TODAY

The U.S. Navy made a major splash this weekend when it revealed the existence of the AIM-424 Malice Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM), which is already deep in development. At the same time, the service also highlighted plans for a new Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM) optimized for shorter-range engagements and internal carriage on stealthy fighters like the F-35 and future drones as part of its larger future missile vision. Readers can first get caught up on what is known about the long-range AIM-424 in our initial reporting on that missile here.

As described so far, the core goals for CAAM sound virtually identical to what the service has outlined previously in relation to a “Compact Variant” of the AIM-9X Sidewinder (AIM-9X CV), which TWZ was first to report on. A missile in this general category would offer a boost in magazine depth that could be especially valuable for more localized defense of carriers and other high-value assets against large waves of missiles and drones.

The “Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM) effort is a future inner boundary weapon. Requirements are being evaluated and assessed by N98 [the Air Warfare Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] at this time,” a Navy official told TWZ when asked for more information. “The Navy does not plan to provide routine updates beyond approved public releases because of operational security and program sensitivity.”

Mention of CAAM was included in the same briefing where the AIM-424 was first unveiled at the Tailhook Association’s annual convention this weekend. A central focus of the CAAM is on “increasing internal carriage capacity for inner boundary weapon,” according to that presentation.

For the Navy, at present, “internal carriage” is a consideration most applicable to the service’s F-35Cs and, by extension, other variants of the Joint Strike Fighter. Internal weapons bays will also be a feature on whatever design the Navy may ultimately select as its future sixth-generation carrier-based combat jet, currently referred to as F/A-XX. Future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) type drones or other uncrewed aircraft the service might acquire in the future could also have internal bays. We will come back to this later on.

The description of CAAM as an “inner boundary weapon” points to a focus on shorter-range engagements, where there could also be less total time to react overall.

In terms of what the Navy’s core requirements for the CAAM might be beyond internal carriage, details are limited. A rendering included in the presentation at Tailhook this weekend shows a relatively generic-looking design with fins only at the tail and a yellow band around the front of the body indicating the presence of a high-explosive warhead.

However, earlier this year, the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD), part of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), did put out a contracting notice regarding rocket motor developments to support CAAM and other developments.

NAWCWD “intends to procure on a Full and Open competition basis to develop and demonstrate technology that results in greatly enhanced kinematic capability for the next generation of tactical missiles,” the notice explained. “To support this technological development efforts, NAWCWD is interested in maturing high total impulse loaded and energy tailorable solid propulsion systems for transition into compact weapon systems, including a Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM).”

“Requirements will include tasking and products needed to provide a Concept Design with build-to-print data package, identify critical technology gaps, conduct critical component and rocket motor experiments, conduct a Design for Manufacturing & Assembly study to identify features required to meet manufacturing and cost goals, and provide a plan to mature the CAAM HLG Concept Design to a maturity state ready to enter a Department of Defense (DOD) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program,” the notice added.

“HLG” here stands for “Highly Loaded Grain.” This, in turn, refers to solid-fuel rocket motors designed to maximize output per volume. This is an area of missile technology where the Navy has already been heavily investing for years with a broad eye toward increasing the range and improving the performance of future missiles. Furthermore, a missile with an HLG rocket could offer substantially increased capability over a similarly-sized design with a non-HLG motor. This, in turn, offers particular advantages when designing missiles for carriage in internal bays with rigid dimensions.

“The Next-Generation Highly Loaded Grain project team has matured the technology and seeded the development of future mission-modular propulsion systems that can increase weapon ranges by up to 1.5x while maintaining inner boundaries for short-range and time-critical missions,” according to one fact sheet detailing notable achievements by NAVAIR’s Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCAD) in 2023. Note here also the explicit mention of ‘inner boundary’ design considerations.

As mentioned earlier, the Navy has previously used virtually identical language to describe the planned AIM-9X CV, which is also a joint program with the U.S. Air Force.

“The AIM-9X CV repackages the SIP IV technology into a compact airframe optimized for internal carriage on advanced aircraft with improved kinematic performance,” according to the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request, released earlier this year. “The program will deliver increased capability to the warfighter with greater standoff range, increased aircraft weapon station capacity, and maintains inner boundary performance.”

How exactly the CAAM and the AIM-9X CV programs may be related is unknown, but they clearly have the same general goals if they are not different names for the same development effort. From what was shown this weekend, CAAM is a distinctly different-looking missile from the AIM-9X, and plans for a compact Sidewinder variant or derivative could also be a stepping stone to a new design intended to fill the same general role.

U.S. defense contractors have been publicly showing concepts for compact air-to-air missiles for years now. This includes Raytheon’s Peregrine, unveiled in 2019, which was said to be roughly half the size of an AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) while still offering comparable range. The company said it also had equivalent maneuverability to current-generation Sidewinders. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the AIM-120 and the AIM-9, as well as the newly unveiled AIM-424.

In the late 2010s, Boeing also put forward a concept for a multi-stage Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM), which had a design that raised the possibility of whether the first stage could be used as a more compact, stand-alone weapon. In 2022, Boeing notably received funding for further development of that missile under a contract from the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to “investigate advanced missile sub-system components to support the Compact Air-to-Air Missile [CAAM] and Extended Range Air-to-Air Missile Systems [ERAAM].”

During the 2010s, Lockheed Martin promoted a compact anti-air missile design called Cuda, with a focus on internal carriage, as well. However, Cuda had largely disappeared from the company’s marketing materials by the end of the decade.

Regardless, the use case for such a CAAM-type missile is clear-cut, especially for the Navy and its carrier air wings. In particular, the service is facing a threat ecosystem that is rapidly evolving in scale and scope, including multiple different classes of anti-ship missiles (ballistic, cruise, hypersonic) and long-range one-way attack drones. There is a very real prospect of large-volume and complex attacks made up of very different tiers of weapons incoming from multiple vectors simultaneously, creating a greater risk that both long- and short-range defenses will be overwhelmed. TWZ previously explored this reality in depth in discussing how the long-range AIM-174B, an air-launched version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) that was officially unveiled in 2024, fits into the service’s larger plans.

How The Navy’s New Very Long-Range AIM-174 Will Pierce China’s Anti-Access Bubble

Added localized defensive capability and capacity could also be relevant for aerial force packages pressing their way to a target in hostile territory, where similarly growing aerial threats could materialize suddenly and in close proximity. Depending on its capabilities, CAAM might even be able to provide a new layer of defensive capability against incoming anti-air missiles, including for larger aircraft. So, giving individual aircraft more total engagement opportunities will only become more valuable, if not vital, as time goes on.

As noted, stealth platforms with limited internal bay space face particular constraints in this regard. For years, more magazine depth via smaller missiles has been seen as a key avenue for improving payload limitations for platforms like the F-35 and F-22 when operating in their most low-observable (stealthy) configuration. In many scenarios, these aircraft can get closer to their targets without detection, offering different options for the employment of what could be shorter-range weapons. A compact air-to-air missile design that still offers comparable performance to larger existing designs, through the use of a high-load-grain rocket motor and other features, would be even more of a boon. Having something that is capable of short-to-intermediate-range engagements, but that can be loaded in greater numbers internally would expand tactical flexibility, amplify lethality, and increase utility of the aircraft as they can down more targets on a single sortie in certain scenarios.

The continued growth of drone threats, especially those posed by long-range one-way attack types, has added another dimension to this equation. Limited magazine depth limits the ability to rapidly retask stealthy platforms to respond to often unpredictable high-volume drone attacks. Furthermore, the anti-air version of the 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) laser-guided rocket, the U.S. military’s current go-to lower-cost air-to-air weapon against drones, cannot be fired at all from the internal bays on the F-35 or the F-22. CAAM can offer the ability to address these threats better than aircraft like the F-35 and F-22 can today.

A weapon like CAAM would also be especially relevant for future collaborative combat aircraft, which have extreme constraints on payload capacity, internal and external, as well as total takeoff weight. For CCA-type uncrewed aircraft, keeping the airframe size as small as possible to meet requirements is also essential for meeting affordability and producibility targets. Arming these platforms with an AIM-120-sized missile might not necessarily be required, or even be ideal, especially when operating along the leading edge of the air-to-air battle, closer to threats. In those scenarios, having the option of carrying even twice as many missiles per sortie, internally (if available) or externally, even if they have shorter reach, could be hugely beneficial.

There could easily be interest in a CAAM-like missile from other branches of the U.S. military, if it is not already a joint service effort. The Air Force is already known to be involved in the AIM-9X CV effort. The service has publicly pursued new compact and lower-cost air-to-air missile concepts over the years under various different project names. This includes its own CAAM effort, through which Boeing previously received funding.

What is clear now is that the Navy is pushing to maximize the anti-air capabilities of its aircraft at both the shorter- and longer-range ends of the engagement spectrum.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Speaking in June last year to British businesswoman and podcaster Emma Grede, Meghan talked about her Netflix lifestyle series With Love, Meghan, and hinted at a return to acting when asked if she missed that side to her life.

“Sometimes,” Meghan replied. “Being back on set with With Love, Meghan was great because I realised how much I miss my crew. I love being around a crew.”

But Variety’s chief correspondent Marlow Stern says when it comes to deliberations over a potential acting role for Meghan, “a lot of it has to do with scheduling, to be honest”.

“They’re maybe also negotiating the size of the role and how many days she’ll shoot, and also compensation for it. Both sides often play the media to try and push things along, and we could be seeing that.”

For Harry, the focus once back in the UK will be on the charity work and patronages he has kept hold of while living thousands of miles away.

He has now completed his final charity engagements in the US before flying back to the UK in the coming days.

In Washington DC, he met military veterans and their families and visited America’s main hospital for injured servicemen and women, Walter Reed National Military Medical Centre.

At Arlington National Cemetery, he visited the final resting place of many service personal killed in Iraq and Afghanistan wars where he himself served on two operational tours.

At the grave of Sergeant Michael Verardo, who died last year from complications related to injuries sustained in Afghanistan in 2010, he met Verardo’s widow Sarah – who now supports other military families – and their nine-year-old daughter, Elizabeth.

The Metropolitan Police have sent a file of evidence to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) relating to a man in his 80s as part of its investigation into Mohamed Al Fayed.

A man and a woman, both in their 80s, were interviewed under caution last month on suspicion of aiding and abetting rape and sexual assault, and assisting the commission of sexual offences.

The CPS will now decide whether a charge can be made.

Earlier this year, three women, aged in their 40s, 50s and 60s, and one man in his 60s were also questioned. The former Harrods owner died three years ago aged 94 having never faced any charges.

A Met Police spokesperson said “detectives submitted a full evidential file” to the CPS for a “charging decision”.

“The file relates to one suspect, a man in his 80s, and relates to two indecent assaults on two women in London. Officers will continue to work closely with CPS prosecutors as the case progresses.

“To date, seven suspects have been interviewed under caution on suspicion of offences including aiding and abetting rape and sexual assault, assisting in the commission of sexual offences, and human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation.”

Co-chairs of the Justice for Fayed and Harrods Survivors Jen Mills and Lindsay Mason welcomed the latest development.

“The submission of a full evidential file to the CPS is a significant step, and it matters most of all for the two women whose allegations are at the centre of it,” the statement said.

“Both are members of Justice for Fayed and Harrods Survivors and, as with all those impacted by this scandal, we stand alongside them with love and empathy.”

A cross-party delegation lands in Beijing as Tokyo tries to defrost its worst China rift in decades.

Japanese lawmakers have travelled to Beijing in a bid to soothe strained relations between the two nations.

The delegation landed in China on Monday for talks aimed at restoring communication. The mission was undertaken after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi issued comments on Taiwan that triggered a diplomatic dispute that has begun to weigh on economic relations.

The visit will run through Thursday and marks the first such consultations with senior Chinese Communist Party officials since ties soured late last year.

Relations plunged after Takaichi suggested in November that Japan could respond militarily if China attacked Taiwan, a self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own territory.

China is highly sensitive regarding Taiwan and considers questioning of its claim on the island a red line. In response to Takaichi’s comments, it warned its citizens against travel to Japan and tightened trade restrictions, including measures that reportedly disrupted the flow of rare earth minerals to Japanese firms, adding an economic sting to the diplomatic fallout.

Among those making the trip was Gaku Hashimoto, a member of the House of Representatives and Takaichi’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party. He was joined by other lawmakers from the opposition Komeito and Centrist Reform Alliance parties.

An official from Hashimoto’s office confirmed only that he had “departed for Beijing to stay for two days”.

Before leaving Tokyo, delegation member Shinichi Isa, a spokesperson for the Centrist Reform Alliance, told reporters: “Communication has been severed in all areas, and we are beginning to see their impact in many areas. I hope we can somehow find a clue to restart a dialogue.”

Isa, a former diplomat at the Japanese embassy in China, had already sounded the alarm over the situation this month in a post on X, writing that officials had always managed to stay in contact even during past low points but now “all channels between officials and ministries have been cut off.”

He described the current state of relations as the worst since diplomatic ties were normalised in 1972.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Friday that “some people of insight from both Japan’s ruling and opposition parties” were troubled by the state of relations and hoped to help steer them back on track while calling on Tokyo to heed those voices and act to restore normal exchanges between the two countries.

Takaichi has not retracted her comment on Taiwan and is yet to respond to the concerns.

Further exchanges are planned. Former Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya is expected to lead another delegation to China in late September, which is to be followed by a group of Japanese business representatives later in the year, according to the Kyodo News agency.

The waters far away from El Niño’s Pacific hunting ground are also extremely warm, including around the UK and Europe.

The western English Channel has seen almost continuous marine heatwave conditions for more than three years, peaking at 7C above normal in July, according to Prof Tim Smyth, director of science at Plymouth Marine Laboratory.

“This is unprecedented,” he added.

Scientists say such widespread warmth around the planet is a clear sign of the growing effect that human-caused climate change is having on the world’s seas.

The oceans take up more than 90% of the excess heat trapped by humanity’s greenhouse gas emissions, mainly from burning fossil fuels.

“The latest Copernicus data reinforce the troubling upward trend in ocean temperatures,” said Smyth.

Warmer seas help to fuel more extreme weather. They can provide storms with extra moisture and energy, and can intensify heatwaves on land in some coastal regions by reducing the cooling effect of sea breezes.

Warmer water also takes up more space, raising sea levels and bringing a greater risk of coastal flooding – while intense ocean heat can be devastating for sea habitats, such as coral reefs.

The increasing frequency of marine heatwaves is already “putting increasing pressure on marine ecosystems and the communities that depend on them”, Burgess said.

Attacks on Palestinian communities by Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank, which are often supported by Israeli forces, have gathered pace over the past month since settlers from the Havat Gilad settlement attacked Palestinian homes on the eastern edge of Tal, southwest of Nablus.

On Sunday and Monday, the Israeli military raided multiple towns, villages and refugee camps across the occupied territory, and reports of arrests, home searches and settler attacks have continued to mount.

A 15-day siege on three families comprising 15 people, including two children, in the village of Qusra, which is ongoing, drew a rare public condemnation this month from the United States ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, a staunch supporter of Israel and its West Bank settlements.

Israel is also pushing ahead with plans for the so-called E1 settlement expansion close to Jerusalem, which human rights organisations warn would essentially sever the West Bank in two, further hampering the freedom of movement of Palestinians on either side of it and endangering the possibility of a Palestinian state.

The West Bank attacks increasingly fit the definition of a pogrom, experts said. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories Francesca Albanese described these Israeli attacks against Palestinians as “pogroms against defenceless civilians”.

So why are experts calling settler attacks pogroms, and do they fit the formal definition of one?

What’s happening in the West Bank?

Settlers, frequently supported by the Israeli military, have been attacking Palestinian homes, businesses, and agricultural fields across the occupied West Bank. Such attacks have been commonplace for decades as settlements have expanded across the territory, but they gathered pace after October 7, 2023 when Israel launched it genocidal war on Gaza, and have become particularly violent and frequent over the past month.

Israeli settlements across the West Bank are illegal under international law.

According to the Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, however, Israeli settlers now number roughly 780,000 across the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, living among 192 settlements and 400 outposts, rising to 71 percent of Area C, which is under full Israeli civil and military control, and 91 percent of the Jordan Valley.

Settlers often set up outposts without formal approval around Palestinian villages from which they launch a campaign of harassment, including killing livestock, cutting supply lines and damaging property, in order to drive local residents out. Once they establish a more formal settlement, they often receive retrospective approval from the Israeli government for the settlement.

In some places more recently, illegal settlers have laid siege to individual family homes – such as in the Ras al-Ein area of Qusra – cutting off water and other supplies and damaging orchards or harming livestock.

This has set a new pattern: settlers establish a tent adjacent to individual homes; Palestinians’ homes are besieged, with essentials cut off; and Israeli soldiers arrive not to remove the settlers, but rather to remove the family – through arrest or ostensibly for their “protection”.

In Qusra, the three besieged families were forced together into one of the family houses. Meanwhile, Israeli forces have occupied one of the other homes for use as a military post and thrown furniture and belongings from its windows, according to the Palestinian news agency Wafa.

The UN humanitarian affairs office recorded more than 1,330 settler-related attacks on Palestinians in the occupied West Bank between January and late July this year, averaging six a day and marking the fastest pace since the agency began systematic tracking two decades ago.

Separately, a UN-appointed commission of inquiry has found that the Israeli authorities have repeatedly failed to prevent foreseeable settler attacks and, in some cases, have directly enabled them through army protection and the provision of weapons and funding.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has found that settler attacks, demolitions and evictions forcibly displaced more Palestinians in the first four months of this year than in the whole of 2025.

OCHA reported that 107 communities, comprising 5,900 Palestinians, had been completely or partially displaced as a result of settler violence since January 2023. It also found that the Israeli military have expelled another 32,000 Palestinians from their homes in the occupied West Bank since January 2025, essentially emptying the Jenin, Tulkarem and Nur Shams camps.

What is the definition of a pogrom?

Major US and UK dictionaries vary to some degree on the definition of a “pogrom”.

The British Collins Dictionary identifies a pogrom as “organised, official violence against a group of people for racial or religious reasons”, with a notable inclusion of official, or state-backed violence.

Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary calls it “the organised killing of large numbers of people, because of their race or religion”, without mention of state-sanctioned violence.

Merriam-Webster says it is “an organised massacre of helpless people” – “specifically: such as a massacre of Jews”.

Cambridge Dictionary says it is “an act of organised cruel behaviour or killing that is done to a large group of people because of their race or religion”.

The word is understood to have been introduced via Yiddish and was at first used to describe the wave of violent, organised mob attacks on Jewish communities in the Russian Empire following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881.

It is important to note that unlike legal terms including “crimes against humanity” or “genocide,” “pogrom” has no established legal definition under international law.

Can attacks in the West Bank be referred to as pogroms?

Besides Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, who has described Israeli attacks against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank as “pogroms against defenceless civilians”, Israeli officials themselves have described such attacks as “pogroms”.

On February 26, 2023, hundreds of Israeli settlers attacked Huwara and surrounding Palestinian communities after two Israeli settlers were killed. A Palestinian was killed, hundreds were injured, and homes, businesses and cars were burned.

The Israeli military’s then-commander in the occupied West Bank, Yehuda Fuchs, called the settlers’ attack a “pogrom”, and it was also recorded as such by the US State Department.

Israeli-Palestinian human rights group B’Tselem has also previously described Israeli actions in the occupied West Bank as “pogroms”, especially after the February 2023 attacks. Later, it followed up with a report titled, “The pogroms are working – the transfer is already happening”, which argued that settler attacks were contributing to the displacement of Palestinian communities.

“Settler violence is not a new phenomenon. But over the past three years, it has become more violent, more systematic and, most importantly, part of a state mechanism intended to ethnically cleanse large parts of the West Bank,” said Yair Dvir, the spokesperson for B’Tselem.

“The government funds and arms the settlers, while the Israeli military stands by and, in many cases, actively participates in the attacks,” he told Al Jazeera. “So far, these militias have expelled 64 Palestinian communities and taken control of around one million dunams of land.”

Dvir also told Al Jazeera that the Israeli settlers are “now carrying out organised attacks on established Palestinian villages and towns in order to drive out their residents”.

“These are armed militias operating as an unofficial arm of the state, with a shared goal: to ethnically cleanse as much of the West Bank as possible,” he added.

The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, which is named after Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who is credited with coining the term genocide after the Holocaust, referred to settler attacks on Al-Mughayyir, a Palestinian village in Ramallah, as “pogroms”, reporting that hundreds of armed settlers attacked residents and burned buildings and cars while soldiers stood by earlier this year. In 2025, the Israeli military uprooted thousands of Palestinian olive trees at Al-Mughayyir.

Raheel Dhattiwala, an Indian scholar who focuses on collective violence, told Al Jazeera: “West Bank attacks fit the characteristics of a pogrom – systematic targeting of one civilian group by another with state approval. A few senior Israeli army officers have called it ‘pogroms’ in the past too, for example after attacks in Huwara.

“One might want to debate the use of the term, ‘pogrom’, but it is accurate to call settler violence systematic attacks of occupiers, with government approval, on groups of occupied people.”

Ahmed Krim spent 30 years teaching English in Algeria’s middle schools. Now retired, the 60-year-old watched the language he loved remain firmly behind French as the country’s second language.

English was less valued than French, which might have been the language of Algeria’s coloniser, but continues to be present in every dialogue, six decades after independence.

On July 25 , Algeria’s Education Minister, Mohamed Seghir Saadaoui, announced that English will become the sole foreign language taught in the third year of primary school in the new academic year for 2026-2027.

French would be pushed back to the fourth year, ending its domination of foreign language classes in Algerian schools.

From next month, eight-year-olds across Algeria will become the first to learn English before French.

“It is a very good decision. But it requires thinking, planning and resources,” Krim told Al Jazeera.

It is among the first steps in President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s linguistic overhaul for Algeria, which he first outlined in 2022 with English being introduced to primary schools.

Since then, medicine and science faculties have begun switching from French to English.

The French language has been erased from some utility bills and Air Algerie tickets. Road signs are beginning to feature English alongside Arabic, while government ministers’ websites will also have English as an option.

The shift from French to English as Algeria’s secondary language is both sweeping and structural.

It comes amid the most serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries since Algeria’s independence from France in 1962.

In July 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron publicly backed Morocco’s sovereignty claim over Western Sahara.

Algeria, which supports the Sahrawi Polisario Front and hosts over 170,000 Sahrawi refugees, viewed that as highly provocative.

That, and other issues, saw Algeria expel French diplomats, and vice versa.

Algeria’s replacement of French as the country’s second language accelerated after the diplomatic crisis grew.

A classroom without enough teachers

A rethink of the whole education system in Algeria may be needed.

“First and foremost, specialised training centres must be restored and candidates must not be forced into the teaching profession without wanting it – we need people who genuinely want to do this work,” Krim said.

He refers to dedicated institutes established after independence, where primary and middle school teachers, like himself, trained via a model that combined classroom instruction with direct school placements to meet the gap in Arabic instructors.

The centres operated until the late 1990s, when an economic crunch replaced them with the fewer and more selective Ecoles Normales Superieures.

Most teachers today are university graduates, but lack the practical, classroom-first grounding that the older model provided.

Krim said that school curricula must be designed and entrusted to “a qualified body that includes both linguistic and pedagogical expertise, free from all ideology”.

But journalist and analyst Noureddine Bessadi said the ideological dimension matters in Algeria, which overthrew colonialism following a bloody and bitter struggle against the French.

“Since independence in 1962, every shift in language policy has been fought as much on political as pedagogical grounds,” Bessadi told Al Jazeera.

After independence, Algeria’s Arabisation drive, when French was displaced from government and education, was “part of state building and enforcing Algeria’s identity, centring Arabic and Islam”, Bessadi added.

Tamazight, a non-Semitic language spoken by around a quarter of Algeria’s population, was marginalised until 1995, Bessadi said, shaped by an “ideological perception of unity that prioritised linguistic and cultural harmony”.

Critics argue that the transition from French to English is happening faster than the system can keep up with. For one, it is believed that there are not enough qualified English teachers to make the language reforms work.

But one source familiar with the matter told Al Jazeera that there are enough teachers to roll out this programme in primary schools and that any shortage could be filled through contractors.

In February, Algeria’s education ministry reportedly recruited about 15,000 English language teachers for primary schools.

Rafik Laceb, a lecturer in English at Mouloud Mammeri University in Tizi Ouzou, is cautiously optimistic about the primary school reform. But he considers the parallel push to teach university subjects in English to be rushed and poorly executed.

“Frankly, and beyond any chauvinism, I believe this decision is positive… I believe there is, today, sufficient supervision and evaluation work from the first experience,” Laceb said, in reference to the previous introduction of English in later primary school years.

The university experiment that began in 2023-2024 produced insufficient contact hours, a lack of genuine assessment of students’ English levels and no tracking of their progress.

Around 50 percent of teaching at Tizi Ouzou University’s English department is by younger contract staff, which brings other challenges.

“A young contract teacher must first master the basic principles of medicine before attempting to teach medical terminology in English,” he said.

Levelling the playing field

Currently, children only begin learning a foreign language in the third year of state primary schools, whereas multiple languages are taught at private schools from kindergarten.

Djamel Merah, whose daughter attended private schools before transferring to public secondary school, studied Arabic, French and English simultaneously from kindergarten level.

Merah welcomes the government’s language reforms at state primary schools, which will provide more children with the opportunity to learn English.

“It addresses a question about the gap in opportunities between children who get multilingual education from the start and those in public schools who don’t get the same chance,” he said.

Shakespeare’s rising shelf space

There also appears to be a more organic response among the public that precedes the government’s promotion of the English language.

Krimo Taleb, a bookseller at the Libre Pensee bookshop in Tizi Ouzou, has seen a growth in English-language book sales, particularly among female readers.

“In my opinion, it has nothing to do with government decisions. The majority of young readers today speak three languages fluently,” he said.

His own daughter, a middle school student, reads fluently in Arabic, English and French.

Colleen Hoover, Ana Huang and J. K. Rowling are some of the best-selling authors at his shop.

“Previously, our bookshops provided for English literature students the works of Shakespeare,” Taleb says. “Today, there is a diverse range of English-language titles aimed at the general public.”

However, French remains Algeria’s most influential foreign language. According to the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), Algeria has approximately 15 million French speakers, nearly a third of its population.

There is not a single newspaper published in English and written English by Algerians remains in its infancy.

But there are signs that former colonies are turning their backs on France’s linguistic legacy, particularly in Africa, where Paris’s military and political presence made a resurgence in recent decades.

In March 2025, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso withdrew from the OIF, accusing it of being a political instrument of Paris.

“Mali made its national languages official in 2023, demoting French to a working language. Burkina Faso followed the same year and Niger in 2025,” Bessadi added. “Even Senegal, which has not removed French as an official language, has begun encouraging local languages at its expense.”

For Krim, Algeria’s linguistic ambitions are not far-fetched, but for it to work, the country needs the “necessary resources… and transparency”.

New Delhi, India – An investigation by human rights group Amnesty International has confirmed that Indian government forces used lethal weapons, including pellet-firing shotguns, grenades, batons and electric shock devices against demonstrators in Gen Z protests that rocked the national capital last month.

On July 20, thousands of protesters had all but shut down New Delhi, blocking off Parliament Street, demanding the resignation of then-Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan following a string of examination scandals involving the leaking of national exam papers and other irregularities.

More than 100 students were injured in the crackdown by police and paramilitary forces that day. Indian newspapers obtained hospital records that showed that doctors had treated pellet wounds in several cases.

India’s opposition, led by Congress party leader Rahul Gandhi, has since called on Home Minister Amit Shah, seen as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s confidant, to answer questions about the alleged police brutality and has joined protesters in calling for his resignation.

But despite mounting evidence and growing political criticism, the Modi government repeatedly insisted that security forces had been measured in their response to the protests and denied using excessive force.

Now, an Amnesty investigation has found the use of tactics that Indian law enforcement rulebooks themselves warn against using in all but exceptional circumstances.

What happened on July 20 in New Delhi?

In July, the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a satirical, youth-led movement which gathered momentum in response to the national examinations scandal, called on its supporters to march on the Indian Parliament after a monthlong sit-in failed to oust the education minister.

Two days before the march, the police forcibly removed renowned activist Sonam Wangchuk, who had been taking part in a hunger strike. That move galvanised public anger, bringing out more protesters in New Delhi.

On the morning of the march day, the police used tear gas as protesters swelled, then attacked them with electric shock batons, as well as shooting at them with pellet guns, Amnesty International’s Evidence Lab has verified from video and photographic evidence alongside witness testimony.

Amnesty also found that government forces had put up barricades and enforced a communications blackout.

“The weapons were deployed in a manner that breached international law and standards and domestic policing guidelines,” Amnesty said in a statement on Monday.

The rights group’s report also noted that the Delhi Police had publicly denied any disproportionate use of force, specifically pellet guns. The police also repeated this before India’s top court during a hearing about the alleged use of excessive force.

Amnesty says the evidence it has gathered “directly contradicts [the police’s] account”.

Four days after the July 20 march, as protests spread across the country, police in Bihar state’s Siwan town opened fire on protesters, injuring at least three youths.

Did government forces fire pellets at protesters?

Following the July 20 protest, several videos and photos emerged of protesters with injuries consistent with pellet wounds, which were reflected in their medical records as well.

The Evidence Lab verified two videos showing a paramilitary Rapid Action Force officer firing a shotgun into the crowd at the intersection of Connaught Place and Parliament Street in New Delhi, where protesters had gathered.

At least two protesters had wounds consistent with those caused by birdshot, a hunting round that fires a large number of small metal pellets, the group noted.

“The doctors confirmed that they were pellet injuries. Thankfully, my bones have been saved, but my body has been scarred badly,” one protester told Amnesty.

Amnesty said birdshot ammunition has not been developed for law enforcement purposes due to the widespread dispersion of the metal pellets, which “is inherently inaccurate and presents a high risk of serious injuries to the targeted person and even bystanders”.

Amnesty also said the police did not issue a public warning before firing pellet guns, as recommended by the Indian government’s Bureau for Police Research and Development.

Police and security forces have used metal pellets for more than a decade in Indian-administered Kashmir, leading to the first mass blinding during a 2016 civilian uprising.

Posting on X, Delhi Police called the reports of pellet injuries during the latest protests “fake news”, “completely false and misleading” and warned that “appropriate legal action” would be taken against anyone “spreading rumours”.

A subsequent internal inquiry by India’s paramilitary forces, however, reportedly found that personnel had fired at least seven rounds of ammunition containing metal pellets.

“Instead of facilitating the right to protest, Indian authorities suppressed it first with a communication blackout, barricades and transport disruption. They then attempted to crush it with unnecessary or excessive use of force against peaceful protesters, including children,” said Aakar Patel, chair of the board, Amnesty International India.

“This heavy-handed response was state-sanctioned violence masked as crowd control. The continued impunity after a month is a testament to that,” Patel said.

Did police use tear gas grenades and batons?

Government forces did use tear gas grenades to disperse the crowd at several places in New Delhi, as seen by Al Jazeera and verified by Amnesty, not just on July 20 to prevent CHP supporters’ march to Parliament.

“Tear gas grenades releasing an excessive amount of explosive energy are extremely dangerous and should be prohibited for use in public assemblies,” Amnesty said, referring to videos of tear gas shells exploding near students.

The group also noted that witnesses observed that “tear gas grenades were launched directly at protesters instead of at an angled trajectory above the head of protesters, at odds with UN Guidance on the use of Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement”.

Amnesty has also verified claims that the police used lathis, the Indian version of batons, to beat protesters.

The UN special rapporteur on torture considers lathis to be inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading as “they deliver a greater level [of] kinetic force than conventional batons, causing excessive pain and increasing the risk of serious injury” and has called for them to be prohibited, a position that Amnesty supports.

The group also found men in civilian clothing beating protesters “while uniformed officers, who escorted them toward the crowd, stand beside them and make no attempt to intervene”, as visible in videos seen by Al Jazeera. Several officials were not wearing their name tags or badge numbers, as required.

What has been the reaction to the use of excessive force?

A day after the crackdown in New Delhi, CJP founder Abhijeet Dipke told the crowd, “Every police person who attacked you would be identified and dragged to the courts”.

The group also launched a platform for protesters to upload videos and photos from the crackdown.

The opposition, led by the Congress’s Gandhi, pushed the home minister for a discussion on the issue in Parliament, an issue that plagued the monsoon session with Shah missing.

Gandhi argued that either Shah ordered the usage of lethal weapons, in which case “he is guilty”, or he was unaware of the situation, which makes him “incompetent” for the job.

Sahil Lochab, a 19-year-old who lost vision in one eye due to pellet injuries, said the police had been refusing to register his complaint. In response, Gandhi staged a seven-hour sit-in outside the office of the Delhi Police chief, insisting that a case be registered over the use of pellet guns on protesters, alongside Lochab.

After Gandhi’s pressure, the police relented. A student at the University of Delhi, Lochab received multiple pellet injuries on his chest, back, arms and face. Several pellets could not be taken out, he said in his complaint.

“My medical documents show that there are over 200 pellets in my body. Doctors have told me that the possibility of my eyesight coming back is less than 1 percent,” Lochab wrote in his complaint.

US Southern Command says that Sunday’s strike targeted a vessel operating along established narco-trafficking routes in the Eastern Pacific.

The United States military said it struck a suspected drug-trafficking boat in the Pacific Ocean, killing two people.

In a Monday post on X, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) said Sunday’s strike targeted a vessel operating along established narco-trafficking routes in the Eastern Pacific.

“Confirmed intelligence revealed the vessel’s active involvement in narco-trafficking,” SOUTHCOM added.

“This operation is a clear and decisive reminder that SOUTHCOM is taking the fight directly to the cartels.”

Grainy, black-and-white video accompanying the post appeared to show a boat moving through the water immediately before a large explosion.

The post stated that under the direction of SOUTHCOM Commander General Francis L. Donovan, the Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere executed a lethal kinetic strike on the low-profile vessel.

“We are committed to imposing total systemic friction on narco-terrorists — disrupting their operations, dismantling their leadership and eliminating cartel terror across the region,” Donovan was quoted as saying.

“Let me be clear, we will not permit narco-terrorists to operate with impunity in the Western Hemisphere, nor will we allow their deadly poison to reach American communities. This operation is a powerful demonstration of our lethal precision, overwhelming capability, and absolute resolve to protect the U.S. homeland.”

The US military launched Operation Southern Spear in early September, with President Donald Trump arguing that Washington is effectively at war with Latin American drug cartels.

Since then, more than 200 people have been killed in strikes across the Eastern Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, according to a tally by the AFP news agency.

However, the Trump administration has not provided definitive evidence that the targeted vessels were involved in drug trafficking.

Legal experts and rights groups warn that the attacks could amount to extrajudicial killings.

The Pentagon’s inspector general said in May that it would review whether the military followed standard targeting procedures, though the evaluation will not examine the legal authority behind the strikes.

US President Donald Trump’s administration has said it aims to sever “every” economic lifeline sustaining Iran in what officials have warned will be the toughest sanctions campaign ever seen.

The threat, if followed through, would mean putting China, Iran’s biggest trade partner, squarely in the crosshairs of US sanctions.

That would be a risky proposition for Washington due to the likelihood of severe blowback from Beijing – so much so that some analysts doubt that the Trump administration’s measures, set to be announced on Monday, will match its rhetoric in scope or severity.

While the Trump administration has yet to provide details about what it has dubbed “economic D-Day”, US officials have made it clear that Iran’s trade partners are in their sights.

In an op-ed in the Financial Times on Sunday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that countries fearful of breaking ties with Iran should not “discount the cost of testing Washington”.

“The president has created the conditions to leverage every agency, every authority and action many assumed we would never summon,” said Bessent, who is scheduled to unveil the sanctions in a news conference at 17:00 GMT.

Brett Erickson, a sanctions expert and managing principal of Obsidian Risk Advisors, said the Trump administration’s willingness to target China will be an indication of its resolve to mount a sustained economic offensive against Tehran.

“That is not a relationship you degrade lightly. If the United States decides to really bring China into the ring, it will be a serious indication that the United States plans to wage this economic war for a prolonged period of time,” Erickson told Al Jazeera.

“If they do not, it will be a tacit admission from the Trump administration that they do not believe economic hardship can seriously bring about a change in the Iranian position,” Erickson said.

Any US pressure campaign that excludes China would be necessarily limited in scope given the outsized importance of Beijing and Tehran’s economic ties.

China reported $9.96bn in two-way trade with Iran in 2025, a figure that does not include some $31.2bn in Iranian oil shipments, according to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

China’s purchases of Iranian oil have been a particularly crucial lifeline for Tehran, accounting for about 90 percent of its oil sales, according to the US Treasury Department.

Until now, the Trump administration’s Iran sanctions regime has targeted only a handful of relatively minor China-based entities.

In April, the Trump administration sanctioned Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery, one of China’s largest independent refineries, commonly known as “teapots”, over its alleged purchases of Iranian oil.

The Trump administration also imposed sanctions on four firms in Hong Kong in May, followed by measures in August targeting six China and Hong Kong-based shipping lines.

Washington has so far left Chinese financial institutions, widely viewed as a key node in Iran’s oil trade, untouched.

“Cutting off Chinese economic ties will be key to the success of any attempt to increase pressure on Iran. However, the United States won’t do it,” Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow at Defense Priorities, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank, told Al Jazeera.

“If it does, China will retaliate and has the leverage to impose costs on the US,” Kavanagh said.

China has vigorously opposed US sanctions against Iran, arguing that economic pressure will not resolve the nearly six-month-long war.

In a statement on Sunday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Beijing remained “committed to promoting peace talks” and willing to “continue making efforts for the early restoration of peace and tranquility in the region”.

Iran, for its part, has threatened to retaliate against countries that support the US measures.

Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned on Saturday that any country that participated in sanctions would be considered an “enemy” and that “not a drop” of oil would leave the Gulf if Iran’s neighbours joined the US campaign.

Wang Wen, dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, said Beijing would inevitably take countermeasures in response to any US sanctions and their intensity would depend on the “severity of US actions”.

“China maintains its desire to avoid conflict, but its bottom line cannot be crossed,” Wang told Al Jazeera.

For Trump, invoking Beijing’s ire would risk not only economic retaliation, but also unravelling efforts to stabilise US-China relations only weeks before the US president is due to host Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the White House.

Trump’s scheduled summit with Xi on September 24 would be their second face-to-face meeting aimed at lowering the temperature in US-China relations since Washington launched its war on Iran in late February, following Trump’s visit to Beijing in May.

Zichen Wang, deputy secretary-general of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) think tank in Beijing, said neither Beijing nor Washington were likely to want Iran to define the upcoming summit.

“Unless the US measures become very broad or directly target major Chinese interests, both sides are likely to try to keep this dispute from overwhelming the wider agenda,” Wang told Al Jazeera.

“That said, Chinese restraint should not be read as an absence of response,” Wang said.

“Beijing has often avoided immediate rhetorical escalation, but when unilateral US actions have materially affected Chinese companies or other Chinese interests, it has shown a growing willingness to answer with practical countermeasures.”

While the Trump administration could potentially make it more challenging and expensive for China to continue its economic support of Iran, it is unlikely to be able to stop Beijing outright if it is determined to maintain ties, said Erickson of Obsidian Risk Advisors.

“US sanctions can absolutely force companies to de-risk in order to avoid exposure, but there will always be an entity willing to fill this role,” Erickson said, adding that Xi is unlikely to “merely stand by while Trump flexes the powers of American economic statecraft without flexing Beijing’s own in return”.

Though US officials have stated their intention to “collapse” Iran’s government with ramped-up sanctions, Erickson expressed doubt that the Trump administration will be able to achieve its war goals through economic pressure alone.

“Unless the Trump administration is willing to burn serious bridges and employ all remaining levers of economic warfare simultaneously, there is no reasonable assertion that can be made that it will be able to produce the victory that kinetic warfare could not,” he said.

Fast-fashion giant Shein could see its stock market valuation reach almost $27bn (£19.8bn) when its makes its debut in Hong Kong on 1 September.

The long-awaited move comes after failed attempts to list in the US and London due to regulatory challenges amid scrutiny of the firm, which has its headquarters in Singapore but was founded in China.

Since it was founded in 2008, Shein has risen to become one of the world’s biggest fast-fashion retailers, with customers in more than 150 countries.

The e-commerce giant is known for selling ultra-cheap clothes, backed by a vast network of factories in China that are able to quickly manufacture new products based on the latest trends.

Shein said in a filing on Monday, external that it will offer nearly 280 million shares for between HK$47.60 ($6.07; £4.45) and HK$49.50 each.

At the top of the range, the share sale would raise $1.77bn (£1.3bn) for the company and give it a market valuation of $26.8bn.

But that is much lower than the $100bn it was worth in 2022, reflecting weaker sales growth and higher costs.

The initial public offering (IPO) is being backed by Wall Street investment giants Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan.

The company will make its highly anticipated debut on the Hong Kong stock exchange after efforts to go public since 2023.

Hong Kong has been revived as “one of the largest IPO markets” after attracting more firms from mainland China, said economics associate professor Feng Qu from the Nanyang Technological University.

Shein is likely to command a higher valuation in Hong Kong than it would in London, where regulatory scrutiny derailed its plans to sell shares there, Feng said.

Chinese companies may also be wary of selling shares in the US as tensions between the world’s two largest economies could result in firms being de-listed, he added.

In early August, a Pentagon official stood in front of reporters and conceded something the department almost never says out loud: the world’s best-funded military cannot out-produce a country under invasion. Travis Metz, deputy director of the Defense Innovation Unit, put a number on it. Ukraine will manufacture six to seven million small first-person-view attack drones this year — roughly 500,000 a month, built in garages, repurposed furniture factories and basements within range of Russian glide bombs. The Pentagon’s own flagship drone program, a $1.1 billion initiative branded Drone Dominance, will have ordered fewer than 200,000 drones, cumulatively, by February 2027. Metz’s response was not defensive. It was aspirational: “I see no reason why we shouldn’t… be the world champions of this as well.” The gap he was describing is not a technology gap. It is a speed gap, and speed is the one metric wartime industry cannot fake.

The instinct is to read this as a story about Ukrainian ingenuity, and it is one. But it is also the epilogue to a specific American failure. In 2023 the Pentagon launched Replicator, a program to field “multiple thousands” of autonomous systems within 24 months to counter China. By its August 2025 deadline it had delivered “hundreds,” not thousands, after burning through roughly $1 billion — undone by drones that were unfinished at selection, software that could not command large numbers of different systems at once, and a Switchblade loitering munition priced above $100,000 a unit. Washington’s answer was not to slow down and fix the model; it was to bring in the Department of Government Efficiency to override procurement rules and reclassify small drones as disposable supplies rather than regulated weapons systems. Meanwhile, Russia’s own Shahed and decoy drone output is reportedly climbing toward several hundred, and by some Ukrainian estimates up to a thousand, units a day. The war that forced Ukraine to mass-produce cheap drones is the same war exposing how slowly America still moves.

Why the gap isn’t about money

Start with unit economics, because they explain most of the gap. A Ukrainian FPV drone can be built for as little as $300 to $500 — an airframe, a camera, a battery and a warhead, assembled by hand and flown once. The Pentagon’s comparable systems have historically cost orders of magnitude more, not because the components are better but because they were designed inside an acquisition culture built for exquisite, low-volume platforms like fighter jets, where every part is sourced, tested and certified over years. Layer onto that a July 2026 rule requiring a “wholly domestic” supply chain — no Chinese-made motors, no Chinese battery packs — and the honest tension becomes visible: the policy meant to make American drone production more secure is, in the near term, also what makes it slower and more expensive to scale. Metz’s own explanation was blunt: it is “much harder to get from zero to 200,000” than to expand an existing line. Ukraine skipped that problem by never centralizing production in the first place — thousands of small, dispersed workshops that are individually replaceable and collectively enormous.

The deeper obstacle is not money but structure. Replicator had no dedicated budget line, was bounced between the Defense Innovation Unit and a newly created Defense Autonomous Warfare Group under Special Operations Command, and repeatedly selected systems that existed as concepts rather than finished products, in a rush to hit an artificial 24-month deadline. Congress, by its own research service’s account, has struggled to get basic cost and capability data out of the program. This is what forced DOGE’s intervention: not a shortage of appropriated dollars, but a procurement system engineered for careful, low-volume exquisiteness trying to behave like a wartime factory floor, and failing at both.

The strongest objection to treating this as a straightforward American failure is that the comparison is not apples to apples. Ukraine’s FPVs are disposable, short-range and built for a static front line; American planners are chasing autonomy, jamming resistance and long-range swarm coordination for a Pacific theatre defined by vast distances rather than trench lines, and that ambition costs more and takes longer to get right. That is a fair distinction — but it does not rescue the record. Years and a billion dollars into that more ambitious bet, the Pentagon still lacks software able to command mixed fleets of different drones, while Ukrainian manufacturers are already fielding AI-assisted terminal guidance on sub-$500 airframes, refined through thousands of real combat sorties a month. The ambition gap did not produce a capability lead. It produced the same failure as the cost gap: exquisite requirements colliding with a timeline the requirements were never built to meet.

Which is why the Pentagon’s actual fix looks nothing like a bigger budget. Six Ukrainian manufacturers, including F-Drones and General Cherry, are now required to form joint ventures with American companies — near Toledo, Ohio, and in New Hampshire — as a condition of future Pentagon orders. Washington is not just buying drones. It is importing the production model, and with it the tacit admission that the expertise now runs the other way.

Three ways this goes

What happens next depends on whether the joint-venture model actually transplants Ukraine’s manufacturing tempo onto US soil, or just its branding.

Base case (roughly 50 percent probability). The Ohio and New Hampshire joint ventures scale gradually. By 2027–28, US-based output climbs into the low hundreds of thousands annually — a real improvement, but still an order of magnitude below Ukraine’s current pace, held back by the domestic-sourcing rule’s cost premium. The program becomes a credible proof of concept for a future Indo-Pacific contingency rather than a fix for any current shortfall, and “Drone Dominance” quietly redefines success downward to match what it can actually deliver.

Downside case. The DOGE-driven bypass of standard testing repeats Replicator’s failure mode at greater scale: units purchased without adequate vetting turn out unreliable in the field, a GAO or inspector-general report documents it, and Congress reimposes the very procurement safeguards that were just stripped away. Combined with a Chinese-component ban that keeps unit costs well above Ukrainian levels, US output stalls again, and the gap that Metz conceded in August widens rather than closes by the time it next matters.

Upside case. The joint-venture model works as intended — not just as a purchasing arrangement but as a transplant of Ukrainian manufacturing culture, its dispersed micro-factories, rapid iteration and tolerance for combat-tested imperfection, into the American industrial base. That model, proven on drones, becomes the template for how Washington arms the next partner already fighting a war, whether Taiwan or a Baltic state: not a slow pipeline of finished stockpiles shipped from the continental United States, but manufacturing capability transplanted onto the partner’s own soil, and now, in this instance, onto America’s.

The takeaway

So: what does the mismatch reveal? Not that Ukraine builds better drones — the Pentagon never disputed that its own designs, on paper, are more capable. It reveals that capability on paper is not the same as capability in time, and that the American defense-industrial base, even backed by an executive order, a billion-dollar program and a DOGE override of its own rules, still cannot mobilize at wartime tempo on its own. The fix Washington has actually reached for is not more money. It is outsourcing the missing ingredient — speed — to the one partner that has been forced to master it under fire. That is the real admission, and it may be the more durable one: the next time the United States arms a country fighting a live war, it may look less like supplying an ally and more like apprenticing to one.

Watch for: whether the Ohio and New Hampshire joint-venture lines are shipping US-assembled drones at anything close to Ukrainian unit costs by the next Gauntlet test cycle at Fort Carson. If the “wholly domestic” sourcing rule keeps American-made units several multiples more expensive than their Ukrainian counterparts, the joint ventures will have transferred the branding of Ukraine’s drone war without transferring its speed.

The U.S. Air Force is looking for a new family of aerial targets that can replicate an extremely broad range of airborne threats, from small drones operating in swarms to stealth fighters, large uncrewed aircraft, strategic bombers, and airborne early warning aircraft.

The service wants these targets to be realistic enough to challenge modern sensors and weapons, but inexpensive and simple enough that they can be routinely risked, and even destroyed, during testing.

The requirements are laid out in a new Air Force Request for Information (RFI), which calls for a family of systems capable of representing the “full range of airborne threats, spanning from inexpensive ‘hobby drones’ to the most advanced adversary fighter and large-scale aircraft.” Responses are due September 28.

The service says the next-generation systems should be sufficiently inexpensive and straightforward to manufacture that they can be “treated as attritable or expendable when required.”

That represents a significant departure from the economics of certain existing aerial targets. The Air Force’s QF-16 full-scale aerial target, for example, is based on a converted fighter aircraft, and can be crewed when required. It solves the problem of putting a full-sized, high-performance target in the air, but consuming an F-16 for a test is fundamentally different from losing a purpose-built target designed to be produced and expended in quantity. The service also uses purpose-designed drones of many kinds as targets, as we will come back to later.

Test Missile Fired at Boeing’s QF-16

The new effort is also deliberately open to approaches outside the traditional defense-industrial base.

The RFI calls for industry proposals “including commercial, modified commercial, dual-use, and non-developmental solutions.” The government is “particularly interested in non-traditional, commercially derived, or dual-use solutions” that can offer advantages in “cost, scalability, and simplicity over legacy systems.”

That language suggests the Air Force is not necessarily looking for another clean-sheet aircraft program. Instead, it appears interested in exploiting existing commercial technologies, manufacturing methods, propulsion systems, electronics and other readily available components to produce targets in significantly larger numbers and at lower cost.

The proposed systems would cover several distinct threat categories, with requirements changing substantially depending on what the target is intended to represent.

For advanced fighter aircraft, the Air Force wants targets capable of “supersonic capabilities (up to and exceeding Mach 1.6 at 40,000 feet)” along with high-agility and high-G combat maneuvers.

Reflecting the need to mimic more advanced threats, including stealthy ones, the Air Force says the new targets should also provide precise low-observable radar cross-section profiles, multispectral infrared signatures, active radio-frequency emissions, and integrated electronic-attack capabilities.

That could be particularly important for testing weapons and sensors against fifth-generation-type threats — and what might come after. A conventional subscale target can reproduce aspects of an aircraft’s flight behavior, but it does not necessarily reproduce the radar, infrared, electromagnetic or electronic-warfare environment presented by a sophisticated combat aircraft.

The Air Force has been trying for years now to acquire new full-size target drones, or ones that can at least mimic real fast-moving tactical jets. As in the new RFI, the goal has also been for those drones to have stealth and other more modern features, or the ability to simulate those capabilities with a high degree of fidelity. So far, however, despite the launch of programs such as the 5th Generation Aerial Target (5GAT), progress in this regard has been extremely limited.

A different set of requirements are outlined for targets representing C-130-sized multi-engine aircraft.

Here, the RFI calls for “matching the physical scale, slow subsonic flight envelopes, and propeller or turbofan propulsion characteristics of larger multi-engine aircraft.”

Those targets would need representative physical volume as well as basic RF and IR emissions and realistic radar returns. The Air Force specifically says these characteristics are intended to help verify missile-seeker guidance and assess warhead lethality against large-airframe targets.

For still larger aircraft, such as strategic bombers and AEW&C platforms, the emphasis shifts toward physical scale and signatures. The service wants targets capable of reproducing the “massive physical dimensions, multi-spectral thermal signatures, and heavy-aircraft radar strategic threats” associated with these aircraft.

That requirement highlights one of the limitations of today’s subscale aerial targets. A small drone can be made to generate a particular radar return, but there are important differences between artificially reproducing a signature and putting a target into the test environment that physically occupies something approaching the volume and presentation of the aircraft being simulated.

The proposed family would also encompass multiple classes of uncrewed aircraft.

For Group 5 UAVs, the targets should be capable of operating at altitudes up to 50,000 feet.

Group 3 and Group 4 targets would need to fly at approximately Mach 0.5 to 0.8 and maneuver at between 3 and 6 Gs.

At the other end of the spectrum, Group 1 and Group 2 targets should fly below 150 knots and be capable of operating in swarms.

The inclusion of swarm operations reflects the fact that the Air Force wants at least part of the new target family to be able to reproduce the massed airborne threat that small uncrewed systems can present.

That could allow weapons and sensors to be evaluated against scenarios involving numerous inexpensive targets rather than a single isolated aircraft.

The Air Force has operated remote-controlled aerial targets for decades, but many of its existing systems represent very different approaches.

The BQM-167A, which entered service in 2007, is a subsonic subscale target roughly 20 feet long with an 11-foot wingspan. It is inexpensive relative to a fighter-sized aircraft, but its physical dimensions are nowhere near those of many of the aircraft the Air Force may need to replicate.

At the other end of the scale, converted QF-16s provide a full-scale target with genuine fighter performance, making them useful for testing against fourth-generation fighter-type threats.

But a converted F-16 is expensive to operate, cannot be expended in large numbers, and increasingly falls short when it comes to replicating a fifth-generation stealth aircraft, let alone a strategic bomber, an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, or a mass of inexpensive drones.

The new RFI appears designed to bridge that gap, and potentially eliminate it altogether by creating multiple classes of targets optimized for different threats.

Significantly, the effort put the requirement for targets to reproduce the characteristics that modern weapons and sensors use to find and defeat aircraft in the foreground.

That suggests the targets are intended to support testing across the entire kill chain, from initial detection and tracking through seeker acquisition, guidance, and terminal engagement.

There is also a strong emphasis on simplicity and scalability.

A target that costs almost as much as the system being tested is of limited value if the objective is to conduct repeated, realistic engagements. A target that can be manufactured cheaply enough to be routinely expended, meanwhile, would enable much more aggressive testing and larger numbers of test scenarios.

While it is relatively straightforward to produce a low-cost drone, the challenge will be producing one that can fly above 40,000 feet at supersonic speed, perform high-G maneuvers, generate controlled low-observable radar signatures, reproduce multispectral IR characteristics and conduct electronic attack.

The Air Force is therefore effectively asking industry to find the sweet spot where high-fidelity threat representation and mass-produced affordability intersect.

If it succeeds, the resulting target fleet could look very different from today, with the Air Force employing a family of relatively inexpensive systems that can be configured to represent almost any fixed-wing aircraft that might be encountered.

As well as training, the same family of drones could support development and evaluation of radars, infrared sensors, electronic warfare systems, air defense networks, and other technologies against a much broader range of realistic airborne threats.

The breadth of the requirement is noteworthy. If it achieves its goals, it could allow the Air Force to replicate large numbers of future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) as well as simulating swarms of small drones and barrages of one-way attack drones, reflecting the expected scale and diversity of future air warfare.

The new requirement ultimately calls for targets that can reproduce the speed, maneuverability, size, radar signature, infrared signature, electromagnetic emissions and electronic warfare capabilities of an increasingly diverse range of aircraft, while being cheap enough that losing them is an acceptable cost of testing and training.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com