NEWS

Canada official condemns Israel’s ‘invasion’ of Lebanon, calls for sovereignty as aid pledged to the crisis-hit nation.

Canada’s secretary of state for international development, Randeep Sarai, visited Lebanon to announce new humanitarian aid, condemning what he called Israel’s “unlawful invasion” of Lebanon.

During his visit, Sarai stated that Beirut should govern its own space. He also announced new programmes Canada is launching to support Lebanese families affected by the conflict, raising its total assistance to Lebanon this year to more than $50m.

“Our commitment is long-term, and we’re there for Lebanon,” said Sarai, who visited shelters housing people displaced by the war and Syrian refugees during his visit.

Amid the escalation between Israel and Lebanon in March, Canada warned on March 25 that Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity “must not be violated” and strongly condemned plans by Israeli forces to occupy southern Lebanon.

As part of the US-mediated framework agreement signed in late June, “pilot zones” were designed to return small areas in southern Lebanon from Israeli forces to the Lebanese army.

In late July, the Lebanese Armed Forces accused Israel of obstructing its efforts to take over control of security in southern Lebanon.

The war has killed more than 4,000 people and has caused widespread destruction across Lebanon. The United Nations says that about 360,000 people are displaced as a result of the latest conflict.

Home to a large Lebanese diaspora, Canada has given Lebanon about $575m in assistance in the past 10 years, Sarai said.

Sarai also met Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who promised to reinstate state authority across Lebanon and to implement reforms to fight corruption.

Israeli officials said they will not pull out of Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.

Israeli air strikes on Gaza kill 10 Palestinians, targeting police headquarters and a refugee camp in separate attacks.

Israeli strikes have killed at least 10 Palestinians in two separate attacks targeting a Gaza City police post and Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza.

Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip, condemned what it called “a new war crime”.

On Wednesday, medical sources at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City said they received nine Palestinian bodies following an attack on the municipal police headquarters in the centre of Gaza City. Another 15 people were wounded.

Al Jazeera’s Hani Mahmoud, reporting from Gaza City, said the bombardment occurred at a busy time near a park crowded with civilians, including children.

Victims of the Gaza City strike included a newly-appointed Gaza City police chief, the director of a women’s police force, and several officers.

Earlier in the day, a strike on Nuseirat refugee camp killed one Palestinian, medics said, increasing Wednesday’s death toll to at least 10.

The Israeli army claimed its air force struck two Hamas commanders in Nuseirat, and that it later struck a Hamas commander in the Tuffah area of Gaza City, without providing evidence of their affiliation.

In a statement, Hamas rejected Israel’s justification that the strike targeted “resistance leaders”, calling the claim “baseless and false allegations used to justify its aggression and cover up its deliberate targeting of civilian police and unarmed civilians”.

Hamas accused the Israeli government of “deliberately undermining these efforts and dangerously pushing towards reigniting the war of extermination against our people in the Gaza Strip”.

On Tuesday, Israeli strikes killed seven people – including a child – and wounded 14 others at a crowded cafe on Gaza City’s harbour. The city’s port has been turned into a displacement camp, according to Wafa news agency.

The Israeli military again claimed, without providing evidence, that it had targeted Hamas commanders in the enclave.

Diplomatic deadlock

Wednesday’s attacks occurred two days after US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and Middle East envoy Jared Kushner visited the region to push for a Trump-backed deal to end to Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

Kushner’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed to break a diplomatic deadlock after Netanyahu rejected an agreement for Israel to withdraw from the Strip in exchange for Hamas disarming.

Following the meeting, Kushner reiterated “Israel’s right to defend itself”. He threatened that Hamas must disarm or the US would support Israel to “finish the job in the appropriate way”.

New imagery provides what appears to be the first visual confirmation that Singapore has begun installing the Blue Spear surface-to-surface missile, also known as the 5G SSM, on its Formidable class frigates. The appearance of Blue Spear aboard RSS Steadfast offers a first glimpse of a key element of Singapore’s broader naval modernization effort. The installation also gives the Israel-Singapore missile joint venture a high-profile reference point as it seeks to market Blue Spear to other operators looking to replace their aging Harpoon fleets.

In photos shared with TWZ by Koji Inoue (@kojiinet on X), a container for the missile is clearly visible aboard Steadfast, the third ship of Singapore’s six Formidable class frigates, offering what is believed to be the first publicly available photographic evidence of the weapon actually fitted to one of the ships.

The appearance of Blue Spear on Steadfast comes as the frigate prepares to open its doors to the public during guided tours at the Tokyo International Cruise Terminal on August 21-22.

Singapore had previously disclosed that Blue Spear would replace the class’s legacy Harpoon anti-ship missile as part of a mid-life upgrade (MLU). However, until now, confirmation of the weapon’s installation has largely come through official statements and industry reporting.

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) first introduced the RGM-84 Harpoon for its Sea Wolf class missile gun boats (MGB), when they were upgraded in the late 1980s. The Victory class multi-purpose corvettes continued using the Harpoon when they were introduced in the 1990s, and the same missile was then installed on the Formidable class when it came online from 2005 onwards.

Each of the Formidable class could carry as many as 24 Harpoons, if required, with capacity for six quad packs on the missile deck. The likelihood is that the same 24-mille capacity will be retained for Blue Spear, although as configured for its Japan visit, Steadfast has the mimimum fit, with one quad launcher.

Singapore first revealed plans to equip the frigates with Blue Spear in 2023, when a senior Republic of Singapore Navy officer outlined the intended missile upgrade during an interview with Janes ahead of the IMDEX exhibition. Then-Commander of the RSN’s First Flotilla, Colonel Ng Kok Yeng Daniel, outlined the plans during the exhibition preview.

The MLU is considerably broader than the missile replacement. Singapore’s Ministry of Defense has said the programme will also introduce upgrades to the frigates’ combat management, communications, and engineering systems.

Blue Spear is produced by Proteus Advanced Systems, a joint venture between Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Singapore’s ST Engineering. The weapon traces its development lineage to the Israeli Gabriel family of anti-ship missiles, but is intended to provide a modern, multi-role precision-strike capability.

The missile was publicly displayed for the first time at the Singapore Airshow 2022, soon after a contract had been signed with the Estonian Defense Forces to meet its coastal anti-ship missile requirement. In this form, the missile is fired from a truck-based launcher.

Blue Spear was also proposed to the U.K. Royal Navy as a Harpoon successor, under the name Sea Serpent. However, the Interim Surface-to-Surface Guided Weapon (I-SSGW) requirement was ultimately won by the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM), a weapon also used by the U.S. Navy, among others.

According to specifications released by Proteus, Blue Spear is a subsonic missile with a range of around 180 miles. It is designed for beyond-line-of-sight engagements and can be employed against both maritime and land targets.

The turbojet-powered weapon incorporates a radio-frequency seeker and guidance system designed to operate in complex electromagnetic environments, including scenarios in which an adversary is employing electronic countermeasures. The missile uses ‘advanced algorithms’ for target discrimination and can be launched in fire-and-forget or fire-and-update modes. Proteus has said in the past that is has considered installing an imaging infrared seeker, if required.

Blue Spear is designed to engage moving targets and can dynamically modify its flight path during an engagement. Its low-level, sea-skimming approach is intended to make detection and interception more difficult for defending forces.

For the Republic of Singapore Navy, the transition from Harpoon to Blue Spear brings a substantially longer-range strike capability to a class of ships that remains a central component of the country’s surface fleet. The Harpoon has a range of around 130 miles and, in the RGM-84C form used by the RSN, lacked a land-attack capability. In the anti-ship role, the missile provides a critical capability for Singapore, considering the dense littoral region and the strategic strait that it sits on.

As well as the pacing maritime threat posed by China, there other potential adversaries in the region are also investing in new ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles, as Roy Choo, a defense journalist and TWZ contributor explained:

“The introduction of the Blue Spear will help the Singapore Navy keep pace with the growing lethality and range of new and upgraded anti-ship missiles being introduced across the region. Indonesia has the Russian-made Yakhont on the Ahmad Yani class frigates and will get the Turkish-made ATMACA missile soon, among the many types it operates. Malaysia was supposed to introduce the Naval Strike Missile on its littoral combat vessels but is now searching for a replacement.”

Meanwhile, Singapore is building a new class of drone motherships, or Multi-Role Combat Vessels (MRCV), the largest and most complex ships the RSN has ever operated. Blue Spear is provided an an option for these hulls, with at least four mounting points, exploiting their modular design.

The MRCVs will form the cornerstone of the navy’s fleet modernization effort, alongside two additional Type 218SG submarines in addition to the previous four, and the Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which will also provide a significant capability boost.

The Blue Spear program also underscores a decades-old, largely low-profile defense-industrial relationship between Israel and Singapore, one that has produced cooperation across some of the city-state’s most sensitive and advanced military capabilities.

Among the very advanced arms acquired by Singapore from Israel is the Gulfstream G550 Conformal Airborne Early Warning (CAEW) aircraft, four of which were bought from IAI. Singapore’s Block 52 F-16s are equipped with Israeli-supplied equipment, including avionics, electronic warfare kit, and air-to-air missiles. There have long been rumors that Singapore acquired Merkava main battle tanks from Israel, but these vehicles have never been publicly seen.

Now, after sales to Estonia and Singapore, Proteus is pitching Blue Spear as a Harpoon replacement for other nations, with the company eyeing potential customers across Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

Estimates for the number of Harpoon missiles built range from 6,400 to around 8,000, depending on source. The missile has been ordered by 30 countries, so there is potentially a very significant market for a new weapon in this class.

For the time being, the arrival of Blue Spear aboard Steadfast underscores the scale of Singapore’s ongoing naval modernization, extending the reach and flexibility of one of the RSN’s core surface combatants. As the service introduces new frigate weapons alongside MRCVs, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft, the missile also offers a glimpse of the increasingly long-range and networked force Singapore is building.

With thanks to Roy Choo.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

A girl is taken to hospital in critical condition in what PM Burnham calls a ‘terrible family tragedy’.

Three members of a Palestinian British family have drowned after entering the sea off England’s Sussex coast, the Palestinian embassy in London says.

The embassy announced their deaths on Wednesday, a day after the family went for a swim near Shoreham Fort in Shoreham-by-Sea, West Sussex.

The father, Hossam al-Khawas, was a Palestinian refugee from the Rashidieh Camp in southern Lebanon near Tyre, the Press Association news agency reported.

Police, paramedics, coastguard crews and a lifeboat were deployed at the scene where four people were pulled from the water.

Al-Khawas, a woman and a teenage girl were pronounced dead. A younger girl was taken to hospital in a critical condition.

“The Embassy is closely monitoring the incident and is making the necessary contacts with the relevant British authorities to ascertain its circumstances and to check on the condition of the injured girl,” the Palestinian mission in the United Kingdom said in a statement.

UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham on Wednesday warned of the dangers of open water swimming after the incident, which he described as “a terrible family tragedy”, the BBC reported.

He said he sends his “best wishes and love” to the family and friends of those who died as well as the girl who remains in critical condition.

Drownings have surged across Europe as people seek relief from the heatwave on the continent with incidents reported in France, Germany and the UK. Experts warned that open-water swimming can carry hidden risks, including cold water shock, strong currents and sudden changes in depth.

Police added that officers have trawled hours of public and private CCTV footage as part of the investigation, while door-to-door enquiries are also continuing.

The last sighting of either man had been on Friday morning.

Police also said the Chancellor Street property where the bodies were found was the home of one of the victims, and that the two men knew each other.

Det Supt Kelly said: “I am appealing directly to anyone with any information, no matter how small or insignificant they feel it may be, to come forward and speak to us.

“Please do not assume that the police already know the information you have.

“We are keen to hear from anyone who knew Paul and Gary or who was in the Partick area near to Chancellor Street from Friday morning from 09:00, who saw Paul or Gary, or saw or heard anything suspicious.”

Supt Craig Brady said: “I would like to extend my sympathies to the family and friends of Paul and Gary as they try to come to terms with their loss.

“We understand the significant impact this will have on the local community and I would like to thank everyone for their help so far.”

Post-mortem examinations took place on Monday and Tuesday and confirmed the causes of death as being murder.

A major incident public portal has been launched, external as part of the investigation.

Japan has issued an unusually direct criticism of its U.S. ally after Washington imposed sanctions on International Criminal Court President Tomoko Akane and senior trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye.

Japan’s foreign ministry described the sanctions as “very unfortunate” and reaffirmed Tokyo’s support for the ICC and its role in prosecuting serious international crimes. The statement marks a rare public disagreement between Tokyo and Washington over an issue of international law.

The dispute comes as the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump intensifies its campaign against the Hague based court. Washington has increasingly challenged the ICC over its investigations and arrest warrants involving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as its earlier investigation into U.S. personnel in Afghanistan.

For Japan, however, the issue is particularly sensitive. Tokyo depends heavily on the United States for its national defence, yet it has consistently supported the ICC and the broader international legal framework surrounding it.

Why Did the U.S. Sanction ICC Officials?

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the sanctions targeted individuals involved in ICC efforts to investigate, arrest, detain or prosecute officials from governments that have not consented to the court’s jurisdiction.

Among those sanctioned was Tomoko Akane, a Japanese judge who serves as ICC president. Abdoulaye Seye, a Senegalese senior trial lawyer, was also targeted. Seye was part of the prosecution team that sought an arrest warrant for Netanyahu and has been nominated for election as an ICC judge.

Washington argues that the ICC has exceeded its authority by pursuing officials from countries that have not accepted its jurisdiction.

The United States is not a member of the ICC and has repeatedly objected to the court’s actions involving American personnel and Israeli officials.

The latest sanctions therefore represent another escalation in Washington’s confrontation with the institution.

Why Is Japan Supporting the ICC?

Japan joined the ICC in 2007 and has consistently supported its role in prosecuting war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Tokyo’s foreign ministry said Japan remains committed to strengthening the rule of law internationally while maintaining communication with countries involved in the dispute.

Japan’s position reflects its broader commitment to international institutions and rules based governance.

For Tokyo, the ICC is not simply a legal institution. It is part of a wider international order in which disputes and allegations of serious crimes are addressed through established legal mechanisms.

That creates an obvious tension with Washington’s increasingly confrontational approach.

Why Is This Significant for U.S. Japan Relations?

Japan rarely criticises the United States publicly, particularly on issues involving national security.

The two countries maintain a close military alliance, with U.S. forces playing a central role in Japan’s defence and regional deterrence.

Japan’s decision to openly describe the sanctions as “very unfortunate” therefore carries diplomatic significance.

It does not indicate that Tokyo is abandoning Washington or challenging the broader alliance. Instead, it demonstrates that the two countries can maintain close security cooperation while disagreeing sharply over international law.

That distinction is becoming increasingly important as U.S. foreign policy under Trump diverges from the positions of several traditional allies.

The ICC Dispute Is Also Creating Friction in Europe

Japan is not the only U.S. ally to object to the latest sanctions.

The Netherlands, which hosts the ICC, has also criticised Washington’s action. Dutch Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen said the Netherlands opposed the sanctions and invited Akane to discuss continued support for the court.

The development places Washington increasingly at odds with European partners as well as Japan.

The disagreement therefore extends beyond the U.S. relationship with a single international institution. It raises broader questions about how far America’s allies are willing to follow Washington when its policies conflict with international institutions they continue to support.

What Do the Sanctions Actually Do?

The sanctions have significant practical consequences.

They freeze any U.S. assets held by the targeted individuals and largely cut them off from the American financial system. Because most internationally active banks maintain close connections with the U.S. financial system, the effects can extend beyond American jurisdiction.

The U.S. Treasury Department has also authorized a temporary wind down of transactions involving Akane and Seye through September 17.

The measures therefore do more than express political disagreement. They can directly affect the ability of sanctioned individuals to conduct international financial activities.

Washington’s Wider Campaign Against the ICC

The sanctions against Akane and Seye are part of a broader U.S. campaign against the court.

Washington previously imposed sanctions on several ICC prosecutors and judges after the court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant and pursued an earlier investigation involving U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Rubio has also indicated that the administration intends to intensify efforts against the ICC through diplomatic pressure on other countries.

According to Reuters, Washington has sought to encourage countries to leave the institution, with at least five countries already responding to the call.

The strategy therefore goes beyond individual sanctions. It represents an attempt to challenge the ICC’s legitimacy and reduce its international reach.

Why Does Japan’s Position Matter?

Japan’s response is significant because Tokyo has generally been closely aligned with Washington on major strategic questions.

Japan faces a challenging regional security environment involving China, North Korea and wider tensions in the Indo Pacific. Maintaining a strong U.S. alliance remains central to Japanese security policy.

Yet Tokyo has also invested heavily in supporting international institutions and the rule of law.

The ICC dispute highlights the possibility that these two pillars of Japanese foreign policy can sometimes pull in different directions.

Japan may need American military power for its security while simultaneously disagreeing with Washington on how international law should operate.

That is not necessarily a crisis in the alliance, but it illustrates its increasingly complicated political foundations.

Could the Dispute Deepen Divisions Among U.S. Allies?

The ICC controversy could contribute to a wider pattern of disagreement between Washington and its traditional partners.

The United States is increasingly willing to use economic and diplomatic pressure against international institutions it considers hostile to American interests. Several European governments, by contrast, continue to view those institutions as essential components of the rules based international order.

Japan’s criticism adds an important Asian voice to that disagreement.

If more U.S. allies openly defend the ICC, Washington could face growing diplomatic isolation on the issue even while maintaining strong bilateral security relationships.

That could make the dispute increasingly difficult to contain as a narrow disagreement between the United States and an international court.

How Far Can Japan Disagree With Washington?

Japan’s criticism of the ICC sanctions should not be interpreted as a fundamental rupture in the U.S. Japan alliance.

Tokyo remains heavily dependent on Washington for defence and security, and there is little indication that the ICC dispute will fundamentally alter that relationship.

Its importance lies elsewhere.

Japan is signalling that alliance solidarity does not necessarily require complete alignment on international law.

For Tokyo, supporting the ICC is consistent with a broader foreign policy objective: maintaining an international system governed by rules and institutions rather than purely by the power of individual states.

Washington’s position is increasingly different. The Trump administration views the ICC as a potential threat to American sovereignty and to officials from the United States and allied governments who could face prosecution by the court.

This creates an unusual strategic contradiction.

The United States and Japan remain closely aligned against major security challenges in the Indo Pacific, yet they are increasingly capable of finding themselves on opposite sides of debates over the international legal order.

The consequences could extend beyond the ICC itself.

If Washington continues using sanctions and diplomatic pressure against international institutions while its allies continue defending them, the United States may find that its strategic partnerships remain strong militarily but become more divided politically.

For Japan, the challenge will be maintaining its essential alliance with Washington without abandoning its support for the international legal institutions it considers important.

The ICC dispute therefore reveals a broader tension within the U.S. alliance system: strategic partners may remain united on security while increasingly disagreeing over the rules and institutions that are supposed to govern international politics.

With information from Reuters.

Iceland will hold a referendum on August 29 on whether to reopen negotiations over joining the European Union, in a closely contested vote that could reshape the country’s economic and strategic direction.

The referendum, however, is not a vote on EU membership itself. Icelanders will only decide whether their government should begin accession negotiations with Brussels.

If voters approve the proposal, negotiations could last two or more years before Iceland holds a second referendum, potentially in 2028, on whether to actually join the bloc.

With opinion polls showing a near-dead heat between supporters and opponents, the vote has become an important test of Iceland’s relationship with Europe at a time of economic uncertainty and growing geopolitical competition in the Arctic.

Is Iceland Voting to Join the EU?

No.

The August 29 referendum only asks whether Iceland should begin negotiations with the European Union.

A “yes” vote would open a potentially lengthy accession process. Iceland would then negotiate the terms of membership with Brussels before citizens have another opportunity to accept or reject the final agreement.

That means the upcoming referendum is essentially a decision about whether to explore EU membership, rather than a final decision to join.

Prime Minister Kristrun Frostadottir’s government has nevertheless presented the vote as a potentially decisive moment.

What Happens If Iceland Votes No?

The government has described the referendum as a “now or never” opportunity.

Frostadottir has warned that rejecting negotiations would effectively put the EU question aside.

This makes the vote particularly important because Iceland has already attempted the accession process once.

Reykjavik applied to join the EU in 2009, but negotiations were abandoned in 2013 after a Eurosceptic government came to power.

A second rejection could therefore close the issue again for the foreseeable future.

Why Does Iceland Want to Reconsider EU Membership?

Economic concerns are among the strongest arguments for reopening negotiations.

Iceland has faced high living costs and economic volatility, while the country’s relatively small economy remains vulnerable to external shocks.

Supporters argue that closer integration with the EU could provide greater economic stability and strengthen Iceland’s position when dealing with larger trading partners.

EU membership could also eventually allow Iceland to adopt the euro, replacing the Icelandic krona.

Supporters say the euro could reduce currency volatility, help address inflation and potentially lower interest rates.

The country’s strategic environment has also changed since Iceland abandoned its previous accession negotiations.

The war in Ukraine and growing competition in the Arctic have encouraged Iceland to reconsider how closely it should align with European institutions.

What Would Iceland Gain From Joining the EU?

EU membership would provide Iceland with access to the bloc’s customs union and its wider internal market.

The customs union eliminates internal tariffs between member states while applying common external tariffs to goods entering the bloc.

Iceland would also gain a formal role in EU decision-making.

Its representatives would participate in institutions including the European Parliament, European Commission and European Council.

For supporters, this is important because Iceland would move from being closely connected to the EU economically to having a direct role in shaping policies that affect it.

The argument is particularly relevant for a small country dealing with much larger economic powers.

Why Do Icelanders Oppose EU Membership?

Opponents argue that membership would transfer too much political authority from Reykjavik to Brussels.

They also question whether joining the EU would substantially improve Iceland’s security.

The most sensitive issue, however, is fisheries.

Why Are Fisheries Central to the Debate?

Fishing is one of the pillars of Iceland’s economy and a major part of the country’s national identity.

Opponents fear that joining the EU would subject Iceland to the bloc’s Common Fisheries Policy and potentially weaken its control over fishing resources.

They worry that common European resource-management rules could eventually increase access for foreign vessels to Icelandic waters.

For a country surrounded by some of the world’s most important fishing grounds, that is not simply an economic concern. It is also a question of national sovereignty.

The fisheries debate therefore gives the opposition one of its strongest arguments against membership.

Why Does Iceland Want to Keep the Krona?

Iceland’s currency is another major dividing line.

Supporters of the euro argue that replacing the krona could reduce exchange-rate volatility and improve economic stability.

Opponents see the krona differently.

They argue that an independent currency provides Iceland with an important economic adjustment mechanism.

During a downturn, the krona can weaken against major currencies, potentially helping Iceland’s economy adjust. During periods of stronger growth, it can appreciate.

Giving up that flexibility in favour of the euro, opponents argue, could leave Iceland with fewer tools to respond to economic shocks.

Who Supports EU Membership?

The country’s centre-left government coalition has backed putting the issue to a referendum.

Vidreisn, Iceland’s most explicitly pro-EU political party, pushed for the vote.

Prime Minister Frostadottir’s Social Democrats also support EU membership, although they have taken a more cautious approach to campaigning.

The coalition’s third party, the People’s Party, opposes membership.

The political divide therefore does not fit neatly along government versus opposition lines.

Who Opposes EU Membership?

The opposition Independence Party, led by Gudrun Hafsteinsdottir, is campaigning against reopening accession talks.

Its argument centres on sovereignty, fisheries and economic independence.

Opponents believe Iceland can maintain its existing relationship with Europe without accepting the political obligations of EU membership.

The close polling suggests neither side has yet secured a decisive advantage.

Why Is the Arctic Important to the Vote?

The referendum is taking place against a backdrop of growing geopolitical competition in the Arctic.

Iceland occupies a strategically important position between North America and Europe.

It sits along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, commonly known as the GIUK gap, a critical North Atlantic maritime corridor.

The area has long been important for monitoring Russian naval movements between the Arctic and the North Atlantic.

Iceland is also a NATO member despite having no standing army of its own.

That makes its strategic location particularly important to the security architecture of the North Atlantic.

What Would Iceland Mean for the EU?

For the European Union, Iceland’s potential membership would have significance beyond economics.

It would expand the EU’s presence in the Arctic at a time when the region is becoming increasingly important to major powers.

Russia, the United States and other countries are paying greater attention to Arctic shipping routes, natural resources and military positioning.

Iceland could therefore give the EU a stronger institutional and geopolitical foothold in the North Atlantic and Arctic region.

Its accession could also be relatively straightforward compared with some other countries seeking EU membership.

Unlike Ukraine and several Western Balkan states, Iceland already has close economic and institutional links with Europe and would require fewer major reforms to align with EU rules.

Could Iceland Join the EU Quickly?

Potentially, but the process would still take years.

A “yes” vote would only begin negotiations.

Iceland would then have to negotiate the terms of membership before citizens could vote again on the final agreement.

The second referendum could potentially take place in 2028.

This means that even if Icelanders vote in favour of talks on August 29, actual EU membership would remain uncertain.

The referendum is therefore the beginning of a political process rather than its conclusion.

Analysis: Why Does Iceland’s EU Vote Matter?

Iceland’s referendum is ultimately about more than whether a small North Atlantic country should join a political and economic bloc.

It reflects a wider debate over sovereignty, economic resilience and strategic alignment in an increasingly contested Arctic.

For supporters, EU membership offers economic stability, greater influence over European decisions and closer integration with a bloc that could provide Iceland with additional leverage against larger powers.

For opponents, the same process represents a potential loss of national control over fisheries, monetary policy and important economic decisions.

The strategic dimension is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.

Iceland’s location makes it disproportionately important to North Atlantic security despite its small population and lack of a conventional military. As competition involving Russia, the United States and European countries intensifies in the Arctic, Iceland’s relationship with the EU could acquire greater geopolitical significance.

The vote also highlights a fundamental dilemma facing smaller states: whether greater integration with a larger political bloc provides more security and economic strength than the sovereignty it requires them to surrender.

The August referendum will not answer that question definitively.

It will determine whether Icelanders are willing to begin the conversation.

If voters choose “yes,” Iceland could move toward its most significant geopolitical realignment in more than a decade. If they choose “no,” the country may once again put EU membership aside and preserve its distinctive position outside the bloc while remaining closely connected to Europe.

With information from Reuters.

New Delhi, India – In a crowded ward of New Delhi’s All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), India’s premier public hospital, a mother sits quietly beside her 29-year-old son, Piyush Singh*.

Diagnosed with stomach cancer a year ago, Singh has already undergone five rounds of chemotherapy. He now lies in the hospital’s palliative care unit, where the goal is no longer to cure the disease but to relieve pain and preserve his dignity.

“The world comes to AIIMS when they are not well. But where shall we go?” asks his mother. “My son has already received five doses of chemotherapy, but his condition has not improved. The doctors are not telling us anything. I don’t know what to do next.”

Piyush’s family is not asking for his life to end. They simply don’t know what comes when treatment fails.

A few floors away, Aryan* has come to AIIMS from Auraiya, a small town in Uttar Pradesh state, to accompany his 40-year-old brother Amit (name changed), who has been battling mouth cancer for four years. Two surgeries, radiation and two rounds of chemotherapy later, doctors say there is little hope of him surviving. The final checkup has been done. There is nothing more left to try.

“There is no duvidha [dilemma in Hindi],” says Aryan. “The doctors have said no. So it is clear now.”

He plans to take Amit to his rented flat in Gurgaon and give him whatever painkillers he has been prescribed. Beyond that, he has no plan, because no one has given him one.

“I don’t know about palliative care. I don’t know how to ease his pain. I have nothing apart from the medicines I got today,” he said.

Piyush and Amit are no exceptions. They represent a reality that many Indians are coming to terms with – with little institutional help.

India recorded an estimated 1.56 million new cancer cases in 2024, according to an Indian Council of Medical Research study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association. But cancer patients are not alone. Families of patients with traumatic brain injuries and degenerative neurological conditions also hit the same wall.

According to a 2025 analysis by ecancermedicalscience, an open-access medical journal, an estimated seven to 10 million people require palliative care in India, but only about 4 percent receive it.

Such families find themselves with little or no awareness or preparedness for what comes next. Many have never heard of palliative care, or that the law gives them the right to document their treatment preferences before a crisis arrives.

The problem is also rooted in how many Indians confront death – a phenomenon that is one of the least-discussed subjects within families or societies. In many households, conversations about dying are considered inauspicious.

In such a worldview, to think of interventions in how or when someone dies carries a moral weight that goes beyond medicine or law. Families often avoid discussing medical wishes until a loved one is critically ill, leaving relatives to make deeply personal decisions during moments of grief and uncertainty.

From caregiving to court

The answers are increasingly being shaped not just by medicine, but also by the law.

In 2018, India’s Supreme Court recognised that the “right to die with dignity” was part of the fundamental right to life, enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

The court also allowed such patients to record their wishes about life-sustaining treatment if they lose the capacity to decide in an advanced stage of their ailment.

The top court’s ruling was in response to a petition filed by Common Cause, an NGO, which called for legal procedures allowing terminally ill individuals to execute Advance Medical Directives, commonly known as “living wills”, to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment.

A living will is a legal document that highlights an individual’s preferences for medical treatment when they cannot voice their choices. The provision allows them to nominate a loved one to decide for them.

“It [judgement] broadens the scope of Article 21. It now affirms, kind of completely, that the right to life includes the right to die with dignity. That is the bottom line for us,” Vipul Mudgal, director of Common Cause, the organisation behind the 2005 petition, told Al Jazeera.

Yet, for most Indians, that right largely existed on paper – until six years later.

In 2024, a family in Ghaziabad, an industrial district on the outskirts of New Delhi, filed a petition in the Delhi High Court and later in the Supreme Court, asking for a decision on the fate of a 32-year-old patient who was in a vegetative state for nearly 13 years.

Harish Rana’s case was a first in India where passive euthanasia, or withdrawal of life support, was permitted by the top court. On March 11, the Supreme Court directed the withdrawal of his life support at AIIMS, New Delhi. He passed away two weeks later.

But the journey from caregiving to courtroom was not easy.

Rana’s family managed his feeding tube, tracheostomy and urine bag every day for 13 years, and it had drained them.

“A family reaches such a decision when it sees no scope for improvement. Harish Rana could not speak, we were his voice,” Rana’s father Ashok told Al Jazeera. “He was not in that state for 13 days or 13 months, but for 13 years.”

All those years, said Ashok, he watched his son breathe but not recover, with only one question on his mind: “I am around 63 years old, and my wife is 58 years old. If something happens to either of us, who would take care of him?”

That is when they decided to approach the court.

While the Rana case is a landmark, experts say it is unlikely to set an immediate precedent in a country where death is an uncomfortable topic. That is why, despite being legalised in 2018, living wills remain uncommon and largely unheard of.

As a result, terminally ill patients do not discuss their wishes while they still can, and families end up making decisions for them without preparation or guidance.

A 2019 survey across seven cities, including New Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata, by Healthcare at Home (HCAH), a health advocacy group, found that 73 percent of urban Indians were unaware of their right to a living will. Even among people aware of their right, only 6 percent had actually drafted such a will.

“The Harish Rana case was made more complex because there was no living will,” said Manish Jain, the lawyer who represented the family in court. “Living will clinics are absent across India.”

There are only two such clinics in India. The first opened in Mumbai last year, followed by one in New Delhi – both operated by private hospitals, which are beyond the reach of most Indians.

Fears of misuse of living wills

Concerned over a likely misuse of living wills, the Supreme Court made its guidelines complex. However, in the process, the court ended up making it difficult to navigate for most people.

To make a living will legally valid, an individual would sign it before two witnesses and get it countersigned by a magistrate. If the patient later became terminally ill, the treating doctor would be required to form a board of specialists with at least 20 years of experience each, whose findings then had to go to a district magistrate, who would form a second medical board. Only after both boards agreed could the process move forward, and any disagreement meant the matter went to the regional High Court.

In 2019, the Indian Society for Critical Care Medicine, a nonprofit group of physicians, approached the Supreme Court, arguing its guidelines were unworkable. In 2023, a five-judge top court bench simplified the process, removing the requirement of a magistrate’s countersignature, reducing the minimum medical experience requirement for review boards from 20 years to five, and allowing multiple nominees instead of one.

“Decisions are being made every day, sometimes by the family members, sometimes by the doctors, sometimes because of paucity of money,” said Mudgal.

He said if the families, doctors and courts can make end-of-life decisions for an individual, why cannot the individuals make those decisions for themselves? This recognition, while respecting individual autonomy, also relieves family members from the guilt of deciding for their loved one, he added.

“If there is no meaning left in life, somebody is kept alive artificially, just beating the heart with some mechanical device, that life has no meaning,” he said.

Yet, such questions remain unanswered by law. Living wills and the right to die exist entirely through judicial interpretation. There is no parliamentary law governing the same.

“There is no framework [of parliamentary law] passed by the parliament,” Jain said. “The Supreme Court of India itself requested the government to pass legislation regarding this issue,” he added, first in 2018 and again in 2023.

But lack of a law is only one part of the challenge.

For families, the absence of palliative care means little or no guidance on what comes after treatment options run out. Even families like Piyush’s, who have access to palliative care, don’t know what comes next.

“There are many patients like this who don’t have legal awareness of passive euthanasia. Not only patients, but their doctors also do not have full awareness about palliative care,” Dr Saipriya Tewari, principal consultant and unit head of pain management and palliative care at Max Super Speciality Hospital in New Delhi, told Al Jazeera.

She said families often look confused when told there is no treatment left, and that they should take the patient home.

“What will they do after taking the patient home? Nobody tells them. It is only discussed if the palliative care doctor is involved in the treatment,” Tewari said. “And even if the end is coming, then how do we maintain dignity in time? That is the question.”

Piyush’s mother has a different question.

“If he is sick, then we have to get treatment. We have to do something to keep him alive. What should we do? We are not able to think of a way out of this. Nobody is giving us any suggestions about where to go.”

*Names changed to protect the identity of the patients and their families.

India take a 1-0 lead with a 165-run win against the hosts in Galle to begin the two-Test series.

Left-arm spinner Manav Suthar finished with a haul of 10 wickets as India thrashed Sri Lanka by 165 runs in the first Test in Galle to take a 1-0 lead in the two-match series.

Suthar, playing only his second Test, impressed with his line and length to ensure India a memorable win on Wednesday in their 600th Test match.

He took four wickets in the first innings and kept up the fine show to take 6-55, helping bowl out the hosts for 206 shortly after lunch on the final day.

Set a target of 372 runs, Sri Lanka’s batters failed to apply themselves, other than Sonal Dinusha, who top-scored in both innings.

Indian captain Shubman Gill called the victory “very satisfying”.

“We were in a comfortable position but were not sure if the match would go on [because of the weather], but the team responded well,” he said.

Gill also praised Suthar and the batsmen for their effort on a wicket that was not easy to score runs on.

“He has been bowling magnificently. Looks like a very promising guy and someone who can play for India for a long time,” he said.

India claimed two wickets in the morning session after Sri Lanka resumed from their overnight score of 84-4 and then quickly ran through the tail.

Captain Dhananjaya de Silva (59) and first-innings centurion Dinusha tried to fight back, batting for more than two hours to add 95 runs for the fifth wicket.

De Silva, who had been dismissed off a no-ball early in his innings, looked set to make the most of the reprieve, posting his 20th half-century.

But his knock ended after he attempted a sweep shot off Ravindra Jadeja and was caught at short fine leg by Suthar.

“It was not easy [batting fourth in Galle],” said de Silva.

“They won the toss, got the runs on the board, and with our batting, we lost wickets, and it went downhill from there.”

Wicketkeeper Niroshan Dickwella posted a half-century in the first innings but could not make an impact in the second.

Dickwella fell for 10 when he attempted to hit Prasidh Krishna over the slips but ended up edging one to the wicketkeeper.

Suthar triggered a late-order collapse with a triple-wicket maiden after lunch and then, in his next over, claimed the last wicket of Keshara Nuwantha as Sri Lanka folded 36 minutes after lunch.

The last four wickets fell for seven runs, with Suthar claiming them all.

The 25-year-old Dinusha (84) put up a solid effort despite little support from his teammates.

Playing his fourth Test, he showcased maturity beyond his age, taking on India’s spinners with nimble footwork.

He was dismissed when Dhruv Jurel at leg slip took a bat-pad catch. He faced 128 deliveries during his defiant knock and hit eight fours and one six.

Apart from Suthar, the other standout performer for India was top-order batter Devdutt Padikkal, who posted 167 and 44 in the game, having come in as a late injury replacement.

“The wicket had its natural wear and tear [but] it was a good Test wicket,” Padikkal said.

“Turned a lot more from the third day onwards. In the end, it was all about who came out on top with their skill-set.”

The teams now head to Colombo for the second Test match, starting on Sunday.

Reflect. Think about yourself, about those around you, and you will reach the same conclusion as I have. Since the signing of the disastrous economic adjustment package with the International Monetary Fund in February 1989, Venezuela has never experienced such a unanimous feeling of bewilderment, contained anger, and repulsion at others deciding for us.

In October 2025, a Hinterlaces survey had 83% of respondents state that they would be willing to confront a foreign military invasion. The attack came [on January 3], we were denied the possibility of resistance, and now we face an invisible invasion. An insolent foreign presence that barely appears on screen, but tramples us, crushing the executive, legislative, judicial, and moral attributes of sovereignty one after the other, stealing over $13 billion worth of oil from us in just half a year, resources that no one knows where they have gone, and remodeling our country so that the plundering can continue indefinitely.

Along with the looting, a shroud of opacity has fallen over Venezuela, relegating everything that matters to mystery, except for occasional voices that infiltrate informal media. María Alejandra Díaz Marín warns us from Colombia about the attempt to remove all constitutional limits that hinder the looting. Mario Silva contrasts what politicians used to say and what they say now. Ramsés Reyes confesses that he “spits blood.” José Sant Roz proclaims in Ensartaos: “I tremble with indignation when I hear people say ‘Iran is not Venezuela,’ ‘Cuba is not Venezuela.’”

Comparisons are odious, but more odious is avoiding them to escape self-criticism.

For my part, I preach that anger is a more valuable natural resource than the oil and gold that the US is plundering from us, because anger is infinitely renewable and more fruitful than resignation. I admire all the countries that have shaken off the yokes of empires. I appreciate those who reproach us for apparently having stopped doing the same. I do not even invoke the sacred wrath of the [1813] Decree of War to the Death, which liberated what are now six countries. The assertion that Venezuela is not like this or that country reiterates that freedom and sovereignty do not fall from the sky nor are automatically defended. They are conquered through the extreme pedagogy of the unbearable.

Venezuela is not Iran. Nothing could be truer. Since 1941, Iran had been living under the dictatorship of Shah Reza Pahlavi. The nationalist Majlis movement succeeded in having Mohammed Mossadegh appointed as prime minister in 1951, and he nationalized the oil industry. The hegemonic countries blockaded the Iranian state from selling oil. In 1953, the CIA and MI6 incited street demonstrations, a military coup ousted Mossadegh, and Shah Reza Pahlavi was installed as a dictator, handing over oil to Europeans and yankees and presiding over a repressive autocracy. Only in 1979, after an endless 37 years of fierce monarchical dictatorship and the continuous theft of oil by foreign powers, did waves of Iranians depose the puppet and confirm that autonomy is not gifted: it is defended. They took their affirmation of cultural identity to the extreme. They faced the selective assassination of their scientists and leaders until they became impregnable. They won wars against neighboring Iraq, instigated and armed by the United States, and now against the US Empire itself. They divided their defensive system into “mosaics” capable of continuing to resist when others would have fallen. We are not like the admirable Iranians. But they teach us a rough path to become like them.

We are not like the Cubans. When José Martí arrived in Caracas in 1881 and first visited the statue of Simón Bolívar, it had already been 57 years since we had gained independence and formed what are now six countries. The Liberator included in the Panama Congress of 1826 the goal of the emancipation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Hispaniola, and planned to achieve it with an expedition that domestic secessionism thwarted. The Apostle [Martí] and Cuba still had to endure a bitter lesson. For Martí, death in his first battle. For his homeland, the humiliation of an independence interfered with by the US invasion of 1898, and a sovereignty tarnished by the Platt Amendment. And still remaining was the bitter record of 60 years of dictatorships and corruption covered up by the United States, until Commander Fidel Castro arrived and put a stop to it. Martí never felt humiliated because in his time Cuba was not like Venezuela. He sacrificed his fragile existence in the Promethean attempt to overcome it, and his legacy pierces our conscience like red-hot iron.

China is not like Venezuela. Starting from 1848, it was attacked by England amid the Opium Wars. Through the Infamous Treaties, Western powers filled it with military bases and puppet governments. Starting in 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria; the rest of the world threatened, blockaded, or ignored China. Only after a bitter century of humiliations could the country, in 1948, resume the arduous path that led it to becoming the world’s leading power.

No, Venezuela is not Algeria, or Vietnam, or Korea, or Afghanistan, or India, or Pakistan, or Somalia, or Yemen. Venezuela preceded them. In 1810, we had a foolish homeland that had to learn to stand on its feet, and in 1825 it taught the world lessons. Today we must understand, along with so many admirable nations, that there is no independence greater than that which is conquered, nor sovereignty greater than that which is defended.

Once again, the current metropolis [the US] is losing its hegemony. Its bases are demolished, its mercenaries put to flight. Its Congress denies funds for its reckless aggressions, its energy sources slip away, its fraudulent unbacked currency vanishes, emerging powers surpass it in economy, social advantages, science, culture, and defense. The path diverges between the road to extinction and that of Utopia.

What Venezuela needs to relearn is to be like Venezuela.

Translated by Orinoco Tribune. Minor edits by Venezuelanalysis.

Source: Luis Britto García blog

Beirut, Lebanon – Not long after the fall of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, the new government was keen to hunt down members of the former regime.

Al-Assad and his brother fled the country hours before the capital Damascus fell to the advancing armed opposition, leaving many top officials and military commanders to fend for themselves.

Many of them reportedly fled and crossed to neighbouring Lebanon where some top officials were spotted openly in capital, Beirut.

Now the Syrian government is trying to get them extradited for war crimes committed during the uprising, which began in 2011.

“We are seeking to boost the international judicial cooperation to pursue members of the former regime and extradited to Syria to complete judicial procedures and process,” judge Mustafa al-Qassem, an aide to the Syrian justice minister, said in an interview with state television.

Former officials felt they were safe in Lebanon due to their close connections with Hezbollah or their network with figures in Lebanon’s military. Some had built connections in Lebanon over the years, including during Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, which ended in 2005.

But that’s no longer the case.

Adel Issa, a former major general in al-Assad’s Syrian Army, was arrested recently in Lebanon after staff at the Syrian embassy reportedly tipped off authorities after he came in to do paperwork. A top Lebanese prosecutor announced on Tuesday that Issa would be extradited to Syria to face trial due to alleged crimes he committed during his military service.

But there are other former al-Assad regime officials who are in Lebanon and whom Syrian authorities also want returned to face justice.

Last week, al-Assad, his brother Maher and his cousin Atef Najib were all sentenced to death by a Damascus court. Bashar and Maher al-Assad were sentenced in absentia because they are in exile in Moscow, where they fled after the regime fell.

Their presence in Russia likely protects them from extradition. But the case brings to attention important issues about remaining regime figures in Lebanon and their potential extradition to Syria.

Regime officials in Lebanon

On December 8, 2024, the five-decade reign of the al-Assad regime ended when Bashar left Damascus for Moscow. As rebels entered Damascus, al-Assad fled without telling many of his top officials who then had to sort out their own escapes.

Sources with knowledge of the whereabouts of former regime members said the top figures – such as the al-Assads or the former head of the National Security Bureau Ali Mamlouk – are in Moscow or the United Arab Emirates.

However, Jamil al-Hassan, the former head of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, is thought to be in Lebanon. Last year, media reports suggested that Syria and France have called on Lebanon to arrest and extradite al-Hassan.

Aside from him, Bassam al-Hassan, a former Republican Guard commander who was in al-Assad’s inner circle, was tracked down to a Beirut apartment by a US broadcaster last year. He had been responsible for procuring weapons and liaising with Syria’s chemical weapons programme, which the regime used against its own people.

Hezbollah’s role

Syrian and European sources intimately familiar with the details said most former regime officials still in Lebanon are now in Tripoli’s Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood or in parts of the northern region of Akkar, which borders Syria. Estimates on the number of former regime officials in Lebanon are imprecise, experts said, because many have either moved to third countries, sometimes with false passports, or have been smuggled back into Syria.

One source familiar with the issue, speaking on background because he wasn’t authorised to share information publicly, said that in the early days after the fall of the regime, former government figures set up training camps in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. However, the source said, the camps have since been shut down by Hezbollah and the Lebanese army.

On August 4, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem said his party was open to a meeting with Syria’s leadership. The group fought side by side with the al-Assad regime in Syria’s war and is, therefore, viewed negatively by many Syrians. But Hezbollah has said it has no desire for bad relations with Syria’s new government.

“Russia shelters the family and its fortunes while so far declining to fund a restoration [of the al-Assad regime], and Hezbollah, under disarmament pressure, needs calm with Damascus more than it needs a [battle on the] Syrian front,” Nanar Hawach, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst on Syria, told Al Jazeera.

Syria has been under pressure from the United States to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah although experts believe Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his government are aware that such a move could lead to widespread regional unrest and undermine the domestic authority they are working to establish, including from figures still in Lebanon.

For years, Syria had a paternal relationship and view towards neighbouring Lebanon. The Syrian military entered Lebanon in 1976 when Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, was in power and occupied large swaths of the country until 2005 when a popular uprising pushed Bashar al-Assad to withdraw his troops.

The younger al-Assad and Syria still exerted their influence in Lebanon via local allies, including Hezbollah, until the regime’s demise in 2024. Since then, Syria’s new government under al-Sharaa has indicated a willingness to have a more balanced and egalitarian relationship with Beirut.

To date, no Syrian regime figures accused of committing atrocities have been returned from Lebanon. That’s why, with extradition approved, Issa’s case could be so groundbreaking. While they have not yet faced trial, many former regime officials are either under foreign sanctions and/or worked in key regime roles that contributed to severe crimes against the Syrian people.

Earlier this year, Syrian authorities asked Lebanese security forces to hand over more than 200 senior officers who fled to Lebanon after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, according to a Reuters agency investigation that showed how the neighbouring country was a hub for insurgent plotting.

Lebanon’s parliament has passed a law to abolish capital punishment, making it the first country in the Middle East to do so. That has contributed to the controversy over the extradition process with Syria, which does apply the death penalty.

Wadih al-Asmar, cofounder and president of the Lebanese Centre for Human Rights, said a number of the Syrian officials in Lebanon would have committed crimes during the occupation period and, therefore, the Lebanese judiciary “has a duty and obligation” to prosecute some of these figures.

Al-Asmar said his organisation has received asylum requests from Syrians afraid to return to their country but none had been military figures connected to the former regime.

But other ex-regime officials, particularly those in Europe, could have those connections. And the landmark trial in Damascus last week that sentenced the al-Assad brothers and their cousin to death could be a concern for European and other states when extraditing wanted figures to Syria.

Experts said Beirut’s desire to have a positive relationship with Damascus will likely supersede human rights concerns related to the death penalty for former regime figures. Still, al-Asmar said: “Lebanon cannot, without violating international law and its own law, send back any person to a country where he can face the death penalty.”

He added: “It’s a very complicated situation, and I believe the only way out for the Lebanese government and the Syrian government with respect to the state of law is for Syria to abolish the death penalty.”

As its defense against Russia grinds on and with the future of foreign military assistance never assured, Ukraine is ramping up procurement of its new, domestically produced “Equalizer” aerial glide bomb, according to the Ukrainian military. Brave1, the Ukrainian defense technology incubator, on Tuesday provided us with some new details about this weapon, which extends the range and accuracy of so-called dumb bombs by adding guidance kits and pop-out wings.

Also known by its Ukrainian name “Vyrivniuvach,” this bomb first broke cover in May, which you can read more about in our initial story on the topic here. It was developed by the Ukrainian company DG Industry with the Brave1’s support.

While glide bombs have been used to great effect by both sides, Kyiv has had to rely on donated weapons like the U.S.-made Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range munition (JDAM-ER) and the French-made AASM-250 Hammer bomb. The Ukrainian Air Force also makes extensive use of the U.S.-supplied Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which is smaller and also has pop-out wings.

The Ukrainian Air Force began launching JDAM-ERs in March 2023 and SDBs that November, though the use of the latter wasn’t officially confirmed until May 2024. The weapons became critical for striking Russian targets over the front lines because they allowed Ukrainian jets to release them from standoff distances and better avoid Russian air defenses.

Russia, meanwhile, produced its own crude glide bomb earlier in the war and it has become a highly problematic and deadly threat for Ukraine to contend with since. Now Ukraine is building its own.

As we noted in our earlier piece, the weapon had cleared trials and is ready for combat, giving Ukraine a domestically produced standoff munition that could augment its current arsenal of donated ones and provide a more secure supply chain given the uncertain nature of foreign assistance. One of our outstanding questions at the time was whether the Equalizer would have independent propulsion, a modification that provides this class of munition with a significant boost in range beyond the “dozens of kilometers,” Brave1 claims it can reach. By comparison, the stated JDAM-ER range is more definitive, able to hit targets about 45 miles away.

Russia last year introduced a small turbojet engine to its glide bombs, with claims that this has boosted range to at least 60 miles. Ukraine says it is developing that capability as well, with the goal of reaching targets as far as 125 miles away.

It’s worth noting that Ukraine’s French-supplied Hammer precision-guided bombs also feature a rocket booster. This feature is of unique utility for Ukraine, which often slings its glide bombs via pop-up launch profiles from low level executed by its fighter and attack aircraft. This is due to the extremely heavy air defenses near the front lines.

You can see a Ukrainian MiG-29 launch two Hammers in the following video.

The Equalizer “has no motor,” Brave1 spokesman Yurii Voronkov told us.

“A major challenge was the lack of an engine, as navigation and control rely entirely on the bomb’s own inertia and aerodynamics,” he explained. “Naturally, this demands precise calculations, structural balancing, and extensive testing.”

“The main difficulty lay in combining several critical factors: speed, high g-forces, and aircraft integration,” the Brave1 spokesman added. “This is precisely the type of system where even millimeters are critical, and choosing the right components directly impacts the structure’s effectiveness and resilience.” 

“The weapon was designed with high-precision targeting and compatibility with current Ukrainian aircraft and systems,” Voronkov stated. While designed for Ukrainian Su-24, Su-27, and MiG-29 jets, it can also be used with donated F-16 and Mirage fighters, though it “has to receive additional certification for usage on F-16s and Mirages.”

“The bomb also has modern guidance algorithms that promote better targeting and accuracy,” he noted, without providing additional details.

“Structurally speaking, the product differs from both Russian and foreign counterparts,” Voronkov added. “During development, the developers researched existing systems, incorporating real combat experience and feedback from the military. As a result, the product integrates all the advantages of existing solutions while addressing their shortcomings.”

Voronkov declined to elaborate, but highlighted that “everything—from the wings to the flight controller software—was developed in Ukraine, with the exception of the chips and microcircuits. In terms of the component base, approximately 90% consists of Ukrainian, European, and American parts. Overall, the company managed to avoid critical dependence on foreign components.”

Ukraine began developing the Equalizer two years ago over concerns about the future flow of arms into the country, Voronkov said. Given that with the war dragging on, the U.S. has stopped donating weapons to Ukraine and other nations, like the Netherlands, have as well, it was not an academic exercise.

“In 2024, a team of developers asked themselves a practical question: what happens if foreign arms supplies stop?” Voronokov proffered. “Ukraine needed its own capabilities to help its military carry out combat missions independently. That marked the beginning of their mission to develop a domestic guided aerial bomb.”

“By May 2025, following a series of successful tests, the team proved the concept was viable and decided to move forward,” the Brave1 spokesman added. “They transitioned to producing the initial prototypes and scaling up manufacturing. Naturally, it was a gradual process—the team continued refining the product and fine-tuning specific technical solutions, work that remains ongoing to this day.” 

“Brave1 supported this project from its inception in 2024,” Voronkov stated. “We aim to back innovations right from the start because it gives teams a real shot at success. We recognized the chance that the project would reach completion and prove its capabilities quickly, but we were equally aware it might take much longer. In the end, going from concept to the first working prototype took 17 months.”

DG Industry is one of “at least eight manufacturers working on glide bombs altogether,” Voronkov noted.

“The guided aerial bomb itself isn’t just a single product—it represents a technology that has now emerged in our country,” Yaroslav Vinnytskyi, Head of Defense Technologies at Brave1, told us. “It will continue to evolve, and its application can be scaled across various types and sizes. Mastering this technology is a major milestone, providing additional capabilities for both manufacturers and the armed forces.”

Beyond seeking supply independence, by developing its own weapons like Equalizer, Ukraine won’t have to worry about preclusions placed on their use by foreign donors, something that happened with several weapons systems, though the limits ebbed and flowed.

As we noted earlier in this story, the Equalizer “is already being officially purchased for supply to the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn, head of the Central Department of Innovation Activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, told the Ukrainian Ukrinform media outlet.

Voloshyn noted that Russia has increased its daily use of glide bombs from about 180 last year to more than 300 this year. It remains unknown when the Equalizer will arrive on the battlefield for Ukraine at scale, or when the other options will either.

Given what these weapons can bring to the table if they truly work as advertised, for Kyiv they cannot come soon enough.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Iran denies launching missiles at the UAE, suggesting the incident was a ‘false flag operation’.

The United Arab Emirates has imposed an indefinite trade embargo on Iran after accusing Iranian forces of firing two ballistic missiles at the country, an allegation Tehran denies.

In a statement early on Wednesday, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the decision was made in “light of escalations that undermine peace and security in the region”.

“All trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice,” it added.

The statement came after the UAE’s Ministry of Defence said its air defences detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran, with one falling outside the country’s territorial waters and the other landing within them.

In a follow-up statement, the ministry said the missiles had been “targeting maritime traffic” and promised to “resolutely confront any attempt to undermine the security of the nation or maritime navigation in the region”.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the accusation as “baseless”, with spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei suggesting it was a “false flag operation” amid the war launched by the United States and Israel against his country.

Baghaei warned the claim “contradicts the principle of good neighbourliness” and urged regional parties to steer clear of what he called unfounded claims against Tehran, and argued that any honest assessment of the situation must also weigh the “malicious actions” of the US and Israel.

US naval blockade

Tuesday’s attack came a day after a 60-day window for US-Iranian peace talks expired without a breakthrough in the more than five-month-old conflict.

In the war’s first six weeks, Iran targeted the UAE with retaliatory strikes more than any other Gulf country, launching more than 530 ballistic missiles, dozens of cruise missiles and over 2,200 drones at what it described as US assets. Tuesday’s strike is the first targeting the UAE since May, and comes days after Abu Dhabi accused Tehran of attacking two of its state-owned ADNOC (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company) vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran has not claimed responsibility for the ADNOC attacks.

The trade embargo comes as the US maintains a naval blockade on Iranian ports, with President Trump signalling a pivot towards economic pressure, rather than military pressure, to compel Tehran into accepting US demands.

Mark Kimmitt, a retired US general and former assistant secretary of state, told Al Jazeera the UAE’s trade embargo could hit Iran harder than anything Washington has imposed, with Dubai having quietly become Iran’s most important trading partner, edging out both China and Turkiye to supply roughly a third of everything Iran imports each year.

The UAE had suspended direct cargo shipping between the two countries in early March, just days after the war began, and resumed trade only in late June via Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port.

“I don’t think that you can overstate or understate the importance of the trade, both financial and goods trade, between Dubai and Iran,” Kimmitt said.

That reliance runs deeper than goods on ships, given Dubai’s standing as a global financial hub, which Kimmitt said has long given Iran a discreet way to move money around international sanctions, cutting off a route Tehran has long relied on for years. “In many ways, the embargo being put on by the UAE is even more significant than the embargo being put on by the United States,” he said.

The former general said he doesn’t expect other Gulf states to follow suit immediately, predicting a “wait-and-see” approach even if Iranian attacks continue.

But he said the UAE’s move is significant enough that Tehran could interpret it as bordering on an act of war, likening it to the near-total embargo the US imposed on Japan after World War II.

BREAKINGBREAKING,

Trump announces pause on 50 percent duty on Canadian exports shortly before midnight deadline.

The United States and Canada have reached a deal to avert steep tariffs on billions of dollars of Canadian goods, US President Donald Trump has announced.

Trump made the announcement shortly before the expiry of a midnight deadline for imposing a 50 percent duty on a wide range of Canadian exports, including electronics, industrial machinery, furniture, and dairy products.

“I have paused the 50% Tariffs against Canada, that were scheduled to kick in tomorrow morning for a three day period, based on the fact that Canada and the U.S.A., subject to the finalization of documents, have a DEAL!” Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social.

“The great Keystone XL Pipeline, long ago killed by Sleepy Joe Biden, may be awoken from the grave!”

More to follow…

The U.S. Army has chosen Hanwha Defense USA to advance to the next phase of its Mobile Tactical Cannon (MTC) program. The company will now provide prototypes of its wheeled 155mm K9 Mobile Howitzer for further testing. This, in turn, could lead to its adoption as a replacement for the Army’s existing towed 155mm M777 howitzers.

“The U.S. Army announced today an agreement with Hanwha Defense USA, Arlington, Virginia, for the development of prototypes for the Mobile Tactical Cannon program, a critical priority in the Army’s ongoing continuous transformation and long-range fires modernization efforts,” according to a press release the service put out this evening. “Awarded competitively under an Other Transaction Authority (10 U.S.C. Section 4022), the firm-fixed-price agreement will provide the Army with up to 18 wheeled Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems for rapid prototyping, testing, and Soldier experimentation over an estimated four-year period of performance. The amount of this action is $100,302,961 with a total cumulative face value of $262,903,274.”

OTAs are a contracting mechanism that U.S. government agencies regularly use to help accelerate advanced research and development and prototype efforts.

The Army’s release does not explicitly mention the K9 Mobile Howitzer (K9MH), also known as the K9A2. However, Hanwha Defense USA has confirmed that this is the design it will be supplying in its own press release. The company had also announced this would be its entry for the MTC competition back in March. American Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems, and Elbit Systems USA had also been in the running.

“The agreement provides for the accelerated delivery of six prototype MTC systems, with an option for an additional 12. Soldiers will use these platforms in a series of operational experiments to assess performance, reliability, and supportability in realistic combat conditions,” the release adds. “This Soldier-centric, experiment-driven approach reflects the Army’s continuous transformation initiative to rapidly deliver lethal capabilities, incorporate immediate Soldier feedback, and adapt the force to pace emerging threats in multi-domain operations.”

The K9MH was developed from Hanwha’s earlier tracked K9 design, variants and derivatives of which are already in service in South Korea, as well as Australia, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, India, Norway, Poland, and Turkey. Both the tracked and wheeled designs share the same 52-caliber 155mm cannon. Caliber here is a measurement of length in relation to the diameter of the barrel. A 52-caliber 155mm barrel is just under 26 and a half feet long. The M777’s barrel is 39 calibers long, or just around 16.7 feet.

K9 and K10 prove compatibility with US munitions during a live-fire demonstration at YPG

In general, longer barrels on howitzers translate to greater range. Hanwha says the maximum range of the K9MH is just over 37 miles (60 kilometers), though it is unclear if this is only when using rocket-assisted or other specialized ammunition. The stated maximum range of the M777, even when using specialized rounds, is just under 20 miles.

As a self-propelled howitzer, the 8×8 K9MH also offers the benefit of integrated mobility over the towed M777, which requires a separate vehicle to move it from point A to point B. “Its emplacement/displacement times of under 30 seconds enables ‘shoot and scoot’ tactics,” according to Hanwha’s website.

The K9MH can also carry 40 rounds of ammunition onboard, as well as be rapidly reloaded in the field via a companion K10 resupply vehicle.

“We’re focused on creating a U.S.-anchored K9 Mobile Howitzer manufacturing network – with Opelika, Alabama, as the current phase I launch point – that can deliver advanced Mobile Tactical Cannons at the speed and scale the U.S. Army needs,” Jason Pak, Hanwha Defense USA Head of Land Systems-Artillery, also said in a statement.

“Hanwha’s global supply chain and local production experience in Australia, Egypt, Poland and Romania demonstrate a proven commitment to local execution we’re excited to bring to the U.S.,” Michael Coulter, Hanwha Defense USA CEO, said in his own statement. “Localization is central to Hanwha’s global business model, leveraging our global leading industrial technology and process in Korea to create sovereign industrial strength in the U.S., whether it be in shipbuilding, munitions or combat vehicles.”

The Army has been actively exploring the idea of replacing the M777 with a new wheeled self-propelled howitzer since at least 2019, and has even conducted shoot-offs of various designs in the past. The service has also made clear that its selection of Hanwha Defense USA to advance in the MTC effort does not guarantee that it will field the K9MH.

“Data and insights gained from these experiments will directly inform senior leaders’ decisions on future fielding. If approved for fielding, MTC will replace M777 towed artillery systems in select formations, significantly increasing their lethality, mobility, reliability, and survivability on the modern, highly transparent battlefield,” per the Army’s release today. “By rapidly prototyping these systems, the Army is advancing a more mobile and adaptable fires formation aligned with the rigorous demands of large-scale combat operations.”

The release does not elaborate on what “select formations” might be in line to eventually receive K9MHs. However, a past MTC contracting notice says the initial focus is on replacing M777s within Brigade Combat Teams equipped with Stryker wheeled light armored vehicles. Airborne, airmobile, and ‘leg’ infantry brigades also have M777s that could be supplanted by new wheeled self-propelled howitzers.

The possibility of the Army replacing at least a portion of its existing M109-series tracked self-propelled 155mm howitzers has also been raised in the past. However, the service’s press release today makes clear that the focus of the MTC program right now is still on replacing towed M777s. There is a long-standing debate about the relative pros and cons of wheeled versus tracked self-propelled howitzers, with the U.S. Army long having favored the latter. Tracked designs typically offer greater off-road mobility and are often more heavily armored. They are also generally heavier overall, which can negatively impact mobility and transportability more broadly, and can be more costly to acquire and operate.

“If you look at the [fight] in Ukraine on either side, it’s really hard to move out and get fires ready to go. … The Paladin [the name applied to the latest A6 and A7 variants of the M109] is just incapable of it at speed,” Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll told members of the House Appropriations Committee at a hearing earlier this year. “And so while we think the Paladin will be in our lives for a while, because we want to be good custodians of the assets the American taxpayer has given us, we think that new purchases to balance that platform out should be something different.”

At that time, Driscoll was defending his service’s omission of funding for any more M109A7s in its Fiscal Year 2027 budget proposal.

It is worth noting here that both sides in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine have and continue to employ tracked and wheeled self-propelled howitzers, as well as towed types. The war has underscored the continued importance of artillery, in general. At the same time, mobility, and greater speed while on the move, are ever more important considerations in an era of drone warfare and expanded kill chains that put anything that stays in one place too long at higher risk

MTC is part of a larger Self-Propelled Howitzer-Modernization (SPH-M) effort that could also include the separate acquisition of a new tracked self-propelled howitzer. There have been several abortive Army attempts to replace the venerable M109 family since the 1990s. This includes the advanced XM2001 Crusader, which was canceled in 2002 ostensibly due to growing costs. The service axed the more recent XM1299, developed under its Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ECRA) program in 2024. The XM1299 featured a 58-caliber cannon and had a demonstrated range of 40 miles (just over 60 kilometers). The Army has previously said that the length of the barrel presented technical challenges that contributed to the program’s cancellation.

XM2001 Crusader Howitzer Prototype

Since the XM1299’s cancellation, the Army has also been investing heavily in new long-range artillery shells, including ramjet-powered types.

Today’s announcement is also another important win for South Korea’s defense industry, which has made major export gains globally in recent years. Poland, in particular, has become a huge customer for South Korean arms exports, including versions of the K9. Further progress in the U.S. Army’s MTC program could offer a major inroad into the American market for Hanwha.

With today’s announcement, the Army has taken an important new step toward adding a new wheeled 155mm self-propelled howitzer to its arsenal.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Lawmakers in the United States have renewed calls for answers about conditions on board the USS Abraham Lincoln, suggesting that reports emerging from the aircraft carrier may belie a troubling pattern.

In at least three separate appeals, Democrats called for more information about how the Navy prepared for the vessel’s record-breaking deployment.

The aircraft carrier has been involved in military operations against Venezuela as well as the US-Israel war on Iran since it departed from San Diego, California, in November.

The ship has yet to dock for a port call in the time since. Having spent more than 260 days at sea, it has broken the US Navy’s record for the longest deployment without a stop.

Reports have emerged in recent weeks about crew members attempting to jump overboard amid shortages of food and other supplies.

On Tuesday, US Representative Pat Ryan published a letter sent to acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao and signed by 22 members of Congress.

It noted that the lengthy deployments “have become a pattern in the Administration’s handling of its war against Iran”.

The war, which began on February 28, shows no sign of ending. Ryan pointed out that the USS Gerald Ford had also broken records for the length of its deployment as part of the Iran war, and it, too, was the subject of worrying reports about strain on sailors’ health. The ship returned to the US in April.

“The reported conditions on the Lincoln, following so soon after the reported conditions on the Ford, leave Congress and the public concerned that the Department is not adapting quickly enough to the conditions,” Ryan wrote in his letter, dated August 14.

He also questioned whether US Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversees military operations in the Middle East, was “taking the appropriate steps to mitigate the continued challenges in our fleet”.

A delegation of California lawmakers, including Senators Adam Schiff and Alex Padilla, has also sent a letter to the Pentagon calling for an inquiry.

Separately, a group of Democratic senators addressed another letter, dated August 15, to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, demanding answers and calling for accountability.

“This is a symptom of poor planning by both you and the President and exacerbated by the deeply unsound decision to start a war with Iran,” that letter said.

“Open-ended deployments driven by an open-ended war have real consequences for our servicemembers, and we are seeing those consequences now.”

The appeals for more information come as the USS Lincoln prepares to navigate home.

Cao revealed last week that the USS Lincoln would soon return to the US. The announcement coincided with reports that the USS George Washington has been rerouted from the Pacific Ocean to replace its fellow aircraft carrier.

But the USS Washington’s departure leaves no aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, long portrayed as a region of strategic interest for the US as it seeks to check China’s territorial ambitions.

President Donald Trump and his defence officials, meanwhile, have argued that reports about the USS Lincoln’s conditions have been overblown.

Hegseth, for instance, has called the reports of conditions “completely misrepresented”. Trump last week also said the vessel had not been deployed “nearly long enough”.

On Monday, the president brushed aside questions about the USS Lincoln’s conditions as part of a “CNN fake report”.

Admiral Brad Cooper, the head of US Central Command, has also released a statement on social media this week, saying he has visited the USS Lincoln in recent days and found the crew “awe-inspiring”.

“This doesn’t mean that all is perfect,” he wrote. “Find any of the nearly 4 million Navy veterans in America today and they will likely tell you that service at sea for long periods isn’t for everyone.”

But he applauded the USS Lincoln’s leadership for having made “mental health and crew resilience” a priority.

Unlike Democrats, members of Trump’s Republican Party have largely not responded to the reports of mental health strain and supply shortages on the USS Lincoln.

However, Representative Don Bacon voiced concern during an interview on CBS News’s Face the Nation programme on Sunday.

“We should have oversight,” he said.

The arrest comes after an attack on activist Nadia Beller, who says she was targeted for her opposition to conservative reforms and corruption.

Bolivia has arrested a prominent adviser to several right-wing political leaders in Latin America on suspicion of plotting a murder.

Fernando Cerimedo was arrested on Tuesday following an attack on lawyer and political activist Nadia Beller. The consultant has worked on political campaigns for Argentina’s President Javier Milei, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, and Bolivia’s President Rodrigo Paz.

The Argentinian national was arrested in Bolivia at an airport, trying to travel to his home country.

Security videos captured Beller standing in front of a hotel in Santa Cruz when two men dressed as delivery drivers walked up the stairs, shot her from close range, took some of her belongings, and left her behind as she lay on the ground.

Beller, who was four weeks pregnant, believes she was targeted for her opposition to a pack of unconstitutional laws under Decree 5503, which were being prepared by Cerimedo and the government, and for witnessing high-level corruption.

Decree 5503 introduces radical economic reforms, such as eliminating state fuel subsidies, that target policies put in place under Bolivia’s former socialist government.

Beller is also understood to have had a romantic relationship with Cerimedo. She admitted to her relationship with him in a video appearance from her hospital bed, and highlighted Cerimedo’s significant political influence.

She said she decided to speak out as she believes that “until I speak directly to the Bolivian people, they are going to finish what they attempted to do. They are going to end up taking my life”.

Bolivian Vice President Edmand Lara said the attack “threatens life, democracy, and freedom of expression” in a news conference where he called for an impartial investigation “without any kind of favoritism”.

Yes. The US South Korea relationship has not broken down under Donald Trump, but it has become more transactional, cost focused and strategically uncertain. The latest decision to scale back joint military exercises highlights a broader evolution in which Washington increasingly expects Seoul to shoulder more of the alliance burden while seeking greater flexibility for US forces across the region.

From deterrence to deal making

Trump’s approach to South Korea has been shaped heavily by his personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. His first term moved rapidly from threats of “fire and fury” to unprecedented summits with Kim, followed by the suspension or redesign of major US South Korean military exercises.

Although the Hanoi summit collapsed without a denuclearisation agreement, Trump has continued to emphasise his relationship with Kim. His latest instruction to reduce joint exercises therefore carries significance beyond cost savings. It signals that Washington may once again be willing to modify elements of its alliance posture in pursuit of diplomatic space with Pyongyang.

The strategic environment, however, is very different from 2018. North Korea has expanded its nuclear and missile capabilities and strengthened military cooperation with Russia. Reducing exercises therefore creates a more complicated calculation for Seoul: diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang may reduce tensions temporarily, but weaker military preparedness could also increase the risks associated with North Korea’s growing capabilities.

The alliance is becoming more transactional

The clearest transformation under Trump is arguably the growing emphasis on burden sharing.

Trump has repeatedly questioned the cost of maintaining roughly 28,500 US troops in South Korea and has pushed Seoul to contribute more to its own defence. The existing cost sharing agreement requires South Korea to contribute about 1.52 trillion won this year toward the upkeep of US forces.

For Washington, the argument is straightforward: South Korea is wealthy enough to assume a greater share of the financial and military burden. For Seoul, however, the US military presence remains central to deterring North Korea.

This creates a fundamental tension. The alliance is still strategically valuable to both sides, but Trump increasingly approaches it through a cost benefit framework rather than solely through traditional alliance commitments.

Defence cooperation is expanding even as exercises face pressure

The apparent contradiction is important. Trump is seeking to reduce certain military exercises while South Korea itself is increasing defence spending.

President Lee Jae Myung has pledged a larger security role and increased defence spending, while continuing to insist that Washington’s security commitment remains firm. Seoul has also sought greater strategic autonomy, including greater latitude over nuclear fuel technology and faster progress toward transferring wartime operational control.

This suggests that the alliance may be evolving rather than simply weakening.

South Korea appears to be preparing to assume greater responsibility for its own defence, while Washington wants the alliance to become more flexible and potentially address security challenges beyond the Korean Peninsula.

That latter objective is particularly sensitive for Seoul. The United States increasingly views its Asian alliances through the broader strategic competition with China, while South Korea remains primarily focused on the immediate threat from North Korea.

Trade has become inseparable from security

Under Trump, economic relations have also become an increasingly important component of the alliance.

Washington’s tariff pressure has pushed Seoul toward major investment commitments in the United States, including the $350 billion investment pledge associated with tariff relief. South Korean companies have already invested heavily in US semiconductors, batteries, electric vehicles and shipbuilding.

But disagreements over how the investment should be structured have exposed the limits of Trump’s transactional approach. Seoul has warned that demands for large upfront cash commitments could place pressure on its economy.

The detention of hundreds of South Korean workers during an immigration raid at a Hyundai LG battery project in Georgia further demonstrated how economic and political tensions can spill directly into the strategic relationship.

The result is an alliance in which security guarantees, trade concessions, investment and troop costs increasingly form one interconnected negotiation.

The deeper problem is strategic uncertainty

The central challenge for Seoul is not simply whether Trump wants fewer exercises. It is whether Washington’s definition of the alliance is changing.

For decades, the US South Korea alliance rested on a relatively clear bargain: Washington provided extended deterrence and military forces, while Seoul contributed financially and militarily to maintaining the security architecture.

Trump’s approach introduces more conditionality into that bargain.

If military exercises can be reduced because they are considered too expensive or diplomatically inconvenient, Seoul has to consider how predictable the US commitment remains. At the same time, Washington expects South Korea to spend more, invest more and potentially assume greater responsibility.

This could ultimately produce a stronger South Korean military, but it could also create greater uncertainty about the role of the United States.

What this means for China and the Indo Pacific

The evolution of the alliance also has implications far beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Washington wants greater flexibility for US forces stationed in South Korea to respond to regional contingencies, particularly those involving China. Seoul, however, has historically been reluctant to become directly involved in a confrontation over Taiwan.

That creates a structural divergence in strategic priorities.

For Washington, South Korea is increasingly part of a broader Indo Pacific security network. For Seoul, the primary purpose of the alliance remains deterrence against North Korea.

Trump’s transactional approach therefore forces South Korea to navigate between two competing imperatives: maintaining the American security umbrella while avoiding excessive strategic dependence on Washington’s wider confrontation with Beijing.

The alliance has changed, but it has not collapsed

Trump has not dismantled the US South Korea alliance. Instead, he is redefining its terms.

Military exercises are being reconsidered, defence burden sharing remains contentious, trade and investment have become bargaining instruments, and Washington increasingly expects Seoul to assume greater responsibility for regional security.

For South Korea, this creates both a risk and an opportunity. Greater defence spending and military autonomy could make Seoul less dependent on American forces. But if Washington simultaneously reduces visible commitments while demanding greater financial and strategic contributions, Seoul could find itself paying more for an alliance that feels less predictable.

The most important question, therefore, is not whether Trump is weakening the alliance. It is whether he is transforming it from a traditional security partnership into a transactional strategic bargain.

If that transformation continues, the US South Korea alliance could survive Trump, but it may emerge fundamentally different from the alliance Washington and Seoul built over the past seven decades.

With information from Reuters.

Concern over the security of Europe’s largest nuclear plant has been rife since Russia launched its full-scale war on Ukraine nearly five years ago.

A drone strike close to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in occupied southeastern Ukraine has killed one nuclear specialist and wounded 17, according to Russian reports.

Moscow asserted on Tuesday that the drone was launched by Ukraine. The security of Europe’s biggest nuclear plant has provoked significant global concern amid the full-scale war on Ukraine that Russia launched in February 2022.

Most of those injured by the strike were employees of the plant, according to a Telegram update by the Russian management of the nuclear facility. It asserted that the attack constituted one of the most serious incidents in the plant’s history.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) earlier confirmed reports that the strike hit staff members at a bus stop.

“No nuclear safety or security damage was reported,” the IAEA, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, said on social media.

However, it called “on military commanders responsible for these actions as well as all others aiming on nuclear power plants and/or their staff to put an immediate stop to these unacceptable actions”, citing the “great risks to nuclear safety”.

The Zaporizhzhia plant was seized by Russian forces a month after Moscow launched its invasion. The facility has been under Russian management since.

The safety of the plant – and the potential consequences of a hit amid the hostilities – have been a concern since the start of the war.

Zaporizhzhia’s six reactors can produce nearly six gigawatts of electricity, and the plant was crucial to supplying power to Ukraine’s national grid. All of the reactors have been shut down since Russia captured the plant, but a strike could cause damage and potentially cause serious leaks of radioactive material.

Tuesday’s strike came ahead of a scheduled visit by IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi to assess nuclear safety. It’s not clear if that visit will still take place.

A Russian strike on a thermal power plant was reported in central Ukraine a few hours later, forcing a halt to operations, according to DTEK, Ukraine’s largest energy provider and the company that operates the plant.

No casualties were reported, but DTEK stated on social media that the attack caused “significant damage to equipment”.

Russia has attacked the company’s thermal plants 230 times since the start of the war, according to DTEK’s Telegram channel, as it wages a campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.