MONEY

The impact the Rodríguez administration could have on the Venezuelan oil industry, even under the new Hydrocarbons Law, would be unsustainable and limited in scope. Structural weakness surrounding the Delcy government and the National Assembly’s lack of legitimacy, commitment to the rule of law, and popular support will restrain the reach of her reforms. Nevertheless, the law will test the willingness of the private sector to run both upstream and downstream operations. These measures could deliver a limited economic boost, that despite American supervision, will be weaponized politically by window-dressing the regime’s legitimacy and stalling further political and economic reforms. It’s precisely this flawed political and legal foundation that undermines the sustainability of the economic gains that the new law could provide.

For Venezuela and PDVSA to reclaim relevance in the international oil market what is required are not incremental improvements but a comprehensive overhaul of the industry, the company, and the constitutional framework that ties them together. The reforms must prioritize transparency, accountability, and insulating the industry and PDVSA from political pressures under strong political coverage that provides long term stability. These measures are something an interim administration, independent of who is in charge, will be unable to provide. Only then would international companies and capitals commit to the long term projects needed.

Once the country finds its political footing under a popularly elected and legitimate government can longlasting and durable reform take place. At this point multiple options may surface. There could be a scenario where we see PDVSA take a back seat while the country creates a competitive fiscal system prioritizing royalty collections while up and downstream operations are run by private enterprises. Remaining PDVSA assets and JV operations would be divested gradually as production capacity is recovered in the hands of private enterprises. However, revitalizing PDVSA as a competitive oil company should remain as a national strategic objective. Venezuelans would greatly benefit from building a company able to compete in and outside of the Venezuelan market.

However, the only way to relaunch PDVSA as a relevant actor in the international market is by allowing it to enter the 21st century oil dynamics and embracing a partial privatization via a minority share offering in international equity markets. Beyond the much needed capital that would be raised in the initial and consequent secondary offerings, plus the potential to tap debt markets along the way, going public will create an additional moat and isolate the company some steps from further political interference. A publicly traded PDVSA would not only need to answer to the government but to energy analysts, independent shareholders, and international compliance and regulatory frameworks alike. It will be the pressure generated by the external scrutiny that will enable PDVSA to be scaled up back into international relevance. Given the precarious financial and operational standing of the holding, a partial privatization is not feasible on day one or two of a political transition and economic recovery phase. But it is a question that will become relevant once the objective becomes long sustainable growth.

PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning.

The privatization of PDVSA has been a taboo for Venezuelan society despite serious attempts in late 1990s to execute such an operation. However, the devastation that the industry suffered under chavista mismanagement provides a clean slate opportunity to relaunch PDVSA and the oil industry under a modern governance framework. For too long the Venezuelan oil industry has been treated as the cash cow of whoever seats in Miraflores. Historically, this led to the centralization of political and economic power which hindered the development of democratic institutions and left the nation at the will of the administration’s oil revenue distribution policy. Taking control of PDVSA not only meant controlling the oil industry but the state itself. Reforms should aim to break the petro-state monopoly over oil revenue and to make PDVSA part of a dynamic national industry where other participants are allowed to play.

There are multiple precedents to back this move. Lessons from the partial privatizations of Chinese SINOPEC and Norwegian Statoil from the early 2000s could be drawn to prove that these operations are possible under different political systems. A PDVSA offering would be exceptionally complex, but in order to even start considering it there are three basic fundamentals that need to align.

First, the move would need overwhelming support from civil society to sustain the necessary political will. While that looks like a concrete goal in María Corina Machado’s energy proposals, the possibility seems remote under an interim Delcy government that still needs to appease other factions within the ruling coalition. In addition, chavismo’s current leader has not adhered to international transparency standards following her 2020 appointment as acting Minister of Economy and Finance—a role that earned her the title of Venezuela’s economic vice president before taking control of the national oil industry. Her tenure overlapped with the loss of an estimated $21 billion in oil payments, a scandal that ultimately led to the arrest and scapegoating of former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami.

Second, Petróleos de Venezuela needs a robust rule-of-law framework that can deliver credible guarantees to investors The current interim president is unlikely to provide such assurances, given the deep mistrust surrounding Venezuela’s public institutions—many of which she does not fully control. As Juan Guillermo Blanco points out, her posture may swing from alignment with Washington on this occasion to an anti-imperialist rupture if the circumstances allow it.

Shifting to global best practices

PDVSA cannot move forward without the goodwill of the market. Francisco Monaldi has repeatedly stated that the main risks of Venezuelan oil are above ground. Beyond the politics, sanctions, and the legal framework, PDVSA needs to get its house in order to regain market credibility. For starters, the holding needs to address its debt issue—estimated at $34.5b—through an agreement where debtholders walk away feeling it was a fair deal. Without serious debt restructuring, a share offering roadshow would be impossible.

The company must also cut all non-essential ventures, subsidies, and social project funding from the nucleus. From PDVAL supermarkets to F1 teams, PDVSA bankrolled it all during chavismo. Despite how bizarre the outflows party got, these types of splurges and subsidies have been ingrained in the Venezuelan mindset and will be hard to get rid of. Such measures would represent a comprehensive detachment from century-old beliefs in the magical powers of the Venezuelan petro-state.

Furthermore, PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning. In addition, investors and banking partners must be able to track every dollar. Auditable records are not only essential for building reliable financial projections but also necessary for protecting stakeholders from anticorruption liability. This underscores the need for a new framework of transparent, efficient contract allocation and fully auditable accounting trails, ensuring that financial statements can withstand market scrutiny and compliance verification.

Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market.

Figures such as the “productive participation contracts” (CPPs) or joint ventures that currently dominate private investments in the industry are compatible with this model as PDVSA should seek alliances in cases where it makes financial sense to do so. However, the secrecy under which these ventures have been working on needs to end.

Finally, PDVSA will need to bring in an independent leadership team and board with enough protection to isolate operational and financial decision-making from politics. Venezuela would be represented in the board as the majority shareholder, but would be restrained from running the day-to-day business operations and resource allocation. Studies that examine initial offerings of National Oil Companies (NOC) suggest that a substantial amount of the efficiency gains are delivered before an IPO is launched, as the company restructures itself to be introduced into the public market. PDVSA has a long way to go before we can consider this scenario. Nevertheless, aiming toward partial privatization would provide a blueprint for rebuilding PDVSA as an operationally, financially, and commercially viable company.

A share offering should consider a dual listing that includes the Caracas Stock Exchange, which is also in need of an extreme makeover (that’s part of a different discussion, however). The overhaul needed is not only about getting barrels out of the ground, but about including the company in the wider economy and making it subject to the highest managerial and corporate governance standards. Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market. Ultimately, this would constrain the government’s ability to overreach into the private sector.

Whichever path is chosen for the future of PDVSA and the Venezuelan oil industry, it should be preceded by an inclusive debate that considers implications beyond the industry itself and sets the country on a sustainable growth path. This debate must happen in public, in conditions of full political and economic freedom, free from coercion by either internal or external powers. It should be the opposite of what occurred prior to the swift approval of the new Hydrocarbons Law, when secrecy prevailed and the legislative body responsible for drafting the statute showed no significant deliberation.

The one-sided vote in the illegitimate 2025 National Assembly should not overshadow the legislature’s failure to comply with its own parliamentary rules during the bill’s passage, as purported opposition lawmakers reportedly received a copy of the draft only hours before the first debate. That episode underscores why the legal and constitutional reforms needed to break the petro-state and refound PDVSA can only follow the renewal of all institutions, including a truly multiparty, independent congress.

The end goal is simple, yet history-changing: to dismantle Miraflores’ total control and discretion over oil-industry revenues.

Photograph by unknown author. “Trabajadores petroleros,” Fernando Irazábal Collection. Compiled by Archivo Fotografía Urbana.

On January 29, Venezuela experienced a legislative tectonic shift regarding the future of its hydrocarbon sector. The National Assembly approved a new petroleum law that effectively breaks with the post-1976 tradition of rigid state control, opening participation across the full value chain to private oil companies. 

This is not the first experiment with private participation since nationalization, but it is the clearest attempt since the 1990s Apertura to normalize it as the governing framework of the sector. The legislation, approved with striking speed and opacity, has elicited mixed reactions, ranging from denunciations of lost sovereignty and surrender to foreign interests to support for a first step that still requires major fixes. Despite these divergences, one thing is clear: the return of private companies to Venezuela’s oil sector inevitably revives parallels with the concessionary system under which the industry was born and flourished between 1914 and 1976, a mirror of what Venezuela’s energy sector could become in the twenty-first century.

The 1943 and 2026 hydrocarbons laws

The iconic 1943 bill enacted by President Isaías Medina Angarita (1941–1945) regulated Venezuela’s privately run oil industry until the 1976 nationalization. It became the institutional template of the concessionary era: a rules-and-taxes state overseeing a privately operated industry. Together with related legislation, it established the famous 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement with the state, later tightened by reforms. Yet within the 1943 framework, the rentier state largely confined itself to setting the rules and collecting taxes and rents, while private companies assumed the capital risks. There was no government monopoly over day-to-day operations.

In spirit, the 2026 law reintroduces comparable conditions for private capital. Petroleum companies can now either hold operational control in joint ventures with the state or carry out activities independently through government contracts. The 1943 and 2026 frameworks also embrace flexible royalty schemes that prioritize business viability over rigid tax burdens. Differences, of course, abound. To mention a few, the 2026 version concentrates discretionary power in the executive branch regarding royalties, opens the possibility of international arbitration outside the country, simplifies the tax burden into a 15% integrated hydrocarbons tax, and diminishes the National Assembly’s authority over oil business.

The Venezolanization pioneered by firms like the Creole Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mene Grande Oil Company, and many others also became an exercise in social integration.

Divergences aside, both pieces of legislation share the same underlying imperative: attracting capital and technology. The 1976 and 2001 hydrocarbons laws, by contrast, were designed precisely to limit private initiative. But investment alone will not do all the work. Human capital is also desperately needed to lead a reborn hydrocarbon sector, and here the concessions model offers valuable lessons.

The Venezolanization of the industry

An underappreciated dimension of that era was human capital development. Over decades, foreign firms trained Venezuelans across the corporate hierarchy—in technical, managerial, and executive roles—so that by the mid-1970s expatriates were a small fraction of the workforce and Venezuelans increasingly ran the day-to-day business. This created a pipeline of local talent able to inherit operational responsibility and manage the 1976 transition to state control with unusual continuity.

This history is not nostalgia for a bygone era, but a lesson worth highlighting. Venezuela’s oil collapse in this century is inseparable from the degradation of corporate culture and human capital, deepened by the politicization of the industry. It triggered a professional brain drain and the hollowing out of operational efficiency. Multinationals like Chevron, and others that may follow, should explicitly lean on a “Venezolanization 2.0” that engages local talent still in the country and encourages the return of a diaspora of Venezuelan managers and engineers now abroad. Insulating the sector from partisan hiring and purging is essential if these cadres are to operate with full competence.

The Venezolanization pioneered by firms like the Creole Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mene Grande Oil Company, and many others also became an exercise in social integration. Many American expatriates, like Creole’s CEO Arthur T. Proudfit, embraced the social milieu of the country that welcomed them, often learning the language and speaking it fluently; his daughter even married a local businessman. In exchange, Venezuelans trained abroad and working for these firms absorbed US professional values and traditions. This cultural exchange helped forge durable bonds between both countries and contributed to the successful presence of foreign capital in Venezuela. And these corporations did not stop at their payrolls. They understood that long-term success in the hydrocarbon sector extended beyond employees to the surrounding communities of the oil fields, and beyond.

Social license

Creole, Shell, and Mene Grande undertook significant investments in the country. In the oilfields, they negotiated lucrative labor contracts with unions. They also financed hospitals, university campuses, and other infrastructure projects. These firms even joined the state in ventures like the Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation to fund agro-industrial projects aimed at diversifying the economy, while supporting rural communities through initiatives such as the American International Association. They left an indelible imprint on everyday life, from how Venezuelans shopped through market chains like CADA, to culture through documentaries, corporate magazines, and even TV news programs like Observador Creole.

More importantly, they built alliances with domestic capitalists like Eugenio Mendoza to address social problems. Creole and Venezuelan business leaders, for instance, institutionalized private-sector social action through organizations like the Dividendo Voluntario para la Comunidad (DVC), founded in 1964 to mobilize corporate contributions toward community projects. This nonprofit continues to exist today, fulfilling the original goal of social action bequeathed by American and Venezuelan businessmen more than sixty years ago. Creole also created the Creole Development Corporation, a financial arm designed to provide seed capital for local entrepreneurial activity. This was hardly a frictionless era, but it shows how legitimacy was treated as a condition of stability.

Contributions to health, schools, and infrastructure would also ease the state’s burden and allow it to focus on critical nation-building emergencies.

This largesse reached widely, but it was not mere corporate charity. To avoid jeopardizing their operations and invite nationalist backlash, companies engaged with surrounding communities and invested in their future. That is a lesson new capital arriving in Venezuela should pursue. There is even generational memory favorable to the presence of these firms in oil communities. 

Leveraging that legacy could open renewed opportunities for local professional growth while strengthening bonds between communities and multinationals. Contributions to health, schools, and infrastructure would also ease the state’s burden and allow it to focus on critical nation-building emergencies: democratizing institutions, reconstructing the economy, and addressing the public services and humanitarian needs the population faces.

A spiritual return to the concessions system?

The new hydrocarbons law pushes Venezuela’s oil industry in a new direction, and it functions as a first step in the right path. However, there is room for significant improvement. 

Moreover, key questions remain unanswered. For instance, what will be the fate of PDVSA? Any plan that fails to address the resurrection of its operational capabilities undermines the development of an efficient sector. Only the re-democratization of the country can properly confront the deeper failings reflected in the current legislation. Many industry experts have already proposed an alternative framework that would solve several of the bill’s core problems by establishing clear rules, transparency mechanisms, and a dedicated government agency entrusted with regulating the hydrocarbon sector.

The spirit of the concessionary model walks once more around Venezuela’s refineries, port terminals, and petroleum wells. It is too soon to tell whether foreign capital will return with the same excitement it brought more than a century ago, or whether the scale of investments and engagement with surrounding communities will match that of its predecessors. The sector can either become a platform for institutional rebuilding and professionalization, or another discretionary channel for rents and corruption. 

Democracy, check and balances, and clear rules can turn the 2026 hydrocarbons law (and its potential future modifications) into enduring principles for the remainder of the century. If so, the oil industry might unlock a new period of prosperity. Much remains to be done to materialize that future, but what is undeniable is that a new era begins.

Published on
04/02/2026 – 12:42 GMT+1

Novo Nordisk shares fell sharply on Wednesday after the company warned that sales and profits will drop in 2026.

The Danish drugmaker’s stock slid about 17% in early trading in Copenhagen, erasing gains made earlier in the year. The fall followed an unexpected pre-release of the company’s outlook for 2026.

Sales and operating profit are both expected to decline by between 5% and 13% this year, far below what analysts had anticipated.

The company had already cut its 2025 guidance in July, citing a difficult US market, triggering a one-day share price drop of more than 20%.

Pressure in the US

Novo Nordisk says it is reducing prices to make its GLP-1 drugs more affordable, even though the move is likely to hurt short-term performance.

The company faces growing competition in the United States from cheaper compounded versions of semaglutide — the active ingredient in Wegovy and diabetes drug Ozempic — as well as from rival Eli Lilly.

There have been some brighter signs. The new oral version of Wegovy has seen strong early demand in the US.

Novo Nordisk endured its worst year on record in 2025, with shares falling nearly 50%.

The company also underwent major leadership changes, appointing its first non-Danish chief executive and bringing former CEO Lars Rebien Sørensen back as chair.

At the same time, it struck a deal with US President Donald Trump for a programme tied to TrumpRx and direct-to-consumer discounts.

The starting price for the new Wegovy pill has been set at $149 (€126), far below the price of the injectable version a year earlier.

Patent expiries in several markets outside the United States are also expected to weigh on sales in 2026.

Meanwhile, the head of Novo’s US business, David Moore, who oversaw the launch of the pill, is leaving the company for personal reasons. He will be replaced by Jamie Miller, formerly of UnitedHealth.

Published on
04/02/2026 – 10:19 GMT+1

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will fly to Australia later this month in a bid to seal a long-delayed trade agreement, sources familiar with the matter told Euronews.

Concluding the deal would mark another trade win for the Commission, following recent deals with Latin America’s Mercosur bloc and India, as geopolitical tensions intensify with the US and China.

One source said von der Leyen could head to Canberra shortly after the Munich Security Conference concludes on 15 February.

Whether the trip goes ahead will depend on progress in negotiations led by EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who is due to meet Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell in Brussels next week.

“As always, progress in the sensitive phase of negotiations will depend on substance,” Commission deputy chief spokesperson Olof Gill told Euronews.

Talks on an EU-Australia free-trade agreement collapsed in 2023 after Canberra accused Brussels of failing to offer sufficient market access for beef, sheep, dairy and sugar.

Agriculture remains a perennial flashpoint in EU trade negotiations. The Mercosur agreement has already met furious opposition from European farmers, who fear unfair competition from increased imports coming from Latin America.

Australia, however, is viewed in Brussels as a strategic and like-minded partner as the EU seeks to diversify its trade relationships, expand access to global markets and reduce exposure to a closing US market and China’s increasingly aggressive trade policy.

The free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur countries should be implemented without delay, Paraguay’s President Santiago Peña told Euronews. He warned that stalling the agreement would be a “mistake” amid rising geopolitical tensions.

The free trade pact was signed last month by the EU and Mercosur members Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. However, its full ratification by the EU has been frozen after MEPs referred the agreement to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.

“We already presented the agreement to the Congress of the Paraguayan Nation last week, and we understand that the European Union has the legal tools to implement it temporarily,” Peña said on Euronews’s flagship interview programme The Europe Conversation.

“We are working to make this happen, and we want Paraguay to be the first country to implement it.” The country currently holds the rotating pro tempore presidency of Mercosur.

Despite the judicial review, the European Commission has the prerogative to provisionally apply the deal once one or more Mercosur countries complete national ratification. While Germany, Spain, Portugal and the Nordics are pushing for the next phase, the Commission currently says no decision has yet been made.

‘Opposition rooted in ignorance’

The agreement would create a vast EU–Latin America free-trade zone, slashing tariffs on goods and services. But resistance in Europe remains fierce, with farmers and several capitals, led by Paris, warning of unfair competition from Mercosur imports.

Peña said that European opposition to the deal was rooted in “ignorance” and an outdated and stereotypical view of Latin America.

“Our countries have changed tremendously. They have developed. Human capital has grown,” Peña said. “Europe has to rediscover Latin America.”

In the interview, Peña warned that rejecting the deal would amount to a strategic blunder, as Europe can no longer rely on the United States as its default trade partner due to President Donald Trump’s unpredictable policies.

“If (MEPs) ultimately prefer not to integrate themselves into (new) markets and instead choose to retain their old alliances that today no longer work, it would certainly be a mistake,” he said.

Still, Peña credited Trump with giving the deal “the final push” after 25 years of talks.

“The world was in a state of drowsiness,” he said. “We weren’t moving, and he came along to move us all. He came to challenge what we thought was stable, and that pushed us to leave our comfort zone.”

According to Peña, one of the EU-Mercosur deal’s key advantages is its potential to counter China’s growing presence in the region and dominance of rare earth supplies.

“Europe is losing an enormous opportunity there, because if there is a region that can compete globally, it is Latin America. We have young talent, a predominantly young population, a population (of people who are) already digital natives,” he said.

“We have that tremendous abundance of natural resources, not only food that grows above the ground, but also minerals that are below the earth, which are so critical to this new technological wave. Our region has absolutely everything that Europe and the world need.”

Published on
02/02/2026 – 12:02 GMT+1

Gold and silver prices extended last week’s dramatic sell-off on Monday, as investors continued to digest the implications of President Donald Trump’s announcement of Kevin Warsh as the next chair of the US Federal Reserve.

The move has fuelled expectations of a more government pressure on the Fed and prompted a sharp reassessment of positions across precious metals.

Spot gold fell as much as 10% in early trading, while silver plunged up to 16%, following Friday’s rout that marked the largest intraday decline on record for the white metal.

The scale and speed of the move underscored how vulnerable the market had become after months of aggressive buying driven by geopolitical tension and bets on looser US monetary policy.

“The sharp selloff on Friday followed news that US President Donald Trump intends to nominate Kevin Warsh as the next Federal Reserve chair – a development that boosted the US dollar and reinforced expectations of a more hawkish policy stance,” said Ewa Manthey, commodities strategist at ING, and Warren Patterson, head of commodities strategy.

“While a correction was overdue after the intense rally, the scale of Friday’s decline far exceeded most expectations.”

Why the Fed matters for gold

Gold and silver are particularly sensitive to US interest-rate expectations.

Higher rates increase the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding assets such as precious metals, while a stronger dollar makes them more expensive for overseas buyers.

Warsh, a former Fed governor, has voice sentiments supportive of Trump’s vision for the Fed, including regular rate cuts.

That reassessment has been swift. Investor caution has been evident in exchange-traded funds, with silver holdings falling for a seventh consecutive session to their lowest level since November 2025.

Futures data also show speculators cutting back sharply on bullish bets, signalling a broader retreat from the sector.

“CFTC positioning shows a cooling in speculative interest across precious metals,” the ING report continued.

“Managed money net longs in COMEX gold fell by 17,741 lots last week… Speculators also cut net longs in silver… taking positioning to its lowest since February 2024.”

Margins rise, volatility bites

Market stress has been amplified by mechanical factors.

CME Group is set to raise margin requirements on COMEX gold and silver futures after last week’s historic swings, forcing traders to post more collateral or reduce exposure.

Such moves tend to accelerate sell-offs, particularly in heavily leveraged markets.

Attention is now turning to Asia, where Chinese investors have historically provided support during price dips. However, with volatility elevated and the Lunar New Year approaching, participation may be more cautious than usual.

“With volatility spiking and the Lunar New Year approaching, traders are likely to pare back positions and reduce risk,” the ING analysts said.

“Price direction in the near term will hinge on the extent of dip-buying from Chinese investors following Friday’s retreat.”

Outlook remains fragile

For now, the precious metals market remains at the mercy of macro forces, with little clarity on how quickly sentiment will stabilise.

Investors are watching US data closely for clues on real interest rates and the dollar’s next move, both of which will be shaped by expectations around the Fed’s future direction.

“Overall, volatility across precious metals is likely to remain elevated in the near term,” Manthey and Patterson said.

“For gold and silver, macro uncertainty, real rate expectations, and USD direction will continue to dominate sentiment,” the report concluded.

As the Trump administration ploughs forward with its incendiary policies, European trust in the US government is fading.

Amid tariff threats and pledges to conquer Greenland, citizens and politicians in Europe are unsettled — questioning a long-standing alliance.

Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP), chair of the Defence Committee in the EU Parliament, claims to have an answer that is “worth its weight in gold”. In this case, the expression is more literal than figurative.

Around 1,236 tonnes of German gold, worth more than €100bn, are sitting in vaults in the US. Strack-Zimmermann has now announced that, in view of Trump’s recent political manoeuvres, it’s no longer justifiable to leave them be. This has reignited a fierce debate: to retrieve or not to retrieve?

The demand to bring gold back to Germany has been around for a long time, with some surveys suggesting that many citizens are in favour of the move. Similar debates are happening in Italy, which has the third-largest gold reserves in the world after the US and Germany.

Why does Germany hold gold in the US?

Germany’s gold reserves amount to around 3,350 tonnes. About 36.6% of this is in the US, a legacy of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates after World War II.

“At the time, all exchange rates were tied to the dollar, and the dollar was tied to gold,” Dr. Demary, senior economist for Monetary Policy and Financial Markets at the German Economic Institute (IW), told Euronews.

“Germany had large export surpluses with the US, so we accumulated a lot of dollars. To keep exchange rates stable, we exchanged those dollars for gold. That’s how these reserves were built up.”

During the Cold War, it was also practical to store gold abroad, as the US was considered a safe place in case of conflict with the Soviet Union. Over the years, some gold has been repatriated. By 2017, 300 tonnes were brought back from New York, 380 tonnes from Paris, and 900 tonnes from London.

This was part of a Bundesbank plan, unveiled in 2013, to store half of Germany’s gold reserves in Germany from 2020 onwards.

Bringing in the gold treasure: What are the risks?

Strack-Zimmermann and other politicians and economists cite Trump’s unpredictable trade and foreign policy as the reason for moving the gold out of the US.

“Of course, there is always some risk when you keep assets abroad,” said Demary. For example, there is a storage risk if a break-in occurs. But this risk exists whether the gold is stored abroad or in Germany.

“Another possible scenario is that the US government, due to tight currency reserves, could prevent the gold from being transferred,” he explained.

To ensure the safety of gold holdings, the Bundesbank has had to make frequent trips to New York in the past to take an inventory.

“It makes sense to leave this gold in the US in case we have a banking crisis here and need to obtain dollars,” said Demary.

Retrieving the gold could not only be logistically complex, but also risky.

“The gold would have to be transported in armoured vehicles onto a ship, which would also need to be guarded, and then brought back to Frankfurt under security,” added Demary. “There could be robberies, the ship could sink, or the cargo could be seized.”

Is Strack-Zimmermann’s demand pure populism?

Is Strack-Zimmermann’s demand pure symbolic politics? “I think so,” said the economist. “Perhaps it was a political move in response to the tariff threats, saying, ‘We’re bringing our gold back now.’”

According to the economist, it is also possible that Strack-Zimmermann estimated the magnitude of this gold value to be somewhat greater than it really is. In any case, the gold is currently safe in New York, even if Trump wanted to use it to exert pressure on Germany.

“The Federal Reserve is actually independent in its monetary policy. The US government cannot simply intervene. They would have to change laws first,” explained Dr Demary.

Even in the absolute worst case, if the US refused to release the gold, there would still be the option to go to court and enforce its return or receive compensation in dollars, said Demary.

“You have to weigh up the pros and cons and I would say the advantages of leaving the gold in the US outweigh the disadvantages,” he told Euronews.

The Trump administration has provided around $300 million to the Rodriguez government after seizing tankers and selling oil stockpiled in the country. The funds are being managed through accounts in Qatar and will be subject to audits by US agencies, Rubio told the Senate on Wednesday.

The idea that the US can somehow remote-control its way into a coherent audit of Venezuelan public spending defies imagination. Venezuela has never been an easy place to follow money. Road construction in Venezuela was for much of the 20th century a famous form of campaign finance that bankrolled politicians through well-greased kickback systems. Even in the country’s more prosperous days, public hospitals were notorious rat’s nests of corruption that allowed suppliers of everything from aspirin to X-ray machines to mark up prices for illicit gain and political financing.

Chavismo put this on steroids. Because there has been no alternation of power since Chávez’s 1998 election, no one in a position to audit government books has ever had an incentive to. The government comptroller’s office, once an institutional check on the ruling party, has for decades been used primarily to disqualify opposition politicians from holding office on the basis of fabricated accounting discrepancies.

The Chávez era saw the wholesale unraveling of basic parliamentary oversight of spending. State oil company PDVSA went from being an internationally respected company to a piggy bank used for everything from food imports to housing development. Multibillion-dollar slush funds with no rules about spending and no reporting requirements to the general public came to manage more than parliament. Bilateral financing agreements with China, Russia, and Iran led to secretive and inscrutable financing arrangements that made the country’s borrowing a black box.

Rampant corruption and damaged financial accountability do not mean that outsiders cannot be involved there. When the war in Ukraine broke out, international agencies famously relaxed what had been stringent standards around Ukrainian corruption. Aid agencies and nonprofits working in Haiti have had to quietly make concessions to the realities of operating there. As did the organizations that worked to reduce hunger in Venezuela during the crisis years. Expecting to maintain Swiss-level accounting standards in these types of environments is a recipe for making sure nothing gets done.

Which is a bit of what Rubio is promising by putting the US Export-Import Bank in charge of following every last dollar that Venezuela receives from US-brokered oil sales. Nobody was able to fully follow the money in Venezuela even when they were trying. After almost 30 years of systematically undermining public transparency, a remote-controlled, third-party audit conducted by foreigners from thousands of miles away doesn’t stand a ghost of a chance.

The inevitable conclusion is that the United States will simply have to start turning a blind eye to what actually happens with the money. With clear marching orders to get the economy up and running and oil production moving as fast as possible, there simply won’t be time to stand on accounting formalities. Ask too many questions and the progress will start to slow down. It seems like an unexpected consequence of a transition under tutelage: the Trump administration will quietly become part of the chavista machine.

Gold has risen more than 20% since the start of the year, surpassing the significant $5,500 milestone this week.

The precious metal’s rally, seen alongside a lift in commodities such as silver and platinum, is driven by a number of interlinking factors — including geopolitical tensions, rising government debt, and an uncertain outlook for interest rates and inflation.

Gold’s appeal is linked to the narrative that it is a safe haven asset, acting as a “hedge against inflation”. It typically increases in value when the dollar declines, it’s easily sold, and it’s also a tangible, finite commodity.

These factors are significant at a time when questions are being raised about the dollar, as well as fiat currencies like the Japanese yen. As government debt rises, so do fears around inflation and fiscal stability.

In the US, incendiary policies from the Trump administration are increasing market jitters around the health of the economy, prompting what some analysts view as a “sell America” trade. In recent weeks, the president has threatened to conquer Greenland, hinted at US intervention in Iran, sought to influence policy at the Federal Reserve, and launched an attack on Venezuela. To top that off, he’s also threatened more tariffs on trading partners, bringing back a well-worn tactic from 2025.

Although analysts argue that the dollar will not be unseated as the world’s reserve currency anytime soon, it seems investors are diversifying away from the greenback. The US’ next moves remain uncertain, and no one wants to be caught in the crosshairs. As an alternative to fiat currencies, gold may seem like a strong portfolio option.

“Investors previously bought US Treasuries as they were viewed as being quite risk-free. But especially because of the way that some wealth has been weaponised, certain countries are becoming more careful about how they allocate their capital,” said Simon Popple, managing director at Brookville Capital. “The dollar debasement helps the gold price,” he told Euronews.

Even so, Popple and other analysts stress that a major factor lifting the bullion price is far less complicated. As gold continues to make headlines, investors are caught up in the momentum, sparking a buying frenzy.

“People are naturally drawn to things they see moving and they’ve seen gold have an astonishing rally,” said Chris Beauchamp, chief market analyst at IG. “It’s bound to lead to an ignition of interest.”

He added that while gold has beneficial investment properties, the metal’s ability to hold its value is overstated, particularly in the short term. Gold’s position in the market notably shifted after former US president Richard Nixon decided to end direct dollar convertibility to gold in 1971. Put simply, countries no longer fixed their currencies to a specified amount of the precious metal.

“The gold standard is still invoked to suggest the metal is some kind of totemic asset we should have because it’s a fixed store of value. It’s not,” concluded Beauchamp.

Kenneth Lamont, a principal in Morningstar’s Manager Research Department, reiterated this message, also drawing comparisons between gold and crypto. While both are limited in supply, they are both “incredibly volatile”, he stressed.

“If you’re using either crypto or gold to buy something, it might be 30% less from one day to the next. It’s not actually a good store of value in the short term.”

While gold is much more established than bitcoin, and it has historically performed well over the long term, analysts stress that the unpredictability of both assets means the death knell is not yet ringing for fiat currencies.

Whether bullion’s price will continue to climb in the immediate future is a guessing game. Even so, given the precarious nature of global politics, it seems the metal may still have further to run.

The national debt passed the $36 trillion threshold in November for the first time ever, as the combined debt held by the U.S. public and the federal government grows.

At that sum, the U.S. national debt is approximately equal to the value of the economies of China, Germany, Japan, India, and the U.K. combined, the Peter G. Peterson Foundation found. 

National debt is the total amount of money the U.S. federal government owes its creditors. The American public primarily holds the largest share of federal debt, followed by foreign governments and U.S. banks and investors. The government gathers funds by collecting taxes on personal and corporate income, payroll earnings, and borrowing. The government then spends the money on programs such as Social Security, education, health care, national defense, and more, and takes on debt by borrowing to cover the expenses that accumulate over time. 

But which political party has historically added more to the national debt—Democrats or Republicans? The answer depends on how you slice the data.

Republican Presidents Have Added More to the National Debt Per Term—But Democratic Presidents Added More Debt Overall

Inflation-adjusted data from the U.S. Treasury Department and the Bureau of Labor Statistics would suggest that per term, Republican presidents have added slightly more debt to the U.S. national debt than Democratic presidents. Looking at U.S. presidents from 1913 through the end of the federal fiscal year 2024, Republican presidents added about $1.4 trillion per four-year term, compared to $1.2 trillion added by Democrats. 

However, Democratic presidents added more inflation-adjusted debt overall. That could be because Democratic presidents were in power for nine more years than Republican presidents in the period since 1913. Overall, Democratic presidents have added a total of $18 trillion to the national debt since 1913 (adjusted for inflation), while Republicans have added $17.3 trillion.

How Does a President and Their Administration Affect Debt?

Historically, the way a president has responded to major events has added significantly to the national debt. For example, funding wars and spending on government relief during recessions are some reasons presidents have added to the national debt.

While national debt isn’t entirely in a president’s control, a president and their administration’s fiscal policies do affect it. Federal spending can be out of a president’s control in times of war, natural disasters, or a public health crisis.

During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, then-President Trump signed the $2.2 trillion CARES Act stimulus bill into law in response to the sharp rise in unemployment during the pandemic. Later, President Biden signed the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act to provide more relief to Americans and businesses as they continued to recover from the pandemic.

President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009 when the economy was experiencing the worst recession since the Great Depression. Former President George W. Bush added significantly to the national debt during his term after launching the invasion of Afghanistan and the War on Terror following the Sept. 11 terror attacks. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars cost an estimated $8 trillion over 20 years, ending in 2021. 

How Would the 2024 Election Candidates’ Economic Plans Affect U.S. National Debt?

The national debt was also a leading issue for 2024 presidential election voters. October data from a poll by the Peterson Foundation found that more than nine in 10 voters across seven key swing states said it was important for candidates to have a plan for national debt. 

However, a report by the nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) found that both candidates were likely to significantly increase the national debt under their current spending plans. High levels of national debt can slow down the economy, increase interest rates, and generally increase the risk of a fiscal crisis. 

Tallying what economic proposals the candidates had made, Harris’ spending plan would increase the national debt by about $3.95 trillion through 2035, while President-elect Trump’s plan would increase the debt by $7.75 trillion, according to an estimate by the CRFB.

Which President Added the Most National Debt Per Term? 

Former President Trump added the most national debt per term, adding an estimated $7.1 trillion to the national debt during his term from 2016 to 2020.

The Bottom Line

Looking at U.S. presidential terms since 1913, Republican presidents have added slightly more debt to the U.S. national debt than Democratic presidents per four-year term. However, Democratic presidents added more inflation-adjusted debt overall, though there have also been nine more years of Democratic presidents since 1913 compared to Republican presidents.

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell pushed back against political pressure on the US central bank on Wednesday and defended its independence, urging the next chair to “stay out of elected politics”. Markets, however, appeared unconvinced, accelerating a sell-off in the dollar as gold and silver hit fresh record highs.

“Don’t get pulled into elected politics. Don’t do it,” Powell told reporters.

The reaction followed the Federal Reserve’s latest decision to leave interest rates unchanged in a range between 3.5% and 3.75%.

Asked whether the Fed was drawing any macroeconomic signal from the explosive rally in precious metals, Powell played down its significance.

“We don’t take much message macroeconomically,” Powell said. “The argument that we are losing credibility is simply not the case. If you look at where inflation expectations are, our credibility is right where it needs to be.”

He highlighted that the Fed does not “get spun up over particular asset price changes”, although it continues to monitor markets closely.

Markets react

The market reaction sharply contradicted Powell’s message.

Gold jumped to $5,500 per ounce, setting a new all-time high, while silver climbed above $117 per ounce.

Gold is now up over 20% this month, on track for its strongest monthly performance since January 1980.

Silver’s gains have been even more dramatic, with prices already up around 55% this month — the strongest monthly rise on record.

Meanwhile, the US dollar index, which tracks the greenback against a basket of major currencies, fell to levels last seen four years ago.

“The next couple of days will show whether investors have concluded that the dollar needs to go lower and that today’s bounce is a selling opportunity,” said James Knightley, chief economist at ING.

The dollar is now more than 10% below its 2025 highs, weighed down by persistent macro headwinds, including global central bank diversification away from US assets, widening fiscal deficits, recurring questions over Fed independence, and expectations of further policy easing.

‘Is gold the new bitcoin?’

Veteran Wall Street economist Ed Yardeni linked the rally to politics, suggesting its sustained popularity could make “gold the new bitcoin”.

Yardeni argued that US President Donald Trump, a vocal supporter of cryptocurrencies, appears to be inadvertently fuelling the rise in gold prices.

On Tuesday, Trump said “the dollar is doing great” when asked whether the currency had fallen too much, signalling he is comfortable with a weaker greenback.

“A weaker dollar may put upward pressure on US inflation, which would also boost the price of gold,” Yardeni said.

Commodities surge beyond gold and silver

The rally has spread across the broader commodities market.

Platinum climbed above $2,900 per ounce for the first time on record this week and is already up 33% this month. Palladium, which benefits from stronger industrial demand, rose to a four-year high and is up more than 22% year to date.

Copper also surged, hitting a record $6.30 per pound on Thursday.

Across commodity markets, investors are increasingly positioning for prolonged dollar weakness, amid perceptions that US institutions are willing to tolerate — or quietly accept — the shift.

Euro stronger, equities mixed

In Europe, the euro traded near $1.1950, edging lower after briefly breaking above $1.20 earlier in the week following Trump’s comments.

The single currency has now risen for three consecutive months against the dollar and is up around 15% year on year.

European equities were mixed. France’s CAC 40 and Italy’s FTSE MIB gained around 0.5%, while Germany’s DAX fell over 1%.

Frankfurt’s losses were led by SAP, which slid 16% — its biggest one-day drop since October 2020 — after weaker-than-expected cloud sales and a cut to 2026 revenue guidance outweighed in-line fourth-quarter results.

Published on
29/01/2026 – 12:38 GMT+1

Oil prices rose on Thursday after US President Donald Trump warned Iran that “time is running out” and said a “massive armada” was heading towards the region if Tehran failed to agree to a nuclear non-proliferation deal.

In a Truth Social post, Trump said a fleet larger than the one sent to Venezuela was ready to “rapidly fulfil its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary” if Iran refused to negotiate a deal guaranteeing “no nuclear weapons”.

Global benchmark Brent rose by about 2.02%, trading at around $68.73 per barrel, while US crude (WTI) hovered around 2.15% higher, at $64.57 per barrel.

Trump previously threatened to attack Iran if it killed protesters during the ongoing protest movement across the country. Estimates of those killed range from around 6,000 to as many as 30,000, according to various reports.

Oil delivery disruptions

If the US were to escalate militarily, it could disrupt oil flows to countries that still trade with Iran.

Iran’s economy is already under heavy pressure from US secondary financial sanctions on its banking and energy sectors, compounded by the reimposition of JCPOA snapback sanctions.

These measures have severely limited Iran’s access to the Western financial system and constrained its ability to trade openly.

As a result, Iranian exports rely heavily on so-called “dark fleets,” ship-to-ship transfers and intermediary routes designed to obscure cargo origins along major maritime corridors.

Yet despite years of sanctions, Iran has retained access to oil markets, underlining the difficulty of fully enforcing restrictions on a high-value global commodity.

“Iran has a number of markets for its oil, despite the Western sanctions regime,” said Dmitry Grozubinski, a senior advisor on international trade policy at Aurora Macro Strategies.

China at centre of enforcement risk

China remains the largest buyer, with reports suggesting Iranian crude is often rebranded as Malaysian or Gulf-origin oil before entering the country.

“Independent refineries are purchasing it using dark fleet vessels, with transactions conducted through small private banks and in renminbi,” Grozubinski said.

Other destinations for Iranian oil and derivatives include Iraq, the UAE and Turkey, further complicating enforcement.

“It’s extremely difficult to maintain comprehensive sanctions on oil,” Grozubinski said, “especially when it requires policing transactions between Iran and states that don’t fully share Western priorities.”

China currently imports an estimated 1.2 to 1.4 million barrels of Iranian oil per day — around 80 to 90% of Iran’s crude exports.

US escalation could provoke Beijing

That dependence makes Beijing the central variable in any escalation. Analysts say China would be the most likely major economy to resist compliance and retaliate.

“Beijing has already signalled it would respond if Trump follows through,” said Dan Alamariu, chief geopolitical strategist at Alpine Macro, warning of renewed US–China trade friction.

One risk raised by analysts is the potential for China to again restrict exports of rare earths — a tool it has previously used during periods of trade tension — although such a move is considered unlikely in the short term.

“It’s not the base case,” Alamariu said, “but it’s not impossible.”

On the Trump administration’s decision to work with Delcy Rodríguez

Forcing Maduro out: “We made multiple attempts to get Maduro to leave voluntarily and to avoid all of this. Because we understood that he was an impediment to progress. You couldn’t make a deal with this guy.”

The first goal wasn’t a rushed attempt at a democratic transition or vote: “You can have elections all day. But if the opposition has no access to the media, if opposition candidates are routinely dismissed and unable to be on the ballot because of the government, then those aren’t free and fair elections. That’s the endstate that we want. Free, fair, prosperous and friendly Venezuela. We are not gonna get there in three weeks. It’s going to take some time. So objective number one was stability.”

Not a quick, straightforward process: “For the first time in over a decade and a half there’s a real possibility of transformation. And a lot of it will depend on them. There are many people living in Florida and across the country who would like to go back and be a part of Venezuela’s economic life. Many of them are eager to do so. And Venezuela is going to need them to go back and rebuild the businesses that were taken (…) This is not a frozen dinner that you put  in a microwave and two and a half minutes later it comes out ready to eat. These are complex things. We’ve seen this play out. I use the example of Paraguay and Spain, there are others. When there’s a transition from autocracy to democracy, it’s not linear.”

Rubio didn’t want to get involved in the issue of an investigation into Delcy by US prosecutors. She wasn’t arrested because she hasn’t been indicted like Maduro, and they work with her because those who control the weapons and the institutions are regime figures. The US managed to avoid war, millions of people were prevented from fleeing to Colombia, by establishing communication with key regime actors.

To critics of US policy in Venezuela, Rubio put it this way: “You told us you didn’t want any more regime change, and now you criticize us for not changing the regime.” 

Rubio said he doesn’t want chavismo to entrench. According to him, the US goal is not to leave  “people from this system” in power (who he claims not to trust), but right now it’s necessary to preserve a level of respect and communication maintained so far (since the January 3 military intervention).

On Venezuelan oil

The Secretary of State insisted that the chavista regime was sustained by corruption, something that is no longer sustainable, and that oil money “will not go to the drug cartels.” 

Funds from the oil sales will go into a Venezuela-owned account in Qatar that the US will be able to supervise:  “They needed money quickly to fund the police officers, the sanitation workers, the daily operations of government. So we’ve been able to create a short-term mechanism. This is not gonna be the permanent mechanism, but this is a mechanism in which the needs of the Venezuelan people can be met through a process that we’ve created where they will submit every month a budget of what needs to be funded. We will provide for them at the front end what that money cannot be used for. And they’ve been very cooperative in this regard. In fact, they have pledged to use a substantial amount of those funds to purchase medicine and equipment directly from the US.”

Rubio also said another $300 million might come in, but Delcy & Co. first must allow an audit of the initial funds to ensure they are being used appropriately.

On the other hand, China can buy Venezuelan oil, but at market price. No Maduro-era discounts set as a result of US sanctions. The Secretary of State said the US wants to lift said sanctions to boost economic activity, but he doesn’t expect the recovery to involve US spending.

Rubio celebrated the amendment process of the Hydrocarbons Law, which basically eliminates many of the restrictions on foreign investment in the oil industry. It doesn’t go far enough to attract more investment, but it’s a big step compared to where things were three weeks ago.”

He suggested that companies would invest in Venezuela knowing their money is safe and their assets wouldn’t be taken away. The goal is to create the conditions for a normal, stable and transparent business environment in Venezuela. Their heavy crude isn’t unique, Canada has it too: “It’s not irreplaceable. But we understand that that is the lifeline and their natural resources will allow Venezuela to be stable and prosperous moving forward. what we hope to do is transition to a mechanism that allows that to be sold in a normal way, a normal oil industry, not one dominated by cronies, graft and corruption.”

Threats to the Rodríguez regime

Rubio expressed the regime’s performance is being assessed based on actions, not discourse. Stopping Venezuela from being the backyard of China, Russia and Iran would be a huge step.

“For the first time in 20 years, we are having serious conversations about eroding and eliminating the Iranian presence, the Chinese influence, the Russian presence as well. In fact, I will tell you that there are many elements there in Venezuela that welcome a return to establishing relations with the United States on multiple fronts,” Rubio said.

He acknowledged that political prisoners are being released, though not at the pace he desires, and that US officials would be mindful of how opposition leaders coming out from hiding would be treated (Delsa Solórzano being the last example).

Rubio said the US is generally pleased with how things have evolved in the past three weeks, but “we’ll let them know” if that changes. He does not anticipate any further military action in Venezuela in the short term. He claimed the use of force would depend on the stabilization goals being met, not on helping those goals.

“The only military presence you will see in Venezuela is our Marine guards at an embassy. That is our goal, that is our expectation, and that is what everything that outlines towards. That said, if an Iranian drone factory pops up and threatens our forces in the region, the president retains the option to eliminate that threat.”

On the future

Rubio was reluctant to provide a precise timeline for the current arrangement between Venezuelan authorities and the US. The Trump administration wants to see rapid progress, he suggested. And in five months, the situation must be different to what they currently see.

In the long term, the US wants Venezuela to have a democratically-elected government. But that stage wouldn’t be achieved in a matter of weeks (see quote in sub-section one). Rubio said he wants María Corina to be part of the transition and to be able to participate in an election at some point. He acknowledged they’ve known each other for the past 12 years, and both him and Trump respect the opposition leader.

Finally, Rubio explicitly labeled the Venezuelan opposition as diverse. He said that both opposition figures like Maria Corina who never supported chavismo and chavistas that disliked Maduro (which he called people “committed to chavista ideology) should have representation, and that internal reconciliation would allow those sectors to participate in national politics. The ultimate goal is legitimate democratic elections, and whatever happens, Rubio hopes the next Venezuelan leaders will have cordial relations with the US.

A digital nomad visa is a document or program that gives someone the legal right to work remotely while residing away from their country of permanent residence. A digital nomad is someone who lives a nomadic lifestyle and uses technology to work remotely from outside their home country.

Although only some countries have visas targeted at digital nomads, many offer visas that are liberal enough to allow nomads to work remotely without becoming a resident. Forty regions offer remote working visas, including Anguilla, The Bahamas, Croatia, Spain, Norway, and Colombia, among others.

What Is a Digital Nomad Visa?

A digital nomad visa is a type of visa that allows digital nomads to live and work in a foreign country for longer than a normal tourist visa. They may also offer favorable tax schemes for nomads that stay long enough to need to declare a new country as their tax residence.

Although many digital nomads take advantage of lenient temporary residence visas, only a few countries have debuted visas specifically for digital nomads or remote workers. Other countries simply offer visas that work with the frequent moves that many remote workers prefer. And still other countries have visas that cater to freelancers or entrepreneurs but aren’t open to remote workers employed by a foreign company in a full time capacity.

Both workers and students can use digital nomad visas, although the costs and requirements may differ. For example, the Work From Bermuda Certificate requires scholars to provide proof of enrollment in an undergraduate, graduate, doctoral, or research program with their application. Remote workers or self-employed applicants aren’t required to be enrolled in school.

Some countries allow employers to apply for a digital nomad visa for their company. Dominica’s program charges $800 (USD) plus an additional $500 (USD) for each employee for a business of four or more people.

Who Offers Digital Nomad Visas?

As of 2025, over 50 regions offer programs for temporary remote workers. Besides the regions highlighted below, the following countries also accommodate the digital nomad: Abu Dhabi, Albania, Argentina, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Spain, Belize, El Salvador, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Dubai, Bali, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Grenada, Namibia, Andorra, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

Other countries offer flexible visas that may attract digital nomads, but they’re not strictly remote a work visa. Some are temporary residence visas, while others offer lenient tourist visas that many use as a remote work visa. Countries that offer remote or freelance friendly visas include Croatia, Armenia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Mexico, Thailand, Serbia, Aruba, Montenegro.

North Macedonia, Goa, and Peru have each either discussed or announced digital nomad visas, but they aren’t available at the time of writing.

Antigua & Barbuda

Nomad Digital Residence is a long-stay program offered by both islands for remote workers. The visa is good for two years and costs $1,500 (USD) per individual, while couples and families of three or more must pay $2,000 (USD) and $3,000 (USD), respectively.

Applicants must fill out the application and submit up to 11 documents, including proof of expected income of at least $50,000 (USD) for each year of the program.

The Bahamas

The Bahamas Extended Access Travel Stay allows digital nomads to work remotely for one year from any of 16 islands. An application requires a $25 (USD) fee, a valid passport data page, a medical insurance card, and proof of employment.

The application typically takes just five days to process. Approved applicants must pay $1,000 (USD) to receive their Work Remotely permit. You must add $500 (USD) for each dependent if they plan to join you.

Barbados

The Barbados Welcome Stamp established a visa that allows visitors to work remotely for up to one year. The application fee is $2,000 (USD) for individuals and $3,000 (USD) for families.

The application must be accompanied by two identical 50 x 50 mm photographs (that meet the specific visa photo requirements of the Barbadian government), the biodata page of a passport, and proof of relationship of dependents (if applicable).

Applicants must also prove that they will earn $50,000 (USD) during their 12-month stay.

Bermuda

The Work From Bermuda Certificate permits digital nomads to work remotely for 12 months. The $263 (USD) application fee must be accompanied by health insurance and proof of employment. Applicants cannot have a criminal record.

Although there isn’t a minimum requirement, applicants must have enough income to support themselves for the full year. Family members will also need to pay a fee and apply separately, but all applications must be submitted on the same day. The turnaround time is approximately five business days.

Cabo Verde

The Cabo Verde Remote Working Program is available to remote workers originating from Europe, North America, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, and the Economic Community of West African States.

Applicants must:

• Have a minimum bank account balance of €1,500 for individuals and €2,700 for families for at least the last six months
• Submit five total documents with the application, including a passport and health insurance
• Provide 10 total documents to border authorities in person after arriving at one of the 10 islands, though there is some overlap between the two sets of documents

Processing time can take roughly two weeks. The visa is valid for six months and can be renewed for another 12 months.

Costa Rica

This Central American country’s digital nomad visa, also known as Stay (Estancia) for Remote Workers and Service Provider, offers a one-year remote work opportunity.

Prospective visitors are required to have a monthly income of $3,000 (USD). That amount increases to $5,000 (USD) if there are dependents involved.

Other requirements include, but are not limited to, the payment of a $100 (USD) application fee, bank statements proving income, proof of medical insurance, and a valid passport. The permit can be renewed as long as all requirements are still being met.

Curaçao

This Dutch Caribbean island offers the @HOME in Curaçao program. Available to remote workers for six months, residency can be extended for an additional six-month period. American or Dutch citizens don’t need a visa—they’re already permitted to stay in Curaçao for up to six months as a tourist.

Outside of a $294 total for fees, the application also requires a copy of a passport photo, proof of solvency, and proof of health insurance. Processing time is approximately two weeks.

All applicants must file individually. Families may also apply for the program, but they must do so under the main applicant.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic’s freelancer visa, Zivno, is a bit trickier to acquire than most on this list. This program requires a variable fee, in addition to proof of minimum income equal to 1.5 the gross average annual salary listed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. (This amount changes annually.) You must also have documents like a passport, proof of accommodation, criminal record, etc.

The Zivno is only open to residents of a few countries: Australia, Japan, Canada, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Singapore, and Israel. The visa lasts for one year but holders may apply for an extension before the initial visa expires.

Dominica

Dominica, also known as the Nature Island of the Caribbean, provides an 18-month Work In Nature Extended Stay Visa for digital nomads. Applicants must present proof of expected income of $50,000 for the next 12 months. There is also a $100 application fee and either $800 single or $1,200 family visa fee—all in USD.

Several other documents, including the biodata page of a passport, a bank reference letter, and proof of health insurance, must also be submitted alongside the application. Approval letters are often sent within 14–28 days.

Estonia

On Aug. 1, 2020, Estonia launched an official Digital Nomad Visa for remote workers to remain in the country for up to one year. Applicants need proof of a minimum of €4,500 in gross income and pay a state fee of €90 or €120 for a Type C (short stay) or Type D (long stay) visa, respectively.

Additional requirements include having a valid travel document and health insurance. They must also pass a background check. Applications must be submitted in person at the nearest Estonian Embassy or Consulate, and the processing time can take up to 30 days.

Iceland

The long-term visa for remote workers program is available to digital nomads from any country that doesn’t require a visa to travel to Iceland and isn’t available to any that are part of the EU, the European Economic Area, and/or the European Free Trade Association.

The visa can be issued for up to 180 days, so long as applicants apply and are accepted before coming. If you apply after arrival, the visa is only valid for 90 days. You must prove a monthly income equivalent to 1 million króna (ISK) for singles or 1.3 million ISK for couples. Each applicant must submit a separate application and pay a 40,000 ISK processing fee separately for each one.

Applications will also require a passport photo (no older than six months), copies of a passport, proof of health insurance, proof of purpose of stay in Iceland, and potentially a criminal record check.

All applications must be submitted in person or via mail to the Directorate of Immigration at Dalvegur 18, 201 Kópavogur.

Malta

The Nomad Residence Permit allows digital nomads to work remotely within the archipelago for one year. It can be renewed at the discretion of Residency Malta, as long as the applicant still meets the set eligibility criteria.

Applicants must meet a gross yearly income threshold of €42,000, hold a valid travel document, have health insurance, acquire a valid property rental or purchase agreement, and pass a background check.

Once the application and all required documents have been submitted via email, instructions will be sent to pay a €300 administrative fee for each applicant, including any family members included on the application.

Mauritius

The Premium Travel Visa offers one year of remote working abroad with the potential for renewal. The best part? The Premium Travel Visa is 100% free—no fees of any kind.

Prospective travelers must submit multiple documents with their online application, such as a valid passport, proof of travel and health insurance, and a copy of their marriage certificate (if applicable).

Applications are processed within 48 hours after they’re submitted.

Montserrat

The Montserrat Remote Work Stamp is valid for one year of remote working. It requires proof of an annual income of $70,000 (USD), and there’s a $500 (USD) fee for single travelers or a $750 (USD) fee for families of up to three dependents (plus a $250 (USD) fee for any additional dependents).

Proof of valid health insurance, a copy of passport biographical data, a passport-size photo, a police record, and proof of employment or a business incorporation certificate are also required.

Processing takes seven working days after the application is submitted.

Portugal

Portugal offers a D8 digital nomad visa that is valid for two years. It can be renewed for up to five years. The national visa costs €110, while the residency visa may come with additional charges.

In addition to the application form, prospective residents must provide a valid passport, two passport-size photos, valid travel insurance, proof of residence (if applicable), proof of sufficient income, proof of owning a business entity (or a contract for providing services), and a criminal record.

Income requirements for the D8 are, as of 2026, €3,480 per month.

Seychelles

The Seychelles Workcation program enables digital nomads to work remotely from any of the 115 islands that comprise the archipelago for as little as one month or as much as one year.

There is a €45 fee, and prospective travelers must also provide a valid passport, proof of being an employee/business owner, proof of income (exact amount unspecified), and a valid medical and travel insurance policy with their application.

Family members can also join an applicant as ordinary visitors, so long as they meet all requirements and submit birth and/or marriage certificates, whichever is appropriate.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Digital Nomad Visas

It’s crucial for anyone considering working abroad to review and follow whatever is requested by their temporary residence of choice. While there are certain benefits to working on a digital nomad visa, there are also some downsides to keep in mind.

Advantages

The obvious benefit of these programs is that you can enjoy a long vacation while maintaining a stable source of income without putting your career on hold. Most regions that offer digital nomad visas already have the infrastructure necessary to support remote workers, such as strong wifi as a selling feature.

Disadvantages

Being a digital nomad requires a job that’s remote and flexible. This is especially important when it comes to logging in hours when there’s a time difference. Although these kinds of jobs have become more common in the wake of the pandemic, this may be a guaranteed deal-breaker for some companies and workers.

Visas can be costly, and if the application for your next destination is rejected, you could be left scrambling to find a new place to live before you’re forced to leave when your current visa expires. Moving around can also make it harder to form long-lasting relationships, while the constant distance can also put a strain on existing ones.

Unless a country offers you permanent residency when your temporary visa expires, there’s little point in putting down roots where you won’t be living after a year or so. Although this lack of ties can be seen as a plus to those who value their independence, anyone thinking about a lengthy period abroad should carefully consider how isolating it might be.

Another consideration is your tax residency. Most countries will consider you a tax resident if you stay more than 183 days. Consider how that may impact your U.S. taxes and eat into your income. Unless you qualify for a specialized digital nomad tax scheme, you may find yourself paying higher taxes than you would back home.

Digital Nomads vs. Remote Workers

Although the term remote worker has become increasingly common, it isn’t perfectly synonymous with being a digital nomad. All digital nomads are, by necessity, remote workers. Yet the latter term can also apply to those who simply operate from their permanent residence instead of from an office. Laws differ, but entering a country as a tourist generally doesn’t permit the traveler to work while living there.

Working remotely (in your home country) wasn’t as popular in decades past as it is today. That’s because many employers felt that their employees wouldn’t be productive if they worked away from the office. Those who needed to work from home were given special permission for certain reasons, such as family or a lack of workplace accommodations.

Telecommuting has since become very commonplace, boosted by the pandemic. Many companies now believe that working from home can increase productivity. Some research indicates that people who work from home end up working 1.4 days more than in-office workers.

The Bottom Line

The number of areas of the world that offer digital nomad visas is growing. Such travel programs can provide cultural and extended stay benefits to travelers who long to live and work in a country they’ve perhaps only dreamed about or visited briefly. Each country has specific requirements for its digital nomad visa, so be sure to do all the necessary research before you begin the application process.

In recent days, the Venezuelan public debate has been filled with comparisons between what has transpired after the January 3 US military operation and the era of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–1935), the Andean strongman who ruled for 27 years. The immediate flashpoint is the National Assembly’s proposed reform of the 2006 Hydrocarbons Law, designed to reopen the oil industry to private capital. 

Displaced chavistas such as Andrés Izarra argue the reform is unconstitutional and evokes the “servile” terms under which Gómez granted oil concessions to foreign firms in the 1920s. Yet the comparison extends beyond oil: chavismo’s political economy resembles Gómez’s in three recurring ways: monopoly rents, opaque bargains with capital, and repression that doubles as a system of extraction.

Scholars of early twentieth-century Venezuela have shown that corruption and the privatization of public office of the Gómez era functioned as governing tools that helped finance coercion, reward loyalists, and develop a powerful and centralized state. Gómez assembled a ruling coalition by binding regional powerbrokers and emerging civilian interests to state-sanctioned rents, especially through monopolies granted under the dictator’s shadow. The arrangement remains familiar to Venezuelans who have watched chavismo merge political loyalty, access to state resources, and personal enrichment into a single logic of rule. Those mechanisms are easiest to see in the political economy of monopoly, contracts, and prisons.

Public office as private business

First, monopoly rents have flourished under authoritarian rule. Under Hugo Chávez, the progressive erosion of checks and balances, and the hollowing out of democratic constraints, helped reconstitute a patrimonial logic of governance. Discretionary access to state resources became a core currency of political loyalty. Over time, the government entrusted senior military officers with the “management” of strategic sectors and state enterprises, creating incentives in which institutional loyalty and personal stake became difficult to disentangle. Alongside these appointments, the state’s dense architecture of controls and bureaucratic choke points created new opportunities to extract rents, shifting costs onto ordinary Venezuelans while protecting insiders. A similar political logic constructed power in Venezuela more than a century ago.

Gómez consolidated his ruling coalition through a tacit understanding: public office could be treated as private business, so long as loyalty held and order endured. One reliable stream of income that lubricated those clientelistic networks came from the cattle business. Beginning early in the regime, the autocrat and his circle leveraged control over cattle supply and slaughtering channels, backed by selective taxation and regulatory privilege, to squeeze competitors and reward allies. Another, more explicitly fiscal mechanism, was tax farming. The state granted private individuals the right to collect specific federal taxes, liquor being a prominent case, in exchange for a fixed payment to the treasury, leaving the tax farmer free to pocket the surplus. Many of the habits we now associate with the petrostate were already baked into everyday monopolies on beef and booze. Oil did not invent rent-seeking; it amplified it, turning familiar practices of privileged access into vastly more lucrative rents.

Delcy’s CPPs transfer operational and investment burdens to private actors, while the state retains political control. These deals have created a new class of intermediaries whose profitability depends less on technical competence than on privileged access to decision-makers.

If the military profited from monopolies in agriculture and cattle ranching, oil gave Gómez a broader instrument: it allowed him to co-opt civilian elites who had long bristled at Andean hegemony. Beyond the autocrat’s immediate family, the most visible beneficiaries of the concession trade were lawyers, engineers, bankers, and other members of the professional classes who monetized access, paperwork, and proximity to power in the new petroleum economy.

A comparable dynamic has surfaced amid PDVSA’s collapse. As the government ignored the current hydrocarbons framework, “productive participation contracts” (CPPs) emerged as a salient workaround. These arrangements effectively transfer operational and investment burdens to private actors, while the state retains political control. Investigative outlets have traced how these opaque deals created a new class of intermediaries whose profitability depends less on technical competence than on privileged access to decision-makers. The Anti-Blockade Law, in turn, has provided the legal umbrella for confidentiality, shielding contract terms from public scrutiny in the name of national security and sanctions evasion. 

This pattern is not an accidental echo of the 1920s concession era: the bargain with foreign capital then was not merely economic, but political and deliberately opaque. And when monopolies and privileged access harden into a system, those who cannot buy their way around it are left to absorb the costs; those who challenge it often face a harsher penalty than economic hardship, imprisonment. 

Extractivist fear

La Rotunda became a landmark of political oppression under Gómez. In its cells, political prisoners endured systematic torture and humiliation, and the regime’s agents turned captivity into a market through constant extortion for money, food, and favors. Many detainees suffered forced labor so that the infrastructure they built (roads and highways), and that the dictatorship showcased as “modernization,” often bore the hidden imprint of coerced bodies. 

That same logic is painfully recognizable today for families with relatives held at El Helicoide and other detention centers. Relatives bring medicines, food, and basic supplies only to face a system in which guards and intermediaries can confiscate, withhold, or demand payments simply to deliver necessities, or even to confirm that a detainee is still there. Imprisonment becomes not only repression, but another revenue stream: a mechanism of extraction layered onto fear.

If the Gómez precedent teaches anything, it is that once an authoritarian equilibrium is broken, restoring the old order is far harder than improvising a new one.

These parallels go a long way toward explaining why both systems proved so resilient, able to ride out internal shocks by combining repression with co-optation, and by making access to rents the glue of elite cohesion. Important differences remain, however. 

The dawn versus the sunset of democracy

Gómez ruled over a country still shaped by civil war legacies and weak national institutions. Part of his historical significance lies in how his dictatorship centralized coercion, built a state apparatus, and disciplined regional caudillos, an infrastructure that later governments could eventually open. Democracy did not arrive automatically, but the post-1935 succession did produce a cautious opening under presidents Eleazar López Contreras and Isaías Medina Angarita as the political opposition pressed for change. 

Chavismo, by contrast, emerged through elections. It initially spoke the language of participation and inclusion, yet over time it systematically hollowed out checks and balances and concentrated authority in ways that destroyed institutional autonomy. In any case, neither model was indefinitely sustainable. Both eventually confronted moments of succession, and the question shifted from endurance to what, exactly, would replace them.

In both transitions, it was not ordinary domestic pressure that structurally broke the authoritarian bargain, but a decisive external shock. Gómez weathered conspiracies, incursions, and waves of dissent; in the end, only death removed him. For chavismo, the US extraction of Maduro abruptly altered the balance of power inside the ruling coalition, fracturing the status quo among factions and forcing them to operate under Washington’s shadow for the foreseeable future.

After 1935, López Contreras and Medina Angarita moved quickly to neutralize the most predatory residues of Gomecismo, including the family clique. They steered the system gradually toward institutional consolidation and political opening. Echoes of that succession moment now hover over Venezuelan politics. 

It is too soon to tell where this transition leads, who will define its project, or what counter-moves it will invite. If the Gómez precedent teaches anything, it is that once an authoritarian equilibrium is broken, restoring the old order is far harder than improvising a new one. Whether that improvisation produces a democratic opening, or a reconstituted chavismo capable of surviving even where Gomecismo could not, remains the central question.

Published on
28/01/2026 – 12:54 GMT+1

French firms Danone and Nestlé saw a continued plunge in their share prices on Wednesday after a safety crisis involving baby formula.

At around midday in Europe, Danone shares were down 0.48%, while Nestlé shares slipped 0.33%.

A number of national authorities have issued their own warnings after an initial recall announcement from Danone last Friday.

The French firm said it was pulling “a very limited number of specific batches” of baby formula from the market, linked to fears that they could be contaminated with a dangerous toxin. Cereulide, the substance in question, can cause nausea and vomiting.

The recall came after Nestlé, one of Danone’s competitors, announced earlier in January that it would be pulling specific batches of its infant formula from shelves.

This global action followed a smaller recall in December, when cereulide was first found in a Nestlé factory in Nunspeet, the Netherlands.

Analysts estimate that the recall could cost Nestlé over €1bn, although the firm has said that it does not forecast a significant financial hit. Even so, the company will be working to improve its public image and quell doubts over product safety.

The contaminations detected by the companies have all been traced to a single Chinese supplier of arachidonic acid oil, a critical ingredient in premium infant formulas.

Private firm Lactalis has also been affected, along with smaller firms like Vitagermine and Hochdorf Swiss Nutrition.

The French authorities are currently investigating the deaths of two babies reported to have consumed Nestlé infant formula affected by the recalls due to cereulide contamination. So far, no causal link has been established.

“We are following developments with due attention and remain fully available to the authorities, cooperating with complete transparency,” said a Nestlé spokesperson last week.

Infant formula accounts for about 21% of Danone’s group revenue, according to Bernstein analysts. For Nestlé, the category likely represents around 5%.

In its recall statement, Danone stressed that it “never compromises on food safety”, adding that its priority “is to ensure that parents and healthcare professionals can continue to place their trust in the safety and quality of our infant formula products”.

Apologising for the recall, Nestlé said that the measure was “in line with… strict product quality and safety protocols”.

Former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi will attend an informal meeting of European Union leaders at the invitation of European Council President António Costa, who is looking to accelerate the implementation of his competitiveness report.

The retreat will take place on 12 February and will focus on boosting the European economy. Former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta will also participate in the gathering.

Draghi and Letta penned two influential reports on the EU single market and competitiveness in 2024.

In an interview with Euronews from New Delhi, where the EU signed a major trade deal with India, Costa said the retreat will serve to kickstart a cross-institutional debate on how to strengthen the European economy and implement their reform agenda.

“I invited Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta to join us as we take stock of what we’ve done but also look at what we need to deliver,” Costa said.

“We need to create renewed momentum and give a new impetus” to their call for reforms.

“I expect leaders to give clear political guidance to the Commission and the Council as they did last year on defence and security,” he added. “This time, for the single market.”

Costa has held a series of informal meetings bringing together the 27 leaders to brainstorm without the formalities of a European summit, which usually sees a stricter agenda and looks for compromise to deliver unanimous conclusions.

The retreat format, he argues, allows for more open discussions. Last year, leaders met alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer to discuss European security and defence. By inviting Draghi and Letta, Costa hopes to reinstate momentum around their recommendations published in 2024.

Last year, the European Commission’s efforts focused on reducing red tape and cutting bureaucracy pegged to excessive EU regulation. While pushing for simplification of existing rules, analysts suggest the executive is not doing enough to push forward actual reforms in line with the recommendations of the two reports.

A report by the European Policy Innovation Council published in September last year suggested that only 11% of the recommendations listed in the Draghi report had been implemented in its first year even as the Commission referred to it as its economic compass.

Draghi’s attendance could serve to sharpen minds as the former ECB president is highly influential in diplomatic circles, the European capitals and the EU institutions where his speeches are closely monitored.

Draghi has repeatedly called for the bloc to work as a true union and called for a “pragmatic federalist” approach in a changing world.

Draghi has also expressed support for joint borrowing by EU member states to finance large projects of common interest such as security and defense, and called for the integration of the European capital markets to attract and scale up investments.

Watch the full interview with Council President António Costa on The Europe Conversation on Euronews on 28 January.