TODAY

Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum has warned she could take possible legal action following comments from right-wing tech billionaire Elon Musk, accusing her of ties to cartels.

At her morning news conference on Tuesday, the president was asked for her response to Musk’s statements a day prior. Musk had described her as being beholden to the cartels.

“Well, we are considering whether to take any legal action,” she began. “The lawyers are looking into it.”

She then proceeded to describe the allegations that she leads a “narco-government” as “absurd” and demonstrably false.

“It falls apart all on its own,” she said, dismissing the accusation as hackneyed. “They don’t even know what to invent any more, right? Honestly, it’s laughable.”

Sheinbaum has faced criticism for her national security policies following a spate of cross-country violence over the weekend.

Killing of El Mencho

The violence erupted after the death on Sunday of a top cartel leader, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known by the nickname El Mencho.

The Mexican military had tracked El Mencho to the town of Tapalpa in central Mexico. He died while en route to medical care after being shot by authorities.

Members of El Mencho’s criminal organisation, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, responded to the news of his death with road blocks, arson and clashes with security forces. Dozens of people were killed in the violence.

Musk was among the online commentators criticising Sheinbaum’s handling of Mexico’s security in the aftermath of the attacks.

His posts came in response to a video clip circulating on social media, showing Sheinbaum advocating for alternatives to the militaristic “war on drugs” approach.

“She’s just saying what her cartel bosses tell her to say,” Musk wrote in response to the video.

“Let’s just say that their punishment for disobedience is a little worse than a ‘performance improvement plan’.”

A vocal critic of left-wing governments like Sheinbaum’s, Musk is closely aligned with United States President Donald Trump, who has likewise pushed for more military action against cartels.

In September, for instance, Trump’s State Department listed Mexico as an area of concern for drug-trafficking and outlined steps it expected to see to address the issue.

“Much more remains to be done by Mexico’s government to target cartel leadership, along with their clandestine drug labs, precursor chemical supply chains, and illicit finances,” the State Department wrote.

“Over the next year, the United States will expect to see additional, aggressive efforts by Mexico to hold cartel leaders accountable and disrupt the illicit networks engaged in drug production and trafficking.”

Trump himself has accused Sheinbaum of inefficacy in her campaign to crack down on illicit drug trafficking.

“She’s not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico,” Trump told Fox News in the hours after launching a January 3 military operation to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

“She’s very frightened of the cartels. They’re running Mexico. I’ve asked her numerous times, ‘Would you like us to take out the cartels?’”

Sheinbaum has repeatedly refused the prospect of unilateral US intervention, arguing it would violate Mexican sovereignty. Still, Trump has repeatedly warned that the US is considering military strikes on Mexican soil.

“Something’s going to have to be done with Mexico,” he told Fox News.

Upping the pressure

Sheinbaum, however, has defended her administration’s track record. Faced with US tariffs in February 2025, she deployed nearly 10,000 members of Mexico’s National Guard to the country’s northern border to crack down on fentanyl trafficking.

She has also taken targeted military actions against cartels, though she has argued that the process should be focused on prosecuting criminals, rather than killing them in law enforcement operations.

Her administration has also overseen the extradition of dozens of Mexican nationals suspected of crimes in the US. In January 2025, for instance, 37 people were sent to the US. In April and August, groups of 13 and 14 suspects were transferred, respectively.

Sunday’s capture and killing of El Mencho was the fulfilment of a decades-long goal for the Mexican government, which has long sought his arrest.

Still, on Monday, Trump briefly posted a message on his Truth Social platform indicating that he expected Sheinbaum to do more.

“Mexico must step up their effort on Cartels and Drugs,” he wrote in a post that was later removed.

Sheinbaum, meanwhile, used Tuesday’s news conference to dismiss the criticism as out of touch with what was happening in Mexico. She added that what matters to her is the opinion of the Mexican people, not Musk.

“The vast majority of people recognise the work of the armed forces and the work we are doing every day, not only in security, but for the good of the country, for the wellbeing of all Mexicans,” she said. “That is what will guide us.”

Search and rescue workers are looking for more than 40 people who remain missing as towns reel from torrential rainfall.

Torrential rainfall has caused floods across the state of Minas Gerais in southeastern Brazil, killing at least 23 people.

Dozens of emergency workers, some with disaster-trained search dogs, combed through mounds of debris on Tuesday in the municipality of Juiz de Fora, which recorded at least 18 deaths.

They were on the lookout for the more than 40 people who have been missing since the rains began on Monday.

“We’ve been here since last night to see if they survive underground,” Livia Rosa, a 44-year-old seamstress, told the news service AFP.

She explained that several of her relatives were buried in the mud. “Hope is the last thing to die.”

Rainfall in the region is expected to continue for the coming days, complicating rescue efforts.

Images of the initial floods show mud and sludge clogging areas of Juiz de Fora, after a swollen river veered off course.

At least 440 people were displaced in the city, located about 310km (192 miles) north of Rio de Janeiro. At least seven deaths were also recorded in the nearby town of Uba.

The mayor of Juiz de Fora, Margarida Salomao, said that at least 20 landslides had been reported in the area, and some homes collapsed.

“Many people were inside their homes at night when it was raining,” Major Demetrius Goulart of the fire brigade told AFP. “We have hope. We found a boy this morning. He was inside a house, under the rubble. It took the team two hours of work.”

At least 108 officials from the Minas Gerais fire department have been deployed to Juiz de Fora, and 28 to Uba.

President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said the government would assist in any way it could and offered his support to those affected.

“Our focus is to ensure humanitarian assistance, the restoration of basic services, support for displaced people, and aid for reconstruction,” he wrote in a social media post.

Salomao said in a social media post that the province has experienced its wettest February on record.

“There were more than 180mm [of rain] in four hours, intense, destructive and persistent,” he said, calling it “the saddest day of my administration”.

“Here, we remain fully committed and prioritising saving lives.”

The MQ-9 family of medium altitude, long endurance uncrewed air vehicles, which includes the new SkyGuradian and SeaGuardian variants, are getting the ability to reach out and hit targets at extreme ranges. In essence, the addition of long-range cruise missiles to their quivers — basically turning the drones into standoff “missile trucks” — will give these aircraft another new mission that is also relevant in high-end conflicts.

MQ-9’s long-range and extreme loitering time would offer a level of flexibility not really available in a tactical aircraft-sized package. As it sits now, Lockheed Martin’s stealthy AGM-158 JASSM and its anti-ship variant, LRASM, as well as Kongsberg-Raytheon’s Joint Strike Missile are being looked at as weapons options.

General Atomics writes in a release: “Hypothetically, a mission profile might look like this: MQ-9Bs could launch from a number of friendly bases in the Western or Southern Pacific, fly to a hold point and loiter there outside a hostile power’s weapons engagement zone. If the order came to release the weapons, the aircraft could launch them in coordination with other U.S. or allied operations.”

The goal is to start flying with at least one of the missiles this year.

Our Jamie hunter was on the show floor in Denver Colorado at the Air Force Association’s Warfare Symposium to discuss this new addition to the MQ-9’s repertoire directly with with Scott Gilloon, Sector Vice President for Strategic Programs at GA-ASI. Check out the video at the top of this story to hear what he had to say about the new standoff weapons offering for the MQ-9.

Aden, Yemen – Lying on the outskirts of Yemen’s interim capital, Aden, al-Basateen district starts where the paved roads end, stretching into narrow, sandy alleyways. It reveals a decades-old refugee story in which Arabic blends with Somali and the faces harbour memories of a different place, across the sea.

Residents know the area by several names, including “Yemen’s Mogadishu” and “the Somalis’ neighbourhood” – a reference to the demographic shift it has seen since the 1990s, when civil war in Somalia pushed thousands of families across the Gulf of Aden in search of safety.

Today, local sources estimate the district’s population at more than 40,000, with people of Somali origin making up the majority. They live in harsh conditions where economic vulnerability overlaps with an unresolved legal status.

Some arrived as children holding the hands of relatives, while others were born in Aden and have known no other home. But they all share one thing in common: the refugee label stamped on their official documents.

Harsh living conditions

As dawn breaks, dozens of men gather at the entrances of the area’s main streets, waiting to be picked up to do a day’s work in construction or manual labour. Many depend on this fragile pattern of employment to put food on the table.

Residents say the lack of regular work has become the defining feature of life in al-Basateen, as extreme poverty spreads and humanitarian aid declines.

Ashour Hassan, a resident in his mid-30s, waiting at a main road junction for someone to hire him to wash a car, told Al Jazeera that he earns between 3,000 and 4,000 Yemeni rials a day (less than $3). That amount is not enough to cover the needs of his family, which lives in a single room in a neighbourhood lacking basic services, surrounded by dirt roads and piles of rubbish.

In a voice mixed with fatigue and despair, Ashour summed up life in al-Basateen: “We live day to day. If we find work, we eat. If we don’t, we wait without food until tomorrow.”

Families in al-Basateen typically rely on both men and women to be breadwinners.

Some women work cleaning homes, while others run small businesses, such as selling bread and traditional foods that blend Yemeni and Somali flavours, and which become especially popular during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan.

Many children also find themselves pushed into work despite their age. One of the main jobs for children involves sifting through waste for materials they can sell, such as plastic or scrap metal, to help support their families.

Little sense of belonging

Poverty is clearly visible in al-Basateen’s architecture and appearance, with tightly packed homes, some made of metal sheets and consisting of only one or two rooms, separated by dirt roads covered in rubbish.

But that is not the only burden weighing on al-Basateen’s Somali residents. A deeper feeling of what many here call “suspended belonging” hangs over them, with the first generation of refugees still carrying memories of a distant homeland and speaking its language, while the second and third generations know only Aden and speak Arabic in the local dialect, with Somalia only known through family stories.

Fatima Jame embodies this paradox. A mother of four, she was born in Aden to Somali parents. She told Al Jazeera: “We know no country other than Yemen. We studied here and got married here, but we do not have Yemeni identity, and in front of the law, we are still refugees.”

Fatima lives with her family in a modest two-room home. Her husband works as a porter in one of the city’s markets, while she helps support the family by preparing and selling traditional foods. Even so, she says their combined income “barely covers rent and food” because of the high cost of living and few job opportunities.

A bleak reality

Conditions in Yemen were never the best for migrants and refugees, but they have significantly worsened since a civil war began in 2014 between the Iranian-backed Houthis and the central government in Sanaa, in Yemen’s north.

The violence from that war, along with declining aid and shrinking job opportunities have increased pressure on both host communities and refugees.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says that funding for support programmes in Yemen in 2025 met only 25 percent of the country’s actual needs, directly affecting the lives of thousands of families. Residents of al-Basateen say the aid they used to receive has sharply declined, and in many cases has stopped altogether.

Youssef Mohammed, 53, says he was one of the first Somali arrivals to the district in the 1990s, and now supports a family of seven.

“[We] have not received any support from organisations for years,” Youssef said, adding that some families “chose to return to Somalia rather than stay and die of hunger here”.

He believes the crisis affects everyone in Yemen, “but [that] the refugee remains the weakest link.”

Despite the bleak picture, a few have managed to improve their material conditions through education or by opening small businesses that have helped stimulate the local economy. But they remain an exception, and the flow of refugees continues.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula, but is also the region’s only signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and therefore allows foreign arrivals to apply for asylum or refugee status. According to the United Nations refugee agency, Yemen hosted more than 61,000 asylum seekers and refugees as of July 2025, the vast majority from Somalia and Ethiopia.

Arrivals in recent years have typically travelled to Yemen via boats, with many planning to use Yemen as a transit point before moving on to richer countries like Saudi Arabia.

Hussein Adel is one of those recent arrivals. He is 30, but leans on a crutch on a street corner in al-Basateen.

Hussein arrived in Aden only a few months ago, having made the dangerous journey on a small boat carrying African migrants.

He told Al Jazeera that he fled death and hunger, only to find himself facing a harsher reality. Hussein shelters on the rooftop of a relative’s home and spends his days searching the city for occasional work. His leg injury, he said, was caused by Omani border guards who shot him while he was crossing into Yemen.

As evening falls, the noise in al-Basateen’s alleyways quiets down. Men lean against the walls of worn-out homes, and children chase a ball through narrow passages barely wide enough for their dreams.

On the surface, life looks normal – like any working-class neighbourhood in a city exhausted by crises. But here, in “Yemen’s Mogadishu”, there is an extra trauma – the sense of a lack of belonging, the memory of refugees fleeing danger and poverty at home, and a lack of stability that will not go away.

Captain Brook’s century guides England home in chase of 165 with Pakistan staring at the prospects of an exit.

England have qualified for the semifinals of the T20 World Cup with a nervy two-wicket win in their Super Eight match against Pakistan, who have inched closer to exiting the tournament.

Captain Harry Brook scored a sublime century under pressure on Tuesday as his side successfully chased a 165-run target in 19.1 overs at the Pallekele International Cricket Stadium outside Kandy, Sri Lanka, and became the first team to enter the knockouts.

Brook formed a 52-run partnership with in-form all-rounder Will Jacks, who scored 28 runs in the winning cause.

England’s win, though, began with a tumble and ended with a wobble as their top-order and lower-middle-order batters slumped in the face of a par total of 164-9 set by Pakistan.

The two-time champions went through to the last four by winning their second game of the Super Eights stage to bag four points while Pakistan remain on one point after two games.

England’s run chase got off to a horrible start when Shaheen Shah Afridi removed opener Phil Salt off the first ball of the innings. Salt edged a length delivery to wicketkeeper Usman Khan, who obliged with a diving catch.

Afridi, who was dropped from the Pakistan team for their washed-out match against New Zealand, carried on his dream return with a wicket in his second over as former captain Jos Buttler was dismissed in a similar manner.

Jacob Bethell, caught in the deep off Afridi, and Tom Banton, caught behind off Usman Tariq, were the next two wickets to fall as Pakistan seemed to have the upper hand in the second innings.

However, Brook’s measured yet attacking onslaught combined with some poor fielding by Pakistan to help England revive their innings in the middle overs.

Just as his team looked certain of victory, Brook fell after scoring his 100, triggering a late batting collapse that gave Pakistan some hope before it was crushed by a Jofra Archer boundary on the first ball of the 20th over to seal England’s win.

Earlier, Sahibzada Farhan continued his imperious run-scoring form to score 63 runs off 45 balls, which became the cornerstone of Pakistan’s innings.

The opener was briefly supported by Babar Azam, who fell for 25 runs.

Fakhar Zaman’s 25 and Shadab Khan’s 23 runs helped Pakistan cross the 160-run mark in a must-win game.

Spin bowler Liam Dawson’s figures of 3-24 in four overs were supported by two wickets each from pacers Jofra Archer and Jamie Overton as England made it four wins in their last four games in the tournament.

They will face New Zealand in their last Super Eight fixture on Friday while Pakistan will play against hosts Sri Lanka the following day.

The next Group 2 match is between Sri Lanka and New Zealand on Wednesday.

Pakistan must now hope that Sri Lanka beat New Zealand by a big margin and England do the same two days later to dent the Kiwis’ net run rate.

Salman Ali Agha’s side must then follow it up by handing Sri Lanka a third defeat to knock them out and emerge as the second team to qualify for the semifinals from their Super Eight group.

Paris St-Germain defender Achraf Hakimi says he is set to face trial after an allegation of rape was made against him.

A woman has accused the Morocco captain of raping her at his home in the French capital in 2023, when she was aged 24. He denies the allegations.

The public prosecutor’s office in Nanterre, a western suburb of Paris, began a preliminary investigation in March 2023.

“Today, a rape accusation is enough to justify a trial,” Hakimi posted on X, external.

“This is as unjust to the innocent as it is to the genuine victims. I calmly await this trial, which will allow the truth to come out publicly.”

No date has been set for the trial.

Hakimi’s lawyer confirmed in a statement that a “trial has been ordered” and that “it is with determination and resolve that we await this trial so that justice may be served”.

BBC Sport has contacted the Nanterre prosecutor’s office for comment.

Paris St-Germain host Monaco in the second leg of their Champions League knockout round play-off tie on Wednesday.

Hakimi was named in PSG’s initial squad, published last Tuesday.

The 27-year-old was born in Spain but represents Morocco and has made 194 appearances for Paris St-Germain, winning the Champions League and Ligue 1 titles last season.

His performances led to him being honoured at the Best Fifa Football Awards ceremony held in Paris on Monday, where he was named in the Fifpro men’s world team of the year.

Morocco will face Scotland, Haiti and Brazil at the World Cup in the USA, Mexico and Canada this summer.

Last week, American diplomats and their Iranian counterparts sat down in Geneva for yet another round of talks mediated by Oman. The outcome seemed unclear. While the Iranians said “good progress” had been made, the Americans claimed there was “a little progress”. Meanwhile, United States President Donald Trump threatened once again to strike Iran.

In recent weeks, there has been a heavy US military build-up in the Middle East in preparation for what many observers see as an imminent attack. In this context, it may be apt to question whether the current negotiations are not simply a tactic to buy time to better prepare for the inevitable.

In the face of US military might, some have suggested that Iran’s only option is negotiating an agreement with the US, however unfair it may be. While Iranian military capabilities stand no chance against an army with the world’s biggest budget, accepting capitulation through a debilitating deal that may be broken again by Washington may not necessarily be Tehran’s only choice.

There is another way in which Iran can stand up to US bullying and win.

The fate of past negotiations

The ongoing US-Iran talks cannot be viewed in isolation. For Iran, any diplomatic engagement with the US is overshadowed by the legacy of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Signed by the US, China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the European Union and Iran in 2015, the agreement provided sanctions relief in exchange for full transparency of the Iranian nuclear programme. Tehran accepted the deal even though it had some unfair provisions, including some US sanctions remaining in place.

Nevertheless, it fulfilled its obligations – a fact that was repeatedly verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In return, however, the US as a signatory did not uphold its end of the deal. In 2018, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed maximum pressure sanctions aimed at crippling Iran’s economy.

It was a stark reminder that American promises are nonbinding. As a leader who has shown no regard for the interests of American allies in pursuit of an “America first” policy, Trump could hardly be expected to respect the interests of American adversaries.

However, even if a Democratic president had been in the White House, there would not have been any guarantee that the JCPOA would have remained in place. In the US’s polarised political climate, an American president’s signature is only valid until the next election.

For the US, negotiations can also be little more than a facade intended to lull adversaries into a false sense of security. Last year, just as US and Iranian representatives were scheduled to meet in Oman for another round of talks, Israel, a key American ally, launched a massive military campaign against Iran.

While the US denied direct involvement, it acknowledged having received prior notice. Given the close ties between the two countries, this prior knowledge strongly implied that the US had given Israel tacit approval for the air attacks.

Today, Iran is engaging in negotiations with the US again, and it is being pressured to accept an even more unfair deal. Should it back down and submit to US demands, then Trump – who preys on perceived weakness – would simply move the goalpost. Demands would shift from Iran’s nuclear programme today to its ballistic missiles tomorrow and regime change the day after.

The special US relationship with Israel means that Washington is fundamentally hostile to an Iranian government that sees the Israeli state as an enemy. Consequently, Trump’s goal is not to reach a durable agreement but to ensure that Iran can never fully comply with his demands, thereby justifying a permanent campaign of maximum pressure and hostility.

In this context and given its recent experience, it would be foolish for Iran to rely on US promises and negotiated agreements.

Leverage through strong regional ties

The current US-Iran standoff is a high-stakes game in which an all-out war is a likely outcome. While the US could achieve an initial victory through overwhelming military superiority, it could also get bogged down fighting a protracted counterinsurgency in Iran’s mountainous terrain.

Conversely, while Iran could eventually repel an American invasion – just as its Afghan neighbours did – the country would be reduced to rubble in the process.

That does not mean Iran should back down. The Greenland crisis and the China-US trade war have demonstrated that Trump’s propensity for sabre-rattling is tempered by his aversion to losses. Even though the EU and China are far more powerful than Iran, a clear show of resolve could compel Trump to retreat.

And Tehran does not have to be alone in its defiance. In its neighbourhood, there are other big players who recognise that another disastrous war led by the US is not in their interests. Iran can and should leverage the regional desire for stability.

For years, Iran pursued a policy of confrontation in the region until it realised that carving out a sphere of influence was actually exacerbating its security dilemma. This recognition ultimately led to the historic normalisation of relations with Saudi Arabia in 2023 – a breakthrough facilitated by China, Oman and Iraq – which in turn set in motion a broader detente with other Arab countries.

Three years later, that decision is yielding dividends. Notably, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Turkiye and Qatar are lobbying Trump to exercise restraint. Building on this neighbourly diplomacy and investing in developing regional stability and a security architecture could help stave off another major US war in the region.

The most important path to peace – and the only means of countering American gunboat diplomacy – does not lie in matching American military might, a contest Iran is destined to lose, but in establishing good relations with its neighbours and accepting regional stability as part of its national security.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Appearing in a London court, Brand denies accusations of raping one woman ​and sexually assaulting another in 2009.

British comedian and actor Russell Brand ⁠has pleaded not guilty to two further charges of rape and sexual assault nearly ⁠two decades ago.

Brand appeared at Southwark Crown ⁠Court in London on Tuesday and denied accusations of raping one woman and sexually assaulting a second woman in 2009.

Once one of the United Kingdom’s most high-profile broadcasters, he was charged last year with two counts of rape, one count of indecent assault and two ‌counts of sexual assault against four women between 1999 and 2005.

Brand pleaded not guilty in May last year to those five charges and is due to stand trial in June. A hearing will be held next month to decide whether the new allegations should be joined to that case, with Brand’s lawyer ⁠saying his client needs more time to address ⁠the latest offences.

“These new charges are in relation to two further women and are in addition to the charges issued to Brand in April 2025, which involved four women,” London’s Metropolitan Police said in a statement in December.

Brand, 50, arrived at court wearing a white cowboy hat and sunglasses. Asked how he was feeling, the actor, who said in 2024 he had become ⁠a Christian, told reporters he was feeling “blessed”.

Born in 1975 to working-class parents in Essex, east of London, Brand began his stand-up career as a teenager, eventually working as an MTV presenter and host of a reality TV series.

A regular on British screens in the ⁠2000s, he was known for his flamboyant ⁠style and appearance. He also worked as a radio presenter for the BBC.

Brand starred in several films, including Get Him to the Greek in 2010, the ‌same year he married American pop star Katy Perry. They divorced in 2012 after 14 months of marriage.

By the early 2020s, Brand had faded from ‌mainstream ‌culture and has since largely appeared online, airing his views on US politics and free speech.

Hauwa Abdulkarim was inside her house when the violence began. 

As evening settled over Woro, a village in Kaiama Local Government Area (LGA) of Kwara State, North Central Nigeria, on Feb. 3, the terrorists descended on motorcycles like a sudden storm. What began as a seemingly ordinary evening quickly turned into chaos, with about 170 people killed, their homes set ablaze, celebrations interrupted, and families forced to flee.

“Most of the youths were at the field playing football [on a school field close to the house]. Then we saw people running back home with the news that kidnappers had entered the town,” Hauwa recounted. 

At first, she did not panic. The terrorists had sent word days earlier, a letter to the district head saying they were coming to “preach”. When the motorcycles rolled in, there was confusion and fear.

Then the shooting started. 

“Upon entering the village [around 5 p.m.], they started shooting at people,” she said. The football field emptied in seconds. Inside her house, Hauwa and her husband tried to gather their children, counting them quickly and realising some were still outside.

“We were thinking about some of our children who were outside and those that went to the football field. The shooting continued until 5 a.m., the next day,” Hauwa added. 

But the terror was not continuous. It came in waves.

“When it was time for the call to prayer, they suddenly stopped,” she recalled. “They made the call to prayer for Maghrib and called out people to pray.”

The silence was almost as frightening as the gunfire. After the prayer, the shooting resumed. “They did the same for the late-night prayer, stopping briefly to make the call to prayer and observe it. Afterwards, they resumed shooting through the night,” Hauwa told HumAngle.

Later that night, everything suddenly became quiet: the gunshots stopped. That was when the residents began to hear the call to come out and extinguish the blazing fires.

Many were confused and afraid, unsure whether to come out to help put out the flames, flee, or stay hidden. 

Hauwa and her husband came out with other residents, but they were ambushed. “We thought they had gone, so we came out with buckets to save our homes. That was when they opened fire again. It was a trap and my husband was almost killed in that encounter. He hid in a ditch, as I ran inside to stay with my children,” she recounted. 

By dawn, the village was scarred by destruction — dead bodies with gunshot wounds to the head and cuts to their necks, houses reduced to ashes, the district head’s residence consumed by fire, and families shaken by the night’s events. 

The alternating rhythm of violence and prayer created a chilling atmosphere that has left Hauwa to grapple with both physical loss and psychological trauma. She described the ordeal as a mix of terror and deception, designed to lure people into vulnerability. 

The attack on Woro and neighbouring Nuku communities has displaced at least 941 persons and exposed glaring intelligence failures, despite prior warnings, and the growing influence of terror groups operating from the Kainji Lake National Park axis. HumAngle met with some of the survivors in Wawa, a town in nearby Niger State. 

Ibrahim Ismail Dan’umar, a community leader in Wawa who serves as the coordinator of the displaced persons, told HumAngle that the community has been providing the families with relief materials and accommodation, as there is no designated camp for them. 

“On our records, we have people from Plateau, Nasarawa, Kebbi, Kwara, and Niger,” he noted. “We decided to organise a breakfast for them and announced that anyone offering shelter to the displaced should bring them to the gathering. On the first day, we had 381 people, even though we only projected for 200.”

“The next day, we distributed food items, and by the third day, the Emir of Borgu and representatives of Kaiama Local Government came with support, which we shared among them. Now, we have 941 displaced persons — adults and children — here in Wawa,” he explained.

Amnesty International, a global human rights organisation, described the killings as evidence of systemic neglect of rural communities. In a statement, the organisation condemned the attacks as “vicious” and criticised the Nigerian government for leaving rural communities at the mercy of rampaging terrorists.

Following the deadly attacks, the Nigerian military has formally launched a multi-agency offensive  in Kwara and Niger states, code-named ‘Operation Savannah Shield’, designed to dismantle terrorist networks and restore security in the region. 

The initiative was flagged off on Thursday, Feb. 19 at Sobi Barracks in Ilorin by the Chief of Defence Staff, General Olufemi Oluyede, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu, and the Kwara State Governor, AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq. 

Unmasking those behind the terror

This attack is one of the deadliest this year.

In the weeks leading up to the Woro massacre, Sadiku’s faction of Boko Haram had already reached out to the community.  

According to the village head, Salihu Umar, a letter dated Jan. 8 — written in Hausa and bearing the signature of JAS (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad) — was delivered to him. The message requested a “private” meeting with local leaders for preaching and assured residents that no harm would come to them.  

Umar said he made copies of the letter and forwarded them to both the Kaiama Emirate and the Department of State Services (DSS) office in Kaiama. Despite this warning, no preventive measures were taken, raising questions about Nigerian security intelligence.

However, security sources revealed that the killings are part of a jihadist campaign commanded by Malam Sadiku, a notorious terrorist whose influence has steadily expanded across multiple parts of Nigeria’s North Central region. 

HumAngle has extensively documented how Sadiku, once closely aligned with Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf and later Abubakar Shekau, has re-emerged at the forefront of a dangerous wave of insurgency. 

After a stint with the Darul Islam sect, he returned to Boko Haram with renewed zeal, positioning himself as one of Shekau’s most loyal comrades. Sadiku’s financial windfall from the infamous Kaduna train abduction gave him the means to expand his influence, strengthen his network, and spread Boko Haram’s radical ideology across Niger State and neighbouring states. 

With resources and reputation firmly behind him, Sadiku built a growing base of followers and fighters. Under his leadership, extremist teachings were not only revived but embedded into local communities, turning quiet rural villages into recruitment and indoctrination centres.

His trajectory, security analysts such as Yahuza Getso of Eagle Integrated Security note, reflects a long-term strategy of territorial control and ideological entrenchment, with this latest attack underscoring both the scale of his operations and the devastating impact on local communities. 

But he is not alone.

Malam Mahmuda, the leader of the Mahmudawa (an Ansaru faction), has also turned the Kainji Forest into a safe haven for his fighters. Despite previous arrests of their leaders, the group has replenished its ranks and rearmed its foot soldiers. 

According to Ahmad Salkida, HumAngle’s founder, who is one of the foremost experts on the protracted Boko Haram insurgency and the complex conflicts in the Lake Chad region, “The relocation of Sadiku and Umar Taraba, both veteran jihadist operatives, to the Kainji axis in 2024 marked a shift. Their presence injected technical expertise into a space previously dominated by loosely organised armed groups.”

He added that they are fragmented into smaller camps: some closer to the Benin border, acting as brokers linking criminal networks of jihadist actors. The Mahmudawa are said to facilitate training, arms movement, ransom negotiations, and sanctuary for fighters arriving from outside the region.

“Official claims regarding the arrest of their leader, Malam Mahmuda, remain unconfirmed in border communities, where continued attacks and coordinated leadership are still attributed to the group,” he noted. 

“If the Mahmudawa are brokers, the Lakurawa are enforcers. With an estimated 300 fighters, they have become one of the most active jihadist–terrorist hybrids affecting […] border communities. Operating from within and around Kainji Lake National Park, they routinely launch incursions into Bagudo and Suru LGAs, combining attacks on military targets with ideological messaging aimed at delegitimising the Nigerian state.”

Security sources and community accounts indicate that Sadiku’s group and Mahmudawa, linked to jihadist networks across West Africa, have long operated in the dense Kainji Lake National Park and Borgu Reserve, straddling Niger and Kwara states. According to the sources, this is an attempt to create another Sambisa: a hotbed for Boko Haram in the North East.

Local residents have repeatedly warned authorities about the presence of terrorist camps in the forest, but responses have been slow. Between September and December 2025, the Federal Government carried out aerial and ground operations in the area, yet the group remains influential. The forest’s vast terrain and porous borders have provided cover for training, recruitment, and staging raids. 

Getso believes that Sadiku’s Boko Haram has rebranded and reorganised remnants of Ansaru and JNIM cells, consolidating them into a formidable force in North Central Nigeria. He also revealed that the Woro massacre underscores the growing threat posed by Sadiku’s network. 

“Nigeria’s current counter-terrorism strategy is insufficient. There is a need for a comprehensive review of military doctrine and intelligence operations,” Getso noted.

A dream on hold

At just 22 years old, Ibrahim Ishaq Woro had recently graduated from the School of Health in New Bussa, Niger State. He had only returned home to Woro a year earlier and was in the process of applying for jobs when the attack shattered his community.  

On the day of the assault, Ibrahim was sitting at a tea stall when he spotted the terrorists approaching. Recognising them from a previous encounter, he fled — but minutes later, gunfire erupted across the village. 

That day was meant to be joyous, with three weddings taking place, including his cousin’s. Instead, the celebrations turned into a massacre. 

“The wedding was taking place at our house. Yahaya, my cousin, was killed. His wife and children were abducted and taken to the forest,” Ibrahim recalled.  

Like Hauwa, who described how false calls to prayer lured residents into ambushes, Ibrahim witnessed the same deception. “Those who hid inside were warned: ‘you either come outside or burn in your houses.’ Those who opened their doors out of fear were kidnapped,” he said.  

By dawn, Ibrahim returned to find the bodies of women, children, and men scattered across the community. His closest friends — Zakari, Habib, and Shamsudeen — were among the dead. 

His mother, three siblings, and several family members who came for the wedding were taken captive. “Personally, we lost 20 people from my extended family and about 50 are still missing,” he said quietly, while looking away. 

Like Hauwa, Ibrahim and other survivors fled Woro to Wawa and other neighbouring communities, with their belongings in wheelbarrows and on their heads, trekking for about 42 kilometres with swollen feet in search of refuge.   

Now displaced, their only plea is for the government to secure the release of kidnapped women and children, and restore safety so families can return home. 

“For those we have lost, we can only pray for eternal peace. But we need our loved ones back. That is why we are afraid to even return home,” Ibrahim said.

Officials in Wawa town, speaking on condition of anonymity, said discussions are ongoing with the district head to facilitate the safe return of displaced residents. The move, they explained, would allow survivors to access federal and state-level interventions more effectively once back home.

U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday warned countries against backing away from recently negotiated trade deals with the U.S. after the Supreme Court struck down his emergency tariffs, saying that if they did, he would hit them with much higher duties under different trade laws.

Trump, in a series of social media posts, said he also may impose license fees on trading partners as uncertainty over his next tariff moves gripped the global economy and sent stocks lower.

“Any Country that wants to ‘play games’ with the ridiculous supreme court decision, especially those that have ‘Ripped Off’ the U.S.A. for years, and even decades, will be met with a much higher Tariff, and worse, than that which they just recently agreed to. BUYER BEWARE!!!” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

Trump said that despite the court’s decision to invalidate his tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), its decision affirmed his ability to use tariffs under other legal authorities “in a much more powerful and obnoxious way, with legal certainty, than the Tariffs as initially used.”

He suggested that the U.S. could impose new license fees on trading partners but did not provide further details. A spokesperson for the U.S. Trade Representative’s office did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Trump’s plans.

EU Trade Deal on Hold

In Brussels, the European Parliament decided on Monday to postpone a vote on the European Union’s trade deal with the U.S. after Trump said he would impose a new temporary import duty of 15% on imports from all countries.

EU goods under the deal would face a 15% U.S. tariff, with exemptions for hundreds of food items, aircraft parts, critical minerals, pharmaceutical ingredients, and other goods, while the EU would remove duties on many imports from the U.S., including industrial goods.

Trump initially announced the temporary duty under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 at 10% but promised on Saturday to raise it to 15%, the maximum allowed under the statute. An initial 10% tariff came into effect at a minute past midnight on Tuesday, though it is unclear when the 15% rate would take effect, as Trump has only signed an executive order for the 10% tariff so far.

Markets React

Wall Street stocks ended lower on Monday as renewed tariff uncertainty following the Supreme Court decision, coupled with concerns about AI-fueled disruption, unnerved investors.

• The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 1.65%
• The S&P 500 fell 1.02%
• The Nasdaq Composite fell 1.01%

The dollar weakened against the euro and the yen, reflecting market anxiety over potential trade escalation and economic uncertainty.

Global Trade Uncertainty

The path forward for Trump’s foreign trade deals remains unclear:

• China has urged Washington to scrap tariff measures.
• The EU has frozen its approval process.
• India delayed planned talks.

The U.S. Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, said the administration expects to open new Section 301 unfair trade practices investigations on several countries, potentially paving the way for new tariffs.

Meanwhile, a group of 22 Democratic U.S. senators introduced legislation to force the Trump administration to issue refunds for all now-illegal IEEPA-based tariffs within 180 days, although the bill faces an uncertain path to a vote.

Trump also criticized the Supreme Court justices who ruled against him, including two he appointed, and expressed concern that the Court could rule against his administration in a forthcoming birthright citizenship case.

Analysis

Trump’s latest moves reflect his ongoing use of tariffs as a negotiating tool and political messaging device, rather than a targeted economic strategy. By threatening higher tariffs and potential license fees, he is signaling to trading partners that backing away from deals could carry immediate financial consequences.

However, the approach carries multiple risks:

1. Market Volatility: Investors are already responding with caution, as uncertainty over tariffs can disrupt supply chains, raise costs for U.S. companies, and weigh on stock prices.
2. Diplomatic Strain: Allies such as the EU, as well as emerging partners like India, may view the moves as destabilizing, complicating future trade negotiations.
3. Legal Vulnerabilities: Section 122 of the Trade Act has rarely been invoked, and using it in place of IEEPA may invite further litigation, leaving Trump’s administration open to judicial challenges.
4. Global Trade Ripple Effects: A 15% tariff on broad imports could increase prices for U.S. consumers, provoke retaliatory tariffs, and shift global supply chains, particularly in sectors like tech, automotive, and pharmaceuticals.

Economists suggest that while Trump’s threats may pressure trading partners, the overall economic rationale is weak, since the U.S. is not in a balance-of-payments crisis, and broad-based tariffs risk collateral damage to U.S. businesses and consumers.

In sum, Trump’s tariff strategy highlights a blend of economic pressure and political signaling, but it comes with high uncertainty and potential unintended consequences for both the U.S. and global markets.

With information from Reuters.

The incident in Isfahan province follows crash of fighter jet in Hamadan province less than a week ago.

Tehran, Iran – Two military pilots and two merchants have been killed after an army helicopter crashed into a fruit market in central Iran.

The crash on Tuesday morning occurred in Dorcheh, a town in Isfahan province, where the army has a major airbase, according to state media, which said the cause was likely a technical fault in the aircraft.

Footage broadcast by state media from the scene of the crash showed the wreckage and emergency responders putting out the fire.

The Army Aviation Training Centre, in a statement, identified the killed soldiers as Colonel Hamed Sarvazad, the pilot; and his co-pilot, Major Mojtaba Kiani.

Two people working at their booths in the market were also reportedly killed on the scene after the helicopter crashed and caught fire.

The army centre said the cause of the crash is under investigation. The local judiciary chief, Asadollah Jafari, said he had also opened a case and dispatched investigators.

The crash comes less than a week after an Iranian Air Force fighter jet, reportedly an old United States-built F-4 model, crashed during a late-night training mission in the western province of Hamadan.

State media reported that one of the pilots was killed, but the other survived after successfully ejecting. The cause of that crash is under investigation, but state media said it was likely caused by a technical fault, as well.

Iran has been largely unable to upgrade its ageing fleet of aircraft, both military and civilian, as a result of decades-long sanctions imposed by the US and its allies.

Iran has purchased a number of fighter and training aircraft from Russia, and has been seeking to buy advanced Su-35 jets, but they have yet to be delivered by Moscow.

The crash of the helicopter took place amid rising tensions between the US and Iran before a new round of nuclear talks, which are set to take place in Geneva, Switzerland, on Thursday.

Iranian officials have warned that the country will not “bow down” to US pressure as Washington bolsters its military presence in the region.

In recent weeks, the US military has amassed hundreds of advanced fighter aircraft, both in military bases and on two aircraft carrier strike groups, as it threatens to strike Iran if it fails to reach a deal on its nuclear and missile programmes.

Tehran has rejected negotiations about its missiles, but has said an agreement may be possible to ensure it will never possess a nuclear weapon.

Joint statement says Israeli land grab is ‘deliberate and direct attack’ on the viability of a Palestinian state.

Foreign ministers of 19 countries, including Turkiye, Qatar, France and Brazil, have signed a joint statement condemning Israel’s moves to unlawfully extend and consolidate its control over Palestinian land.

The statement issued late Monday by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs described Israel’s plans to begin land registration in the occupied West Bank, which will sanction the seizure of land from Palestinians who cannot prove ownership, as “de facto annexation”.

“Changes are wide-ranging, reclassifying Palestinian land as so-called Israeli ‘state land’, accelerating illegal ⁠settlement activity, and further entrenching Israeli administration,” said the joint statement, also signed by Saudi ‌Arabia and Egypt, as well as the heads of the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

Israel’s plans, signed on February 15, will see registration introduced across Area C, which makes up about 60 percent of the West Bank’s territory, according to the illegal settlement monitoring organisation, Peace Now.

The joint statement warned Israel’s moves could permanently alter the “legal and administrative status” of territory that is largely under Israeli military control, with limited Palestinian self-rule, but which would constitute part of a future Palestinian state.

“Such actions are a deliberate and direct attack on the viability of the Palestinian State and the implementation of the two-State Solution,” the statement said, rejecting measures altering “the demographic composition, character and status of the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem”.

Signatories also called on Israel to end settler violence against Palestinians, pledging to take “concrete steps, in accordance with international law, to counter the expansion of illegal settlements in Palestinian territory and policies and threats of forcible displacement and annexation”.

The foreign ministers stressed that Israeli settlements constitute “a flagrant violation of international law”, including previous United Nations Security Council resolutions and the 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The landmark ICJ ruling stated that Israel’s “abuse of its status as the occupying power” rendered its “presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful”.

According to the ICJ, approximately 465,000 Israeli settlers live in the occupied West Bank, spread across some 300 settlements and outposts, which are illegal under international law.

Earlier this month, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that Israel’s land registration plan could lead to the “dispossession of Palestinians of their property and risks expanding Israeli control over land in the area”.

Signatories of the statement urged Israel to immediately release withheld tax revenues owed to the Palestinian Authority in accordance with the 1994 Paris Protocol.

They also stressed the importance of preserving the historic and legal status quo in Jerusalem and its holy sites, particularly during the holy month of Ramadan.

The U.S. buildup of forces in the Middle East ahead of a possible attack on Iran relies very heavily on the performance of the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC). Hundreds of its cargo jets and aerial refueling tankers have moved materiel into theater and helped tactical jets, radar planes and other aircraft deploy across oceans to places like Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, among many other locations. At the same time, the current crisis in the Middle East pales in comparison to the massive spike in demand for airborne logistics that would occur during a Pacific fight against China. Regardless, ever greater demand is being placed on an increasingly aging AMC fleet.

Few people know the nuts and bolts of AMC and its mission better than Michael “Mini” Minihan, a retired Air Force general who led the command from October 2021 to November 2024. In a 45-minute interview, Minihan offered his insights on that and a whole host of other topics. They include the current crisis and its airlift demands, challenges from China, future airframes, arming airlifters and refuelers, the connectivity issues he championed, AI and the leaked memo that put a cap on his career.

Since retiring, Minihan serves as a strategic advisor and board member to defense and technology companies, non-profits, and think tanks while continuing to write and speak on leadership, national security, and the future of air mobility and global power projection.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: The C-17 Globemaster III heavy lifters have been supporting one crisis after another it seems. Have the hours accumulated faster on those airframes? What do you think should replace them and when? 

A: All the things I was concerned about while I was in uniform, I remain concerned about right now. The options on the table are service life extension programs [SLEP] that the C-17 is already a candidate for. There was talk late last year about the KC-135 Stratotanker receiving another [SLEP]. You know, those types of things are concerning to me. At the end of the day, I think this nation needs to pay for the Air Force it needs, and the Air Force that it needs has a modern, capable mobility fleet. It’s not just old stuff that keeps getting patched up to get older. That’s the reality. So I’m concerned.

Q: Right now, a massive buildup is underway in the Middle East. AMC is doing the heavy lifting there as always. But in a crisis in the Pacific, would we have enough airlift aircraft to support moving quick enough across that vast theater, especially to respond to an invasion of Taiwan? 

A: What you’re talking about is always a concern, regardless of the scenario. The reality is that America relies on the mobility fleet to project its power… So there’s not any scenario, even in the day-to-day competition, where you’re happy with the supply-demand intersection. So I think that we’ve got to work on capacity, certainly out of the entire mobility fleet, when it comes to the airlift and the air refueling. And then if you overlay that in contested environments, the concern gets bigger.

Q: Considering how long it has taken to build up forces in the Middle East, where tankers and cargo jets are flying over uncontested airspace, how concerned are you about being able to project enough power over long distances to protect Taiwan from an attack by China?

A: The alarm that I had when I was active duty exists today… So the reason I’m a civilian right now is because I was ringing the bell on the exact questions that you’re asking right now and that concern still remains. The reality is against a China or against a Russia, they’re going to challenge you in all domains, from great distances. They absolutely understand that the mobility fleet is America’s capability to project power quickly. So there’s going to be a focus on it. But once again, you’re describing concerns that I had and expressed when I was active duty, and I still have those same concerns.

Inside Taiwan’s Strategy to Counter a Chinese Invasion | WSJ

Q: What response did you receive when you expressed those concerns in a memo that was leaked to the public in 2023?

A: Well, I’m a civilian right now.

Q: Is that the reason why?

A: The leak created antibodies that would want me in another job. That memo was getting after all the things that you’re asking about right now. It was getting after capability and capacity. It was getting after readiness. It was getting after explode into theater. It was getting after the mobility fleet being able to do what it’s asked to do, despite being extremely vulnerable, despite it being extremely antiquated – all those things. 

I believe that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force [Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach] now is focused on modernization and readiness. Those were 100% things that I was championing very early. And I think those things exist now, and I think we need to continue to put pressure on [those things] to get the resourcing, to get not just the Air Force, but America’s mobility fleet, to the capability and capacity that it needs to be at, so that we can not have concerns about China and not have concern about [deploying] to Europe when needed.

Q: Were you fired over the memo?

A: I was not fired. I thought for two weeks that I was going to be fired, but I was thankfully allowed to serve out the rest of my command tour. But I was asked to retire.

Q: What were the biggest lessons learned by Mobility Guardian and our readiness to meet the challenge China poses in the Pacific? 

A: We’ve got to explode into theater very quickly. We’ve got to be able to explode into theater in numbers and volumes and challenges that we’ve not experienced in any of the modern…operations. We’ve got to put the entire joint force in place. We’ve got to do it quick enough that it gives an enormous deterrent value and also be able to provide that decisive victory, should it get to that.

We’ve got to transition from a deploy to an employ phase very quickly. So that’s establishing hubs and spokes. And then the last thing I’ll say – this is about maneuver. We have got to maneuver at a tempo required to win. So we got to put America’s unique and amazing capabilities in a position of advantage, and then once they’re in that position of advantage, we’ve got to be lethal, and that requires logistics, sustainment, supply maneuver, all the things that have to come together in the joint force to be lethal have to be there, and we need to work extremely hard to do that. 

So Mobility Guardian was really a rehearsal, and we demonstrated that we couldn’t explode into theater. We demonstrated that we could go from deploy to employ. But we also learned some hard lessons, and to get it to the scale and the volume of the tempo that we needed to be, we’ve got work to do.

Mobility Guardian 2023

Q: What were some of these lessons?

A: The lessons are connectivity. You probably heard me say that a bunch both in uniform and out of uniform, but connectivity became my number one thing. I testified before the House Readiness Committee on that. I came up with a concept called 25% of the fleet by 2025, but the reality is that the car I rented right now driving from the airport to my hotel room has more connectivity in it than the overwhelming majority of the mobility fleet. So connectivity matters. 

We’ve got to operate at a tempo required to win, which means we need to do extremely long missions. We need to have exquisite situational awareness. We need to understand the changing dynamic of the operational environment. When it comes to red forces, blue forces, threats, priority receivers, priority users. We’ve got diffuse information and logistic priorities across services, so there’s almost an unlimited amount of lessons learned. And then command relationships matter as well as command and control. All those things matter too. So plenty of lessons learned. I don’t think any of those are surprising. I think they’re accounted for in the Air Force’s readiness and modernization. But we also need to get resources so that we can be the Air Force this country needs.

Q: How would you peg our overall readiness, realistically, to confront China in the Pacific militarily? 

A: We’re ready. I like the way that [IndoPacific Command leader] Adm. [Sam] Paparo uses it. He says we’re ready, but he’ll never admit to being ready enough. This is kind of like the coaches that you love to play for – they are never satisfied. I would broaden it beyond readiness. I would say readiness, integration and agility of the joint force is what matters. And as ready, integrated and agile as we are, we need to be more. And those things have a deterrent value in themselves, and they’re also the essentials to decisive victory. So China enjoys positional advantage, but America enjoys extreme warfighting capabilities that can always get better, and it starts with readiness, integration and agility. We want to get to the point where we’re so ready that they don’t want to take us on.

Q; What were the three biggest problems you faced in your job and how did you go about solving them? Were you successful?

A: The three biggest problems I faced during my command tour at Air Mobility Command was resourcing, resourcing and resourcing – articulating the state of the mobility platforms and securing the resources necessary to get them on step to where they need to be. And so I said resourcing three times, and I mean it.

This is all about money. You can say everything you want. You can say all the things are important. You can say ‘you’re right, General Minihan, we agree with you,’ but if it’s not followed up with resourcing, then it’s meaningless, you know? So at the end of the day, this is all about resourcing. Can we decide to be the Air Force, the joint military that puts the resourcing behind what it means to decisively defeat a near peer adversary? Or do we wait until another December 7, or another September 11 event to finally get all the things pulled together that we need to pull together. So I get it. This is expensive. 

We’ve got a chance of a century right now, I believe, with this administration. When you line up the executive orders, when you line up the acquisition reform, when you look up the possibility of a $1.5 trillion defense budget, you know those things come together means that we can move faster and move differently than we’ve ever done but we’ve got to be ready to do it.

We can’t apply all the opportunities over the same template of how we acquire, how we take risk, how we get our warfighters the things that they need and expect a different outcome at the end of the day. The overall statement for this, and this is big into problem statements. If I were to describe the problem statement we’re trying to solve is, can we get critical war-winning capabilities to our warfighters faster than China? At the end of the day, if we can answer yes to that question, then we’re going to be okay. If it’s a maybe or a no, then we’re going to have some significant concerns moving forward.

Trump Calls For Massive Increase To Defense Spending: $1.5 Trillion For 2027

Q: Were you successful in your efforts to solve those problems?

A: Was I successful? I would say I was successful at ringing the bell. I needed three more years to get it across the line. And I’m not comparing myself to a Gen. [Curtis E.] LeMay or a Gen. [Wilbur L.] Creech, but those two [Major Command] MAJCOM commanders – who are the fathers of the modern strategic bomber force and the father of the modern fighter force –  were both MAJCOM commanders for over six years. So if I had to give myself a grade, I would say me and my teams were A-plus for effort and articulation and at the end of the day, getting the system to react quickly within three years proved extremely challenging.

Q: What was your grade for that?

A: It’s to be determined. You know, the money process takes a little time. I think there’s money for connectivity coming up in the current and the next few years, which is a great sign and a big change. If I were to grade it for what I wanted, I would have given myself a C, but I think it’s a higher grade than that, due to the circumstances, due to the realities of the budgeting and the resourcing process.

Q: What are the three biggest problems facing current interim AMC Commander Lt. Gen. Rebecca Sonkiss (formerly deputy AMC commander until Gen. John D. Lamontagne was named Air Force Vice Chief of Staff earlier this month). 

A: The problems are getting resourcing across the line. Can you deliver them? Money. You know, at the end of the day, MAJCOMs don’t have the money to get the things that they need and under the current process. So how do you affect the organizations and entities above you, so that you can align the resourcing to do the things that it needs to do, and the timelines that you need to do it when that’s always a challenge for everybody. 

Air Mobility Command (AMC) Change of Command Ceremony – Scott AFB

But if you’re asking what [Lamontagne] needs to worry about…if you look at the first Iran operation, if you look at the Venezuela operation, whatever is going to happen over the next short-term future for the Middle East, you can walk away saying, ‘we’re just fine.’ You can walk away saying, ‘Hey, we can project power over long distances. We can impose America’s will. We can do the things that our president and our nation asked us to do.’ And that’s right, you can do it under those circumstances. 

The courage of the joint team is phenomenal. The capability of the joint team is phenomenal, but it does not compare to what will happen in a near-peer fight in the Pacific or in Europe. We are going to be contested from long distances in all domains, and the fleet that we have now is not going to be successful in that environment unless we take quick action and fix things.

Q: There is a lot of hype around Rapid Dragon and giving the airlift community a ‘shooter’ role. But in a major conflict, won’t the fleet be tasked to the max just with its core logistics mission? Do we need more airframes to really do the Rapid Dragon concept justice?

A: I hear this one a lot. So here’s the reality. I’ve got to carry the missile, the bomb anyway. Okay, I’m not trying to be Global Strike. I’m not trying to be a fighter. I’m not trying to compete with capabilities that are legit and high-end when it comes to delivering kinetic effects. But if I have to carry it anyway, and there’s an ability for C-130s, C-17s  and other airlift platforms, why would you not want that capability? 

So I’m not saying it can go into the high-threat areas or the medium-threat areas. I’m not saying that it needs to be a primary mission. But let’s really look at the thing – at the entire process here. I’ve got to carry that stuff anyways, so I am either gonna stop and drop it off for someone else to shoot, or I could have the ability to do it. If a combatant commander needs a demand signal, there’s a ton of C-130s. Our foreign partners and allies operate them. These aren’t complex systems. The munitions already exist. It’s essentially air-dropping it out of the airplane. And I think it has enormous viability in the Pacific. It can service medium- to low-[threat] targets all day long that need servicing and free up the other sets to get after the high-end threat environments where they need to be focused. So I think it’s something we need to consider.

Rapid Dragon

Q: That segues nicely to my next question. What are the biggest threats China poses to our tankers and airlifters during a time of war?

A: The ability to get out of town by dropping electrical grids and navigation signals. This is true for all the platforms. This is why I say we’ll be contested at great distances in all domains. Critical infrastructure matters and getting out of town – we already talked about what it means to explode into theater. So it’d be silly to think that they’re going to not take a very inexpensive way to disrupt our ability to do that. And then, the farther you get to the threat, regardless of which way you’re heading around the ocean, you know is going to increase their ability to reach out with long-range effects and stop mobility. 

If you stop one tanker, you stop six fighters. That sounds like a good return on investment if you’re an adversary trying to prevent us from projecting power. I don’t think I’m saying anything I haven’t said before, and I don’t think I’m saying anything that’s inconsistent with others [are saying] about what the real environment is going to look like. 

They’re students of us. They have unimpeded access to our critical infrastructure for a decade or more, and we’re going to expect them to call in on their investment and impose a cost on us a great distance.

Q: Is there any particular Chinese system or munition that worries you the most?

A: What worries me the most? I’m worried, just like I was in uniform, about the multi-domain aspect for which they’re going to go after us. I’m worrying about how those all come together. Certainly, without connectivity in the mobility fleet, it’s hard for mobility aircraft to understand where the threats are, especially the kinetic threats. So our ability to understand if you’re in a threat ring or a dynamic threat environment is extremely handicapped. And certainly the kinetic ones are of the biggest concern. Like they are in any war. 

Q: We have seen interest from the DoW in multiple fronts on how to give our existing tankers better defenses, from better situational awareness to giving them mini interceptors to pairing them with [collaborative combat aircraft] CCA-like companions. What do you think the best cocktail of solutions is here?

A: The single biggest contributor to survivability in a big airplane is connectivity. The biggest contributor is not having a 12-hour-old Intel brief that you’re relying on to get you through the mission. So real-world updates, real-time updates, just like our fighters and our bombers enjoy. Battle management that gets after maneuver and not just kill chain. Those things matter. 

If you were to ask me what I would want most when it comes to survivability, it would be connectivity that gives me the situational awareness to let our young crews – our captains, our lieutenants, our NCO – go out there and make great decisions as they’re operating under delegated authorities. Connectivity matters most. No doubt. Connectivity is why I put the priority on it when I was in uniform, because it’s the single biggest contributor to survivability. I just don’t think because of the size of these airplanes, in the maturity of the threat, that we’re going to be able to rely on traditional means of survivability.

Q: What about mini interceptors, or pairing these aircraft with CCA-like companions? Would that work?

A: I mean, I love it. The whole concept we came up with, the next-generation air lift [NGAL] and next-generation air refueling systems [NGAS]. I definitely see a role for CCA beyond just loyal wingman to fighter. So we can do this with everything from a CCA version of a tanker. We can do it with a stealth version of a tanker. I don’t think we need huge numbers of those. We can do stealth-like characteristics, like blended wing. 

We can certainly have aircraft that are multirole, both cargo and air refueling. And so then you can have a lot of tankers that look like the tankers that we have now, the ability for small CCA and drones and other things to do electronic warfare and spoof and jam and other things like that are all on the table in my book and things that we should be exploring.

Q: What about a stealth tanker? Would we be able to afford it? Has adapting the B-21 Raider stealth bomber been looked at? What are your thoughts on that?

A:  I think that we’ve got to have a family approach to air refueling, and that’s where the NGAS concept came up. It’s hard for me to believe, to think that you’re going to be able, in a highly contested environment, to get our highest capabilities into the high-threat environments without having some sort of stealth-like CCA air refueling capability. I don’t think we need big numbers of them. I understand completely that they’re expensive, but we’ve got to work through that process, and we’re doing it with NGAS. So everything I’m telling you, I’ve said for years, and I’ve got a lot on the record out there that’s getting after the questions you’re asking, and I’ve not changed since I got out of uniform. 

The announcement by Northrop Grumman, the partnership with Embraer gets after this. If you go tackle that announcement, it gets after creating a family-of-systems approach to the problem, as opposed to we’re just going to field one piece of the problem at a time. We’re not going to work the integration in advance. We’re not going to work the readiness in advance. We’re not going to work the agility in advance, and I was happy to see in that announcement that they’re approaching the problem differently, because that’s the kind of approach I think we need to be successful.

Q: Have you looked at adapting the B-21 for this kind of stealth tanker role?

A: I don’t know what they’re looking at adapting, but I think there’s eloquence in the solutions that exist and that they’re working on, and then broadening their missions to beyond just the original intent for which they were designed. So I think that there’s great value in looking at those opportunities.

Q: What about an Agile Combat Employment (ACE) tanker capable of supporting small numbers of fighters from forward airfields? The KC-390 is being pitched for such a role. Do we need smaller tankers capable of operating from shorter fields?

A: We need a family of tankers that can address all the warfighter needs in all the warfighter environments. So we need tankers that look a lot like the ones we have now, that can handle the low-threat environments. We need tankers that can push into the medium-threat environments and service the big volume offloads in the abundant amount of receivers that will be out there. We need tankers that can operate in a medium- to high-threat with blended wing and stealth characteristics. And then we need stealth like tankers that can go into a higher-threat environment, as well as unmanned and CCA. 

I believe there’s room in the Air Force for all in that capability. Let’s be clear, it’s what the kinetic force needs, you know. So the strike force and the bomber force are [fifth-generation] fifth-gen and [sixth-generation] sixth-gen, and yet we still operate a mobility force that’s on its best day, 2.5 Gen and in some cases, second generation. So we’ve got to catch up, not because of ego, but because of capability. At the end of the day, this is about equilibrium of the enabling force to actually do what it needs to do, so that the strike force can carry out its missions in all environments. That’s what needs to happen.

Q: Is there money to do that? Is there a will from higher headquarters and then the administration to make that happen?

A: Well, there needs to be. Like I said, I think the opportunity is here with this administration. Its executive orders, its acquisition reform, and the possibility of a significant increase in the budget. But this gets back to, are we going to pay for the Air Force that this country needs? It’s been under-invested in, especially in mobility, and we need to ensure that this president and every future president, when they call on the Air Force to support the joint force, to project America’s power to serve the national interests and impose our will when needed, that we need to develop these kind of things. We have to do this if we want to be the Air Force that this country needs.

Q: Have you talked to anybody in the current administration or the current Department of War about this, and what’s your sense of the interest there?

A: I think the conversation is turning where it needs to go. I have not talked to the current administration about this specifically, but I think there’s an appreciation, when you line up the talking points that align the priorities of where the department is going, I think that there is 100% alignment with what my priorities were when I was in uniform, what my priorities are now that I’m out of uniform, with the priorities of where this administration is going.

I realize it’s still hard. I realize there are still challenges. I realize there are no easy answers to any of this, and I realize that there’s more to modernization and readiness than just the mobility fleet. And I also realize that these are the things that we need to do.

Q: Low-end drones are a big problem, especially for big airplanes sitting idle on the ground. What do you think should be done to defend our airlift assets against lower-end drones?

A: Just like everyone else, I watched the [Operation Spider Web] attack that Ukraine carried out on Russia’s strategic forces. And the only thing that surprised me about that is that people were surprised and that it took so long for them to do it. This is a real threat. It gets down to air base defense. It’s something that we championed in Air Mobility Command during my time there, because of the drone incursions that were happening over multiple Air Mobility Command bases and multiple Air Mobility Command missions. So this isn’t a surprise to me. 

This is going to have to be a joint solution, and I know the Army is working very hard on this, but there’s also going to have to be a capability of the Air Force and wings that are deploying to be able to do this on their own as well. So no easy answers here. 

I feel like we’re behind, but catching up. I think it nests nicely into the Golden Dome opportunity as well. But you know, you gotta be able to handle everything from the low-cost drones all the way up to the highest capability missiles that could attack the homeland. This all fits in a spectrum of threats that we need to be concerned about. 

Q: You brought up drone incursions. When and where did they happen and was the source ever found?

A: The incursions took place in late 2021 and early 2022 for Joint Base Andrews in Maryland and constantly at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst in New Jersey throughout my command. I’m not tracking that the source of those incursions was identified. It doesn’t mean that they weren’t. To my knowledge they weren’t. But, you know, at the end of the day, if you can’t control the airspace, including the airspace that drones are using, that’s a problem. It doesn’t matter if you’re in garrison or deployed. We’ve got to have the ability to defend at a greater capability than we have. 

Q: How are the C-5M Galaxy cargo jets doing? Are readiness rates improving? Will we need a direct replacement of something its size when their time finally comes to head to the boneyard? Was the M upgrade program successful?

A: I’m a year and a half out of the conversation. The last data point I got was from U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) commander Gen. [Randall] Reed‘s congressional testimony, where he said that the mission reliability rate, I believe, had fallen to 46%. So, if that’s true, then it’s still an enormous concern. I don’t know any part of your life where you tolerate a critical capability operating less than half the time when you need it. So C-5s are an enormous concern for me. 

I think there are options out there when it comes to large-volume aircraft that exist, that are being worked now, that can help us get capability quickly. And then I think there are concepts out there, like the commercialization of the C-5 fleet, that need to be taken seriously as well and apply commercial standards, commercial supply chain to increase the readiness of it. And between a combination of those two, I think that you can sustain what America needs to project large volume lift, but also get much higher than a 46% mission reliability rate.

Q: Do you see the need for a similar sized cargo aircraft to replace the C-5 when it’s finally time for them to retire?

A: I do. I think building large, colossal aircraft is one of the hardest things to do on the planet, when you think about it. I need someone to help fact check me on this, but I don’t think more than 250 large aircraft have ever been built. You know, when you include the Hughes aircraft, include the C-5, include the Russian Antonovs, the fleet has been small because it’s hard. At the same time, it does things that nothing else can do. You don’t have to condemn your cargo to sea lift only. You can move things very quickly – large volume things, critical capabilities. And so we need to have this capability. 

But I don’t see the Air Force buying C-5 replacements. I see them transitioning C-5s to a different model, like commercialization. And I see the manufacturer of a large aircraft that can handle the volume being in the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet], and being a service concept that can get America the stuff we need when we need it. As opposed to developing another C-5 replacement, in addition to what’s going to have to eventually replace the C-5…

Q: Was the M upgrade on the C-5 successful?

A: I wasn’t there for when it was done, but … I would love to see what the original predictions were. When you spend all that money on that airplane and then still have a 46% mission reliability rate, it sounds like it is still challenged, like it used to be.

Q: Why hasn’t the Air Force gone big into uncrewed smaller logistics aircraft like China has? Especially considering dispersed ops in the Pacific?

A: Aviation right now is at a point of affordability and simplicity that we have got to distribute capability down to more tactical levels and have less centralization. Drones, automated aircraft 3,000 pounds or less, need to be a part of that equation. They need to be a part of the equation. 

I am a big fan of drones…The problem we’re trying to solve is getting winning capabilities to our warfighters faster than China. That’s what we need to be focused on. We have got to be infatuated with automation and connectivity. We have to be infatuated with drones and automated aircraft from small to medium to large capabilities. 

China’s unmanned transport aircraft completes maiden test flight

The biggest question I hear about why people don’t want small- and medium-capability is because they’re concerned about who commands and controls it and in my mind, that’s the point. You don’t have to command and control it. This is like a distributed maneuver pool, like a Jeep used to be in the Army. It’s inexpensive, it’s easy to operate, and we give it to maneuvering commanders in the field. We get TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command out of the command and control of it. We let commanders determine their own priorities and service them, and then all we have to do is integrate them into the critical capabilities that Air Mobility, Command and TRANSCOM provide. You know those and we actually free up more of their assets to do that strategic and operational lift, as opposed to always having to get down into the capabilities that can be served by something much smaller. Does that make sense?

Q: Yes. Single pilot tanker operations, what’s your final thought on that?

A: Final thought on that is, we need to do more of it. I’m not saying we need to do more testing, but when it comes to automation, when it comes to concepts, when it comes to the tempo, the things we’re going to be required to do, we have to set ourselves up to be successful in an extremely deadly and demanding operational environment. 

And to think that we’re going to apply the old dogma over this new operational environment, it’s just going to put us in a really challenging place to be successful in. So single tanker pilot ops made a comment on autonomy. It made a comment on what we need to do to win in the Pacific. It made a comment on risk taking, and it made a comment on, I think, a command team that understood how to apply real concepts over real problems and come out with an informed way forward. So there was a larger message than just single pilots in tankers.

Q: Finally, how did you see the rise of AI influencing AMC and how do you see it being used by the command in the future?

A: I’m a big fan of AI as long as commanders maintain the risk and the priority settings. You know I tried hard to get AI incorporated in Air Mobility Command, but the entire ecosystem wasn’t ready to have that conversation yet. I think AI and data are its own domain. 

Like other domains we’re going to need supremacy and superiority in it. We’re going to need to fight for it and fight from it. It’s going to benefit from the other domains, but I think disproportionately it’s going to benefit the other domains. More so our ability to sense and seize opportunity, our ability to simplify, our ability to reduce variables, our ability to gain decision advantage, our ability to make better decisions, quicker, at a higher tempo than the adversary. I think all those things are AI- and data-oriented, and I’m still not certain that we see it that way. We have got to get first mover advantage in the AI domain, and that’s going to take some work. I think that we’re starting to get there, but I think we have a long way to go on it.

Boeing KC-46A Tanker Refuels Military Aircraft Using 3D

Q: Why do you think that there’s been such resistance to AI?

A: I’m not certain most people actually use it. It’s new. Certainly there’s a newness to it. But at the end of the day, this is about data. Can you trust the data? It really flips the script, if you think about it as its own domain, because then you understand the magnitude of its importance, and you understand that this is about decision making and trust, and that you’re actually not off-shooting that to the machine to do. That you’re asking the machine and the AI to reduce variables and increase simplicity.

Then you really think about, how does a commander be able to set priorities, set risk tolerances, adjust those as required, and then, at the end of the day, this is about better decision making. I think that there’s a complexity to this that just needs to play out a bit, but I know one thing, I don’t think our adversaries are downplaying AI and data as a domain. I think that they’re 100% embracing it, and I think we need to do the same. And of course, it’s American ingenuity. We’ll get better at it and dominate.

Q: Any final thoughts you want to share? Any questions I didn’t ask?

A: No, I appreciate the opportunity here. I think that the Air Force has it right when it comes to modernization and readiness. I think that the Air Force has it right, and we need to have the resourcing to be their Air Force that this country needs. I think mobility has a longer way to go than most within the Air Force. So I continue to champion that. Those things I cared about in uniform, I care about out of uniform, and I didn’t wait to retire to have an opinion on these things. So I want to be the generation of Americans that gets this straight before we get slapped like we did on December 7th and September 11th. Let’s not wait till we get slapped to get the act together. Let’s go now hard, because our sons and daughters deserve it.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Kyiv, Ukraine – Hennady Kolesnik never expected the full-scale Russian invasion to last this long.

“These are the worst and longest years of my life,” the 71-year-old retired welder told Al Jazeera four years after the aggression that began on February 24, 2022.

In the first days of the war, he and many Ukrainians were afraid Kyiv would be lost, as well as the third of their France-sized nation that lies on the left, eastern bank of the Dnipro River.

Tens of thousands of Russian troops, including elite airborne units and motor rifle brigades, occupied north of the Kyiv region, while the Kremlin’s supporters triumphantly touted that the capital would be seized “within three days”.

Months later, “we were ecstatic about what we’d regained” after Russian forces withdrew from around Kyiv and were ousted from northern Ukraine, said Kolesnik, a grey-haired, pallid-faced and emaciated pensioner, clutching a cane.

He is recovering from a case of pneumonia that he feared he would not survive amid days-long power outages and disruptions of central heating caused by Russian drones and missiles during a cold spell, when temperatures plunged to as low as -23 degrees Celsius (-9.4 degrees Fahrenheit).

“But we’re still standing, and that’s the most important thing in a fight,” Kolesnik, who used to dabble in boxing, said with a smile.

His wife, Marina, 70, agreed: “Nobody expected us to last that long, and we’re still here.”

However, Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed to cut Moscow’s “land bridge” from western Russia to annexed Crimea, and Russian troops keep inching forward.

But their advance is glacial amid staggering losses. Last year, they occupied less than 5,000 square kilometres (1,930 sq miles), or about 0.8 percent of Ukraine’s total area, according to Ukrainian officials and Western analysts.

Overall, Russia controls about 19 percent of Ukraine’s territory.

“The front line froze like during World War I,” Nikolay Mitrokhin of Germany’s Bremen University told Al Jazeera. “So far, Russia doesn’t have enough forces or new technologies for a decisive and successful advance, but it can still squander thousands of [its soldiers’] lives.”

This month, Russian forces encountered a dual communication problem that reversed their progress.

Elon Musk’s SpaceX company shut down smuggled Starlink satellite internet terminals used by Russian soldiers, while Moscow’s efforts to block the Telegram messaging app further disrupted coordination.

Ukrainian forces counterattacked, regaining about 200 sq km (77 sq miles) in the eastern Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions.

But in other front-line areas, the pressure is mounting.

Russian drones with attached optic fibre immune to jamming began reaching a heavily-fortified town in the southeastern Donetsk region.

“It has gotten a lot noisier. There are more outages; some locals are panicking,” Sviatoslav, a serviceman stationed in Kramatorsk, told Al Jazeera. He withheld his last name in accordance with wartime protocol.

Moscow insists Kyiv surrender Kramatorsk and the rest of Donetsk – about 1,000 sq km (386 sq miles).

What could affect Ukraine’s stance is further Russian strikes on energy infrastructure.

“Ukraine keeps the front line well, but the functionality of its energy system is hanging by a thread, which may affect a lot,” Mitrokhin said.

Eighty-eight percent of Ukrainians think Russia’s strikes are designed to “force them to capitulate”, according to a survey by the Kyiv International Sociology Institute (KMIS) conducted in late January.

Nevertheless, two-thirds of those polled said Ukraine’s armed forces should fight for “as long as it takes”.

“People en masse are more ready to keep resisting [the invasion] than to capitulate,” Svetlana Chunikhina, vice president of the Association of Political Psychologists, a Kyiv-based group, told Al Jazeera.

And even though there is a spike in depression, anxiety, and chronic stress among Ukrainians, there are no “abrupt jumps” in these conditions, she said.

“People adapt – including through depression – to the war’s horrible circumstances; people keep functioning,” she said.

Ukrainians still hope for a better future, she said.

Only one in five polled Ukrainians hopes the war will end this year, but two in three are sure that in 10 years, Ukraine will be a “thriving” member of the European Union.

“This is the literal realisation of the philosophic principle: ‘get ready for the worst, hope for the best,’” Chunikhina said.

However, brain fog and cynicism are on the rise, she said.

“For the Ukrainian public whose fight against the Russian aggression is largely fuelled by moral virtues – including high ones, such as altruism, patriotism, responsibility to future generations – cynicism could be really destructive,” she said.

News brings little relief.

United States President Donald Trump has so far failed to deliver on his pre-election pledge to end the war “in 24 hours”.

Meanwhile, Russian public figures who support the Kremlin still try to present the invasion as a step to “protect” Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Moscow-based analyst Sergey Markov claims that the war began on February 23, 2014, when pro-Russian protesters began rallying in Crimea, urging the Kremlin to annex the Ukrainian peninsula.

“It was a peaceful uprising of the Russian people for freedom, peace and true democracy,” he wrote on Telegram on Monday.

It’s apparently naming season for autonomous air combat drones. Earlier today, we reported that General Atomics had given the name Dark Merlin to its YFQ-42A Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) design. Now Northrop Grumman has stamped a new name on its YFQ-48A: Talon Blue.

Northrop Grumman first unveiled the drone this past December, at which time it was referred to simply as Project Talon, as you can read more about in our initial report here. Later that month, the U.S. Air Force gave it the formal designation YFQ-48A, and described it as “strong contender” to be part of its future CCA fleets. Currently, General Atomics’ YFQ-42A and Anduril’s YFQ-44A are the designs formally in development as part of the first phase, or Increment 1, of the Air Force’s CCA program. Northrop Grumman may now be under contract for the program’s Increment 2, but this remains unconfirmed.

The “YFQ-48A Talon Blue’s designation within the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program underscores the strategic alignment between Northrop Grumman’s manufacturing agility and the Air Force’s acquisition goals for low-cost, cutting-edge technology,” according to a press release the company put out today. “The aircraft’s design provides mission versatility through advanced modular manufacturing techniques that reduce part count and overall weight – shortening production timelines without sacrificing capability.”

The release does not offer a clear explanation of the significance of the new Talon Blue name. Northrop Grumman previously told TWZ and other outlets that the Project Talon moniker was a callback to the T-38 Talon jet trainer, as both had been designed with high performance, high maneuverability, and affordability in mind.

“And it’s got a cool sound to it, too,” Tom Jones, President of Northrop Grumman’s Aeronautics Systems sector, at the time of the drone’s official unveiling.

As for the new Blue addition to its name, this could be another callback, this time to Northrop’s hugely successful Tacit Blue demonstrator, aka the ‘Whale,’ which revolutionized America’s understanding of stealth technology at the dawn of the stealth age. Lockheed’s stealth demonstrator that led to the F-117 Nighthawk stealth combat jet was also called Have Blue. As TWZ has noted previously, the YFQ-48A is clearly optimized with low-observable (stealthy) characteristics. It also shares many similar features and a general layout with Tacit Blue. You can read more about what else is known about the Talon Blue design so far here.

Regardless, the Talon Blue name is welcome. As we noted with the announcement of the Dark Merlin name for General Atomics’ YFQ-42A, the nomenclatures and terms associated with the U.S. Air Force’s CCA program can often be obtuse to the general public. Being able to use specific names for the different drones helps. Anduril’s YFQ-44A has carried the nickname Fury from the very start, which traces back to its origins as a ‘red air’ training drone.

Beyond the YFQ-48A, Northrop Grumman is now also describing Project Talon as an entire “portfolio of modular, cost-effective and rapidly deployable aircraft that meet the customers’ autonomy needs.” That portfolio includes Talon IQ, formerly called Beacon, a “next-generation autonomous testbed ecosystem” that has been leveraging the Prism autonomy suite and Scaled Composite’s Model 437 Vanguard jet. Scaled Composites is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Northrop Grumman that was also involved in the development of Talon Blue.

Digital Ecosystem Takes Flight

Northrop Grumman has also now released a picture of the YFQ-48A flanked by the Model 437 and one of Scaled Composites’ earlier Model 401 jets, also known as the ‘Son of Ares,’ but it is not immediately clear if the latter is also part of the Project Talon portfolio. The Model 437 evolved from the Model 401. Concepts for uncrewed versions of the Model 401 and Model 437 have been shown in the past.

In December, Northrop Grumman said it was targeting a first flight for YFQ-48A about nine months down the road, or sometime in August of this year.

In terms of the Air Force’s CCA program, the service still has yet to make a decision about which Increment 1 CCA design, or both, it wants to buy in larger numbers. Nine companies are also now under contract to refine concepts under Increment 2. To date, the Air Force has not disclosed the names of any of the Increment 2 awardees, which, as noted, could include Northrop Grumman.

When it comes to the YFQ-48A, the company could also pitch it to prospective foreign customers. The marketspace for CCA-type drones, like what is now dubbed the Talon Blue, is steadily growing globally.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

On 18 February 2026, reports emerged that Britain was withholding American permission to use Diego Garcia in any hypothetical strike against Iran. The following day, Trump posted “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA” on Truth Social, linking the base directly to potential operations against Tehran in terms that left no room for diplomatic interpretation. The sequence lasted forty-eight hours and revealed what months of careful legal construction had obscured: that the architecture of conditional access Britain had built around a strategically significant military installation was worth precisely what the decisive power chose to make it worth. Whether the intervention also carried tactical signalling toward Tehran is a legitimate question, and intra-alliance friction of this kind sometimes functions as maximalist positioning before settlement. What matters analytically, however, is not the post itself but what the post revealed when operational pressure arrived. It was also, for anyone who had read Washington’s December 2025 National Security Strategy carefully, entirely predictable.

Power Does Not Ask

There are two ways to understand how military power operates in the international system, and the Chagos episode forces a choice between them. The first holds that great powers are meaningfully constrained by the frameworks they inhabit, alliance structures, legal agreements, and diplomatic settlements, and that these frameworks produce stable, predictable behavior even when the underlying interests they were designed to manage come under pressure. The second holds that frameworks are expressions of power relationships at a given moment rather than independent constraints upon them, so that when power shifts or decides to assert itself, the frameworks adjust to reflect the new reality rather than containing it. The first is the language of liberal internationalism. The second is the language of realism, and what February produced was an unambiguous realist moment.

The December 2025 National Security Strategy had already committed this diagnosis to paper. The document did not describe Europe as weak through circumstance. It described Europe as having chosen weakness, identifying a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” as the continent’s defining condition and stating openly that it is “far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy framed European concerns about Russia as evidence of that same condition, noting that this lack of self-confidence was most evident in Europe’s relationship with Russia, despite the fact that European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure save nuclear weapons. Washington’s reading of its European partners, formalized two months before the Diego Garcia friction became public, was of states that had systematically preferred institutional solutions over sovereign ones, legal arrangements over unconditional control, and managed conditionality over the exercise of will. Britain’s handling of Chagos was, in that context, not an anomaly. It was a confirmation.

What is analytically significant about Trump’s intervention is not simply that he rejected the deal but that he did not engage it at all, did not address the ICJ ruling that gave it legal foundation, did not contest the lease terms that were its operational expression, and did not enter the diplomatic logic that had produced it over months of negotiation. A decision of this kind does not derive its authority from the framework it overrides, because it precedes that framework, and the framework itself only ever existed on the sufferance of the power now choosing to move against it. When Trump asserted that leases are “no good when it comes to countries,” he was not making a legal argument that could be answered within the same register. He was stating a principle about the nature of sovereign will: that when it moves, it moves prior to and above whatever conditional arrangements were constructed in the period of its dormancy.

This is realism in its purest operational form, in which states pursue interests, great powers pursue interests with the capacity to enforce them, and legal architecture functions as an instrument of power when it serves those interests and an obstacle to be displaced when it does not. The Chagos deal did not alter the underlying power relationship between Washington and London, but it did create a layer of conditionality over an asset Washington considers operationally essential, and when operational pressure arrived, that conditionality became intolerable, not because Mauritius is hostile, not because Britain is an adversary, but because no great power conducting military projection at a global scale can accept that a weak state sits structurally inside the chain of its operational decisions, regardless of how that state arrived there or how benign its intentions are understood to be.

Beneath the realist logic sits a transactional one, and the two reinforce each other in ways that matter for how Britain should read what happened. Trump does not evaluate alliance relationships by their historical depth or their institutional architecture. He evaluates them by what they yield in the current moment, and every asset is a leverage point to be maximized. Diego Garcia represents unconditional American operational value. The Chagos deal reduced that value by inserting a condition. From a transactional perspective, that insertion was not a diplomatic nuance to be managed but a concession to be reversed, because Trump’s governing principle across every alliance relationship is maximum American gain, and conditionality is by definition a reduction of gain. The decisionism explains how he responded. The transactionalism explains why.

The Geography of Decision

Diego Garcia is not incidental to American power projection in the region, though its significance is that of an enabler rather than a prerequisite. The base sits at the center of the Indian Ocean, within operational reach of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca, and the East African littoral, and it has supported American military operations across that entire arc for half a century through bomber rotations, logistics chains, and a sustained forward presence that no other installation in the basin fully replicates at the same scale and permanence. It does not make American power projection possible in any absolute sense, but it makes it faster, cheaper, and more sustained, which in the context of time-sensitive operational planning against a target like Iran is not a marginal difference but a meaningful one.

The Iran dimension exposes the conditionality problem with particular clarity because the operational context in which Diego Garcia’s value is most acute is precisely the context in which conditional access is most dangerous. American military assets have accumulated across the Middle East, talks are active, and a base capable of projecting strategic airpower directly into the Persian Gulf theater is not a background consideration but a variable whose availability, or unavailability, shapes what options exist and on what timeline. Britain’s reported reluctance to grant operational clearance, under a deal still unratified and still contested in domestic courts, still legally dependent on Mauritius’s continued cooperation, revealed that the conditionality embedded in the arrangement had already entered the operational calculus before any of the stabilizing assumptions behind the deal had time to establish themselves. Strategic friction did not arrive at the end of a long maturation period. It arrived in weeks, because operational pressure does not wait for diplomatic frameworks to consolidate.

That compression of the timeline is itself the most realistic lesson. Power does not defer to the developmental logic of legal arrangements, and when the operational moment arrives, whatever sits between a great power’s will and its objective is reclassified from a framework to be respected into a problem to be solved.

The Structural Position of the Weak

The analytical core of the Chagos case is not about Mauritius’s intentions, which by all available evidence are not hostile, but about the structural position that the deal assigned to it within the architecture of American operational planning, because in the logic of great power competition, it is position rather than intention that determines strategic relevance. By inserting itself, or being inserted, into the chain of conditions governing a great power’s operational freedom, a weak state acquires a form of leverage it could never achieve through military means, and the Chagos deal gave Mauritius exactly that position, not through hostility but through legal standing, not through power but through presence within a conditional architecture that a great power now had reason to find constraining.

For Washington operating within a decisionist strategic logic, that presence is categorically unacceptable regardless of Mauritius’s intentions. The relevant question is not whether Mauritius would obstruct American operations but whether, under the terms of the arrangement, it structurally could, and the answer is yes in a way that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can fully neutralize. Sovereignty transferred to Mauritius is not sovereignty parked with a neutral party but sovereignty that now sits within reach of Chinese economic leverage, meaning the lease does not merely introduce conditionality but introduces conditionality whose future content Washington cannot determine or guarantee. A great power conducting global military projection cannot organize its operational planning around the sustained goodwill of a small state whose strategic orientation it cannot guarantee. That such goodwill is required at all is the problem the deal created.

Weak states do not constrain great powers through legal arrangements in any durable sense, because the constraint only holds when the great power chooses to honor it, and great powers choose to honor constraints only when the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance, a calculation that shifts decisively once operational necessity enters the equation and the framework reveals itself to be dependent on tolerance rather than grounded in power.

Conclusion

Britain converted unconditional sovereign control over a strategically significant military installation into a conditional leasehold arrangement whose operationalization depended on a small state’s legal cooperation and presented that conversion as a resolution of vulnerability rather than the creation of a new one. Britain was not being naive. It was an attempt to preserve the base’s long-term legal viability against mounting international pressure, a calculation that the alliance relationship would absorb any friction that followed. What Britain did not account for was that its ally evaluates arrangements not by their legal durability but by whether they constrain American will, and a solution sophisticated enough to satisfy international law was simultaneously insufficiently decisive to satisfy Washington.

From the perspective of the December 2025 National Security Strategy, that conversion was not a surprise. It was the predictable output of a European strategic culture that Washington had already formally diagnosed: one that reaches instinctively for institutional solutions when strong states would resolve through will, that mistakes legal legitimacy for strategic security, and that has internalized the habits of the post-Cold War order to the point where it can no longer easily distinguish between a framework and the power that makes frameworks real.

Trump’s response was the most realistic verdict on that presentation, not an argument against the deal’s legal coherence, which was never in question, but a decision that the framework was insufficient for the operational reality it was meant to serve, delivered in terms that made the underlying logic unmistakable. The framework did not collapse under the pressure. It was revealed, under pressure, to have rested entirely on the assumption that the decisive power would continue to choose not to decide otherwise, an assumption that realism has always identified as the central fragility of arrangements built on consent rather than grounded in power.

The strong do not negotiate with the architecture of constraint, and for Europe, February was less a shock than a reminder that the rules it has built its strategic identity around have always depended on the continued willingness of a decisive power to operate within them.

New Zealand says it, too, will support the UK government if it decides to remove the disgraced prince from succession to the throne.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has announced that his government is writing to Commonwealth countries about its support to have the United Kingdom’s former prince, Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor, removed from the line of royal succession over his links to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein.

Albanese’s announcement on Tuesday came as neighbouring Commonwealth member New Zealand declared that it would also support the UK government if it proposes the removal of Mountbatten-Windsor from the line of succession to the throne.

“Australia likes being first, and we have made sure that everyone knows what our position is, and we’ll be writing today to the other realm countries as well, informing them of our position,” Prime Minister Albanese told Australia’s ABC public broadcaster.

Australians were “disgusted” by revelations about late US sex offender Epstein’s relations with public figures, and they want the government to be clear about its position, Albanese told the ABC.

“King Charles has said that the law must now take its full course. There must be a full, fair and proper investigation. And that needs to occur,” he added.

The former 66-year-old prince was arrested last week, detained and questioned as part of an investigation into alleged misconduct in public office following revelations about his dealings with Epstein.

Albanese also said the UK would have to initiate any proposed change to the line of royal succession, and it would need the agreement of the 14 other Commonwealth nations that have King Charles III as head of state.

Albanese wrote to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and informed him that, “in light of recent events”, the Australian government would “agree to any proposal to remove [Mountbatten-Windsor] from the line of royal succession”, according to Australian media.

“I agree with His Majesty that the law must now take its full course and there must be a full, fair and proper investigation,” Albanese wrote.

“These are grave allegations and Australians take them seriously,” he added.

New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said that if the UK government proposes to remove Mountbatten-Windsor from the order of succession, New Zealand would support it, the UK’s Press Association reports.

“The bottom line is, no one is above the law, and once that investigation is closed, should the UK government decide to remove him from the line of succession, that is something we would support,” Luxon told reporters.

Officials in the UK have told media outlets that any moves to change the line of succession would come after the police conclude their investigation into the former prince, who is eighth in line to the throne.

Starmer’s official spokesman said on Monday that the government was not ruling out any steps in relation to the disgraced prince, but it would not be appropriate to comment further during the police probe.

Mountbatten-Windsor, who was stripped of his royal title last year as news of links to Epstein emerged, has denied any wrongdoing over his relationship with Epstein, who was ruled to have taken his own life in prison in 2019. He has not directly responded to the latest allegations regarding misconduct in public office.