NEWS

Andoni Iraola left his role at Bournemouth at the end of the season and takes over at Liverpool in place of Arne Slot.

Liverpool has named Andoni Iraola as their new manager after sacking Arne Slot following a calamitous Premier League title defence.

Iraola quickly emerged as Liverpool’s top target to replace Slot, whose two-year reign came to a shock end when he was dismissed last Saturday.

Liverpool gave no indication as to the length of the 43-year-old Spaniard’s contract, but British media have reported that he has signed a two-year deal.

“Really excited, really excited, because obviously you know about Liverpool, you know that it’s a big club, a massive club, one of the biggest in the world,” Iraola, who called time on his impressive spell with Bournemouth at the end of this season, said on Liverpool’s official website on Thursday.

“But feeling inside and understanding a little bit more of this club, I always thought it’s a special club.

“You don’t need a lot of things to get attracted by Liverpool. Liverpool is Liverpool.”

After criticism of Liverpool’s lacklustre performances in Slot’s second season at Anfield, Iraola is expected to deliver a more urgent, aggressive style of football, which characterised the team under beloved former manager Jurgen Klopp.

Iraola earned rave reviews for Bournemouth’s sixth-place finish in England’s Premier League this season, which secured the club’s first qualification for Europe, in the Europa League.

He arrived at the south coast club from Raya Vallecano in 2023, having previously managed Mirandes and AEK Larnaca in Cyprus.

Bournemouth improved each year under Iraola, finishing 12th, ninth and sixth.

The former defender was praised for his astute tactics and development of youngsters including Eli Junior Kroupi and Alex Scott.

Prior to leaving Liverpool at the end of the season, Egypt star Mohamed Salah recently called for a return to the “heavy metal football” that led to so much success under Klopp, heaping pressure on the beleaguered Slot.

Iraola has previously talked about his desire for his teams to play with an attacking, high-pressing style, in contrast to Slot’s more controlled approach.

Born in Spain’s Basque Country, Iraola played more than 500 games for Athletic Bilbao before a stint in Major League Soccer with New York City, where he teamed up with Frank Lampard and Andrea Pirlo.

He will arrive on Merseyside with Liverpool at a crossroads after Slot’s failure to maintain the club’s position at the summit of English football.

Slot had the tough task of replacing Klopp, who left in 2024 after winning the Premier League and Champions League during a golden nine-year spell at Anfield.

The former Feyenoord boss made a strong start, leading Liverpool to a record-equalling 20th English league title in his debut season, spearheaded by Salah’s 29 goals.

But Slot was unable to halt Liverpool’s slide in the 2025-26 season as the Reds collapsed from late September onward, finishing a turbulent season without a trophy.

The death of Liverpool forward Diogo Jota in a car crash last July had an immeasurable impact on the squad, while the club’s  450-million-pound ($605m) splurge on new signings failed to pay off.

Slot’s relationship with Salah also deteriorated, while Liverpool fans turned on the manager due to his team’s lifeless displays and poor results.

The club limped to a fifth-place finish, 25 points behind champions Arsenal, which at least guaranteed qualification for next season’s Champions League.

While it might be true that the cases are progressing, families of the missing argue they are moving at a snail’s pace.

Since early December, Fault Lines has spent time with families who are pushing for accountability and pleading with the government to learn what happened to their loved ones.

In some cases, they have spent years without receiving any direct response.

“It gets harder every time my nephew asks when his father will come home and I don’t have any answers,” said Rosario Villon, whose brother, Jonathan Villon, has been missing for almost a year and a half.

The 31-year-old father of three was last seen on December 9, 2024, when he left to pick up groceries in his hometown of Guayaquil.

Addressing a vigil for Jonathan last December, Rosario explained the toll his disappearance has taken on her family.

“Seeing my mother cry for her son, not knowing what to do next to bring him home — it isn’t easy,” she said.

Fault Lines has reviewed footage of the day Jonathan was detained. Security cameras show soldiers patrolling Jonathan’s neighbourhood, Nueva Prosperina.

A neighbour’s mobile phone video also captures the moments after Jonathan was forced into the truck’s bed, under a wooden bench. The truck then drives off, and he has not been seen since.

The family recorded the licence plate numbers of the municipal vehicle the soldiers were using, but the military has refused to respond to requests about Jonathan’s case.

“We have the evidence, we have videos, we have the licence plates of the truck, and they won’t give us a concrete and exact answer. What happened to my husband?” asked Jonathan’s partner, Yadira Bohorquez.

Lawyers representing the family say the military simply declared that it had no operations in that area on that date, despite the video evidence.

“The case of Jonathan Villon is completely paralysed by the refusal of the Ministry of Defence to cooperate in handing over information that the Prosecutor’s Office has already requested,” said Fernando Bastias, a lawyer with CDH Guayaquil, a human rights nonprofit representing the family.

Israel’s Supreme Court rejects government ban on prisoner visits, affirming Red Cross access under international law.

Israel’s Supreme Court has unanimously rejected a government policy banning representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from visiting Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons.

The court ruled on Wednesday that by preventing the Red Cross from visiting prisoners, the government had contravened Israeli and international law, and therefore the policy must be repealed.

It also ruled that the government failed to present a legal foundation for its policy on annulling all visits after the Hamas-led attack on October 2023, in which more than 1,100 people were killed and more than 240 were taken captive.

The assault triggered a brutal war in Gaza, which has been defined as a genocide by several prominent scholars and an independent United Nations inquiry. The Israeli army killed more than 72,950 people in the enclave, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry, and reduced most of the besieged territory to rubble, and forced the displacement of nearly 1.9 million Palestinians.

Violence across the occupied West Bank perpetrated by Israeli forces also intensified to unprecedented levels. All visits to prisoners were halted, and information about them was not shared – something that used to be standard practice before the war. Back then, Israeli authorities accused Hamas of failing to secure access to the captives in Gaza.

It was the first time in 50 years that Israel prevented Red Cross visits, according to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), which filed the petition.

“For the first time in nearly three years, the over 9,000 Palestinian security prisoners being held in Israeli prisons and military detention centers will receive Red Cross visits,” ACRI said. The ban remained in place even after a “ceasefire” was agreed last October.

Initial petition

The petition by ACRI, Physicians for Human Rights, Israeli rights group HaMoked and Israeli NGO Gisha against the government policy was first filed in Israel’s High Court in February 2024. But the state of Israel asked for 27 extensions before a hearing was held at the end of October last year.

The ICRC welcomed the decision, saying it was ready to resume its visits. “We are continuing our dialogue with the Israeli authorities to resume our work in detention as soon as possible,” it said in a statement. It added that access to detainees and the ability to meet with them privately are obligations under international law.

Wednesday’s decision comes amid growing concerns over the ill-treatment of Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons.

Last week, the United Nations released its annual report on conflict-related sexual violence verified in 2025. It cited torture, rape, gang rape, forced nudity and “cavity searches conducted without apparent security justification perpetrated” by Israeli armed forces and security forces primarily during detention and interrogation and across several sites, including the infamous Sde Teiman military camp, among others.

The FIFA World Cup 2026 could be the final act for some of football’s finest talents.

Although some of this tournament’s players will set a men’s football record by appearing in their sixth World Cup, age is catching up, and other players have struggled with injuries.

Al Jazeera takes a look at who might be making their final bow on the global stage at the tournament in North America:

Cristiano Ronaldo – Portugal

Although fitness has been one of Ronaldo’s biggest strengths during his illustrious career, at 41, the Portugal forward knows his playing days are numbered.

Numbers have always been on the former Manchester United and Real Madrid forward’s side, though, and he fired in 30 in 37 matches for Al-Nassr this season, while his tally for Portugal currently sits at 143 goals.

The second-oldest player at this year’s tournament, only behind Scotland’s 43-year-old Craig Gordon, Ronaldo heads to his record sixth World Cup, well aware it could be his final chance to lift the coveted golden trophy: the only one missing from his glittering cabinet.

Lionel Messi – Argentina

Like Ronaldo, Messi is also off to his record sixth finals appearance, one where he will lead Argentina’s defence of the title they won in Qatar four years ago.

Argentina’s all-time leading scorer and appearance holder, Messi, has struggled with injury in the build-up to the tournament, raising doubts about whether he will feature in each game and if his body can keep up with the gruelling demands of an expanded World Cup.

The eight-time Ballon d’Or winner’s impact and talent, however, are such that, even at 38, he remains the heartbeat of the football-crazy South American nation.

Luka Modric – Croatia

After playing a key role in Croatia’s run to the 2018 final and a third-place finish in 2022, Modric is ready for his fifth and final appearance at the World Cup. As the 40-year-old heads to the tournament after undergoing cheekbone surgery, the veteran knows the team still relies heavily on him for his playmaking prowess.

The ageing midfielder, also the Balkan nation’s captain, still enjoys a hero’s status within a side that has often defied expectations on the global stage. Enjoy his magic in midfield before he bows out.

Neymar Jr – Brazil

At 34, Brazil‘s all-time leading scorer Neymar is much younger than Messi or Ronaldo, but unlike the two greats of the game, his place in the national team is not guaranteed. Neymar’s comeback in the Brazil squad after a two-and-a-half-year hiatus electrified football fandom, and only time will tell whether it was a gamble or a tactical masterclass by coach Carlo Ancelotti.

With a history of fitness issues, a series of injuries and mounting age (he would be 38 by the 2030 World Cup), what looks more certain is that this could be Neymar’s fourth and final act at the tournament.

Manuel Neuer – Germany

Such is the “aura” of Neuer, as coach Julian Nagelsmann said last month, that the 40-year-old came out of retirement to be named Germany‘s first-choice goalkeeper for the 2026 World Cup. Back in the squad after nearly two years, fans will have a final chance to see him at the World Cup.

Widely regarded as one of the greatest goalkeepers, Neuer has played at four World Cups, most notably having a key role in Germany’s 2014 World Cup triumph on Brazilian soil.

Mohamed Salah – Egypt

Arguably Africa’s greatest player of all time, Salah became a global superstar on the back of his success at Liverpool, where he won nine trophies. At 33, and no longer at the peak of his powers, this could be the forward’s second, and possibly final, World Cup.

An underwhelming season and his subsequent departure from Liverpool may have tempered expectations. Yet Egyptians continue to place their faith in their beloved number 10, hoping he can inspire the nation and help deliver something it has never experienced before: the joy of celebrating a World Cup victory.

Kevin de Bruyne – Belgium

A big part of Belgium’s “golden generation” between 2014 and 2022, playmaker De Bruyne continues to flourish in his duties for club and country. Age, however, is starting to catch up with the playmaker, who turns 35 later this month.

The Napoli midfielder’s performance is central to Belgium’s odds of a deep run at the 2026 World Cup, and he will be eager to drive them to a memorable finish in what will be his fourth and presumably final appearance at the tournament.

Virgil van Dijk – Netherlands

Experienced centre-back van Dijk is not quite the force he was a few years ago, when he won the Champions League and Premier League in back-to-back seasons with Liverpool.

The Netherlands captain turns 35 next month, and the Dutch could move on with a younger defensive core by the time the 2030 edition comes around.

After reaching the 2022 World Cup quarterfinals and Euro 2024 semifinals, van Dijk will hope to take the team one step further in what will be his third finals.

Sadio Mane – Senegal

Widely regarded as one of the world’s best wingers, Mane heads to the World Cup seeking to make up for the disappointing leg injury that denied him a shot at Qatar 2022.

At 34, the Senegal international is far from the peak of his career, which saw him enjoy trophy-laden spells at Liverpool and Bayern Munich.

Despite his mounting age, Mane remains the team’s source of inspiration and creativity, and he was an integral part of the side that beat Morocco in the Africa Cup of Nations final – only for the result to be overturned due to Senegal’s mid-game protest.

Mane will feature in his third, and likely final, World Cup, given that the Teranga Lion has said the last AFCON was his last, although the coaching team have said they have not given up on changing his mind.

Guillermo Ochoa – Mexico

Part of an esteemed group which includes Messi and Ronaldo, Ochoa is also set to play at a record sixth World Cup. The goalkeeper, who will turn 41 next month, had not been part of the national squad in recent years, but was picked for the tournament, which is being co-hosted by his country, Mexico.

Known for being a formidable figure in Mexico’s previous World Cup campaigns, Ochoa will retire at the end of the team’s run at the tournament.

The FIFA World Cup begins on June 11. You can follow the action on Al Jazeera’s dedicated World Cup 2026 page with all the latest news, match build-up and live text commentary, and keep up to date with group standings, real-time match results and schedules.

The prestigious Russian Navy base at Kronstadt, near St. Petersburg, came under Ukrainian drone attack overnight, in what may well be the first strike of its kind against the Baltic Fleet. Ukrainian drones targeted the naval base, including the Project 20380 Steregushchiy class corvette Boikiy, highlighting the fact that Russian warships are vulnerable even when hundreds of miles from Ukraine’s borders.

According to the official account of the Ukrainian 414th Separate Unmanned Strike Aviation System Brigade on X, the corvette was set ablaze while in the Veleshchynskyi dry dock in Kronstadt, where it is said to have entered scheduled maintenance in February of this year. The same account posted a video showing the attack. While we are used to kamikaze drone video feeds cutting out just before detonation, the fact that multiple drones were involved means we can see the burning vessel from several angles.

Reportedly, the drones that hit the corvette were from the 1st Separate Center of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces. Considering the long distance to the target, it is interesting to note that video from the seekers was available. This indicates that either a local operator on the ground was involved in targeting and recording the feed, or otherwise a satcom link was used to do the same. While it is conceivable that the drones used autonomous guidance, they would still have needed someone nearby or connected via satcom to record the seeker’s view. Another possibility is that shorter-range drones were used for the attack, something that Ukraine has done before for attacks deep in Russia, although this seems less likely here.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces stated that the Boikiy was involved in escorting ships associated with Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, the collection of older tankers operating under foreign flags that Moscow relies on to export oil despite Western sanctions. According to Ukrainian officials, Russia has increasingly tasked Baltic Fleet vessels with escort, monitoring, and security missions for these tankers as they transit the Baltic Sea carrying sanctioned Russian oil to markets prepared to bypass Western restrictions.

The Steregushchiy class ships are among Russia’s more modern corvettes. With a standard displacement of 1,800 tons, a length of 343 feet, and a flight deck for a helicopter, the corvettes are closer to frigates, according to some classification systems. Their primary armament consists of two quadruple launchers for Uran anti-ship missiles, a 12-cell Redut vertical launch system for various air defense missiles, and two quadruple tubes for Paket-NK anti-torpedo/anti-submarine torpedoes.

The attack on the naval base was part of a wider Ukrainian drone barrage directed against other military and energy sites in and around St. Petersburg early on Wednesday. Footage of the attacks showed drones, reportedly FP-1/2 types, low over the Gulf of Finland and in the skies above the city.

The attacks occurred just hours before international guests gathered for the city’s flagship economic forum. “The Petersburg forum is opening with a nice plume of black smoke in the background after Ukrainian strikes,” posted Serhiy Sternenko, an adviser to the Ukrainian defence minister.

Several long-range drones also crashed into oil storage facilities in St. Petersburg after Russian air defenses reportedly tried unsuccessfully to shoot them down. Loud explosions were heard, and black smoke could be seen rising from the blazing oil terminal, one of the largest on Russia’s Baltic Sea coast.

In this footage you can even see two Ukrainian drones flying in formation over the oil terminal in Saint Petersburg, Russia, with one dive-bombing into the oil terminal. pic.twitter.com/eMUdpwsDiz

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) June 3, 2026

The entire city of Saint Petersburg, Russia, received a front row seat for the destruction of the local oil terminal. This includes also the attendees of St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), which will start today. pic.twitter.com/HxDsF6kQ6p

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) June 3, 2026

Russian authorities confirmed that the attacks had taken place, with St. Petersburg’s governor, Alexander Beglov, saying that the Kirovsky and Krasnoselsky districts had been targeted.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, writing on social media, said that drones had hit “important facilities on Russian territory,” including the St. Petersburg oil terminal, the Kronstadt base, and a weapons factory in the Tambov region.

“I thank our warriors for their precision. Ukraine’s plan for long-range sanctions is being implemented exactly as needed to bring peace closer,” Zelensky said.

Our long-range sanctions carried out by the warriors of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Unmanned Systems Forces, the Special Operations Forces, the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine have yielded good results. Important facilities… pic.twitter.com/esxYMexU8d

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) June 3, 2026

The significance of the strikes is manifold.

First off, the drone strikes have a highly symbolic value, and will be especially embarrassing for the Kremlin, since they come immediately in advance of the three-day annual summit being held in St. Petersburg, and billed as Russia’s answer to Davos.

The Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum of 2026 (SPIEF 2026) in Russia has started with a very fiery keynote speech by the Ukrainian surprise guests. pic.twitter.com/VVIuGcQCO7

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) June 3, 2026

Guests arrived for today’s opening ceremony under a pall of thick smoke, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is due to make a keynote speech at the event on Friday. There was further disruption for arriving guests as St. Petersburg’s airport was temporarily closed.

Secondly, the drone strikes underscore Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep within Russia, using a growing array of long-range one-way attack drones and cruise missiles. The targets are around 680 miles from the nearest Ukrainian border.

Finally, by targeting Kronstadt, the attacks also signify the opening up of a new front in the drone war, namely against the Baltic Fleet while it is in port.

A fire has reportedly broken out aboard the Russian warship Boykiy in Kronstadt near St. Petersburg following Ukraine’s latest drone attack.

The corvette repeatedly escorted vessels from Russia’s shadow oil fleet through the English Channel in recent years. pic.twitter.com/Zhsn3nVsVp

— KyivPost (@KyivPost) June 3, 2026

Located on Kotlin Island in the Gulf of Finland, about 18 miles west of St. Petersburg, Kronstadt is one of the principal bases associated with the Baltic Fleet. Today, it primarily hosts corvettes and patrol vessels, naval support ships, training units, as well as repair and maintenance facilities. Since any naval threat approaching St. Petersburg from the Gulf of Finland must pass near Kronstadt, the base effectively acts as the maritime gateway to Russia’s second-largest city.

There have been very few confirmed Ukrainian attacks of any kind on the Baltic Fleet compared with the extensive campaign waged against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

In April 2024, there was a fire on a Russian warship at Baltiysk in Kaliningrad. The fire damaged communications and electronic systems aboard the Buyan class corvette Serpukhov. A Ukrainian military intelligence official subsequently claimed that this was the result of a covert joint operation conducted by his GUR agency and a pro-Kyiv Russian military group.

📹 For the first time in the war, an attack took place in the Baltic Sea, the Russian Serpukhov missile ship was burned in Kaliningrad.
The Buyan-M class Serpukhov corvette belonging to the Russian navy was burned by Ukrainian sabotage teams.
The ship was severely damaged. pic.twitter.com/Isl9sVWF1R

— Mete Sohtaoğlu (@metesohtaoglu) April 9, 2024

So far, of course, Ukraine’s naval campaign has focused overwhelmingly on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Many successful attacks have been recorded against Black Sea Fleet vessels and facilities, forcing the general evacuation of Russian naval assets from occupied Crimea and to bases in Russia proper.

In recent months, Ukraine has waged an aerial campaign to disrupt Russia’s economy. Long-range drones have hit ports and oil storage facilities, military factories, and airbases. There has also been an uptick in attacks against tankers and trucks moving between occupied southern Ukraine and Crimea, leading to fuel shortages across the peninsula.

Meanwhile, the scale of Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukraine remains undiminished. On Monday, a barrage of Russian strikes killed 23 people across Ukraine and injured many more. This led Zelenskyy to renew his plea for the U.S. government to provide Kyiv with more Patriot missiles. Today, he said that “an agreement at the highest political level on the purchase of Patriot systems […] is awaiting implementation at the financial, legal, and technical levels.”

I held a meeting on additional ways to supply air defense to Ukraine – both systems and interceptors. We have an agreement at the highest political level on the purchase of Patriot systems, and this agreement is awaiting implementation at the financial, legal, and technical…

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) June 3, 2026

Whether or not the overnight strike caused significant damage, its strategic message was unmistakable. By reaching Kronstadt, one of Russia’s most historic naval bases, Ukraine demonstrated that even the Baltic Fleet is no longer beyond its reach. The attack highlights Kyiv’s growing long-range capabilities and signals that Russia’s efforts to protect both its regular fleet and its shadow oil-export network may face increasing pressure, even far from the front lines.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Iran is heading to the World Cup while the country is at war with a host nation, a situation that is unique in the tournament’s history.

The United States-Israel war on Iran began on February 28, and there has been an uneasy ceasefire in place since April 8, but the uncertainty – and occasional flare-up in hostilities – means an end to the conflict is far from certain.

For the Iranian players and staff, the situation has thrown their World Cup preparations into chaos – all of their matches are scheduled to be played in the US.

The Iran team has spent more than two weeks in Turkiye, mostly practising at the coastal resort Antalya, and some travelled to the capital, Ankara, to submit visa applications at the US embassy.

The team’s participation in the event in the US, Canada and Mexico has long been in doubt and, with the visa situation still up in the air, nothing can yet be fully guaranteed.

“Well, to be honest, it’s not easy,” said Saeid Ezatolahi, a 29-year-old midfielder who also played for Iran in the 2018 and 2022 World Cups.

“This is going to be my third World Cup. So for me and some of the other players, it might be easier to manage these kinds of things,” he told The Associated Press news agency in English on the sidelines of a training session on Wednesday.

“But at the end … it is going to be difficult for us because, at the same time, we are following the news in our country and the political things, of course, can affect the mind of the players and the people.”

The team is set to travel to Mexico this weekend after receiving visas from the Mexican embassy in Ankara. The team said Thursday that the process of obtaining entry permits had been finalised for all members of the squad.

Problems with visa processing meant Iran’s World Cup training base was moved from Tucson, Arizona, to Tijuana, on Mexico’s border with California.

Iran will play its first two games near Los Angeles, which has a large Iranian community, many of whom oppose the current government.

“So for sure, we are expecting to have a lot of fans during our games at the stadium,” Ezatolahi said. “And this is going to be a lot of pressure for us because the expectation is going to be high. I just wish we can make them proud and show them that Iranians, they are prepared for every hard job in the world,” he said.

Mohammad Ghorbani, 24, is going to his first World Cup for Iran.

“It’s true that we are facing special circumstances right now, but we are football players, and we have to play, practise, and prepare ourselves for the competitions we have ahead,” the Abu Dhabi-based player said in Farsi.

“On the other hand, we know that our people have been going through a lot of difficulties throughout the war, and we are going there for them, to get the best results for their joy and the joy of the people of our country.”

The US and Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader and other top officials in their initial attacks. Iran responded with strikes targeting Israel, US forces and the Gulf Arab states. It also has maintained a chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow mouth of the Gulf, imperilling global energy supplies.

Despite the nominal ceasefire, Iran and the US have yet to negotiate a permanent end to the war, and attacks continue in the region.

Iran is in Group G with New Zealand, Belgium and Egypt and Iran’s team is not required to enter the US until June 14, one day before its first match against New Zealand at the Los Angeles Rams’ stadium in Inglewood.

Iran returns to Inglewood to face Belgium on June 21 and completes Group G in Seattle, against Egypt on June 26.

“I’m really proud to be part of my national team,” said Ezatolahi, whose career has taken him to play for clubs in Spain, Russia, England, Belgium, Denmark, Qatar and now Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.

“We need to clear up our minds and be fresh because our target and our duty is to fight for our people, to represent our country and to show how good we are,” he said.

Ghorbani agreed, saying the team wants to bring joy to Iranians.

“The best message I can give right now is that the Iranian team is showing what it means to be a team,” he said. “We are showing that we are one team under one flag that can bring joy to our whole country, and to show the power of Iranian players and Iranian people to the world.”

The FIFA World Cup begins on June 11. You can follow the action on Al Jazeera’s dedicated World Cup 2026 page with all the latest news, match build-up and live text commentary and keep up to date with group standings, real-time match results and schedules.

The promotion of Conservative MP Alistair Burt to Minister for the Middle East within Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) demonstrates that the UK’s friendship with the Saudi-aligned Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states will remain toxic.

Between May 2010 and October 2013, Burt was only an Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, with responsibility for “Counter Terrorism, Counter Proliferation, Counter Piracy, North America, Middle East and North Africa, the Maldives and Sri Lanka.” As of earlier this month, he is now a full minister of state, responsible solely for the Middle East; he also holds a second ministerial position at the Department for International Development.

As Under-Secretary, Burt had a long record of protecting the Bahrain-Britain intimate relationship. It was not just, as one activist put it, the usual “meaningless FCO shtick” in which he repeatedly claimed that progress was being made on reforms even when it patently wasn’t. It was a serious of smears, lies and fabrications which went above and beyond the call of duty. There is no reason to believe that his time as a full minister will be any different; in his time out of government office he engaged deeply with GCC lobbyists.

That the lobbyists were interested in him is unsurprising. From 2011 (“the Arab Spring”) until he left the FCO in 2013, despite repeated requests, Burt never admitted that British equipment had been used against pro-democracy demonstrators in Bahrain. He claimed there was no evidence that British-supplied shotguns, teargas and stun grenades had been used in the suppression of protests, despite ample photographic proof. When asked whether AssetCo, a private fire equipment company based in Britain, was involved in the crackdown, he twisted away from the truth; it was.

It was BAE Systems armoured cars, manufactured in Newcastle, which were used by the Saudis when they intervened to save the Al-Khalifa ruling family from wipe-out by deploying troops during the Bahrain protests. Burt claimed meekly that they were only there to “safeguard installations.” The Campaign Against The Arms Trade (CAAT) pointed out that even if this was the case, “the Saudi presence in that country increases the capacity of the Bahraini authorities to suppress protests.”

Burt then smeared a Bahraini human rights organisation for offering criticism of the regime; a group which had, coincidentally, helped to organise the 2011 protests.

In the summer of 2013, a Labour MP asked about rights allegations raised by “the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights”. “I have not seen the report,” Burt replied bluntly. The report in question dealt with specific cases of the abuse of prisoners, but he still seemed to know a lot about the specific society. It was almost as if he had been briefed on what to say. He told parliament that the BYSHR was merely “an unregistered non-governmental organisation… and its credibility is untested.” It was a naked attempt to discredit the group.

Mohammed Al-Maskati founded the BYSHR some six years previously. He had applied for it to be registered under Bahrain’s onerous charity regulations, but had been turned down for being too critical of the state. His father-in-law is a prominent political prisoner.

Al-Maskati is now a senior consultant for the highly credible Frontline Defenders organisation. In 2011, Amnesty International adopted his case after the regime sent out a mass text message calling for his death because his society had been a leading organisation in the Pearl Roundabout protests.

Since the mid-2000s, Al-Maskati has been subject to constant judicial and other forms of harassment, including public discrediting. Minister Alistair Burt has looked comfortable about joining in with these attacks.

Burt also displayed studied indifference to anyone facilitating the crackdown and refused to engage with the organisers of the Formula One Grand Prix who were heavily criticised for repeatedly hosting their events in Manama in subsequent years. He also refused to raise with European allies the allegations that they were shipping surveillance technologies to the regime in Bahrain, and completely ignored reports that a British social media monitoring firm, Olton, was also involved, working for the Bahrain ministry of the interior.

What Burt has done since October 2013 until his re-appointment as a senior minister is even more of a concern. He is clearly a man beholden to Saudi-aligned GCC interests. Two months after he stepped down, the Bahrain parliament paid for him to attend the Manama Dialogue, arranged by the PR firm Meade Hall & Associates.

Although he was despatched temporarily to the Department of Health for another ministerial role, when the Saudi Arabian Shura (Consultative) Council arrived on a flying visit to London in 2015, Burt sat down with its members for a cosy meeting.

The new minister’s relationship with the UAE has also remained close. This April, before he was re-appointed to the FCO, Burt took it upon himself to lead a delegation of British MPs to the country, and appeared in the de facto state-controlled media encouraging further economic co-operation. He also became chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for the UAE.

Burt has also maintained a relationship with Bell Pottinger, the PR firm enlisted to defend the State of Bahrain during the 2011 crackdown. In 2015, he was appointed as a non-executive director of the oil and gas exploration company President Energy, whose own lobbying and public relations are also handled by Bell Pottinger. The PR agency also handles secretariat functions for the APPG on Bahrain, a pressure group for Bahraini state interests; Burt is a member. There is an alternative grouping for those British politicians in favour of democratisation, known as the APPG for Democracy in Bahrain; Burt is not a member.

Even after Alistair Burt left the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the APPG Bahrain continued to court him, perhaps in the hope that, one day, he might be returned to greater office; so did the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and he has. The minister is clearly the GCC’s man at the FCO; we should be wary about who he really works for.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Oil shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz have quietly increased in recent weeks, but traders say the movement reflects a fragmented and opaque energy market rather than a full recovery in global supply flows.

More than four months into the ongoing conflict involving Iran, tanker traffic remains heavily disrupted, with shipping patterns increasingly shaped by risk, secrecy and shifting political arrangements.

Tanker Traffic Shows Limited but Rising Movement

Shipping data suggests that only a small number of tankers are currently crossing the Strait of Hormuz compared with pre conflict levels.

Monitoring firms including LSEG and Kpler estimate that an average of just a few vessels per day are now passing through the strait, far below normal volumes.

Despite this, analysis of oil stored on tankers in the Gulf indicates that outflows have gradually increased, suggesting more crude is leaving the region than official shipping visibility shows.

Hidden Shipping Patterns and “Dark” Tankers

A growing share of tankers are reportedly turning off tracking systems during transit through the strait, a practice known as going dark.

This involves disabling Automatic Identification System signals, making it harder to track vessel movements in real time.

According to shipping analytics firms such as Vortexa, a large majority of outbound tankers recently used this method, reflecting rising caution among operators.

This has made it significantly harder for markets to accurately assess global supply flows and has increased uncertainty in oil pricing.

Oil Stored on Tankers Shows Gradual Decline

One key indicator of market movement is the volume of oil stored on ships inside the Gulf, often referred to as oil on water.

Estimates from Kpler suggest that volumes have fallen from a peak of around 184 million barrels in March to roughly 148 million barrels more recently.

This decline indicates that more oil is gradually leaving the region, even if it is not fully visible through standard tracking systems.

Analysts estimate that outflows have increased over recent weeks, suggesting a slow and uneven recovery in shipping activity.

Security Risks Continue to Disrupt Shipping

The ongoing conflict involving Iran has significantly disrupted maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil transit routes.

Limited access to the strait has forced producers to reduce output in some cases, while storage constraints have added pressure to supply chains across the Gulf.

Some shipping routes are reportedly being managed through informal arrangements or alternative corridors, while others rely on higher risk transit strategies to avoid detection or confrontation.

Recovery Remains Uncertain

Despite signs of increased movement, analysts warn that the situation is far from a return to normal.

A sustained recovery in oil flows would require consistent shipping access, stable security conditions and sufficient tanker availability to support exports.

Many shipowners remain reluctant to operate in the region due to elevated insurance costs and the risk of vessels being stranded or targeted.

Long Term Structural Change Possible

Industry observers warn that even if diplomatic progress leads to a formal reopening of the strait, the global oil market may not return to previous conditions.

There is growing discussion that Iran could attempt to impose tolls or control systems on shipping through the waterway, which would fundamentally alter global energy logistics.

Such a scenario could force Gulf producers to seek alternative export routes or invest in new infrastructure to reduce dependence on the strait.

Analysis: Market Stability Replaced by Managed Uncertainty

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz highlights a shift from predictable global energy flows to a more fragmented and opaque system.

While oil continues to move out of the Gulf, the lack of transparency in shipping routes is creating uncertainty for traders and pricing benchmarks.

The increased use of stealth navigation and alternative transit arrangements reflects a market adapting to geopolitical risk rather than resolving it.

As long as tensions persist, energy markets are likely to remain volatile, with supply visibility as important as supply itself in determining global prices.

Conclusion

Oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz are slowly increasing, but hidden tanker movements and ongoing conflict mean the global energy market remains deeply uncertain. Without stable political conditions and transparent shipping routes, a full recovery in oil flows is unlikely in the near term, keeping traders cautious and markets volatile.

With information from Reuters.

Across northeastern Nigeria, former Boko Haram insurgents now move with Nigerian troops into forests they once controlled. They identify footpaths that insurgents use after attacks, point out where improvised explosive devices are most likely buried beneath soft sand roads, and decode habits, voices, and movement patterns invisible to the average soldier. They explain how camps are structured during the rainy season and identify commanders at a distance. Some of these ex-insurgents die in combat fighting the same insurgency they once served.

One of the first such defectors was Abubakar Umar from Bama in Borno State. Soldiers called him Small and say he was presumably in his mid-20s when he died in 2023. Before then, he had fought on the frontlines of multiple operations across Sambisa, Timbuktu, and the Lake Chad basin.

Before surrendering, Small spent years in the insurgency as a Naqeeb, a low-ranking fighter, enabling him to know the terrain intimately. By the time he defected to the Nigerian Army, he already knew which routes disappeared under floodwater during the rains, where insurgents buried weapons before abandoning camps, and how insurgents escaped after raids. He understood the logic behind ambushes because he had once planned and carried out attacks against the same army he would later fight beside.

Others followed a similar path. Among them was Zakariyya from Pulka in Gwoza, another ex-insurgent who later supported military operations across Borno and Yobe. He died in late 2025.

At first, many soldiers distrusted them, especially as some of them had lost close friends and colleagues to Boko Haram attacks. For them, accepting a former insurgent carrying a rifle beside them was never easy. Operation after operation changed the relationship, however. According to military sources familiar with the missions, Small and Zakariyya repeatedly identified patterns that helped troops avoid deadly traps and ambushes. With time, commanders began listening whenever they spoke.

Then came a particular operation deep inside Sambisa in 2023. Small moved ahead of the troops in a way one soldier later described to HumAngle as “fearless, almost reckless,” as though death no longer frightened him, having already crossed too many moral boundaries to fear its arrival. He never returned.

The soldiers who survived that operation spoke about him afterwards with the kind of tone usually reserved for men buried in decorated military uniforms. 

There are many stories like this now scattered across the northeastern region–former insurgents fighting alongside the state. 

From the islands and marshes of Lake Chad to the forests of Zamfara, Sokoto, Kaduna, Niger, Kebbi, and the roads stretching toward Kwara, Nigeria is confronting a conflict system that has changed shape. In response, security forces are increasingly turning toward defectors.

The unseen war

For years, the Nigerian state has made progress against the Boko Haram war. When villages like Bama and Gwoza fell to the terror group, the military reclaimed them very quickly. They have also killed commanders over time, while still exploring non-kinetic approaches that made it possible for insurgents to surrender. Through this approach, defections occurred at an unprecedented rate. 

Boko Haram fractured internally as ISWAP consolidated its presence in parts of the Lake Chad Basin. Many did not want to remain in the Lake Chad theatre, but they also did not trust a formal surrender to Nigerian authorities, so some of them moved to other parts of Nigeria.

HumAngle has tracked the movement of former Boko Haram elements to the North West region and parts of central Nigeria as far back as 2020. Some joined criminal armed groups, others became trainers, bomb makers, couriers, informants, guards, or logistics brokers. Others disappeared into cities following the death of Abubakar Shekau and clashes between factions within the group.

In Kano and several urban areas, defectors and affiliates blended into urban life. Some became labourers, mechanics, phone repairers, commercial drivers, or petty traders. Some drifted into robbery and informal criminal economies, while others married and completely concealed their past.

This creates a difficult security dilemma for many reasons. How does a state track men who have left the insurgency but not entered any formal process? How does it distinguish between a deserter seeking anonymity and one rebuilding operational networks elsewhere? How does it protect communities without criminalising everyone who once lived under insurgent rule?

Nigeria has not answered those questions through a coherent national framework. Instead, it improvises.

The intelligence war nobody sees

When HumAngle spoke with soldiers and intelligence officers who served in the North East, their language was different. They do not romanticise former Boko Haram insurgents nor do they describe them as heroes, but they call them assets.

Before defectors became operationally useful, troops often entered unfamiliar terrain with insufficient intelligence from local hunters, the civilian joint task force, and satellite imagery. Equipment like drones and maps was useful but had limitations, as it could not predict movement patterns or likely landmines. Former insurgents helped dismantle part of that advantage. According to several defectors interviewed for this report, many military successes now depend partly on information provided by them.

“Whenever soldiers go for operations,” one explained, “some of us move ahead because we know the roads, the bushes, and where bombs are planted. We tell them which road not to use.”

Another former insurgent described how they identified hidden weapon caches and camp positions.

“Some of us know where weapons were kept. So when operations happen, we guide soldiers directly to those places.”

They also described helping troops understand insurgent movement patterns after attacks.

“When fighters escape,” one said, “we know the routes they use because we ourselves used those routes before.” The source added, “We advised soldiers to evacuate the women and children left behind by fighters to Maiduguri, which encouraged a lot of the fighters to defect from the group easily at a later date.”

The moral fracture

For victims, however, these battlefield contributions rarely erase memory. A widow whose husband was executed does not easily accept that the man who once terrorised her community now works alongside soldiers. A farmer whose village was burned does not find emotional comfort in hearing that a former insurgent helped identify buried bombs. A displaced family living with hunger in an abandoned resettled community does not easily understand why former insurgents appear to receive rehabilitation support while survivors struggle alone.

That anger has become one of the deepest unresolved tensions inside Nigeria’s reintegration strategy. Many affected communities perceive former insurgents as receiving privileges unavailable to victims. Some surrendered members received food support, accommodation, vocational training, phones, stipends, or reintegration assistance. Meanwhile, many survivors still live with displacement, trauma, hunger, unemployment, grief, and insecurity.

One former insurgent described how resentment intensified after communities observed rehabilitated insurgents riding motorcycles, carrying weapons alongside soldiers, wearing jeans and clean clothes, and moving relatively freely.

“What happened was mostly hatred and resentment,” he said. “People saw the boys looking comfortable and became angry.”

Kabiru Adamu, the Managing Director of Beacon Consulting, comments on this imbalance. “When we look at this from a transitional justice perspective,” he said, “the current imbalance is a significant vulnerability.”

According to him, communities may interpret reintegration programmes as rewarding violence while neglecting victims.

“If the state appears to reward insurgency while neglecting victims, it breeds a deep sense of injustice. Unaddressed grievances are the primary fuel for cyclical violence.”

Former insurgents speak

The former insurgents interviewed by HumAngle described themselves not as forgiven men, but as useful men. “There are those who go to war,” one former fighter said, “And there are informants.” He explained that some maintain communication with active insurgents and relay intelligence to security agencies.

“If attacks are being planned, information is passed quickly to intelligence officers so security can be strengthened.”

Others described identifying civilians secretly supplying insurgents with food, fuel, or information. “There are people in town transporting petrol, food, and information,” one explained. “Those who surrendered know many of them because they worked together before.”

According to the former insurgents, these intelligence networks disrupted insurgent logistics and prevented attacks. Some defectors also described participating directly in combat operations.

“They gave some of us motorcycles and guns,” one said. “Sometimes, operations happen without soldiers even accompanying us.”

Another described units led by surrendered insurgents moving independently through forests to intercept attacks or recover weapons.

“Some commanders are given twenty or thirty motorcycles and sent to carry out patrols,” he said. “They stop attacks and return with captured weapons… Nearly 40 per cent of ground troops’ successes achieved in the past three years in this war come from the contribution of surrendered fighters.”

HumAngle cannot independently verify this claim. Still, several military and intelligence sources who spoke to HumAngle on the condition of anonymity admit that defectors remain useful in operations. What is less clear is whether relying on them will be safe or sustainable in the long run.

Security expert Kabiru Adamu described former insurgents as “force multipliers” rather than the decisive force behind military gains. According to him, conventional military operations, air power, and the Civilian Joint Task Force remain central to weakening insurgent networks.

“Ex-fighters provide precision,” he explained. However, he warned that the strategic dangers remain severe. “The risks include infiltration, double agents, human rights concerns, institutional degradation, and loss of civilian trust.”

The risk of dependence also concerns some analysts and security officials. If military units become too reliant on defectors for intelligence, what happens when defectors lie, or when personal grudges shape accusations, or when former insurgents return to active criminal networks or, as in some cases, return to Boko Haram carrying sensitive operational knowledge? What happens when military institutions fail to build independent intelligence systems because surrendered insurgents appear easier to use?

The northwestern region is quite different from the North East. Boko Haram and ISWAP emerged through ideological insurgency structures combining theology, coercion, governance, taxation, and violence. In contrast, the armed groups in the northwestern region emerged differently, engaging in criminal activities such as cattle rustling, communal conflict, illegal mining, vigilante reprisals, extortion, kidnapping, and governance collapse.

Yet over time, the distinction blurred. Armed groups across Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger, and Kebbi increasingly adopted tactics associated with insurgent warfare: IEDs, ambushes, and rural territories being subject to armed taxation systems.

Abubakar Abdullahi, a journalist who has reported extensively from Zamfara, said Boko Haram-linked elements have become increasingly visible inside parts of the northwestern region.

“In areas such as Dutsin Maiqardaji mountain,” he said, “Boko Haram members have a heavy presence. Both Lakurawa and Boko Haram terrorists preach to residents they keep under siege in ungoverned spaces. Ongoing armed operations in the North East pave the way for fighters to find Zamfara as a haven,” he explained.

Therefore, the state’s decision to use surrendered insurgents in counterinsurgency operations across parts of the northwest follows a grim internal logic.

Trauma beneath the surface

The psychological burden of the insurgency now stretches across an entire generation. In Maiduguri, Monguno, Bama, Dikwa, Gwoza, Damboa, Pulka, Banki, and dozens of smaller communities scattered across Borno and the wider Lake Chad region, trauma shows up in ordinary routines. Some people report waking suddenly at night whenever motorcycles pass too quickly outside their compounds. Parents instinctively gather children indoors whenever rumours of attacks on nearby roads spread. Men who once farmed freely now calculate distance from military formations before deciding whether land is safe enough to cultivate.

For many survivors, peace itself feels temporary.

Kauna Malgwi, a clinical psychologist directly affected by the insurgency during its early years, described northeastern Nigeria as a society living in a prolonged psychological survival mode.

“Prolonged violence keeps societies in chronic hypervigilance,” she explained. “People shift from acute stress into collective survival mode. Nervous systems remain activated for years. Unresolved trauma normalises fear, weakens communities, and erodes cohesion. Ongoing violence keeps trauma active and prevents healing.”

The effects appear everywhere: overcrowded displacement settlements, classrooms where children struggle to concentrate because conflict has interrupted the normal architecture of childhood, families where fathers withdraw emotionally after years of violence, and young men who have grown up around guns, funerals, military convoys, and uncertainty.

“Children in chronic conflict develop emotional, learning, and behavioural problems that, if unaddressed, persist into adulthood and become the generational norm,” Malgwi warned

She listed the consequences as cycles of violence, emotional detachment, chronic anxiety, educational disruption, social mistrust, difficulty forming secure relationships, and increased vulnerability to recruitment by armed groups.

“If trauma among children is ignored,” she warned, “national stability itself is at risk. Peacebuilding that ignores collective healing produces fragile and temporary peace. When victims feel forgotten as ex-fighters are supported, trauma deepens and trust in institutions erodes. Forgiveness must not be forced. Communities require safety and acknowledgement before reconciliation.”

According to her, communities need public acknowledgement of suffering before reintegration can become emotionally sustainable.

“Victim-centred support systems are essential. Communities need visible justice, visible care, and transparent communication before trust can begin to recover.”

She also warned about the development of emotional desensitisation among conflict-affected populations.

“Without support, grief becomes anger or despair,” she explained. “Violence itself can become normalised.”

Many young people in northeastern Nigeria have never experienced sustained normalcy. They grew up hearing stories about massacres the way previous generations heard folktales. They learned directions through checkpoints and geography through displacement.

Kauna Malgwi believes recovery in such environments cannot depend solely on psychiatrists or formal hospitals because the scale of trauma is too large.

“Community healing includes training community health workers in psychosocial support, group therapy, trauma-informed schools, faith-based healing spaces, and safe storytelling forums,” she explained, stressing the importance of collectively restoring dignity. “The goal is not only treatment. The goal is restoring function, trust, and resilience across society.”

For many survivors, however, the war never became a discussion about tactical adaptation. It remained personal. A missing daughter. A burned house. A father was executed beside a road. A child was buried after an explosion and nights of screaming.

A life divided permanently into before and after.

The state’s impossible calculation

For Kabiru Adamu, the question is not whether the state should use former insurgents operationally. The deeper issue is whether Nigeria can do so without weakening its own legitimacy. He described the current approach as a fragile balancing act between military necessity, transitional justice, and social stability.

“The Nigerian military faces a highly asymmetric threat,” he said. “Using former fighters offers distinct immediate operational advantages because these individuals possess granular, real-time intelligence. They know Sambisa Forest, the Mandara Mountains, the Lake Chad islands, and the internal communication structures of factions like JAS and ISWAP.”

Still, he repeatedly returned to the dangers. “The strategic risks are severe and multifaceted.” The operational usefulness of former insurgents can serve as an excuse to abandon accountability. “There must be transparent triage,” he argued. “Low-level associates and coerced participants cannot be treated the same way as high-level perpetrators. Most residents of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe reject blanket amnesty for commanders associated with mass atrocities.”

For Adamu, reintegration without visible justice creates long-term instability.

“If communities feel abandoned by the state in favour of their attackers, it erodes the social contract. It opens the possibility of vigilantism or future militant mobilisation driven by resentment. Demobilisation is not simply a military process,” he said. “Reintegration is generational and should remain civilian-led.”

He pointed to global examples from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia as warnings.

“When stipends dry up without sustainable livelihoods, ex-combatants often return to criminal economies.”

According to him, Nigeria risks repeating similar mistakes unless rehabilitation becomes economically viable. “Cash support alone is not enough. Long-term reintegration requires market-driven livelihoods and ongoing monitoring.”

He also warned against grouping defectors into separate armed formations.

“Never create isolated paramilitary monopolies from ex-combatants,” he said. “If they are used operationally, strict oversight and accountability systems are essential.”

Perhaps most importantly, he insisted that reintegration cannot survive politically unless victims see equal investment in their own recovery.

“For every dollar spent on DDR,” he argued, “an equal or greater amount should be visibly invested in victims and receiving communities.”

Without that balance, he believes the state risks winning short-term tactical gains while deepening long-term social fractures.

The soldiers and the boys

One of the strangest transformations inside this war is the relationship between soldiers and former insurgents. Many soldiers lost friends to insurgent attacks, some carry visible scars, and others carry memories they rarely discuss. Meanwhile, former insurgents themselves live in a state of permanent ambiguity. They are neither fully accepted civilians nor recognised soldiers. They exist inside a grey zone.

According to the former insurgents HumAngle spoke to, several surrendered members deployed to Zamfara and other northwestern states were killed during operations against armed groups.

“In this war,” one said, “many of those helping the government have lost their lives. Some died fighting people they once called brothers.”

A Nigerian soldier told HumAngle he never imagined he would one day fight alongside former Boko Haram members.

“I thought the only relationship I would ever have with these bastards was to kill them or be killed,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he’s not permitted to speak to journalists on this matter

Now deployed with some of the defectors against their former comrades, the soldier said the experience has reshaped parts of his perception over time. Some of the former insurgents have proven useful in combat operations, particularly because of their familiarity with insurgent tactics and terrain.

“They have been very helpful since we started working with them. They are constantly watched and supervised, but the contributions of some of them have been priceless,” said the staff sergeant.

What a serious framework would require

Nigeria does not need to pretend former insurgents are useless. Evidence from the field suggests they have helped disrupt attacks, expose explosives, identify camps, trace logistics, and support military operations. At the same time, experts say the state cannot continue to manage reintegration through improvisation and silence. A credible framework would require clear categories that separate coerced associates from high-level perpetrators. It would require transparent accountability systems. Victims would receive compensation, trauma support, livelihood recovery, education, and public acknowledgement.

The northwest would be treated as its own conflict system requiring tailored responses rather than simple transplantation of northeastern models.

Repentant volunteers

The former insurgents interviewed for this report did not seem to want public sympathy. Most acknowledged that many Nigerians would always see them as part of the violence they once took part in. Yet, beneath their answers was a recurring theme. They insisted they no longer recognised the movement they had joined years earlier.

Abu Muhsin, now 38, said he entered Boko Haram as a teenager after preachers repeatedly visited his village.

“I joined them when I was around 16 years old,” he said. “They used to come and preach in our village, near Damasak. I got convinced, and I joined them.”

Over time, he rose within the movement and eventually became a Naqeeb, a field commander operating around the Lake Chad region. But years inside the insurgency changed his view of the organisation.

“We saw that the group was not following the rules of Islam,” he said. “They kill people and loot their properties. We started communicating with those who surrendered before us. They directed us and later escaped from the bush with some of our families.”

After surrendering, Abu Muhsin said he volunteered to support military operations because former insurgents understood terrain and insurgent movement patterns better than most troops.

“No one forced us to volunteer,” he said. “We just felt we should assist the military since we know the bush better than they do.”

For that assistance, he said, volunteers receive irregular payments. “They give us some allowance. They pay us ₦100,000, sometimes ₦50,000 or ₦30,000.”

Another former insurgent, Ibn Mus’ab, traced his recruitment to family influence. “My cousins were already members and used to visit us,” said the 35-year-old former fighter from Wulgo in Gamboru Ngala. “They used to preach their doctrines to us. Later, they convinced me, and I followed them to the bush.” That was in 2014. 

Inside the insurgency, Ibn Mus’ab became Amirul’Uddah, responsible for weapons management. Like several defectors interviewed for this report, he framed his disillusionment in religious terms.

“I left them because some of their activities are becoming un-Islamic,” he said. “They kill people unnecessarily. They kill someone for taking drugs, which is not so in Sharia.”

His departure from Boko Haram was shaped partly by internal persecution. He said he was accused of an offence and that members of the group declared him wanted. “I escaped to Giedam, not even knowing that the military was accepting people who surrendered,” he recalled. “I was later told I could submit myself, and I surrendered to them.”

He escaped alone, and his family joined him later. Asked why he now assists the military against former comrades, he answered without hesitation.

“I decided to assist because those people are no longer following the Sharia accordingly. There are many of us who are ready to assist, and a lot are doing well.”

Like others, he described financial incentives as modest and inconsistent.

“The usual pay is ₦100,000, sometimes ₦50,000,” he said. “If they can pay more than this, many more would be willing to volunteer.”

Abu Faruq’s story begins differently. Unlike some defectors who joined as adults through ideological persuasion, he said he was absorbed into the movement as a child during Boko Haram’s expansion across Gwoza.

“They took me when I was a kid,” the 35-year-old said. “It was in Gwoza when they were preaching. I grew up in their place and got married.”

He said he became part of the Rijaal, the fighting cadre within the insurgency structure.

Years later, he concluded that the movement no longer reflected the religious principles it claimed to defend. “I left them because they were not practising what the Qur’an and Hadith say about Sharia,” he explained. “They kill innocent people, they loot and destroy people’s properties.”

According to him, communication with earlier defectors again played a critical role in encouraging surrender. “Some of our friends have earlier surrendered, and they told us how they were received warmly,” he said. “They directed us on the phone on how we could come out and meet the military.”

After leaving the bush, Abu Faruq eventually joined operations supporting Nigerian troops, including deployments far beyond the northeast. “Yes, I did,” he said when asked whether he travelled with soldiers to the northwest. “They selected some of us to assist them in Zamfara and Sokoto.”

According to him, defectors participated in operations across multiple villages affected by armed groups. “They first took us to Sokoto, and from there we went to many villages in both Sokoto and Zamfara for operations.”

He said he remained there for about two months. For that deployment, he received what he described as ranger allowances. ‘They pay us ₦100,000 per month as rangers.”

These stories show men trying to find a new place for themselves in a war that has already taken over much of their lives. But none of their reasons answers the deeper moral question about Nigeria’s use of former insurgents.

The US announced a ceasefire framework between Israel and Lebanon, which includes expanded Lebanese army control and a halt to Hezbollah attacks. Al Jazeera’s Manuel Rapalo explains how Hezbollah’s rejection of the talks leaves enforcement uncertain.

Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman has been elected as the 81st president of the 193-member United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). He will assume office when the UNGA session opens in September.

Rahman, who earlier held several portfolios at the UN, won the presidency after defeating Cyprus’s Ambassador Andreas Kakouris in a closely contested vote, taking the helm of the world’s most representative diplomatic body during a time of global geopolitical turmoil.

Who is Khalilur Rahman?

A career diplomat, Rahman joined Bangladesh’s foreign service in 1979. He also held senior UN positions in New York and Geneva, including as the spokesperson for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and as special adviser to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Between 1986 and 1991, he served as the first secretary at the Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the UN.

Rahman became foreign minister in February, when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won the country’s first election since a student-led uprising ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024.

He previously served as national security adviser and the high representative on the Rohingya issue in the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.

Rahman’s presidency will coincide with one of the most consequential processes on the UN calendar – the selection of Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s successor – as his term expires at the end of this year.

“The UN will commence its ninth decade at a time when trust in our organisation is being tested on multiple fronts,” he told diplomats assembled at the UNGA as he accepted the new role. “Taken together, these challenges tend to undermine the public trust and confidence in the ability of our organisation to deliver its promises.”

Guterres congratulated Rahman, saying, “Your remarkable political and diplomatic experience are a guarantee of success not only to the General Assembly but to the United Nations as a whole.”

How is the UNGA president selected?

While the presidency of the UNGA is largely ceremonial, it is also prestigious. It is the UN organ where countries large and small can speak, and it is the scene of the world’s largest annual diplomatic gathering.

The UNGA president is normally chosen by acclamation, meaning member states agree on a candidate by broad consensus. If no consensus can be reached, a secret ballot is held; in that rare case, the candidate who wins a simple majority of votes becomes president.

Before this year, the last contested UNGA presidential election was in 2016, when Fijian diplomat Peter Thomson won the presidency of the 71st session in a secret ballot, defeating Cyprus’s candidate by four votes. In 2012, Serbia’s Vuk Jeremic narrowly beat Lithuania’s candidate in another secret ballot. In 1991, Saudi Arabia’s candidate, Samir Shihabi, won the presidency in a contested vote against candidates from Yemen and Papua New Guinea.

In the secret ballot, Rahman secured 99 votes, eight more than his competitor Kakouris. A total of 190 ballots were cast, with no invalid votes or abstentions.

The presidency rotates among the UN’s five regional groups, and the 81st session falls to the Asia Pacific group. Rahman will serve a one-year term starting on September 8, the UN said.

Outgoing UNGA President Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s foreign minister, highlighted how trust towards multilateralism is under growing strain.

The UN is facing “not only headwinds, but immense pressure”, with consensus increasingly difficult to achieve and defence of the UN Charter becoming “a daily necessity”.

“The role of the president of the General Assembly is no longer simply procedural,” she said.

The US administration under President Donald Trump has tried to undermine the UN system, resorting to unilateral actions to tackle complex global geopolitical issues. Washington has withdrawn from several UN organisations, such as the World Health Organization and the Human Rights Council, and cut funding to the global body.

The US president has called the UN a “talking shop”, questioning its purpose during his speech at the annual UNGA meeting last September. “The UN has such tremendous potential … but it’s not even coming close to living up to that potential,” he said.

What is the UNGA?

The General Assembly is the UN’s most representative body, bringing together all 193 member states, each with one vote. Its annual gathering in September in New York is the only UN forum where world leaders from all countries can speak.

The UNGA controls the UN budget, adopts treaties, addresses global issues from poverty to corruption and passes numerous resolutions that, while not legally binding, almost always reflect global opinion.

The UNGA also makes key decisions for the UN, including appointing the secretary-general on the recommendation of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and electing the nonpermanent members of the council.

The coming UNGA session will open on September 8.

On Wednesday, the UNGA elected Austria, Kyrgyzstan, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe to the 15-member UNSC for two-year terms starting on January 1, 2027.

Germany, which had lobbied hard for a seat, failed to win the UNSC seat in a major setback for Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

The council is the only UN body that can make legally binding decisions, such as imposing sanctions and authorising the use of force. It has five permanent veto-wielding members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

After letting another big lead slip with an error-strewn performance at the French Open, top-ranked Aryna Sabalenka felt like getting as far away from the courts as possible.

“Just want to quit tennis right now,” Sabalenka said after wasting a lead of a set and two breaks in a 3-6, 7-5, 6-0 loss to Diana Shnaider in the quarterfinals on Wednesday.

“We’ll see in a few days. Hopefully, I’ll get back on track mentally.”

Sabalenka’s wait for a first French Open title continues despite the four-time major winner leading 4-1 in the second set and being two points from victory while serving for the match at 5-4.

What followed was a complete collapse as she lost 12 of the last 13 games against a player appearing in her first Grand Slam quarterfinal, looking increasingly frustrated and forlorn in the windy conditions.

Just like her loss to Coco Gauff in last year’s final, when she won the first set before becoming undone with a slew of unforced errors, this one will take some time to get over.

“You know those rooms where you just go in and you smash everything,” Sabalenka said. “Probably I will spend a whole day over there destroying stuff. Maybe it will help, maybe not.”

Shnaider next faces Maja Chwalinska, who extended her remarkable Roland Garros run by beating 22nd seed Anna Kalinskaya 7-6 (3), 6-3.

Sabalenka’s missed opportunities

The world number one stood still and screamed after losing a point to fall 0-30 down in the sixth game of the decider. Although she saved two match points at 0-40 down, she lost when she sent a shot into the net.

“I just think it’s [a] combination of everything,” Sabalenka lamented. “You overthink, then you make easy mistakes, then you miss opportunities.”

Her struggles were reminiscent of the match against Gauff, when she remonstrated loudly, shouting to herself and glaring at her team box.

“I just have to sit back and openly think about what’s going on in my head in those tough moments,” Sabalenka said, recalling that match. “Because I’m quite an experienced player. I have been through so many things, and I [have] overcome so many things.”

Sabalenka had already looked agitated when serving for the first set, but still looked in control as she served for the match in the second, holding a 30-15 lead.

“Of course I saw some moments of her frustration,” Shnaider said. “I know Aryna that she’s a very emotional person.”

Shnaider, who was already on her best run at a major, broke Sabalenka before taking complete control.

“Well, honestly, I am speechless. Super happy,” she said. “I feel like I was trying to focus point by point. Not thinking about the score. She is the world number one, so I [am] just trying to do my best. I just had to fight for every point.”

Sabalenka looked increasingly frustrated as the third set wore on, and when she missed a volley at the net in the fourth game of the decider, she crouched and rested her head on her racket.

Another French Open upset

It was another big upset in a tournament, with defending champion Gauff (third round) and four-time winner Iga Swiatek (fourth round) already out.

Jannik Sinner, last year’s men’s singles runner-up, served for the match in a second-round defeat, and 24-time major winner Novak Djokovic wasted a two-set lead in a third-round loss.

That opened things up for lesser-known players. According to sports analytics company Opta, this year’s French Open is the first major tournament without a former men’s or women’s singles major champion in the semifinals since the 1977 French Open.

The unseeded Chwalinska came through three qualifying rounds to become only the second Polish woman to reach the semifinals at Roland Garros, along with Swiatek.

Chwalinska said British player Emma Raducanu’s run to the 2021 US Open title as an 18-year-old qualifier had inspired her.

“It was such an impressive run, you know,” Chwalinska recalled. “Also, she was so young.”

When Kalinskaya’s big forehand from the back of the court went out, the 24-year-old had her biggest win, having never been beyond the second round at any major before this tournament.

Chwalinska’s total prize money heading into Roland Garros was $864,030, and reaching the last four here earns her 750,000 euros (about $872,000).

The roof was open on Court Philippe-Chatrier, and there was a lot of wind.

“I don’t know why would they keep the roof open when it was crazy windy,” Sabalenka said. “It was very dirty tennis. I don’t know how people could actually just sit there and watch me play.”

Kalinskaya also struggled.

“I feel like I was fighting against the wind,” she said. “It was cold today, so the ball was going slower. I couldn’t use my speed, my power.”

Men’s singles exits

In the men’s quarterfinals, 10th-seeded Flavio Cobolli beat number four Felix Auger-Aliassime 4-6, 6-4, 6-4, 6-4 and will face fellow Italian Matteo Arnaldi for a spot in the final.

Arnaldi advanced when Matteo Berrettini, yet another Italian, retired due to a left hip injury, with Arnaldi leading 7-5, 5-2.

Berrettini had his hip treated during a medical timeout earlier in the second set.

The strong Italian showing comes despite top-ranked Sinner getting stunned in the second round.

Second-seeded Alexander Zverev and number 26 Jakub Mensik will meet in the other semifinal.

Caracas, June 3, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government headed by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has instructed airlines and shipping companies to direct fuel payments to a US Treasury account.

Spanish newspaper El Diario published a May 28 letter from state oil company PDVSA addressed to “aviation and maritime customers” that laid out the “banking coordinates” for foreign currency payments concerning JET A1, MGO, and IFO 380 purchases.

JET A1 is a kerosene-based fuel widely used by commercial airplanes, while Maritime Gas Oil (MGO) and Intermediate Fuel Oil (IFO) 380 are standard for ship engines.

“We urge our customers to take the necessary precautions and forward the payment receipt to PDVSA sales representatives so that the payment is cleared and fuel supply is assured,” the letter read.

An attached US Treasury information sheet contains details for Fedwire payments to a “Venezuela custody account” and requires information about “source of funds, e.g., oil, gold, minerals, etc.”

The leaked letter is the first publicly available document from a Venezuelan state institution directing foreign currency payments to an account run by the US Treasury Department as opposed to the country’s Central Bank (BCV) or some alternative state-run mechanism.

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has seized control of the country’s export revenues. The White House has likewise extracted concessions in the form of pro-business reforms, preferential access for Western corporations to natural resources, and external audits of the Venezuelan Central Bank.

US Treasury general licenses allowing select Western corporations to engage in oil and gas activities mandate that all Venezuela-owed payments for royalties, taxes, and dividends be deposited in US Treasury accounts. Additional sanctions waivers imposed similar constraints on mining sector services and exports.

Neither US nor Venezuelan authorities have disclosed information about the funds, the timings of their disbursements back to Caracas, and the percentage kept by the Trump administration. The US president stated in a May interview that Washington has “made a fortune” from Venezuelan oil sales.

Both Washington and Caracas have acknowledged the use of Treasury-held Venezuelan revenues for the purchase of medicines and medical equipment from US manufacturers. In January, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a Senate hearing in January that Venezuela would need to submit a “budget request” to access its own funds.

According to reports, Washington is mandating that the Venezuelan Central Bank distribute the returned foreign currency to private sector importers via exchange table auctions run by public and private banks. The BCV has reportedly allocated more than US $5 billion thus far in 2026.

The Rodríguez acting government’s diplomatic rapprochement with the Trump White House, coupled with reforms to attract Western investment, has led to a growing number of international airlines reestablishing flights to the Caribbean nation. American Airlines currently runs two daily direct Caracas-Miami flights, while United Airlines will launch a Caracas-Houston connection in August. Jetblue, for its part, is set to initiate its first-ever Venezuela route later in the year.

Venezuelan authorities have likewise recorded increased shipping activity at the country’s ports.

Born in Rosario, Argentina, Bielsa hails from a family of educated minds, with his brother having worked in politics and his sister a renowned architect.

Both of those professions require analytical thinking – a gift Bielsa also possessed from childhood. However, he was drawn to football, not necessarily playing it but absorbing the tactics.

Every day he would send his mother to the local newsagent to buy football magazines and newspapers, spending hours reading up as much as he could about how teams played and how different managers worked.

Bielsa was still a capable but limited footballer. A defender but lacking in pace, he came through the youth system at his boyhood club Newell’s Old Boys before frustrating spells in the lower leagues of Argentinian football meant he decided to call time on his playing career at the age of 25 to focus on coaching.

His post-playing career started with the Buenos Aires university football team and, after two years there, he secured a position back at Newell’s as a coach of the reserve team.

Bielsa’s frustration with his limitations as a player played a significant part in his coaching philosophy, as he focused on ensuring that any player he coached was able to get the maximum out of their ability.

His training sessions were intense, with lots of focus on repetition – if a player did not have the talent to make something happen naturally then he would be sure to drill the processes into their minds.

Bielsa was appointed Newell’s manager in 1990 and his methods brought instant success as they won the Argentinian championship.

A spell in Mexico followed before Bielsa returned to Argentina in 1997 to manage Velez Sarsfield. There he would be labelled ‘loco’ (crazy) as he insisted on fielding two teenage centre-backs. He would have the last laugh, however, as he immediately helped them to win the league title.

Bielsa, who has said his nickname of ‘El Loco’ actually predates his time at Velez Sarsfield, very briefly became manager of Spanish side Espanyol but left them when he was offered his first international post in 1998 – as Argentina boss.

Israeli strikes on residential buildings have killed nine Palestinians, setting homes ablaze and leaving widespread destruction. Footage from the scenes showed rescue efforts amid the flames and ambulances transporting casualties.

Today, the U.S. Marine Corps celebrated the end of more than half a century of Harrier ‘jump jet’ operations with a sundown ceremony at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point in North Carolina. For more than 20 percent of the history of the republic, the British-originated jump jet helped to defend America. The story of how the U.S. military first got involved in the program is a little-known but fascinating one. Michael Pryce, who has worked on various aircraft projects, from the Harrier to the Tempest, explains, and, in the process, connects the dots between the AV-8 and its replacement with the Marine Corps, the F-35B Lightning II.

Read our coverage of the Marine Harrier sundown here.

Right from the start, the Harrier had been of immense interest to Britain’s ‘cousins’ across the pond. In the 1950s, the threat of nuclear war led to the creation of jump jets, and NASA, plus the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army soon found that developing rockets seemed easy in comparison to this new class of combat aircraft.

Despite valiant efforts, no American jump jet could be made to work.

A video shows the Ryan X-13 Vertijet during tests. It was one of many Cold War-era jump jet projects that ended in failure:

VERTIJET

All three services got involved in trials of the Hawker Siddeley P.1127 Kestrel, the first iteration of what would become the Harrier, initially in a joint British-American-West German trials squadron. Then, six of the Kestrels were taken to America to continue testing there, and they were renamed as XV-6As once on U.S. soil. Unlike other jump jet projects, the P.1127 utilized four adjustable exhaust nozzles beneath the wing, which rotated to provide thrust for vertical, backward, or hovering flight as well as conventional forward movement.

The thing that impressed the Americans was the sheer simplicity of the British jump jet. With just one engine, and ‘not an electron’ needed in its flight controls, the Kestrel soon transformed into the Harrier, and in 1968 the U.S. Marine Corps decided they would acquire them. Despite not having flown any of the Kestrel trials, they knew they wanted to bring the jump jet into the front line as soon as possible.

The British makers of the Harrier, Hawker Siddeley, first found out about the U.S. Marines’ interest when two men in uniform walked into the Hawker Siddeley hospitality chalet at the 1968 Farnborough Airshow and said they wished to fly the jet. Within two weeks, they had. It was the start of the Marines’ love affair with the Harrier, but it was not America’s first encounter with the British jet.

Over 10 years before, another American had walked into Hawker’s fancy tent at another Farnborough airshow and asked to see their design for what would become the Harrier. Col. Willis “Bill” F. Chapman of the U.S. Air Force was an American in Paris, there to find European weapons that America could fund. Jump jets were all the rage, and the Hawker P.1127 seemed to him to be the most promising.

As leader of the 340th Bomb Group in Italy in World War II, Chapman had seen dozens of his B-25 bombers wiped out, first by a volcanic eruption and then by a Luftwaffe attack. He knew nuclear missiles could do much worse. Soon, he had funded the Pegasus engine, the heart of the Harrier, and struck up a strong friendship with the Hawker design team led by Ralph Hooper, driving their design forward, from the drawing board into the sky.

In 1968, one of the U.S. Marines who walked in at Farnborough would play an equally vital role in getting the Harrier into Marine service. Col. Tom Miller had flown in Korea and Vietnam, and scored a speed record in a McDonnell F4H Phantom for good measure. Deeply impressed by the Harrier, he went into battle on ‘The Hill’ to secure it for the Corps, then on to lead it into service as the commander of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at Cherry Point — the same unit that retired the Harrier today, 55 years later.

The rest of the history of the Harrier is well known. From the initial, British-built AV-8A to the jointly-developed, with mostly American technology, second-generation AV-8B Harrier II, the Harrier found more use, and created more jobs, in America than in Britain. The American connection was the making of the British jump jet, and helped cement relations between the two countries’ pilots, engineers and ground crews over decades.

In the 1980s, there were attempts to make a new, supersonic successor, with the speed of the Marines’ F/A-18A Hornet and the vertical flight ability of the Harrier. Once again, the Americans turned to British designers. In 1981, Hooper and a team of engineers from the Harrier factory at Kingston-upon-Thames went to work at McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis, Missouri, to design the ultimate jump jet. Over drawing boards and at tailgate parties after ball games, they evolved a great beast of a jet, the P.1218, with two crew, two engines and the latest tech, to succeed the U.S. Navy’s F-14A Tomcat fleet interceptor and A-6E Intruder all-weather strike aircraft. Despite arriving at a joint design, money was limited, and the work was re-focused on research with NASA — the start of what in time would become the Joint Strike Fighter program.

Although the U.S Navy buys jets for the Marines, the big twin-engined design was of less interest to the Corps than another of Hooper’s designs, a smaller, single-engine jet that weighed the same as the Hornet. This supersonic jump jet was seriously studied in the United Kingdom, with tests and design work over many years. The U.S. Marines were involved too, officers visiting the Kingston factory to talk about its prospects. When Britain delayed jump jet plans in favor of what became the Eurofighter Typhoon, it meant Hooper’s single-engined P.1216 design, with its wild-looking twin-boom configuration, seemed to miss its chance with the Marines. The British designer retired too, but he did not let that stop him.

Keen to see a supersonic jump jet in Marine service, he turned to Miller once again. As the accompanying letter in this article shows, in 1992 he gave Miller the technical plans of the new jump jet, and Miller showed it around at Marine HQ at a vital time — just as 10 years of research was turning into the serious acquisition program for the Joint Strike Fighter.

The emerging requirements specified a weight the same as the Hornet — the same, too, as Hooper’s P.1216. Speed, range and weapons load were close too. While avionics and stealth had advanced beyond the British jet’s capabilities, the knowledge that the man who made the Harrier thought a practical jump jet of Hornet size would work helped get the ball rolling on the third generation of jump jets. Miller’s support ensured the Corps got behind it, leading to the Lockheed Martin F-35B now taking over Cherry Point.

Making a fighting jump jet that works is extremely challenging. The Harrier had its problems — without rigid training, accident rates echoed those of its 1950s origins. The F-35B has had to overcome its own hurdles too.

In the early 2000s, Hooper was called in to help fix those. The transatlantic story of the Harrier may have ended today, but the people who found ways to cut bureaucratic corners by trusting each other, and who cracked the technical code of making the Harrier work, continue to support the next generation of F-35Bs.

The ‘Harrier Mafia’ worked their own way, but always in line with the motto of the Marine Corps. “Semper Fi” was a value shared by British pilots who flew American Harriers in combat operations on exchange as much as by the men and women who made, and supported, 55 years of Harrier operations at Cherry Point.

Jump Jet: The Secret History of the Harrier by Michael Pryce is published on August 27 and is available for pre-order.

Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com

The Cameroonian government has urgently called for strong legal action against perpetrators of gender-based violence and child abuse, citing a significant increase in femicide and sexual assault nationwide.

According to official data released by the government on June 1, the sharp rise in domestic and gender-based killings is disturbing. In 2023, 50 women were documented murdered in Cameroon. That figure rose to 67 cases in 2024, and surged to 77 in 2025. Officials noted that data collected in the first half of 2026 suggests the tragic upward trend is continuing unabated.

During a recent joint press conference in Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon, the Minister of Communication, alongside the Ministers of Women’s Empowerment, Social Affairs, and Public Health, called for immediate collective action to halt the escalating crisis. The officials emphasised that a vast majority of these femicides are not random acts of violence and are perpetrated by individuals close to the victims, including spouses, family members, neighbours, and acquaintances.

The major increase in femicide cases is further aggravated by an alarming increase in violent crimes against minors, including rape, murder, and severe physical abuse. High-profile cases currently under investigation include the tragic incidents involving three-year-old Bissong Omgba Joyce, who suffered sexual abuse; 11-year-old Divine Mbarga, who was raped and murdered; and the Nkolbisson tragedy in which a mother killed her three children before taking her own life. Also, in March 2026, an 11-month-old infant was murdered by a family member in Douala, and another 11-year-old boy, Karl Ethan, was killed in Minkan.

In response to the ongoing issue of gender-based violence, several women’s rights organisations have come together to deliver a strong message. They stressed that no woman should lose her life because of her gender, and no child should be raised in an environment filled with fear, violence, or abuse. The women also expressed grave concerns about the situation in Cameroon, describing it as critical and calling for nationwide mobilisation and warned against the trivialisation of gender-based crimes.

“Behind these statistics are broken lives, bereaved families and profoundly shocked communities. Women, mothers, girls and housewives have lost their lives under circumstances linked to gender-based violence,” said Lizzy Claude, a women’s rights activist.

“This is a reality which is more and more disquieting to the civil society and defenders of human rights, especially within a context marked by a spike in sexual violence and abuses inflicted on children,” Lizzy added.

A new type of submarine that appears to lack a traditional sail has emerged in China. The same shipyard launched a smaller ‘sailless’ submarine — a technology demonstrator — eight years ago. More recently, a top Chinese shipbuilding conglomerate put forward a concept for an uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) with a broadly comparable hullform. Designs of this kind can offer benefits in terms of speed, maneuverability, and reduced acoustic signature, but also have major drawbacks.

TWZ has obtained imagery of the submarine in question at JN (Jiangnan) Shipyard in Shanghai on June 1, as seen at the top of this story and below, from Vantor (previously Maxar Technologies). The boat, the name and/or designation of which are currently unknown, first appeared there sometime at the end of May, according to Naval News. That outlet was first to report on this development.

From the imagery, the submarine does not have a traditional sail. However, the exact shaping of what is present is also not entirely clear from the view that is currently available. As noted, JN Shipyard is known to have built at least one other ‘sailless’ submarine in the past, which we will come back to later on.

Writing for Naval News, undersea warfare analyst H.I. Sutton has assessed the design to be roughly 394 feet (120 meters) long and to be between 33 and 36 feet (10 and 11 meters) wide. What its intended missions might be are unknown, but this is certainly larger than common diesel-electric submarines (SSK) and even longer than most nuclear fast attack submarines. For comparison, variants of China’s Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), some of the most modern submarines in People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) service today, are approximately 356 to 360 feet (108 to 110 meters long) and 36 feet wide. The official stated length and width of the U.S. Navy’s Virginia class SSNs, across all existing subvariants, are 377 feet (114.8 meters) and 34 feet (10.36 meters), respectively.

We can also see that the submarine at JN Shipyard has an X-form rudder configuration, something that first appeared on a submarine in China in 2024. This offers advantages over cruciform stern arrangements with horizontal and vertical rudders when it comes to maneuverability, efficiency, and safety.

An X-shaped stern is a feature now further associated with a next-generation Chinese attack submarine design commonly, but still unofficially, referred to as the Type 095. Naval News also reported today on the recent launch of what may be another Type 095, which has a traditional sail, at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, hundreds of miles to the north of Shanghai. This appears to have caused some confusion online, with some mistaking the boat at Bohai for the ‘sailless’ type.

The newly emerged submarine at JN Shipyard may also have a shrouded propulsor, which could be a pumpjet type. Pumpjets offer further benefits for quieter operation, especially at higher submerged speeds.

The absence of a traditional sail is still the most notable aspect of the new submarine at JN Shipyard. Omitting a large structure sticking out of the top of the hull helps significantly with streamlining the overall design. Eliminating that drag can allow greater optimization for speed and maneuverability while submerged. It can also help make the submarine quieter and, by extension, harder to detect, even while transiting through an area at higher speeds. This can be especially useful when racing out to threats, even those far away.

Not having a traditional sail could impose certain design constraints. Traditionally, naval submarines have used their sails to mount periscopes and other sensor masts, as well as extendable communication antennas and snorkels to help cycle air without fully resurfacing. That is space that can be used for other purposes, including launchers for countermeasures and general storage.

Above all else, while running on the surface, the sail is key for general navigation and situational awareness. It can also provide an elevated position for local force protection or supporting vertical replenishment (VERTREP) operations. If sufficiently hardened, it can even break through feet of ice during operations in and around the polar regions.

The lack of a sail might reflect a focus on seabed operations far from the surface where mast deployment and other considerations might be less pressing. At the same time, the design’s features could just as easily be centered on improving performance, including the ability to make transits as quickly as possible during blue water operations. It could also offer benefits for shallow-water operations, though we have noted that, overall, it is very large compared to SSKs.

As mentioned, a smaller ‘sailless’ submarine had already emerged at JN Shipyard in 2018. H.I. Sutton previously estimated that design to be around 150 feet (45 meters) long and 15 feet (four to four-and-a-half meters) wide. That submarine also had a non-X-shaped rudder arrangement and what appeared to be an unshrouded propeller. The exact reasons for building that boat and how it has been utilized over the years remain unknown, but it would have at least provided a testbed and technology demonstration platform to explore this design concept, and potentially other capabilities. Whether it was designed for crewed or uncrewed operation, or to be optionally crewed, is not clear, either. The same is true of this new submarine, though it seems unlikely it is uncrewed.

At the Zhuhai Airshow in 2024, the state-run China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) did show a model of an unprecedentedly large, diesel-electric UUV. Its overall design was highly reminiscent, at least in broad strokes, of JN Shipyard’s original ‘sailless’ submarine, as TWZ noted at the time. JN Shipyard is one of many subsidiaries of CSSC.

CSSC said at the time that the drone submarine could be configured to perform a wide array of missions, including launching attacks on enemy vessels, laying mines, supporting special operations forces, and serving as a mothership for smaller uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV). You can read more about all of this here.

Other shipyards and navies around the world have explored low-profile submarine designs in the past, but designs have generally been consigned to the world of paper concepts and limited experimentation. The U.S. Navy, for instance, previously tested a Large Scale Vehicle Range (LSVR) subscale demonstrator submarine with a novel sail structure. The Navy’s Acoustic Research Detachment (ARD) conducted that work in a lake in Bayview, Idaho.

In 2021, the Navy also notably put out a contracting notice calling for concepts for inflatable sail structures, which could combine the benefits of traditional sails and low-profile designs. What degree of work the service may have conducted since then on this Inflatable Deployable Sail System (IDSS) is unclear, but it underscores how important a sail is for general operations on the surface.

The PLAN’s submarine force otherwise continues to grow in terms of capability and capacity, with an increasing number of more modern types. U.S. officials have openly said in the past that the quality of newer Chinese submarines has been getting closer in parity to American designs. All of this is further underscored by the recent appearance of the other new submarine at Bohai. In addition to new nuclear-power designs, China is also understood to be developing at least one design with a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, referred to as the Type 041 or Zhou class. The first known example of the Type 041 came to light after it looked to have sunk in a shipyard in 2024.

Greater use of nuclear propulsion promises to extend the reach of Chinese submarines in the Pacific and beyond, and is clearly part of the PLAN’s larger vision for naval power projection going forward.

“The PLA Navy is executing a significant strategic shift from diesel-electric to all-nuclear construction, representing a fundamental departure from historical construction patterns,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Brookes, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote in prepared remarks ahead of a hearing before members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.

Brookes also highlighted how the hybrid Type 041, specifically, could offer “greater endurance, potentially filling regional patrol and presence missions more economically than full-size SSNs [attack submarines] and SSGN [guided missile submarines.”

China has significant demands for naval presence, in general, especially to assert its extensive and widely disputed maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere. The PLAN continues to expand the scale and scope of its combat fleets, overall, at a pace that far exceeds that of other navies globally. This includes the U.S. Navy, where the disparity has become increasingly concerning, as TWZ routinely highlights.

More remains to be learned about the newly emerged submarine at JN Shipyard, but it could point to new low-profile designs without traditional sails, possibly to act as the PLAN’s underwater high-speed interceptor, being part of China’s larger future submarine future.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Hours after residents went to bed on the morning of Wednesday, June 3, sounds of gunshots pierced through the air as terrorists circled an off-campus hostel housing some students of the Federal Polytechnic Kaura Namoda in Zamfara State, northwestern Nigeria. The hostel, located in the Low-cost area, is meters away from a military checkpoint, according to residents. 

Students at the polytechnic had increasingly been moving into off-campus housing to avoid being abducted from their school.

As fear of what might happen enveloped people, the terrorists compromised the gate of the hostel and took away eight students of the polytechnic. Even as they fled with the students, they continued to fire shots in the air.

“Two of the students, Favour and Joshua Sunday, escaped while being taken away by the terrorists,” a resident who simply gave his name as Musa told HumAngle. “My house is not far from Oga Bulu’s house, which shares a wall with the house the students live in. I heard the gunshots and heard when they were leaving with the students.”

Since 2015, terrorists have terrorised the sub-region. Their activities have led to the death of thousands of people and the displacement of over a million. Attacks on schools and students have been on the increase since 2020, when terrorists stormed Government Science Secondary, Kankara and abducted 300 pupils.

Zamfara, which is considered the hotbed of the crisis, has recorded several school abductions in Jangebe, where over 300 schoolgirls were abducted, in Federal University, Gusau, where 24 students were abducted, and at the College of Agriculture and Animal Sciences, Bakura, where 15 students were abducted. 

Musa, the source, says Joshua Sunday told them six students (three men and three women) have been taken.

HumAngle reports that the Kaura Namoda area and other communities in Maradun and Bungudu fall under areas where the notorious terrorist leader, Bello Dan Sadiya, controls. 

An administrative staff member of the Polytechnic, who asked not to be named, told HumAngle over the phone that several staff members of the institution have relocated to Gusau, the state capital, for fear of being attacked. “Even me, I’ve relocated my family to Gusau. We have two staff, all senior lecturers, who are still with the bandits after they were abducted two months ago,” he said.

He said a ransom has been paid for the release of the lecturers, but the terrorists have continued to hold them.

Federal Polytechnic Kaura is located on the road to Shinkafi and Zurmi LGA, two areas in the northern part of Zamfara State that have witnessed repeated terrorist attacks.

The police public relations officer in the state, DSP Yazid Abubakar, confirmed the abduction and promised to release a statement, but has yet to do so.

Local authorities blame informants for the escalation of attacks in the town centre. The Chairman of the area, Mannir Haidara Kaura, told DW Hausa that the state government has taken measures to tackle the terrorists, but informants are sabotaging the efforts.

Real Madrid president Florentino Perez says he will bring Jose Mourinho back as manager if he wins Sunday’s election.

Jose ‌Mourinho will return to manage Real Madrid if Florentino Perez wins ⁠the club’s presidential ⁠election on Sunday, the sitting president has declared as he campaigns for another term at the helm of the La Liga ⁠club.

Perez, facing renewable energy entrepreneur Enrique Riquelme in the club’s first contested election in 20 years, delivered the campaign announcement on his social media ⁠channels with a short video featuring Mourinho simply saying “Yes!”

The clip followed the slogan “So MOUch history to be made”, a not-so-subtle nod to the Portuguese coach who guided Real to a record La Liga points tally in 2012, but last lifted ‌a league title with Chelsea in 2015.

The move for Mourinho follows a disappointing domestic campaign in which Barcelona secured back-to-back league titles.

Real, 15-time Champions League winners, have also exited Europe’s top club competition at the quarterfinal stage in the last two seasons, with the absence of major silverware prompting Perez to call elections.

Perez’s announcement landed while Riquelme was ⁠appearing on Spanish television programme El Hormiguero, in which he ⁠said Manchester City midfielder and Spain captain Rodri would be his first signing if elected.

He said he would also target Manchester City striker Erling Haaland, and that former forward and ⁠club great Raul would be his sports director.

Since leaving Chelsea, Mourinho’s trophy haul has been more modest. He ⁠won the League Cup and Europa League with ⁠Manchester United, and later led AS Roma to the third-tier Conference League title.

His managerial road has also taken him to Tottenham Hotspur, Fenerbahce and Benfica, where he was under contract until ‌June 2027 and had said the Portuguese club had proposed a renewal.

While pundits argue that the game has moved beyond Mourinho’s pragmatic style, Perez appears ‌to ‌see him as the manager to restore discipline and edge to a squad featuring Kylian Mbappe, Vinicius Jr and Jude Bellingham.

Mourinho previously stated that no contact had been made with Real, despite heavy reports linking him with a return to the Bernabeu.

Should Perez win the election, Mourinho would return to the club 13 years after his departure in 2013.

Mourinho first joined Real Madrid in 2010, spending three seasons at the club.

During his tenure, he won one La Liga title, a Copa del Rey and a Spanish Super Cup.

Xabi Alonso was sacked by Real in January, in his first season in charge of the Madrid club, while Alvaro Arbeloa carried the team to the end of the season as interim coach.

Kuwait’s defence ministry has labelled an attack on the country’s international airport as ‘heinous Iranian aggression’. One person was killed and dozens were injured after Iranian drones struck a terminal on Wednesday, causing ‘significant material damage’.