but cannot survive in the field,” says Dr Danladi.

Dr Obiora returns the question to dignity. “A journalist whose interaction with a source contributes to lifting the source’s dignity has discharged his or her obligation professionally.”

In environments where silence sustains suffering, the act of telling a story, and the way that story is told, carries consequences beyond journalism.

The latest escalation between Hezbollah and Israel began in early March following strikes linked to a wider regional conflict involving Iran and the United States. Hezbollah entered the conflict shortly after, positioning itself as part of a broader regional confrontation.

Since then, the group has faced significant battlefield losses, territorial setbacks in southern Lebanon, and growing domestic criticism. Israeli forces have established a buffer zone inside Lebanese territory, while large numbers of civilians have been displaced, particularly from Shiite communities that form Hezbollah’s core support base.

The conflict follows an earlier war that severely weakened Hezbollah, including the killing of its long time leader Hassan Nasrallah. Despite rearming and adapting its tactics, the group now faces mounting pressure on both military and political fronts.

Hezbollah’s Strategic Gamble
Hezbollah officials suggest the decision to re enter conflict was calculated. By aligning more closely with Tehran during a wider regional war, the group aims to ensure Lebanon becomes part of any future negotiations between Iran and the United States.

The expectation is that Iranian leverage could secure a stronger and more lasting ceasefire than previous agreements. However, this strategy carries high risks, especially as Washington has indicated that any deal with Iran may not include Lebanon.

Rising Human and Material Costs
The war has inflicted heavy casualties. Lebanese authorities report thousands killed since March, though the exact number of Hezbollah fighters remains disputed. Reports from within the group suggest losses could be substantial, with some fighters’ bodies still unrecovered in frontline towns.

Entire communities in southern Lebanon have been devastated, with villages destroyed and new graves appearing rapidly after ceasefire periods. Displacement has also intensified sectarian tensions, as affected populations seek refuge in other regions where resentment toward Hezbollah is growing.

Domestic Political Fallout
Inside Lebanon, opposition to Hezbollah’s armed status has hardened. Critics argue that its actions continue to expose the country to repeated wars. In a significant shift, the Lebanese government has engaged in direct talks with Israel, a move Hezbollah strongly opposes.

The government has also taken steps to limit Hezbollah’s military role, including banning its armed activities earlier this year. However, enforcing such measures remains difficult given the group’s entrenched influence and the risk of internal conflict.

Continuing Clashes Despite Ceasefire
Although a ceasefire announced in mid April reduced large scale fighting, hostilities have not fully stopped. Both sides continue to exchange strikes in southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah has dismissed the truce as ineffective due to ongoing Israeli attacks.

Israel maintains that its operations are necessary to eliminate threats to its northern regions and has indicated that dismantling Hezbollah’s military capacity will be central to any long term agreement.

Analysis
Hezbollah’s current position reflects a complex mix of resilience and vulnerability. While it has demonstrated the ability to regroup and continue fighting, this alone does not translate into strategic success. The group is increasingly constrained by battlefield losses, internal Lebanese opposition, and uncertainty over external support.

Its reliance on Iran introduces another layer of risk. If a broader agreement between Tehran and Washington excludes Lebanon, Hezbollah may find itself bearing the costs of a war without securing meaningful political gains.

At the same time, Israel appears determined to reshape the security landscape in southern Lebanon, potentially prolonging the conflict. Without a comprehensive regional settlement, the most likely outcome is a prolonged stalemate marked by intermittent violence and continued suffering on both sides.

With information from Reuters.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s map here.

The historic deployment of the Gerald R. Ford CSG appears to be winding down, finally. The strike group – now deployed for a record-setting 314 days – transited the Suez Canal northbound on May 1 and has reportedly begun the journey back home to Norfolk, according to the Washington Post. However, CENTCOM still has two CSGs under its command, led by USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush, positioned in the Arabian Sea together for the first time since the conflict kicked off. The second carrier provides additional flexibility to enforce the blockade, support the just-announced ‘Project Freedom’ mission to get commercial vessels out of the Persian Gulf, and, should combat operations resume, strike Iran with double the firepower.

“U.S. military support to Project Freedom will include guided-missile destroyers, over 100 land and sea-based aircraft, multi-domain unmanned platforms, and 15,000 service members,” CENTCOM stated in a release on Sunday. But reporting from the Wall Street Journal claims the plan “doesn’t currently involve U.S. Navy warships escorting vessels through the strait,” and the mechanics of the mission remain unclear. Also of note, Adm. Brad Cooper, CENTCOM’s Commander based in Florida, visited troops over the weekend.

Adm. Brad Cooper, CENTCOM commander, visited USS Milius (DDG 69), May 2, as the guided-missile destroyer patrolled regional waters in support of the U.S. blockade operations against Iran. While on board, he interacted with Sailors and addressed them on the 1MC while highlighting… pic.twitter.com/2qTmMmfY05

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) May 3, 2026

The Boxer ARG steamed northbound through the Malacca Strait on April 30, TWZ was among the first to report, and entered the Indian Ocean the following day. Boxer went dark on AIS shortly after completing the transit but, assuming a direct route to reinforce the Tripoli ARG in the Middle East, could arrive in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility sometime next week. As of publication, the ARG was still operating under U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

Continuing her scenic tour circumnavigating South America, USS Nimitz moved through the Strait of Magellan and into the Atlantic Ocean on April 26. While Nimitz’s exact position is currently unknown, pictures on DVIDS show her most recently participating in a PHOTOEX off the southeast coast of Argentina.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@teamrecurrent.io

Aaron Hardie’s brilliant all-round performance ensured Peshawar Zalmi clinched their second Pakistan Super League cricket title with a five-wicket win over newcomers Hyderabad Kingsmen, despite an early wobble in the run chase in the final.

Hardie grabbed 4-27 to bowl out Hyderabad for a below-par 129 all out in 18 overs and then hit a fluent 56 not out off 39 balls to anchor Peshawar to 130-5 in 15.2 overs, in front of a packed crowd at the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore on Sunday.

It completed a redemption arc for Peshawar’s captain Babar Azam, who finished the franchise-based T20 tournament as its leading run-scorer after finding himself in and out of Pakistan’s T20 squad in recent years.

“It’s a very big achievement for me, for Peshawar Zalmi and all the fans,” Babar said after winning his first PSL title as skipper.

“Throughout the tournament, we’ve performed really well as a team … Every player executed the plans they were given in batting, bowling, and fielding. Our plan was to go match by match.”

The crowd at the Gaddafi Stadium in Babar’s hometown chanted his name and erupted in joy when Hardie scored the winning runs for the team in yellow and pink kits.

Peshawar, who won the toss and chose to chase, had slumped to 40-4 inside the first five overs after losing Babar for a golden duck, while Mohammad Haris, Kusal Mendis, and Michael Bracewell also fell for single-digit scores.

But Hardie, who smashed nine fours, then combined in a match-winning stand of 85 runs with Abdul Samad (48), who missed out on his half-century before holing out in the deep when Peshawar needed only five runs for victory.

“It was just a great game of cricket,” Hardie said. “Kingsmen came out of the blocks really hard. They’ve certainly had a lot of momentum from the last couple of games and they carried that in, but I’m really proud of the way the boys were able to fight back.”

Peshawar were favourites for the title after losing only one game in the tournament, with Babar, who scored two centuries, equalling Fakhar Zaman’s PSL record of 588 runs in one edition of the tournament.

Earlier, Saim Ayub (54) scored a fighting half-century to help Hyderabad post 129.

Hyderabad had a productive power play of 69-2, despite Hardie having captain Marnus Labuschagne (20) caught behind off a rising delivery, and Maaz Sadaqat’s early aggression was cut short to just 11 runs when he half-heartedly pulled pace bowler Mohammad Basit to deep backward square leg in the first over.

However, Hyderabad lost momentum and crashed to 73-6 in the space of nine balls after the power play for just two runs.

The slide began when Usman Khan, coming into the final with half-centuries in the last three successive games, was trapped leg before wicket by the tournament’s leading wicket-taker Sufyan Moqim (1-23).

Irfan Khan and Kusal Perera were run out due to some sharp fielding by Bracewell, and between those dismissals, Glenn Maxwell was undone by Nahid Rana’s (2-22) pace and got caught first ball while going for a pull against the Bangladesh fast bowler.

Ayub stretched the total beyond the 100-run mark with a knock of 54 off 50 balls before he fell in Hardie’s last over as he top-edged a pull to mid-on, before the fast bowler wrapped up the innings by having No 11 batter Akif Javed caught behind.

The Australian batter, who was visibly moved to tears after leading Hyderabad into the final in a dramatic last-over win over Islamabad United in the second qualifier on Friday, admitted that his team did not post an imposing target.

“As a batting group, we probably left a few runs out there,” Labuschagne said. “We showed once again that belief in the side and what we can do, putting them four for 40, but just not enough runs on the board tonight.”

Hyderabad had a fairytale run in the tournament when they came back strongly after losing their first four league games, and also knocked out both former champions Multan Sultans and Islamabad United in the playoffs.

“Tonight hurts,” Labuschagne said. “But reflecting on what an amazing tournament we’ve put together, coming from four losses to winning four in a row, getting bowled out for 80 then winning by 100, and then winning two games to get into the final, we’ve made so many great memories and I’m just so proud of the team, it’s been an awesome effort.”

Venezuela’s recent Hydrocarbon Law reform has sparked fierce debates about its short- and long-term implications. In this essay, Blas Regnault, an energy policy analyst and researcher, offers an in-depth analysis of the new legislative framework, from the significant changes to the state’s governance over its natural resources to his perspective on a sovereign recovery of the oil industry.

The recent hydrocarbon reform: an overview

It is important to distinguish between two closely connected but analytically separate developments: first, US oversight of Venezuelan oil revenues after Maduro’s kidnapping; and secondly, the new Hydrocarbon Law itself. The first is an externally imposed mechanism that conditions oil sales, revenue collection, transport, and the distribution of oil proceeds to US interests. The second is a domestic legal reform whose constitutionality and political legitimacy have been widely questioned.

It remains unclear whether the new law is fully operative in practice, or whether it is only being applied selectively while its fiscal substance is displaced by the US revenue-control mechanism. ^{But the outcome is largely the same: a loss of fiscal automaticity and a form of fiscal sovereignty under tutelage in relation to Venezuelan oil income.}

In other words, the crisis of governance in the Venezuelan oil sector, together with its chronic lack of transparency since 2017, now culminates in a profound loss of sovereign control over all three dimensions of the business: its rentier dimension, belonging to the nation; its fiscal dimension, belonging to the state; and its shareholder dimension, linked to the role of the state oil company PDVSA as principal participant in extraction and commercialisation.

Therefore, the new law is not simply a technical reform. It is not merely about updating contracts, modernising procedures, or making the sector more attractive to investors. The deeper issue is that the reform changes the way the nation is compensated for the use of the subsoil and therefore alters the very governance of the sector. What is at stake is the relationship between sovereignty, ownership of the subsoil, and public income.

It is true that, on paper, the law formally preserves state ownership over the resource. But the business models it opens weaken the practical substance of that ownership. And that is the crucial point. Ownership is not a decorative legal formula. Ownership means that the state, acting on behalf of the nation, has the right to decide whether the resource remains underground or is extracted; and if it is extracted, under what conditions, with what public charge, and for whose benefit. The recent reform softens the link between ownership and the nation’s participation as owner of the subsoil, turning something that was once grounded in a general rule into something negotiable, adjustable, and highly discretionary.

A useful way of understanding the economic and social significance of the reform is to distinguish the different streams of public income historically associated with oil in Venezuela. Under the former hydrocarbon law, the nation participated in the oil business through three distinct channels: as owner, as tax authority, and as shareholder. The first channel, corresponding to ownership, was royalty. The second was taxation, arising from the state’s fiscal authority over the activity. The third was dividends, arising when the state participated through PDVSA and therefore received income in its capacity as stakeholder rather than as landlord or tax authority.

This distinction matters because the oil business has historically involved different claimants competing over the fruits of extraction. In a sector marked by extraordinary profitability and strategic importance, the owner of the rent, the fiscal authority, and the capitalist operator all seek to maximize their share of the value generated. In the Venezuelan framework that prevailed before 2026, those three roles were clearly present: the nation as owner of the subsoil, the state as fiscal authority, and the operator as capitalist actor. The new law alters the balance between them.

Royalty

The royalty is where the change is most revealing. As already noted, royalty is the clearest expression of ownership. It is paid upfront. It does not depend on profit. It is charged before taxes are assessed and before the remaining income covers the factors of production; that is, wages, interest, profits, and the other claimants on the project. In other words, royalty is not part of the production costs. If the oil price is 100 dollars per barrel and the agreed royalty rate is 30 per cent, the owner receives 30 dollars per barrel straight away. That is the proprietorial logic in its purest form.This has long been a battleground in the global oil industry. The dispute over rent has historically taken place between the operating companies, whether private national oil companies acting as operators, and the owner of the resource, that is, the landlord. Depending on the property-rights regime, that owner may be a private individual, as in parts of Texas, or the state, as in Venezuela and in most oil-exporting countries. Whether in Texas, Alaska, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Norway, the United Kingdom, Nigeria, or Venezuela, the property-rights regime has been the principal legal instrument through which the owner secures a share of the rent. It is a legitimate exercise of sovereignty, recognised by all parties involved in the global oil business.

And yet the new law, in practical terms, empties out that proprietorial logic by turning royalty into a negotiable variable within a range of zero to 30 per cent, something highly unusual in the global oil business. The potential scale of the loss becomes immediately clear once one thinks in terms of export volumes. At an oil price of 86 dollars per barrel, a 1 per cent royalty leaves the nation with less than one dollar per barrel, whereas a 30 per cent royalty yields 25.8 dollars. If Venezuela exports 800,000 barrels per day, that means roughly 688,000 dollars per day under a 1 per cent royalty, compared with 20.64 million dollars per day under a 30 per cent royalty. This is a dramatic compression of the owner’s income. It shows that a high oil price cannot compensate for the hollowing out of the royalty. Put simply, under the new law, higher oil prices will no longer automatically translate into greater income for the nation if royalties are arbitrarily lowered to the benefit of transnational capital. This is not a marginal fiscal concession; it is a radical compression of the nation’s proprietorial income. 

Taxes

Turning to taxes, under the previous legal framework, the fiscal regime included not only taxes on profits, but also local and municipal taxes on oil activity, together with other parafiscal charges and special contributions linked to extraordinary profits. These different channels gave the public side several routes through which to capture value from extraction. Under the new law, much of that architecture is displaced and compressed into an integrated tax on gross income that will also be set in a discretionary fashion up to a fixed ceiling. According to supporters of the reform, this new framework is designed to ensure the project’s “economic equilibrium.” But the political significance of that shift is considerable. What was previously structured through several distinct legal claims can now be more easily absorbed into a flexible package, negotiated project by project. In that sense, this is not simply simplification; it is a substantial thinning of the fiscal claim. Once the fiscal architecture becomes thinner, the public claim over oil value becomes weaker, more flexible, and ultimately more negotiable.

Table 2 illustrates the magnitude of the change using the March 16, 2026, marker Merey 16 price. Under the previous regime, taxes and parafiscal charges alone could amount to about $31 per barrel, or 36 percent of the barrel price. Under the post-reform interim scenario, that could fall to about $17.6 per barrel, or 20.5 percent.

Dividends

Finally, there are dividends arising from state equity participation, and these too must be distinguished from both royalty and taxation. Dividends are not paid because the nation owns the subsoil, nor are they collected because the state exercises fiscal authority over the activity. They arise because the state participates in the business as shareholder and therefore receives part of the profits in its capacity as investor. In other words, dividends represent the state’s participation in the profits of the business itself. But that income is not necessarily available for immediate public use in the same way as royalty or taxation. Part of it may be retained within the company, used for reinvestment, capital expenditure, debt service, or the wider financial needs of the enterprise. So, unlike royalty, which expresses ownership, or tax, which expresses fiscal authority, dividends are tied to the corporate logic of the business. Depending on the ownership structure, this channel of participation may range, illustratively, from zero to 60 per cent of distributable profits.

International jurisdiction of potential oil litigation

There is also an important jurisdictional dimension. By reducing the fiscal share captured by the state and by placing greater weight on contractual flexibility, the reform moves the sector towards a framework that is more exposed to international arbitration. At the same time, the sanctions and licensing regime has become part of a broader architecture of control over the oil business: control over access to the fields, control over marketing channels, and control over financial access to revenues. So, this is not merely a domestic fiscal reform. It is also part of a broader reordering of the legal and financial chain through which Venezuelan oil is governed.

Key takeaways

Supporters of the new law argue that it delivers increased flexibility, greater operability, improved investment prospects, and greater bankability. And that is not a trivial argument. In a country that has experienced production collapse, sanctions, institutional erosion, and a loss of market share, it is understandable that policymakers would seek a framework that appears more attractive to capital. In that sense, the reform may indeed reduce perceived risk and make projects easier to finance. It may also simplify part of the gross take and make negotiations easier. In that sense, the reform should not be caricatured. But it also entails the abandonment of each of the nation’s and the state’s historic roles in the sector, undermining the institutional fabric that once gave the oil economy a degree of stability and rationality.

For that reason, the disadvantages of the reform ultimately outweigh its potential benefits. What is lost is fiscal automaticity. That means the nation is no longer guaranteed a stable share by rule, but must now negotiate it, justify it, or recover it through more uncertain channels. Put differently, the reform replaces payment-by-rule with payment-by-negotiation on a case-by-case basis. In practical terms, each contract will generate its own conditions over each of the principal sources of public income arising from oil activity.

What is also lost is the clarity of a system in which the state charges because it owns the resource, not because the project happens to be commercially convenient. Once royalties become variable and fiscal terms are subordinated to the “economic equilibrium” of the project, the centre of gravity shifts. The guiding principle is no longer the nation as sovereign owner; it becomes the financial viability for the investor/operator. That is a profound political change presented as technical pragmatism.

In summary: the 2026 reform does not abolish formal ownership, but it hollows it out in practice. It replaces a more proprietorial fiscal logic with a more contractualized and discretionary one. That may attract investment, but it also weakens the automatic link between national ownership and national income. Whatever mechanism one chooses to emphasize, the result is much the same: 

• The nation no longer receives royalty by rule, but under externally conditioned arrangements. What is presented as flexibility is a retreat from ownership. 
• The state compresses its fiscal participation at every level. 
• The state oil company weakens its position as an investor. 

Once that happens, the central question is no longer simply, “How much is the state collecting?” but rather “Who decides, under what rules, with what traceability, and with what accountability?”

The historical context of Venezuela’s oil legislation

Venezuela’s oil history is not just a history of contracts or companies; it is a history of how the nation has tried to define its authority over the subsoil. Venezuela did not begin from the same position as many oil-exporting countries in West Asia or North Africa. It was already an independent republic when it developed its mining and hydrocarbons legislation. That matters, because it means Venezuela built a national jurisdictional framework around state ownership of mines and deposits, rather than inheriting a colonial concessionary order imposed from outside. That distinction is central.

From the early twentieth century onwards, successive legal frameworks progressively consolidated the republic’s sovereign claim over oil-bearing land. In other words, Venezuelan oil law was historically moving towards a more explicit assertion of the nation’s right to charge for the extraction of its natural wealth. This is one reason Venezuela mattered so much internationally: not only because it was a major producer, but because it became a reference point for fiscal regimes and sovereign oil governance, including later in the wider OPEC environment. In that sense, Venezuela’s experience was historically complete in a way that few other oil-producing countries were.

Nevertheless, there is a paradox surrounding the 1975-1976 nationalization of the oil industry. On paper, it ought to have marked the culmination of national control, but it did not deepen sovereignty. In practice, it helped produce a shift towards a more internationalized governance structure. The Ministry, as representative of the owner-nation, was gradually displaced by state oil company PDVSA, and PDVSA increasingly operated under a logic of global business rather than one of public sovereign rule. So instead of the owner-state speaking directly, the national oil company became the intermediary, and that had long-term consequences. Put differently, PDVSA, together with international oil capital, gained ground in the long struggle to reduce the landlord’s direct grip over rent.

This is where the historical relationship with Western transnational corporations becomes more nuanced than a simple story of foreign domination versus nationalist resistance. The issue is not merely the presence of Western companies, but the governance structures they operate under. Venezuela moved from a more classic proprietorial regime towards a more cessionary one, and later, especially in the late 1980s and 1990s, towards more liberal or non-proprietorial arrangements. The oil opening (“Apertura Petrolera”) of the 1990s is especially important here, because it reduced the fiscal burden and shifted the framework in a way that centralized the operator’s conditions. That was already a major break.

The Chávez years brought a partial reversal. The restoration of the property right was not merely ideological posturing; it was a restoration of a more classical fiscal logic, in which the sovereign character of the state take was reaffirmed. But that restoration took place amid other contradictions, including the politicization of PDVSA and the accumulation of debt. So even that phase did not resolve the deeper institutional tensions.

The 2026 reform, then, does not emerge from nowhere. It is a new chapter of a long historical movement: from national jurisdiction, to nationalization, to cessionary governance, to the oil opening, to partial reassertion, to crisis and collapse, and now to a new form of contractualization from a position of weakness. Venezuela’s oil history has been a struggle not simply over who owns the oil, but over who governs the terms on which ownership is exercised. The present reform is the latest chapter in that struggle, but it is a particularly radical one because it comes after institutional erosion and under a global order that is far more contractual, litigious, and externally structured than the one Venezuela faced in the mid-twentieth century.

Oil in the present geopolitical battle

The current geopolitical context of the US-Israeli aggression against Iran should, in principle, strengthen Venezuela’s bargaining position. When West Asia becomes more unstable, supply security rises as a strategic concern, and oil regains immediate geopolitical urgency, countries with large reserves and an established production history become more valuable. 

Venezuela has occupied that position before. Venezuelan oil played an important strategic role for the Allies during the Second World War, for example. Today, renewed disruption around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz has again tightened the market and raised the geopolitical value of accessible barrels.

That is precisely why the current outcome appears so paradoxical. If global conditions improve Venezuela’s leverage, one would expect the country to negotiate from a stronger position and to demand a larger participation. One would expect a legal framework that captures more rent, not less; that uses geopolitical scarcity to reinforce state take, not to dilute it. But the current reform, alongside the sequence of deals with foreign conglomerates, and combined with US control over revenues, seem to move in the opposite direction.

This leads to the second point: the geopolitical issue is not only price or supply. It is also about control. What is emerging is a form of sovereignty under tutelage. Venezuela may formally remain the owner of the resource, but effective control over commercialization, revenue channels, and external validation appears increasingly conditioned from outside. Whether one calls that tutelage, external supervision, or subordinated reintegration, the takeaway is the same: sovereignty over the resource is no longer identical to sovereignty over the business. Recent US licenses illustrate the point very clearly. Washington has opened the door to renewed oil transactions with PDVSA, but under Treasury oversight and with proceeds channelled into US-administered accounts. That is not normal sovereign control over national oil income.

This is where the distinction between the origin and the destination of rent becomes especially useful. Even before we ask what is done with oil income socially or politically, we first need to know how that income is generated: through what pricing, what discounts, what fiscal structure, and through which payment channels. If that first level is opaque, then both the origin and the destination of rent become politically indeterminate. In other words, the problem is not only that the country may receive less revenue. The problem is that the country may not even be able to clearly verify what it is owed, how, and why. That is a much deeper sovereignty problem.

As a result, a geopolitical context that would, in theory, favor Venezuela, sees the country re-entering global markets with weakened sovereignty, under a framework of greater flexibility for operators and less certainty for the nation. That is why the debate is no longer only about production volumes or export flows. The real debate is about the jurisdictional and political order that now governs Venezuelan oil: who authorizes, who commercializes, who arbitrates disputes, who tracks the proceeds, and who answers to the country.

What does a sovereign recovery look like?

Moving from critique to programme is difficult, and the first honest thing to say is that no one can predict the exact path ahead. Venezuela is emerging from collapse, sanctions, loss of market share, institutional erosion, and a deep social crisis. Any recovery scenario, therefore, is bound to be politically fraught. But one thing is clear: if the country does not rebuild the public intelligibility of oil income, then any so-called recovery may simply reproduce opacity, distrust, inequality, and social tension.

A sovereign recovery does not mean autarky. It does not mean excluding foreign firms, nor does it mean mechanically returning to an earlier model. It means something more precise: restoring the link between ownership, public rule, and accountable income capture. In other words, if the nation owns the resource, then the nation must be able to know, verify, and govern how value is extracted from it. That means transparency over net prices, discounts, taxes, royalties, exemptions, payment channels, and the destination of funds. Without that, there can be no recovery in any meaningful sovereign sense. It would simply be resumed extraction.

A sovereign recovery also requires stripping away some of the ideological confusion that usually surrounds debates on natural resources. As Bernard Mommer argued more than twenty years ago, the governance of natural resources is, in many ways, a more elementary question than the conventional left-right divide suggests. In the case of oil and minerals, the deeper divide is above versus below. It is the tension between those who live and work on the surface (the nation, society, the public realm) and those who make their living from the subsoil.

That is why the question of ownership comes before the question of distribution, that is, before the question of what is done with the income generated by oil activity. Only after establishing the governance over the resource and the rules over its extraction does the familiar left-right question properly arise: how that income is used, whether for social spending, public services, etc., or private accumulation. 

The first step, then, is transparency. Not as a slogan, but as an institutional obligation. Who is selling? At what net price? Under what discounts? With what deductions? Paid where? Audited by whom? These are not minor administrative questions. They are the very mechanics of sovereignty in an extractive economy. If the country cannot answer them, then the state is no longer exercising full command over its principal source of income.

The second step is to move away from excessive discretion and back towards intelligible general rules. Contracts will always matter in oil. But there is a difference between contracts operating within a strong public framework and contracts effectively replacing public rule. Once everything becomes negotiable in the name of investment or “economic equilibrium,” the public realm shrinks and the executive realm expands. That is politically dangerous in any country, but especially in one where oil historically underpinned a broader social pact.

The third step is to reconnect oil income with social legitimacy. This is not an abstract issue. It is whether oil wealth translates to salaries, living standards, public services, social protection, and some minimum sense of collective benefit. If the country enters a new extractive cycle in which more oil is produced but public income remains narrow, opaque, or externally conditioned, then social tensions are likely to intensify rather than diminish. That is why a sovereign recovery cannot be measured by production figures alone. It must be judged by whether the nation regains an intelligible and legitimate claim over the income stream.

In simple terms, the average Venezuelan citizen is aware of fluctuations in crude prices because they know they affect the national budget. Oil income is widely and legitimately perceived as income belonging to the nation, and therefore as something that ought to support public services and collective welfare. Even when that income is later misused (through corruption, clientelism, or mismanagement) the underlying perception remains: oil revenue belongs to all Venezuelans.

That is also why the current situation can be described as one of sovereignty under tutelage. The country may still be sovereign in formal terms, yet it operates under external supervision in practical terms. Unless that gap is closed, the language of recovery will remain politically fragile.

Blas Regnault is an oil market analyst and researcher based in The Hague, whose work explores how oil prices move across time and what they tell us about the global economy. Drawing on years of experience in central banking, energy research, and international consulting, he brings together political economy, business cycles, production costs, and petroleum governance in a way that is both rigorous and accessible.

He has spent much of his career studying the deeper forces behind oil price trends and fluctuations, always with an eye on the institutional and geopolitical realities of the global petroleum market. Later this year, he will publish his book, Political Economy of Oil Prices: Trends and Business Cycles in the Global Petroleum Market, with Routledge.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

US President Donald Trump has announced ‘Project Freedom’, a naval mission to escort stranded ships through the Strait of Hormuz starting Monday, warning any interference will be met “forcefully”. The move comes amid a fragile US-Iran truce, with Tehran warning it would treat US intervention as a breach.

“For the good of Iran, the Middle East, and the United States, we have told these Countries that we will guide their Ships safely out of these restricted Waterways, so that they can freely and ably get on with their business,” he said in a post on social media without specifying which countries.

The 60-day clock for President Trump to seek congressional approval for further military actions against Iran was stopped by the April 7 ceasefire, a senior White House official claimed to The War Zone Friday morning. As we previously noted, the president faced a deadline today under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 to obtain permission from Congress to continue fighting.

The White House decision comes as the now-paused war is at a stalemate, with both sides believing they can outlast the other. Meanwhile, Trump is considering options for a new round of strikes while Iranians say they have presented new plans for working toward a peace deal.

“For War Powers Resolution purposes, the hostilities that began on Saturday, February 28 have terminated,” the official told us, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the matter. “Both parties agreed to a two-week ceasefire on Tuesday, April 7 that has since been extended. There has been no exchange of fire between U.S. Armed Forces and Iran since Tuesday, April 7.”

The administration’s statement today follows War Secretary Pete Hegseth’s Congressional testimony yesterday that “the 60-day clock pauses or stops in a ceasefire.”

Under the War Powers Resolution, the use of armed forces should be terminated within 60 days unless Congress has declared war or voted to approve a 30-day extension. Since Trump formally notified Congress about the Iran war on March 2, that deadline fell today. Even though several other presidents have simply ignored the War Powers Resolution, the Trump administration is now arguing that the measure doesn’t really apply to their operation just yet.

It remains unclear how or if Congress will react. It adjourned yesterday for a week-long recess. On Thursday, the Senate rejected the latest of many resolutions intended to halt the war, The Washington Post noted. 

Republican lawmakers appear to be deferring to Trump on the issue of the War Powers Resolution. Senate Majority Leader John Thune, R-S.D., told The Associated Press on Thursday that he doesn’t plan on a vote to authorize force in Iran or otherwise weigh in.

“I’m listening carefully to what the members of our conference are saying, and at this point I don’t see that,” Thune said.

Republican Sen. Kevin Cramer of North Dakota said he’d vote for an authorization of war if Trump asked for it. But he questioned if the War Powers Act, passed during the Vietnam War era as a way for Congress to claw back its power, is even constitutional.

“Our founders created a really strong executive, like it or not like it,” Cramer said.

Shield AI revealed a revised planform configuration and new details about its extremely ambitious X-BAT jet-powered autonomous stealth ‘fighter’ drone at April’s Sea-Air-Space 2026 convention, as detailed by TWZ. At the event, I was able to speak at length with Armor Harris, the chief designer of X-BAT, who was keen to discuss the status of the project. You can read TWZ’s original deep dive exclusive interview with Harris that was published when X-BAT first emerged from the shadows last October here.

The tail-sitting X-BAT, designed to take off vertically and land the same way, is planned to start vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) testing before the end of this year. Harris explained how it is designed to fly combat missions under the control of the company’s Hivemind artificial intelligence “pilot” and how Shield AI has designed-in payload bays that are roughly the same size as those found on the F-35, which will enable it to carry many of the same weapons as the stealthy crewed fighter.

The X-BAT concept is aimed to disrupt not just the budding advanced autonomous drone marketplace, but parts of the fighter market too. So much hangs on the VTOL element that the airframe is designed around, so to say that a lot is riding on those tests is an understatement.

Here is the full interview from the show floor at Sea-Air-Space:

Meet The Man Behind The X-BAT Autonomous VTOL Fighter Drone

Iran protests as Trump announces ‘Project Freedom’ to escort stranded ships out of the Strait of Hormuz.

Thousands of protesters gathered in India’s northeastern Manipur state to mark three years since ethnic violence erupted in May 2023 between the majority Meitei and minority Kuki-Zo communities. The conflict, driven by disputes over land and political power has killed nearly 260 people and displaced around 60,000.

After years of high-tempo operations in the Middle East, the Israeli Air Force is set to get two new fighter squadrons, one each of the F-15IA and the stealthy F-35I Adir. This will bring the total of F-35I squadrons to four and will add a second squadron of F-15IAs. While the numbers involved were not stated, the IAF has recently bolstered its fighter inventory in the form of 25-aircraft squadrons. This is almost certain to be the case here, too, which would provide the service with an additional 25 examples of each type, for an eventual inventory total of 100 F-35Is and 50 F-15IAs.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense confirmed on its official social media channels that, over the weekend, the country’s Ministerial Committee on Procurement approved its plan to simultaneously procure two new fighter squadrons.

“The scope of the deals is estimated at tens of billions of shekels and includes the integration of the squadrons into the Air Force, comprehensive support, spare parts, and logistics,” the ministry said.

In a statement today, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referenced the two new squadrons. He also noted that, as part of Israel’s investment in military independence through domestic production of armaments and defense technology, the country “will develop groundbreaking Israeli-made aircraft.” He provided no further details about this project, although a fighter, along the lines of the failed Lavi, or even more likely, some kind of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) type drone, is a possibility, as are different types of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. We also know of the existence of at least one secretive Israeli drone, referred to as RA-01 and used for covert missions, and further developments along these lines should not be ruled out. We are trying to get clarity on this aspect of the announcement.

Now that the acquisition has been approved by the Ministerial Committee, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense has authorized its procurement delegation in the United States to proceed with signing the deals with U.S. government and military officials “in the near future.”

Neither a delivery timeline nor the likely costs of the deals have been specified.

In a statement, Israeli Minister of Defense Israel Katz explained that the two-squadron procurement is driven by “operational lessons learned from the campaign against Iran [that] require us to accelerate our force buildup.”

Israel and the United States launched airstrikes on Iran on February 28, but a ceasefire has been in place since April 8. While the U.S. Navy maintains a blockade of ⁠Iranian ports, the IDF remains heavily engaged in fighting in Lebanon.

According to Katz, the Israeli campaign against Iran, Operation Lion’s Roar, “again demonstrated the power of the Air Force and its crucial role in safeguarding the security of the State of Israel. The operational lessons learned from this campaign compel us to continue accelerating our force development to ensure the Air Force’s superiority in the decades to come.”

As well as operations against Iran, Israeli aircraft have also conducted strikes against Iranian-backed Hamas militants in Gaza and Hezbollah militants in Lebanon following the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel. Long-range strikes have also been flown against targets in Syria and Yemen in recent years.

“The procurement of these squadrons is a central part of the ‘Magen Israel’ program, which is designed to ensure the Israel Defense Forces maintains a sustained qualitative edge,” Katz added. “Our mission is clear: to stay one step ahead of our enemies.”

Magen Israel — Israeli Shield in Hebrew — includes other investments, too. As well as the new additional new fighters, it will provide funding for what is described as “a technological leap forward in the development and integration of autonomous flight capabilities, next-generation advanced defense systems, and the establishment of Israeli military superiority — both defensive and offensive — in space.”

The Magen Israel initiative has been approved by Prime Minister Netanyahu and the defense minister and will provide a budget of close to $120 billion over the next 10 years. Some of the funding for the new aircraft will almost certainly come from the United States, which delivers billions of dollars in military funding to Israel each year, largely tied to American weapons. Since October 7, 2023, Washington has surged tens of billions of dollars more, fast-tracking arms to the IDF.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amir Baram, the director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, described the procurement as the “first and central step in implementing […] force buildup for a challenging security decade.”

“In the face of evolving threats in the region and alongside immediate procurement for wartime needs, we are committed to acting now to ensure the IDF’s military superiority even a decade from now and beyond,” Baram continued. “Operation Lion’s Roar has once again demonstrated the crucial importance of the strategic partnership between Israel and the U.S. and the need for advanced air power. The combination of the two squadrons’ distinct capabilities will provide the Air Force with full flexibility to address a wide range of combat scenarios.”

Israel signed a contract, with a ceiling of $8.58 billion, for its first 25 F-15IAs in December last year. These will be the first new Eagles that the country has acquired since 1999, when it received the last of its 25 F-15I Ra’am jets.

That contract covered the design, integration, instrumentation, test, production, and delivery of 25 new F-15IAs, with an option for an additional 25, which Israel will now exercise.

Work on the first batch of F-15IAs is expected to be completed by the end of 2035. The aircraft will almost certainly feature extensive Israeli-specific modifications, as was the case with previous Eagles, especially when it comes to electronic warfare, weapons, and communications systems.

In August 2024, Israel was given U.S. approval to buy as many as 50 F-15IAs, as well as upgrade its existing F-15Is as part of an overall package valued at $18.82 billion that you can read about here.

In the past, the Israeli Ministry of Defense has said that deliveries of the F-15IAs would start in 2031, with between four and six aircraft being supplied annually.

The status of the plan to upgrade the F-15I fleet is unclear, but the additional F-15IAs will likely be earmarked for replacing the older F-15A-to-D Baz, two squadrons of which are still active.

The Baz is used for both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, but these are mainly very old jets, with the first examples having seen combat as long ago as 1979. These jets have been successively upgraded and also bolstered through transfers from U.S. Air Force stocks. They have also been heavily employed in recent combat operations.

The Baz fleet is highly illustrative of the fact that the IAF has been working at a considerable tempo for the last few years, something that has clearly put immense stress and additional hours on its fighters, some of which are 50 years old.

For Israel, the F-15 in general is prized for its long range and impressive stores-carrying capabilities. As well as significant ‘magazine depth,’ the latest versions of the F-15 also have a notable ability to carry outsize weapons, including hypersonic missiles, another feature of the jet that will be of particular interest to Israel. The IAF is increasingly reliant upon air-launched ballistic missiles and other air-launched standoff weapons, for which the F-15 is an ideal launch platform.

The Baz is used for both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, but these are mainly very old jets, with the first examples having seen combat as long ago as 1979. Successively upgraded and also bolstered through transfers from U.S. Air Force stocks, these jets remain very valuable to the Israeli Air Force, as demonstrated by their prominent role in recent combat operations.

Meanwhile, the F-35I is increasingly becoming a mainstay of the IAF for a range of combat missions both in close proximity to Israel and over much greater distances.

In 2023, Israel opted to buy a third squadron of F-35Is, covering 25 more jets worth approximately $3 billion, and expand the Adir fleet to 75 aircraft. This batch of jets is scheduled to be delivered starting in 2028.

Israel announced in May 2018 that it had become the first operator to use the jet on offensive operations and, since then, it has also recorded success in aerial combat against Iranian drones.

In recent months, the IAF’s two Adir squadrons have demonstrated the jet’s flexibility by scoring the F-35’s first aerial victory against a crewed aircraft, bringing down an Iranian Yak-130 Mitten combat trainer over Tehran. The type has also been flying strike sorties, including with external ordnance, demonstrating the F-35’s so-called ‘beast mode,’ featuring heavier loads on underwing pylons.

Carrying external stores erodes the F-35’s valuable stealth characteristics in return for providing a considerably larger payload. For many of the kinds of missions that the IAF flies, especially against opposition with little to no meaningful air defense capabilities, such a tradeoff is well worthwhile.

As we have described in the past, there are strong arguments for Israel to pursue a policy of procuring a mix of fighters:

“Buying the F-15IA and F-35I will provide the Israeli Air Force with two complementary platforms, both of which are among the most capable anywhere in the world, especially when it comes to long-range strike. Israeli F-15s, in particular, are also used for forward networking and command and control nodes, vital for managing long-range operations. On the other hand, both the F-15IA and F-35I are also more than efficient for air defense, including against drone threats, as well as air-to-ground operations closer to Israel, such as the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon.”