USIsrael

Gulf countries have stepped up diplomacy with Iran in a bid to de-escalate tensions across the Middle East, amid fears of renewed US strikes on Tehran and intensifying hostilities between Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

The three nations that signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement in August – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye – and diplomats from Qatar met with high-ranking Iranian officials on Monday in an effort to prevent the resumption of all-out war.

Underscoring the high stakes, the meeting in Tehran was attended by Saudi Minister of Defence Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, just days after Iran-aligned Houthi fighters struck Saudi airports, ports and oil facilities.

Meanwhile, during a diplomatic visit to the United Kingdom’s University of Cambridge on Monday, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi called for a regional security framework, including a “non-aggression pact”, between the Gulf countries and Iran under which the United States would no longer be the primary provider of security.

While Gulf countries appear determined to avoid another round of conflict – which has already restricted passage through the Strait of Hormuz, disrupted global oil and gas supplies and wreaked havoc on energy facilities and infrastructure in Gulf states – questions remain over whether a regional agreement is possible and where it would leave relations between the US and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Regional security or de-escalation?

On Friday, US President Donald Trump repeated warnings that Washington may carry out another military operation against Iran as rising fuel prices weigh on the US midterm elections scheduled for November 3. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said Iran would respond more forcefully to any renewed US military action, stoking fears of an even wider escalation.

While this week’s talks in Tehran mark the first high-level ‌contact between Iran and the Mecca mutual defence pact nations since the US-Israel war on Iran began on February 28, reports suggest they have stopped short of landing an agreement.

Reuters reported that Qatari mediators ⁠presented ⁠Iran with a draft deal on Sunday, which Tehran was expected to respond to by the end of the week. On Wednesday, the news agency quoted Iranian officials as saying Qatar had put ‌forward ideas that were unacceptable and that Tehran would ⁠show ⁠no flexibility regarding the nuclear ‌issue.

Khaled Batarfi, a Saudi political analyst and academic, said the visit to Tehran indicated that Saudi Arabia was willing to give Iran a “last warning” and “submit to the region’s concerns”, but that Iran has so far refused.

“The gap is [wide] and what makes it worse is that there is no trust,” Batarfi told Al Jazeera.

Observers say diverging views are unlikely to turn the current diplomatic efforts into a lasting infrastructure. “It’s really hard to see a regional security framework coming out in the coming months or even years,” Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, an associate fellow at Chatham House in London, told Al Jazeera.

“What we are seeing is more small groups, flexible groups of countries that are taking the lead in trying to reach either bilateral or multilateral solutions,” the analyst said. “A regional security framework would need the same vision for the region, which is not necessarily shared… among the GCC countries themselves.”

Challenges ahead

Hamidreza Azizi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye share concerns that a prolonged confrontation between Iran and the US could further destabilise the region.

“The main obstacle remains the fundamental disagreement between Tehran and Washington over the sequence of commitments,” Azizi told Al Jazeera. “The US wants Iranian concessions, particularly on the nuclear issue, while Tehran insists that its conditions for ending the war must be met first.”

“Regional mediation could help bridge this gap, possibly through an interim arrangement, but the willingness of regional actors to facilitate an agreement does not necessarily mean that the two principal parties are prepared to make the necessary compromises,” he added.

As for a new security order, Azizi said regional countries do not share a common understanding of what it should look like and what role the US – which has so far been the GCC’s main security partner – would have left to play.

Iran has long advocated for a regional security architecture that would reduce or eliminate the US military presence. “Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, however, remain deeply integrated into the US security system, and there is little indication that they intend to abandon it,” Azizi said.

“The recent war has certainly raised questions about the reliability of American security guarantees, but this has encouraged these countries to diversify their security partnerships rather than fundamentally redefine their strategic alignments.”

Doha, Qatar – African countries are feeling the economic fallout from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, with rising fuel and fertiliser prices threatening to drive up food costs, according to trade ministers from the region and the United Nations’ top trade official.

The crisis around the Strait of Hormuz due to the United States and Israel’s war on Iran needs to be resolved “sooner rather than later”, Luz Maria de la Mora, director of the Division on International Trade and Commodities at UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), told Al Jazeera at the World Investment Forum on Monday. She warned that soaring fertiliser prices could affect harvests next year.

“Prices of fertilisers have risen dramatically … so many countries have decided to reduce the use of fertilisers, which will have an effect next year in terms of crops,” she said.

“It may have an effect on availability of food and prices of food.”

The US-Israel war on Iran has highlighted the world’s heavy reliance on the strategic waterway, through which one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade previously passed.

Against this backdrop, Doha hosted UNCTAD’s World Investment Forum on October 25 and 26, bringing together heads of state, policymakers, CEOs and investors to discuss global investment and sustainable development.

The Strait of Hormuz’s disruption has rippled through African economies. In Zimbabwe, rising fuel and fertiliser prices are a critical concern in a country where more than 70 percent of the population depends on agriculture, Monica Mutsvangwa, the country’s minister of women affairs, community, small and medium enterprise development, told Al Jazeera.

Uganda, another heavily agrarian economy, has also been hit, with fuel prices more than doubling, Sanjay Tanna, the country’s minister of trade, industry and cooperatives, told Al Jazeera.

The impact extends beyond the immediate cost of energy. Rising oil prices have disrupted supply chains, with effects lasting longer than anticipated, according to de la Mora.

“The effects are lasting longer than we would have expected or would have wanted,” she said.

‘Friend to all, enemy to none’

The shock has also exposed differences in how African economies weather global disruption.

Uganda’s reliance on subsistence farming has helped cushion the impact, with domestic food production offering some protection from international market volatility, said Tanna.

But the country has not been insulated from financial pressures: its currency has lost 10 percent of its value against the US dollar, the minister said. The Ugandan shilling has steadily declined since mid-2026.

For Zimbabwe, the crisis has reinforced the importance of attracting investment while maintaining economic ties across geopolitical divides.

Amid the simmering trade war between the US and China, Harare considers itself a potential partner to investors from either side, Mutsvangwa said.

“We are a friend to all and an enemy to none,” she said.

“Money has no color … If we get an investor who comes into our country, follows the rules and regulations of the country, makes his money, and Zimbabwe develops, that’s what we want.”

The official pointed to Zimbabwe’s deposits of more than 60 critical minerals, including lithium and graphite, as well as its tourism potential.

Trade in an unequal system

But attracting foreign capital remains a challenge for developing economies, with investment concentrated in a relatively small number of countries.

That concentration is “very understandable”, de la Mora said, arguing that investors need confidence that their money will generate returns.

“Capital is risk averse. Capital needs to have certainty that its investment is going to yield returns and it’s going to come to fruition,” she said.

Governments can help build that confidence through transparent institutions, the rule of law and investment in infrastructure, including reliable electricity, energy supplies and digital connectivity, she added.

The question of whether the international trading system treats all countries equally prompted a more blunt assessment from Uganda’s trade minister.

“Of course not,” said Tanna. “The world cannot be equal … It’s unfair, but we believe that, within the space that we are in, we are in a good space.”

Uganda was well placed for the future, he argued, because it produces its own food – an advantage at a time when international supply chains are under pressure.

For both Uganda and the Republic of Congo, building resilient economies also means investing in younger generations.

The Republic of Congo’s Deputy Prime Minister for Coordination, Development Infrastructure and Land Planning, Jean-Jacques Bouya, said the country had aligned its national development plan, Vision 2063, with the African Union’s broader development ambitions.

Connectivity – through electricity, digital infrastructure and physical links – is central to that strategy, he told Al Jazeera.

The Republic of Congo also wants to expand local processing so that more value from its natural resources remains within the country.

“Africa can no longer be a reservoir of raw materials, and neither can Congo – a place where raw materials are extracted, taken elsewhere, processed and then sold back to us at a much higher price. We cannot go on like this,” Bouya said.

Tehran, Iran – Ministers and senior security officials from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye – the three nations that signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement – are in Tehran to discuss regional security issues amid threats of new US strikes on Iran.

Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, Pakistani military chief Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin met Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and will discuss tensions with security chief Mohsen Rezaei.

The meetings are among the highest-profile dialogues held in Tehran in recent months. While there is still little information on what might be discussed, the meetings come amid a flurry of diplomatic activity to deal with a new escalation between the United States and Iran.

But analysts broadly believe the visit to Tehran by the three signatories of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, a regional defence alliance, will be enough to prevent a new outbreak in violence between the US and Iran.

“The Mecca pact’s 11th-hour visit to Tehran is an attempt to tip the balance in favour of those willing to compromise before the guns start blazing again,” said Ali Vaez, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at the International Crisis Group.

“But unless they arrive with a credible formula to bridge the US-Iran divide, they may find themselves with little more than goodwill in a race against the clock.”

The talks are expected to address the waves of missile and drone attacks carried out by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who are allied with Tehran, on Saudi Arabia, which supports Yemen’s internationally recognised government.

“I believe that parties to the Mecca agreement lack options of military engagement with the Houthis, but Riyadh is certainly asserting greater pressure for more, and its expectation of its partners has grown in parallel with the offensive from Yemen,” Ayesha Siddiqa, a senior research fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

But despite the collective security arrangement in the Mecca defence pact, Saudi Arabia’s allies Turkiye and Pakistan cannot “afford to commit troops on the ground” in Yemen, said Siddiqa.

The latest diplomatic push is likely linked to visits by Pakistani army chief Asim Munir to Saudi Arabia and Iran last week, Siddiqa said, and coincides with Islamabad’s restrictions on overland border trade with Tehran amid the US blockade on Iran.

Iranian authorities have said they favoured “security originating from within the region” as they prepared for the meetings.

Umer Karim, who researches Saudi foreign policy and its implications for regional security, said the Tehran meetings are unlikely to reduce the risk of a renewed war between Iran and the US, which would likely lead to more regional turmoil.

“Therefore, these talks perhaps are more concerned about the security of Saudi Arabia and involve an attempt by Turkiye and Pakistan to compel Iran to reach a compromise,” he told Al Jazeera.

US President Donald Trump is said to be considering new attacks to break the diplomatic deadlock with Iran, which has refused to agree to any peace agreement with Washington unless several of its demands are met.

The US and regional powers want international shipping and transit through the Strait of Hormuz to resume without impediments or attacks. Washington also wants to rein in Tehran’s nuclear programme and bring in international inspectors to assess Iran’s highly enriched uranium. Israel says it wants to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

Tehran wants to lift the US naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports, which has halted crude oil exports and disrupted most trade, and return to a memorandum of understanding agreed between the two countries in June.

The US has refused this, with President Trump saying he is left with a choice to “finish the job” by launching major strikes on Iran’s civilian infrastructure. This could prompt Iran to lash out at its neighbours, as it did earlier in the war with strikes on US bases in Arab states and infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the US Department of State issued an October 21 order for nonemergency US government employees and their family ⁠members to leave Saudi Arabia for their safety’s sake, given the Houthi threat.

As talks involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye continue in Iran, analysts say these Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signatories will likely try to minimise the impact on Saudi Arabia if war does break out again.

“However, since little has changed from an Iranian strategic calculus and the actors involved don’t have the kind of leverage needed to affect Iran’s strategic thinking, these negotiations are going to yield little,” Karim said.

Iran’s authorities are increasing investment in a campaign to arm and train civilians who would serve in the state security apparatus against domestic and foreign threats amid growing fears that fighting with the United States and Israel could resume imminently.

The public mobilisation drive – called Janfada, or “those who sacrifice their life” – was launched in late March at the peak of the war with the US and Israel. It has now spread to large parts of the country and is aiming to attract volunteer men and women. It has a stated focus on youth but is open to all ages.

At their numerous street booths and stations, representatives of the Basij militia of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other state bodies offer training on using weapons and other equipment to defend the government and its “revolutionary” values.

State-organised events and armed “exercises” linked with the mobilisation campaign have been held in Tehran, Isfahan, Zanjan, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Bojnord, Ahvaz and other big and small cities across many of Iran’s 31 provinces.

Ali Kowsari, Basij’s deputy for training, announced during a news conference this month that the IRGC wants to use at least 14 main squares across Tehran as training and equipment stations for Janfada volunteers. The goal is to use at least one to three squares in the capital city of every single province, he said, without divulging how many cities are currently being used as part of the campaign.

State-run nighttime events are sometimes held with rallies and motorcades during the day. A resident of Gilan province in northern Iran told Al Jazeera that people regularly see state-run stations on the streets in big and smaller cities across the province during their commutes.

“Sometimes they hold competitions to win some small prizes. They bring in live bullets, teach people how to load them into magazines, how to arm pistols and assault rifles, and how to aim and fire,” the resident said, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons.

“The organisers are mostly old men. Since the start of the war, they’ve gathered around the main square almost every night, also often playing revolutionary tunes and chanting from loudspeakers.”

In Gilan’s city of Rasht on October 15, residents objected to the noise and blocking of the street for the nighttime pro-government gathering. Videos circulating on social media showed a confrontation that escalated into a brawl although the authorities did not comment.

On Saturday, authorities cautioned residents in Alborz province’s Karaj near Tehran that they could expect explosions and loud noises from one of the Janfada exercises.

‘Revolutions are like riding a bicycle’

Last week, there was a big mobilisation campaign in northwestern Iran’s Kurdistan province, which borders Iraq.

The IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency characterised a procession in the provincial capital, Sanandaj, as an exercise in “unity” between the Shia and Sunni Muslim populations.

But a number of foreign-based Iranian human rights groups have characterised such armed mobilisation efforts as “intimidation” campaigns that are held months after January’s nationwide protests, during which thousands of civilians, including many young people, were killed from gunshots and stab wounds.

The government has acknowledged that protests took place in more than 400 counties across all provinces but describes them as a “coup” attempt wholly orchestrated by the US and Israel to overthrow the establishment. It also rejected findings by an independent United Nations fact-finding mission that said the authorities committed crimes against humanity while cracking down on the protests.

Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University in Qatar, said the US-Israeli war on Iran has “presented another opening for the more revolutionary elements of the Iranian body politic”.

“Revolutions are like riding a bicycle. To avoid a nasty fall, you must pedal hard. And this is precisely what the Janfadas and their leaders are trying to do – to remain relevant,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The Janfada’s training mobilisation also gives the more revolutionary-minded figures within the Iranian leadership a chance for choreographed displays of political and ideological loyalty to the revolution and its principles,” the professor said.

‘Siege mentality’

The government said 33 million Iranians have signed up on the campaign’s website but has provided no evidence to support this number.

It represents more than a third of the country’s population, or more than half of the over-12 population, men and women.

Earlier this year, foreign-based activists accessed the website’s source code, which showed that fewer than four million people had registered. Only a phone number was required for registration, and no national identification number was needed.

Speaking last week about the political goals of the campaign, Nematollah Bagheri, IRGC commander for the province of Lorestan, said: “The aim is to show that, just as the government supports the people, the people support the Islamic Republic and the Islamic revolution.”

Organisers said registrants could be used in future rescue operations and for social services and media and financial support. The government has also asked them to help ease the pressure of the US war, naval blockade and sanctions by consuming less fuel, electricity and other resources.

The establishment’s efforts to expand the campaign have only grown after nearly eight months of attritional war, which has killed thousands of people, made Iranians poorer and seen parts of the country’s civilian infrastructure destroyed.

Children have become a major focus for the campaign, and schools have increasingly been accommodating mobilisation. Last week, Education Minister Alireza Kazemi said the Basij militia was registering “student Janfadas” and had plans for more mobilisation and ceremonies involving children over the coming weeks.

Kamrava, the university professor, said this kind of mobilisation does not necessarily broaden the scope of the state’s legitimacy among the larger society.

“It does, however, serve to deepen the legitimacy that the state already has among its existing supporters. It reinforces belief in the revolution’s ideological and political mission and reifies the siege mentality that all revolutionaries have,” he said.

Speaking at the World Investment Forum in Doha, state minister says peace and security are essential for trade and investment prosperity.

Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Trade Affairs Ahmad bin Mohammed al-Sayed has called for greater international cooperation and economic stability, warning that trade and investment cannot flourish without peace and security.

Speaking at the United Nations-led World Investment Forum in Doha on Sunday, al-Sayed said geopolitical upheaval and growing economic fragmentation were threatening global investment prospects.

“The global economy is undergoing changes. There are geopolitical changes. These are all issues that redefine the landscape of global investment,” he said.

“We believe that investment in the future is related to investment in peace and security,” the minister added.

“Trade will prosper, and long-term investment will create its potential only with a safe and stable environment.”

Organised by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Investment Forum brings together heads of state, policymakers, CEOs and investors to discuss global investment, opportunities, challenges and sustainable development.

Al-Sayed’s remarks come as several conflicts continue to rage around the world, and with growing fears of an escalation in the US-Israel war on Iran in the coming weeks.

Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments, has been disrupted since the US and Israel launched the war on February 28. Iran responded by effectively blocking the strait and attacking targets across the region.

Prior to the war, one-fifth of the world’s traded oil and gas flowed through the strait.

In the past week, escalating attacks on shipping in the strait and uncertainty over diplomatic efforts to end the nearly eight-month war have led to a surge in oil prices, putting further pressure on the global economy.

On Thursday, oil prices climbed about 4 percent to a five-month high, with Brent futures crossing $113.17 a barrel.

‘Further cooperation, less isolation’

Al-Sayed stressed the need for predictable international rules and stronger economic partnerships at a time of heightened uncertainty.

“In our world, which is facing further uncertainty and economic fragmentation, our message stays clear. It is a call for further cooperation and less isolation, further cooperation and less division,” he said.

Iranian strikes on Qatar’s Ras Laffan industrial complex in March damaged facilities, with repairs expected to take several years.

The minister outlined Qatar’s efforts to strengthen supply chains, diversify economic partnerships and “open new markets for our exports”.

He said Qatar attracted 373 foreign direct investment projects in 2025, a 50 percent increase from the previous year, generating more than 15,000 jobs.

Qatar has also unveiled infrastructure projects worth $38.5bn over the next five years, alongside an anticipated $22.5bn in private sector investment in hospitality and real estate, al-Sayed added.

Tehran warns that even limited strikes would trigger a response ‘several times greater’.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has blamed Washington for the unravelling of an interim deal aimed at ending the war with the United States and Israel, amid growing fears that the fighting could resume imminently.

In comments broadcast by Iranian Press TV on Saturday, But Pezeshkian also said that both sides should return to the deal and “conclude it”.

His remarks come amid growing fears that military action could resume as soon as this weekend, after US President Donald Trump said on Friday that he “may do another little Epic Fury”, using the codename of the US-Israeli war against Iran that started on February 28.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has warned that even limited strikes would trigger a response “several times greater”, according to comments reported by the semi-official Fars News Agency.

Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ali Abdollahi said on Saturday that the US military would not be allowed in the Gulf “under any circumstances and at any time”. Abdollahi said Trump could only “dream” of seeing US forces enter the Gulf, adding that he would take his dream to the grave.

Trump has suggested he could take further military action against Iran, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he remains committed to overthrowing the country’s government.

Both leaders face elections, with Israelis set to choose their next government on Tuesday. Meanwhile, Trump’s Republican Party faces crucial midterm elections on November 3, with Democrats potentially winning control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Such an outcome would be a major blow to Trump, who still has more than two years left in his final term in the White House.

Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani said on Saturday that Tehran would not “wait for permission to defend itself”, adding that the country “seeks peace but will respond to any aggression with severe consequences”.

“Our position is clear: we do not flee from dialogue for peace, and we do not hesitate in defending the country. Those who harbour the illusion of destroying Iran must correct their calculations,” Mohajerani wrote in a memo.

Her comments came as Iranian judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei met Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. The pair discussed how to tackle corruption and pursue compensation for Iranians affected by the US-Israeli war, among other issues.

Khamenei replaced his father as supreme leader after the latter was assassinated during the opening strikes of the war on February 28. He has not been seen in public since assuming the position in early March.

Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was reported to have met Khamenei earlier this week.

Trump says the US is considering a possible attack on Iran as soon as Sunday, or it could reach a major deal with Tehran.

Global crude prices continue to climb, with Brent benchmark hitting $117.30 a barrel to build on four-year highs as market fears grow over a potential resumption of the US-Israeli war on Iran.

Oil prices have climbed towards their highest levels in five months as attacks on tankers in and around the Strait of Hormuz mount and efforts to end the United States-Israel war on Iran are deadlocked.

Brent crude, the international benchmark, rose by more than $2 to $110.85 a barrel on Wednesday, close to a five-month peak.

A day earlier, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said two tankers were “set ablaze” after hitting mines at what it called an illegal crossing point in the strait. Then, on Thursday, the IRGC said it hit seven more tankers although Washington dismissed the claim. In a statement, the IRGC said four of the vessels were transferring oil when they were targeted and caught fire overnight.

In September, the Houthis, an armed group also known as Ansar Allah (Arabic for Supporters of God), seized territory in Yemen close to the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a critical chokepoint into and out of the Red Sea and a gateway to Egypt’s Suez Canal.

The escalation came as the world’s emergency oil stocks, already tapped heavily since the Iran war began on February 28, sit at their lowest levels in decades.

Al Jazeera put a question to analysts: If fighting resumes in full, the Strait of Hormuz is shut off completely and Houthi attacks choke off Bab al-Mandeb, how long could the world’s reserves last?

Here’s what you need to know:

What emergency oil reserves are there?

Strategic oil reserves are stockpiles of crude oil and fuel held by governments or by companies on their behalf for use in a supply emergency.

The International Energy Agency (IEA), which was established in 1974 after the Arab oil embargo, coordinates most of them. Its importing members must hold at least 90 days of net imports. China and India are not members.

How much of the reserves has already been released this year?

A record amount.

On March 11, days after the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, the IEA’s 32 members agreed to make 400 million barrels available from emergency supplies, more than double the volume released after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The US pledged 172.2 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and Japan 79.8 million, according to IEA figures.

The SPR has since fallen to 283 million barrels, its lowest level since October 1982, according to the US Department of Energy.

Much of that oil was lent rather than sold and must be returned with extra barrels, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

How much oil is left?

Far less than before the war began in February, and not all of it can be used.

Aaron Kildow, a senior crude oil analyst at Sparta Commodities, told Al Jazeera that global strategic stocks excluding China and Iran have fallen by nearly 327 million barrels since the end of December 2025 with the US, Europe and Japan accounting for about 95 percent of the draw.

He estimated that leaves only about 400 million barrels of usable reserves worldwide, excluding China’s stockpile, which is unlikely to be exported, and Gulf stocks, which could be cut off by a total closure of Hormuz.

Nearly half of these available stocks are in Japan.

Europe has about 76 million barrels uncommitted, but members such as Germany are holding some back for a local emergency, Kildow said.

“Europe is the real wildcard, both on timing and willingness,” Kildow said.

Meanwhile, China’s onshore crude stocks stand at 1.13 billion barrels, down from 1.23 billion in late February but still enough for about 80 days of refinery intake, Muyu Xu, a senior crude oil analyst at the analytics firm Kpler, told Al Jazeera.

India’s reserves cover just eight days of its imports, the Reuters news agency reported.

What would a full closure of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb mean?

Before the war, about one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies, or roughly 20 million barrels of oil a day, passed through the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia has increased the amount of crude it transports from its oilfields in the east to its Red Sea port of Yanbu in the west via the East-West Pipeline, thereby bypassing Hormuz.

But there have been strikes on that pipeline, and tankers heading south from Yanbu must pass through Bab a-Mandeb, where the Iran-backed Houthis declared a blockade on Saudi shipping in July.

Only a confirmed 373,000 barrels a day of Saudi crude have transited Bab al-Mandeb so far this month, the lowest level since February, Xu said, with most Yanbu cargoes now heading north via Egypt instead.

If Hormuz were shut and the Houthis blocked all Saudi tankers, Gulf producers could export only through a few pipelines and Yanbu’s northbound route, Xu said.

That would leave about 7.5 million barrels a day of Middle Eastern crude, against 16.8 million now, a shortfall of about 9.3 million barrels a day, she estimated.

“If such attacks occur, the supply disruption could be even more severe and prolonged,” Xu said, referring to strikes on oilfields, terminals and pipelines.

So how long would reserves last?

Not for long – possibly just weeks, according to experts.

If Kpler’s estimated shortfall had to be covered entirely from the roughly 400 million usable barrels that Kildow identified, they could not, in practice, be released that fast. Japanese and South Korean reserves can move quickly, Kildow said, but US barrels are staged over three months, and Europe’s contribution is uncertain.

Chris Beauchamp, chief market analyst at IG Group, said the world was fortunate after the first closure. “The salient feature of March and beyond was how a crisis didn’t actually develop. We got away with it,” he said.

“I don’t think the global economy will be as lucky next time if there is a protracted conflict,” Beauchamp said. “A month or two is all we have.”

The world would not literally run out of oil. Instead, prices would rise until enough demand disappeared. “One hundred fifty dollars [per barrel] becomes a very distinct possibility, which then sees significant demand destruction,” Beauchamp said.

The sharpest squeeze would be on diesel, which is already nearly double the price of crude, the IEA said.

Refiners would compete for crude grades rich in diesel, “a cost that ultimately lands on consumers,” Kildow said.

Who would feel it first?

Asian importers with thin reserves.

Most Gulf exports in September and October went to Asian buyers, and India and Pakistan are among the most exposed, Kildow said, adding that their nearest alternative supply, from West Africa, is 25 to 28 days away by sea, compared with two days from Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates.

“The squeeze won’t hit uniformly. It lands fastest and hardest where reserves are thinnest and substitute supply is farthest away,” Kildow said.

Who would gain?

Oil producers far from the Gulf.

In the second quarter of this year, as the US-Iran war was under way, ExxonMobil reported earnings of $14.5bn, its highest in four years while Chevron posted $12bn, its best in six years and Shell more than doubled its earnings to nearly $10bn. Their profits are largely down to the high oil prices.

A second shock would send refiners scrambling for supplies from the US, Latin America, West Africa and Russia, Xu said.

“This would allow non-Middle Eastern producers to benefit from higher crude prices, potentially alongside lower transportation costs,” she said.

In August, US President Donald Trump said companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron were “making too much money based on a shortage”.

United States President Donald Trump has announced his official endorsement of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s election campaign after previously refusing to endorse anyone.

Trump posted on his Truth Social platform on Sunday that Netanyahu had been a “great warrior prime minister and an even greater partner for peace”, adding that Iran had been “systematically destroyed both militarily and financially, and unless they change their ways, rapidly, we will soon finish the job.”

“If Israel has the wrong Leader, which would be anyone other than Bibi, America will have to do this work ourselves, and I am not inclined to do so,” Trump wrote.

“Bibi Netanyahu has been Strong, Brave, and Brilliant in the face of tremendous opposition, including that coming from even Israel, itself. Despite all of that, he has endured and, in fact, he has thrived!”.

The president added that normal men and women would have “wilted” under the pressure that Netanyahu was under, but the Israeli prime minister “got stronger”.

“This is the kind of Partner that the United States of America is demanding of Israel, a Country for which it has done so much. Please let this Letter serve to represent my Complete and Total Endorsement of Bibi Netanyahu in his upcoming Race for Re-Election as Prime Minister of Israel. BIBI NETANYAHU WILL NEVER LET YOU DOWN!”, he added.

The Israeli election will be on October 27 . According to Israeli news outlet Haaretz’s tracker, as of Sunday, the opposition alliance led by the Yashar party of Gadi Eisenkot is expected to win the most seats, at 52, with Netanyahu’s Likud party-led coalition taking 51 of the 120 seats in the Knesset.

So far, no party is projected to secure an outright majority.

But Trump’s endorsement comes after he had previously shied away from fully backing Netanyahu’s election campaign.

Earlier this month, when asked twice by TIME magazine if Netanyahu should be given another term, Trump pivoted to his own popularity in Israel and Washington’s actions supporting Israel.

When asked on Thursday by the right-wing US news outlet, Newsmax, if he was planning to get involved in the Israeli elections,  Trump said: “They’d like me to be. Yeah, they’d like me to be”.

When asked whether he trusted Netanyahu, Trump replied, “I don’t trust anybody, honestly”.

Still, Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East North Africa programme at the British think tank Chatham House, explained that Trump’s endorsement of Netanyahu was “politically significant” because it comes after months of tension between the two leaders.

“It allows Netanyahu to reinforce his claim that he is indispensable to Israel’s relationship with Washington,” Vakil told Al Jazeera.

“However, its electoral impact should not be overstated. Israeli voters remain divided over Netanyahu’s leadership and the outcome of the Iran war. The endorsement may help consolidate his existing support, but it does not resolve the wider questions surrounding his record,” she added.

Andreas Krieg, senior lecturer at the school of security studies at King’s College London, said that Trump’s endorsement was a “political gift” to Netanyahu, whose electoral campaign is struggling.

But like Vakil, he cautioned against treating Trump’s endorsement as a game-changer.

“Netanyahu’s problems are structural, involving fragmented right-wing parties, disillusioned ultra-Orthodox voters and the legacy of October 7. Trump may mobilise reluctant Likud voters, potentially worth a seat or two in a close contest, but he cannot manufacture the coalition majority Netanyahu currently lacks,” Krieg told Al Jazeera.

What the endorsement means for the Iran war

Much of Trump’s endorsement has been heavily focused on the Iran war, at a time when many analysts suggest the US president might be looking to restart attacks, either before or after the midterm elections in early November.

The conflict, which began in February after the US and Israel launched attacks across Iran, is currently at a standstill.

The Strait of Hormuz, which once transported 20 percent of global crude, was effectively shut by Iran after the war started. A US naval blockade of Iranian vessels followed, as each country struck ships passing through the waterway that they accused of not complying with its orders. Oil traffic last month through the strait picked up to pre-war levels as the US Navy shepherded an increasing number of tankers. But a spate of Iranian attacks on vessels early this month has again hit crude exports through Hormuz.

On Monday morning, Brent crude futures stood at $107.57 a barrel, down slightly after reaching their highest since May 19 on Friday, when they briefly touched $110 a barrel.

Last month, Iran presented a proposal to Washington to reopen the waterway within seven days, but negotiations failed after the US did not address Tehran’s seven conditions, which included the lifting of sanctions and the ending of its naval blockade.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Iranian media outlets on Sunday that the proposal remained on the table and, if Washington accepts Tehran’s conditions, the strait could reopen within six days, with talks resuming the following day.

At the same time, Araghchi, in a post on X on Sunday night, accused Netanyahu of wanting to restart attacks on Iran with the US to “stay out of jail”.

“Last time you wanted to ‘finish the job’, Iran emerged even stronger. Want to try your luck again? Be our guest. But be careful; we have unfinished jobs too,” he wrote.

“Netanyahu is driving America into another war to stay out of jail, whatever the consequences for Israel – let alone POTUS,” he added.

Krieg said Trump was prioritising the use of “coercive leverage” through his endorsement of Netanyahu but not necessarily “war over diplomacy”. 

“The naval blockade is hurting Iran considerably and Washington believes time is working in its favour. Trump’s calculation is that Iran will eventually accept nuclear concessions and reopen Hormuz, without Washington having to offer significant concessions first,” he argued.

“His endorsement reinforces the military threat underpinning that strategy. But it does not mean diplomacy is finished. Trump still wants a deal he can present as a victory. The danger is that Tehran increasingly believes it must escalate to improve its bargaining position.”

What is next?

Vakil explained that, while Trump’s declaration of support for Netanyahu had signalled renewed political alignment with Israel and left the door open for future joint military action, it also makes it “harder for Trump to distance himself from the war or portray the US as having been reluctantly drawn into it”.

“He is explicitly taking ownership of the partnership and its military campaign against Iran. However, the endorsement does not necessarily mean that the two leaders have agreed on another operation, nor does it settle the question of who initially pushed hardest for war,” she said.

Vakil added that for Tehran, the statement will reinforce the belief of Iranian leaders that there is “little meaningful distinction between US and Israeli objectives.”

“At the same time, Trump’s suggestion that he is reluctant to confront Iran without Netanyahu could be interpreted as evidence of the limits of Washington’s appetite for another war.”

Meanwhile, while Trump has said that he would not attack Iran before the November midterms, several US media outlets have reported that the Pentagon has drawn up plans to relaunch attacks before voters head to the polls.

Last week, US news outlet Axios reported, citing both US and Israeli officials, that both Trump and Netanyahu had spoken about launching a major new operation against Iran ahead of the elections in both countries.

For Krieg, the likelihood that the US and Israel launch an attack on Iran remains low, assuming there is no Iranian strike that forces a response.

“The more dangerous window opens after November 3 [US midterms], when those electoral constraints disappear. Both militaries are preparing for that possibility. The greatest immediate risk is an uncontrolled escalation in Hormuz that forces Washington’s hand before either leader is politically ready,” he said.

Tehran, Iran – Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is due to meet with senior Iranian officials in Tehran to discuss the war with the United States and efforts to end it.

Lavrov landed in the Iranian capital on Monday afternoon on his first visit to Iran since February 2025. Moscow said the trip was part of efforts to ease months of tension, since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28. The Russian minister is scheduled to hold talks with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi later on Monday.

On Sunday, Lavrov was in Bahrain, which was heavily targeted by Iran during the war, to participate in a strategic dialogue session between Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

He was urged by GCC members to use Moscow’s influence with Tehran to press for “serious dialogue” and restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which has been severely disrupted by attacks on commercial vessels.

GCC chief Jasem Al-Budaiwi said member states had faced more than 7,000 Iranian missiles and drones since the start of the war.

In the council’s closing statement, the six Arab countries said they wanted Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, as well as its support for regional armed groups, to be included in future talks to end the war.

Nikita Smagin, an analyst and researcher on Iran and Russia’s role in the Middle East, said Lavrov’s trip reflects Moscow’s efforts to maintain working relations with all countries in the region.

He said Lavrov also wants to maintain Russia’s status as a mediator, despite the impact of the Ukraine war on its global reputation.

“The timing of visits to the Gulf monarchies and Iran, taking place almost simultaneously, is a deliberate signal: Moscow wants to show that it approaches relations with all these countries on broadly equal terms and is equally interested in cooperation with each of them,” Smagin said.

How does Russia fit in?

Lavrov told GCC ministers in Manama that the region was once again teetering on the brink of a full-scale war and Russia wanted to establish a regional architecture for “collective security”.

He said this could include combining initiatives from countries in the region, along with those put forward by Russia and China, with the aim of restoring maritime traffic and achieving lasting peace. The Russian foreign minister urged other regional states such as Iraq and Jordan, which have also been hit by Iranian strikes, to participate.

Lavrov expressed support for the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Iran and the US in June, which later collapsed, as a framework for reducing tension.

Iran has said it wants a return to that agreement, and for Washington to honour a finalised bilateral deal between Iran and Oman to manage territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. This has been opposed by the US, which has established its own route in the waterway for shipping.

Intelligence reports cited by US media said that Russia and China are providing military support to Iran in the form of satellite imagery for targeting purposes and components for weapons.

But US President Donald Trump contradicted those reports last week, saying Moscow and Beijing would have “too much to lose” if they helped Iran.

Washington has also issued sanctions waivers for Russia in a bid to lower fuel prices driven up by the war against Iran.

Mixed intentions

Russia’s position on the Iran war is somewhat unusual, said Smagin. It has a partial interest in the conflict continuing, as higher oil prices and the severe restrictions on Iranian oil reaching China all benefit Moscow.

“Russia and Iran have been competing primarily for the Chinese market, so China is now effectively forced to buy Russian oil at higher prices because Iranian supplies are largely unavailable,” he said.

Smagin added that Russia does not want the conflict to escalate further, as the consequences could be unpredictable, but its leverage over either Iran or the US to influence the course of the conflict remains limited.

Russia will continue to expand relations with Tehran, Smagin said, including through Caspian Sea trade, and limited military cooperation with Iran.

“These efforts appear to be aimed less at generating economic returns than at expanding Russia’s political influence over Iran and the course of events,” he said.

Military strikes by Iran and the US to wrest control of the waterway have continued, with the US midterm elections approaching on November 3 .

In comments to the media, Trump threatened to “soon finish the job” with Iran, to which Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi replied: “We have unfinished jobs too.”

Tehran, Iran – Mehrdad Akhlaghi Ketabchi has been appointed Iran’s defence minister at a time when the war with the United States is expected to escalate.

The 68-year-old was approved on Sunday by parliament, which has convened online since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran on February 28, to assume leadership of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics. In total, 237 lawmakers voted in favour of Akhlaghi’s appointment and 15 against.

Former Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh was killed along with a large number of other senior figures, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, on the opening day of the war.

The position was filled temporarily by Majid Ebn-e Reza, who will now become Akhlaghi’s deputy.

Akhlaghi will be responsible for rebuilding and expanding Iran’s military-industrial infrastructure, which has been heavily targeted by the US and Israel.

The new minister’s defence plans were approved earlier by senior military authorities, President Masoud Pezeshkian and parliament’s Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran will not be the instigator of aggression against any country but will defend the territorial integrity of the country strongly and to the death against any aggression,” Pezeshkian said.

The president said Akhlaghi has more than 42 years of experience in the Defence Ministry and related organisations.

His principal expertise is in ballistic missiles, solid-fuel propulsion, aerospace technology and military-industrial production, according to state media.

Previously, he served as the head of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, the Aerospace Industries Organization and the Defence Industries Organization. Akhlaghi and these entities are all subject to sanctions by the US. He is also under United Nations sanctions.

He has been associated with developing several missile types and related weapons-development projects over the past decades, according to Tasnim, a newspaper linked with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),

Akhlaghi reportedly played a role in expanding the major Sejjil and Zolfaghar family of Iranian ballistic missiles as well as precision-guided weapons, such as the Almas missiles and Yasin guided bombs.

He is also said to have expertise in space launchers, research rockets and infrastructure associated with the Imam Khomeini Space Center in Semnan. These have all been critical elements in Iran’s wars against Israel and the US.

This month, Iran’s Defence Ministry spokesman, Brigadier General Reza Talaei-Nik, told reporters that Akhlaghi’s nomination reflected Iran’s need to increase the quantity and quality of strategic weapons, particularly missiles and drones.

“Offensive arms are being actively improved,” the spokesman said.

The US has repeatedly claimed that it has destroyed most of Iran’s military-industrial capacities, but Tehran has maintained it continues to have considerable offensive and defensive capabilities outside the reach of US and Israeli bombs. These weapons have been upgraded based on Iran’s new war experience, it has insisted.

Akhlaghi told members of parliament this month that he had met with senior military commanders, including the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, to develop a better understanding of their requirements during and after the war.

His priorities as defence minister would be faster military-industrial development, air defences, incorporation of emerging technologies using government and private sector firms, improvements in armed-forces welfare and development of international military cooperation, according to reports.

In his first comments as defence minister on Sunday, Akhlaghi taunted the administration of US President Donald Trump, which this month threatened to use the “mother of all bombs” on Iran’s nuclear and energy infrastructure.

“We have made preparations and continue our work with ease of mind,” he told reporters. “The US president must think of getting his forces out of our region in one piece. If he drops one bomb, he must see how many of his troops he will have to evacuate horizontally.”

Since the start of the war, there have been several negotiation initiatives between the United States and Iran. Only one – the memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad on June 18 – was concluded, but it collapsed within days.

While prevailing analyses tend to explain this failure through the details of the provisions, this article proceeds from a different premise: that the diplomatic stalemate between the two sides is shaped by a syndrome that has governed US-Iranian relations for years.

In international relations, psychological syndromes can arise as a result of deep crises that leave their mark on political consciousness and memory, potentially obstructing efforts at rapprochement and negotiation between countries.

In the case of Iran and the US, the syndrome is comprised of two complexes: the complex Washington developed as a result of the 1979 siege of the US embassy in Tehran and the complex Tehran developed as a result of historical US hostility and its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018.

The roots of the rupture between the two countries go as far back as August 1953 when US and British intelligence agencies helped overthrow the nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddegh after it nationalised the oil industry in 1951. Since then, a perception has become entrenched in Iranian consciousness: that Washington does not accept an independent government in Tehran and it is prepared to sabotage it if it goes against its interests.

From this perspective, Washington’s decision to host Shah Reza Pahlavi, who had just been overthrown by his people, for medical treatment in October 1979 was read in revolutionary Tehran as a prelude to a second coup.

Iranian students stormed the US embassy on November 4 that year and held 52 Americans for 444 days. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed and have not been restored to this day.

While the incident is portrayed in the Iranian narrative as a defence of the revolution, in American consciousness, it established the image of Iran as a state that does not respect international norms, whose word cannot be relied upon and whose behaviour should not be rewarded.

That is the embassy siege complex. It is not about the incident itself so much as the informal rule it produced in US decision-making: that Iran must concede first and its concession must be verified before it receives anything in return.

The Iranian complex was shaped by this history as well, but it reached its peak in May 2018 when US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) confirmation that Tehran was complying with it.

Just two weeks later, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced 12 demands for a new deal, only four of which were related to the nuclear file. Seven of them were related to Iran’s regional behaviour in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Gulf. In other words, Washington did not merely revoke an existing agreement; it also raised the ceiling of its conditions for any future agreement.

The knot then deepened in June 2025 when the US took part in the Twelve-Day War and struck the nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan at a time when a new round of indirect negotiations was scheduled in Muscat. It then reached its furthest point with Washington’s participation alongside Israel in the current war.

Accordingly, a conviction became entrenched in the Iranian consciousness that an American signature guarantees nothing, that any agreement can be overturned with a change of administration and indeed that negotiation itself may be a cover for war rather than an alternative to it.

The informal rule this has produced in Iranian decision-making is that there will be no step taken before binding guarantees and no concession before pressure is lifted.

Thus, the two complexes stand at opposite ends: The first requires Iranian action before an American quid pro quo while the second requires an American guarantee before Iranian action.

A reading of the recent negotiation initiatives shows that every US initiative bears the imprint of the embassy siege complex. The 15-point plan put forward in March demanded the dismantling of the Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow facilities; an end to uranium enrichment; the suspension of Iran’s missile programme; and the abandonment of its allies in exchange for promises to lift sanctions later.

The May draft by White House envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner linked the release of Iran’s frozen funds to the suspension of enrichment first. The American response in September also stipulated the freezing of enrichment and the entry of inspectors throughout the negotiation period.

What remains constant in the American initiatives is that Iranian action precedes the quid pro quo and verification precedes trust.

The imprint of the JCPOA withdrawal complex in the Iranian initiatives is also a constant. The five-point response in late March demanded guarantees that war would not be repeated. The 10 points put forward in April demanded a binding UN Security Council resolution shielding any agreement from being overturned. And the 14 points in May demanded a nonaggression pledge that includes Israel.

Meanwhile, the seven-day plan proposed by Tehran last month stipulated the lifting of sanctions and the US naval blockade on Iran before the opening of the Strait of Hormuz on the sixth day and the start of nuclear negotiations on the seventh. What remains constant in the Iranian initiatives is that guarantees precede action and the lifting of pressure precedes Iranian concessions.

All these initiatives were dialogue between two complexes with each side drafting its text to protect itself from a repetition of its historical experience with the other, rather than to meet the other halfway. This may explain why the gap in substance has narrowed, but the gap in trust has not.

The Islamabad memorandum represents the exception that proves the rule as it was the closest moment to a settlement because it was formulated to reassure both sides over their core concerns. To reassure Washington, it stipulated the dilution of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and made the lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of funds conditional on Iranian implementation.

To reassure Tehran, it provided for an end to hostilities, respect for mutual sovereignty, a mechanism to monitor implementation and UN Security Council approval of the final agreement. Ballistic missiles were also entirely absent from the text.

But this agreement did not hold. Tehran suspended its participation in the Geneva round of talks because of the absence of a ceasefire in Lebanon, which had been a consistent demand in every Iranian initiative since March. In the Iranian reading, Washington’s inability to rein in Israel confirmed that an American signature was not enough. The JCPOA withdrawal complex immediately kicked in, and the two sides returned to square one.

By late September, the dispute appeared to have shifted definitively from substance to sequencing. Informed sources indicated that it now revolves around the order of steps rather than their content and the stated goal has become a return to an enhanced version of the June memorandum.

Here the two complexes appear in their clearest form: Washington wants the Strait of Hormuz opened and enrichment frozen first because it does not trust Iran while Tehran wants the naval blockade lifted first because it does not trust the US.

A comparison between Pompeo’s 2018 conditions and the June 2026 memorandum shows that US demands have retreated from redefining Iran’s regional role to focusing on the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz while Iranian demands have shifted from compensation to be paid by Washington to a conditional investment fund financed by other parties.

In other words, the substantive gap between the two sides has narrowed considerably – something that would have been unimaginable eight years ago.

However, the two complexes have not diminished; indeed, they may have deepened because of the war. Each complex feeds the other until together they have become a single syndrome, and diplomatic deadlock has turned from a passing condition into a stable structure.

Accordingly, any new formula for sequencing the steps, however precise, will remain unable to break this deadlock unless it addresses both complexes at once – something that requires a third party capable of guaranteeing both the action and the reciprocal action simultaneously.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Fires reported on three tankers in Strait of Hormuz and Sea of Oman, as masked settlers attack European politicians in occupied West Bank.

The UK Foreign Office says it advises against “all but essential travel” to Saudi Arabia, after attacks by Yemen’s Houthis on the country.

United States President Donald Trump has for the first time explicitly ruled out the use of a nuclear weapon against Iran, but has not denied US media reports that his administration is considering deploying the US’s most lethal non-nuclear munition, nicknamed the “mother of all bombs” in the near future.

In an interview published on Thursday by right-wing American news site Newsmax, Trump suggested he does not plan to use nuclear weapons, but also clarified that the devastating aerial weapon, the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb (MOAB – ‘mother of all bombs ) “is not nuclear”.

“I wouldn’t use nuclear. We don’t have to. We’re the greatest nuclear power in the world,” he told Newsmax.

The comments marked Trump’s first definitive statement on the nuclear topic following speculation about a possible atomic conflict earlier in the US and Israel’s war on Iran. They also appeared to confirm speculation that another phase of the war is imminent, likely after the US midterm elections on November 3.

Here’s what we know:

What did Trump say?

Trump told Newsmax that the US might indeed launch another strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, particularly on Pickaxe Mountain, where Tehran is believed to be hiding a nuclear facility deep under layers of granite.

He ruled out using a nuclear weapon or a tactical nuclear weapon.

“I wouldn’t use nuclear. We don’t have to. We’re the greatest nuclear power in the world,” he said.

He also clarified that the MOAB, which CNN reported the US government is considering using, “is not nuclear”.

Responding to a question about whether the MOAB is “tactical nuclear” – meaning smaller nuclear munitions – Trump reiterated that it is not.

“Well, the mother of all bombs is not nuclear,” Trump said. “It’s not nuclear at all. This is just an extremely large bomb.”

Trump declined to say whether he had authorised its use in Iran.

Trump also suggested renewed attacks are likely in the near future. The US cannot end the war now because it has to ensure Iran cannot produce a nuclear weapon, he argued, saying he believes that “if they had it, they would use it, in my opinion, instantaneously”.

Trump also reiterated that the war would end “very soon” whether by force or diplomacy and that oil prices would then drop.

When asked if he would put “troops on the ground”, Trump said: “No, I don’t see that, I don’t see it.” Earlier in the war, Trump had made comments regarding sending in troops, a move analysts said would be devastating for US soldiers because of Iran’s mountainous territory.

What is the ‘mother of all bombs’?

The MOAB carries a massive payload of about 8,500kg (18,000 pounds or 8.5 tonnes) of high explosives. It weighs 9,800kg (21,605 pounds or nearly 10 tonnes) – about the same as four cars – and is just over nine metres (about 30 feet) long. Stealth bombers are too small to carry it, so it has to be deployed by larger, Lockheed C-130 Hercules transporters.

It is designed to explode a few metres above the ground, sending out intense fireballs that can blast buildings and other hard-surface structures within a 1km radius, experts have told Al Jazeera. It is so powerful that a mushroom cloud from its blast has been seen 32km (20 miles) away in tests, the US Air Force has said.

“Its large explosive charge can produce devastating blast effects against exposed personnel, equipment and vulnerable structures,” Brussels-based military and weapons analyst Elijah Magnier said. “Its purpose is to generate an exceptionally powerful blast across a surface area.”

However, Magnier said there is doubt about whether using the massive surface explosive would be effective against deeply buried nuclear installations in Iran. He added that the terrain in Iran could be difficult for larger cargo aircraft to access.

What has Trump previously said about nuclear weapons?

Trump has never explicitly mentioned using a nuclear weapon, but he has also never ruled it out.

Speculation regarding whether Washington might use nuclear weapons was rife in the early days of the conflict, largely because of the extreme nature of Trump’s numerous threats against Tehran.

In April, for example, as Iran enforced a blockade on ships in the Strait of Hormuz, Trump posted on his Truth Social site that “…a whole civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again”, if Iran did not agree to a peace deal and reopen the strait.

He also threatened to destroy Iran’s infrastructure, saying a bombing campaign “will be Power Plant Day and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one”, in Iran.

Experts widely interpreted his statements as a threat of nuclear destruction, but one that still failed to force Iran to the table.

Although Trump largely moved away from his sabre-rattling rhetoric in the following weeks, he reiterated at the United Nations General Assembly in New York last month that he could “annihilate” Iran. He also told the assembly that he believed a deal would emerge after the midterms.

What is a ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon?

“Tactical” nuclear weapons (TNW) are smaller nuclear munitions designed for the battlefield as opposed to strategic nuclear munitions designed for mass destruction.

Some perceive TNWs as having a lesser impact than an atomic bomb, but experts warn that their names are misleading and they can nevertheless be devastating. Their explosive yield, between 0.3 and 50 kilotons, can impact areas within a 500-600km radius.

The US dropped a 15-kiloton nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, meaning that weapon would today be considered a TNW. The US, North Korea and Russia have TNWs in their arsenals, although no country has ever used them. TNWs are not subject to any international treaties and are largely unregulated.

What might another US attack on Iran look like?

With Trump failing to rule out dropping the MOAB, analysts speculate that the US might launch another – perhaps final – intensive bombing campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear and defence sites, particularly Pickaxe Mountain.

The US could also continue its naval blockade on Iranian ports, while providing escorts for commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran has vowed to respond to escalatory strikes by targeting oil and digital infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf states.

Senior defence officials have also warned that Iran will invade its neighbours if the US launches a ground operation, although Trump appears to have ruled that out.

Earlier in the war, he hinted at the possibility of sending ground forces to retrieve some 400kg of “yellowcake” – highly enriched uranium that Washington and Israel claim Tehran has hidden underground.

Trump’s phone calls in March to Kurdish militia groups fighting Iran provoked speculation that Washington could coordinate with them for an invasion, although that did not happen.

The United States has developed plans to strike Iran with the largest non-nuclear bomb in its military arsenal on Iran’s energy infrastructure and nuclear sites if President Donald Trump orders renewed combat operations, according to US officials cited by CNN.

Deploying the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb (MOAB), nicknamed the “mother of all bombs”, could significantly escalate the ongoing conflict at a time when fighting has lulled, experts say.

Concerns are also being raised, including within the Trump administration itself, over what such a move would even achieve. Officials familiar with military planning discussions told US news outlet CNN and Al Jazeera that deploying the MOAB would be unlikely to help the US achieve its stated strategic goals, including to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Brussels-based military expert Elijah Magnier told Al Jazeera that using the MOAB would not even guarantee the destruction of Iran’s deeply buried underground nuclear installations and that such a strike would likely amount to little more than “political theatre”.

Here’s what we know:

What is the MOAB?

The GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb (MOAB) is a massive munition containing about 8,500kg (18,000 pounds or 8.5 tonnes) of high explosives. It weighs 9,800kg (21,605 pounds or nearly 10 tonnes) – about the same as four saloon cars – and is as long as a small yacht at just over 9 metres (about 30 feet).

The MOAB is typically deployed from the Lockheed C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft because it cannot fit in a stealth bomber.

The bomb, which was first manufactured between 2002 and 2003, has undergone 12 detonation tests.

Its name is a reference to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s comments during the 1991 Gulf War when he invoked the “mother of all battles”.

The US has only deployed the MOAB once before – during its 2017 attacks on an Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) cave and tunnel complex in Afghanistan. Afghan authorities claimed that while 94 Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) fighters were killed in the blast, no civilians were hurt. However, there were unconfirmed, local reports of civilian casualties and many homes were destroyed.

What is the ‘mother of all bombs’?

The GBU-43/B, the US’s most powerful non-nuclear bomb, was used once, against Islamic State-Khorasan…

GBU-43/B

Pallet is deployed from rear cargo door of MC-130H or C-17aircraft.

1. Released from the aircraft.

2. Cradle separates; GPS and fins guide it.

3. H6 explosives detonate.

4. A powerful shockwave spreads.

5. Hot gases, smoke and debris rise in a mushroom cloud.

1 of 4

What kind of damage can it cause?

Designed to explode a few feet above the ground, the MOAB sends out lethal waves of fire when it detonates, blasting away buildings, cave openings and other hard-surface structures.

“Its purpose is to generate an exceptionally powerful blast across a surface area,” Magnier said.

Military expert Colonel Nidal Abu Zeid told Al Jazeera the bomb does not require impact in order to detonate and that its massive blast will destroy everything above ground within a 1km (0.6-mile) radius.

It is likely that the US would aim to use the high-explosive MOAB to completely destroy Iran’s ground-force positions above ground, and to reach its underground facilities, including Pickaxe Mountain, which Trump has previously threatened to attack, Abu Zeid said.

However, Magnier said the bomb’s radius and level of destruction would depend greatly on the terrain it is used within and how populated the area is. He added that it may not be particularly effective against targets buried deep underground.

Some of Iran’s nuclear sites which the US may wish to target, such as the Fordow complex and an under-construction site at the Pickaxe Mountain, are heavily fortified and deeply buried.

“Its large explosive charge can produce devastating blast effects against exposed personnel, equipment and vulnerable structures,” Magnier said. “The Afghanistan operation demonstrates its intended application against a cave-and-tunnel position; it does not demonstrate an ability to destroy every kind of underground installation.”

While its blast can reach underground, the MOAB is not especially designed to punch through deep concrete or mountain rock in the way that a “bunker buster” bomb is. The US military’s most powerful bunker buster is the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator. Weighing about 30,000 pounds (13,600kg), including a 2,700kg (6,000 pound) warhead, this precision-guided bomb is made of high-strength steel and built to penetrate up to 200 feet (61 metres) underground before exploding.

Would the US really use an MOAB?

It already has done – in Afghanistan in 2017.

However, besides not being guaranteed to hit underground targets effectively, Magnier told Al Jazeera it could be difficult to deploy the necessary aircraft in the regions of Iran where nuclear sites are located. Stealth bombers which are better suited to this terrain are not able to carry this size of bomb.

Using the bomb could also destroy infrastructure without inducing Iran to make any concessions, he added, noting that its deployment would risk turning “a spectacular event” into one that ultimately delivers few political results for Washington.

“The question I would put to any commander advocating its use is straightforward: What will this weapon accomplish that another available weapon cannot, and how will that result advance an achievable political settlement?,” Magnier said.

“If the answer centres on the spectacle of the explosion, the proposal is stronger as political theatre than as military strategy,” he added.

CNN reported that Trump, in private discussions, has been seeking a “definitive” end to the war that will prove Washington has been undefeated.

How might Iran respond?

A MOAB strike would likely prompt a major reaction from Iran, experts say, warning that Tehran could even invade its neighbours who host US military assets in response.

Iranian security officials have for months made comments regarding a possible invasion of countries like Kuwait to capture US troops and force Washington to surrender.

In May, during a pause in hostilities, Kuwait alleged that sailors from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) infiltrated its Bubiyan Island, leading to an exchange of fire between Iranian and Kuwaiti forces. One Kuwaiti was injured and four Iranian soldiers were captured.

Iran denied that it had invaded the island and said the troops’ navigation system had malfunctioned.

On Tuesday, IRGC security adviser Mohammad Reza Naghdi warned that Iran could capture troops if Washington were to launch ground attacks, although military experts have long dismissed Trump’s earlier threats of an invasion due to Iran’s mountainous terrain.

“If the United States launches a ground attack, so many of its troops will be captured that it will be forced to raise the white flag,” he said.

Experts say Iran has been preparing for another round of war by stockpiling weapons, fortifying key nuclear and defence locations, and rallying its supporters.

In a television broadcast on Sunday, National Security Council chief Mohsen Rezaei threatened that Iran would attack regional digital infrastructure, including communication cables, data centres and artificial intelligence facilities in the United Arab Emirates and others, if American strikes resume.

Oil prices gain as Houthi strikes hit Saudi Aramco and Tehran vows new tactics against shipping in Hormuz.

US President Donald Trump has accused Houthi rebels of targeting Saudi infrastructure to inflate energy prices before the US midterm elections.

Saudi-led coalition spokesperson Turki al-Maliki says forces intercepted and destroyed two Houthi ballistic missiles targeting Khamis Mushait airbase.

As the United States maintains a naval blockade of Iran’s ports and imposes more sanctions on its oil exports, Tehran is confronting another problem: billions of dollars in revenue from previous oil sales that it says have gone missing.

A spokesperson for Iran’s judiciary said in September that a network of oil intermediaries known as “trustees” owed the Iranian government between 10 billion euros ($11bn) and 11 billion euros ($12bn). That figure was equivalent to half of the total oil revenue projected in Iran’s government budget for the current fiscal year.

US officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, have tied Iran’s struggles to access oil revenues as evidence that its economic pressure campaign is having an effect. In August, Bessent said that “Iran’s shadow banking system was buckling” under pressure from the US campaign against the country, which has been ramped up as Washington seeks a way to force Tehran to capitulate in the war between the two countries, launched by the US and Israel in late February.

So who are the oil intermediaries, why does Iran depend on them, and what has happened to the billions of dollars they owe? Let’s take a closer look.

The debt, and the crisis it has created for the Iranian government, both stem from an oil-sales arrangement Tehran adopted in 2012 in response to US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports.

American and European sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales and revenue collection began in 2012. The stated rationale behind both sets of measures was that revenue from oil sales helped finance Iran’s nuclear programme and that restricting Iranian oil exports could prevent the programme from advancing.

In response, the Iranian government devised a way to circumvent international sanctions on its oil sales. Unable to sell oil through the Oil Ministry and receive the proceeds through the Central Bank, it began selling oil to domestic buyers or using it to settle outstanding obligations to institutions and organisations owed money by the state.

This arrangement gave rise to a network of oil intermediaries often referred to in Iran as the “trustee network”. Rather than selling all its oil through official government channels, the state entrusted crude oil to institutions, individuals and companies to sell on its behalf. The proceeds were supposed to be transferred to the government’s treasury, with the sellers or recipient institutions subsequently recovering their agreed costs and outstanding claims. Some institutions sold the oil themselves, while others contracted private trading companies to handle the sales.

The Oil Industry Pension Fund, established for retired Oil Ministry employees familiar with the oil-sales process, was among the first institutions to receive crude oil for sale. Other recipients included Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Base, a major hub for large-scale infrastructure projects. Even the municipal police received payments owed to them by the government in the form of crude oil.

Effect of the nuclear deal

Even in those early experiments, discrepancies emerged between the revenue expected from oil sales and the amounts sellers actually deposited into the government’s treasury. These discrepancies eventually gave rise to some of Iran’s largest economic corruption cases.

The accounting discrepancies and the government’s inability to recover money from private sellers entrusted with Iranian oil persisted until 2016, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal was signed and when sanctions on Iranian oil sales were lifted. The government was subsequently able to regain control over oil sales.

Individuals who had sold Iranian oil but failed to return the proceeds were imprisoned. With the ability to sell oil again through legal and transparent channels, the government was able, for a time, to manage its oil revenues and spending with greater control.

How did money from oil sales go unreturned?

After US President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 during his first presidential term, the Iranian government once again had to rely on private oil traders to sell its oil. But the problems associated with selling oil through intermediaries rather than official state channels, including delays in returning revenues, accounting discrepancies, debts owed by oil sellers to the government, and the occasional seizure of Iranian oil shipments at sea, once again constrained the government’s ability to manage its oil revenues.

Moreover, the US expanded its sanctions beyond Iranian government institutions and interests, adding bank accounts involved in transactions with the Iranian government, currency-exchange offices, companies, and individuals to its sanctions lists. As a result, the time between individuals participating in Iran’s oil-trading network and being sanctioned themselves, along with their assets and companies, and having their accounts blocked or frozen grew progressively shorter.

This contributed to an accumulation of debts owed by sanctioned oil traders – no longer able to access their accounts – to the government. It also left Iran with little choice but to expand its private oil-sales network. That meant increasing the number of people involved in trading Iranian oil, reducing the volume of oil allocated to each individual or company and, ultimately, increasing the risk that the proceeds would not be returned.

Iranian officials have also accused trustees of exploiting the sanctions workarounds to enrich themselves.

The billions of dollars owed by private oil sellers to the Iranian government are a combination of outstanding payments, disputed financial obligations and allegations of corruption. Iran’s judiciary chief recently addressed the issue, warning that oil sellers who refuse to return the proceeds from oil sales will face legal action. But such warnings do not change the sanctions environment or remove the obstacles that prevent some oil sellers from returning the money.