Venezuelas

Y así arrancó.

August 1 arrived with no sign the talks would begin, nor confirmation about those involved in each delegation. Mauricio Claver-Carone, the Americans’ informal intermediary coordinating the talks, announced his departure from the famous “Viceroy” role the day before, though several sources claim he was pushed out. The uncertainty just increased until radio silence broke, when Dinorah Figuera and Jorge Rodríguez published their respective statements at around 6 pm Caracas time, via X.

Both of them claimed to have held a phone call “to commence” the so-called dialogue process between the Rodríguez administration, under the Trump administration’s tutelage, and an opposition group also under the Trump administration’s tutelage. This looks nothing like the start of previous talks featuring chavismo and the opposition, with pictures of mediators and negotiators in a meeting hosted by some Caribbean nation.

We can imagine that, as nothing was really prepared for last weekend, Rodríguez and Figuera simply rang each other on WhatsApp and agreed what they would put in writing to leave a public record that the thing had begun. That’s if the call actually happened.

All statements established the same three-point agenda: the earthquake response (surely a subject Rodríguez is invoking to postpone anything that is not reconstruction), the strengthening of democracy (which has a different meaning for each stakeholder), and political rights and guarantees (what Venezuelans are demanding, in third place). 

Rodríguez skipped any mention of a transition, or the United States, or the chavista National Assembly.

Shortly after, a State Department official called Dylan Johnson said the “US welcomes this announcement.” Today’s press statement by State echoes the agenda points shared by Figuera and Rodríguez.

When both camps confirmed the start date on July 14, the response to the disaster did not appear as an agenda point for the Figuera-led delegation. It seems Jorge Rodríguez managed to sneak it in with the gringos’ approval.

Rodríguez addressed Figuera as the “representative of a sector of the Venezuelan opposition” and skipped any mentions of a transition, or the United States. His statement did not mention the chavista National Assembly or display its logo either. Instead, he spoke of a national government delegation where he stands out as coordinador and includes six members. Second in the list is Ana María Sanjuan, a close advisor of the Rodríguez siblings who joined the government as minister of education in March. Then there is Jorge Arreaza (one of the most senior chavista figures in the current legislature and a usual suspect in prominent commissions), Pedro Infante (the parliament’s vice president), and two PSUV lawmakers strongly linked to the ruling party’s youths: América Pérez and Génesis Garvett. The latter is a chavista politician-influencer born in 1999.

Machado said disagreements with the Trump administration concern the speed and urgency of the transition, and demanded short-term results.

Figuera said the first in-person meeting is set to take place next week in Caracas. She confirmed the US-backed opposition delegation is composed of a political technical commission of six members (Marco Aurelio Quiñones, Ramón López, Jorge Millán, Juan Miguel Matheus, and Sergio Vergara and herself) and a supporting commission (Macario González, Julio César Moreno, Desiree Barboza and Elimar Díaz). Figuera thanked the US and Marco Rubio for their backing of the transition before signing off on behalf of the 2015 National Assembly, which doesn’t actually exist anymore.

In an August 2 interview, María Corina Machado restated what she and Edmundo González had already established: she will not join the talks nor block them. Venevisión aired 15 minutes of the conversation between the opposition leader and Luis Olavarrieta, the first broadcast of a Machado interview on the network in ages.

“Everything that brings us closer to fulfilling the July 28 mandate will have our support,” she said, “but from a very firm perspective of always telling the truth. At this point no one is going to put a muzzle on me.” Asked about her disagreements with Washington’s agenda, Machado stated that these concern the speed and urgency of the transition and demanded short-term results: freeing political prisoners, allowing the return of exiles, renewing the National Electoral Council (CNE), and establishing a date for new elections. 

Whoever now runs Nicolás Maduro’s X and Telegram accounts announced that he welcomes “any path of dialogue that helps to consolidate peace, coexistence, and encounter among Venezuelans.”

Dinorah Figuera was allowed to return from exile thanks to her participation in this initiative. The same happens with some members of the opposition delegation

On August 1, representatives of Venezuela’s two rival legislatures sit down together under Washington’s supervision in the most concrete attempt to negotiate again since the Barbados talks of 2023. 

The talks, framed by Washington as the start of a transition, are driven by the Department of State and pair two delegations of ten. On one side sits the current National Assembly controlled by chavismo, led by its president Jorge Rodríguez. On the other is the Comisión Delegada of the National Assembly elected in 2015 — the last legislature the US and many other countries recognized as democratically legitimate. 

According to Dinorah Figuera, president of the Delegate Commission, the primary objective is laying out the institutional groundwork for a political transition: renovating Venezuela’s key state bodies, establishing a new National Electoral Council (CNE) capable of holding elections with credible guarantees, and extending to the Supreme Tribunal’s electoral and constitutional chambers. Figuera has said she hopes to deliver a transition proposal by December 2026, conveniently timed for the Trump administration to show a foreign-policy success just after the US midterm legislative election in November.

Figuera and Jorge Rodríguez first met on June 18, along with U.S. Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett, hours after Figuera returned to Caracas after years in exile. Those contacts were interrupted by the June 24 earthquakes, seeming as though the political track would freeze indefinitely behind the humanitarian emergency, especially as Delcy Rodríguez said on July 13 that the government had “no head” to think about elections while managing the disaster. 

The roots of Dinorah Figuera, the opposition’s co-chair, lie on the left. She belonged to the labor party La Causa R in the 1990s (then an important force in the rising Venezuelan Left) and served as deputy secretary of the Libertador municipality in Caracas under Aristóbulo Istúriz, who later jumped onto the chavista wagon. She eventually joined Primero Justicia and was re-elected as a lawmaker in 2015 before being forced into exile in 2018. Shortly after she led protests denouncing the death of party colleague Fernando Albán under SEBIN custody —a PJ councilman, key aide to Julio Borges and the godfather of Figuera’s daughter— she was threatened by the intelligence services and took shelter in the French Embassy of Caracas for 10 days before fleeing to Spain and receiving political asylum. 

Sources close to Primero Justicia describe Figuera as a principled politician willing to serve without seeking personal or financial gain from her sacrifices. She maintained a very low profile in this role until the State Department elevated her visibility several weeks ago.

While exiled in Spain, and following the collapse of the interinato, Figuera succeeded Juan Guaidó as the figure managing Venezuela’s overseas assets in the US via the 2015 National Assembly’s Comisión Delegada (recognized by Washington as Venezuela’s sole democratically elected institution until this year). Sources close to Primero Justicia describe Figuera as a principled politician willing to serve without seeking personal or financial gain from her sacrifices. She maintained a very low profile in this role until the State Department elevated her visibility several weeks ago. Figuera and US representatives have been undertaking preparatory meetings in Madrid for over two weeks, coordinated by Mauricio Claver-Carone, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s principal interlocutor on Venezuela.

Figuera has called herself “an instrument” of the reinstitutionalization process. She acknowledges Edmundo González Urrutia as president-elect and María Corina Machado as the opposition’s leader, yet notes she holds “a different vision.” She is, in the role the State Department has cast for her, what Edmundo González was to Machado in 2024: a figure admitted by chavista institutions because she isn’t a threat, and little enough ambition to follow guidelines from influential people in the opposition alliance.

Jorge Rodríguez, her counterpart, is chavismo’s veteran negotiator and the brother of acting president Delcy Rodríguez. He led the government’s delegation in the Mexico talks of 2021–2022 and signed the 2023 Barbados Agreement on Maduro’s behalf. Before that, he was Chávez’s vice president, communications minister, and president of the CNE in 2005–2006. 

Up until yesterday, the opposition’s full roster was not yet public. The opposition’s ten were revealed in stages and through extraofficial communications. In June, El Pitazo confirmed six names: Dinorah Figuera, Juan Miguel Matheus, Ramón López, Jorge Millán, Marco Aurelio Quiñones and Sergio Vergara. The remaining four were disclosed on July 29th: Elimar Díaz, Julio César Moreno, Macario González and Desiré Barboza.

Six are from Primero Justicia: Figuera, constitutional lawyer Juan Miguel Matheus, engineer Ramón López, Caracas legislator Jorge Millán, and recent additions Elimar Díaz and Julio César Moreno. 

Four are from Voluntad Popular, Leopoldo López’s party: Marco Aurelio Quiñones; Táchira legislator Sergio Vergara; and late additions Macario González and Desiré Barboza. Nearly all have spent recent years in exile, or in González’ case, in detention. Several are returning only now, under the process’s complicit US security guarantee. 

For most of the last two years, Primero Justicia has effectively been two parties. After Henrique Capriles chose to participate in the 2025 regional and legislative elections, the party’s official leadership, aligned with Machado’s abstentionist line, expelled him, Tomás Guanipa, and others for legitimizing what it called a fraud. Both Tomás Guanipa and Capriles were elected members of the NA that Rodríguez presides over. What remained of Primero Justicia, keeping the party’s name and recognition, was the abstentionist wing, led by Juan Pablo Guanipa, with Julio Borges as coordinator and María Beatriz Martínez as president. 

The delegation Washington seated is drawn substantially from the faction of Primero Justicia most doctrinally opposed to negotiating an electoral path with chavismo. The party has tried to hold both positions: in its July 27 statement it backed the dialogue as a route toward free elections while, in the same breath, ratifying its support for Machado. 

Who’s Who?

Juan Miguel Matheus (PJ, Carabobo) is a lawyer with a PhD in constitutional and parliamentary law behind the Estatuto que rige la Transición a la Democracia, the legal framework that underpinned Guaidó’s 2019 interim presidency. Elected for Carabobo in 2015, he was among the sharpest critics of the 2017 Constituent Assembly, calling it fraudulent. He is in exile in Austin and coordinates PJ’s board of directors. 

Ramón López (PJ, Distrito Capital) is an engineer and the former vice president of Venezuela’s Colegio de Ingenieros. López sat in the 2015 Assembly and the Parlasur, Mercosur’s parliament. Exiled in Spain after being threatened by Diosdado & Co., he became PJ’s international spokesperson. He flew back to Caracas alongside Figuera on June 18 for the meetings that launched the process..

Jorge Millán (PJ, Distrito Capital) is an industrial engineer and administrator. Millán is PJ’s Caracas coordinator and one of the opposition’s longtime specialists on the collapse of the national electric system. In 2019, the Constituent Assembly ordered his prosecution on charges including treason and instigation to insurrection. When Maduro issued him a pardon in 2020, Millán rejected it, arguing he had committed no crime and that Maduro had no legitimacy to pardon anyone. 

Elimar Díaz (PJ, Zulia) is the delegation’s youngest member. Díaz began in Manuel Rosales’s Un Nuevo Tiempo before moving to Primero Justicia, where she is now national political coordinator and PJ’s political vice-president in Zulia.

Julio César Moreno (PJ, Falcón) has the thinnest public record of the ten. Moreno was elected to the 2015 Assembly for Falcón and is counted among Primero Justicia’s delegates.

Marco Aurelio Quiñones (VP, Anzoátegui) was elected for Anzoátegui in 2015. In his early career, he was close to Capriles and Borges in Primero Justicia and then crossed to Voluntad Popular in late 2016, becoming a close ally of Guaidó. In December 2024 the exiled Assembly swore him in as second vice president, filling the seat left by Auristela Vásquez’s resignation and making him the highest-ranking officer of the 2015 legislature at the table after Figuera.

Sergio Vergara (VP, Táchira) is a founding member of Voluntad Popular alongside Leopoldo López and Daniel Ceballos. He was elected for Táchira in 2015 with nearly 76% of his circuit’s vote. He served as acting mayor of San Cristóbal after Ceballos was jailed in 2014, and has been in exile since 2019, when the SEBIN raided his home in connection with the Roberto Marrero case. He is also among the signatories of the document tied to the failed Jordan Goudreau incursion, asking for a military foreign intervention.

Macario González (VP, Lara) is a veteran Lara politician and former mayor of Barquisimeto’s Iribarren municipality. González was detained by the SEBIN in September 2025 as he left a university in Barquisimeto, held incommunicado, in what Voluntad Popular denounced as a forced disappearance for what he says was 68 days without charge, judicial hearing, or explanation. He was released near midnight on November 19, 2025, hours after the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted him precautionary measures. He has publicly held Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello politically responsible for his detention.

Capriles, now sitting in the Rodríguez-controlled national assembly, cautioned that a negotiation excluding Machado “will be condemned to fail.” 

Desiré Barboza (VP, Zulia) was an alternate deputy for Zulia in the 2015 Assembly and is Voluntad Popular’s regional coordinator there. Like most of the delegation, she has built her recent political life in exile and within the structures of the 2015 legislature.

On the ‘chavista’ side, only Jorge Rodríguez has been named to the time of writing. While the opposition’s ten were leaked or rumored until confirmed, the radio silence from those representing the current national assembly clashes awkwardly with Diosdado Cabello’s boasts of chavista unity. Francisco Arias Cárdenas, 1992 coup veteran and former Zulia governor, urged Rodríguez’s delegation to consult the PSUV’s base and submit any agreement to the Venezuelan public, warning that dialogue must not become a matter of simply following Washington’s instructions. 

The positions around the table

Primero Justicia and Un Nuevo Tiempo have called August 1 a “historic opportunity,” with PJ setting conditions: free, fair elections and the restoration of popular sovereignty. Voluntad Popular was the first to back the US initiative outright. But Acción Democrática’s Henry Ramos Allup has warned against any process that sidelines the coalition and Machado. Capriles, now sitting in the Rodríguez-controlled national assembly, cautioned that a negotiation excluding Machado “will be condemned to fail.” 

Machado and González stated their own position on July 26, claiming they will neither participate in nor obstruct the process, having taken no part in its “design, construction and functioning,” and will judge it by concrete, verifiable results: institutional recovery, the release of political prisoners, guarantees without exclusions, a presidential electoral calendar, and respect for popular sovereignty. 

Caracas, July 28, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez hosted a US Congress delegation in Caracas on Friday. 

The team of US politicians was led by Florida Republican Representative Brian Mast, a military veteran who also served voluntarily in the Israeli armed forces. It also included Florida Republican representatives Randy Fine and Kat Cammack alongside Illinois Democratic representative Jonathan Jackson. 

According to Venezuelan state media, the high-level meeting saw the two sides “assess progress in bilateral relations and the joint agenda in strategic areas.”

“Both sides reviewed bilateral cooperation schemes geared toward fighting transnational organized crime and border security,” the official report said.

For his part, Fine wrote on social media that he was “honored” to take part in the first congressional delegation to Venezuela in a decade. He added that the US’ January 3 kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro “set Venezuela on a trajectory to be a key ally” of the US. 

Fine, like Mast, is a major advocate of Israeli interests in the US legislature and has the backing of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). He has publicly called for starving and dropping nuclear bombs on the Gaza Strip. 

Also participating in the summit were US Chargé d’Affaires in Venezuela John Barrett, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia, and Vice Minister for Europe and North America Oliver Blanco.

Blanco, who comes from the ranks of the opposition Democratic Action (AD) party, has been the main government liaison with US officials in the country. He was recently appointed First Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to “strengthen Venezuela’s foreign policy and peace diplomacy around the world.”

In addition, the US Congress members held talks with National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, who described the meeting as “fruitful” and said discussions focused on “the legislative agenda and international investment.” Rodríguez added that Venezuela took the opportunity to “thank the United States for its support” following the June 24 twin earthquakes.

The US lawmakers held subsequent meetings with officials from Venezuela’s Ministry of Defense and the National Anti-Drug Superintendency (Sunad), according to reports.

Following the January 3 US military strikes and Maduro kidnapping, the Rodríguez-led acting government fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with Washington following seven years of severed ties. Both administrations have opened their respective embassies.

Venezuela’s acting president has hosted a number of US officials in Caracas in recent months, including Energy Secretary Chris Wright, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe.

Last March, Rodríguez had already received a delegation from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee as part of the ongoing “peace dialogue” between Washington and Caracas.

At that time, the presidential press office said the Senate delegation had traveled to Caracas for a “technical and political” visit intended to continue the bilateral “roadmap” focused on “direct communication to manage historical differences and strengthen energy cooperation in light of global challenges.”

Venezuela and Peru Move Toward Restoring Relations

Caracas’ foreign policy shift has likewise seen authorities mend ties with regional US allies that had sought to isolate the Caribbean nation.

On Friday, the governments of Venezuela and Peru announced the start of a gradual process to fully restore diplomatic relations, which were severed in 2024 after the Peruvian government refused to recognize Venezuela’s official electoral results that saw Maduro secure a third term in office.

“In a first stage, both countries have agreed to reactivate consular relations as an initial step toward the full restoration of bilateral ties,” the foreign ministries of Venezuela and Peru said in a joint statement.

The immediate objective is to guarantee protection and consular services for Venezuelan and Peruvian citizens residing in each country. The diplomatic rapprochement comes days before a change of government in Peru, where conservative leader Keiko Fujimori is set to replace interim President José María Balcázar after a narrow and disputed electoral triumph.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Originally published in Spanish by Runrun.es

The mission of the Venezuelan Foundation for Seismological Research (Funvisis) is to guide life-saving actions during earthquakes. Its capacity to fulfill this purpose was severely diminished when, on June 24, the earth shook twice, devastating the country’s central coastline.

Multiple sources consulted separately for this report agree that the institution suffered a progressive dismantling following a pivotal change in command: the historical tradition of having scientists lead the agency was replaced by military leadership. Simultaneously, the entity was transferred from the Ministry of University Education, Science, and Technology to the Ministry of Internal Relations, Justice, and Peace, now under Diosdado Cabello.

Former employees look back at the institution with nostalgia. They speak of an era when budgets were always tight, but the sheer dedication to the job was enough to prioritize science, training, and prevention. Today, the landscape reveals a significantly reduced monitoring network, shuttered educational programs, and a lack of specialized personnel after they left the country in a state of heightened vulnerability.

Declining precision in seismological activity

Presently, the National Seismological Network represents a mere quarter of what it was a decade ago. A clear sign of this institutional weakness is that it took the Foundation 4 hours and 26 minutes to inform the public about the details of the dual earthquake. By comparison, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) maintains an average standard of 20 minutes to process and publish data for earthquakes outside its territory. For events within the state of California, where its seismic network is extensive, reports are issued within 2 to 5 minutes.

According to the institution itself, the National Seismological Network is responsible for recording Venezuela’s tremors in real-time using broadband stations “to reduce vulnerability across the country.”

André Singer, president of the institution between 1996 and 2000, noted that in 1999, the necessary funds were secured to acquire a modern seismological network. This network featured 35 broadband stations and began installation in the year 2000. That same year, Funvisis became an attached agency of the newly created Ministry of Science and Technology.

By 2014, Funvisis’s website stated that Venezuela had 40 stations distributed across areas of highest seismic activity. Regional networks complemented local data, such as the Seismological Network of the Venezuelan Andes (RedSAV) and the Seismology Center of the Universidad de Oriente (CSUDO).

The network in the Venezuelan Andes used to cover 25 seismological stations. Now, it is completely inoperative.

Curiously, in the 2015 annual report from the Ministry of University Education, Science, and Technology, Funvisis reported expanding the network to 38 stations. This was achieved after putting two satellite seismological stations into operation and building and installing two others.

“The network must currently have at least ten operational stations, in addition to several accelerometers and satellite GPS stations in service,” Singer explained in an interview with Runrun.es, adding that this was only possible due to a recent restoration effort.

During a forum on July 2, Dr. Raúl Estévez, founder of the Geophysics Laboratory at the Universidad de los Andes (ULA), asserted that this reduction in stations occurred due to “an absolute lack of budget and technical support.” He added that the western regional network, managed by ULA—which at one point operated 25 of its own stations—became completely inoperative due to a lack of resources.

In Sucre, the Venezuelan state with the highest seismic risk, the UDO Seismology Center is also inactive, its director, Janette Castillo, confirmed to Runrun.es. The institution previously managed a network of stations covering the northeastern region.

The specialist explained that they were severely affected following the pandemic by the dismantling of UDO’s Sucre campus and a dwindling university budget. However, she noted that efforts are currently underway to try and recover the institution. She emphasized that local networks are vital for enabling more detailed monitoring and study of seismic activity in each region of the country.

The closure of flagship public spaces

Following the 1967 Caracas earthquake—a magnitude 6.5 event that left approximately 283 dead and 2,000 injured—the need arose to create a specialized institution for the study and investigation of earthquakes. Thus, Funvisis was born in July 1972. Following the 1997 Cariaco earthquake, which claimed 73 lives, the entity modernized how earthquakes were recorded nationwide, transitioning from heat-sensitive paper to the digital-satellite screens still used today.

In 1998, one of the institution’s flagship programs was created: the Madeleilis Guzmán Seismic Classroom, named after the schoolteacher who died during the Cariaco earthquake after saving two of her students. It served as a laboratory to understand how different sectors of the population responded to tremors, allowing the institution to tailor training and prevention guidelines accordingly.

Through this program, seismic classrooms managed by local authorities were established across various corners of the country’s seismic geography, including Cariaco, Lagunillas de Mérida, El Tocuyo, and at the Cagigal Observatory, before the former Seismological Museum of Caracas ceased operations, Singer detailed.

The program was shut down in 2018 under the administration of Vice Admiral Roberto Antonio Betancourt Arocha, the man photographed above. The space where it operated was converted into an auditorium.

In 2018, former Interior Minister Néstor Reverol promised to strengthen Funvisis’ stations and guarantee their security. After the June quakes, Funvisis reported the theft of a vital seismological sensor.

A former employee with experience in the comprehensive management of socio-natural and technological disaster risks explained that under that administration, the goal was to commercialize training and charge for workshops. “That was the reason I resigned from Funvisis, because knowledge and learning are universal rights,” they told Runrun.es.

Despite five separate sources reporting the suspension of the program, Funvisis claimed in a press release on February 16 of this year that they were celebrating the 28th anniversary of its creation.

It was also under this military administration that the Seismological Museum of Caracas was closed. The museum operated out of the historic Juan Manuel Cagigal Observatory, where, among other equipment, a mid-20th-century Wiechert seismometer was preserved.

“That museum featured a seismic simulator so the public could experience the shaking of an earthquake, along with instructors, specialized technical personnel, and a library maintained by Funvisis. It fulfilled a major role in addressing the social demands of the communities most in need of seismic prevention, specifically the working-class areas surrounding the Cagigal Observatory and western Caracas,” Singer detailed. He added that some of the instruments and personnel from that museum were transferred to a room at the Museum of Natural Sciences in Bellas Artes.

According to the former worker who preferred to keep their name confidential, the free 0800-TEMBLOR telephone service was also suspended during the tenure of Vice Admiral Betancourt. Runrun.es called the number multiple times during the first week of July, but the calls went unanswered.

The dwindling financial lifeline

The former president of the institution during the 1990s explained that “Funvisis’s deficit-ridden budget situation has been a recurring ailment throughout its history.” He recounted facing these difficulties firsthand and avoiding the technical shutdown of the entity through a budget rectification and the support of lawmaker Walter Márquez across political factions in Congress. He added: “The institution was sustained by income generated from contracts for seismic hazard studies, which the oil industry continuously requested for over 20 years starting in 1980 to ensure the safety of its installations.”

“During the peak demand for contracted studies, that revenue source represented nearly half of Funvisis’s annual budget,” he said.

However, over the last 15 years, this funding stream dried up in tandem with the collapse of the oil industry. Consequently, Funvisis came to depend almost exclusively on the budgets of the ministries to which it was subordinated.

“There was very little qualified staff left [when Jiménez Villarruel took over last year] given that most had been made persona non grata by Vice Admiral Betancourt (…) to the point where he blocked visits from anyone wishing to use Funvisis’ public library.”

In 2015, while attached to the Ministry of University Education, Science, and Technology, the institution acknowledged among its obstacles that “delays in foreign currency liquidation have paralyzed the purchasing processes for technological equipment acquired abroad, leading to delays in the physical execution of projects, as well as hindering the proper tracking of national seismic activity by Funvisis.”

By decree of then-President Nicolás Maduro, Funvisis was transferred in 2018 to the Ministry of Internal Relations, Justice, and Peace, which was then headed by Néstor Reverol. The minister at the time indicated that the change aimed to strengthen the National Seismological Service with investments in various stations across the country and to guarantee their security.

Nonetheless, this security guarantee was far from absolute. Just days after the June 24 earthquakes, Funvisis geologist Franck Audemard reported the theft of a sensor installed to monitor tectonic movements along the Boconó fault, which is linked to the first of the earthquakes recorded last month. The equipment had been installed in 2013 in the La Chicharronera sector, between Morón and Barquisimeto, on a property owned by former Venezuelan Major League Baseball player Melvin Mora. “The data from this equipment is vital for what is happening seismically in the country,” Audemard said in a video shared on social media.

A critical shortage of specialists

One of the interviewed sources pointed out that in September 2025, the current president of Funvisis, Major General (G/D) Luis Alejandro Jiménez Villarruel, took command.

“He inherited the hardest part, because he took over a foundation already lacking supplies, equipment, tools, and logistical materials. Furthermore, there was very little qualified staff left, given that most had been made persona non grata by Vice Admiral Betancourt and the majority of his executive team—to the point where he blocked visits from anyone wishing to use the foundation’s public library,” the source expressed.

Estévez, from ULA, agreed that there is a severe shortage of experts in the field nationwide, attributing it to a brain drain caused by the financial asphyxiation of universities and research centers. “The next generations in this field have left. Only us retirees remain,” he lamented during a forum at the Mérida College of Engineers.

Days after the dual earthquake, geological engineer Luiraimar Salazar denounced via her X account that the deterioration of Funvisis directly aligns with the military management that took over in 2017. During this period, she alleged that experienced scientists were forced to retire, while other specialists were pushed out of the institution, and the personnel who remain working do so under precarious salaries and with increasingly limited resources.

The expert insisted that citizens have the right to question what decisions were or were not made, and how those actions impacted the country’s capacity to monitor and study seismic threats.

Runrun.es visited the Funvisis headquarters in Caracas to seek an official statement. The staff at the entrance indicated that no one was available to address the request. They stated they would contact the outlet to arrange an interview, but at the time of this publication, no such call had been received.

In Venezuela, the focus has shifted from rescue to rebuilding three weeks after devastating earthquakes killed at least 4,829 people. But for many affected communities, uncertainty remains over how and when the government’s reconstruction plan will take shape.

Caracas, July 13, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government has approved a new set of oil industry regulations that prioritize the “economic and financial viability” of private sector investment.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez signed the statute on Wednesday, July 8, and it was published in the National Gazette. Rodríguez hailed the directive a “historic step” that will “transform our energy reserves into development.”

“These norms establish clear rules, greater legal certainty, and a favorable environment for the cooperation between the [Venezuelan] state and national and foreign capital,” the acting president said.

Western oil executives and Trump officials have aggressively lobbied to tailor the new rules to their interests after seeing preliminary drafts. White House energy advisor Jarrod Agen stated that he had contact with Rodríguez and her team “multiple times a day” to offer input on the regulations and contract models.

The 122-article text establishes the framework for the implementation of the reformed Hydrocarbon Law approved by the Venezuelan National Assembly in late January. The legislative overhaul replaced the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law approved by former President Hugo Chávez and subsequent decrees that established a leading role for the Venezuelan state in the energy sector.

Under the new law, private sector companies can take over oilfield operations and sales as minority joint venture partners, or via concession-type agreements.

The legislation also slashed royalties and fiscal contributions. The former was capped at 30 percent, and a former extraction tax was replaced by an “integrated hydrocarbon tax” with a 15 percent maximum.

However, the new statute defines a “combined contribution” of royalties and the integrated tax ranging from 20 percent for undeveloped greenfields to 35 percent for currently active brownfields, meaning an effective 10 percent further reduction from the 45 percent maximum defined under the law.

Companies are eligible for additional 5 percent discounts in their combined contribution if they run offshore operations or if their business plans include “building or amplifying crude transformation, upgrading, or refining plants.”

Income tax was lowered from 50 to 34 percent for greenfields under the 2026 legislation. But the regulations establish that companies can request further reductions to their royalty, integrated tax, and income tax contributions if necessary to attain “economic equilibrium.” The decisions will be taken by the Venezuelan executive on a case-by-case basis without any mandatory oversight from the National Assembly.

The reformed energy law allowed legal disputes to be settled by international arbitration bodies, with Venezuelan officials promising  “legal certainty” to investors. The new norms permit arbitration re via “alternative mechanisms,” with analysts suggesting that the vague language aims to avoid any clashes with US sanctions.

The directive also set an obligation to capture “associated gas” in oil extraction operations, which can be used for reinjection or transformed into cooking gas. Historically, it has been mostly flared. Oilfield operators are likewise mandated to secure their electricity supply. The Venezuelan National Assembly is presently working on reforms to open electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization to the private sector.

The enacted framework goes on to establish environmental responsibilities, oversight mechanisms, and penalties for non-compliance. State oil company PDVSA is not mentioned at all in the text.

Venezuelan oil expert Blas Regnault told Venezuelanalysis that the new norms risk turning the oil sector into an “enclave.”

“The regulations organize oil activity but do not guarantee that it will be integrated into the national economy,” he explained. Regnault warned that empowering corporations to negotiate royalties on an individual case-by-case basis “turns a sovereign right into a flexible variable in a contractual regime” in what is an “unusual” practice for oil-producing nations.

“Royalties are not taxes. They represent the sovereign right of the owner of the resource, and thus should be universally established, not negotiated project by project,” he underscored.

The pro-business opening of Venezuela’s most important industry has seen major Western corporations, including Chevron, Shell, and BP, ink agreements or memoranda of understanding with the acting Rodríguez administration to develop new projects or establish more favorable conditions in existing ones.

For its part, the Trump administration has kept in place sanctions against the Venezuelan oil industry, though it has issued a number of licenses allowing US and Western enterprises to enter into agreements with Caracas. However, the waivers mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments be deposited in a US Treasury-run account, while also blocking transactions with firms from China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

The maintenance of US sanctions has slowed new investment, while the Trump administration has so far returned only a fraction of Venezuelan export revenues to Caracas. 

The dire economic situation is indexed in persistent inflation and stagnating oil production. Venezuela’s crude output plateaued after four consecutive months of growth, with June’s 1.070 million barrel-per-day (bpd) output virtually unchanged from May, according to OPEC secondary sources. The figure remains the highest since early 2019.

For its part, PDVSA reported 1.187 million bpd in June, up from 1,179 million bpd in May. Direct and secondary measurements have historically differed over disagreements on the inclusion of condensates and natural gas liquids.

The South American country’s main crude extraction areas, in the eastern and western regions, were largely unaffected by June 24’s double earthquake, with no major disruptions to operations reported.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.t issued a number of licenses allowing US and Western enterprises to enter into agreements with Caracas. However, the waivers mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments be deposited in a US Treasury-run account, while also blocking transactions with firms from China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

Venezuela’s oil production has stagnated after four consecutive months of growth, with June’s 1.070 million barrel-per-day (bpd) output virtually unchanged from May, according to OPEC secondary sources. The figure remains the highest since early 2019.

For its part, PDVSA reported 1.187 million bpd in June, up from 1,179 million bpd in May. Direct and secondary measurements have historically differed over disagreements on the inclusion of condensates and natural gas liquids.

The South American country’s main crude extraction areas, in the eastern and western regions, were largely unaffected by June 24’s double earthquake, with no major disruptions to operations reported.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

The first days after the earthquake were defined by what had been lost. Apartment blocks lay in ruins, entire neighborhoods disappeared beneath the rubble, hospitals overflowed, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans found themselves without a home. Yet as the emergency slowly gave way to recovery, another realization has emerged, one less dramatic but perhaps more consequential. 

Venezuela did not only lose buildings: it is now discovering that it has very little left with which to rebuild them.

Reconstruction is often described as something that begins after disaster strikes. In reality, it begins years earlier, with the reserves a country accumulates while times are good. Wealth matters, but so do things that rarely appear in economic statistics: functioning institutions, domestic industries, engineering firms, construction companies, reliable electricity, access to credit, insurance markets, emergency planning, skilled workers and the public trust needed to mobilize them all. These are the hidden reserves that allow societies to absorb shocks. The earthquake revealed that Venezuela had spent much of them long before the ground began to shake.

That depletion has become evident in almost every aspect of the response. Venezuela imports a significant share of the food it consumes and much of its medicine. The emergency quickly exhausted whatever inventories existed. Heavy machinery needed to clear debris had to be sought abroad. Medical supplies became scarce almost immediately. Temporary shelters proved insufficient, forcing thousands of survivors to remain in tents erected in parks and public spaces weeks after the disaster. The government is now considering housing many of them in schools, an understandable emergency measure made possible only because classes are suspended for the summer.

Temporary solutions, however, have a habit of becoming permanent in Venezuela. Families displaced by the Vargas Tragedy of 1999 and by the 2010 floods spent years, in some cases decades, living in shelters that were never meant to become homes. The earthquakes risk repeating a familiar pattern, not because Venezuelan authorities necessarily want it to, but because they have long lacked the capacity to offer anything else.

The Venezuelan diaspora contains an extraordinary concentration of precisely the human capital required to rebuild the country. Whether that expertise can be persuaded to return, even temporarily, remains an unlikely scenario.

Some will inevitably attribute this lack of preparedness primarily to sanctions. It is an understandable argument, but one that struggles to explain what the earthquakes actually exposed. The collapse of domestic industry, the deterioration of public infrastructure, chronic underinvestment in the electrical grid, the shrinking of Venezuela’s manufacturing base and the erosion of emergency response capacity all began years before oil sanctions were imposed.

Recent research has also challenged the idea that sanctions caused a discrete collapse in access to food and medicine, showing instead that essential imports had already fallen dramatically before sanctions and later stabilized as the government dismantled some of its own economic controls. The sanctions era itself demonstrated that Venezuela retained the ability to import consumer goods. Supermarkets gradually refilled for those able to pay. Construction cranes returned to Caracas’ wealthiest neighborhoods. Restaurants multiplied. Consumption recovered far more quickly than productive capacity.

The earthquake exposed the difference.

The destruction of resilience

Disasters ask questions that ordinary economic life does not. They care little about how many imported products sit on supermarket shelves or how many luxury apartments are being built in eastern Caracas. They ask whether a country can mobilize excavators, engineers, trauma surgeons, logistics networks, emergency housing, electricity, financing and public institutions at scale. They ask whether resilience has been accumulated or consumed. Venezuela’s answer has been painfully clear.

That is perhaps one of the least understood legacies of chavismo. Much has been written about the destruction of wealth, the collapse of oil production or the country’s prolonged recession. Less attention has been paid to the destruction of resilience itself. For years, the Venezuelan State approached institutions with the same extractive logic that governed its relationship with oil. Productive assets became sources of immediate political or fiscal returns rather than investments to be maintained and strengthened. Private companies were expropriated rather than incorporated into development. Public enterprises became instruments of patronage rather than production. Infrastructure was consumed faster than it was repaired. The country did not merely become poorer. It gradually spent the reserves that societies rely upon when catastrophe arrives.

Resources that may have financed future growth must now finance immediate recovery.

The consequences extend far beyond physical infrastructure. Reconstruction is ultimately carried out by people, and Venezuela has spent the last two decades exporting many of those it now needs most. Engineers who now design highways in Spain, petroleum specialists managing fields in Texas or Guyana, architects working across Latin America, doctors practicing in Colombia and Chile, electricians, project managers and construction supervisors who left because opportunities disappeared at home. The Venezuelan diaspora contains an extraordinary concentration of precisely the human capital required to rebuild the country. Whether that expertise can be persuaded to return, even temporarily, remains an unlikely scenario.

Money presents an equally daunting challenge. Before the earthquake, Venezuela’s slow economic reopening had begun to attract cautious international interest. Much of it remained exactly that, cautious. Memoranda of understanding outnumbered signed investment agreements, access to financing remained limited and investors continued to price Venezuela’s political risks accordingly. The expectation, however tentative, was that new investment would increasingly flow toward rebuilding the electrical grid, expanding oil production and modernizing neglected infrastructure. The earthquake has fundamentally altered those priorities. Resources that may have financed future growth must now finance immediate recovery. Every home rebuilt is a home that cannot wait. Every hospital repaired is indispensable. Every bridge reconstructed delays another project that might otherwise have expanded productive capacity. Reconstruction does not replace development. It postpones it.

Reconstruction-era uncertainty and challenges

The financing challenge has also become more complicated politically. Investors had already approached Venezuela with understandable caution. The humanitarian emergency has increased the country’s fiscal needs precisely as political uncertainty has deepened. The constitutional arrangements established after Nicolás Maduro’s removal were always presented as exceptional. As they become more prolonged and their legal basis increasingly contested, companies considering long-term reconstruction projects must ask whether contracts signed today will remain secure under whatever government eventually succeeds the current one. Investors do not need constitutional certainty, they simply need enough legal certainty to believe that agreements lasting ten or twenty years will survive political change. Venezuela offers remarkably little of it.

This is also why Delcy Rodríguez’s recent call for the lifting of sanctions misunderstands the country’s central problem. Whatever benefits further sanctions relief might provide, it cannot eliminate the uncertainty surrounding Venezuela’s legal and political environment. Investors deciding whether to finance ports, housing developments or power plants are unlikely to base their decisions on sanctions alone. They also ask whether contracts will survive a change of government, whether courts will enforce them and whether today’s authorities will still possess the legal authority to honor them tomorrow.

Reconstruction depends on trust, functioning institutions, access to capital, legal certainty and a productive economy capable of sustaining the effort long after international solidarity inevitably fades.

There is another irony hidden beneath the rubble. The Venezuelan insurance industry will likely survive this catastrophe better than many expected, not because losses have been modest, but because so much of what was lost was never insured. This was an under-insured disaster. Homes, businesses and families that lacked coverage will inevitably look toward the state for assistance. Yet the state that spent years hollowing out its own fiscal and institutional capacity now finds itself acting as insurer of last resort, precisely when it possesses the fewest resources to fulfill that role.

Natural disasters often become moments of national renewal. Reconstruction can modernize infrastructure, attract investment and accelerate reforms that politics alone struggles to produce. Those opportunities exist in Venezuela as well. Rebuilding cities will require new housing, new roads, new power systems, new telecommunications infrastructure and new industries capable of supplying them. But opportunities are only as valuable as a country’s ability to seize them. Reconstruction depends on trust, functioning institutions, access to capital, legal certainty and a productive economy capable of sustaining the effort long after international solidarity inevitably fades.

The earthquake destroyed thousands of buildings. Rebuilding them will take years. What it ultimately revealed, however, is something far more difficult to reconstruct. Over the last quarter century Venezuela has steadily depleted much of the industrial, institutional, financial, human and political capital that countries quietly accumulate before disasters occur. Those invisible reserves are what determine whether recovery becomes a matter of years or generations. They cannot be imported as easily as food or medicine. They have to be rebuilt, patiently, one institution at a time.

Since last week, the world’s attention has been set again on Venezuela just like six months ago.

Of course, the differences between the events of January 3rd and the terrible disaster of June 24th could not be more stark, even if both evenets have massive implications for the country’s future.

Most coverage coming from international media these days has highlighted two things: first, the terrible devastation seen in worst-hit areas like parts of Caracas and especially in La Guaira State (formerly known as Vargas); and second, that many are complaining about the official response and even calling it “negligent”, like in this report from BBC News correspondent Yogita Limaye.

Interestingly enough, in recent months there has been a reopening to the presence of foreign reporters in the country, a shift from the heavily restricted access during the Maduro years. A larger number of reporters and media crews arrived in the last few days. They have been mostly allowed to do their job (unlike Sky News’ Trump 100 podcast, interrupted by government officials while recording), but they’ve been facing their own set of specific challenges.

Earlier this week, NGO IPYS Venezuela offered a summary of some apparent restrictions from the Communication and Information Ministry to international media workers, like indicating that they could be mobilized to affected areas only through State-authorized buses and establishing a schedule for those trips from the Media Center established at La Carlota Airport in Caracas.

One person quoted in the summary is British freelance journalist Catherine Ellis, who’s covering the disaster for Al-Jazeera and UK weekly magazine The Spectator while also doing some radio interviews for other outlets. She has worked in Venezuela since 2023 and, before that, volunteered for an NGO in Colombia and Spain, helping Venezuelan immigrants. It was Ellis who published on X a picture of the buffet the regime was offering to foreign correspondents while thousands of people were thirsty and hungry.

At the time of writing, several international reporters told Delcy Rodriguez during her recent press conference what they’ve seen firsthand. She minimized those criticisms against the official response and pointed her finger at “media matrixes created in laboratories” (matrices de opinión is a popular term in Venezuela to describe artificial narratives in journalism or social media). 

Caracas Chronicles interviewed Ellis earlier this week to discuss what she recently witnessed.

How has it been for you and other international correspondents to cover the disaster on the ground? Have there been any limitations by government officials and particularly from the Communication and Information Ministry?

The experience so far as a journalist in terms of getting in and communicating with the Ministry has been quite strange in some ways. It needs to be said that it has been much more open than it usually is. Quite often, if I come to Venezuela, I can’t really do any reporting or get a journalist visa; they give very few journalist visas, and it’s particularly hard for freelance journalists when you’re not a fixed employee for a certain media outlet. But this time they let journalists in. They’re letting foreign journalists in without visas. On one hand, it’s been much, much better. This time journalists are actually allowed into the country, and access is not restricted, although we don’t know how long that will go on for. Communications have been terrible and completely lacking to the point of being almost non-existent. 

How was your experience with the bus trip to La Guaira the day after registering at La Carlota airbase in Caracas? 

We took the bus on June 28, the day after we registered in La Carlota. They told us they would take us there, and we left for La Guaira an hour and a half late. No problem, that happens sometimes, but there was no communication about what was happening. The following day was the worst because I arrived early thinking it might leave on time, only to wait for two hours with no explanation at all. Then we knew from other journalists that the trip was cancelled and access had been suspended for 48 hours for journalists. No one on the logistics team provided any explanation. They just said: “we are not in charge of it, we don’t know.” One person told me: “you have to be patient, you have to wait… This is a complex situation, and things don’t move quickly.”

How are you and your colleagues doing your work in the disaster area? 

We were completely given free rein… We were taken to a Misión Vivienda place, but we could go wherever we wanted, so I spoke to people from that place, and some were very critical of the government. I went to other buildings around, which were either for retired people or just normal apartment buildings, and I spoke to lots of people. I was very, very free to speak to people. So much that I missed the bus and the Guardia (Nacional) took another journalist and me to the next site to speak to people. 

Have there been any issues involving the police, the military, intelligence services or local officials?

Some people have been helpful, and some haven’t in terms of the authorities. In La Guaira, generally, no one stopped me from doing anything. Police and military pulled me away from a building because they were excavating to take bodies out, but to be honest, that was more for health and safety reasons, and I did understand. I went to the hotel in Caracas where the Venezuelan deportees were supposed to arrive after they got back, and the hotel collapsed. It was full of SEBIN agents. We weren’t allowed to pass because of “security reasons.” When I started to take photos, I was told off by SEBIN. That was interesting. 

Genuinely, I have to say the police and military have not stopped me speaking to anybody or stopping doing anything. And to be honest, some of them haven’t really been around. I think it’s because, as you wear the pink armband (identifying as foreign press), they know you’re press, that you’ve been approved, but getting to the hotel where the deportees were was impossible.

How has the relationship been with the civilians in the area? How do they react to the presence of the media?

Civilians have been brilliant. Absolutely brilliant. Everybody is very, very open to talking. Venezuelans are incredibly warm and open people. I have no problem chatting to people. If I see people who are visibly, incredibly upset, who have family (members trapped) in buildings, it’s not the right time to talk to them.

Sometimes, I’ve approached them very sensitively, and people have shared their stories, described the people they have lost, told about what they’re lacking or what they need. Some people openly criticize the government, but others who have criticized the government then say they don’t want their names used, and others are not thinking about politics. They’re just in shock.

How has the relationship been between international correspondents and Venezuelan journalists?

Venezuelan journalists are incredibly helpful. I think there has been a lot of solidarity between all journalists, between Venezuelan and international journalists and among the international journalists themselves. I’ve been speaking to people from the US, Canada, Argentina, parts of Europe, and they all want to help each other. 

On a critical note, there have been a couple of international journalists who either pushed me out of the way at certain sites because they want to film or come up to me when I’m interviewing people and taking my interviewees. This isn’t a show, people have lost (their) lives. I would encourage the international press to have a heightened level of sensibility and respect for all Venezuelans and all affected by this crisis.

Have you noticed the difference between how you see the situation on the ground, how it is covered outside, and how it is covered inside, how the government is presenting it? 

From what I’ve seen, Delcy and the government are trying to project an image of solidarity with the international community, thanking and praising them for being here and helping Venezuelans in their time of need. But not necessarily announcing tangible and concrete steps of what they’re actually putting in place. Someone put it to me like this: “The government has been very visible, key figures have been very visible in terms of presence on social media and even visiting sites, but there has not been enough concrete information about donation centers, about what’s happening next, about actually managing the actual crisis.”

How have people in La Guaira been coping?

A lot of people are still in shock. It’s very hard to process, but everybody seems to be very grateful to everyone who is helping them, either members of their own community or the international rescue teams. Some people have said, “Other governments are helping us more than our own government.” 

I think the most important thing to emphasize, which is non-political, is that people are saying “Venezuelans are helping Venezuelans, they’re helping each other.” Someone said to me the other day, “We are a family, this is what we do, we help each other, we won’t give up, and you know, keep going.”

I spoke to a guy who came from Valencia. He had three kids back home and said, “I couldn’t bear to think of my own kids lying somewhere like that and no one going to find them,” so he came on his way, he got lists from people, and he came so he can help with the search and rescue. 

There’s definitely a lot of shock. A lot of kids are still scared and adults feel that any movement or anything, not just aftershocks, mean something is going to happen again. People are getting through by supporting each other.

Is the aid arriving properly? Have you seen aid being delivered?

There’s so much aid everywhere. In Caracas, I’ve seen so many trucks coming in. The problem is that I can’t exactly say what’s happening to the aid. Some aid is getting through, but there seem to be a little bit of bottlenecks or bureaucracy; I don’t know the full reasons… It’s getting through to some people but isn’t getting through to other people, and they’re running out of some things. People want proper accommodation also. Definitely, in a lot of places there are now international NGOs setting up food points as well.

– 

Just yesterday, while covering relief efforts taking place at Parque del Este, Ellis was approached by a couple of suspicious looking fellows. This was the exchange:

I was in Parque del Este tonight speaking to volunteers and affected families camping there. I was chatting to one family when two men came over to look what was going on then left. I started helping the family move their stuff to the road (I was carrying the cat!) as they were moving somewhere else. The two men called me over, asked me if I was a journalist, to which I said yes and showed them my wristbands. Asked more questions, who I was, where from, what I was doing. I asked who they were, as they still hadn’t introduced themselves by this point. One (the politer one) said they were intelligence police, asked what I was doing, so I said speaking to the family etc. Asked if I knew them, I said no. Then asking qus like my age, which was weird as one had my passport which has my DOB. Took photos of my passport. Asked where I lived, said I didn’t want to give that info. I asked why they wanted to know all this, they said for security and that people were taking children, so I asked if they thought I was taking kids. They said no. I told me they were asking me because I was a journalist and there was not a real free press. One was fairly polite and said they didn’t want to make me uncomfortable. I said they already had. Eventually they gave me it back. It’s ok to check who someone is, check they have a wristband which you now should have in the park – but I did, and I showed them, so why the need for questionning and taking photos of my passport? And why was the first qu, are you a journalist? Does everyone who enters the park get that level of treatment?

It doesn’t take much for chavismo to step back into its old ways.

On June 24, Venezuela was struck by a devastating double earthquake that caused thousands of deaths and widespread destruction. In this infographic, we detail the facts and figures surrounding the disaster, as well as US military encroachment amid an ongoing sanctions regime.

(Click on the crosses for more information)

Click here to download the full infographic.

At first, Jesus did not believe it was possible, but then he heard his father shouting out from the rubble, saying: “Don’t leave me here.”

“I said, ‘Trust me: Stay calm. Keep the kids calm over there. I’m not leaving here without you,'” Jesus recalled.

Jose had been trapped for more than an hour by that point, unsure of his fate. He and his two younger sons had survived the collapse with relatively minor injuries, but dangers remained. The debris could still shift and crush them.

“The first thing I thought of was my children. I had the little one right here,” Jose recalled, lifting his hands to his chest. “And I still had the other one. He was right next to me but buried. I couldn’t see his face; I could only see one foot and one hand.”

Still, Jose put on a brave face for his boys. A friendly voice had pierced the rubble: Jesus’s friend, the firefighter.

He had been shouting for survivors. He had also brought Jesus’s old firefighting equipment to the site.

After finding out his father and brothers were alive, Jesus began desperately trying to get them out. But he realised he would have to wait until the next day for the sun to come up and, crucially, to get his hands on a jackhammer that could drill through the floors of rubble separating him from his family.

Finally, the next morning, a specialist squad from the police arrived with the gear they needed to carry out the rescue.

With the help of his firefighting team from La Guaira, who showed up to help their old comrade, Jesus was able to pull his father and two younger brothers from the rubble at about 3:30pm on June 25, more than 20 hours after the earthquakes.

He quickly swept Diego and Santiago into his arms.

“When I saw them, I hugged them, gave them a kiss, and said, ‘I love you, brother,'” Jesus recalled. “Then I stepped away for a moment and started crying.”

Jose is still shaken from the experience, which has changed his life forever. “I am someone who will be grateful for the rest of my life that I was given this opportunity. Not just me, but my two young children.”

Venezuela’s acting president Delcy Rodriguez, whose 180-day mandate ends Friday, dismissed criticism of the government’s earthquake response, saying rescue crews were deployed immediately with adequate equipment. Residents have said they were on their own for the first 48 hours.

Venezuela’s acting president Delcy Rodriguez, whose 180-day mandate ends Friday, dismissed criticism of the government’s earthquake response, saying rescue crews were deployed immediately with adequate equipment. Residents have said they were on their own for the first 48 hours.

The search for survivors continues in Venezuela after a powerful earthquake left hundreds dead and thousands missing. Al Jazeera’s Teresa Bo reports from one of the country’s worst-hit areas where many residents have lost their homes and are now sleeping outdoors.

Rescuers in Venezuela are racing against time to find survivors after twin earthquakes left thousands missing. International teams have pulled several people from the rubble alive, including 11-year-old boy Moises rescued after a six-hour operation and a newborn reunited with their family.

Originally published in Spanish on Asdrúbal’s personal Substack

There are weeks that change a government. And there are weeks that change a country. This is one of them.

Until just a few days ago, the economic debate regarding Venezuela revolved around how much we would grow this year. Around whether the figure would be 4% or 6%, and at what point that growth would materialize in people’s daily lives: exchange rate stabilization, the reestablishment of relations with multilateral organizations, and the possibility of slowly beginning a recovery process.

On the morning of June 24th, a Financial Times scoop centered the discussion on the actual size of our foreign debt. That was the horizon. Today, the horizon no longer looks like that. The earthquakes that struck this week not only leave a human tragedy of dimensions still difficult to quantify; they also profoundly alter the country’s economic outlook. International evidence shows that a major earthquake can generate losses equivalent to between 3% and 10% of GDP, depending not only on physical damage but on the State’s capacity to respond.

Anyone who thinks the problem is limited to the cost of rebuilding highways, hospitals, or housing is seeing only a part of the picture. Earthquakes destroy infrastructure, but they also destroy productivity, employment, tax revenues, logistical chains, and confidence. Thousands of businesses interrupt operations, families postpone consumption and investment decisions, and economic activity loses momentum for months or even years. The expectations and decisions of economic agents are disrupted by a widespread sense of loss and uncertainty.

The economic literature is quite consistent on this point. Studies by the World Bank, the IMF, and numerous academic papers conclude that the impact of a natural disaster depends far less on the intensity of the phenomenon itself than on the institutional strength of the affected nation. Economies with solid States tend to absorb the initial shock and recover relatively quickly. Conversely, in fragile States, a natural disaster often mutates into a prolonged economic crisis because institutional weakness amplifies the damage and delays reconstruction.

The economic agenda will no longer be dominated exclusively by growth, but by reconstruction. We need to prevent the disaster from destroying a large part of Venezuela’s remaining physical and human capital.

That is precisely Venezuela’s primary challenge. Over the years, the country lost fiscal, technical, and operational capacity. This is not a political assessment, but an observable fact. The State’s capacity to design public policy has been significantly reduced. The prolonged economic crisis and hyperinflation led us to a state of “save yourself if you can.”

The difficulties in maintaining basic infrastructure, public utilities, or the hospital network were already evident before the earthquake. Rebuilding cities like La Guaira demands far more than financial resources: it requires planning, engineering, contracting capacity, technical supervision, and a public administration capable of coordinating thousands of projects simultaneously. Today, the Venezuelan State lacks a good portion of those capabilities.

Our recent history shows how society has demonstrated resilience where the State has lost capacity. The private sector, non-governmental organizations, churches, universities, and multiple civil society initiatives have, through years of crisis, developed a remarkable ability to organize, mobilize resources, and respond swiftly to emergencies. We saw it during the pandemic, during the landslides in Las Tejerías, and in so many other humanitarian crises. And we are seeing it now. This accumulated experience will be one of the most critical assets in confronting this tragedy, though on its own, it remains insufficient to undertake a reconstruction of this magnitude.

It would be a mistake to turn international aid into a battleground for confrontation. Venezuela doesn’t need speeches on sovereignty, but engineers, heavy machinery, hospitals, drinking water, electricity, and the capacity to rebuild.

That is why I maintain that this earthquake completely changes the economic conversation. Just a few weeks ago, we were discussing how to accelerate growth, attract investment, or deepen reforms. We argued that institutional reform was necessary for Venezuela to achieve sustained and inclusive growth. Today, the priority has shifted to preventing the disaster from destroying a large part of the country’s remaining physical and human capital. The economic agenda will no longer be dominated exclusively by growth, but by reconstruction.

An inevitable conclusion emerges from this: Venezuela cannot face this challenge alone. This is not merely a matter of securing financing. It will be indispensable to mobilize technical assistance, specialized teams, field hospitals, temporary infrastructure, fast-access credit, and international coordination mechanisms. International cooperation will cease to be a mere complement and will become a necessary condition for recovery.

There’s some good news, however: for the first time in many years, the conditions exist for such cooperation to be possible. The reestablishment of relations with international financial institutions opens a window that until a few months ago seemed firmly shut. It would be a mistake to turn this aid into a new battleground for political confrontation. Countries do not need speeches on sovereignty after an earthquake. They need engineers, heavy machinery, hospitals, drinking water, electricity, and the capacity to rebuild.

The country needs to design a roadmap to achieve broad political agreements, leading to a democratically elected government able to drive the necessary reforms.

Economic history demonstrates that major disasters can become turning points. Some countries seized these tragedies to modernize their infrastructure, strengthen their institutions, and build more resilient economies. Others remained trapped for decades in a cycle of destruction and precariousness. The difference was never solely the magnitude of the earthquake, but the quality of the collective response.

Beyond the immediate emergency, this tragedy also leaves a political lesson that is impossible to ignore. The reconstruction of Venezuela demands more than financial resources or international assistance. It requires leadership with democratic legitimacy and the capacity to build consensus. The country needs to design a roadmap to achieve broad political agreements, leading to a democratically elected government and providing it with the necessary backing to drive the economic and institutional reforms that recovery demands. No reconstruction program will be sustainable unless it rests upon legitimate institutions, clear rules, and a political pact that offers stability, generates trust, and allows for the mobilization of support from the international community and private investment.

That is why I believe this earthquake has not only moved the earth. It shifted Venezuela’s economic horizon. The projections we made just a week ago likely no longer describe the country we will have at the close of this year. The Venezuelan economy has just entered a new phase, and the speed with which we manage to combine the efforts of the State, the proven capacity of the private sector and civil society, and the decisive support of the international community will determine not only the economic performance of 2026, but the real possibilities for recovery over the next decade.

President Donald Trump has posted a video of a ‘swift and lethal’ US strike he claims has killed the leader of Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua gang. Trump said Venezuela helped the US with the strike on Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores.

Caracas, May 19, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting with a World Bank delegation at Miraflores Palace on Friday.

In a statement, Caracas described the summit as “cordial and constructive,” with both parties “exploring possible collaboration in matters of technical assistance.”

“The Venezuelan government and the World Bank agreed on the need to deepen dialogue and agreed to work together to establish concrete areas for technical collaboration for the benefit of the Venezuelan people,” the communiqué read.

Rodríguez was flanked by Economy Vice President Calixto Ortega and Finance Minister Anabel Pereira. The World Bank delegation was led by Susana Cordeiro Guerra, the US-based organization’s vice president for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Rodríguez administration recently reestablished ties with both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund following a seven-year hiatus due to Washington’s non-recognition of Venezuelan authorities. However, relations with the two institutions had been frozen several years prior. Former President Hugo Chávez disengaged Venezuela from the multilateral bodies in 2007, calling them “weapons of US imperialism,” though the country remained a formal member.

Since the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, Caracas has fast-tracked diplomatic rapprochement with the Trump administration, which recognized Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader” in March. The Venezuelan government has launched a series of pro-business reforms and struck agreements with Western energy and mining corporations.

On May 13, Venezuela’s acting president announced the launch of a debt restructuring process as part of efforts to return the Caribbean nation to global financial markets. Venezuelan authorities plan to present a macroeconomic framework and debt sustainability analysis to stakeholders next month.

Venezuela’s foreign debt is estimated as high as US $170 billion, from a combination of defaulted bonds and loans with accrued interest, as well as international arbitration awards. US financial sanctions from 2017 severely exacerbated Venezuela’s economic crisis and blocked the country from fulfilling its debt obligations.

The acting Rodríguez administration has vowed that the country’s priority is to access $5 billion in IMF Special Drawing Rights and that there are “no plans” to contract IMF loans. Venezuela’s Central Bank President Luis Pérez recently announced that a delegation will head to Washington to meet with IMF officials by the end of May.

Trump billionaire allies move in

Caracas’ opening to Western conglomerates has seen multiple Trump officials visit the country alongside business executives to discuss investment opportunities.

Erebor Bank, backed by far-right tech mogul and close Trump ally Peter Thiel, has reportedly pitched its services to Venezuelan officials to restore the country’s access to the US financial system. According to Bloomberg, Erebor co-founder Jacob Hirshman has made several trips to Caracas in recent weeks and met with Central Bank authorities and private bank executives.

Hirshman reportedly told Venezuelan authorities that he counts on US government support. For its part, Erebor confirmed that it held “preliminary conversations about correspondent banking and related financial services” with Venezuelan counterparts. 

Erebor is a digital-only bank registered in Ohio that received its US banking charter in February.

The lure of lucrative investment prospects has also attracted smaller players such as Yorkville Advisors, a New Jersey-based financial firm with ties to Trump’s family, which plans to raise $200 million for acquiring assets in Venezuela.

The company created a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) and stated that businesses in Venezuela will require “substantial capital investment […] to capitalize on improving macroeconomic conditions.”

In April, Acting President Rodríguez installed a commission to evaluate the “strategic” value of Venezuelan state assets and their possible privatization. Venezuelan private sector companies have begun raising funds ahead of potential sell-offs.

Caracas’ pro-business overtures have also caught the eye of US billionaire investor Fred Ehrsam. The co-founder of crypto exchange Coinbase has likewise made multiple visits to Venezuela in recent weeks to explore “investments ranging from oil and gas to fintech and digital payments,” according to Bloomberg.

Ehrsam held discussions with Venezuelan government officials and reportedly argued that the present moment was ripe for investment as Venezuelan assets remained “deeply undervalued.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

MOLLY Mae and Tommy Fury have been spotted out together a day after his niece Venezuela’s wedding to groom Noah Price.

The lavish nuptials took place in the Isle of Man with both Molly and their daughter Bambi, 3, in attendance – but Tommy was forced to skip the family affair due to ‘boxing camp’.

The two were seen walking with their daughter Bambi, who had a special role on the big day as one of Venezuela’s bridesmaids.

Pregnant Molly, 26, who is due to give birth soon, stepped out in a casual look, donning black tracksuit bottoms and a black coat, with a grey t-shirt that struggled to contain her bump.

The expectant mum finished her look with sunglasses and some UGG boots for maximum comfort.

Tommy also dressed down amid the reunion, in joggers and a hoodie, with Bambi looking sweet in a candy striped co-ord as she held on to her parents’ hands.

TOMMY’S NO-SHOW

Paris Fury reveals truth about why Tommy was no show at Venezuela’s wedding

WEDDY TO GO

Molly Mae gets off private jet with bridesmaid Bambi before Venezuela wedding

Despite Tommy’s absence it’s clear that Molly enjoyed Venezuela’s special day as she shared a number of sweet photos from the event afterwards.

Taking to her Instagram Stories, the Maebe founder shared some adorable snaps of Bambi in her pale blue bridesmaid dress.

Bambi was one of 13 bridesmaids, who matched Mother of the Bride Paris Fury in the same blue hue.

In one sweet photo, Bambi is seen being held by Venezuela who Molly dubbed ‘beautiful bridey’ in the caption.

Another photo saw Bambi pucker up for a kiss with her mum, who wore ablack jumpsuit, with a floral mesh style top for the occasion.

The tot was also seen looking with awe at Venezuela and groom Noah’s incredible blue cake that was almost three times the height of her.

The cake boasted five tiers and was accompanied with an impressive blue and yellow floral display.

“WOW,” read Molly’s caption as Bambi gazed up at the towering creation.

Venezuela stunned in a lace fishtail wedding dress with elaborate sleeves and a train spanning 50ft.

In a sit down chat with Sun Club ahead of the nuptials she told us exclusively how she designed the gown herself at Ava Rose Hamilton bridal boutique in Colne.

“I described what I wanted and it was as if they could see what was in my mind.

“You slip on these big sleeves and then they flare out and they’re like wings.”

Of the dress, mum Paris added: “I told her she was being eccentric, but the seamstress made her these beautiful big draped sleeves, they are like wings, they’re beautiful.”

Dad Tyson donned a black Tuxedo for the day, while Venezuela’s husband stood out in an ivory tux.

Clearly ready to become a married woman, the bride changed her surname from Fury to Price a mere hour after tying the knot.

PARIS Fury has revealed why Tommy Fury wasn’t at Venezuela’s wedding after his pregnant fiancée Molly-Mae Hague flew to the venue by private jet.

The proud mother-of-the-bride showered Molly, 26, with praise for going above and beyond to make it to Venezuela’s big day, while Tommy was nowhere to be seen.

Molly, who is heavily pregnant with her second child, was seen stepping onto the runway with her daughter Bambi, 3, and sister Zoe Rae.

The extravagant soiree is taking place at The Comis Hotel and Resort on the outskirts of Douglas, Isle of Man.

In awe of Molly, Paris told The Sun: “She is incredible. She is being fully supportive, and she is bringing Bambi over, so that Bambi could be a bridesmaid with the kids.

“But I have got to throw her props. She is making that journey while heavily pregnant and I wouldn’t have been able to face that while I was at her term of pregnancy.

“It’s very good,” Paris added.

Molly’s fiancé, Tommy, 27, Tyson’s younger brother, wasn’t able to join in the festivities.

Tommy, who Molly met on the reality TV hit in 2019, had to stay in Manchester for his boxing training camp.

She says: “I’m very glad that they are coming. It means a lot. It’s a big journey for anyone to come from home to here.

“It’s lovely that they are making the effort. It’s lovely that Bambi and the other little girls all get to be bridesmaids. They are all cousins and it’s sweet that they‘ll make memories together.”

Bambi is one of 13 of the child bridesmaids, including Venezuela’s little sisters Valencia, eight, and Athena, including four of Noah’s cousins, and family members, as well as five grown up bridesmaids.

Venezuela revealed: “I chose powder blue cupcake dresses for the little ones, they’re really cute, and fitted gowns for my friends.”

Paris said: “Evangeline Designs in Liverpool made the bridesmaid dresses and every day there it was like, ‘There’s a new little dress, there’s a new dress there’s a new dress, because we ended up having a few extra little bridesmaids’.

“They’re wearing flowers in their hair.”

Paris revealed: “We found £120 shoes for the little ones, and the only shoes we found in the right shade of blue for the women were stunning shoes that were £13 from Shein.”

Paris stored all the wedding party outfits in a specially allocated wedding room in the basement of their home.

Paris and Venezuela thoughtfully put together goodie bags, which included diamante Primark flip flops, matching pyjamas, a hairbrush, sweets, Doll beauty make up and a “little dolly” for each of the younger bridesmaids.

And it wasn’t just the women who dazzled on Venezuela’s big day. The men were looking just as dapper.

“The men are in black tuxedos, Tyson too and Noah is in an ivory tuxedo. Noah picked it,” Paris said.

“Collecting everything wasn’t easy. I felt like I was doing circles on ferries with carloads.”