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At first glance, the Soviet submarine S-49 looks like a design mistake. While its hull resembles a normal Cold War diesel-electric submarine, its bow appears to have been fitted with a strange pair of enormous “barrels” pointing forward. But the bizarre nose and bug-eyed look was the result of a highly specialized Soviet effort to create a submarine that could test a new generation of underwater weapons. At a time when extreme submarine modifications were in vogue, S-49 stood out for its pioneering work and long service.

S-49 began life as an ordinary Project 633 submarine, known to NATO as the Romeo class. The Project 633 submarines were diesel-electric attack submarines developed for the Soviet Navy in the 1950s and built in Gorky (modern-day Nizhny Novgorod). Since this was hundreds of miles from the sea, submarines built here were transported by river on special barges, then completed and tested at coastal shipyards before entering service.

The early career of S-49 was completely conventional. Its keel was laid in March of 1961, it was launched in July, and commissioned into the Soviet Navy in December.

S-49 initially joined the Black Sea Fleet, was transferred to the Northern Fleet in 1962, and conducted routine submarine operations, including Mediterranean deployments.

In 1969, S-49 returned permanently to the Black Sea Fleet and continued in service as a normal Soviet attack submarine.

By the 1960s, however, faced by the growing threat of the U.S. Navy’s emerging nuclear-powered submarine fleet, Soviet naval engineers were developing a new class of faster, farther-reaching weapons: submarine-launched anti-submarine missiles. These were essentially long-range weapon delivery systems whose purpose was to allow one submarine to attack another far sooner and from much farther away than was practical with a conventional torpedo, allowing the shooter to remain at standoff distance. This was especially vital in a nuclear warfighting context.

A live test of a nuclear-armed U.S. Navy SUBROC submarine-launched rocket — broadly similar in concept to the Soviet submarine-launched anti-submarine missile — gives an idea of its destructive power:

Swordfish Sailor Hat MK57 ASROC ASTOR SUBROC DOE Video #0800046

The Soviet concept combined a torpedo or a depth charge with a missile; the weapon would be launched underwater from a submarine or fired from a surface combatant into the water. After a brief period of submerged travel through the water, it would break the surface, a rocket motor would ignite, and the weapon would fly rapidly — according to available sources at around Mach 0.8 — toward the target area. The weapon could deploy a homing torpedo or a nuclear depth-charge warhead.

In the early 1970s, the Soviet Navy was working on two next-generation anti-submarine missile systems: the RPK-6 Vodopad (Russian for waterfall) was designed around a 533mm torpedo-tube launch system, while the RPK-7 Veter (meaning wind) was a larger 650mm weapon with greater range and depth capability — it could only carry a nuclear depth charge.

In practice, while both Vodopad and Veter could be launched from submarines, surface combatants had only 533mm tubes, so were limited to the Vodopad. The RPK-6 Vodopad had a range of about 20 nautical miles, while the RPK-7 Veter increased this to around 54 nautical miles.

A 2018 video showing the Kirov class nuclear battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy firing multiple Soviet-era RPK-6 Vodopads during a drill:

Пуски ракет-торпед ТАРКР «Петр Великий» в Баренцевом море

There is some confusion about the NATO designations of these weapons. Some sources suggest both Vodopad and Veter were known as SS-N-16 Stallion, others that SS-N-16 Stallion applied to different generations of 650mm anti-submarine missiles, while SS-N-15 Starfish applied to different generations of 533mm weapons.

Needing a test submarine for the weapons, the Soviets chose two Romeo class boats, S-49 and S-11, both of which were converted into the experimental Project 633RV standard.

OTD 1961: S-11, Project 633 ROMEO SS, was launched. Between 1970 & 1972 she and S-49 were converted to Project 633RV 65cm torpedo test sub. pic.twitter.com/cW0FgFRqhH

— AncientSubHunter 🇺🇦 🇮🇱🌻 (@AncientSubHunt) April 15, 2017

Podwodny ,,Star Trek,, ,czyli ,,Romeo,, projekt 633RV.
Pod koniec lat 60. do testowania kompleksów przeciwpodwodnych RPK-7 “Veter” i RPK-6 “Vodopad” przebudowano dwie jednostki typ,,Romeo,,(S-11 i S-49) …. 1/2 pic.twitter.com/rNnwfzUiOG

— StaryOkręt (@Zbignie87752240) July 2, 2023

Between December 1971 and October 1972, S-49 underwent a major reconstruction at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol, on the Crimean peninsula.

The modification completely transformed the submarine, the most visible change being the enormous forward superstructure containing two giant external 650mm tubes for the Veter, which were simply too large to fit inside the original Romeo class hull. At the same time, two internal 533mm launch tubes were modified for the Vodopad.

As well as the new launchers, specialized systems included weapon programming equipment, electrical connections for pre-launch testing, fire-control systems, special sealing arrangements, and guide tracks that prepared the weapon during launch.

Essentially a giant underwater weapons laboratory, the Project 633RV allowed engineers to test the entire firing process before the weapons entered service on operational submarines.

Inside the forward section, engineers removed normal submarine equipment and replaced it with test systems. Spare torpedo storage was taken out, and improved sonar equipment and upgraded navigation systems were added.

Overall, the systems were designed to replicate those of Soviet nuclear attack submarines, including those planned for the Project 671 (Victor class) nuclear attack boats.

As well as firing missiles, the modified submarine was equipped to measure launch behavior, weapon performance, effects on the submarine, underwater pressures, guidance system operation, and reliability.

After conversion, S-49 became one of the most important weapons-testing submarines in the Soviet fleet.

In December 1972, S-49 conducted the first Soviet underwater launch of a Vodopad missile-torpedo, from a depth of 50 meters (164 feet).

During 1973 and 1974, 24 successful launches were completed from depths between 50 and 150 meters (164 and 492 feet) and under increasingly demanding conditions.

In 1975, S-49 received an improved deep-water launch system and successfully completed another 22 launches, including one from an unprecedented depth of 240 meters (787 feet).

For S-49, the mission expanded beyond Vodopad and Veter.

In 1977, the submarine participated in testing of the new 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) land-attack cruise missile, a turbofan-powered weapon that was deployed from a launch capsule via a 533mm launch tube. Analogous to the U.S.-made Tomahawk, this was the first missile of its class fielded on Soviet submarines.

From 1977 through 1985, S-49 continued to support Soviet missile-torpedo development.

After a major overhaul between 1986 and 1991, S-49 continued weapons-related duties until 1995, when it was removed from active naval service.

But even retirement did not end its unusual career.

In late 1995, S-49 was transformed again, emerging as PZS-50, a floating battery charging station. The submarine supported the Black Sea Fleet by charging batteries and assisting submarine training activities.

S-49 remained in service as a support vessel into the 2010s, finally retiring around 2019.

#SovietNavy #ColdWar Today, after dock repairs and museumification, the submarine S-49 (PZS-50) of Project 633RV was towed to the Southern Bay of Sevastopol. This is a temporary mooring and in the near future the submarine will be towed to Balaclava. pic.twitter.com/PZ7d0d7jNy

— Capt(N) (@Capt_Navy) November 8, 2021

In May 2022, S-49 became part of the Balaklava Underground Museum Complex, preserving one of the most unusual submarines of the Cold War era in a former Soviet underground submarine base. With Russia occupying the peninsula and engaged in a war with Ukraine, during which Crimea has been repeatedly targeted, the ultimate fate of the boat is by no means certain.

S-49 never fired a missile in anger. But without it, some of the Soviet Navy’s most advanced underwater weapons might never have entered service.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

As a keen reminder of the threats Ukraine is facing, Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh had to stop a recent interview with TWZ to scramble to a shelter as Russian ballistic missiles were approaching. A 35-year-old architect by training, Terekh helped turn Fire Point from a Ukrainian start-up making weapons in a garage into a leading producer of indigenously made long-range strike drones and missiles, and we talked to her about the company’s weapons and future plans. 

Fire Point’s FP-1 and FP-2 drones have been striking Russian targets to devastating effect and its heavy-hitting Flamingo cruise missiles are adding a new level of long-range threat. 

Beyond these, Fire Point is developing the FP-9 ballistic missile to hit targets up to about 500 miles away and the FP-7.x ballistic missile interceptor, intended to provide a more plentiful and cheaper alternative to Patriot munitions.

Among the many topics discussed, Terekh talked about the status of the FP-9 ballistic missile program, roadblocks to fielding an indigenous Patriot interceptor alternative, how her firm is using AI, why the FP-2 drones were so successful against Russian ships in the Sea of Azov and the challenges of building complex weapons systems while under constant Russian fire. Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.

Q: Tell me how Fire Point came to build drones and missiles.

A: Well, we started with the intention to win the war and destroy the Russian Empire, some knowledge in engineering, physics, mathematics, and industrial production, and we started with the FP-1 drone, which was basically the idea behind this. There were two ideas. First is to make an analog of the Shahed drone by technical characteristics, and the second was to utilize a huge stock of Fab 50 bombs. It’s an old Soviet aviation bomb. There was a rumor that there were dozens of thousands of these in Ukrainian stocks, so we decided to build a platform to carry this huge stock.

When we finished designing the aircraft, it turned out that this rumor was just a rumor about the huge stocks of Fab 50s. But anyway, this was a start for FP-1. And when we started to really scale up the production and design a model that would be fitting to be scaled at volume, then we were forced to build a lot of satellite productions around the main production because very soon we met all the possible bottlenecks. And while developing this huge satellite network of productions of the spare parts of different components, we understood that probably we now have enough missiles to go into missile design. That’s the short story.

Footage of the production and testing of the FP-1/2 attack UAVs and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile

Q: The Flamingo ground-launched cruise missile, which broke cover last fall, has a claimed range of about 1,800 miles. It uses Ivchenko AI-25 turbofan engines that are commonly found on the L-39 Albatros jet trainer. How many of these engines still exist and how long can you sustain production with those surplus powerplants without switching to something that can be produced en masse cheaply today?

A: First of all, the AI-25 TL was the initial engine with which we started to fly, but this is just one of five different engines that we use on Flamingo. So it’s not the only engine, and Flamingo was initially designed to be flexible and to be able to work with different types of engines. So we can really widen up the stock of used engines. 

But at the same time, we started to develop our own turbojet engine with the same design bureau that designed the 25 TL many years ago, and we built it specifically for the purpose of UAV, not for aviation. And it took quite some time, more than a year and a half. And now we are assembling our first 10 prototypes of the future turbojet fan engines of our production.

The AI-25 turbofan engine, part 1

Q: And when will that be ready?

A: As soon as possible. Obviously it is harder to make a turbojet engine than it is to make a missile.

Q: What’s the timeline?

A: The goal is to finish testing all the samples and making all the improvements by the end of this year, and next year go into mass production. 

Q: Fire Point has said that it aims to increase Flamingo production to a daily rate of at least seven missiles by October of this year. This would translate to 2,555 built annually. How can you make this happen?

A: We did not increase the production to these numbers. This is the maximum capacity of our production that we built. Unfortunately, since Ukraine was waiting for the funds coming from the European Union loan, the orders did not match the maximum capacity of the production, so the production was lowered to a lower percentage of what it could possibly provide. We expect to ramp it up to the named number. Probably by the end of this year or beginning next year. It depends on how the contracts will arrive. 

Q: How does the Flamingo do its job? Can you run us through what mission preparation, launch, navigation, impact and after action activities look like? 

A: I personally place Flamingo in the drone category, despite the fact that it’s a big missile, because the process looks almost the same. 

Of course, there are nuances that we need to count on during mission planning, but the mission planning is on the side of Ukrainian armed forces. In terms of our company, as a manufacturer, we do a very detailed after-action review. After each mission, we understand how it reacted to electronic warfare. We were able to do a very effective countermeasure against on-ground air defense systems like Pantsir and Tor. So basically, there is just one threat that is really left for Flamingo, and this is aviation. Against this, we cannot really fight. Otherwise, it’s half of the technical perfection of the missile and half of the art of mission planning. So, to fly as low as possible to plan the mission correctly, to understand the altitudes, we cannot afford the luxury of doing the ramp up before the final attack, because then we would be visible to radars. 

Therefore, when you plan the ramp up picket, it is much easier than to plan a very smooth, almost horizontal few degrees attack. 

Anyway, our armed forces already mastered this as well, and from our side, it is important that we provide a navigation solution that is completely resistant towards electronic warfare, jamming, spoofing, any sort of interference, and this we did. So we see the improvements after each mission on both sides, both on our software part and on the mission planning part.

Q: What navigation and target package suites are available for Flamingo at this time? What about in the future?

A: I don’t want to name exact systems for obvious reasons, but it’s a combination of a [Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna] antenna, inertial navigation system, of specific software, of additional data sources, and sometimes it’s visual navigation as well.

Q: Olena Kryzhanivska, a defense fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, recently told the New York Times that the Flamingo missiles have shown “low effectiveness,” possibly because of accuracy problems and that the “results that we see are not the ones that Ukraine would like to have.” How do you respond?

A: Honestly, I don’t respond to such things at all because in the end, we are no magicians. If anybody could create a cruise missile in one year and then already pay back all of the money spent on this missile with the effect of the damage on the enemy’s territory, they can show better and more effective results.

Ukraine’s New FP-5 Missile Has Twice the Range of a Tomahawk | WSJ Equipped

Q: Let’s talk about the FP-9. Ukraine getting its own ballistic missile is a big deal. What went into developing it and what can you tell us about its design?

A: The FP-9 is a missile that we planned would be able to reach Moscow with a range of 850 kilometers. It required building the whole new infrastructure specifically for casting solid rocket propellants in such a huge amount. The engine itself is 4.6 tons of solid rocket fuel, compared to FP-7, where it’s just one ton of solid rocket fuel, so a whole set of factories of preparation infrastructure. 

Anyway, as we are speaking now, the engines are being cast. Therefore, we expect test launches soon, as soon as possible. The navigation solution, everything else on this missile is already ready. So basically, it’s the last touch on the engine, and we are ready to start. 

Ukrainian FP-9 ballistics ready to strike! 800 km range – MOSCOW is now within reach!

Q: So when will it be operational? It hasn’t been used yet, right?

A: No, we are preparing for the first flight.

Q: When do you think that will be?

A: I understand the curiosity behind the question on when exactly this would happen, but we have our specific dates in mind where we are aiming. But I don’t like naming them because a lot of things could go wrong on the way, so my expectation is that this would be autumn. I would not specify better at this moment.

Q: For the FP-9 ballistic missile, Ukraine had to build a new solid-fuel engine casting facility. How difficult was that and what is the status of it?

A: Obviously, it was quite a challenge because we do have such a factory. Ukraine had such a factory in Pavlograd, but Pavlograd is under constant attack, and also they’re using a little bit different technology for that. We understand if we do not build an alternative to Pavlograd, then we will have no future for the missile program. 

So we built multiple factories in Ukraine and one in Denmark for the sake of solving this task. Of course, it’s extremely challenging. It’s equipment. It’s mixers for casting. It’s a specific post-curing process, casting process. This is a dangerous production, and we had to reinvent in a way this whole technology almost from scratch. Therefore, it was quite a challenge, but I like how it went out. Since we are already casting a lot of solid rocket fuel for smaller rockets, I like how it’s developing and how it’s going. 

Q: How difficult is it to put all this together from so many dispersed locations?

A: Well, the logistics are hell, to be frank (chuckles). But we do not have the luxury to have the factory in a classic way, with the walls and roof, we if when I say factory and we have 90 of them in the moment, when I say factory I mean this whole ecosystem with logistics, with warehouses, everything is hidden and dissolved in a way that the critical components are always duplicated, triplicated, quadruplicated. It’s a lot of additional investments and, of course, a lot of risks and a lot of additional time for logistics specifically, but again, we do not have any other choice. Therefore, the factory in this matter is a whole ecosystem.

Q: Fire Point claims that Ukraine can build missiles faster than Russia by building cheaper, less complex missiles. How would that work?

A: I personally believe that if you want to build something in volume, you need to think of this from day one of future product development, and this is probably a critical thing that we changed in this culture at Fire Point. So understanding how the production works is a very important thought to be established as a fundament of the future development. So in practice, how it looks when we start the R&D process, our chief designer has a lot of ideas. But I have the power to interrupt and to block any idea that will not be possible to mass produce later. Therefore, we are rethinking and rethinking until we get the solution that is possible to mass produce. 

And when you think of this in the design stage, then of course it is easier to do it. In fact, and also technological sovereignty is very important for all the critical components and processes. We have our own capabilities inside Fire Point, all the critical, even the machine production. So we do cover lots of things. We rely at least on subcontractors and contractors, and we try to set up the maximum control over the supply chain. 

Author’s note: At this point Terekh stops talking and looks at her phone.

Terekh: I am looking to see if this is a ballistic missile attack or not. Yeah, it’s ballistics. So, I would be glad to maybe talk more with you on this point, but I have to evacuate now to the shelter. The flight time is like two minutes.

Author’s note: A week later, we continued the conversation.

Q: Can you talk about the arrangement with Diehl Defense to build Flamingos in Germany? How does this help Fire Point and Ukraine? Can you provide any details about the new seeker Diehl is working to outfit the weapon with and any other details about how Diehl will improve the munition?

A: I cannot provide many details yet because the negotiations are ongoing. But basically, in terms of Germany, we are in negotiations with Diehl Defense, they initiated this discussion. We, I’m sure, can be a mutually interested industrial partner for each other. There is something that Diehl can bring to the table in terms of technology. There is definitely something that we could bring to the table in terms of technology and industrial knowledge.

So I consider such types of negotiations and cooperations very useful. Because the way big primes rethink their future by learning from Ukrainian companies and at the same time using their legacy knowledge for future development – I think is very fruitful for both sides. And of course, it all started by an initiative of the German government because everybody wants to have long-range capabilities of domestic production. 

Q: Let’s talk about the FP-1 drone. Created in 2023, it has been widely used in Ukrainian attacks on targets deep inside Russia. How did you ramp up production of this system and improve it to keep it effective against always adapting Russian defenses?

A: At the beginning, I thought that just constantly analyzing the feedback in a correct way, and then adapting and making changes would be enough. But from today’s point of view, I would say that’s definitely not enough. You have to be so deep in the context of what’s happening on the front line, and in general of the development of enemy tactics of electronic warfare. So you have to be able to make some sort of forecast and try to predict what will happen in the future, find a solution for this future problem, test it, validate it, and when the problem actually comes, you have to have something on your shelf already ready for solving this solution. 

So we are trying to trick the timelines a little bit, even if in some cases, my forecasts are not correct. Eighty percent of the time, they are correct, and that’s definitely enough to always keep up in this technological race. 

You can see video of an FP-1 drone being used in an attack below:

Q: There are now two configurations of this drone, one for longer range and one for a larger warhead. Can you talk about them and how they were adapted to be useful over such a wide range of target sets?

A: You know, when we just made the FP-1, it was just 700 kilometers, and then we found a way to increase the distance and increase the accuracy as well. The same logic happened with FP-2. It started as a middle strike of 200 kilometers, and now it’s up to 500 kilometers. So these are gentle improvements, or as I call them, nuanceful improvements. You can work with an engine. You can work with engine consumption. You can work with reassembling some part of the aircraft in a way that is more aerodynamically effective. So when you make a product that you are satisfied with, there is always room for improvement, to be frank. 

In the case of the longer-ranged version of FP-1, it is a little bit more complicated in production. So it’s not possible, at the moment, to make 300 of them per day, but it allows us to go such long distances. It has a different wing. This wing contains additional fuel tanks, and there are also some minor improvements here and there that provide this result.

Q: And the FP-2?

A: The same logic. It could be different changes, but the same logic.

Q: Can you provide any insights into the ongoing Sea of Azov campaign against Russian shipping that relies heavily on the FP-2 drone? What makes this a good weapon for such attacks?

A: It is controlled manually. There is additional AI assistance on that control. So basically, that makes it the best option to fight dynamic moving targets. Especially, it has multiple options for content streamline. I would explain it like this. So, in case one type of connectivity does not work, there are other options for this as well, and it is very effective when you are controlling your aircraft in real time. Then the pilot can target the most vulnerable part of the ship, and unfortunately, as far as I can see, these are the only sanctions that our enemy really understands.

Q: What other options are there when one type of connectivity doesn’t work?

A: I don’t really want to share exactly what the setup we use is because the more detailed I will explain it, the faster the enemy will find the countermeasures for this.

The following video shows Fire Point drones being used to attack Russian ships in the Sea of Azov:

Q: News reports state that you look to arm this drone with rockets to take on multiple ground targets at standoff ranges. Can you talk about this concept and how you aim to see it be used on the battlefield? 

A: Actually, the FP-1 and FP-2 are pretty universal platforms. There are so many versions of this that we didn’t announce it publicly yet, however these airplanes can make a lot of different side quests, and one of these side quests is of course carrying uncontrolled short-range missiles. We do have a huge stockpile of this missile in the Ukrainian army that is not largely used, and it is the way to utilize them with the most possible sense. It helps to counterattack the mobile interceptor groups, and when the aircraft is done with letting the missiles out, it can go further for the initial mission. So it’s really like a side quest. 

Q: What kind of rockets are you talking about?

A: Old Soviet 57mm S-5 rockets.

Soviet 57mm S-5KO High Explosive Anti-Tank FRAG Aircraft Rocket #military #coldwar #airforce #rocket

Q: How many S-5 rockets can it carry?

A: But it could be any, to be frank. But that does not matter much.

Q: But how many can the drone carry?

A: Eight.

You can see an FP-1 drone launching rockets in this video:

Q: How do you use AI in these drones and other weapons? Where is this headed in the future? 

A: Since we are using quite a big platform, our user experience with AI is slightly different from smaller FPV or reconnaissance drones. We use it for visual map-matching for final target corrections. But I do not say that it’s largely changing the narrative of how we’re using drones because I still believe there should be a person behind making a final decision. So we do use AI a lot in our daily work in software development, in technical consultancy, but in terms of directing the flight, it is still in the end a human who makes the final decision.

Q: Do you use man-in-the-loop or man-on-the-loop?

A: Both.

Q: Can you provide more details about how you use AI in the terminal phase of an attack?

A: There are multiple versions for this type of terminal work. At the moment, we are mostly at the point of collecting more precise data for more inertial platforms like ours. At the same time, it helps to correct and lead the aircraft if the connectivity is lost for quite some time because it has the target recognition possibility and the final targeting as well. But it should still be human-in-the-loop at this moment. 

Q: Where is this headed in the future? 

A: You know, AI companies are now hiring philosophers to decide on where it’s heading in the future. My perfect scenario would be that we will use AI for finding alternative deterrence options. What I mean is, instead of just relying on nukes as a deterrent, it could be that we will build some sort of drone walls, or we will operate the kill zones where the decision-making would be solely on AI. 

There are pros and cons to this as well. For example, we all knew of cases where Russians were infiltrating their agents in the governments of different countries, and when it came to making a fair response to barbarian actions, somebody sabotaged this fair response. So probably AI could be an instrument to provide an immediate response for aggressive actions in the future of whoever this could be, the aggressor. I don’t have a clear answer. Obviously, we are all thinking about this: to what point we can delegate the responsibility, and it’s still an open question.

Q: Satellite communications are also key to long-range strikes against dynamic targets like ships. How has the miniaturization of this technology changed how your products are used? 

A: Miniaturization is crucial, but that is all the detail I can share at this stage.

Q: Let’s talk about Project Freya and the FP-7.x interceptor missile you are developing. Who is providing the seeker to make this work? What is the timeline and what are the expected costs per interceptor? And how will it compare to PAC-3 Patriot?

A: We are working with two European and one Ukrainian company on secret development, and I don’t know which of the options would be the fastest out of this. The final goal is to make the whole interceptor cheaper than 1 million euros. I think with the expected price range of the seekers that we discussed with our partners, this is doable. Probably not from the first iterations, but definitely in serial production. 

Q: What seekers are you using, and from which companies?

A: It is [imaging infrared] seekers. One deal is public, so one option is from Diehl Defense that we are currently integrating. The other is – I don’t know if they’re comfortable with public disclosure yet, so I have to talk with them first.

Q: What’s the timeline for this?

A: Nobody can answer at this point. So the deep technical integration is happening right now. We expect, of course, it to be in the nearest months, because the seekers aside, we are on a good level of readiness. But nobody can answer this point. 

Q: What’s the major issue that still has to be overcome?

A: On technical integration?

Q: On being able to produce the interceptor at scale.

A: If we look at everything but the seeker, our production is already ready, even for mass production, and we finished all the tests on this matter. But the amount in which we will have seekers and their accuracy and the results of technical integration – it’s still something that we are cooking at the moment. Of course, we will be doing our best to maximize both the accuracy, the energy consumption, and the mass production in the future. But we have to understand that even the seeker manufacturers are doing this for the first time in such an integration. So it requires a lot of talent, a lot.

Q: How will it compare to PAC-3 Patriot interceptor?

A: The PAC-3 is a different missile designed for different consumption levels. I think FP-7.x is more comparable in the first iteration to the Patriot PAC-2 because we do not expect immediate success with hit-to-kill, and the first interception we expect to do with the blast interception. Hit-to-kill is the next iteration. So at the beginning we will have more the analog of the PAC-2, but more mass-produced and cheaper.

Q: How many do you think you will be able to make?

A: From our side, we are ready to make almost an infinite amount. So we are targeting to do at least 2,000 a year as a starter, and then develop the production. Right now, we are solving the bottlenecks again, especially on the seeker part of this. But everything that is dependent on Fire Point, we can scale these numbers up.

Q: What do you think about the Patriot interceptor licensing deal Presidents Trump and Zelensky discussed before the American leader backed away from that? Would this affect anything you are doing?

A: No, it could be a good addition to what we are already doing.

Q: Why?

A: Because, in my opinion, every industrial corporation is like the greatest university of all. And the more you cooperate with different companies – there are not that many companies in the world who can produce anti-ballistic capabilities, and we have to kind of stay together on solving massive threats.

Q: On his last day as defense minister, Mykhalio Fedorov wrote that “a successful ballistics test was conducted, which was developed within the Ministry of Defense’s area of responsibility. We significantly changed the technical specifications and demonstrated maximum accuracy. We reduced the price by 30%. Ukraine will enter a new league.” Is this something you are working on or is it the government-run Sapsan program? What can you tell me about this?

A: I don’t know what exactly his words meant to be about because around the same time we were both testing our missiles and Pivdenne was testing theirs [the Sapsan], but from what I know, Sapsan also got a big improvement, and they had recently one of their first big successes with accuracy and technologically. So I think probably he meant both of us or just Sapsan. I don’t know.

🚀 Moscow has a new reason to worry. Ukraine has tested a new ballistic missile

In his farewell post, Mykhailo Fedorov revealed that successful tests of a Ukrainian ballistic missile took place on the very day the government stepped down. He did not specify which missile it was.… pic.twitter.com/PoprVjAUx8

— NEXTA (@nexta_tv) July 16, 2026

Q: A little more than six months after naming the tech-savvy Fedorov defense minister, Zelensky fired him, ultimately replacing him with Major General Yevhen Khmara, who now serves as acting defense minister. How has the change in command in the Ministry of Defense affected Fire Point and Ukrainian domestic weapons development in general?

A: I think in general, our president has a big vision on why he’s doing specific things. The team of Mykhailo Fedorov helped a lot to develop Ukrainian industry, specifically with removing a lot of bureaucracy from the process. I think this initiative alone was the reason why Ukrainian industry is looking like this today. It was back in 2023. But the new minister is a war person. He is deep in the knowledge of asymmetric actions. So we expect a positive future.

Q: Fire Point has talked about the need for a Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) UAS armed with a 30mm cannon that can intercept glide bombs before they hit their targets. What details can you provide about that?

A: There is a version of this, like an interceptor. We have multiple versions for interceptors on the platform of FP-1. One is with a gun, the other with small interceptors, like the ones that are popular now, the [General Cherry] Bullet interceptors. And there are also a few other options. As I mentioned at the beginning, it’s a pretty universal platform that can do a side quest. 

Q: What kind of gun are you talking about?

A: Honestly, it was created to intercept Shaheds. I think for intercepting the glide bombs, it’s almost impossible to do so after the glide bomb has left the aircraft. It looks unrealistic to me, to be frank. Maybe, there would be a way, for example, to try and catch the aircraft before it launches. But the most effective way to fight glide bombs is to destroy Russian aviation, and I don’t know yet a more effective way to do this. 

⚡ Russia may have brought back UMPB-5R jet-powered glide bombs. Recent strikes suggest the weapons can reach targets about 150 km away.https://t.co/xiZ6Nf0H1X

— Militarnyi (@militarnyi) August 2, 2026

Q: What else is on the horizon for Fire Point? What new capabilities and platforms are you looking at developing and what battlefield realities are driving those developments?

A: Aside from everything that is well known, we are also focusing on creating our own satellite constellation, so we have an independent connectivity for the drones. So this is one of the focuses, and of course we are working on improving the autonomous flight for the drones, so there are many small and big developments, but the biggest one is probably satcom.

Q: Tell me about this. Are you actually going to launch your own satellites? Are you building satellites for someone else to launch?

A: We are working together with a company that produces satellites, and we are also starting to develop our future possibility to deliver satellites. We are far from that yet, but we already have the equipment, and we already are experimenting with the bigger rocket engines. So this development had already started. It’s not the main focus at the moment, of course, because at the moment we have to win the war first. But this is something we are preparing for the future. 

Q: What company are you working with?

A: Again, I have to talk with them whether or not they want to be public.

Q: Finally, what about Fire Point as a weapons exporter? Where do you see the company as a global arms provider in the near future and after the war hopefully ends?

A: We have a big interest from a majority of European countries to have Fire Point products in their armies, and we already started to work on that because they all saw the threat that may potentially come from Russia. Of course, we also have other negotiations, but now we have to be more careful how we ensure that our products do not wind up with the bad guys. So every export movement would be treated with the maximum cautiousness.

Q: How could your weapons land in the hands of the bad guys?

A: Ah, that’s a good question, how these deals could be possibly secured from being redirected to the wrong place? We have a huge level of trust with our partners, but those countries that are new to us, we do not yet have this relationship and this level of trust.

Q: Are you selling any weapons right now to either the U.S. or, say, some of the Gulf Arab nations, given what’s going on there? 

A: Not at the moment.

Q: Are you in negotiations with the U.S. and/or Gulf Arab nations?

A: Yeah, we have a lot of negotiations and discussions going on in parallel. I will comment once the negotiations are successful.

Q: Are there any weapons or products that you’re developing that I haven’t asked about?

A: I think it is important to understand that we will soon consider all the weapons more in terms of security subscription rather than actual hardware product.

Q: What do you mean?

A: I mean the amount of updates that we make, even on the software side, is huge and happens so often. It kinda reminds me of how you update your smartphone. This does not mean that you have to buy each new smartphone every month, but the software updates quite fast, and also could be that in a year or two you will need a new smartphone. So Ukraine is rethinking the weaponry more in the possibility of how the company can ensure that the army will always have a capability, and how this capability is provided is now a headache of the company. 

So in the old model, when a defense contractor delivers the contract, that’s it. Maybe after some time he will be called for maintenance. But our responsibility isn’t finished on the day that we deploy the weapon, but after I finally receive the post-flight analysis and I’m happy with this. So the whole logistic services, software updates, up-training, any changes that are happening on the way we do by ourselves. The end user can focus on launching and planning the missions, and of course we work shoulder to shoulder to ensure that we will use the battlefield data to a maximum level of usefulness.

The post-Cold War order was built on assumptions russia never shared.

Today’s queues at the Fire Point stand suggest Europe has understood the assignment.

Exceptional second day at Eurosatory. pic.twitter.com/hwMLEMcZXN

— terekh (@iraterekh) June 16, 2026

Q: What can the U.S. learn from Fire Point?

A: Make the market more transparent and attractive to younger startups. Remove bureaucracy as much as possible, share the risks with the contractors to make everybody more flexible, and probably that’s it. 

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Israelis head to the polls in October for the country’s first election since the war on Gaza began. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces mounting pressure over the October 7 attacks, corruption charges, international isolation, and divisions within his coalition.

The Department of War is challenging the U.S. defense industrial base to transform the way it builds and supplies weapons for the military – stimulating manufacturers to find new ways to enable faster and more efficient procurement. It’s a necessary move, particularly when it comes to weapons stockpiles, as some have been placed on red alert due to high consumption in crisis abroad. Efforts to create a so-called “Arsenal of Freedom” involve shoring-up critical supply chains, injecting predictable long-lead funding, lowering costs, and increasing competition.

Lockheed Martin’s Missiles and Fire Control (MFC) division is reacting by investing in production capacity to accelerate some of its most important munitions facilities – a reflection of how many of its missiles are in high demand. Speaking at a groundbreaking event at the company’s Troy, Alabama, site in May 2026, at which TWZ was present, Lockheed Martin chairman, president and CEO Jim Taiclet addressed employees about a “first landmark framework agreement” that will dramatically accelerate production of PAC-3 MSE (Missile Segment Enhancement) air defense interceptors, which are designed to destroy adversary tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones and aircraft.

Taiclet said the “agreement represented a new model for how government and industry could work together with greater speed, accountability and shared commitment to the mission’s execution.” In addition to PAC-3 MSE, Lockheed Martin is also boosting production of its Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) lines to meet the urgent demand for more missiles. 

Both PAC-3 and THAAD have been integrated together in Joint All-Domain Operations, including with the U.S. Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) and during exercises with the F-35 stealth fighter.

The company says it’s planning an $8-9-billion investment through 2030 to expand this munitions footprint across the U.S.. Lockheed Martin has invested more than $7 billion since President Donald Trump’s first term to expand capacity for priority systems, including approximately $2 billion dedicated to accelerating munitions

production. Investment is being channeled into MFC facilities, tooling, suppliers, as well as its workforce. “This effort reflects the power of a commercially-inspired partnership between government and industry,” Taiclet said, endorsing this approach as an obvious method to expand capacity for priority systems.

Paving the way for acceleration

The Department of War’s Acquisition Transformation Strategy is designed to create long-term stability that gives industry the confidence to make necessary investments to change the way it produces equipment. Lockheed Martin was the first in the defense industry to announce a framework agreement like this for munitions acceleration under the new government initiative – initially committing to the tripling of production capacity of the PAC-3 MSE interceptor and then quadrupling the production capacity of THAAD interceptors.

The U.S. government awarded Lockheed Martin a $4.7-billion undefinitized contract action (UCA) in April 2026 for the accelerated production of PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), which built on a framework agreement signed in January 2026 to ramp up production of the missiles. Production of the PrSM short-range ballistic missile will also quadruple. PrSM, which succeeds the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), received Milestone C approval from the U.S. Army in July 2025, which led to a $4.94 billion contract award. PrSM then made its operational debut earlier this year in operations against Iran. 

“We’re rapidly ramping up a number of munitions. It’ll probably [expand to] include all the munitions that we build here at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control,” explained Tim Cahill, president of the company division. “We are working in partnership with the Department of War to identify go-quick contract actions that we can put in place, the suppliers we need and what investment is needed, and then determine what we call the enablers to make that happen.”

“It’s not just a case of let’s just go faster, it’s about what we fundamentally have to change across the entire business and in the technical process to go quickly to replenish stocks at a higher level than we ever have before,” Cahill added. “Ultimately, I would expect that we’re going to see all the munitions that we build in some sort of heads of agreement, some sort of a contract to increase the level of production.”

Lockheed Martin’s Master Plan For Accelerating Munitions Production

In addition to PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, and PrSM, the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) programs are also ramping up, and Cahill added that the AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile JAGM and Javelin shoulder-launched anti-armor weapon are expected to follow suit. “We have been ramping some of these munitions for several years already. Javelin production has increased, as has GMLRS [Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System] and GMLRS Extended-Range, but I would expect they’re going to ramp up beyond those numbers in the next few years.”

The manufacturing process for these advanced weapons is a complex business. It has typically taken as long as three years from contract signature to the delivery of a PAC-3 MSE. Lockheed Martin aims to dramatically cut timelines like this. “Lockheed Martin is not waiting – we have been taking proactive steps to ramp up production and secure materials well in advance,” explained Jason Reynolds, vice president and general manager for integrated air and missile defense. “It takes time for each of those suppliers to actually create those individual subcomponents and ship them to places like our plants in Troy, Alabama, or Camden, Arkansas. Then we do the final assembly. Once we’ve completed that, we have to go through testing and qualification, packaging and signing off, then delivering them to the U.S. government or to our partners and allies that have placed that order. It’s a time consuming process, but we’re doing everything possible to shorten that in the near term.”

One of the critical keys to the change lies in contracting. Cahill says companies have become used to annual contracts, with incremental follow-on options. He says this drove industry to commit to a year’s worth of production at a time, with no real certainty over what the ensuing years would bring. The new government approach presents a commitment of between five and seven years, which provides far greater confidence and predictability for manufacturers to invest in long-lead items to help prevent bottlenecks in the complex production cycle, and ultimately streamlines and expedites the production process.

The long-term approach to procurement has an additional benefit of being able to secure lower prices for components and materials, enabling the prime contractor to invest in a supplier’s capacity with greater confidence. Keeping a production line moving and not having to pause to wait for components to arrive is a significant factor. Securing larger quantities of parts with plenty of lead time enables cost savings and production acceleration.

“For all of us, there’s also economic value there,” explains Cahill. “There is real money in being able to drive efficiencies, knowing what the next seven years will be like. We can take those efficiencies and effectively apply them into self-investment up front, so the U.S. government gets better value in the price of the munitions. They’re ordering more and business gets the opportunity for increased revenue and increased capability.”

“We have thousands of suppliers, particularly underneath our key suppliers all across this nation and in many cases across the world. It’s about what they need all the way down to raw materials. For example, one thing that’s held us up over the years is titanium. Titanium goes into a lot of things, including golf club shafts! So you’re out there competing on the commercial market for materials. Being able to get ahead of that curve and aggregate demand, first of all, increases our priority and allows us to deal with the lead times and plan for that so those don’t become bottlenecks. What we are doing with our suppliers is in effect addressing all those elements.”

It’s not just the contracting that is being overhauled, changing the way these complex systems are actually built is equally important. Lockheed Martin is now increasing both its workforce and the use of robotics, plus it’s bringing in additive manufacturing techniques such as 3D printing to reduce reliance on costly and time-consuming traditional tooling.

“Building missiles faster is a key priority for us, and we can do that a couple of different ways,” added Jason Reynolds. “You can shorten the span time and the lead times of all the different components, and you can actually increase the factory floor [footprint] to increase throughput. We’re doing all of that. We’re working with suppliers to reduce the individual span times, whether it be a rocket motor, a seeker, or a section that we make internally like the guidance section, so that we can build these things faster using automation and advanced manufacturing technologies at the same time. We’re increasing the actual capacity. We’re making additional tooling and test equipment, hiring additional people both here at Lockheed Martin and at our suppliers around the world.”

License production is another means to share the load and unlock expanded production capacity. Lockheed Martin has already licensed PAC-3 MSE production to Japan, which operates a final assembly and checkout facility. “That’s something we’re going to be looking at, because if we can expand our supply base in Europe, for example, where we have potential co-production in Europe, there are some great possibilities there,” says Tim Cahill. “We’re looking at all the elements, everything that might be a methodology to bring those numbers up and make sure that our nation and our allies have the capacity they need. Licensed production could very well be part of that.”

Rapid prototyping and speed to field

New start-up companies and industry “disruptors” are playing a fundamental role in changing the government’s expectations when it comes to driving down costs and rapidly developing and then producing new capabilities. Tim Cahill pulls no punches when acknowledging this and emphasizing how Lockheed Martin is similarly evolving its approach. 

MFC has set-up a Rapid Fielding Center at its Grand Prairie facility in Dallas, Texas, designed to promote the use of latest in production and prototyping technologies. “We are looking at how we can apply some of the emerging technologies to do things quickly, like using Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to make our production more adaptive and able to build in mass quantities that we couldn’t build before. We are competing in that space.”

The use of commercial off the shelf products is a recognized means to accelerate, but Cahill cautions that it’s not always a suitable solution. “You’re looking for the most capable parts to meet the requirements and get you there fast. That’s always been part of the dynamic for Lockheed Martin. We always look at commercial parts. Some systems are more conducive to it than others. If you’re building a low-cost drone or a counter-drone system, you’re looking for something that’s treatable – it’s great for those kinds of systems. But as these become more complex – when they have to operate in environments that range from the Arctic to the high desert in the Middle East in the middle of summer – or if they have to go through extreme launch environments or whether they have to survive in the presence of our adversaries trying to counter them. As the requirements get harder and harder, commercial off-the-shelf parts just don’t meet those requirements. They fail because they’re not designed for that.”

“You can’t take an automotive guidance system and run it at Mach 5, run it through the atmosphere at high temperature and have somebody try and disrupt it. In most cases we have to make them more robust and capable, or build parts that are unique to those particular products. We always start with the questions of how we accomplish the mission? How do we give our warfighters what they need to prevail, and we will use commercial off-the-shelf if that fits what is necessary for that mission – sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn’t. Any technology that you can imagine, we are looking for, how might we apply that just like all the new entrants and frankly all the traditional companies are doing much the same. We get the sense of urgency and that’s what we intend to do.”

Lockheed Martin is also involved in deep research around low cost weapons. “There’s a lot of people competing in that space,” Cahill acknowledges. “Sometimes for us when we’re applying our investment, our expertise, it’s more effective to focus on some of the other capability areas. For example, we have introduced a counter-UAS [unmanned aircraft system] called MORFIUS™ X-Rotor, a newly-released airborne high power microwave system that can neutralize more than 50 enemy drones in a single flight.”

MORFIUS is designed for field recovery and reuse and Lockheed Martin says it offers a very low cost-per-kill ratio.

Lockheed Martin is also ready to move ahead with a lower-cost Patriot missile interceptor. “Our PAC-3 Adapted Capability Effector, or PAC-3 ACE, answers the call,” Cahill told TWZ, adding that it will probably be less than half as expensive as the current PAC-3 MSE, but that it would still retain a lot of the capability. “They’re never going to have that full capability because you’ve got to fundamentally remove parts, some of the things that are most expensive.” 

Cahill says that PAC-3 ACE is built on the PAC-3 fire-control system and will be fully linked to the Patriot weapon system and the Integrated Battle Command System. “There isn’t magic here and when you take some of those things off, they become less capable, but that’s absolutely part of the dynamic. This rapidly fielded, complementary PAC-3, will be deployed quickly and enhance the resilience of the U.S. defense industrial base worldwide.”

Barzani meets Syria’s al-Sharaa in Damascus to discuss Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration and Kurdish rights in post-Assad Syria.

Nechirvan Barzani, president of Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurdish region, has held talks with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, in the first visit by a Kurdish leader to Syria since the fall of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

On Monday, Barzani led a high-level delegation to Damascus, where he was received at the People’s Palace. According to Syria’s state news agency SANA, the two sides discussed bilateral relations between Erbil and Damascus, as well as several key regional issues of mutual concern to strengthen cooperation and coordination across various fields.

The visit to Syria’s capital comes after months of diplomatic engagement between the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and Syria’s new administration. Barzani and al-Sharaa previously met twice on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, first on April 11, 2025, and again on April 17, 2026. According to a statement from the Kurdistan Region Presidency, the second meeting covered the development of economic ties and the agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The integration of the SDF into Syrian state institutions is a central focus of the talks. The SDF, a Kurdish-led force that controls much of northeastern Syria, has been in negotiations with Damascus over its future status. The Syrian government has sought to integrate the force into its military structures, while Kurdish representatives have pressed for guarantees of political and cultural rights.

According to news reports from Al Hadath, Barzani and al-Sharaa discussed mechanisms for entrenching the constitutional rights of Kurds in Syria, particularly language rights and administrative autonomy. Implementation of Decree No. 13, which pertains to Kurdish language rights, was also on the agenda. Syrian officials have expressed interest in benefitting from the Kurdistan Regional Government’s experience in Kurdish-language education, curriculum development and teacher training.

Barzani’s itinerary also includes meetings with Kurdish officials in Syria, including SDF commanders and Kurdish members of the Syrian parliament, according to Kurdish media reports.

The visit follows a series of diplomatic exchanges, including a trip by Syria’s education minister to Erbil and efforts to reopen the Syrian consulate in Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurdish region. Barzani has previously hosted SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and delegations from northeastern Syria in Erbil.

For the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil, which shares a 1,100km (684-mile) border with Syria and hosts tens of thousands of Syrian refugees, the engagement carries vital security imperatives. Ensuring a stable, inclusive Syria reduces the risk of the resurgence of ISIL (ISIS), limits future refugee flows, and enhances Erbil’s diplomatic leverage with both Baghdad and Ankara.

The talks come at a sensitive time, during ongoing clashes between Syrian forces and Kurdish fighters in the northeast.

A new study by Australia’s internet regulator has revealed that more than eight in 10 young Australian teens and preteens are continuing to use social media platforms despite the government’s prohibition for children under 16.

The ban came into effect in December last year.

Here is what we know about how it’s going.

What did the latest report find?

Australia’s internet regulator, eSafety, said it had found that more than eight in 10 Australian under-16s are continuing to use social media despite being banned from doing so.

The report also found that most of those children aged 10 to 15 were using social media just as frequently in March as they had been before the ban came into force on December 10 last year.

“Most under-16s who had social media accounts before commencement were able to either retain them or create new ones at the three-month ⁠mark, with social media platforms’ failure to implement effective age assurance measures cited as the main reason,” eSafety said in a statement.

About half the children who retained their accounts said platforms had not checked their age, the most common reason they were able to stay on the services. Others said that their accounts listed them as aged 16 or older or ‌that age-checking ⁠systems had incorrectly determined they were older.

Prior to the ban, nearly 86 percent of children surveyed reported using at least one age-restricted platform. Three months later, that figure remained above 81 percent, the eSafety report said.

Around 58 percent of teenagers reported using social media daily, the report found. Before the ban, the number was roughly 60 percent.

The report showed minimal change in “sports and physical activity, arts and music, spending time with friends and family, and attendance at community events”.

At the time the new rule was introduced, experts warned that enforcing it would be extremely difficult.

Joanna Orlando, a researcher in digital wellbeing and the author of Generation Connected: How to Parent in a Digital World, told Al Jazeera in December last year: “Tech-savvy teens simply use VPNs, fake birth photos for face scans, or migrate to less regulated platforms like Lemon8, or to platforms not part of the ban like video games. Enforcement is proving to be difficult in the days leading up to the ban.”

In December 2025, Australia prohibited children under 16 from using social media platforms, becoming the world’s first country to do so. Video game platforms are not included in the ban.

The government said this was prompted by increasing concerns about the effects of cyberbullying, sexual exploitation and self-harm content on the mental and physical health of children and young people.

Research commissioned by the Australian government in 2023 found four out of five children aged eight to 16 use social media, often beginning between the ages of 10 and 12. That report was led by former National Australia Bank CEO Andrew Thorburn, who recommended age restrictions.

Under the law, 10 of the biggest social media platforms face $33m in fines if they fail to take “reasonable steps” to block Australian-based users younger than 16. Such steps include using age-verification tools to determine how old users are.

As of January 16, social media companies had revoked access to about 4.7 million accounts identified as belonging to children in Australia, according to officials.

“We stared down everybody who said it couldn’t be done, some of the most powerful and rich companies in the world and their supporters,” Australian Communications Minister Anika Wells told reporters in January.

However, several months later, it now appears that youngsters have been able to open new accounts with relative ease.

Days after Australia’s ban took effect, Reddit, one of the 10 platforms required to block minors, lodged a challenge to the ban in the High Court, while still complying with it. The case is still ongoing.

How has the Australian government responded to the latest findings?

On Saturday, Andrew Leigh, Australia’s assistant minister for productivity, competition, charities and treasury, defended the new law, arguing that the social media ban has already reshaped the “national debate” about the use of social media by children.

The ban has been “an important game changer in the conversation among parents”, Leigh said in televised remarks.

“We’ve had millions of accounts shut down,” he said.

“We never expected that this would have 100 percent compliance. We don’t get 100 percent compliance out of minimum drinking age laws, but it’s still appropriate that we have that law on the books.”

While social media has long provided easy access to unregulated and often harmful content, misinformation and hate speech, the recent explosion of AI‑generated material poses new risks to the wellbeing of children and young people, experts say.

The American Psychological Association published an advisory last year warning that generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems can amplify harmful content such as violent or sexual videos.

It also added that adolescents are less likely than adults to question the accuracy of AI-generated content. “They may also be unaware of the persuasive intent underlying an AI system’s advice or bias,” the advisory stated.

AI can also amplify pre-existing societal prejudices, according to Ayo Tometi, co-creator of the US-based antiracist movement Black Lives Matter.

Children worldwide are also worried about the misuse of AI for online child sexual exploitation and “deepfakes”, according to research by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) on children’s perspectives and AI, which it published in October 2025.

Following the introduction of Australia’s landmark law, some other countries are contemplating similar bans.

In the United Kingdom, the government has announced that it also plans to introduce a ban on social media platforms such as TikTok, Snapchat and Instagram from spring 2027 onward. 

Messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Signal, educational tools, and e-commerce and music streaming will be excluded.

The government will announce the new regulations by the end of this year.

In November 2025, Denmark’s government said it also plans to prohibit social media platforms for children under 15, saying it had secured majority support in parliament. The ban is due to come into effect later this year.

Around the same time, Malaysia said it would ban social media accounts for people under 16 from this year.

In April, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis formally announced plans to prohibit social media access for children under 15 from January 1, 2027, subject to parliamentary approval.

Iran on Monday denied that any negotiations were taking place with the United States, directly contradicting U.S. President Donald Trump’s claim that talks were scheduled later in the day and exposing fresh uncertainty over Washington’s strategy after months of military confrontation.

The conflicting statements came after Trump once again backed away from threatened military action against Iran, saying he preferred diplomacy over escalation. Tehran, however, insisted that no negotiations were planned and that no meetings with American officials had been arranged.

Iran Rejects Trump’s Claims

Speaking aboard Air Force One on Sunday, Trump said the United States would begin negotiations with Iran on Monday afternoon, describing diplomacy as preferable to launching another round of attacks.

Iran swiftly dismissed the claim.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said there were no negotiations under way with Washington and no plans to host American officials or dispatch Iranian negotiators abroad. He added that, apart from Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, who is currently on a religious pilgrimage in Iraq, all Iranian negotiators remain inside the country.

A senior Iranian source also told Reuters that no talks had been scheduled and that Araqchi would remain unavailable until at least the end of the week.

According to Tehran, the only ongoing discussions involve Oman and focus exclusively on managing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

A Familiar Cycle of Escalation and Retreat

The latest episode mirrors a pattern that has defined the five month conflict between Washington and Tehran.

Since launching Operation Epic Fury alongside Israel, Trump has repeatedly threatened major military action before stepping back at the last moment, often citing diplomatic efforts as justification.

Iran has consistently rejected direct negotiations since the collapse of a U.S. backed memorandum of understanding in early July, arguing that Washington has failed to uphold previous commitments while continuing military pressure.

The repeated cycle of escalation followed by de escalation has left uncertainty hanging over regional security and global energy markets.

Hormuz Remains the Central Dispute

At the heart of the dispute remains the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most strategically important oil shipping route.

Washington argues that the failed June agreement required Iran to reopen the waterway to unrestricted international shipping. Tehran maintains that the document explicitly preserved its authority over traffic through the strait, allowing it to retain significant leverage.

The inability of the United States to secure unrestricted access has become one of the most significant unresolved issues of the conflict.

For the Trump administration, failure to reduce Iran’s influence over Hormuz would represent a strategic setback after months of military operations aimed at weakening Tehran’s regional position.

Strategic Goals Remain Unfulfilled

Five months into the conflict, many of Washington’s stated objectives remain largely unmet.

The United States has sought to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme, reduce its capacity to strike regional rivals, protect commercial shipping, and increase pressure on Iran’s leadership.

Instead, Iran has continued to demonstrate its ability to disrupt regional energy infrastructure and maritime trade while maintaining leverage over one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

Each round of military escalation has been followed by Iranian retaliatory actions targeting shipping, Gulf energy infrastructure, or U.S. interests in the region, complicating Washington’s efforts to establish deterrence.

Despite the diplomatic confusion, financial markets welcomed Trump’s decision not to proceed with further attacks.

Brent crude prices fell more than 4 percent to around 84 dollars per barrel as traders anticipated a reduced immediate risk of supply disruptions in the Gulf.

Nevertheless, tensions remain elevated.

The British maritime security organisation UKMTO reported that a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz detected an explosion in nearby waters overnight, although no injuries or damage were reported.

Diplomatic Uncertainty Persists

The contradictory messages from Washington and Tehran highlight the absence of a clear diplomatic pathway toward ending the crisis.

While Trump continues to present negotiations as an alternative to military action, Iran’s categorical denial suggests that no formal channel currently exists between the two governments.

With the Strait of Hormuz still contested and military incidents continuing across the Gulf, the conflict remains caught between diplomacy and confrontation, leaving regional stability and global energy markets vulnerable to further shocks.

With information from Reuters.

President Donald Trump on Wednesday vowed to retaliate for Iran’s surprise attack on U.S. forces in Jordan launched Tuesday. His comments came a day after fighting in the region erupted anew after a several-day pause in U.S.-Iranian tit-for-tat actions. After the Iranian barrage, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia hit Iranian-backed militia groups in Iraq. That was in response for previous strikes from Iraq on U.S. and Saudi assets. Meanwhile, the Houthis are reportedly considering imposing a toll on Bab al-Mandeb Strait transits, adding to the region’s heightened tensions.

“We’re going to beat the fucking shit out of them,” Fox News reporter Troy Yingst says the president told him this morning, referring to Iran. “We’ll be hitting them hard. They’re going to get a beating.”

Yingst also said Trump told him that “U.S. forces had just minutes to shoot down these incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. The president says he has reviewed video of the shootdown, and it was U.S. forces conducting this operation to defend that area. He said it was real time; they were calling out coordinates and ensuring that none of this incoming Iranian fire got through.”

“In terms of possible talks with the Iranian regime, the president says ‘we’re going to let them keep talking,’” Yingst added. “…those talks are taking place as we speak behind the scenes.”

On Tuesday, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “launched multiple ballistic missiles from Iran in an attempted surprise attack on U.S. forces based in the Middle East,” U.S. Central Command stated on X. “All Iranian missiles were successfully intercepted. U.S. forces remain vigilant and at a high state of readiness.”

The attack began at 5:45 p.m. ET, according to CENTCOM.

The official Iranian Press TV media outlet released video it claims showed a missile attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (MSAB) in Jordan. As we have pointed out in the past, the base has been frequently targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. Three U.S. Army soldiers were killed in an attack there on July 17.

Trump also addressed the combined U.S.-Saudi strike on Iraqi militias linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The action appears to marke the first publicly known instance of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia joining forces to carry out attacks in this conflict.

The president “says those strikes were coordinated with the Iraqi government,” Yingst explained. “He called these Iran-backed militias a cancer on the world, and says he is considering additional warnings against Iranian proxies and their link to the Iranian regime.”

Hours before Trump spoke with Yingst, Iraqi militia groups condemned the action.

Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN), an armed group in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), said those would be avenged, Al Jazeera reported. The PMF said at least 20 of its members were killed and 32 wounded in the U.S.-Saudi airstrikes, which took place across Iraq.

In a statement, HaN demanded the expulsion of U.S. forces from the country, saying their continued presence “has become an imminent threat to the country’s security and stability,” the outlet added. The group also called for an end to cooperation with Saudi Arabia and for the deployment of advanced air defense systems and threatened retaliatory attacks against U.S. and Saudi interests.

Prominent Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militia Al-Nujaba says it will not allow the U.S. and Saudi Arabia “to defile Iraqi soil without exacting a heavy price from them,” following joint U.S.-Saudi strikes on Iran-backed militias in Iraq overnight. https://t.co/r9euaiH60u

— Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران (@ariel_oseran) July 29, 2026

Meanwhile, influential Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr urged the IRGC and allied armed groups to stop launching attacks from Iraq.

“Since this holy land was not a launching point for bombing the Islamic Republic, then our brothers in the Revolutionary Guard must not bomb our independent and holy lands,” al-Sadr posted on X. “Likewise, the rogue militias must not give our brothers in the Gulf Arab states a pretext to target our holy land.”

“Everyone must embrace the spirit of brotherhood and peace and not be drawn into the schemes of the Zionist-American enemy to drag brothers into fighting and conflict,” the cleric added. “While I condemn the targeting of the holy Iraqi lands by all countries and parties, and I condemn the shameless actions of the militias to drag Iraq into a pointless war, I call upon the Iraqi government to establish security, enforce sovereignty, and work diligently for the safety of the Iraqi people and their holy sites, and not to be drawn into the abhorrent sectarian myths.”

CENTCOM on Tuesday said its forces, along with the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, “conducted precision strikes in Iraq, July 28, against Iran-aligned terrorists that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directed to attack U.S. forces and Saudi energy infrastructure.”

“U.S. and Saudi fighter aircraft struck multiple terrorist logistics and weapons sites across eastern Iraq in a strong response to over 30 IRGC-directed aerial drone attacks in the last 72 hours. The unwarranted attacks against U.S. forces were not successful,” CENTCOM added. “From February through April 2026, there were more than 600 attempted attacks on U.S. citizens and facilities by Iran-aligned terrorist militias in Iraq. The IRGC and its terrorist proxies must cease these attacks to avoid further U.S. military response.”

A U.S. official told TWZ Tuesday night that the combined U.S.-Saudi attacks came after the Iranian barrage.

“To be clear, the IRGC-directed attacks at our forces and our Saudi partners since over the weekend came without any provocation,” the official added. “This is a clear message that we will not let those attempts go unanswered.”

U.S. troops are adding to the danger they face by posting cellphone videos of attacks online, CENTCOM commander Adm. Cooper warned, according to Reuters. The command is also considering having some personnel surrender their phones, the outlet added.

Cooper, in a previously unreported letter, “said Iran was benefiting from being able to see the success or failure of its strikes in near real-time by searching news reports or online posts by journalists referencing ‘reactions, photos, and footage from the cellphones of our troops,’” Reuters stated.

The CENTCOM commander appeared to reference the following video in his letter, Reuters suggested.

“The direct, unavoidable cost of this open-source intelligence could be measured ​in the lives of American service members and civilian residents in targeted Gulf countries,” Cooper wrote in his July 28 letter, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters.

He ​called on troops to “redouble our focus on operational security,” without prescribing specific steps in the memo,” the news organization further noted.

“Admiral Cooper’s top priority is the well-being and protection of over 50,000 American service members operating in the Middle East,” CENTCOM spokesman Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins told TWZ in response to our questions about the letter. “His guidance to troops about operational security reinforces this priority.”

Cooper’s letter follows moves by U.S. satellite companies like Vantor and Planet Labs to delay posting imagery from the region out of similar concerns about operational security.

Cooper’s memo underscores the mounting tensions between real-time news reporting on the war, often aided ⁠by satellite imagery and first-person accounts, and the desire by the U.S. military to restrict any information that could aid Iran as it tries to kill and wound U.S.… https://t.co/0OBN2o1rtg

— Phil Stewart (@phildstewart) July 29, 2026

Amid the renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities, the Houthi rebels of Yemen are considering imposing fees on ships transiting the Red Sea, according to Reuters. The move follows the group’s imposition of a blockade on Saudi ships and its firing on Saudi vessels. It mirrors a similar effort Iran is trying to impose on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“The Houthis were looking into imposing fees on most traffic through the narrow Bab el-Mandeb [BAM] gateway,” Reuters noted, citing sources. The narrow waterway, between Yemen and Djibouti, links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. “No timeframe was given ​at this stage for implementation,” the sources added.

The Houthis’ media office did not respond to a request for comment.

July 29 (Reuters) – Yemen’s Houthi group is considering imposing fees on commercial ships sailing through the southern Red Sea, a week after declaring a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, regional sources with knowledge of the matter told Reuters.

— Tala Ramadan (@TalaRamadan) July 29, 2026

As we have frequently detailed, Houthi actions in the BAM threaten to add far greater pressure on oil exports from the Middle East, already drastically affected by the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the resumption of the U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. The Yemeni rebel group has already expanded its target set, hitting oil terminals and infrastructure Saudi Arabia is using to pump supplies to tankers in the Red Sea. The kingdom has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Even with the BAM closed, oil exports could still head to the West, via the Suez Canal. But if the infrastructure used to convey these energy products is put out of action, the consequences could be even more severe, with far less or even no energy supplies from Saudi Arabia moving out of the Red Sea. The closing of the BAM, and the possible imposition of tolls, also raises the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations.

Despite the increased risks, transits through both straits are trending upward, according to the Kpler risk management firm.

“Daily monitoring shows stronger transit volumes across the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, with 12 and 41 confirmed crossings respectively on 28 July,” Kpler noted on X. “Yet higher traffic should not be mistaken for lower risk. Hormuz routing remains concentrated outside traditional traffic separation patterns, while Bab el-Mandeb continues to present elevated operational and compliance challenges through dark transits, sanctioned vessels and shadow fleet movements.”

“With 62 confirmed maritime security incidents recorded by the IMO as of 27 July and geopolitical tensions still unresolved, vessel behavior remains a more meaningful indicator than crossing volumes alone,” Kpler added. “For operators and markets alike, transparency, routing choices and emerging disruptions remain the key signals to watch over the coming days.”

Traffic rises, risks persist

Daily monitoring shows stronger transit volumes across the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, with 12 and 41 confirmed crossings respectively on 28 July. Yet higher traffic should not be mistaken for lower risk. Hormuz routing remains concentrated… pic.twitter.com/fwUxZyUaf8

— Kpler (@Kpler) July 29, 2026

In the wake of new fighting in the region and threat of Houthi tolls on the BAM, oil prices are once again trending upward. The per barrel price of Brent Crude has risen to nearly $90, according to OilPrice.com. It had fallen to just over $83 per barrel yesterday when the pause in hostilities was still holding.

As we have previously noted, the U.S. and Iran had stopped firing at each other late last week, leading to a pause after 13 straight days of continuous tit-for-tat operations. U.S. President Donald Trump hadn’t ordered a U.S. strike on Iranian territory since last Thursday. This was ostensibly to give another round of diplomacy a chance. However, lingering concerns over the supply of munitions, especially air defense interceptors, reportedly played a role in Trump’s thinking.

The U.S. has burned through hundreds of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot interceptors since a shaky ceasefire went into effect on April 8, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) latest assessment. CSIS was updating a previous analysis of munitions expenditures during Epic Fury that you can read more about here.

According to CSIS, the U.S. had about 2,300 Patriot interceptors in its inventories before Epic Fury, 1,030 by the time the ceasefire was agreed to and between 759 and 827 as of July 27.

As for THAADs, there were 452 interceptors in the U.S. inventory before Epic Fury, between 232 and 262 on the date of the ceasefire and between 234 and 278 as of July 27.

The report authors noted that “[e]stimated inventories today account for additional interceptor use and new deliveries since the April 8 ceasefire. THAAD deliveries during the ceasefire outpaced estimated use over the same period, resulting in higher inventories today than in April. Patriot calculations include the latest MSE variant and PAC-3s. Several hundred PAC-2s, not represented in the chart, are estimated to remain in the U.S. inventory.”

New estimates of American Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD anti-ballistic missile interceptor stockpiles in American inventory from CSIS.

Roughly a third of pre-war Patriot interceptors are estimated to remain. pic.twitter.com/fa986PkBQM

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) July 29, 2026

The lack of sufficient magazine depth is an issue that TWZ has raised frequently for years, and especially in regard to America’s air and missile defenses, in particular. In fact, we laid out in detail these exact concerns and how they would be a major issue in war with Iran just prior to the conflict starting in a feature you can read in full here.

Given Trump’s threat against Iran today, those concerns may be set aside out of a need to respond to the ballistic missile attack. The coming hours should give us a better picture of how all this will develop.

UPDATE: 1:16 PM EDT –

Two vessels were struck by drones in the Egyptian port of Damietta, according to the Ambrey maritime security firm.

One of the ships was a U.S.-owned and operated, Marshall Islands-flagged liquefied natural gas (LNG) floating storage facility and the other was a Greek-owned and operated, Bermuda-flagged LNG tanker, Ambrey stated.

“Reportedly, the incident occurred during LNG discharge operations, with the strike causing a fire on board” the floating LNG storage facility, Ambrey said in an alert. “Ambrey was aware that a second vessel reportedly experienced a fire in connection with the incident. AIS data indicated that the vessel was subsequently towed by two tugs to a position 2.9 NM northeast of the port, accompanied by a fire-fighting vessel.”

The security firm added that it “was aware that the crew had been evacuated and that the fire had subsequently been brought under control. At the time of writing, no party had claimed responsibility. No casualties, damage to port infrastructure or pollution had been reported in connection with the incident.”

After being struck by a drone and experiencing a fire, the Greek-owned and operated Bermuda-flagged LNG tanker “departed and anchored in a position approximately 10.2 NM northwest of the port,” Ambrey noted. 

A maritime security specialist told us that the U.S.-owned and operated, Marshall Islands-flagged floating gas storage facility was the Energos Winter while the other ship was the Gaslog Salem.

Fire involving two LNG vessels disrupts Damietta terminal

A fire involving the Energos Winter floating storage and regasification unit and the LNG carrier GasLog Salem has disrupted activity at Egypt’s Damietta LNG terminal. Following the incident, both vessels were moved… pic.twitter.com/3weeuJ4YvS

— MarineTraffic (@MarineTraffic) July 29, 2026

TWZ cannot confirm claims about the drone attacks, however, NASA FIRMS shows two thermal anomalies within the port limits near the vessels’ berths.

Video emerging from the scene shows what is purported to be smoke wafting from the Energos Winter after the attack.

A drone struck the U.S.-owned floating gas storage tanker Energos Winter while it was unloading cargo at Egypt’s Damietta Port, sparking a fire that spread to a second vessel, GasLog Salem. The crews were evacuated, the fire was brought under control, and no injuries were… pic.twitter.com/JwyNSywv8t

— Moshe Schwartz (@YWNReporter) July 29, 2026

UPDATE: 4:38 PM EDT-

Asked during a press conference whether Iran was behind the drone attack on Egyptian port, Trump said “it’s a little more of the same, but it’s going to be straightening out, it’s going to be straightening out. But in the meantime, we are going to be hitting them very hard, because it is our turn to hit ’em. They know it’s coming, they are asking us not to do it.”

“We’re going to hit them very hard.”

President Trump warns adversaries that the U.S. is prepared to respond forcefully following a drone attack on an LNG tanker off the coast of Egypt.

Trump signaled that retaliation is imminent despite requests from adversaries to hold back.… pic.twitter.com/SMOUuj5qGT

— Fox News (@FoxNews) July 29, 2026

UPDATE: 8:33 PM EDT –

As promised by Trump, the U.S. is hitting Iran tonight.

“U.S. forces began launching strikes against Iran at 8 p.m. ET today,” CENTCOM announced on X. “The strikes are a powerful response to yesterday’s attempted Iranian attacks on U.S. forces based in the Middle East.”

U.S. forces began launching strikes against Iran at 8 p.m. ET today. The strikes are a powerful response to yesterday’s attempted Iranian attacks on U.S. forces based in the Middle East.

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 30, 2026

UPDATE: 10:37 PM EDT –

In a post on X, CENTCOM announced that at 10 PM ET, its “forces successfully completed a heavy wave of strikes against Iran in response to yesterday’s attempted missile attacks on U.S. forces.”

“CENTCOM assets struck dozens of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets in Iran, including military command centers, missile and drone facilities, coastal surveillance and defense sites, and maritime capabilities,” the command stated. “The strikes aimed to further diminish threats posed by Iran and its proxies to American forces, commercial shipping, and neighboring Gulf countries.”

CENTCOM says it struck dozens of targets in a “heavy wave” of airstrikes on Iran overnight in response to yesterday’s Iranian missile attacks on U.S. forces.

Newly released strike footage: pic.twitter.com/47V0nlAKFu

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) July 30, 2026

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

During a long-endurance trek across the Pacific, a small uncrewed surface vessel (USV) owned by a California company had an encounter with a Chinese guided missile destroyer near the Philippines. The Lightfish USV, owned by Seasats, came close enough to the Type 052D guided missile destroyer that it was able to capture the warship on video. Reuters was the first to report about this event.

The incident highlights the growing presence of USVs, and especially in some of the world’s most contentious locales. The USV coming so close to the Chinese surface combatant also underscores the potential danger USVs can pose even to an advanced warship, a fact TWZ has frequently reported on. It also raises questions about the rules of engagement navies, and even some merchant vessels in troubled areas, will have to adopt for when they happen upon USVs that come close without explanation or clear intent.

The incident in question took place about 73 miles northwest of the Philippine island of Luzon, Seasats CEO Mike Flanigan told TWZ. The Luzon Strait is one of the world’s most strategic waterways and a potential flashpoint. It sits south of Taiwan and north of the Philippines, in a channel that provides access from the greater Pacific to the South China Sea and vice-versa. This is an area that is highly trafficked in the air, sea and undersea by major military players in the region and commercial shipping. If a conflict were to break out over Taiwan, this area would be turned into a super weapons engagement zone. In a future war, due to its unique littoral geography and importance, it would be a prime hunting ground for USVs of many kinds.

The encounter involved a Lightfish USV, a 12-foot-long, 305-pound USV that can travel great distances for up to six months with the help of its solar power panels paired with its hybrid powertrain, according to the company. Lightfish is not a speed boat. It prioritizes extreme endurance over anything else, so it couldn’t have ‘chased down’ the warship in question, but many other USVs are very capable of doing just that.

“The Lightfish tracked the Chinese vessel on radar from a range of ~10 nm and visually to a minimum range of several hundred meters,” Flanigan explained in an email. “It took place in the evening Pacific time on June 15th and our team was alerted to it immediately by our watch team that monitors vessel traffic in the vicinity of our deployed USV fleets.”

The Chinese destroyer spotted the Lightfish and took evasive action.

“We don’t know the intent, but we were able to observe the vessel altering course and generally observing the Lightfish USV,” Flanigan noted.

The company discussed it with the U.S. military after the event, but Flanigan declined to offer any details.

The company shared with us two videos of the Lightfish’s view of the Chinese warship. In it, the destroyer appears to be moving very slowly if at all.

The videos are eerily reminiscent of scores of videos released by the Ukrainian military showing its USVs attacking Russian warships, although in this case, the Lightfish had no such capability or intent.

You can see one of those Ukrainian videos below.

As we have reported extensively, Ukraine has demonstrated the devastating potential of USVs against the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Magura family of drone boats, among others, has been central to that campaign, and has taken on a wide variety of roles. Repeated successful strikes against Black Sea Fleet vessels and naval infrastructure forced Russia to relocate much of its fleet from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of bases in mainland Russia.

Yemen’s Houthi rebels were at the forefront of employing kamikaze USVs operationally prior to Ukraine. We first reported on the capability in January 2017, after an explosive-laden Houthi drone boat struck a Saudi frigate. The modern version of this concept traces back to Iran, which developed a variety of rudimentary one-way attack USVs before transferring the capability to its Houthi proxies, who became the first to use them successfully in the Red Sea in 2017. They have since used them repeatedly, targeting shipping during their intervention following the events of October 7th and Israel’s invasion of Gaza.

Fast forward to the present, with the U.S. military employing USVs as offensive strike weapons in combat for the first time on July 12. The strikes, which involved Saronic-built Corsair USVs, occurred amid an escalating exchange of attacks between the United States and Iran centered on the Strait of Hormuz. Among the targets of the drone boat attacks was an Iranian Ghadir class diesel-electric midget submarine.

The following video captures some of those strikes.

Yesterday, using multiple one-way attack surface drones, CENTCOM forces successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran. Three Corsair unmanned surface vessels hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, marking the first time American forces have employed sea… pic.twitter.com/bOM2kmgRxz

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 13, 2026

More recently, the U.S. Navy showed off the danger its USVs present to potential enemy warships when one of its Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft (GARC) USVs took part in its first live-fire training exercise. The kamikaze drone boat was employed during RIMPAC 2026, attacking the ex-USS Peleliu in one of the operation’s high-profile sinking exercises (SINKEX). You can read more about that here. The highly-publicized inaugural drone boat strike against Iran’s port and the use during SINKEX at RIMPAC clearly sends a message that the U.S. Navy is now aggressively pursuing this new form of kinetic surface attack. 

Amazing Footage from USV’s as they Attack the USS Peleliu (LHA 5)

These lessons are not lost on Seasats.

“The Ukrainians have definitively proven the threat that small USVs pose to surface ships,” Flanigan proffered. “With the Lightfish’s range — 8,000+ nm — we’re showing that the entire ocean is ‘in range’ for small USVs and that they aren’t just limited to coastal/littoral assets.”

The June 15 encounter was one of several Seasats USVs have had with Chinese warships. In May, the Lightfish came upon a Chinese Type 056 Corvette while transiting the Taiwan Strait earlier on this journey, Flanigan said. 

“This isn’t our vessel’s first run-in with a Chinese warship,” he noted in a company media release at the time. “But the location and timing make this encounter notable. It’s generally understood that the PLAN aggressively projects its vessels into the sovereign waters of smaller neighbors, but the opportunity to capture and share geolocated photographic evidence of it is unique.”

None of these incidents have resulted in China firing upon the drone boat. Still, these close encounters at sea raise questions about how warships should respond to such sightings, especially given what has taken place in the Black Sea, Red Sea, and more recently, near the Strait of Hormuz.

“This would be a better question for a military end user,” Flanigan answered when we asked him what the rules of engagement should be for these encounters. “I’d imagine it’d depend on the context and region (eg in the Black Sea presumably all USVs are assumed armed and dangerous). For commercial mariners, USVs would probably be treated with caution similar to other maritime hazards, with the level of caution depending on how well and predictably they (the USVs) are signaling their behavior.”

This is important, given the frequency of Lightfish sightings. 

“We have commercial shipping encounters on a nearly daily basis,” Flanigan said. “They happen so often that mariners don’t notice, or if they do, they are curious.”

This is especially true for fishing vessels, he pointed out.

Seasats Lightfish – Autonomous Drone Carrier

“Generally we follow two rules of thought” when it comes to other vessels, Flanigan stated.

The first is that “robotic systems should all fall secondary to human-piloted vessels. Meaning USVs should always avoid human vessels, and safety at sea rules should also bias towards giving right of way and safety of navigation to a piloted vessel,” Flanigan suggested.

The second is that “USVs should comply with COLREGs [International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea] and general navigational policies wherever possible,” he added.

Still, these are not crewed ships with people onboard that can communicate in some fashion. AIS identification is not proof of anything. And there is no way of knowing for certain if a curious USV belongs to a friend or foe. Hanging a flag onboard and painting a service name on the drone boat’s hull is in no way a definitive signal. How much risk will sailors take as the potential threat posed by these systems rapidly evolves and is already firmly in the hands of non-state actors?

It’s also worth noting that destroying a clearly uncrewed drone boat is a much lower threshold of escalation than doing so with a manned vessel, obviously. We have seen this reality played out repeatedly in the air, where an adversary will take a shot at a drone but not a crewed platform during times of tension but not outright war. Regardless of the international norms, taking out a drone boat that gets too close to a warship could become common place based on these factors, as well as the threat picture in the region and the status and proliferation of the technology.

Once again, in this case, the slow and small Lightfish may have been recognized as not a major danger to the destroyer, but as USVs become more common place in all forms, and especially in arsenals of militaries and potential nefarious actors alike, this equation will become more complex.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Ukraine has struck another warehouse belonging to Russian e-commerce giant Wildberries in a long-range drone attack. Kyiv says the company stores drone components used by Russia’s military.

A magnitude 5.4 earthquake struck Egypt, north of Suez early on Monday, startling a content creator during a livestream. Tremors were felt as far as Gaza, prompting residents to evacuate homes and hotels. No casualties were reported.

I recently travelled to Sorowako, South Sulawesi, for a corporate social responsibility programme supported by Vale Indonesia. I helped local journalists use artificial intelligence ethically and responsibly in investigative reporting: reading documents, identifying inconsistencies and preparing interviews while keeping verification and editorial judgement in human hands.

Yet Sorowako made it difficult to see AI merely as a newsroom tool. The town sits within the industrial landscape powering Indonesia’s nickel ambitions. Materials processed across Sulawesi are entering global battery supply chains, while AI is moving beyond screens into machines, factories, ports and mines. Here, both transformations occupy the same geography.

Indonesia produced roughly three-fifths of the world’s mined nickel in 2024. The boom has attracted smelters, battery-material plants and billions in foreign investment. Yet how much Indonesian technological capability is emerging around it—and how much is taking root in the regions carrying the industrial and ecological burden? US Geological Survey

Responsible AI skills expand local journalists’ agency. The same principle should reach the industrial value chain. Mining regions should participate as producers of knowledge, technology and services, beyond extraction and social compensation.

The Physical-AI Window

Autonomous equipment, machine vision and robots able to act in the real world are bringing AI into factories, warehouses and difficult industrial environments.

The International Federation of Robotics recorded 542,000 industrial robot installations in 2024. Asia absorbed 74 percent; China installed 295,000 units and now operates more than two million. Goldman Sachs estimates the more speculative humanoid segment could reach US$38 billion by 2035. The projection is uncertain, but the physical-AI market is already widening. International Federation of Robotics, Goldman Sachs

China treats this frontier as industrial policy. Indonesia’s credible entry point is more practical. Mines need robotic inspection and safer hauling; their environmental monitoring also needs improvement. These are difficult operating problems—and domestic companies already need them solved. State Council Information Office of China

Nickel is a launching pad, not a guarantee of robotics demand. Many robots use none. Indonesia’s advantage lies in combining its mineral and battery base with industrial sites where new systems can be tested.

Its downstreaming strategy, however, remains highly linear: ore becomes processed nickel, then battery material, batteries and eventually electric vehicles. Horizontal downstreaming would build capabilities that spread sideways from this chain. Industrial AI developed for nickel could later serve copper or geothermal operations. Low-carbon processing and environmental technology could travel even further.

The objective is to convert temporary geological power into capability that outlives the commodity. Progress can be read through a downstreaming capability ladder: enforcement, processing, supplier formation and technological ownership. Indonesia has climbed the first two stages more decisively than many peers. The last two remain unfinished.

Different Positions on the Ladder

Canada illustrates the mature destination. In July 2026, its government backed mining projects using AI, robotics and subsurface imaging, alongside work on ecological restoration. Its mines function as testing grounds for domestic technology and exportable expertise. Government of Canada

Chile offers a more achievable Global South pathway. CORFO and the National Piloting Center help suppliers test technology under real conditions. Expande translates operational problems into industry challenges; its network has involved more than 2,500 suppliers and generated over 180 contracts. Chile has not completed the journey into higher-value manufacturing, which makes its lessons more useful for Indonesia. Expande

The Philippines shows the cost of stopping earlier. The world’s second-largest nickel producer exported 44.97 million wet metric tonnes of ore in 2024 while operating only two processing plants. Its Senate approved a phased ban on unprocessed ore exports in February 2025, but the provision was removed four months later amid concerns over mine closures, financing and insufficient domestic capacity. Argus, Reuters

Thailand shows another route onto the ladder. Without Indonesia’s nickel leverage, it used subsidies and tax incentives tied to local-production obligations. Those policies have attracted more than US$4 billion in EV investment, while Chinese brands now account for over 70 percent of EV sales. Reuters BYD’s Rayong plant—its first in Southeast Asia, opened in July 2024—anchors the emerging production cluster. Reuters Thai suppliers are entering the chain, but the transfer of deeper engineering and intellectual property is less visible. Thailand has shown that scale and supplier participation can be built quickly; technological ownership remains the harder rung.

Indonesia enforced its ore-export ban and built processing scale, although much technology and capital came from abroad. Its next test is whether enforcement produces Indonesian suppliers—and whether those suppliers eventually own technology.

MIND ID and Vale as Ecosystem Builders

MIND ID, Indonesia’s state-owned mining holding and Vale Indonesia’s largest shareholder, could orchestrate the next stage by pooling operational problems across its portfolio and financing the pilots that address them. It could then route proven solutions into procurement, allowing technology tested in nickel to travel into copper or tin. Sorowako is the natural lighthouse site. Vale Indonesia could open bounded challenges in worker safety or land rehabilitation, provide controlled access for testing and give successful suppliers a path into procurement. Vale Indonesia

The investment network is already multi-aligned. The Pomalaa project brings together Vale Indonesia, China’s Huayou and Ford from the United States. Separately, the nearly US$6 billion CATL–Antam–Indonesia Battery Corporation project links North Maluku with battery manufacturing in West Java. Indonesia is hosting production relationships that cross geopolitical blocs. Vale Indonesia, CATL

These relationships can extend from batteries towards battery-powered industrial intelligence. Indonesia’s return should be measured by whether local engineers gain ownership and the ability to sell abroad.

Connecting Sorowako to Rebana—and the World

This transition needs a spatial architecture connecting Indonesia’s nickel-producing east with Java’s manufacturing and logistics base. Sorowako is not starting from zero. Politeknik Sorowako grew from a technical academy into a vocational institution oriented towards local industrial needs. It offers a base for building capability close to the mines. Vale Indonesia

The polytechnic could anchor field engineering and testing. ITB’s Cirebon campus, within West Java’s Rebana corridor, could add advanced research and systems integration. Joint laboratories and supplier incubation would allow knowledge to move in both directions. Institut Teknologi Bandung

Patimban International Port gives Rebana an external gateway. Its container terminal currently has annual capacity of 250,000 twenty-foot equivalent units and is being expanded to 1.65 million. The port’s long-term design targets 7.5 million TEU per year; this is planned capacity, not present throughput. A regular international service launched in July 2026 now connects West Java with Singapore, Thailand and major Chinese ports. ANTARA

The emerging chain is tangible. Field capability developed in Sorowako could be refined in Cirebon, manufactured across Rebana and exported through Patimban.

This is the spatial expression of a multiplex industrial-digital ecosystem. Yet it carries an internal risk. If ecological burdens remain in Sulawesi while intellectual property and high-value firms accumulate in Java, Indonesia will reproduce a double asymmetry within its own borders. Rebana should become a scaling node without monopolising knowledge. Contracts and technical capacity must circulate back towards producing regions.

Vale’s support for Politeknik Sorowako could therefore evolve from conventional CSR into a long-term capability strategy. Skilled work and local suppliers can give communities a stake in the industry’s future, reducing resistance rooted in exclusion. None of this substitutes for environmental performance, land rights or meaningful participation.

Geopolitical Localisation

ASEAN adds a wider market. Its Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030 calls for sustainable investment across the minerals value chain and stronger capacity in mining technology, research and innovation. ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030

Equipment proven under Sulawesi’s heat, dust and uneven connectivity could find buyers across the Global South. Indonesia can occupy the critical-mineral and industrial-intelligence layer of ASEAN’s AI economy.

Manufacturing in Indonesia could also help Chinese-linked firms diversify production. Factory location alone does not dissolve geopolitical concerns. US connected-vehicle rules show that governments may scrutinise who owns the software and retains remote access. Europe’s foreign-subsidy regime adds another layer of exposure. US Bureau of Industry and Security, European Commission

The defensible strategy is geopolitical localisation. Foreign production in Indonesia must create substantial domestic value and withstand scrutiny over ownership, supply chains and cybersecurity. Indonesian participation in engineering and intellectual property is central. This would make the country a bridge production node with capabilities of its own, rather than a passport factory for technology routed through its territory.

When I left Sorowako, what stayed with me was the proximity between a community learning to adapt to AI and industrial operations capable of becoming laboratories for it. The same region supplying global industries could help create safer mines and more credible environmental monitoring.

Nickel’s geopolitical leverage will not last. The durable test is what Indonesia can build before that advantage fades.

If firms and technical institutions take root in Sulawesi, then scale across Indonesia, Sorowako will have done more than supply the AI economy. It will have helped Indonesia learn how to compete within it.

Hungary’s corporate landscape is undergoing its most significant transformation in decades as businesses that flourished under former Prime Minister Viktor Orban adjust to a new political order led by Prime Minister Péter Magyar. Companies that once benefited from close ties to the previous government are now restructuring their operations, while investors and foreign firms are watching for signs of a more competitive business environment.

The shift follows Magyar’s decisive election victory in April, ending Orban’s 16 year rule and ushering in an administration that has pledged to curb political favoritism, increase transparency in public procurement, and align Hungary more closely with European Union governance standards.

Construction Giants Shift Strategy

One of the clearest signs of the changing business climate comes from Market Építő, one of Hungary’s largest construction firms, which has historically secured major government backed infrastructure projects, including football stadiums.

Chief Executive Sandor Scheer said the company is preparing for a future less dependent on large public contracts.

“We are preparing for a shift where, instead of large scale projects, we will have a higher volume of smaller scale projects, and housing and infrastructure construction will become dominant,” Scheer told Reuters.

The company, which has been linked to Orban ally Istvan Garancsi, generated roughly one quarter of its revenue from public contracts during the previous administration.

End of the Crony Capitalism Model?

For years, Orban’s political allies built powerful business empires through access to state spending, public tenders, and favorable regulations across sectors including construction, banking, telecommunications, and real estate.

Analysts believe companies that relied heavily on government infrastructure spending now face the greatest risks.

Daniel Hegedus, Deputy Director of Berlin’s Institute for European Politics, said construction and road building companies closely tied to Orban’s political network could struggle to survive as contracts become more competitive.

Some firms, analysts warn, may disappear entirely if they fail to adapt to a marketplace where political connections carry less influence.

Government Pushes Transparency Reforms

Prime Minister Magyar has moved quickly to introduce anti corruption legislation designed to satisfy long standing European Union concerns over Hungary’s procurement system.

A 2024 OECD survey found Hungary had an unusually high number of single bidder public procurement contracts, while research by Hungarian anti corruption think tank CRCB concluded there was clear evidence of political favoritism in state tenders during the Orban era.

The reforms are also intended to unlock billions of euros in suspended European Union funding that has been tied to improvements in governance and transparency.

Markets React to Political Transition

Investors have already responded to the changing political landscape.

Several companies widely viewed as benefiting from their proximity to the previous government have experienced significant share price declines since Magyar’s election.

Among those affected are construction and energy group Opus Global, real estate developer Appeninn, telecommunications company 4iG, and MBH Bank.

The declines contrast with a broader rally in Hungary’s stock market, reflecting optimism that a more transparent business environment could attract greater international investment.

Companies Defend Their Business Models

Despite the uncertainty, businesses linked to the previous administration reject suggestions that their success depended solely on political connections.

Market Építő says its financial strength and diversified operations provide long term stability regardless of political change.

Road construction giant Duna Aszfalt, whose owner became one of Hungary’s wealthiest businessmen during Orban’s tenure, also expressed confidence in its future.

The company stated that it had successfully competed against international firms even before Hungary’s democratic transition in 1990 and remained prepared for a more competitive marketplace.

Meanwhile, telecommunications firm 4iG denied benefiting from political favoritism, while MBH Bank said its procurement practices fully complied with both Hungarian and European Union regulations.

Review of Previous Government Contracts

The Magyar administration has also begun reviewing spending commitments approved under the previous government.

One early decision was to suspend an extension of a southern Hungarian highway and request that Duna Aszfalt repay funds received before the election for the project.

The move signals a broader willingness to scrutinize public contracts awarded during Orban’s administration and reassess government spending priorities.

Foreign Investors Could Benefit

Political analysts believe the reforms could reshape Hungary’s investment climate by creating more opportunities for international firms that previously struggled to compete with politically connected domestic companies.

Greater transparency in public procurement, combined with stronger oversight, may improve investor confidence and encourage new foreign investment into sectors previously dominated by companies with close government ties.

However, the transition is also expected to produce significant disruption as businesses adapt to a competitive environment driven more by market forces than political relationships.

What Comes Next

Hungary is entering a new phase in which political change is reshaping corporate power as much as government itself. Companies built around privileged access to state contracts now face growing pressure to compete in a more transparent marketplace, while new reforms seek to restore confidence among investors and European partners.

Whether these changes produce lasting economic modernization or simply redistribute political influence will depend on the implementation of Magyar’s reform agenda. For Hungary’s business elite, however, the era of relying on political proximity for commercial success appears to be drawing to a close.

With information from Reuters.

Semenyo joined City from Bournemouth for £65m in the January transfer window, with Guardiola fighting off competition from rivals Manchester United, Liverpool, Tottenham and Chelsea for his signature.

The player says interest first came in early December with “a lot of talks” taking place, before he made the decision the following month that he wanted to join City.

“I owe them everything to be honest,” Semenyo said of former club Bournemouth. “They helped my Premier League career flourish and obviously the management, the staff behind the scenes, they were all amazing, they made everything so smooth.”

Semenyo scored a total of 21 goals for club and country last season, netting the winning goal in the FA Cup final win over Chelsea which he called a “dream come true”, as well as lifting the Carabao Cup.

Speaking at Ahmad Tea’s Preparation is Everything event in Hong Kong, he added: “I think for me, I just wanted the next step to be the big one and Manchester City was the option. Pep spoke to me beforehand and he said, ‘look, when you come, I am going to make you a better player’.

“You want to get better, you want to improve every season and he definitely helped me with that in the first five months, but obviously sad for him to leave.”

Cuba’s electricity system has deteriorated amid shortages of fuel and replacement parts.

Cuba’s national electricity grid has collapsed, plunging the island into a widespread blackout.

The state-run Electric Union, known as UNE, announced the collapse on X late on Sunday but did not immediately identify its cause, the extent of the disruption or when electricity would be restored.

Before the nationwide failure, Havana’s electricity company had reported outages caused by damaged transformers, circuit failures, and planned cuts linked to insufficient generating capacity.

Early on Sunday, it recorded dozens of unresolved complaints across various municipalities, including Guanabacoa, Habana del Este, La Lisa, and Marianao, according to the Reuters news agency.

Authorities typically attempt to recover from a total collapse by creating small, isolated power networks to supply hospitals, water systems and food facilities before gradually reconnecting larger generating plants.

Series of nationwide blackouts

Sunday’s failure is the latest in a series of nationwide blackouts this year. The grid collapsed three times within nine days in July, including two island-wide failures in the same week. One of those outages left about 10 million people without electricity, while authorities struggled to restore power because the country could not generate enough electricity to meet demand even after the network was reconnected.

Cuba’s electricity system has deteriorated amid shortages of fuel and replacement parts, as well as repeated breakdowns at ageing thermoelectric plants. Some generating facilities are more than 30 years old and have received limited maintenance.

The Cuban government blames Washington, which has severely restricted oil supplies to the island and access to financing and equipment.

Cuba lost a key source of fuel after United States President Donald Trump imposed an oil blockade on the island following the US’s January 3 abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Venezuela had long been Cuba’s primary oil supplier, and imports from Mexico have also been halted amid increased pressure from Washington.

Others, meanwhile, cite decades of underinvestment and mismanagement in the energy sector.

Extended outages have disrupted transport, water supplies, communications and medical services. They have also left households struggling to preserve food, cook meals or sleep during the summer heat.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has fired a Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile from one of its warships for the first time, marking a significant development in Tokyo’s efforts to field a long-range conventional strike capability at sea. The launch, conducted by the Kongō class Aegis destroyer Chōkai in the Pacific Ocean with support from the U.S. Navy, is the result of years of work to integrate the U.S.-made cruise missile into Japan’s surface fleet and significantly expands the country’s standoff attack options.

Japan becomes the third country outside the United States to fire a Tomahawk from a surface combatant, with Australia and the Netherlands having previously done so. The other operator of the missile, the United Kingdom, has only fired Tomahawks from submarines.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense announced that Chōkai, which has been deployed to the United States since late last year for modifications and crew training, carried out the live-fire event on July 29 Japan Standard Time (July 28 Pacific Daylight Time). According to the ministry, the test confirmed not only the ship’s ability to launch the missile but also the proficiency of its crew in operating the weapon, clearing another major hurdle toward operational service.

The firing represents the culmination of a process that began in October 2025, when Chōkai arrived in the United States. In March, Japan announced that the destroyer had successfully completed the structural upgrades, software integration, and crew instruction required to employ the Tomahawk, making it the first Japanese warship capable of launching the missile. At the time, officials said a live-fire demonstration would follow before the capability entered operational service.

“This live-fire test demonstrates steady progress in the Tomahawk project, and the Ministry of Defense will continue to work towards the early establishment of stand-off defense capabilities,” the ministry said in a statement.

Chōkai is expected to return to Japan around September 2026.

For decades, Japan’s Aegis destroyers have been optimized almost exclusively for fleet air defense and ballistic missile defense missions. Integrating the Tomahawk fundamentally changes this by giving the ships the ability to strike fixed targets hundreds of miles inland, and potentially other ships at sea over great distances, extending the reach of the JMSDF far beyond traditional maritime operations.

The Tomahawk acquisition forms part of Japan’s broader effort to build what Tokyo describes as “standoff defense capabilities” in response to an increasingly challenging regional security environment. Under Japan’s revised National Security Strategy, the country has embraced a limited counterstrike capability intended to hold hostile missile launchers, command nodes, and other military targets at risk if Japan comes under attack. Officials have repeatedly stressed that these weapons remain consistent with Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented security policy and are intended to strengthen deterrence rather than enable offensive military operations.

Japan is purchasing up to 400 Tomahawk missiles from the United States, including both Block IV and newer Block V variants, at a cost of around $1 billion. The Block IV Tomahawk can hit targets nearly 1,000 miles away with a 1,000-pound unitary warhead. It is capable of rerouting mid-flight and can loiter over an area to hit targets as they emerge, featuring an imaging infrared seeker capability. The Block V variant is an improved version with survivability upgrades that can be used to also hit moving targets, especially in the long-range anti-ship missile role.

Tomahawk is seen as a bridge capability while indigenous long-range weapons — including Upgraded Type 12 anti-ship missiles and other domestically developed standoff systems — enter service. Tomahawk deliveries have already begun, and additional Aegis destroyers are expected to receive the modifications needed to employ the weapon over the coming years.

Japan’s four Kongō class destroyers already feature the Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS) and an Aegis combat system closely aligned with U.S. Navy architecture, requiring modifications rather than wholesale redesign to operate Tomahawk. Future installations are expected across the remainder of Japan’s Aegis destroyer fleet, including the two Atago and two Maya class ships.

Tokyo has already allocated funds of close to $700 million for the appropriate modifications to four more Aegis destroyers: Kirishima, Haguro, Myoko, and Atago.

Japan’s future Tomahawk fleet is likely to extend beyond its existing destroyers.

The country is constructing two massive Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs), due to enter service in fiscal years 2027 and 2028, respectively. Although the ships are being designed around the ballistic missile defense, or BMD, mission, Defense Ministry officials say that a Tomahawk capability will be added later.

Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has officially launched his reelection campaign, warning against foreign interference and vowing to defend Brazil’s sovereignty as political tensions rise ahead of October’s election.

Maasai Mara, Kenya – The Maasai Mara, Kenya’s most famous wildlife reserve, is one of Africa’s best-known safari destinations. Every year, hundreds of thousands of visitors travel to the reserve, generating millions of dollars for Kenya’s economy and supporting jobs, businesses and local communities.

But as luxury camps and lodges spread across the reserve, concerns are growing over the environmental cost of tourism. Conservationists warn that unchecked development is damaging wildlife habitats and threatening one of the world’s greatest natural spectacles, the annual migration of wildebeest, zebras and gazelles between Tanzania’s Serengeti National Park and Kenya’s Maasai Mara National Reserve.

The debate has now reached Kenya’s courts.

A legal battle over the Mara

The future of the Maasai Mara is increasingly being contested in court. Conservation groups have filed several cases challenging the construction and expansion of tourist camps inside and around the reserve, arguing that some developments were approved without adequate environmental safeguards.

The latest petition, filed by the East Africa Law Society, Natural Justice, JustAct and the Africa Centre for Peace and Human Rights, seeks conservatory orders to halt the construction and expansion of accommodation facilities in the Maasai Mara National Reserve pending the hearing of the case.

The petition names the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, Marriott International, Lazizi Mara Limited, the Narok County government, the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), the attorney general, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), The Safari Collection Ltd and Minor Hotels Ltd.

Court documents filed by advocate Gichohi Waweru challenge the construction and operation of the Ritz-Carlton Maasai Mara Safari Camp, alleging that it was built in a protected ecological zone despite a 2023 moratorium on new tourism accommodation in sensitive areas of the reserve under the Maasai Mara Management Plan 2023-32.

The petition also claims that the camp lacks a valid environmental impact assessment licence and sits along a key wildebeest migration corridor.

The petitioners are seeking an audit of all lodges in protected zones, warning that continued development could cause irreversible damage to the Mara ecosystem.

The legal battle has become a test of whether Kenya can balance conservation with tourism, one of the country’s most important economic sectors.

Kelvin Kubai, an advocate at the High Court of Kenya, told Al Jazeera that tourism should never come at the expense of wildlife and the environment.

“When the interests of wildlife and nature conflict with tourism, the rights of nature are supreme. Any interaction between tourists, wild animals and the environment should not come at the expense of the animals. The rights of human beings in the Mara are not above those of animals and nature,” he said.

The disappearing migration

Every year, more than a million wildebeest, zebras and gazelles move between the Serengeti and the Maasai Mara in search of fresh grazing land. The migration sustains predators, attracts visitors from around the world and plays a crucial role in maintaining the health of the ecosystem.

Kenya has, however, seen a significant decline in the number of wildebeest making the journey into the Maasai Mara. Conservationists say that construction, vehicle traffic and human activity near migration routes are disrupting animal movements and placing additional pressure on wildlife already affected by climate change.

According to a Kenyan government wildlife survey whose findings were released after fieldwork conducted between June 2024 and August 2025, populations of several species, including lions, buffalo, hirola antelope and wildebeest, have fallen sharply. Wildebeest numbers declined from 58,000 to 34,200 between 2023 and 2025.

Scientific data released in early 2026 showed that the number of wildebeest using one of the key migration routes in the Greater Mara ecosystem had fallen by almost 90 percent in just five years.

The pressure from tourism development has become a central concern. Despite the 2023 moratorium on new tourism accommodation in sensitive parts of the reserve, conservationists say new camps have continued to emerge while existing facilities have sought to expand.

The moratorium was introduced to curb overdevelopment, reduce pressure on wildlife habitats and protect migration corridors, but conservationists argue that enforcement has been weak.

Samwel Odhiambo, a climate activist and founder of the Climate Awareness Defenders community-based organisation, told Al Jazeera that conservation must take precedence over commercial interests.

“The government must rein in investors who do not really care about conservation because everyone has a responsibility to the environment and the animals. What we are seeing today is a result of developments that are profit-driven, to the point where lodges are built on riverbanks, too close to animals, and on migration routes, affecting especially female animals as they lose their habitats for nurturing and delivering their babies.”

Odhiambo argued that the same level of environmental protection applied along Kenya’s coast should be extended to the Mara.

“Kenya’s coast at times generates more tourism revenue than the Maasai Mara, but you will not find developers building on the beach or in the waters,” he said.

Maps published in December 2025 by ecologists at the Smithsonian National Zoo and Conservation Biology Institute in the Atlas of Ungulate Migration showed that migration routes supporting more than 100,000 wildebeest as recently as 2020 now support fewer than 30,000.

The report estimated that the wildebeest population, which numbered between 120,000 and 150,000 in the 1970s, had fallen to about 26,700 by 2024. Settlement and fencing across the Loita Plains and northern Mara Plains have severely restricted migration, confining surviving herds to a patchwork of conservancies surrounding the reserve.

Although these figures come from different wildlife surveys and migration studies, they all point to a sharp decline in wildebeest numbers and movements across the Greater Mara ecosystem.

When tourism threatens itself

For decades, the Maasai Mara has been Kenya’s premier tourism destination, earning billions of shillings annually and supporting thousands of jobs, from safari guides and hotel workers to transport operators, craft sellers and Maasai communities.

But conservationists and tourism analysts warn that overdevelopment could begin undermining the very industry that depends on the reserve’s wildlife and wilderness.

Tourism operators say overcrowding, rising park fees and increasing competition from other regional destinations have made the safari market more competitive. Conservation groups argue that continued habitat loss and pressure on wildlife corridors could further erode the Mara’s appeal to visitors seeking intact wilderness and abundant wildlife.

Al Jazeera contacted Marriott International, Lazizi Mara Limited, the Narok County Government, NEMA and KWS for comment. Marriott and Lazizi have previously said the Ritz-Carlton Maasai Mara Safari Camp received the necessary approvals and complied with Kenyan environmental and planning requirements, while Kenyan authorities have defended the project as being located in a designated tourism investment zone under the Maasai Mara Management Plan 2023-32.

Wangari Kebuchi, an economist and managing director of Expertise Global, told Al Jazeera that the conservancy model offered the most viable path forward, provided it was accompanied by stronger oversight.

“The Maasai Mara is one of Kenya’s biggest economic assets and a major source of foreign exchange, but Narok County depends too heavily on it for revenue. If wildlife numbers decline because of overdevelopment, tourism demand will eventually fall. The conservancy model will help by protecting wildlife corridors and limiting visitor numbers, but it needs stronger oversight. Future tourism growth should be guided by ecological limits, not commercial demand, so the Mara remains both environmentally healthy and economically sustainable,” Kebuchi said.

For conservationists, the court cases are about far more than a single luxury camp. They could determine whether Kenya is willing to enforce ecological limits in one of Africa’s most celebrated landscapes.

As the legal battle unfolds, the question is whether the Maasai Mara can remain both a thriving wildlife ecosystem and a sustainable source of livelihoods and tourism revenue.

“Future tourism growth should be guided by ecological limits, not commercial demand, so the Mara remains both environmentally healthy and economically sustainable,” Kebuchi said.

US President Donald Trump says an agreement with Iran is imminent, with negotiations set to begin on Monday.

A pair of previously unseen missiles slung beneath the wings of a Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) Mitsubishi F-2 fighter underscores the progress Tokyo is making on expanding its long-range strike arsenal, to which the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile was recently added. While the weapon has not been officially identified, its size, configuration, and timing strongly suggest it could be the air-launched version of Japan’s new Type 25 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile (25SSM).

Photographer @bibabibabibary on X was one of many to capture the new missiles during what was apparently the first test flight from Gifu Air Base today. The aircraft carrying them was the two-seat F-2B serial 68-8101, one of the F-2 prototypes now operated by the JASDF’s Air Development and Test Wing (ADTW). The first F-2A prototype, 68-8101, served as a ‘chase plane’ for the sortie.

Carried on the inboard wing pylons, the missiles are notably large — bigger than the familiar ASM-2 or even the newer, ramjet-powered ASM-3 anti-ship missiles already associated with the F-2 fleet. The new, gray-painted weapons have a long, fairly slender fuselage, folding wings in the upper part of the body, and four cruciform tailfins. The boxier cross-section has ‘chines’ reminiscent of those on other low-observable missiles. Its stealth features should enhance its survivability and lethality against increasingly capable naval integrated air defense systems. An underslung engine intake, with a protective cap, is located below the rear part of the body. There is no obvious optical window, suggesting that the missile relies on GPS/INS navigation and a radar seeker for the terminal phase.

Overall, the weapon has the look of a subsonic, radar-evading cruise missile optimized for long-endurance flight rather than high-speed dash performance.

どうやらスタンドオフ防衛能力向上のための12式地対艦誘導弾空発型のようですね。
初めて吊るし飛んだと思いますが凄くでっかくて太いです…。
後席Pさん👍

2026.07.30
岐阜基地 RJNG
F-2B 101 pic.twitter.com/eP4E443OOI

— ボボ・AKEBOVO (@AKEBOVO) July 30, 2026

Significantly, the new missile has a lot of similarities with what we have seen of the Upgraded Type 12/Type 25 family of weapons, suggesting that this is an air-launched derivative.

The Upgraded Type 12/Type 25 is a heavily upgraded evolution of Japan’s legacy Type 12 anti-ship missile, with its range reportedly increased to around 1,000 kilometers (around 620 miles).

Once in service, it will substantially increase Japan’s maritime-strike reach. The original Type 12 used by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) has a range of 200 kilometers (124 miles), while the JASDF’s ASM-2 can strike targets at 180 kilometers (112 miles).

While the original Type 12 was conceived as a coastal defense weapon to attack enemy shipping, the new missile family is a multirole strike system capable of engaging maritime as well as land targets, including enemy missile launch sites and other fixed infrastructure, hundreds of miles from the home islands, as part of Japan’s evolving ‘counterstrike’ posture.

Japan’s pursuit of increasingly capable standoff weapons is being driven largely by the deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific, particularly China’s rapid military expansion and growing arsenal of long-range precision missiles. The People’s Liberation Army fields extensive anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks designed to keep U.S. and allied forces at arm’s length, while China’s navy continues its rapid expansion. At the same time, North Korea’s advancing ballistic missile and nuclear programs have reinforced Tokyo’s view that it needs the ability not only to defend its territory, but also to hold hostile missile launchers, command nodes, and naval forces at risk before they can strike.

At the end of March of this year, the JGSDF announced the deployment of the Upgraded Type 12, and, at the same time, officially redesignated it as the Type 25 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile (25SSM) — the “25” reflects fiscal year 2025, when the coastal defense weapon was formally inducted to service.

The Japan Ministry of Defense also says it plans to deploy ship- and air-launched variants of the 25SSM on Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyers and JASDF fighters in fiscal year 2027.

With that in mind, it would make sense that the weapons seen on the F-2 today are the air-launched variants of the 25SSM. We cannot be certain of that, however, and the official designation of such a missile is also unknown (ASM-4 has been suggested).

At this point, we don’t know the status of the new air-launched missile. However, Japan is currently testing a variety of new missiles.

The F-2 is also being used to test an improved version of the ASM-3 high-speed anti-ship missile, the ASM-3 Kai.

Japan is meanwhile working on the New Surface-to-Ship Missile. Earlier this year, an official video was released showing a flight test of the missile in which it executed a series of manoeuvres, including barrel rolls, intended to defeat defenses in the terminal phase of the attack. The New Surface-to-Ship Missile is powered by an efficient turbofan engine and is expected to have a greater range than the Upgraded Type 12. It is similarly intended for launch from ground, maritime, and air platforms. You can read more about it here.

The demonstration of the New SSM’s barrel roll capability can be seen in the video starting at around 0:49 in the runtime.

P-31-1_島嶼防衛用新対艦誘導弾の要素技術の研究

As we reported earlier today, the JMSDF recently fired a U.S.-made Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile from one of its warships for the first time, the Aegis destroyer Chōkai, marking another significant expansion of the country’s standoff attack options.

In terms of air-launched weapons, Tokyo has procured the stealthy Joint Strike Missile (JSM) to arm its F-35As, giving them a combined standoff anti-ship and land-attack capability, and the longer-range JASSM has also been cleared for sale to Japan.

An air-launched Type 25 would fit well into Japan’s broader shift toward long-range ‘counterstrike’ capabilities, and add another string to the bow of the F-2. Alongside ground-launched Type 25 missiles, new hypersonic weapons, and Tomahawks, Tokyo is assembling a layered standoff strike arsenal designed to hold hostile ships and land targets at risk from far greater distances than ever before.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Tens of thousands have been killed since April 2023 in the war between RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his former ally, army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

At least 35 people were killed, and several others wounded, when Sudanese army drones struck a traditional court in western Darfur, a rights group has said.

The Emergency Lawyers group, which has documented abuses by both sides of the three-year civil war in Sudan, said the strike on Sunday hit a court in the village of Garra al-Zawaya in North Darfur state at about 1pm local time (11:00 GMT).

It said civilians had “gathered to attend hearings on local cases and disputes” when the attack took place.

The village is under the control of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Tens of thousands of people have been killed since the war began in April 2023 between supporters of RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his former ally, Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

The court building, which serves as a traditional institution for resolving local and tribal feuds, was also damaged in the strike, Emergency Lawyers said.

“The court session was being held under a tree with the participation of local community leaders,” a witness from the area told the AFP news agency on condition of anonymity for safety reasons.

Among those killed were “four tribal leaders and two RSF commanders”, the witness added.

Garra al-Zawaya lies near the town of Kabkabiya, about 150km (93 miles) west of el-Fasher, the army’s last stronghold in Darfur, which the RSF captured after a bloody offensive in October last year.

United Nations investigators have said violence linked to the RSF siege and capture of el-Fasher bore “the hallmarks of genocide”.

Following its takeover of the city, the RSF – which emerged from the government-backed militia known as the Janjaweed, accused of atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s – consolidated control over much of the region.

Since that campaign, both sides have increasingly relied on drone warfare. According to the UN, more than 1,000 civilians were killed in drone strikes during the first five months of this year.

The conflict has also displaced millions and created what the UN describes as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.