TODAY

When Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva scored his surprise election victory on Sunday, winning an unprecedented fourth term in office, his supporters were euphoric.

The joy they felt over Lula’s victory has echoed across large parts of the Global South – and could restore some hope to the grouping that has sought to give emerging countries a greater stake on the world stage, the BRICS alliance.

At a time when United States President Donald Trump is seeking to reassert US power and has cast BRICS as a threat to US interests, Lula’s victory in Brazil offers the alliance a measure of political reassurance, experts say.

A win by his rival, Flavio Bolsonaro, could have threatened Brazil’s commitment to the bloc, given his links to Trump and calls to reconsider the country’s role in BRICS.

Instead, Lula’s return gives the grouping one fewer reason to fear a retreat from within – as it continues to help forge a more multipolar future for a world dominated by the US.

As Esmat Zaidan, professor of public policy at Qatar’s Hamad Bin Khalifa University, told Al Jazeera, “The victory of Lula is important to BRICS’ political continuation in the current climate as it seeks to increase the bloc’s role and make it stronger in global governance.”

A spared fracture

It was clear to analysts that Lula’s win would safeguard the continuation of the BRICS alliance, while under Bolsonaro, its future may have floundered.

Lula himself was one of the architects of the bloc when it was founded nearly two decades ago, and has sought to advance its role on the global stage.

According to Zaidan, Bolsonaro’s desire to reconsider Brazil’s participation in BRICS and instead pursue closer alignment with Washington would have weakened the bloc’s political cohesion and potentially slowed cooperation on trade and financial reform.

Bolsonaro had reportedly also promised the US Trade Representative that Brazil’s Pix instant payment system would stay out of non-Western payment schemes, as the US seeks to safeguard global dominance of the dollar, said Imran Khalid, a geostrategic analyst and senior fellow at Foreign Policy in Focus.

“BRICS makes decisions by consensus, so one unwilling founding member can slow everything down from the inside. That was the real risk, more than Brazil walking out,” Khalid told Al Jazeera.

Still, Zaidan cautioned that continuity of the alliance does not amount to total unity within.

“The member countries of BRICS have distinctly different economic interests and geopolitical goals,” he said. “Therefore, while Lula’s victory makes it easier for the BRICS bloc to continue working towards a common agenda, his election did not eliminate these distinct differences.”

Guy Burton, a geopolitical and policy analyst, agreed that the bloc’s differences will remain unchanged with Brazil’s election result.

“BRICS matters because it represents a large share of the world’s population, economy and trade. But it has never really acted as a political unit. Its members are too different,” he said.

“The bloc now includes Iran and the UAE, which sit on opposite sides of the current war. That tells you how limited its cohesion is,” Burton added.

More multipolarity, but not a counterweight to Washington

The apparent relief in the Global South to Lula’s win reflects a broader concern among many emerging economies about their exposure to decisions made in Washington, “particularly regarding trade, tariffs and international economic relations,” said Zaidan.

“For these countries, the issue is not necessarily opposition to the US. It is about having greater room to make independent decisions and avoiding excessive dependence on any single global power,” he said.

Khalid pointed to China and Russia’s support for Lula, with Xi Jinping backing him against outside interference, and the Kremlin praising his work for the BRICS alliance.

“Most of these countries do not want a fight with the United States; they want the freedom to say no to Washington without being punished for it,” he explained.

“A strong Brazil inside BRICS helps protect that freedom.”

Lula has long advocated for a more multipolar international system, in which emerging economies have a stronger voice when it comes to shaping international rules and institutions, added Zaidan.

Burton said even countries and regions beyond the Global South are looking to lessen their reliance on  Washington, including Europe, which is building its own security against Russia and in support of Ukraine.

“So states, whether in the Western camp or not, have accepted that they must pursue their own interests. That means working with whoever they can. We are moving into a genuinely multipolar world,” he said.

Still, BRICS’ diversity and its member states’ varied interests have meant it has never been a coherent counterweight to the West, experts said.

Many in the alliance maintain strong economic and security relationships with the US, said Zaidan.

“I would see Lula’s victory as strengthening the case for strategic autonomy rather than confrontation with Washington,” said the professor.

“BRICS is potentially more effective when it expands the choices available to its members, rather than defining itself simply through opposition to the United States.”

Burton agreed, pointing to Brazil’s changing ties with Trump over the years.

“Russia and China are the obvious US rivals. But India under Modi long had a close relationship with Washington, and with Trump in particular, even if that has weakened recently,” he said.

“Brazil, too, was close to Trump under Jair Bolsonaro, Flavio Bolsonaro’s father, when he was in office.”

Challenging dollar dependence

Among the BRICS’ many ambitions is to promote trade in local currencies rather than the US dollar – and Lula’s victory could provide the political foundation to build on these efforts, said Zaidan, given that Brazil is one of the largest trading economies in the bloc.

Khalid said that after the alliance scrapped the idea of a common BRICS currency at its most recent summit in New Delhi in September, its ambition for trade in local currencies has become far more viable.

“If the [BRICS’ New Development Bank] moves towards its goal of 30 percent of lending in member currencies, and Brazil and China settle more trade in reais and yuan as they agreed in 2023, reliance on the dollar falls step by step, without an open confrontation,” he explained.

But Zaidan said that political will alone is not enough.

“Countries also need reliable payment infrastructure, sufficient currency liquidity, appropriate financial regulations, and businesses willing to use these arrangements,” he said.

For now the dollar reigns supreme in foreign exchange transactions, and there may be no tipping point for another decade or so, Burton said.

Ultimately, though, Lula’s victory could help BRICS move from political discussions towards more practical financial cooperation, while reducing dollar dependence will be “gradual, uneven and driven as much by economic feasibility as by geopolitical ambition”, said Zaidan.

How Washington reacts to this is another variable; Trump’s government sits at the contradiction of wanting to remain the world’s superpower, while also retreating to a more protectionist America-first role, said Burton.

“Developments such as Lula’s re-election will only sharpen the pressures already building in the Global North,” said the expert.

Almost 45 percent of Israelis had cast a ballot by mid-afternoon, but questions have been raised about possible voter suppression in Arab towns.

Almost 45 percent of Israeli voters had cast a ballot by mid-afternoon on Tuesday, according to Israel’s Central Elections Committee, marking the highest election turnout by 2pm (12:00 GMT) in 50 years.

The figure was 6 percent higher than at the same time in the last elections in 2022.

Mitchell Barak, a pollster and former aide to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, told Al Jazeera that voter turnout “is really high and that’s good”.

“I think … it will probably pass its historic peak in ‘73 – when Israel was also involved in a huge war – so draw what conclusion from that you will,” he added.

The election is largely seen as a referendum on Netanyahu’s handling of the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks and the wars that followed, the most intense period of combat for Israel since the 1973 surprise military campaign by Egypt and Syria.

“Those numbers are going to help the incumbent parties,” Barak said, “as the 3.25 percent threshold a party needs to get into the Knesset remains, the number of votes you need to meet that threshold increases dramatically.”

Israeli officials noted that several polling stations had faced exceptionally long lines, which were attributed to high voter turnout despite rainy and blustery weather in parts of the country, and a flood warning in some areas.

Arab vote

In a message more than five hours after polls opened, Netanyahu urged supporters to vote, saying turnout was high among his opponents on the left and among Palestinian citizens of Israel, about a fifth of the population.

“We need it to be high too. You all need to stream to the polls,” he said. “This is a fateful moment.”

Netanyahu had repeatedly warned supporters of the prospect of high turnout among Palestinian citizens in Israel ahead of the vote, seeking to mobilise his base under the slogan “the right or Palestine”.

Those voters were casting ballots in “unprecedented” numbers, Palestinian candidate Ahmed Tibi said.

Netanyahu and his main rival Gadi Eisenkot have ruled out partnering with Arab parties, citing a lack of shared values, although some possible scenarios envision them propping up a minority government to ensure Netanyahu is removed from office.

Meanwhile, an Israeli rights group has filed a complaint with the country’s election commission warning that widespread delays could be suppressing the vote among Israeli Palestinians.

Though delays could be a result of high voter turnout, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) said in its complaint to the Central Elections Committee that delays had been reported in at least 18 communities. It asked the committee to investigate “whether these delays are deliberate.”

The ACRI also reported “a large presence” of police and National Guard officers at a polling station in the Negev Desert, raising concerns that officers were using crowd control as a pretext to prevent people from entering to vote.

Strikes hit a major bridge in the Ukrainian capital as leaders push for ‘direct discussions’ to end the war.

Russia has attacked transport infrastructure in Ukraine’s capital, targeting a major bridge, as the leaders of Finland and Norway held a rare call with Russian President Vladimir Putin and a separate one with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Officials in Kyiv said the South Bridge was hit in overnight attacks on the city ⁠⁠that included 16 ballistic missiles and more ⁠⁠than 280 drones. Zelenskyy said Russian forces struck again while emergency crews were still dealing with the aftermath of the initial strikes.

“This is a serious escalation in Russia’s campaign targeting our logistics,” he said.

Russian attacks also caused deaths and injuries in the cities of Kharkiv and Pavlohrad.

Russia’s Defence Ministry said on Telegram that its forces had targeted transport infrastructure in Kyiv and a logistics hub in the Kharkiv region, along with industrial sites and cargo vessels it said were serving military purposes.

Officials in the Russian-controlled part of Ukraine’s southeastern Zaporizhzhia region said a drone strike on a bus killed one person and injured 30 others.

One person was also killed and six others were wounded in a drone attack on the Russian city of Bryansk, near the Ukrainian border.

The attacks come as the warring sides prepare for talks. On Friday, Kyiv and Moscow said they had agreed to hold United States-mediated technical meetings in Abu Dhabi in early November.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store called Putin from Helsinki on Tuesday to convey messages on future negotiations ahead of the Abu Dhabi meetings, according to a statement from both governments.

Zelenskyy, who spoke to the pair afterwards, said on X that they had told Putin real steps were needed to de-escalate attacks on Ukraine’s energy facilities and infrastructure. He said they also discussed preparations for the November talks.

“There must be peace, de-escalation is needed, and Russia must stop dragging out the war,” he said.

In the Finnish-Norwegian statement, Stubb said the war’s outcome would directly affect the security of Finland and Norway, both of which border Russia, and of Europe more widely.

“Ending the war requires direct discussions,” he said.

Store said the two leaders had stressed the importance of de-escalation during the call.

Both leaders said they spoke for their own countries, not Europe, and that Finnish and Norwegian support for Ukraine would continue.

Most Western European leaders have avoided direct contact with Putin since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022.

The calls come amid a renewed US push to end the war. The two governments described Tuesday’s call, held in consultation with Ukraine, as a follow-up to talks in Oslo on October 20 with Zelenskyy and US special envoy Steve Witkoff.

Witkoff met Putin in St Petersburg the next day, after which the Kremlin said it was ready to resume US-mediated talks with Kyiv that stalled in February.

US President Donald Trump has also credited his wife, First Lady Melania Trump, with securing a localised ceasefire in the southern Kherson region, which took effect on Tuesday to allow aid into the Russian-controlled town of Oleshky.

The Ballon d’Or is football’s most prestigious individual honour. On Monday, Bayern Munich striker Harry Kane became the first Englishman to win it since Michael Owen in 2001. But his victory also raises a fundamental question about the award: How can individual excellence be fairly assessed in a team sport?

For much of the past two decades, that question has been overshadowed by the extraordinary rivalry between Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo. From 2008 to 2017, one or the other won the Ballon d’Or every year, turning the annual award into a contest between the two superstars. Messi eventually accumulated a record eight trophies and Ronaldo five, together accounting for 13 of the 17 awards presented between 2008 and 2025.

Their rivalry generated unprecedented excitement around an award first presented in 1956, when England’s “wizard of the dribble”, Sir Stanley Matthews, became its inaugural winner. But it also pushed several important questions into the background. Has the growing commercialisation of the Ballon d’Or distracted from its purpose? Why does it overwhelmingly reward attacking players? And why does a supposedly global award remain so heavily focused on European football?

The commercialisation of the Ballon d’Or reflects the transformation of football into a global entertainment industry, in which individual players have become brands in their own right.

“The whole dynamic of the Ballon d’Or has changed because the dynamic of the sports and entertainment industry has changed with the way individual athletes are marketed,” Steve Martin, founding partner of MSQ Sport + Entertainment, formerly of M&C Saatchi, told The Athletic.

“They’ve found a way as an individual athlete or player to build their own profile and their own fanbase, as opposed to relying on their clubs. They control their own destiny, and they market themselves.”

Former Switzerland defender Ramon Vega has been more critical of this development. “The commercialisation and monetisation of this award is not taking it in the right direction,” he told the writer.

The Ballon d’Or has undoubtedly become a bigger spectacle, but the attention surrounding the award should not obscure the question of what constitutes individual excellence. And commercialisation is not its only problem. The award has also long favoured players in attack over those in other positions.

A goalkeeper’s or defender’s performance is as important as that of midfielders and strikers, in a sport where a team is supposed to be as great as the sum of its parts. Yet Russia’s Lev Yashin remains the only goalkeeper to have won the award, in 1963, while Italy’s Fabio Cannavaro was the last defender to do so, in 2006, after captaining his country to World Cup victory. Germany’s Franz Beckenbauer and Matthias Sammer were among the few other defenders to have received the honour.

“Goalkeepers and defenders are also part of the spectacle. Attackers don’t just play amongst themselves,” Cannavaro told France Football after winning the award in 2006. “If a goalkeeper has saved 15 or so matches in a year, it’s only fair to highlight him.”

But the Italian’s observations have done little to change the pervasive bias of voters for the award, as strikers and midfielders on the European club and national team stage remain the yardstick for measuring global excellence.

That focus on European football points to another longstanding weakness of the Ballon d’Or: Its failure to adequately recognise outstanding players from elsewhere in the world.

For nearly four decades after the award was established, only European players were eligible to win it. This was a great injustice to exceptional footballers from other continents, even those competing in Europe’s leading leagues. The late Diego Maradona was perhaps the most notable victim of this exclusion.

The restriction was finally lifted in 1995, allowing players of any nationality at European clubs to compete for the prize. It took another 12 years, until 2007, for the award to be opened to players competing anywhere in the world.

It could be argued that when the award began, the club and national team game outside Europe was beyond the close observation and expert knowledge of the Ballon d’Or selectors. But that argument no longer holds water. Knowledge of the global game has grown exponentially, yet recognition of excellence beyond Europe’s leading competitions remains limited.

When Liberia’s George Weah became the first non-European player to win the Ballon d’Or in 1995, following outstanding performances for Paris Saint-Germain and AC Milan, his victory was expected to open the door for exceptional players from parts of the footballing world that had long been denied recognition.

But 31 years on, the former president of Liberia remains the only person outside Europe and South America to have won it.

“When I started playing football, I never thought I would ever win the Ballon d’Or and emerge as the best player in the world. I just had a passion for the game and I worked hard. Every day. I would rather train than eat or sleep,” Weah told the writer in Monrovia.

“I am surprised that no other African player has won the award since I did so. I think there have been others that deserve to win. But it is down to those who select the winners.”

Cameroon’s Samuel Eto’o, the former Barcelona and Inter striker, now president of his country’s football federation, is one person with a right to feel aggrieved that he didn’t win the award before retiring in 2019.

“It’s difficult to understand how Samuel Eto’o never won the Ballon d’Or with the impressive career he had,” Jose Mourinho, who managed Eto’o at Inter, said in a 2019 interview with Cameroon Radio.

“He played in three Champions League finals, winning two with Barcelona and scoring in both finals. He also won one Champions League at Inter and won many league titles. He was the best striker in the world for several years, and I think he deserved a Ballon d’Or, but these are things out of our control.”

Eto’o’s omission, like Weah’s continued status as the only African winner, raises questions about how the award’s selectors and voters assess the achievements of players from outside football’s traditional European and South American powerhouses.

The Ballon d’Or already has an international voting panel, with journalists from 100 countries selecting the winner from a shortlist of 30 players. But geographical representation among voters does not necessarily translate into recognition of the world’s footballing talent.

France Football, the award’s organisers, should ensure that the process of selecting nominees and winners draws on a genuinely global understanding of the game and gives due recognition to exceptional players, regardless of nationality or where they compete.

The award must also address its other shortcomings. Football is a team sport in which goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders and strikers all contribute to success, and individual recognition should reflect that. Nor should the growing commercial appeal of the Ballon d’Or distract from the footballing achievements it was created to honour.

The Ballon d’Or should be a celebration of individual excellence across all positions and all continents, not an award dominated by football’s biggest stars and Europe’s leading competitions. Only then can it truly claim to recognise the best footballer in the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The opening pair put on 133-run partnership as India chased down 199 to wrap up the five-match T20I series.

An aggressive partnership between Abhishek Sharma and Vaibhav Sooryavanshi propelled India to a six-wicket win and a series victory over New Zealand in Wellington.

India sewed up the five-match Twenty20 International (T20I) series on Tuesday with two games to spare, chasing down New Zealand’s total of 198 in just 13.2 overs, with Abhishek blasting 113 and Sooryavanshi 45.

The opening pair’s 133-run partnership in just 7.1 overs obliterated the New Zealand bowling attack with one of the most destructive partnerships in T20I history.

Jacob Duffy’s first over went for 26 runs, and the openers never let up.

Abhishek hit nine fours and 11 sixes in his 38-ball knock, receiving a standing ovation when he eventually fell to the bowling of Kyle Jamieson.

By that stage, India had reached 178-2 in just 10 overs.

“The key was pretty simple: Vaibhav and I enjoyed our time,” Abhishek said of their partnership.

“When we were fielding, we saw there was some extra bounce. Vaibhav started off well, and we took the momentum from there.”

Sooryavanshi was promoted to open alongside Abhishek after batting at number three in the second T20I, hitting four fours and four sixes in his 19-ball innings.

“Getting 100 in five overs – I have not seen that before at the international level,” India captain Shreyas Iyer said.

“Credit where it is due, the way they played was exceptional.”

India won the toss for the third time in three matches and again elected to bowl.

Bhuvneshwar Kumar and Arshdeep Singh extracted prodigious seam from the pitch, beating the outside edge of New Zealand openers Tim Seifert and Finn Allen.

Seifert was removed top-edging Singh for two, before Daryl Mitchell joined Allen and combined for an 86-run partnership.

Mitchell was quick to assess the conditions and moved around the crease to counteract the seam movement.

He seized on any short deliveries with powerful strikes to the short square boundaries, hitting five fours and five sixes on his way to 89 from 52 balls.

Allen made 40 from 25 balls before departing, and Mitchell found another powerful partner in Bevon Jacobs, who hit an unbeaten 39 from 23 deliveries.

The fourth T20I is at Auckland’s Eden Park on Friday.

Mao founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and ruled through tumultuous decades in the 1960s and 1970s.

His attempt at rapid industrialisation, which he called the Great Leap Forward, led to a famine that killed tens of millions. Then came the Cultural Revolution: a violent purge of anyone seen as a threat to Communism, which included Chinese intellectuals, landowners, artists and often rivals within the Party.

His death in 1976 brought a new era for China, which began to open its doors to the global economy. Even as the country moved away from Mao’s rule, he continued to be hailed by the party as a national icon whose legacy was beyond reproach.

So jokes or memes about Mao are seen not just as an insult to the party but also its closely-guarded narrative about the country’s past.

It’s unclear when the Mbappé meme involving Mao began but the nickname – “the dictator” – has made the striker the subject of many memes and jokes online.

In 2024, he sued a French influencer and kebab shop owner for using his name in the description of one of the shop’s sandwiches, leading to more jokes about the nickname.

France team-mate Ousmane Dembele jumped on the trend during the 2026 World Cup, calling Mbappé Mobut – a reference to Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator who ruled the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, for three decades.

In an interview with France Football in September, Mbappé acknowledged the light-heartedness behind many of these memes, but said they “sometimes reveal a lack of political and human awareness among people”.

“There’s a side that’s a bit less funny, because we know the damage people like that have caused throughout history,” he said.

“Being compared to people who murder others, or who have made millions upon millions of people miserable… I don’t think I’ve done that in my life.”

Additional reporting by Fan Wang and Osmond Chia

Developments in the Gulf since the beginning of this year have raised fundamental questions about the security of the region in general and Qatar in particular. How can Qatar and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states become effective, independent military powers that do not rely on external security guarantees to ensure their safety?

The question for Qatar is how it can build, over the next five years, a national defence capability that would enable it to protect the state and its vital interests even in the absence of Gulf or regional support, or if the United States provides only limited assistance. The aim is to explore whether Qatar can achieve what might be described as defence autonomy, rather than isolation. In other words, Qatar should remain open to alliances and partnerships without making its security dependent on the decisions of another state.

Qatar is a small country in terms of geography and population, but it enjoys numerous advantages. It has highly valuable critical infrastructure, a sensitive geographical location and an economy that depends heavily on the uninterrupted flow of energy exports, trade and shipping to almost every part of the world. At the same time, it possesses substantial financial resources, extensive international relationships, a major military base hosting US forces, advanced air defence capabilities and a network of political relationships that give it influence beyond its physical size.

These advantages, however, do not amount to “strategic autonomy”. In a major crisis such as the one the region has been experiencing for several months, Qatar’s protection remains heavily dependent on the US. Nor does reliance on the collective capabilities of the GCC provide sufficient assurance that its member states would be able, or willing, to take risks in defence of another member.

Against this backdrop, Qatar’s policy objective over the next five years should be to design and build an independent national strategy based on the capacity to prevent threats, withstand attacks and maintain continuity. The goal should be to achieve defence autonomy, rather than to build an army capable of confronting a major regional power on its own.

Such a strategy would rest on six pillars:

• Air and missile defence
• Early warning capabilities and information sovereignty
• Protection of critical infrastructure
• Air and naval power
• Cybersecurity and electronic warfare
• Restructuring security and military policy around the principle of multiple security guarantees rather than dependence on a single guarantor

Defence autonomy

Qatar does not need to exhaust its resources building the capabilities required to fight an all-out war alone against a major regional power, regardless of which power that might be. Such an ambition would be unrealistic for a country with limited territory and population.

A more realistic objective is to achieve a degree of defence autonomy appropriate for a small state such as Qatar. This means being able to perform a number of essential tasks without waiting for assistance from others.

These include, but are not limited to:

• Detecting threats and identifying their nature before they reach Qatari territory
• Delaying or absorbing an initial strike
• Protecting the country’s leadership and strategic centres
• Maintaining energy and water supplies, electricity, communications, ports and airports
• Keeping political and economic activities functioning during a crisis
• Imposing sufficiently high costs on an aggressor to force it to reconsider its calculations
• Withstanding a prolonged crisis without making the state’s continued functioning conditional on the arrival of external forces

To carry out these tasks effectively, the strategy should focus on the following priorities:

First: Building an integrated Qatari air defence shield

This is the most important gap that needs to be addressed. Possessing advanced fighter aircraft and air defence systems is not enough to make Qatar militarily autonomous. What is needed is an integrated national air and missile defence system.

The objective by 2031 should not be to possess the best defence system, but one that continues to function even in the absence of US forces or any other external security guarantor.

Such a system should include:

• A multilayered Qatari radar network
• Integration of civilian and military radar systems
• A unified national command and control centre
• Integration of short, medium and long-range air defences
• Expanded counter-drone capabilities
• Stronger electronic warfare capabilities and equipment
• Low-cost interception systems for small targets
• Enhanced mobile protection for radar installations and command centres
• Large national stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts

Second: An air force designed for independence

Qatar currently possesses an advanced air fleet. But the independence of an air force cannot be measured by the number of aircraft it operates. The crucial question is whether the Qatari air force can sustain operations for several consecutive weeks if external supply lines are disrupted.

For the answer to be yes, Qatar must develop the capacity to continue air operations even without direct US or other foreign support, albeit at a reduced level.

This requires policymakers and those responsible for developing the national defence strategy to focus on the following priorities over the next five years:

• Increasing ammunition stockpiles, whether through domestic production or imports
• Expanding domestic defence manufacturing capabilities and strengthening maintenance capacity
• Training more Qatari personnel to carry out a range of functions, including maintenance
• Building up dispersed ammunition stockpiles rather than concentrating them in a single location
• Increasing stocks of drones and other unmanned aircraft
• Developing ground and aerial refuelling capabilities and strengthening logistical support

Third: The sea as a second line of defence

For Qatar, a peninsula surrounded by water on three sides, protecting its maritime domain is not merely a military concern. It is also an economic necessity of the highest importance.

Liquefied natural gas, oil exports and imports all depend on the security of the surrounding waters. Qatar should therefore develop a naval force suited to its needs, equipped with advanced technology and capabilities.

The objective is not to build a large fleet, but to make attacks on Qatar’s maritime infrastructure both difficult and costly.

This requires a focus on several important priorities:

• Continuously improving and expanding maritime surveillance capabilities to protect Qatar’s waters and offshore installations
• Strengthening and developing capabilities to counter maritime drones
• Enhancing the protection of ports and securing shipping routes

Fourth: A national resilience programme

The most serious vulnerability of a country with limited territory and population lies in its infrastructure. A successful attack on a small number of critical facilities could have severe and far-reaching consequences for the entire country.

Given the importance of this threat, the national defence strategy should include the establishment of what might be called a “national resilience and protection programme”.

Such a programme would aim to protect critical infrastructure, including gas and energy facilities, water desalination plants, power stations, telecommunications centres and towers, civilian and military airports, ports and fuel networks, hospitals, government institutions and data centres.

One aspect of this protection is ensuring that every sector has adequate backup capacity. If a major desalination plant were to stop operating for any reason, for example, an alternative source of supply should be available to prevent a water supply problem from escalating into a national crisis. The same principle should apply to every other sector.

Fifth: Qatar must know what is happening around it before the US does

Military independence begins with information. Qatar therefore needs to develop its own national capabilities in the following areas:

• Space-based reconnaissance
• Unmanned aerial vehicles
• Radar systems
• Electronic intelligence
• Artificial intelligence-driven data analysis

This does not mean that Qatar needs to launch large satellites for every mission. Instead, it should work towards building an integrated system combining commercial and military satellites, international partnerships and national capabilities for collecting and analysing data.

The underlying principle is that Qatar should not depend on an external party to inform it of a threat approaching its territory.

Qatar will undoubtedly continue to need intelligence from the US, France, the United Kingdom and other countries. Nevertheless, it must possess the independent capacity to produce its own national intelligence picture, assess the nature of threats and determine how to prepare for them at an early stage, before requesting assistance from allies or partners.

Sixth: Diversifying security guarantees

The events of this year have demonstrated to all GCC states the importance of diversifying their alliances and security guarantees rather than relying on a single external power, particularly the US.

That power could become involved in future international crises, decide for one reason or another to limit its direct involvement in regional crises, or even reduce its military presence.

This makes it necessary to adopt a forward-looking approach based on diversifying alliances and making the security of the Gulf a matter of global interest requiring international cooperation.

In this context, GCC states could benefit from partnerships with South Korea, Turkiye and certain European powers, as well as regional powers such as Pakistan and China in specific fields, without hastily abandoning cooperation with the US.

The objective is to reduce the risks associated with dependence on a single supplier or ally. Such diversification does not mean building an alliance against the US.

Achieving defence and political autonomy for Qatar by 2031 does not mean isolating the country from its partners or dispensing with existing alliances. Rather, it means developing national capabilities that can ensure the protection of the state and its vital interests under all circumstances.

This strategic objective requires the development of an integrated air defence system, stronger intelligence and cyber capabilities, and better protection of critical infrastructure. It also requires improving the effectiveness of Qatar’s air and naval forces to ensure resilience and allow state institutions to continue functioning during a crisis.

Defence autonomy also requires diversifying international partnerships and establishing multiple security guarantees to reduce dependence on any single external power.

The foundation of this strategy is a transition from dependence on external protection towards the ability to deter threats, withstand crises and make independent national decisions at the appropriate time, while remaining open to international cooperation and partnerships.

A version of this piece in Arabic was originally published by Al Jazeera Arabic here.

British defense contractor Babcock has confirmed that it is putting itself forward for the U.S. Navy’s future frigate program, with its Arrowhead 140 general-purpose frigate, the design behind the Royal Navy’s Type 31 class, expected to form the basis of its proposal. The move adds another foreign-designed warship to Washington’s search for a relatively mature frigate that can be built quickly and in significant numbers.

Babcock has held preliminary discussions with Pentagon officials and is expected to submit an expression of interest before the end of October, according to recent reporting by The Telegraph and Navy Lookout. The proposal is understood to potentially involve Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), America’s largest military shipbuilder, with the two companies exploring an arrangement that could see the Arrowhead 140 built in the United States under license.

“Of course we’re interested. We have a world-class frigate, close links to the U.S. and U.S. industry. It would be insane for us not to respond,” Sir Nick Hine, head of Babcock’s marine business and a former Second Sea Lord, told The Telegraph.

The initiative comes as the U.S. Navy seeks to accelerate the acquisition of smaller surface combatants after the troubled Constellation class frigate program was axed. Japan’s upgraded Mogami class, South Korea’s Chungnam class, and Turkey’s Istanbul class have also been reported as candidates for the Navy’s international frigate effort. You can read more about all three designs here.

Fincantieri Marine Group, which had developed the cancelled Constellation class frigate for the U.S. Navy, also says it sees a possible new opportunity in the service’s latest frigate plans. 

Meanwhile, German defense contractor Rheinmetall, a newcomer to the surface combatant market, recently unveiled its GMF 140 frigate, which it has said it plans to offer “initially as part of a procurement project in North America” before pursuing opportunities with other allied navies.

For Babcock, the opportunity would be a major expansion of its relationship with the U.S. defense industry. If successful, the company would likely provide the design, engineering expertise, and potentially the intellectual property needed for American shipyards to manufacture the frigates.

This would mirror the process for the Polish Navy’s Project 106 Miecznik (Swordfish) class, which is building three new multirole frigates in Poland, rather than using the company’s own facilities in Britain.

The Navy’s assessment of potential options is due by November 12. No contract has been awarded, and the details of any Babcock-HII proposal remain unconfirmed.

The Arrowhead 140 is the foundation of the Royal Navy’s five-ship Type 31 program, which is being built at Babcock’s Rosyth shipyard in Scotland. The design is derived from the Danish Iver Huitfeldt class frigate. As well as Poland, the warship has also been selected for Indonesia.

The Type 31 Frigate in action

The Arrowhead 140 has a baseline length of approximately 455 feet, a beam of 65 feet, and a displacement of around 5,700 tonnes, although national variants may be considerably heavier. The vessel uses a conventional combined diesel-and-diesel (CODAD) propulsion system and can achieve speeds exceeding 28 knots. Its design emphasises long endurance, with a baseline endurance of approximately one to two months. The AH140 incorporates a flight deck and hangar for naval helicopter operations, accommodation for embarked personnel, boat-handling facilities, and adaptable mission spaces. Its modular architecture allows customers to integrate different sensors, combat management systems, electronic warfare equipment, and weapons according to national requirements.

Taking the Polish Navy’s Project 106 class as an example of an Arrowhead 140 iteration, this is a notably heavily armed adaptation, featuring a 76mm Leonardo Strales main gun, a 32-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system for surface-to-air missiles, eight Naval Strike Missiles for anti-ship strike, and lightweight torpedo launchers. The Polish variant is reported to have a maximum displacement of approximately 7,700 tonnes.

The Type 31 is a general-purpose warship capable of undertaking maritime security, escort, and surface warfare missions. Its relatively large hull offers considerable internal volume for weapons, sensors, aviation facilities, and future upgrades.

That could make it attractive to a U.S. Navy looking for a ship able to protect convoys, operate independently, and supplement its larger destroyers. A frigate with a significantly lower operating cost than an Arleigh Burke class destroyer could still take on a range of missions, freeing more capable combatants for broad area air and missile air defense, sustained strike operations, and other more demanding tasks.

The Arrowhead 140’s size could also provide flexibility in accommodating American weapons and combat systems. However, a U.S. version would require a defined configuration, and there is no publicly established weapons fit for a potential American variant.

At the same time, the Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigate has not yet entered operational service, and its baseline configuration is not optimized for every mission the U.S. Navy may require. In particular, the integration of the sonar and other systems needed for sustained anti-submarine warfare would be a significant undertaking.

The Navy will also have to wrestle with how much of the existing design can be retained while meeting its own requirements. One of the major lessons from the Constellation program was that extensive modifications to an existing foreign design can create huge cost and schedule risks. With so little left of the original design after it was adapted to Navy specifications, this eventually doomed the program.

For Babcock, it will be essential to keep the Arrowhead 140 as close as possible to its established configuration, while integrating essential American equipment, to keep the proposal competitive.

Babcock does not operate a shipyard in the United States, making an American industrial partner central to its approach.

HII, which operates major shipbuilding facilities at Newport News and Ingalls, would offer substantial experience constructing warships for the U.S. Navy. Babcock and HII already have an established relationship in the submarine sector, including work supporting the Virginia class attack submarine program.

Babcock’s facilities in Rosyth and Bristol manufacture tactical missile-tube assemblies for General Dynamics Electric Boat, supporting the Common Missile Compartment used by the U.S. Navy’s Columbia class and the Royal Navy’s Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarines. HII has also expanded its relationship with Babcock through work involving Virginia class submarine components.

Those existing industrial relationships could provide a foundation for a surface-ship partnership. Under a potential arrangement, Babcock could transfer the necessary design rights and provide technical support while an American yard undertakes construction.

Such an arrangement would fit the Trump administration’s stated goal of using allied expertise to accelerate warship production while rebuilding domestic shipbuilding capacity. It would also allow Babcock to pursue a potentially significant U.S. order without requiring Rosyth to absorb a large new construction program alongside its Royal Navy commitments.

The prospect of HII supporting more than one design raises questions about production capacity, program priorities, and how the company would manage competing demands on its shipyards.

More generally, the administration’s interest in foreign frigates reflects growing concern about the time and expense involved in developing new American warships.

The Constellation class program was supposed to provide a modern replacement for the Navy’s retired Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. Based on the European FREMM design, it underwent extensive modifications for American service before suffering serious schedule and cost problems. The Navy subsequently abandoned the program.

The service is now pursuing FF(X), a patrol frigate intended to be easier to build and field. Its initial configuration, however, is not expected to include a vertical launch system, limiting its ability to provide some of the capabilities associated with a more heavily armed multi-mission combatant.

HII is building the FF(X) frigate, based on the Coast Guard’s Legend class National Security Cutter. It is somewhat telling that they would partner with Babcock on the foreign frigate offering considering they already have the FF(X) contract.

The international frigate effort is intended to examine whether a ship based on an existing allied design could provide a different balance of capability, cost, and delivery speed.

An August presidential memorandum opened a route for the Navy to consider allied designs and, under limited circumstances, overseas construction through a national security waiver. The approach has been compared with a model in which an initial small number of ships could be constructed abroad before production moves to U.S. yards.

The reported framework limits overseas construction to no more than two ships and ties it to investment in American shipbuilding. Any eventual Babcock proposal would therefore need to demonstrate how the design could be transferred and produced domestically at the required pace.

That could be a big challenge. Babcock’s own Type 31 production line is already committed to the five ships ordered by the Royal Navy, while setting up an American production line would require workforce training, supply-chain development, and the transfer of manufacturing knowledge.

The Navy will also need to establish whether a foreign design can meet its minimum operational requirements without undergoing the kind of extensive redesign that dogged the Constellation program.

Babcock enters a field that already includes several established frigate designs from Japan, South Korea, and Turkey — and potentially more.

Each offers a different combination of design maturity, combat systems, production capacity, and potential industrial arrangements. The Mogami and Chungnam programs have operational ships in service, while the Arrowhead 140 has been selected for multiple export programs but is yet to enter operational service.

Introducing the Babcock Arrowhead 140

Babcock’s selling point is likely to be the Arrowhead 140’s size, adaptability, and established design pedigree, combined with the prospect of American production through HII.

With the Arrowhead 140 adopted by multiple navies, this brings potential cost savings through economies of scale, shared design evolution, and collaborative upgrades across the fleet. A wider international user base also brings the possibility of overseas industrial partnerships, including training and logistical support around the globe.

At the same time, U.S. Navy selection would represent a major endorsement of the platform and would further strengthen its position in other export markets.

For now, Babcock’s confirmation that it intends to pursue the opportunity adds another contender to the Navy’s search for a new frigate. Whether the Arrowhead 140 advances beyond the initial expression of interest will depend on how its capabilities and production prospects compare with the other candidates. And critically, Babcock and its U.S. partners will need to convince the Pentagon that they deliver a ship that meets the Navy’s requirements without repeating the delays and redesign challenges of the Constellation program.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

As the U.S. and Israel once again mull decisions on whether to resume strikes on Iran, regional powers held an unprecedented meeting in Tehran today in an effort to find ways to stave off a further conflict. The gathering of officials from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey reportedly also addressed the ongoing war between Riyadh and the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen. Frequent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure are adding to strain on the global economy that relies heavily on Middle Eastern energy supplies.

“The participants agreed to continue the dialogue to strengthen cooperation amongst the four regional countries, including for peace and security in the region,” the four nations said in a joint statement after the hastily called, last-ditch meeting concluded.

The meeting was the first meeting between Iran and the other three countries since they formed a new military alliance in August called the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. The attendance of Saudi Arabia is of particular note as Iran struck Saudi Arabia repeatedly during Operation Epic Fury and Saudi Arabia hosted U.S. forces that attacked Iran. Iran’s proxies in Yemen, the Houthis, have been pummeling the Kingdom with drones and missiles as of late, too.

Regardless, details about the conclave are sparse, with officials saying this was just the first of what is expected to be a series of such efforts.

“Very good discussions took place between us,” Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, told Iranian state television. “I feel that a new atmosphere is emerging in the region… I sensed a very positive atmosphere in the discussions among the gentlemen.”

“We have reached an understanding with Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia that the security of the region is achieved through its countries,” Rezaei added.

#عاجل | أمين مجلس الأمن القومي الإيراني: توصلنا لتفاهم مع باكستان وتركيا والسعودية بأن أمن المنطقة يتحقق عبر دولها pic.twitter.com/ILuUTH9k2r

— قناة الجزيرة (@AJArabic) October 26, 2026

The Tehran visit was called “as part of the continued efforts by the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement countries for de-escalation between parties involved in the ongoing crisis, and promoting dialogue and diplomatic solutions, in support of the mediation efforts carried out by the State of Qatar and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” Saudi Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy Rayed Krimly said Monday on X before the meeting began. He used an alternative English spelling of the Saudi holy city.

HRH Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Minister of Defense, leads the Kingdom’s delegation to the meetings that will be held today in Tehran, capital of Iran, between Makkah Joint Defense Agreement countries and officials from the Islamic Republic of Iran, with…

— AMB Dr. Rayed Krimly (@Rayedkrimly) October 26, 2026

Both Qatar and Pakistan have been key to previous efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the U.S.-Iran conflict. The two countries helped broker a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on June 17. The MoU provided a 60-day extension of the ceasefire to iron out an agreement to end fighting throughout the region, including Lebanon, prevent Iran from seeking nuclear weapons, end U.S. sanctions, and resume the flow of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz among other points.

That effort soon fell apart as the U.S. and Iran resumed striking each other. It has been more than a month, however, since the two nations traded direct blows.

“The visit underscores the pivotal role of Makkah Joint Defense Agreement countries in reinforcing regional security and stability, and working with all countries in the region to achieve that goal,” Krimly added about today’s Tehran meeting.

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was created as a pact designed to assist the Kingdom in its fight against the Houthis. An attack on one is supposed to be considered an attack on all. However, the agreement has evolved to take on the larger issue of overall regional stability amid concerns about the individual members’ own national security interests.

The Tehran meeting was attended by high-level officials, Krimly noted. Saudi Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Minister of Defense, led the Kingdom’s delegation, he stated. In addition, Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, and Ibrahim Kalin, Director of the Turkish National Intelligence all met with the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Dr. Masoud Pezeshkian, and Rezaei.

Before the meeting, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei ⁠said the discussions on regional security would include “Israel’s expansionist policies, developments in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon, and the repercussions of U.S. and Israeli military action against Iran,” according to Reuters.

Baghaei said the meeting, ​proposed during a visit by Munir to Tehran last week, could be a first step towards establishing regional security mechanisms based on the interests of countries in the region.

Iranian officials told Munir ahead of today’s meeting that there would be no talks with Washington until Tehran’s demands were met, Reuters reported, citing Iranian media.

It is unclear at this point whether any results from this round of meetings will change whatever plans U.S. President Donald Trump is drawing up for Iran. Before the meeting began, a senior U.S. official downplayed it to us when we asked about it.

“The United States is in a very strong position with control of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian economy collapsing,” the senior U.S. official told us in response to our question about whether the Tehran meeting will influence any decisions by Trump on his next moves toward the Islamic Republic. “Iran has been decimated, and one way or the other, the conflict in Iran will be over very soon. President Trump holds all the cards and will do whatever is best for the United States.”

The Tehran talks took place after Trump once again claimed he was at an inflection point on deciding his future approach toward Iran. On Sunday, the American leader said it’s “getting to be decision time” on whether he will make a new deal with Tehran or resume attacks as Iranian and Houthi threats against Americans in the Middle East continue to grow.

“I have a decision to make: Do I finish it off, which would be very easy to do, or do I make a deal? That’s all,” Trump said in an interview with Fox News’ Sunday Morning Futures. “We don’t play games.”

“There won’t be a strike today,” he told reporters later Sunday as he left the White House. On Friday, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack suggested the U.S. could strike Iran as early as this past weekend, but that failed to materialize.

Still, tensions in the region are increasing.

U.S. forces in the Middle East “are prepared to launch new, potentially major, military operations against Iran ‘within 96 hours of receiving’ an order from President Donald Trump,” CNN reported on Sunday, citing two U.S. officials.

“Sufficient forces are now deployed in the region to carry out the potential attacks,” the sources told the network. “The scope of new U.S. military operations would likely go beyond efforts to simply ‘mow the lawn’ or maintain the status quo by striking radars, launchers and other Iranian assets that can be quickly reconstituted — as has been the case since Trump halted full combat operations earlier this year.”

You can read more about how the U.S. is deploying additional Navy, Marine and Air Force assets to the Middle East in our report about that here.

Adding to U.S. concerns, on Saturday, The Wall Street Journal reported that “U.S. intelligence suggests Iranian preparations to attack Americans throughout the Middle East have reached ‘advanced stages,’ prompting a sudden exodus of personnel from embassies and military bases throughout the region.”

Jay Clayton, the director of national intelligence, “summarized that finding in a brief memo Friday to Secretary of State Marco Rubio,” the newspaper added.

“Iran has substantially increased efforts to target U.S. personnel. The lethal plotting efforts by the Iranians against U.S. citizens have reached advanced stages in both the Middle East and certain other countries,” Clayton wrote.

The U.S. in recent days also “ordered the departure of diplomats and staff from the embassy in Saudi Arabia and other countries, initially citing threats from the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen,” the Journal noted. “The U.S. also has evacuated personnel from military bases across the region in preparation for renewed fighting, according to U.S. officials familiar with the planning.”

Trump on Sunday told reporters that there “are two very different sets of intelligence reports on Iran. I have them both. They are very different.”

Israel too appears to be continuing its planning for renewed hostilities with Iran. Its previous attacks during Operation Epic Fury were carried out in close coordination with the U.S., a cooperative effort that is ongoing.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday repeated his warning that Iran or its proxies could launch an attack before the close election to disrupt the vote, citing intelligence.

“The (military) is ready both to defend and to strike,” he said in a video statement. “You will suffer disproportionate blows far greater than you can imagine.”

⚠️ 🇮🇱 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Sunday that Iran and its regional allies could launch attacks intended to disrupt Israel’s October 27 election, declaring that the Israeli military is prepared for both defensive and offensive operations.

Speaking in front…

— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) October 25, 2026

In addition, Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir “clashed over a military action that could renew the conflict with Iran days before Israel’s elections,” according to the Jerusalem Post. 

“Recently, Zamir received a directive from the political echelon to carry out an action, which security officials told N12 would ‘trigger a rapid escalation into a confrontation with Iran,’” the newspaper added. “Due to the sensitive nature of the action, N12 reported that Zamir requested an in-depth discussion and formal authorization before moving forward with the action.”

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz disputed those reports.

“I state unequivocally that there was no intention on Israel’s part to initiate an attack on Iran before the elections in Israel—when we made clear that if Iran attacks Israel, we will respond with great force, and all reports on the matter are entirely false,” Katz stated on X. “The attempt by opposition figures to exploit these reports to attack the Prime Minister and me and to cast doubt on our judgment—at a time when we are prevented for understandable reasons from addressing the details of the Iranian issue—is shameful and irresponsible. We will overcome this too.”

הפרסומים על פערים בין הדרג המדיני לצה”ל בנושא איראן הם מופרכים ושקריים לחלוטין.

מאז כניסתי לתפקיד שר הביטחון התיאום בין רה”מ וביני לבין צה”ל בנושא איראן הוא מלא – עם הישגים היסטוריים חסרי תקדים לטובת ביטחון מדינת ישראל.

זהו השיקול היחיד – וכך יהיה גם בעתיד.

אני קובע באופן חד…

— ישראל כ”ץ Israel Katz (@Israel_katz) October 26, 2026

Last Monday, in a phone call with Trump recorded live on Monday and posted on his X account, Netanyahu suggested future operations against Iran.

“Donald, we have a job to finish [in Iran]…and we’ll finish it together,” the Israeli leader told Trump. “We’ll finish it, and no one else will do it.”

That post appears to have been since been deleted.

Actions by both Trump and Netanyahu are taking place against a backdrop of heated domestic politics in their respective countries.

With continued Republican control of Congress on the line, the Nov. 3 midterm elections are a huge factor in Trump’s plans. The president has previously said the war with Iran would end “immediately after the election” and has reportedly told aides he expects to resume strikes on the Islamic Republic after the midterms. Domestic U.S. polls show the ongoing conflict continues to be deeply unpopular with voters, who are also eager to see it concluded.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu faces a vote on his future tomorrow in a nationwide parliamentary election, and there are concerns, as we noted last Friday, that the Israeli leader could use a new conflict with Iran to bolster his hold on office. Given the fractious nature of Israeli politics, election results will not necessarily immediately determine who Israel’s next prime minister will be.

“Coalition negotiations can take weeks or even months as parties attempt to reach agreements on who will govern and under what terms,” The National noted. “Israel has a history of political deadlock. Between 2019 and 2022, the country held five elections as parties repeatedly struggled to form stable governments.”

Iran isn’t just threatening the U.S. and Israel.

“Following the intensification of Berlin’s anti-Iranian stance, Tehran has warned of the consequences should Germany directly enter the military conflict, emphasizing that facilities and military installations associated with Germany in the region could become targets within the scope of Iran’s legitimate defense,” the semi-official Iranian Fars News Agency reported on Sunday.

BIG: Iran has warned Germany that all German military bases and facilities across the region will be considered legitimate targets if Berlin openly joins military action against Iran.

Source: Iran’s Fars, citing information obtained by its security and defense correspondent

— Clash Report (@clashreport) October 25, 2026

As mentioned earlier in this story, officials meeting in Tehran also addressed the ongoing fighting between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia and its proxies in Yemen.

“The urgency of the initiative was underscored by fresh explosions in Riyadh overnight and warnings of a hostile aerial threat, as the Houthis claimed another attack on the Saudi capital’s international airport,” Gulf News reported. In addition, the Houthis are expanding their attacks on oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, including a recent strike near the Shaybah oilfield. Combined with a spike in Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthi strikes on Saudi oil interests have sent the price of Brent crude rising. However, the Tehran talks may be tempering things. According to OilPrice.com, the per-barrel price of Brent crude was over $115 as of Monday evening, a slight drop from Friday, when it was more than $117.

With the issue of oil flow in mind, Adm. Brad Cooper, the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), visited the Strait of Hormuz on Oct. 25 as U.S. forces reached “the milestone of assisting Gulf partners in exporting more than 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil since summer,” Cooper said.

Cooper “observed the current operational environment while flying in a U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook over the international waterway,” according to a CENTCOM post on X. “More than 3,000 commercial vessels have successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz with support from CENTCOM forces over the last six months.”

“We continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with our Gulf partners and the shipping industry,” said Cooper. “This visit underscores our strong commitment to continued freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.”

CENTCOM added that “American forces successfully cleared the strait’s international shipping lanes of sea mines laid by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).”

“Today, primary transit routes in the Strait of Hormuz remain free and clear of Iranian sea mines thanks to incredible efforts by our people,” said Cooper. “We remain intensely focused on keeping commercial traffic flowing as we work with our teammates in the U.S. interagency, Gulf Cooperation Council, and shipping industry.”

In recent months, “over 95% of ships navigating the Strait of Hormuz have sailed through safely despite the IRGC’s unwarranted aggression, clearly demonstrating that the United States and regional partners control the international waterway,” CENTCOM claimed. TWZ cannot independently verify this.

That the four-way meetings between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey will continue to seek a peaceful way forward is a positive sign. Still, how much, if at all, this effort changes the threat picture are open questions and the answers will be provided by Washington, Jerusalem and Tehran in the coming days and weeks.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The political party of Senator Flavio Bolsonaro has acknowledged the result of Brazil’s presidential run-off, despite the right-wing candidate pledging to annul the outcome.

On Monday, Valdemar Costa Neto, the leader of the right-wing Liberal Party, issued a statement saying his political group had accepted the outcome of the vote.

Still, he echoed Bolsonaro’s concerns about the circumstances surrounding the election.

“We recognise the presidential election results,” Costa Neto said. “But we believe the issues raised need to be properly clarified.”

On Sunday, Bolsonaro was defeated by left-wing incumbent President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva by a margin of more than 4.4 million votes.

Bolsonaro has yet to formally concede. In a post-election speech, he called the election results “unacceptable”, citing a last-minute extension to voting hours.

“We will take legal action,” he told supporters. “I will request that these elections be annulled.”

An extension to Sunday’s vote had been sought by the campaigns of both candidates — but for different reasons.

Bolsonaro’s camp had pointed to inclement weather that impeded some voters from reaching polling stations. Parts of southern Brazil, considered a right-wing stronghold, had experienced heavy rains on Sunday.

Lula’s campaign, meanwhile, pushed for longer voting hours after it accused some cities of limiting public transportation on election day.

The left-wing leader’s allies framed those reductions in service as an attempt at election interference, aimed at preventing Lula’s working-class base from voting.

Media reports indicated that Pablo Souza, a transportation official in the city of Salvador, was arrested on Sunday over the matter.

In response to the petitions, Supreme Court Justice Cristiano Zanin agreed to extend voting by two hours.

Whereas polls across the country had been slated to close at 5pm Brasilia time (20:00 GMT), Zanin’s order allowed those that had not already closed to remain open until 7pm (22:00 GMT).

Following his loss, Bolsonaro cried foul, saying that the justice’s decision had disadvantaged his voters.

He pointed to Zanin’s relationship with Lula as support: Lula had appointed Zanin to the high court in 2023, and Zanin had formerly served as the left-wing politician’s personal lawyer.

“With a simple stroke of a pen, at the request of a former partner, [Zanin] changed the rules of the game mid-match,” Bolsonaro said in his address on Sunday night.

But experts signalled they were sceptical of Bolsonaro’s claims of malfeasance.

An analysis by Pedro Burgos, a professor at the Brazilian educational institute Insper, found that the extension resulted in 35,000 additional votes across the country, less than 0.03 percent of the total.

That amount was far short of Lula’s 4.4 million vote advantage. The incumbent won more than 64.25 million votes, compared with Bolsonaro’s 59.83 million.

Still, some right-wing allies rallied to Bolsonaro’s support. US President Donald Trump, who has clashed with Lula in the past, told reporters that the vote seemed “rigged”.

“Elections have to be indisputable and it looked very bad to me,” Trump said on Monday. “It looked like another rigged election, frankly.”

Still, Trump stopped short of suggesting that he would get involved on behalf of Bolsonaro, saying instead he “did not take sides” in the election.

Bolsonaro’s refusal to accept his loss has raised concerns about whether he will abide by the democratic process or follow in the footsteps of his father, Jair Bolsonaro, who served as Brazil’s president from 2019 to 2023.

After his defeat to Lula in the 2022 election, the ex-president refused to acknowledge the outcome.

Instead, he and his allies sought to overturn the results, including through a legal challenge, and prosecutors accused him of plotting a coup to prevent the legal transfer of power.

Jair Bolsonaro is currently serving a 27-year prison sentence on coup-related charges.

Separately, he was also barred from serving in public office for eight years, after a court found he had misused his public office to spread misinformation about the election.

Flavio Bolsonaro, along with his siblings, has sought to have his father released. The family has denounced the elder Bolsonaro’s trial as a case of political persecution.

Still, it is unclear whether Flavio Bolsonaro will continue with his legal challenge over Sunday’s election.

The Brazilian news outlet Folha de S Paulo reported on Monday that legal advisers and political allies have convinced Bolsonaro to abandon his quest to have his loss annulled, citing the large margin of Lula’s victory and its validation by the Supreme Court and election authorities.

Bolsonaro also announced on Monday that federal police asked him to hand over his passports amid speculation that he could leave the country following his loss.

He said that he would comply with the order and had no plans to leave.

“To withstand the chaos, I’m going to organise the opposition,” the right-wing politician said.

Authorities say the fire in Brasov in September is part of a broader Russian campaign against European countries that support Ukraine.

Romanian authorities say they have uncovered a network “coordinated” by Russia that they believe was responsible for a fire at an industrial site near a state-owned weapons factory in September.

Romania’s Intelligence Service said on Monday that the blaze in the central city of Brasov on September 14 was “part of a wider campaign of sabotage operations coordinated” by Russia amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The agency said the operations were aimed at arms manufacturers and “other targets of military and industrial interest”.

“These actions are intended to intimidate, undermine defence capabilities and weaken the contribution of the targeted states to European and regional security,” it said in a statement.

There was no immediate comment from Russia on Romania’s claim. Moscow has previously repeatedly denied such accusations.

Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism, known as DIICOT, said three people had been involved in the Brasov fire – two Belarusians and a Ukrainian, all living in European Union countries.

Two were “tracked down and remanded in custody in Germany while they were preparing to commit similar offenses”, the directorate said.

The third remains at large in Poland.

According to Romania’s Intelligence Service, recruits for such networks are often found on social media and are first offered money “for a seemingly harmless task”, such as “observing or photographing certain targets”.

Over time, “the tasks become increasingly serious, potentially involving acts of vandalism, arson or even murder”, it said.

‘Hybrid’ war

Romania, a member of the EU and NATO, shares a border of more than 600km with Ukraine.

Its centrist president, Nicusor Dan, has said the country is a target of a hybrid war that Russia is waging to destabilise nations backing Kyiv, citing drone incursions into Romanian airspace, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and sabotage.

Foreign Minister Dan Neculaescu said the fire in Brasov was “part of a broader campaign of sabotage across Europe” targeting military production.

“Hybrid attacks will not hold us back from strengthening our resilience and defense,” he wrote on X.

The accusation follows a string of incidents at defence sites across Europe in recent weeks.

In September, explosions and a fire erupted at an ammunition storage site in Bulgaria, weeks after a blaze at another munitions facility in the country. Both sites are operated by the Bulgarian arms maker EMCO, whose munitions are used in Ukraine.

That same month, firebombs were thrown near the offices of a defence company in Munich, and Romanian authorities said they had detained a Russian citizen accused of filming and photographing military sites in preparation for sabotage.

In August, a blast struck an ammunition factory near Rome in Italy operated by the arms maker KNDS.

At sea, at least eight cargo ships have been hit off the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria over the past three weeks, and about 34 sailors have been reported dead or missing.

Dan, the Romanian president, has called the attacks on ships in Romanian waters “a new example of the tragic consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine”.

A year ago, Poland and Romania also detained eight people suspected of taking part in a Russian plot to send exploding parcels to Ukraine.

The U.S. Air Force has handed Lockheed Martin a $694 million contract for the production of AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) hypersonic missiles. In 2023, the service had moved to cancel ARRW, which had been in line to be the U.S. military’s first operational hypersonic weapon. At the time, we had reservations about the service’s intent and speculated the missile could make a major comeback or continue development in a classified setting. The program has since made an incredible turnaround, and there are already plans for another variant that will be able to use an all-new seeker to hit moving targets, including enemy warships.

The ARRW contract was awarded on September 29, but only announced today. It is not immediately clear how many missiles are to be built under this deal or when the Air Force expects to start taking delivery of them. The Air Force has previously disclosed plans to integrate the missiles onto its B-52 and B-1 bombers. Other aircraft with sufficiently large payload capacities and physical space to carry outsized stores could potentially carry AGM-183As, or variants thereof, in the future.

“The contract was executed under the Department of War’s Enterprise-Wide Agile Acquisition Contract to modernize America’s Arsenal of Freedom,” according to an Air Force press release. “This milestone marks the formal transition of the boost-glide hypersonic missile program from prototyping and flight testing into production, solidifying the Air Force’s commitment to fielding standoff, high-speed strike options.”

As noted here, the AGM-183A is a so-called boost-glide vehicle-type hypersonic weapon, which uses a rocket booster to bring it first to an optimal speed and altitude. The nose cone on ARRW then breaks away, and a wedge-shaped unpowered boost-glide vehicle concealed within is released.

The vehicle then glides to its target along a relatively shallow flight path within the Earth’s atmosphere at hypersonic speed, defined as anything above Mach 5. It is capable of maneuvering along the way, sometimes erratically. The mix of speed, flight trajectory, and maneuverability creates significant challenges for opponents in terms of spotting and tracking the glide vehicle, let alone attempting to intercept it. As a result, hypersonic weapons of this type offer particular benefits for piercing enemy air defenses to very rapidly strike time-sensitive and otherwise high-value targets.

The ARRW production contract “is a turning point in our advanced weapons roadmap,” Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink said in a statement accompanying today’s release. “By moving ARRW from test to production, we’re providing our combatant commanders with a credible, high-speed strike weapon capable of penetrating the most advanced anti-access and area-denial systems.”

“Fielding ARRW enhances our ability to hold targets at risk anywhere around the world,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach said in his own statement. “This hypersonic weapon provides the Joint Force a flexible and rapid response option for highly contested environments.”

As mentioned, the Air Force had moved to cancel ARRW in 2023, following a number of failed flight tests. The explicit intent at the time was to shift resources to the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) effort. HACM is an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile that functions in a completely different way from ARRW. HACM is still in development, and the program has now moved into flight testing, as TWZ was first to report earlier this month.

There had already been steady signs in recent years that ARRW’s fortunes were changing and that it had not actually been axed, despite the Air Force’s stated plans to do so. The Air Force’s 2026 Fiscal Year budget request last year confirmed that the service had fully rebooted the program and was seeking new funding to procure actual missiles.

The service’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request, released earlier this year, revealed further plans “to begin [ARRW] INC 2 [Increment 2] technology efforts such as but not limited to integrating pre-planned product improvements, design, trade studies, hardware upgrades, facilitization, affordability initiatives, and testing.”

A request for $296 million would support “the design, test, and evaluation of Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) Increment 2 with terminal seeker and data link capability and other cost reduction production initiatives into ARRW,” those same documents added.

In general, the U.S. Air Force has historically framed hypersonic weapons, including ARRW and HACM, as being especially critical for success in future conflicts, especially high-end fights, such as one in the Pacific against China. This was underscored by the launch of an AGM-183A with a live warhead from a B-52 flying from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam in 2024. The future anti-ship variant could be even more relevant in a Pacific context.

As TWZ has written previously:

“…the Guam test sent clear signals to China. The Air Force has made no secret of how important it views the development and fielding of hypersonic weapons as part of larger preparations for a potential future high-end fight against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Pacific. This is further underscored by the fact that the mention of the ‘terminal seeker and data link capability’ for Increment 2 of ARRW is actually contained in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) section of the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request.”

“In the context of a major conflict in the Pacific, there would also be a very high demand for prompt, long-range anti-ship capability. The ability to conduct those strikes even in the face of dense anti-air defenses would be even more attractive for engaging very high-value vessels, such as China’s growing fleets of aircraft carriers or big deck amphibious assault ships. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) combat fleets, overall, continue to grow in scale and scope at a prodigious rate, as well. This, in turn, has put additional emphasis on the development and fielding of new and improved anti-ship capabilities that can be air-launched, as well as employed from the maritime and ground domains, across the U.S. military in recent years. Increment 2 ARRWs could also offer another means to strike mobile, high-value targets on land, such as ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers.”

“For its part, the PLA has been actively developing and fielding various types of hypersonic weapons, including boost-glide vehicle designs. Its ever-growing arsenal of traditional ballistic missiles now includes several air-launched types, including ones with nuclear and conventional warheads. The latter are widely believed to be capable of being employed against enemy ships, as well as targets on land.”

If nothing else, after moving to cancel the ARRW three years ago, the Air Force has now fully reversed course and has placed its first order for production examples of this hypersonic missile.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The Pentagon is reportedly aiming for U.S. military installations to be able to continue essential operations for at least 90 days, or roughly three months, without any external support. The installation of new small nuclear reactors and other infrastructure is key to this part of a larger plan called Fortress America. The main intent is to ensure America’s armed forces can remain functional and ready to protect the homeland in the face of any massive disruptions to power grids and other supply chains due to major conflicts or other crises. For years, TWZ has been sounding the alarm about the glaring vulnerabilities of America’s critical civilian energy infrastructure, including to drone swarms and cyberattacks, which could cripple key military capabilities right where they live.

Fox News was first to report on the 90-day base resiliency goal yesterday, citing documents it said it reviewed. This is part of the extremely wide-reaching Fortress America initiative the Pentagon announced last month, which covers everything from improved physical and cyber defenses at facilities to securing reliable access to critical defense industrial resources. The “Fortress” in Fortress America is technically an acronym that stands for Federal Operations for Resilience, Troop Resources, Energy Supply, and Survivability.

“Under FORTRESS [sic], every major military installation in the continental United States would be expected to sustain essential operations independently for at least 90 days, including access to electricity, water, fuel and communications,” according to Fox.

Fox News’ story also includes comments about Fortress America from Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell, but it is unclear if he explicitly confirmed the 90-day target. TWZ has reached out for more information.

Parnell did put particular emphasis on the importance of reducing reliance on civilian power generation as part of the larger Fortress America plan. Previous reports have said that Parnell was key to formulating this initiative. He has also been discussed as a potential frontrunner to become the next Secretary of the Army.

“Power is combat now. Without electricity, you lose communications, water, logistics, assembly lines and just basic military command structures,” Parnell told Fox. “We don’t want to rely on standard civilian municipal infrastructure to run our national defense. We just simply can’t. It’s an intolerable risk.”

It should be pointed out here that some U.S. military bases do have their own power plants now, but this is not something that is far from universal across the board.

Secretary Pete Hegseth made similar comments when he first unveiled the Fortress America initiative during a speech to service members at the U.S. Marine Corps’ base in Quantico, Virginia, in September.

“We are launching Fortress America, a national insurance policy for the American homeland,” Hegseth said at that time. “Every major military installation in America is going to generate its own power, independent of the civilian grid. If an adversary takes down the grid by cyber attack, by sabotage, or by any means, our bases stay lit, our aircraft keep flying, our command centers never go dark.”

Fox News’ report says that “portable nuclear reactors,” as well as “large-scale battery storage and microgrids capable of disconnecting military installations from the civilian electrical grid,” are key elements of the plan to achieve this independence when it comes to generating electricity.

The U.S. military, in cooperation with the Department of Energy, has already been heavily investing in the development and installation of so-called microreactors at bases across the country. In August, the U.S. Army, in partnership with the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), notably cut new deals with five companies as part of a plan to install more than 20 microreactors at bases, starting in 2028. This effort, called the Janus program, is not limited to Army installations.

The video below offers an overview of one of several microreactor designs the U.S. military is currently pursuing.

Introducing Kaleidos, a Portable Microreactor from Radiant

Establishing new microgrids and other supporting energy infrastructure has also been an important focus for the U.S. military in recent years.

Details about how bases are expecting to maintain supplies of water and fuel, as well as communications connectivity, for 90 days or more are, as yet, still not entirely clear. All branches of the U.S. military have already been exploring new and novel options for ensuring the availability of water and fuel in future contingencies, though generally with more of an eye toward tactical operations. Relevant developments, including the possibility of using a process called carbon transformation to turn ambient air into fuel, could easily be applicable in a homeland defense scenario.

Fox News’ story also makes no mention of how sufficient food for personnel at these facilities would be sustained, but that would have to be part of the equation. In his remarks in September, Secretary Hegseth also made clear that making sure supply chains delivering munitions, medicine, and even blood would be unbroken in any future crisis was part of the Fortress America vision. As already mentioned, the initiative also extends much more broadly into matters of physical force protection, cyber defense, and the resilience of America’s defense industrial base.

“For decades, we built the most powerful military in the world,” Hegseth said at Quantico. Then we “regrettably made it dependent on foreign mines for rare earths, on overseas factories for microchips, on foreign supply chains for weapons, and on a civilian power grid to keep the lights on at our bases.”

“We’re bringing our critical supply chains home: the rare earths, the specialty metals, the semiconductors, the propellants, mined in America, refined in America, built in America by American workers,” he added at the time. “We are building long-overdue strategic reserves, deep enough to fight through disruption.”

More specific details about how the Pentagon now intends to pursue these aims have yet to be more fully defined.

“The Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment is directed to stand up the FORTRESS America Program Office within thirty (30) days,” according to a memo dated September 30, which was released after Hegseth’s September speech. “The Program Office shall report directly to the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment who will appoint a member of the Senior Executive Service to lead the day-to-day operations, assisted by a two-star Military Advisor, and shall begin as a lean core cell that scales to full operating capability within months – delivering results in weeks, not years”

There is also a question of how much of the Fortress America initiative will actually be new. As mentioned, just when it comes to increased energy resiliency, including through the installation of new microreactors, this is something that has already been top of mind for the U.S. military for years now. In 2022, the U.S. Army had a publicly stated goal for every one of its bases to have its own microgrid by 2035 as part of a larger plan to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. In 2024, the Department of the Air Force rolled out its own Installation Infrastructure Action Plan (I2AP) that included a target to have new microgrids in place at 16 bases by Fiscal Year 2030. In May, the U.S. Navy announced plans to demonstrate the ability of the supercarrier USS Gerald R. Ford to act as a floating nuclear power plant as part of broader “energy resilience and mission assurance” plans.

The U.S. military has also already been heavily engaged in efforts to secure access to critical resources, especially rare Earth elements in light of China’s continued dominance in that market globally, and otherwise expand America’s domestic defense industrial base. Physical hardening of bases, especially against emerging drone threats, has been more of a heated debate, as TWZ has been following closely for some time now. However, even before Fortress America was unveiled last month, there had been signs that institutional attitudes were shifting.

“The [Fortress America] program aligns basing and infrastructure projects to ensure they are collectively advancing toward greater independence,” the aforementioned September 30 memo itself notes.

There are additional questions to be answered as to how the U.S. military expects to fund its expansive Fortress America ambitions and the schedules for implementing them. This will all be heavily influenced by how much the initiative leverages efforts that were already ongoing. At the same time, concerns about underinvestment in infrastructure modernization, in general, across America’s armed forces, and the worrisome cascading impacts thereof, are hardly new.

There are still key elements of the Fortress America initiative that have yet to be fully proven out. This is particularly visible when it comes to microreactors, which hold the promise of being simpler and safer to build and operate compared to traditional nuclear power plants. Despite significant progress with this technology just in recent years, environmental, proliferation, and other concerns continue to be raised. You can read more about all of this can read more about here.

On top of all this, it should be noted here that the U.S. military and the rest of the U.S. government already have mechanisms in place to ensure the key functions can continue, even in the midst of the gravest of crises, such as a limited nuclear attack. This is known as continuity of government planning, and includes a network of hardened and otherwise resilient facilities designed to support continued military operations and other activities in those ‘doomsday’ scenarios. But these facilities are few in number and are focus on strategic capabilities compared to what the Fortress America plan envisions.

At the same time, the dangers posed to civilian power grids in the United States, in particular, are only growing in scale and scope, both in the physical and cyber domains. Existing domestic U.S. energy infrastructure is aging and has been increasingly strained to meet routine day-to-day demands for decades now.

The potential for uncrewed aerial attacks on power plants and power lines has been real for years. The basic barrier to entry when it comes to weaponized drones, including converted commercial types, is also already low. Drone threats, broadly speaking, are only set to expand as swarming technology and artificial intelligence-driven capabilities continue to proliferate, as you can read more about this in this past TWZ feature. A well-informed enemy could concentrate a small number of resources on highly critical points in the grid to have vastly outsized effects, using drones or any other kinetic means.

The threat of various types of cyberattacks is also no longer limited to blockbuster movies and other popular media. This was made clear all the way back in 2021 with the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, a key American oil pipeline system, and has only become more evident since then, including in the course of the war in Ukraine. U.S. authorities have run major exercises to help prepare for exactly these kinds of threats in the past. These are also capabilities where the barrier to entry has been steadily lowering over the years. Increasingly open access to powerful artificial intelligence agents with the ability to overwhelm networks and software to find critical vulnerabilities faster than humans can react is perhaps the most concerning layer of risk.

If a major conflict with a global competitor like China were to break out, physical and cyberattacks on energy infrastructure would be an extremely attractive avenue to hobble U.S. military forces, including airpower, before they can even leave their bases. The capacity to threaten grids in the United States, at least to certain degrees, has become worryingly within reach of smaller nation-states, as well as non-state actors and even lone wolf attackers, too. Firmly attributing cyberattacks to a nation-state, at all, can be challenging.

There is also a secondary component to all of this for responding to major natural disasters, which are another way U.S. grids can end up being knocked out for extended periods of time. These same circumstances could easily leave military bases, as well as their surrounding communities, without access to fresh water and other supplies. The U.S. military routinely plays a key role in responding to such crises.

“This is not a wait-and-see kind of a thing. We want to move out pretty quickly to get to that energy [resilience]. Those solutions can include investments in microgrids, battery backup storage,” a senior U.S. defense official said last week at a Defense Writers Group roundtable, according to a separate report from Air & Space Forces Magazine. “First and foremost, it’s doing the assessments of the installations to make sure we understand power generation and where we’re going to go with that, and then getting those deployed.”

The Pentagon is certainly making a new push now to make sure that, as Secretary Hegseth put it last month, “America cannot be starved out, shut down, or cut off.” However, there is clearly still work to be done to meet a goal of bases being able to go three months without outside help and the many other aims of the Fortress America plan.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

No single Argentine capability shaped British planning during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict more than the pairing of the Dassault Super Étendard strike fighter and its deadly AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile. Against that threat, the British launched a series of special forces operations, all with the same objective: kill the Argentine pilots and destroy their aircraft and missiles before they could be used again. Together, the strike fighter and missile pairing had proven to be the biggest threat to the Royal Navy task force that had been sent to recapture the islands.

Five Super Étendard aircraft and five AM39 Exocet missiles had been delivered to Argentina before a French embargo took hold. The jets were flown by the Argentine Navy’s 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron out of Río Grande, on Tierra del Fuego, a region at South America’s southernmost tip, shared by Chile and Argentina. The Super Étendard/Exocet combination had already cost the British the destroyer HMS Sheffield on May 4 and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor on May 25.

The special forces operations were broken down into four phases — named PLUM DUFF, MIKADO, KETTLEDRUM, and IMPI — the last of which is the least well-documented, and the focus of this article.

PLUM DUFF was the insertion phase and was a reconnaissance mission. On May 16, an RAF Hercules airdropped eight special forces troops onto RFA Fort Austin to form a recce party. On the night of May 17/18, a Sea King HC4, ZA290, lifted off from the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible for a one-way flight to Tierra del Fuego, where the men were to observe Río Grande and report back. The patrol was set down far from the objective and never completed the reconnaissance; the helicopter crew flew on into Chile, where the aircraft was deliberately burnt to try and hide the evidence, while they tried to evade capture.

MIKADO was the planned attack phase, and it depended on that missing intelligence. Two Hercules were to air-land up to 70 men of B Squadron, 22 Special Air Service (SAS), directly on Río Grande — the air operation order of May 19 also named Río Gallegos, further up the Argentine coast, as an alternative. The men would destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets on the ground, kill the pilots, and then withdraw overland into Chile. Commander Task Force 317, at Northwood, accepted from the outset that the mission could well cost both Hercules.

The aircrew did not refuse the task, but they were blunt about what it demanded: formation landing by two heavy transports on a possibly heavily defended, icy military runway, with a probable 20-knot tailwind, at night and on passive night-vision goggles in minimum light levels, with intelligence that was inadequate to support any air-land option at all. The RAF planning team recommended an airdrop as the better way to maintain a covert posture, and the Senior Air Staff Officer at Headquarters 38 Group warned the Air Commander to watch for overambitious schemes coming out of the SAS.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense formally cancelled MIKADO on June 4.

KETTLEDRUM was planned as the third of the set. It was aimed at Puerto Deseado, Santa Cruz Province of Argentina, and would have inserted a Special Boat Service party (SBS, the Royal Marines’ special forces unit) from the submarine HMS Onyx — a boat that will reappear before the end of this story.

None of the three was executed as planned.

Less well-known is that the cancellation of MIKADO produced a fourth project: Operation IMPI, named after a Zulu fighting force.

Cancelling MIKADO did not mean the wider operation was over. Also on June 4, the U.K. Ministry of Defense tasked CTF 317 to produce a new plan for special forces to destroy the combat effectiveness of the Super Étendards.

CTF 317’s staff went to work on what became IMPI. The planning document, Ops 1/3, is dated June 14 — the day of the Argentine surrender in the islands. In broad terms, the objective was to be attacked by special forces arriving both by air and by sea.

That much has been known, in fragments.

What has not been published until now is the fact that the operation had already been resourced.

At 2240Z on June 12, Maj. Gen. Jeremy Moore, commanding the land forces as CTG 317.1, signalled Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward’s battle group (CTG 317.8), with Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse at Northwood (CTF 317) and Commodore Michael Clapp’s amphibious group (CTG 317.0) as information addressees. The message called for B Squadron, 22 SAS, to be made available for operations as soon as possible: cover was needed against rapid developments of an unfavorable nature in West Falkland (Gran Malvina), and the theatre’s existing special forces assets were fully absorbed supporting the battle for Stanley — and IMPI. Operation IMPI, Moore noted in passing, was by then self-sufficient.

Examining two lines of routine signal traffic settles several things at once. Forty-eight hours before the surrender, IMPI was not a staff study but an operation that had been resourced, and that was enough to consume the theatre’s special forces and justify calling a fresh SAS squadron forward. It is also the only contemporary, operational-level reference to IMPI released so far: everything else comes from a narrative written years afterwards.

As that later narrative describes it, the concept behind IMPI was much leaner than MIKADO. Against two Hercules and 70 men, the air element of IMPI rested on a single RAF Hercules.

The aircraft was to fly from Ascension Island, refuel in flight, and then track east of the Falkland Islands and south of Cape Horn before making a low-level approach below Argentine radar cover for a night landing of special forces at the airfields codenamed San Jose and Arco Iris. Other special forces would have been inserted by sea. That air element, as will be seen, is the most questionable part of the entire file.

The routing is worth attention, because it rules out the intuitive picture of a direct run south from Ascension. Instead, the aircraft would have entered from the least-covered and least-expected direction, coming around the bottom of the continent rather than from the northeast.

The precise identities of San Jose and Arco Iris are not established in the declassified record.

The most likely reading is that they stand for Río Grande and Río Gallegos — the airfields at which the planned navigation ended, and the two named in MIKADO’s air operation order a month earlier. For a document circulating through restricted channels, encrypting the names of the two targets was an elementary precaution, although it should be noted that an operational order would more commonly have designated them simply as Target One and Target Two.

None of this rules out Chilean participation in other phases of the operation; if anything, it suggests it’s more likely. The narrative survives inside a folder classified Top Secret and restricted to the Chief of the Air Staff, whose declared subject is cooperation with Chile. That setting contrasts with the earlier stage of the planning, when mounting and recovering a special forces insertion from a Chilean airfield was considered and expressly discounted on political grounds — much as the use of an Antarctic strip was discounted after the New Zealand High Commission advised that the Antarctic winter precluded safe trans-polar flight.

The maritime half of IMPI can be traced in the records of those who were there.

Navigational support for the final phase was to come from the nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror. On June 9, 1982, Conqueror was off Bahía Camarones, working as an advanced picket and hunting targets of opportunity that ventured outside the 12-nautical-mile limit of Argentine territorial waters, with authority to sink any civilian vessel judged to be running to the Falklands/Malvinas; that same morning the sub had in fact entered Argentine territorial waters trying to locate the Argentine Navy’s Task Group 79.2.

That day, Conqueror received preparatory information on IMPI. The sub’s task was to come to periscope depth and act as a radio beacon, giving the Hercules a radio reference against which to refine a navigation that, low and at night, allowed no error. The resulting picture is an odd one: a nuclear submarine deployed on interdiction off the Patagonian coast, turned into a navigation aid for a transport aircraft.

The insertion itself fell to HMS Onyx, the Oberon class diesel-electric boat that had already taken part in Operation KETTLEDRUM and the only conventional submarine Britain deployed to the South Atlantic. On June 14, at 0815Z, lying in San Carlos Water, Onyx embarked a party of 10 men from B Squadron, 22 SAS and the SBS for the mission. The timing matches Moore’s signal of two days earlier almost exactly.

The plan called for the submarine to surface some two nautical miles offshore at night. The troops would close the beach in Gemini inflatables and destroy the objective — aircraft and missiles, if any were there — using anti-tank weapons and demolition charges.

What happened next illustrates the inertia of military machinery. The Argentine surrender in the islands came on that same June 14, hours after the party had gone aboard Onyx. Even so, preparations did not stop at once: on June 15 the embarked troops carried out practice landings from a Gemini. That does not mean IMPI was ever executed — it was not — but it does show that with the strategic outcome already settled, the machine was still rehearsing.

The British record closes the matter with administrative dryness: the surrender of the Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands and the cessation of hostile activity by Argentine aircraft resulted in the operation being cancelled.

The air part of the mission is another matter entirely and is where IMPI becomes more uncertain.

The only link between IMPI and an aircraft is a single paragraph in an RAF historical narrative. The folder that holds it was opened on April 18, 1986 — four years after the war — as an eyes-only briefing file for the Chief of the Air Staff, and the pages appear to be a working draft rather than a finished submission, carrying pencil amendments throughout.

Had a Hercules been earmarked, there is no doubt which unit would have provided it. The Special Forces Flight that runs through the whole chapter — five crews, commanded by a squadron leader, exercising regularly with SAS and SBS Sections — appears with its squadron number blanked out, yet the number surfaces a few paragraphs later, where two of its crews are described training on the probe-fitted Hercules C1P. The unit was No. 47 Squadron, RAF, home-based at Lyneham, and it would keep the special forces air support role for decades afterward.

The men who were at Ascension with that detachment, however, say they had nothing to do with it. Reliable sources with direct knowledge of the flight’s activity state that they never saw the codeword at the time, had never heard of the operation until this file surfaced, and consider it inconceivable that a special forces Hercules and crew could have been earmarked for a mission of this kind without the flight — a community of five crews that has stayed in touch ever since — learning of it at some point in the intervening four decades. By June 14, at most one aerial-refueling-qualified special forces crew was at Wideawake.

That skepticism is reinforced by the way the same narrative handles events those crews lived through. Its account of their own work-up does not survive contact with their logbooks.

For example, a practice infiltration into RAF Laarbruch in Germany that the narrative describes as successful had in fact been detected; the Hercules was notionally shot down about two miles out on the approach. The ramp toes (attachable extension plates located at the very end of the rear cargo ramp) it describes as droppable at 20 to 30 knots were never meant to be lowered with the aircraft moving, which would have been unsafe and risked the airframe. There are other anomalies, too.

A document that misstates the squadron’s own exercises is thin evidence on which to place that squadron over Tierra del Fuego.

What is not in question is what the Special Forces Flight could have done, had it been asked.

By mid-May the flight had two crews qualified in air-to-air refueling — one deployed to Ascension, the other held in the United Kingdom to train the others — flying Hercules C1s fitted with probes and, where the task required it, additional fuel tanks in the fuselage. It had rehearsed stream landings and rapid offloads, parachute insertion below radar cover to a pinpoint coastal feature, as well as flying on ANVIS goggles at 250 feet over sea and land. The goggles themselves were fitted to the crews’ helmets by RAE Farnborough specialists in a single day in mid-April. The reach was demonstrated on May 16, when the sortie that dropped the PLUM DUFF party stayed airborne for 24 hours and five minutes, with Victor tankers refueling some 1,800 miles from Ascension. Almost none of it was routine: nearly everything the force did during the conflict was improvised, at speed, in a matter of weeks.

What never had an answer — not for MIKADO, and not for whatever IMPI intended — was the other end of the problem. Putting men ashore deep inside Argentine territory was the solvable half. Getting an aircraft and its passengers out again after a direct action, from a strip in range of the Argentine Air Force, was not.

All of the above is reconstructed from lateral references: the RAF’s narrative in file AIR 20/13036 at the National Archives, unit records, submarine logs, operational signal traffic, and the accounts of participants.

The specific file — the one holding the complete plan with its annexes, the identification of the airfields and the execution sequence — remains closed. It is DEFE 71/980, titled Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Operation IMPI, retained at the National Archives at Kew with no announced opening date. Until it is released, the air element of IMPI cannot be settled either way.

Forty-four years after the conflict, the last British special operation of the war is still, in essence, a document the British state is not prepared to show. That is not a trivial detail: the files touching on cooperation with Chile have consistently been the most reluctantly opened of all.

What remains is an operation of two halves. One of them is solid: a resourced plan, declared self-sufficient on June 12, with a nuclear submarine briefed to act as a beacon, 10 men of the SAS and the SBS embarked in a conventional submarine in San Carlos on the morning of the surrender, and rehearsals continuing the following day. The other half — a lone Hercules coming round Cape Horn to land on a codenamed strip — rests on one paragraph of a flawed staff narrative and is rejected by the only men who could have flown it.

Either way, the obsession is the same.

Between June 4 and June 14, 1982, while the final battle for Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino was being fought and the Argentine land campaign was collapsing, part of the British planning effort was still revolving around five French-built aircraft, their 10 aircrew, and their missiles. That the plan carries the date of the surrender itself, that it was still being rehearsed the following day, and that it remains classified today says a good deal about how far the British were prepared to go to destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets.

Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com

Mariano Sciaroni holds a master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics as well as a postgraduate diploma in Contemporary Military History, both earned at the Argentine Army’s Military Academy. Sciaroni has published five books and numerous articles on military and naval history. He is also an active member of the Argentine Institute of Military History and serves as a sub-lieutenant in the Argentine Army Reserve (Army Aviation Reserve Squadron). You can find out more about his books here.

El-Sayed’s opponents have sought to link him to the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organisation that was founded in Egypt. Trump designated certain chapters of it as Foreign Terrorist Organisations earlier this year.

Some of the scrutiny of the affiliations of El-Sayed and his family members relates to their writings from more than a decade ago.

A social media post, external in 2012 by El-Sayed’s half-sister, Eman Abdelhadi, appeared to refer to the movement, saying “my family has long been MB”. El-Sayed’s team have previously distanced him from other comments by Abdelhadi.

Critics have also pointed to an opinion piece El-Sayed wrote in Huffington Post in 2011, external about pro-democracy protesters in Egypt. In it, he acknowledged concerns that “supporting democracy in Egypt might allow the country to fall to the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood”.

A year later he also allegedly signed an open letter by Egyptian Americans. In it, the group urged Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president and a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, to “purge the media and police” following the toppling of the authoritarian regime in the Arab Spring. This letter has not been discussed by El-Sayed.

El-Sayed has previously denied any connection to the Muslim Brotherhood and has stressed his loyalty to the United States. Asked recently at a town hall event whether he would disavow the organisation, he responded: “Absolutely.”

Also in 2012, El-Sayed’s current opponent Rogers, who was then a US representative and chairing the House Intelligence Committee, appeared to call for cautious engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, telling Reuters, external: “Do I think there are moderate Muslim Brotherhood individuals we are going to have to reach out to and talk to? Yes but we are going to have to watch it carefully.”

HA Hellyer, senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and an expert on Egypt, says the row has more to do with Islamophobia on the political right in the US than with the Trump administration’s actual position on the Muslim Brotherhood.

“If the accusation is to be taken sincerely, then [Trump] should surely have a problem with engaging with any government that has engaged positively with the Brotherhood or with groups that are even more to the right of the Brotherhood,” Hellyer told the BBC. “He clearly has not done that.”